

Report Title	Two incidents involving track workers between Clapham Junction and Earlsfield	
Report Number	03/2012	
Date of Incident	08/03/2011	

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
03/2012/01	Implemented	White	The purpose of this recommendation is to reduce the potential for unsafe actions to be	Network Rail has carried out a
'	by alternative		taken by a COSS when required to carry out unplanned work in unfamiliar and complex	review in response to this
	means		situations.	recommendation and has
				reported that it intends to
			Network Rail should review and, if necessary, revise the arrangements for unplanned /	generate further information
			emergency work (paragraphs 123a and 123b) to reduce the potential for:	about sharing line blockages in
				emergencies for inclusion in new
			a. confusion when attempting to apply the rules for working in a possession but	training material. In addition
			outside a work site (paragraph 125a); and	Network Rail is implementing a
				programme to enhance COSS
			b. confusion when sharing line blockages (paragraph 126a).	competence. At this stage it is not
				proposing to clarify and simplify
			Options for consideration should include:	the rules for working in a
				possession. However, all such
			I simplification of the rules, and / or improved COSS training, relating to working in a	rules are to be assessed as part of
			possession but outside a work site;	a review of track worker safety
				linked to the introduction of the
			I means to control the risk associated with a COSS planning the system of work in	new Safe Work Leader role.
			unfamiliar and complex situations (such as restricting the definition of an 'emergency	While recognising the changes
			situation' or by introducing additional checks on the proposed system of work);	that are planned, the RAIB
				continues to urge Network Rail to
			I a review of the risk of shared line blockages for unplanned works and the	consider the clarity of the rules
			identification of alternative approaches; and	that will apply when working
				inside a possession but outside
			I adoption of situational risk assessments to inform decision making in unfamiliar and	an individual work site.
			complex situations (such as the 'Take Time' process being trialled by the Wessex	
			Route).	



03/2012/02	Implemented by alternative means	None	The purpose of this recommendation is to reduce the pressure on an engineering supervisor and / or COSS when there is an unplanned interruption to the normal passage of trains, due to a possession overrun or the need for emergency engineering access.  Network Rail should develop a set of proposals for managing the pressures related to train performance on those responsible for setting up protection arrangements for access to the railway in unplanned and / or emergency situations (paragraph 124a). This might include (but should not be limited to):  a. improving the mutual understanding of the challenges faced by shift leaders in maintenance delivery units and incident controllers at route control centres, for example by providing regular experience of working in each others' environments;  b. a suitable briefing to remind trackside staff, as well as route controllers, that trackside staff themselves should decide the most appropriate protection arrangements for carrying out emergency work; and  c. the provision of clear protocols on communication and co-ordination arrangements in situations where pressure may arise particularly where performance may conflict	Network Rail has informed the ORR that it is intending to address recommendation 2 by enhancing COSS non technical skills, leadership conversations and training in site safety.
03/2012/03	Implemented	None	with safety.  The purpose of this recommendation is to determine whether, following the proposed changes to Assessment in the Line, the workload of Track Section Managers is reasonable. If necessary, the role should be restructured to strengthen the supervision of staff competence.  Network Rail should review the workload of Track Section Managers, to determine whether it is reasonable, taking account of the changes which are due to be introduced in 2012 as part of the 'Assessment in the Line review project'. This review should include the requirement to manage technical, managerial and administrative tasks; specific attention should be given to the work associated with the management of staff competence and on-site surveillance. If this review identifies that the workload of the role is unreasonable following the proposed changes, practical steps should be taken	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.



			to restructure responsibilities to improve the delivery of safety-related activities (paragraph 125b).	
03/2012/04	Progressing	None	The purpose of this recommendation is to improve the competence of track maintenance staff in safety-critical roles, particularly when exposed to situations with which they are unfamiliar.	Network Rail has carried out a review of training and competence arrangements. It is proposing to address the
			Network Rail should review the adequacy of training and assessment of track maintenance staff to deliver practical competence, particularly in skills or situations which are encountered infrequently (paragraph 125b). Where necessary, improvements should be made to enhance current processes. Consideration should be given to:	underlying issue of maintaining staff competence in rarely-experienced situations (which this recommendation addressed) by placing more emphasis on the general competence of the
			a. the extent to which it is appropriate to have detailed and complex rules for responding to infrequently-encountered situations;	individuals rather than by assuming that training alone is enough to equip any individual
			b. methods of providing experience in situations which an individual may encounter infrequently;	with the necessary skills. RAIB is currently awaiting an update by ORR
			c. identifying methods of assessment for situations which it is unlikely a line manager would normally be able to observe;	,
			d. reassessing safety-critical competences when there are significant changes in an individual's work pattern, eg changing from day patrolling to planned maintenance work on permanent night shifts; and	
			e. reinforcing the need for regular face-to-face reviews of staff performance and competence by line managers.	
03/2012/05	Implemented	None	The purpose of this recommendation is to increase the likelihood that a signaller will be correctly informed that an ESR has been implemented by an appropriate person.	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions to address this recommendation by updating its
			Network Rail should amend its company standards to clarify who is responsible for informing the signaller that the equipment for an emergency speed restriction has been set up, and that it is no longer necessary to caution trains (paragraph 126b).	standard NR/L3/SIG/MGO110. The RAIB has noted improvements in the control of the relevant standard



	that clarifies the responsibilities of the person initiating an emergency speed restriction.
	ORR proposes to take no further action.