Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment of freight train at Carrbridge, Badenoch & Strathspey

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.


The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB
means:	during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being
	delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is
	in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.

Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the
	recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
1 04/01/2010 03/2011 Derailment of freight train at Carrbridge, Badenoch & Strathspey Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to improve the effectiveness of the existing running brake test undertaken in snow in detecting or preventing any reduction in the brake forces available to a train when it is climbing steep gradients. Freight operating companies, in conjunction with the Rail Safety and Standards Board, should make a proposal to review module TW1 of the Rule Book in order to establish if additional measures (such as bringing trains to a stand when starting to descend from summits) are required for trains working on steep gradients when snow is falling or being disturbed. The requirements and guidance within DB Schenker's special operating advice notices for working in extreme weather conditions and the Rail Freight Operations Group's code of practice for operating freight services in winter should be examined for their suitability as a basis for these additional requirements (paragraphs 211a, 211b, 212c and 216a).	Freight operating companies, in conjunction with the Rail Safety and Standards Board, have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
2 04/01/2010 03/2011 Derailment of freight train at Carrbridge, Badenoch & Strathspey Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that risks to safety on steep gradients during periods of falling or disturbed snow are assessed and that appropriate control measures are considered in advance of adverse weather. It is also intended to extend the current use of line-side snow signs to other sites assessed as requiring such additional risk control measures. Network Rail, in consultation with train operators, should assess any lines which include steep gradients in order to establish if additional risk control measures (such as bringing trains to a stand prior to descending from summits) may be required during periods when snow is falling or being disturbed by the passage of trains. Any steep gradients assessed as requiring additional risk control measures in these conditions should be designated in the appropriate sectional appendix and marked by the use of lineside snow signs (paragraphs 211a, 211b, 212c and 216a).	ORR reports that Network Rail and Freight Operators have issued an approved code of practice. This identified six high risk falling gradients where drivers must take special actions to avoid icing up of brakes. Network Rail has identified a further 668 falling gradients of concern and shared this information with Freight Operators at OPSRAM meetings. ORR proposes to take no further action.
3 04/01/2010 03/2011 Derailment of freight train at Carrbridge, Badenoch & Strathspey Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that the potential risks involved in the prolonged use of stock equipped with miniature snow ploughs to clear snow from lines are understood and that Network Rail staff involved in the management of extreme weather are made aware of any risk control measures identified. Network Rail, in consultation with train operators, should assess the risks of an accumulation of snow being left on or close to the	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
	line as a result of the prolonged use of miniature snow ploughs to clear lines of snow. Any appropriate risk control measures (such as additional instructions within route winter working arrangements) that are identified should be implemented (paragraphs 213a, 214a and 217a).	
4 04/01/2010 03/2011 Derailment of freight train at Carrbridge, Badenoch & Strathspey Status: Implemented	The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that the risk of an overrun of signal AC336 is reviewed in line with existing industry requirements to ensure that it is acceptably low. It is also intended to ensure that the secondary risk introduced by trap points at other similar locations is considered. Network Rail should consider if there are additional measures which could reduce the overrun risk at signal AC336 and implement those measures found to be reasonably practicable to introduce. This consideration should include the undertaking of a detailed assessment as required by Network Rail standard NR/L2/SIG/14201. Network Rail should have regard to the guidance and requirements regarding trap points within Railway Group Guidance Note GI/GN 7606 and Railway Group Standard GK/RT 0064 and should specifically consider the risks to the public of an overrun at this signal. Network Rail should also review where trap points have been used to control overrun risk at similar locations in order to establish that any secondary risks introduced by their use have been adequately assessed and mitigated (paragraph 219).	ORR reports that, after consideration of various options, Network Rail has removed the catch points at Carrbridge. This in conjunction with the new rules relating to the application of brakes on the summit prior to signal AC336, is considered to provide sufficient mitigation to the risk of overrun at signal AC336.