

Recommendation(s) Status: Incident at Romford Station




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 04/02/2010 20/2010</p> <p>Incident at Romford Station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intention of this recommendation is that the PGA wagon fleet should be modified to enable wagon discharge operators to have a clear indication of the state of the doors.</p> <p>DB Schenker should investigate the design and the maintenance arrangements of the hopper doors of PGA type wagons and their control gear, and evaluate whether it is feasible to devise a means by which the open, closed or locked status of the door can be more clearly indicated to the operator than is the case at present, and implement this change if it is reasonably practicable to do so (paragraphs 79b and 81).</p>	<p>DB Schenker has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> <p>RAIB notes that DB Schenker responded to this recommendation by repainting the handles that operate hopper doors. The RAIB is concerned that this does not fully address the risk. \$</p>
<p>2 04/02/2010 20/2010</p> <p>Incident at Romford Station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intention of this recommendation is that staff at terminals served by DB Schenker should have guidance on how to operate wagon doors and check they are secure, and adequate light to enable them to do this.</p> <p>DB Schenker should issue to its staff and relevant customers guidance and instructions on how to correctly operate the doors of all the types of wagons in use by the company, and how to check that the doors of wagons are secured closed. As part of this work, DB Schenker should review the visibility of wagon doors and the means of ensuring suitable levels of lighting to enable staff to check them (paragraphs 79b and 81).</p>	<p>DB Schenker has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 04/02/2010 20/2010</p> <p>Incident at Romford Station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intention of this recommendation is to improve the competence of DB Schenker ground staff.</p> <p>DB Schenker should carry out a review of the training, monitoring and competence of all ground staff, with particular reference to the use of PGA wagons and the supervision and operation of yards. This review should include:</p> <p>I The training of staff in the preparation and examination of trains before departure; and</p> <p>I Instructions to staff on when train preparation and examination should be done.</p> <p>The results of this review should be implemented as appropriate (paragraph 80).</p>	<p>DB Schenker has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body) to
4 04/02/2010 20/2010 Incident at Romford Station Status: Implemented	The intention of this recommendation is to learn lessons from the incorrect application of DB Schenker's safety management system. DB Schenker should investigate the reasons why formal safety validation of organisational changes (including risk assessment) did not take place in respect of the changes implemented at Acton Yard in 2009-10, and implement any recommendations arising from this investigation (paragraph 83).	DB Schenker has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
5 04/02/2010 20/2010 Incident at Romford Station Status: Implemented	The intention of this recommendation is to introduce a procedure within DB Schenker for responding to reports of defective wagons that come from outside the company. DB Schenker should devise and implement a procedure for handling reports of defective wagons that are received from sources outside the company (paragraph 84).	DB Schenker has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.