

Recommendation(s) Status: Failure of Bridge RDG1 48 (River Crane) between Whitton & Feltham

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 15/11/2009 17/2010</p> <p>Failure of Bridge RDG1 48 (River Crane) between Whitton & Feltham</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 1 is to establish a sustainable process for the routine inspection of bridges spanning watercourses and avoid the risk associated with structures not receiving frequent checks for obvious signs of hazards.</p> <p>Network Rail should positively identify which structures require checking for obstructions against upstream faces, and how frequently. Such checks should be mandatory and the process for delivering them should be enhanced such that those who perform the task have the time, competence and information available to do the job effectively (paragraph 103a).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 15/11/2009 17/2010</p> <p>Failure of Bridge RDG1 48 (River Crane) between Whitton & Feltham</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 2 is to increase the probability of debris being reported and removed prior to structural damage occurring.</p> <p>Network Rail should provide means by which members of the public can report obstructions or other defects, particularly at locations where public access exists. This could include the provision of bridge identification plates giving a telephone number similar to those provided at low headroom highway bridges, together with a location description, map reference and structure number (paragraph 104a).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 15/11/2009 17/2010</p> <p>Failure of Bridge RDG1 48 (River Crane) between Whitton & Feltham</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of recommendation 3 is to reinforce the role of the examining engineer so that the review of examination reports can add value to the examination process, particularly in cases where no action is proposed.</p> <p>Network Rail should re-consider the purpose of the role currently performed by the examining engineer and then identify the information and resources (including time) that are required to undertake the task effectively (paragraph 105a). This may include:</p> <p>a. requiring bridge examiners positively to confirm that particular requirements for different types of bridge have been considered during an examination, for example by means of a checklist within the examination report (paragraph 65);</p> <p>b. requiring bridge examiners to submit elevation photographs of bridges spanning watercourses, which show the surface of the water at each pier and abutment, and direction of flow for the purpose of identifying obstructions (paragraph 64); and</p>	<p>Network Rail have reported increasing resources to enable examining engineers to carry out adequate examinations and has developed a new management information system to support their work.</p> <p>Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

c. requiring bridge examiners to submit supplementary photographs in support of a visual examination report to enhance the level of information available to the examining engineer (paragraph 68).

4 15/11/2009 17/2010
Failure of Bridge RDG1 48 (River Crane)
between Whitton & Feltham
Status: Implemented

The purpose of recommendation 4 is to improve the assessment of scour risk.

Network Rail should review its underwater examination task lists nationwide to check for further omissions, and require that underwater examinations are normally undertaken in advance of scour assessments to enable a fuller picture of a structure's condition to be realised (paragraph 105b).

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

5 15/11/2009 17/2010
Failure of Bridge RDG1 48 (River Crane)
between Whitton & Feltham
Status: Implemented

The purpose of recommendation 5 is to give infrastructure managers the opportunity to respond to scour risk where identified by an EA inspection.

The Environment Agency should, in conjunction with railway infrastructure owners, introduce processes to allow the immediate reporting of obstructions in watercourses where these occur adjacent to railway structures such as bridge piers or abutments, and regardless of whether there is an associated flooding risk (paragraph 105c).

The Environment Agency has informed RAIB that it has entered into a MoU with Network Rail. This commits local management teams in the Environment Agency and Network Rail to share intelligence of risk resulting from asset inspection, surveys and assessments.

6 15/11/2009 17/2010
Failure of Bridge RDG1 48 (River Crane)
between Whitton & Feltham
Status: Implemented

The purpose of recommendation 6 is to reduce the risk of a secondary incident occurring following the failure of a structure.

Network Rail should review the guidance provided for non-specialist staff who may be required to assess the failure of track support in the vicinity of a structure, and determine whether it is safe for trains to run over that structure (paragraph 106).

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.