

Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing, Caithness

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 29/09/2009 16/2010</p> <p>Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing, Caithness</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intention of this recommendation is that Network Rail should maintain the backboards fitted to road traffic light signals at level crossings so as to maximise the contrast between the lit red light unit and the backboard.</p> <p>Network Rail should enhance the maintenance and inspection instructions relating to road traffic light signals, and brief staff accordingly, with the objective of ensuring that the backboards to level crossing road traffic light signals are maintained to provide the best possible contrast between a lit red light unit and its backboard (paragraph 135b).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 29/09/2009 16/2010</p> <p>Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing, Caithness</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intention of this recommendation is that Network Rail should take into account the human factors issue of highway speed limit and other signs positioned close to level crossings while assessing the risk.</p> <p>Network Rail should consider amending the level crossing risk management toolkit to include the human factors issue and associated risk reduction measure relating to the potential distraction caused by highway speed limit signs and other signs positioned close to level crossings (paragraph 135c).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has commissioned an analysis of human factors issues associated with speed limit, and other signs, in proximity to level crossings.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless it becomes aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> <p>The RAIB notes that Network Rail has asked RSSB to initiate some research work in this area and that this will be developed and considered by the Road Rail Interface Safety Group on which ORR has observer status.</p>
<p>3 29/09/2009 16/2010</p> <p>Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing, Caithness</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intention of this recommendation is that Network Rail should obtain a full understanding of the risk at Halkirk crossing with the result that more costly risk reduction measures such as the installation of half barriers might be justified.</p> <p>Network Rail should obtain a full understanding of the risk at Halkirk level crossing by taking account of all relevant local factors such as the accident and incident history, as well as the results from ALCRM. The results of this assessment should be used to determine whether it would be reasonably practicable to upgrade the crossing with half barriers, or to implement other measures to deliver an equivalent level of safety (paragraph 136a).</p>	<p>Network Rail has advised the RAIB that they plan to commission an upgraded crossing at Halkirk no later than March 2014.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>4 29/09/2009 16/2010</p> <p>Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing, Caithness</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The intention of this recommendation is that those who execute the level crossing risk management process have sufficient guidance on how to assess the risks from factors not included in the All Level Crossing Risk Model assessment, including taking into account local factors such as the previous incident and accident history.</p> <p>Network Rail should issue improved guidance, and brief its staff, on assessing the risk from factors that are not currently included</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that they are developing a process to take into account the previous history of a level crossing when carrying out risk assessments.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

in the All Level Crossing Risk Model when carrying out risk assessments and making decisions on implementing risk reduction measures at crossings. This should include methods to be adopted when taking into account local factors such as the previous incident and accident history (paragraph 136a).

5 29/09/2009 16/2010
Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing,
Caithness
Status: Implemented

The intention of this recommendation is to make staff carrying out level crossing inspections and maintenance aware of the difference between the visibility of road traffic light signals and their alignment and how they may determine that the lights are correctly aligned.

Network Rail should improve the guidance to staff and brief its staff who undertake the inspection and maintenance of level crossings on how they should check that road traffic light signals are correctly aligned and how this differs from them being visible (paragraph 137a).

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

6 29/09/2009 16/2010
Fatal accident at Halkirk level crossing,
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Status: Implemented

The intention of this recommendation is to cause Network Rail to change the design of long hoods so that they are more effective and to give its staff guidance on the criteria under which they should be fitted.

Network Rail should review the design of long hoods that can be fitted at level crossings and implement any necessary changes identified to make them more effective. Guidance should also be issued to its staff on the specific circumstances of site orientation and prevailing lighting so that their use is optimal (paragraph 137b).

ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.