Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment at Wigan North Western station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.		
The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB		
during the investigation.		
Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.		
The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.		
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Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.		
Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.		

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.



Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status			The purpose of this recommendation is to put in place a clear and consistent set of instructions to maintenance staff on the measurement and rectification of twist in wagons. DB Schenker should put in place a system to assess and mitigate, so far as is reasonably practicable, the risk arising from twisted frames on container wagons and audit compliance with it. This should include an update of procedure EI WF/81 to reflect the types of wagon to which it is applied and to clarify where packings are to be placed.	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body) DB Schenker has reported that it has reviewed and updated its specification for checking for twist when examining its wagons. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
1 25/08/2009 14/2010 Derailment at Wigan North Western station Status: Implemented				
2 Derailment Status: Imp	25/08/2009 14/2 at Wigan North Westerr		The purpose of this recommendation is to identify and rectify other sites where design or construction is not in accordance with the track construction standard. Network Rail should check, on a risk basis, other sites where WCRM S&C Alliance has installed track to verify that it has been designed and installed correctly and should implement corrective action where necessary.	ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions to address the absence of a check rail on a tight radius curve at Wigan and elsewhere. ORR proposes to take no further action.
3 25/08/2009 14/2010 Derailment at Wigan North Western station Status: Implemented			The purpose of this recommendation is to prevent the situation arising where the maintainer does not recognise that incorrect components are fitted and so does not rectify the situation. Network Rail should update its processes for track management to include checks that the rail fastening components are of the correct type for the particular rail and sleeper combination.	ORR have reported that Network Rail had sought to understand whether the derailment in Wigan is an isolated issue or is indicative of a more fundamental track management deficiency. The conclusion reached as part of the response to Recommendation 2 indicated that this incident was an isolated issue and that there is no evidence of a more fundamental track management deficiency. It was therefore considered that there is no requirement to challenge current training and competence provision for component recognition during maintenance. In addition Network Rail has introduced a new process for checking that new installations of track conform to relevant standards. ORR proposes to take no further action.
4 25/08/2009 14/2010 Derailment at Wigan North Western station Status: Implemented			The purpose of this recommendation is to provide advice on dealing with gauge variation, which is given limits in the inspection standard but is not routinely monitored. Network Rail should update its track recording information handling process to deal with gauge variation and should issue guidance to staff on minimum actions to be taken at each alarm level.	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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