

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment at Windsor & Eton Riverside station




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:


Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 11/10/2009 11/2010</p> <p>Derailment at Windsor & Eton Riverside station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is to improve the skills of all staff involved in track inspection (including managers and supervisors) in identifying excessive dynamic gauge widening. Taken in conjunction with their existing competence in identifying chair shuffle the enhanced skills should increase the ability and confidence of staff in deciding if a dynamic derailment risk is evident.</p> <p>Network Rail should revise its current competency training programme for all staff involved in track inspection to include reference to the visual identification of abnormal running band and its relationship with chair shuffle and wide gauge as an indication of dynamic gauge problems and potential risk of derailment.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 11/10/2009 11/2010</p> <p>Derailment at Windsor & Eton Riverside station </p> <p>Status: Implemented by alternative means</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to consider how potentially vulnerable parts of the network that are not covered by track recording vehicles can be subject to dynamic gauge measurement.</p> <p>Network Rail should develop a proposal for the periodic measurement of dynamic gauge at potentially vulnerable locations not covered by a track recording vehicle, and implement the identified measures, as appropriate.</p>	<p>ORR reports that Network Rail has considered how potentially vulnerable parts of the network that are not covered by Track Recording Vehicles (TRV) can be subject to diagnostic gauge measurement. Network Rail has delivered additional training to track maintenance engineers and is evaluating the feasibility of direct measurement of dynamic gauge at slower speed at potentially vulnerable locations not covered by a track recording vehicle</p> <p>Although the RAIB acknowledges the amount of work undertaken it observes that Network Rail has still to develop a comprehensive solution. The RAIB is concerned to note that the on-going investigation into the derailment at Liverpool Street has also identified an issue with the detection of gauge widening in locations not covered by TRV measurements. \$b</p>
<p>3 11/10/2009 11/2010</p> <p>Derailment at Windsor & Eton Riverside station</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that Network Rail auditors are aware of findings from previous relevant audits to determine whether appropriate action has been taken and to enable them to understand the reasons why issues have recurred after they had been reported as closed.</p> <p>Network Rail should ensure that its procedures for planning audits are amended to include a requirement for those undertaking audits of infrastructure maintenance activities to include as an input to the development of the audit plan a review of the findings from previous relevant audits and action taken, irrespective of whether the associated action is open or closed.</p>	<p>ORR reports that the underlying standards have not been changed, due to the current freeze on standards change as a consequence of the move to Business Critical Rules. However, ORR is satisfied that Network Rail's working level instructions to its auditors have been changed and are being followed.</p> <p>Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>