

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment of a passenger train near Cummersdale, Cumbria

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 01/06/2009 06/2010</p> <p>Derailment of a passenger train near Cummersdale, Cumbria</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should develop a comprehensive document for the maintenance and repair of jointed track, which brings together best practice, existing, and any new requirements and implement procedures so that it is used by relevant staff as the principal reference for jointed track. The document should include monitoring and controlling rail creep, setting and checking of expansion gaps in 120 ft rails in rail creep sites, ballast disturbance in hot weather, seasonal briefings to track patrollers and maintainers and rail temperature monitoring.</p> <p>The purpose of this recommendation is to provide a consolidated document which provides maintainers with the necessary instructions and guidance to manage the risk of buckles in jointed track.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions (by alternative means) in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 01/06/2009 06/2010</p> <p>Derailment of a passenger train near Cummersdale, Cumbria</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should identify all sections of jointed track on its infrastructure which have 120 ft rail lengths in rail creep sites and introduce a process for monitoring such sites, undertaking remedial work as necessary in preparation for the 2010 hot weather season onwards.</p> <p>The purpose of this recommendation is to minimise the risk of track buckles on other jointed track sites with similar characteristics to Cummersdale.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 01/06/2009 06/2010</p> <p>Derailment of a passenger train near Cummersdale, Cumbria</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should identify rail creep sites at which Panlock keys should be replaced (in accordance with NR/SP/TRK/102) and those sites at which they should be retained (to prevent risks from other types of track faults) and arrange for replacement at the identified locations, monitoring such sites in the interim.</p> <p>The purpose of this recommendation is to remove the risk from Panlock keys at sites prone to rail creep, where it is safe to do so.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions (by alternative means) in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>4 01/06/2009 06/2010</p> <p>Derailment of a passenger train near Cummersdale, Cumbria</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should re-brief its signallers on the requirements of GE/RT8000, module TS1, clause 17.1, to clarify that when a track defect is reported which, by its nature and severity, could endanger trains (including track buckles), trains should not be used to examine the line, and include this in signallers' competency based assessments.</p> <p>The purpose of this recommendation is to provide clarity to signallers on dealing with track buckles or other reported track defects that could endanger trains.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

5 01/06/2009 06/2010
Derailment of a passenger train near
Cummersdale, Cumbria
Status: Implemented

Northern Rail should promote appropriate changes to clause 16.1 of module TW1 of GE/RT8000, so that there is a specific requirement on drivers to come to a clear understanding with signallers as to what the maximum speed should be when examining the line.

The purpose of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of a dangerous situation arising as a result of an omission by a signaller to specify the maximum speed.

Northern Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.