

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment of two locomotives at East Somerset Junction

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:



Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 10/11/2008 28/2009</p> <p>Derailment of two locomotives at East Somerset Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to introduce a 'self-checking' procedure for staff working on their own, to be used when they are required to implement procedures to deal with specified types of equipment failure:</p> <p>Network Rail should consider how signallers working on their own can affirm that they have taken the correct actions when implementing procedures to cope with equipment failures that result in a degraded level of safety, and issue requirements to the routes on this subject. The guidance should identify whether there are any circumstances under which it will be mandatory for signallers to obtain verification of their actions by a second competent person, taking into account risk associated with speeds, frequency of movements and traffic type and include consideration of human factors (paragraph 200b).</p>	<p>Network Rail have carried out a review in response to this recommendation. Network Rail propose no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 10/11/2008 28/2009</p> <p>Derailment of two locomotives at East Somerset Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to improve the current rostering arrangements for signallers at Westbury by reducing or eliminating twelve-hour night shifts:</p> <p>Network Rail, Western Route should review the current roster pattern at Westbury Power Signal Box to reduce the duration of, or eliminate, twelve-hour night shifts and make changes to the roster as appropriate.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail Western Route has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 10/11/2008 28/2009</p> <p>Derailment of two locomotives at East Somerset Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented </p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to extend the use of the Fatigue and Risk Index or apply other suitable assessment tools to proposed or amended rosters for signallers and other safety-critical staff:</p> <p>Network Rail should develop criteria to determine the circumstances under which proposed or amended rosters to be worked by signallers and other safety-critical staff should be evaluated using the Fatigue and Risk Index or other suitable assessment tools (with the aim of ensuring that defined thresholds are not exceeded) and provide guidance to the routes on this subject.</p>	<p>Network Rail has provided guidance for when short-term roster changes are to be made; this is principally a checklist of good practice items to be considered. The RAIB is concerned that use of a fatigue modelling tool is only recommended when the roster is seriously disturbed, typically by the long term (4 + weeks) absence of an individual. ORR proposes to take no further action. \$b</p>
<p>4 10/11/2008 28/2009</p> <p>Derailment of two locomotives at East Somerset Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented </p>	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to enhance company standard NR/SP/ERG/003 by widening its focus to incorporate an extended set of limits on working time:</p> <p>Network Rail should amend its company standard NR/SP/ERG/003 to include an extended set of limits on working time for safety-critical staff, considering the scope and range of parameters applied to air traffic controllers, the guidance</p>	<p>Network Rail has carried out a detailed review of the recommendation and has issued a new standard.</p> <p>The RAIB is concerned that it appears Network Rail has yet to fully address the staff fatigue risks identified in the East Somerset Junction and Grayrigg (20/2008) investigations and that there is still a need to establish clear thresholds on hours worked (in the context of an overall fatigue management</p>

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contained in the ROGS regulations, use of both the fatigue and risk elements of the Fatigue and Risk Index and advice from their human factors department.

system). RAIB is disappointed to note that despite discussions with ORR, Network Rail has not reduced its current threshold for hours worked from its current level of 72 hrs. Consequently it is still possible for managers to roster safety critical staff for excessive hours to cover for shortages (although the impact of doing so should be assessed). Although the absence of a clear threshold continues to be a concern, the ORR has informed the RAIB that Network Rail has stated an intention to eliminate working more than 60 hours (and the number of cases of working in excess of 60 hours is said to be very rare).

ORR proposes to take no further action. \$b

5 10/11/2008 28/2009
Derailment of two locomotives at East
Somerset Junction
Status: Implemented

The purpose of this recommendation is for ORR to ensure that Network Rail is making timely and adequate progress in implementing Recommendation 4 and to take suitable action if they are not satisfied:

The ORR should agree with Network Rail appropriate timescales for the implementation of Recommendation 4 and devise a programme of intervention to ensure that Network Rail develops and implements adequate measures, as described in Recommendation 4, to address the risk arising from fatigue within those timescales. If the ORR is not satisfied that Network Rail's proposals to change standard NR/SP/ERG/003 address the risk, or consider that insufficient progress is being made, the ORR should consider devising and implementing its own set of working time limits to be applied to Network Rail's safety-critical staff.

ORR is reviewing the progress of Network Rail for the implementation of recommendation 4.
RAIB has concerns that the actions of Network Rail do not appear to fully address the risks identified by the investigation.

6 10/11/2008 28/2009
Derailment of two locomotives at East
Somerset Junction
Status: Implemented

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure that there is adequate human factors' input to decisions taken at Recommendations Review Panels:

Network Rail should include on its Recommendations Review Panels a representative from the human factors department with full membership status.

ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

7 10/11/2008 28/2009
Derailment of two locomotives at East
Somerset Junction
Status: Implemented

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to improve its processes for monitoring causes of previous accidents and incidents and for reviewing the effectiveness of recommendations previously made:

Network Rail should develop and implement a monitoring system that will enable its Recommendations Review Panels to identify recurring causes in all investigations into accidents and

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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incidents on, or relevant to, its network and to enable them to identify whether previous responses to relevant recommendation have been effective.

8	10/11/2008	28/2009	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail, Western Route to make greater use of simulators to help signallers to maintain their competence:</p> <p>Network Rail, Western Route should arrange for signallers to practise a range of infrequently encountered situations (such as the introduction of pilot working) on a simulator at regular intervals within the three-year competence cycle.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
9	10/11/2008	28/2009	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to make greater use of simulation techniques to help controllers maintain their competence in responding to emergency incidents:</p> <p>Network Rail should introduce simulated emergency exercises for all controllers who have not experienced handling NRN emergency messages during the three-year competence cycle.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
10	10/11/2008	28/2009	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to enhance its standards, training and reference material for controllers to assist them when they are notified of an accident:</p> <p>Network Rail should amend company standard NR/L3/OCS/043/2.1 to identify key information to be gathered by controllers when receiving an NRN emergency call, or when they are advised of an accident having made a NRN emergency call, and ensure that training and reference material for controllers encompasses this change.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
11	10/11/2008	28/2009	<p>The purpose of this recommendation is to provide Network Rail managers with greater clarity over the circumstances under which it is necessary to arrange relief for signallers who have been involved in an accident or incident:</p> <p>Network Rail should enhance guidance contained in Procedure 2-05 of the Operations Manual to define the factors that should be taken into account when deciding whether a signaller who has been involved in a serious accident should be allowed to remain on duty. This guidance should include reference to volume of train movement expected, consideration of whether the signaller is working on his/her own and the maximum time that they can be permitted to continue working.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
