

The Recommendation Progress Report

This status report is based on a consolidation of information provided to the RAIB by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).

The status of implementation of the RAIB's recommendations, as reported by the safety authority or public body, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented	Regulation 12(2)(b)(i) = recommendation accepted and implemented
Implemented by alternative means	
Implementation ongoing	Regulation 12(2)(b)(ii) = recommendation accepted and implementation has started
In-Progress:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(ii) = recommendation accepted and implementation proposed
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial response



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has particular concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed to be taken, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
1 26/04/2008 24/2009 Freight train collision at Leigh-on-Sea Status: Non-implementation	Network Rail should introduce a procedure that will provide a written record of instructions between the Engineering Supervisor, train driver and 'competent person' with verbal read back to confirm an understanding of the planned movement.	Network Rail have carried out a review in response to this recommendation (details). A joint industry workshop was held on 23 February 2010 chaired by the RSSB with representatives from Network Rail, Amey Colas, Babcock Rail, Volker Rail, Jarvis Fastline, Balfour Beatty Rail and DB Schenker. The purpose of this workshop was to consider a number of incidents that had occurred involving train movements towards and over CCTV level crossings within possessions since 2007 which included the incident at Leigh-on-Sea. Network Rail noted that it was particularly useful in that attendees included PICOP and ES practitioners working within possessions. Network Rail further advised that the workshop generated a good debate with all parties including issues relating to Recommendation 1. The consensus from within the group was that the existing rules were adequate but the application was weak. It was suggested that completion of a form when authority for a movement was given would not be a practicable solution, for example when unloading ballast the form would need to be completed for every 50 yard movement. It was also considered that there could be a danger if a form was used that did not accurately reflect conditions at that point in time, for example by showing a level crossing as being on local control when this was no longer the case. Network Rail propose no further action.
2 26/04/2008 24/2009 Freight train collision at Leigh-on-Sea Status: Implemented	Network Rail should incorporate a challenge stage within the planning process so that possession and work site length are minimised and that planned train movements are operationally risk assessed.	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
3 26/04/2008 24/2009 Freight train collision at Leigh-on-Sea Status: In-progress	Network Rail should modify procedures so that, if a specific risk is identified from the risk assessment (Recommendation 2), such as train movements over long distances within a work site, the risk is documented in the hazard list within the PICOP pack.	ORR has reported that Network Rail is taking suitable actions to address the recommendation although an accurate plan for full implementation has not been formulated. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes. Re-opened by Network Rail.
4 26/04/2008 24/2009 Freight train collision at Leigh-on-Sea Status: Implemented	Balfour Beatty should introduce a process so that staff involved with train movements within the work site have accurate knowledge of train positions.	Balfour Beatty' has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
5 26/04/2008 24/2009 Freight train collision at Leigh-on-Sea Status: Implemented	Network Rail should modify the Engineering Supervisors Training Manual to accurately reflect the specification within its company standard relating to the requirement on the Engineering Supervisor to give precise and explicit instructions to drivers or a 'competent person'.	Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
6 26/04/2008 24/2009 Freight train collision at Leigh-on-Sea Status: Implemented	Rail Safety and Standards Board should make a proposal, in accordance with the Railway Group Standards code, to introduce a requirement to modify the modules within the Rule Book relating to the requirement on the Engineering Supervisor so as to require him to give precise and explicit instructions to the driver or 'competent person' as shown in the Network Rail company standard NR/SP/CTM/021.	RSSB made a proposal in response to this recommendation. ORR has closed the recommendation.
7 26/04/2008 24/2009 Freight train collision at Leigh-on-Sea Status: Implemented	Network Rail in conjunction with Rail Safety and Standards Board should make a proposal, in accordance with the Railway Group Standards code, to define the competence and limitations of the role of a 'competent person' authorised by the Engineering Supervisor, so that this role can only pass on the instruction to the driver given by the Engineering Supervisor on the movement of trains within a work site but cannot guide or manage such movements.	ORR has reported that Network Rail and RSSB have taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.