Recommendation(s) Status: RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:


Key	to	Recommendation	Status
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Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the I		
means: during the investigation.		
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.	
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is	

Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.

Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the	
	recommendation.	

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:



in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Network Rail should require all organisations that are permitted to use high ride RRVs on its infrastructure to identify those machines that require the operator to be assisted by another person(s) during on/offtracking15, and to enhance their procedures so that (paragraph 235b): I for each machine, the operator is made aware that he needs assistance before he starts working with the machine; and I operators are aware of the need to come to a clear understanding with the person(s) assisting them before starting to on/off-track; this understanding should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the steps to be gone through, who is responsible for each step, and the clear and unambiguous communication that is to be used so that the RRV can be safely on/off-tracked.	- -	
1 04/11/2007 11/2009 RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill Status: Implemented			
2 04/11/2007 11/2009 RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill Status: Implemented			
3 04/11/2007 11/2009 RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill Status: Implemented	Network Rail should enhance the relevant modules of the Sentinel training so that machine controllers (paragraphs 235a, 235b and 236a): I are aware that operators need to come to an understanding with any person assisting15 them with on/off-tracking; and I understand the control measures that prevent an unbraked condition occurring during on/off-tracking.	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.	

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status		Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
	04/11/2007 11/2009 way incidents at Brentwood, Essex ningham Snow Hill blemented	Network Rail should enhance the relevant modules of training given as part of the Sentinel machine controller competency scheme so that those persons holding this Sentinel competency are aware of the specific duties they should be competent to perform and any specific tasks, for example assisting15 the operator with on/off-tracking, that this competency does not cover.	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
	04/11/2007 11/2009 way incidents at Brentwood, Essex ningham Snow Hill plemented	Network Rail should enhance the relevant modules of Sentinel training for machine controllers to give guidance and practical training on the actions to be taken in the event of a runaway.	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
6 04/11/2007 11/2009 RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill Status: Implemented		Network Rail should review the MEWPs that were not modified as a result of the ORR Improvement Notice issued following the incident at Copenhagen Tunnel on 15 October 2006. If necessary, Network Rail should require that enhancements are made to these MEWPs so that they are not at risk of being in an unbraked condition during on/off-tracking.	Network Rail advised it had completed a final check of MEWPS [Mobile Elevated Work Platforms] requiring modification, as per the ORR improvement notice issued following the Copenhagen Tunnel incident, and confirmed that all relevant machines had been modified or removed from use, i.e. placed on the Network Rail Do not use list ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.