

## Recommendation(s) Status: RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Implemented:</b>	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
<b>Implemented by alternative means:</b>	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
<b>Implementation ongoing:</b>	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
<b>In-progress:</b>	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
<b>Non-implementation:</b>	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1            04/11/2007    11/2009</p> <p>RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should require all organisations that are permitted to use high ride RRVs on its infrastructure to identify those machines that require the operator to be assisted by another person(s) during on/offtracking<sup>15</sup>, and to enhance their procedures so that (paragraph 235b):</p> <p>I for each machine, the operator is made aware that he needs assistance before he starts working with the machine; and</p> <p>I operators are aware of the need to come to a clear understanding with the person(s) assisting them before starting to on/off-track; this understanding should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the steps to be gone through, who is responsible for each step, and the clear and unambiguous communication that is to be used so that the RRV can be safely on/off-tracked.</p>	<p>ORR is content that this recommendation has been implemented by Network Rail and that Network Rail is carrying out a range of RRV assurance activities.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2            04/11/2007    11/2009</p> <p>RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should require all organisations that are permitted to use high ride RRVs on its infrastructure to review their procedures for on/off-tracking and also the supporting training given to their operators. If necessary, organisations should enhance their procedures and training so that (paragraphs 235a, 235b, 236a, 237a and 238b):</p> <p>I the defined steps their operators need to go through during on/offtracking result in a brake force sufficient to prevent the RRV running away on the maximum gradient permitted for on/off-tracking, and that this force is consistently applied at the holding end of the RRV (the end of the RRV that is opposite to the end at which the rail gear is being lowered (or raised));</p> <p>I the operator understands his responsibilities for following these defined steps and how the steps assure the braking condition described above; and</p> <p>I that if assistance<sup>15</sup> is required:</p> <p>O the respective roles of the operator and the person(s) assisting (machine controller or otherwise) are identified for each step; and</p> <p>O any special training and competency requirements for the person(s) assisting are identified and implemented, and that the operator understands his responsibilities for checking such competencies.</p>	<p>ORR is content that this recommendation has been implemented by Network Rail and that Network Rail is carrying out a range of RRV assurance activities.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3            04/11/2007    11/2009</p> <p>RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should enhance the relevant modules of the Sentinel training so that machine controllers (paragraphs 235a, 235b and 236a):</p> <p>I are aware that operators need to come to an understanding with any person assisting<sup>15</sup> them with on/off-tracking; and</p> <p>I understand the control measures that prevent an unbraked condition occurring during on/off-tracking.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>4            04/11/2007    11/2009</p> <p>RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should enhance the relevant modules of training given as part of the Sentinel machine controller competency scheme so that those persons holding this Sentinel competency are aware of the specific duties they should be competent to perform and any specific tasks, for example assisting the operator with on/off-tracking, that this competency does not cover.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>5            04/11/2007    11/2009</p> <p>RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should enhance the relevant modules of Sentinel training for machine controllers to give guidance and practical training on the actions to be taken in the event of a runaway.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>6            04/11/2007    11/2009</p> <p>RRV runaway incidents at Brentwood, Essex and at Birmingham Snow Hill</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should review the MEWPs that were not modified as a result of the ORR Improvement Notice issued following the incident at Copenhagen Tunnel on 15 October 2006. If necessary, Network Rail should require that enhancements are made to these MEWPs so that they are not at risk of being in an unbraked condition during on/off-tracking.</p>	<p>Network Rail advised it had completed a final check of MEWPS [Mobile Elevated Work Platforms] requiring modification, as per the ORR improvement notice issued following the Copenhagen Tunnel incident, and confirmed that all relevant machines had been modified or removed from use, i.e. placed on the Network Rail Do not use list. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>