

Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident at Tackley station level crossing, Oxfordshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

| | |
|--|--|
| Implemented: | All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed. |
| Implemented by alternative means: | The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation. |
| Implementation ongoing: | Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered. |
| In-progress: | The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this. |
| Non-implementation: | Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken. |
| Awaiting response: | Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation. |

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

| Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status | Safety Recommendation | Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body) |
|--|---|--|
| <p>1 31/03/2008 09/2009</p> <p>Fatal accident at Tackley station level crossing, Oxfordshire</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should investigate whether it is reasonably practicable to install a predictor miniature stop light warning system, capable of warning users of the approach of fast trains and if a second train is coming, at this location, and whether safety benefits would be gained from such an installation.</p> | <p>Network Rail are going to carry out a risk benefit analysis in response to this recommendation.</p> |
| <p>2 31/03/2008 09/2009</p> <p>Fatal accident at Tackley station level crossing, Oxfordshire</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should issue an updated policy or standard to improve the control of fencing at unprotected crossings, such that decision points are not forced to the minimum dimension or sighting distances unnecessarily compromised.</p> | <p>Network Rail is proposing to amend its fencing standard in response to this recommendation.</p> |
| <p>3 31/03/2008 09/2009</p> <p>Fatal accident at Tackley station level crossing, Oxfordshire</p> <p>Status: Non-implementation</p> | <p>Network Rail should, at unprotected crossings where the location of the decision point is between the instruction sign and the track and therefore potentially counter-intuitive, propose measures to clearly mark the point at which the final decision to cross should be made for acceptance by the ORR. This is for the benefit of crossing users and for the guidance of persons making inspections of the crossing.</p> | <p>Network Rail is proposing to take no action in response to this recommendation. This is the subject of ongoing discussions involving ORR, RSSB, RAIB and Network Rail.</p> |
| <p>4 31/03/2008 09/2009</p> <p>Fatal accident at Tackley station level crossing, Oxfordshire</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should incorporate in their procedures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. arrangements to routinely pass the findings of level crossing assessments and inspections between operations and maintenance departments, so that the organisation achieves a co-ordinated view of the condition of those assets; and b. an audit process to identify errors, inconsistencies or the application of inappropriate mitigation measures in crossing inspection reports. | <p>Network Rail has stated that the processes address the intent of this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>5 31/03/2008 09/2009</p> <p>Fatal accident at Tackley station level crossing, Oxfordshire</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should review their methods for assessing warning times, as the current arrangements which rely on calculations and the measurement of distances using optical equipment have been shown to be unreliable, particularly on curved track. This should include consideration of permanently identifying the sighting distances to be achieved, so that visibility can be positively verified from each decision point when crossings are inspected to improve the objectivity of</p> | <p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |

**Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status**

Safety Recommendation

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

these
assessments.

6 31/03/2008 09/2009
Fatal accident at Tackley station level
crossing, Oxfordshire
Status: Implemented

Network Rail should consider providing a permanent solution to the restricted visibility from the down side of Tackley crossing by profiling the embankment to the south-west of the crossing and removing surplus material.

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.