

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment at Ely Dock Junction

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 22/06/2007 02/2009</p> <p>Derailment at Ely Dock Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should investigate the capability of Wheelchex or a similar system to produce data to identify laterally out of balance wagons, and should instigate a system to use this data to reduce risk from such wagons (paragraphs 360 and 378 to 389).</p>	<p>Network Rail is addressing this issue in response to Newcastle King Edward Bridge Recommendation 1. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 22/06/2007 02/2009</p> <p>Derailment at Ely Dock Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Lafarge should as a short term measure, evaluate the use of, and if practical fit, visual markers on PHA wagon suspension, to enable train preparation staff to identify if a frictional lock up has occurred, after discharge and before the train movement from the depot (paragraph 359).</p>	<p>Lafarge has reported that it has carried out a test programme to assess the extent of frictional lock-up in the suspension of PHA type wagons and modified wagons are currently being trialled. The RAIB is concerned to note that a train comprising unmodified PHA type wagons derailed at Bordesley Junction on 26 August 2011. The RAIB investigation has revealed that frictional lock up of the suspension was a causal factor . This recent derailment reinforces the need to review the performance of the modified wagons and to implement a permanent solution.</p>
<p>3 22/06/2007 02/2009</p> <p>Derailment at Ely Dock Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail and PHA wagon owners should review the risks arising from the derailments of these vehicles and whether in light of the Ely incident the current mitigation measures are adequate in respect to the compliance of the PHA wagon and the suspension characteristics of the PHA wagon against the requirements of GMRT/2141, including the effects of contamination and frictional breakout. If appropriate, Network Rail's Private Wagon Registration Agreement department should require the owners of these wagons to take such steps as are necessary to ensure they comply with its requirements (paragraphs 359, 360, 363 and 374)</p>	<p>Following the derailment at Ely in June 2007, the relevant freight operator carried out a test programme to assess the extent of frictional lock-up in the suspension of PHA type wagons. Following those tests a number of potential modifications to the suspension were identified and in April 2010 two PHA wagons were modified; these were then subject to testing between May and September 2010 and then another 16 months of trial running. In January 2012 the trial running was concluded and subsequently a campaign of modifications was launched. The RAIB is concerned to note that a train comprising unmodified PHA type wagons derailed at Bordesley Junction on 26 August 2011. The RAIB investigation has revealed that frictional lock up of the suspension was likely to have been a causal factor . The RAIB has suggested to ORR that special attention be given to completion of the planned modifications to PHA wagons to reduce the risk of derailment due to frictional lock-up of the suspension. \$</p>
<p>4 22/06/2007 02/2009</p> <p>Derailment at Ely Dock Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should review the historical research data and recommendations on the GFA to determine if the recommendations are valid for the current PHA wagon design and its operating and maintenance environment. If it is found to be relevant they should arrange for this research to be briefed to all owners of PHA wagons, and for them to take any necessary steps (paragraphs 360 and 365).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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5 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail should instruct all private wagon owners on the importance of compliance with POCL 484, and in particular with the requirement to mark wagons that have been shimmed for frame twist correction (paragraphs 359, 364 and 374 to 377)	Network Rail has reported that private wagon owners have been rebriefed on measures to mitigate the risk of excess frame twist. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
6 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail should instruct all private wagon owners to comply with the requirement to mark wagons that have been shimmed for frame twist correction (paragraphs 366 and 375).	Network Rail is addressing this issue in response to Newcastle King Edward Bridge Recommendation 1. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
7 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail should brief private wagon owners to retain maintenance records relating to wagons and provide an auditable history on sale or transfer (paragraphs 359 and 375).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
8 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail, in conjunction with wagon owners and maintainers, should review, and if appropriate revise, inherited British Rail maintenance manuals so that they are complete in their coverage and that they include processes from the current Railway Group Standards and POCL (paragraphs 347 and 364 to 366)	Network Rail has reported that maintenance requirements for privately owned wagons have been reviewed and updated. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
9 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail should review maintenance hours and resources available for the maintenance of track between Ely Dock Junction and Soham, and provide appropriate levels of time and resource (paragraphs 362 and 372)	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
10 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail should include guidance in NR/SP/TRK/001 Section 11.4.2 so that additional consideration is given to geometry monitoring frequency and methodology for locations where the dynamic track geometry is likely to deteriorate and exceed the maintenance limit without otherwise being detected (paragraphs 359 and 372).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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11 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Wabtec and other maintainers of torsionally stiff 2 axle wagons in conjunction with their owners should revise their annual maintenance procedures so they adequately mitigate the risk of derailment which may arise due to frame twist. Post-maintenance wheel weighing or dimensional checks may achieve this (paragraphs 359, 364, 366 and 391).	Network Rail has is addressing this issue in response to Newcastle King Edward Bridge Recommendation 1. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
12 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	English Welsh & Scottish Railway should review and if necessary, adjust resource levels at Mountsorrel so that there is sufficient staffing to prepare trains in accordance with their procedures (paragraphs 367 and 392).	Former EWS (now DBS) has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
13 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Lafarge should re brief all staff involved in loading wagons to check peak loadings and residual load safety limits (paragraphs 367 and 392).	Lafarge has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
14 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	English Welsh & Scottish Railway should implement processes so that incident investigation managers are appointed where appropriate, a comprehensive remit is prepared and investigations are completed in accordance with Railway Group Standards and their own procedures (paragraph 359).	English Welsh and Scottish Railway (DB Schenker Rail Uk Ltd) has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
15 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Lafarge should introduce a system so that the Mountsorrel computer loading system is within calibration and that time intervals are sufficient to allow the wagon payload to be within the accepted tolerance (paragraphs 368 and 392).	Lafarge has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
16 22/06/2007 02/2009 Derailment at Ely Dock Junction Status: Implemented	Lafarge should introduce and enforce procedures at Mountsorrel so that the staff involved in the loading of wagons, provide an accurate list for input into TOPS (paragraphs 368 and 392).	All loading staff have been re briefed about the importance of providing accurate information to TOPS. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.