

Recommendation(s) Status: Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 29/08/2007 22/2008</p> <p>Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The RSSB should, in consultation with Network Rail and representatives from the train operators, develop and implement a method for formally dictating and recording communication between signallers and drivers to be used when it is necessary for a signaller to warn drivers of a hazard ahead that requires reduction in speed, and no physical warning of the speed restriction is present locally. Consideration should be given as to whether the chosen means could be designed in such a way as to enable it to be used as an effective visual reminder to the driver of the location of the hazard and the speed restriction applied (paragraphs 121a and 122a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 29/08/2007 22/2008</p> <p>Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>a. use the circumstances of the incident at Ty Mawr to re-brief the requirements of 'Interpretation of Apply 20 mph ESR' (Appendix D, Page 79) in Standard NR/SP/TRK/001, 'Inspection and Maintenance of Permanent Way'; and</p> <p>b. within one year of the briefing taking place, conduct an audit of ESRs imposed in the intervening period, to identify the number of occasions when the duration of an ESR has exceeded two hours without emergency equipment being erected, and take action, as appropriate, to address any deficiencies found (paragraph 121b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 29/08/2007 22/2008</p> <p>Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should review the range of speed restrictions and the timings for trains between Talerddig and Caersws to determine whether rationalisation of the number of such restrictions and/or relaxation of timings could enhance the driveability of the route and reduce the potential for distraction and misunderstanding by train drivers under degraded operating conditions (paragraph 122b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate."</p>
<p>4 29/08/2007 22/2008</p> <p>Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should conduct a review of the availability of warning equipment for emergency speed restrictions for the more remote areas of its network. The purpose of the review should be to identify how the requirement in NR/SP/TRK/001 to install warning equipment within two hours can be achieved. The review should include consideration of whether improvements in the speed of installation could be achieved, for example, by providing warning equipment at additional locations or on road vehicles used by staff who may have to install it as part of their duties (paragraph 122c).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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<p>5 29/08/2007 22/2008</p> <p>Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr</p> <p>Status: Implemented by alternative means</p>	<p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>a. review the circumstances of this incident and identify other parts of the network where the length of signal sections results in the potential for a significant period of time to elapse between a driver being informed of an ESR and the ESR being encountered; and</p> <p>b. for each location identified, include within the relevant Sectional Appendix any additional locations where drivers should be reminded of the presence of an ESR ahead and how and by whom that reminder will be administered (paragraph 122d).</p> <p>The purpose of this recommendation is to identify those areas of the national network where there might be significant elapsed time between a warning of an ESR being given and it being encountered and to provide further warnings to drivers, where practical.</p>	<p>ORR reports that Network Rail has implemented this recommendation by issuing specific box instructions to signallers at locations with long block sections, instructing signallers to remind drivers of long blocks when cautioned for an emergency speed restriction.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>6 29/08/2007 22/2008</p> <p>Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should modify procedure NR/PRC/MTC/MG0110 to list the information that the signaller is required to be told when an emergency speed restriction is to be imposed as defined in section 9.1 of module SP of the rule book (paragraph 123), and clearly identify who is responsible for providing each item of information (paragraph 124).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>7 29/08/2007 22/2008</p> <p>Train overspeeding through an emergency speed restriction at Ty Mawr</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>The Association of Train Operating Companies should develop guidance for train operating companies on 'for-cause' drugs and alcohol testing with the objective of achieving greater consistency in its application. The guidance should address the issue of who should have the authority to permit a driver to continue driving after an incident. It should also consider different scenarios where drugs and alcohol testing might be required, including how to deal with a situation where an incident requires a member of staff to be screened as soon as reasonably practicable and that member of staff is remote from a location where such testing can easily be administered (paragraph 125).</p> <p>The purpose of this recommendation is not to conduct a comprehensive review of drugs and alcohol policy or practice, but rather to offer guidance on the application of existing drugs and alcohol policy in order that a more consistent approach by train operating companies can be achieved.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that the Association of Train Operating Companies have taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>