Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident to a trackworker east of Reading Station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

| All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed. | |
|--|--|
| | |
| The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation. | |
| Two days to the state of the st | |
| Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered. | |
| | |
| The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this. | |
| | |
| Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken. | |
| Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the | |
| | |


RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.



Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

| Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status | Safety Recommendation | Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body) |
|---|--|---|
| 1 29/11/2007 21/2008 Fatal accident to a trackworker east of Reading Station Status: Implemented | Network Rail should specifically prohibit the use of umbrellas by staff on or near lines which are open to traffic (paragraph 121). | Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. |
| 2 29/11/2007 21/2008 Fatal accident to a trackworker east of Reading Station Status: Implemented | Network Rail should introduce procedures to improve the safety of staff removing detonator protection by: a. reinforcing the message that persons removing detonator protection should either be permanently clear of the running lines, or have sufficient sighting to protect their own safety while walking back to the permanent position of safety before confirming to the PICOP that the protection has been lifted, for example by including this information in the RIMINI plan (paragraphs 139 and 170); and b. providing guidance to BRMs on the sequence for withdrawing detonator protection to reduce the opportunity for a possession to be given up unintentionally before staff are clear of the track (paragraph 143). | Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. |
| 3 29/11/2007 21/2008 Fatal accident to a trackworker east of Reading Station Status: In-progress | Network Rail should look critically at the possession management process to reduce the need for staff to be on the track for the purpose of taking or giving back a possession (paragraphs 160 and 171). | Network Rail have carried out a review in response to this recommendation and concluded that the existing arrangements for protecting possessions will be retained. Network Rail propose no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. However ORR is continuing to press for improvements in this area. RAIB is concerned that the safety benefits of alternatives for possession management are no longer being pursued. In particular, the RAIB is concerned that the placing of protection at the boundary of engineering possessions exposes the staff involved to the the risk of being struck by a train. |
| 4 29/11/2007 21/2008 Fatal accident to a trackworker east of Reading Station Status: Implemented by alternative means | Network Rail should introduce a structured approach to the monitoring of compliance with Network Rail's standard maintenance procedure NR/PRC/MTC/0117 'Planned general safety inspections' (paragraph 164),and incorporate in this the means to assess the workload of those tasked with undertaking these inspections. | ORR has reported that Network Rail has addressed this recommendation by revising its planned general inspection procedures. Steps have also been taken to assess and reduce the workload for local general managers by the assessment in line process. Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. |

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Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status

5 29/11/2007 21/2008

Fatal accident to a trackworker east of Reading Station

Status: Non-implementation



Network Rail should, at those locations where T3 protection is regularly placed, introduce a system to physically mark the location of possession limit boards on the track to assist staff in positioning and checking the position of equipment (paragraph 169), or consider installing a semi-permanent possession limit board system.

Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)

Network Rail has carried out a review in response to this recommendation and proposes no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. The RAIB recognises that Network Rail has considered adoption of this proposal and has concluded that marking the location of possession limit boards is an option that may be adopted at specific locations (following an assessment of the risk). However, the RAIB remains concerned about the number of incidents during which protection is wrongly placed. Consequently the RAIB is carrying out a preliminary examination of operating irregularities associated with engineering possessions \$w

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