

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 10/08/2007 16/2008</p> <p>Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Freightliner should investigate the possibility of modifying current, or developing new, software, to give warning if containers are loaded onto a wagon in a way that contravenes company loads standards with regard to the distribution of load. Appropriate solutions should be implemented.</p>	<p>Freightliner has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 10/08/2007 16/2008</p> <p>Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Freightliner should take steps, including re-briefing and assessment, to ensure that loading staff clearly understand and can apply the company's rules on permissible loading of container wagons. Freightliner should monitor compliance with their loading standards to provide assurance that such rules are being complied with.</p>	<p>Freightliner has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 10/08/2007 16/2008</p> <p>Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Freightliner should re-examine how they present information on permissible container wagon loads. They should aim to present the information in a clear unambiguous way that suits the needs of the user of the information, be they terminal staff, Freightliner management, wagon manufacturers or approval bodies. This will involve the modification of MIE 0767 and the possibility of generating other related documents suited to the particular needs of the recipients</p>	<p>Freightliner has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>4 10/08/2007 16/2008</p> <p>Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail Vehicle Conformance Group should put in place procedures so that when considering derailment resistance during the approvals process of wagons, they determine the full range of loads and their distributions that can legitimately be encountered in service, and consider the sensitivity of the wagon to likely longitudinal and lateral offsets in loading. They should take these factors into account when deciding what testing and calculations need to be undertaken to demonstrate compliance with applicable derailment resistance standards.</p>	<p>Network Rail Vehicle Conformance Group has stated that it has considered this recommendation to be unreasonable but is prepared to participate with ongoing discussions about the application of the Railway Group Standards. ORR has raised the issue with ERA when drafting the revised Freight Wagon TSI. ORR consider that this recommendation has been implemented by alternative means and proposes no further action.</p>
<p>5 10/08/2007 16/2008</p> <p>Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham</p> <p>Status: Non-implementation </p>	<p>Freightliner should put in place procedures so that when procuring wagons, they unambiguously define to manufacturers and approvals bodies the full range of loads and distribution of loads that can reasonably expected to be encountered by the wagon in service.</p>	<p>ORR, Freightliner and RSSB met in September 2011 to discuss this recommendation, they concluded that it was not reasonable for the UK Freight Industry to attach any additional requirements relating to lateral load beyond that of other member states in Europe. ORR has advised RAIB that the proposed mechanism for managing the risk of offset loads would be unlikely to produce any tangible benefits given the limited history and data of this kind of incident and the impracticability of checking distribution of loads. The RAIB notes that the Group Standards and the associated guidance include a margin for the normal variation of vehicle</p>

Number/ Date/ Report No/
Inv Title / Current Status

Safety Recommendation

Summary of current status (based on latest report from
the relevant safety authority or public body)

6	10/08/2007	16/2008	Freightliner should arrange that the FEA-B wagon wheel unloading performance is re-evaluated taking into account the full range of load conditions they permit (currently defined in MIE 0767) to confirm compliance with GM/RT 2141. This should consider sensitivity to longitudinal and lateral offsets in load that can reasonably be encountered in service.	parameters. However, the RAIB is still of the opinion that further data is needed so that the full range and distribution of loads can be understood. The raib is also concerned that load distribution was also a factor in the recent derailment of a container train at Reading West on 28 January 2012.\$
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Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham Status: Implemented				Freightliner has carried out modelling of different configurations of containers, consequently the RAIB concluded that actions have been taken in response to the recommendation. However, this modelling had led Freightliner to the conclusion that they could relax their current restrictions consequently the RAIB is concerned that some of the actions they have taken has increased risk. Freightliner has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.\$
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7	10/08/2007	16/2008	Freightliner should act upon and close NIR 2084.	Freightliner has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
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Derailment at Duddeston Junction, Birmingham Status: Implemented				
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8	10/08/2007	16/2008	Network Rail should amend NR/SP/TRK/001 section 11.4.2 to make clear into which regime, areas that are not covered by measurement vehicles but are operated at less than 20 mph (32 km/h), fall. They should also clarify under what conditions it is mandated for the TME to maintain a list of areas of track not covered by measurement vehicles.	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.