Recommendation(s) Status: Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation St	atus
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Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB	
means:	during the investigation.	
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being	
	delivered.	
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is	
	in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.	

Non-implementation: Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.

Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the	
	recommendation.	

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation Network Rail should update the COSS handbook and associated training material with the objective of ensuring that staff that are qualified to act as COSS are fully aware of the hazards associated with working in a Red Zone at locations beyond facing points and can set up appropriate safe systems of work (paragraph 238). Included in the revised documentation should be a clear definition of the term 'approaching train' (paragraph 194).	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)	
1 29/04/2007 04/2008 Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction Status: Implemented		Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. The RAIB is aware that Network Rail and RSSB have now clarified the meaning of the term 'approaching train' and issued a definition for the guidance of staff. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.	
2 29/04/2007 04/2008 Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail, in consultation with RSSB, should carry out human factors research into the impact of peer pressure, group communications and dynamics on safety decision making in small COSS led work teams. This should include a consideration of how teams are constituted and how a relatively inexperienced COSS can deliver authority, compliant behaviour, leadership and a challenge function. The findings of this research should be used to inform a review of training and management systems (paragraph 239).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions (by alternative means) in response to this recommendation. Network Rail has carried out a review of safety leadership and competence issues. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.	
3 29/04/2007 04/2008 Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction Status: Implemented	First Great Western should rebrief all train drivers on the use of a repeated series of horn blasts and the application of the emergency brake. Driver training modules should be updated to include a scenario of track workers not moving clear of an approaching train (paragraphs 241 and 253).	First Great Western has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.	
4 29/04/2007 04/2008 Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction Status: Implemented	Associated rules (eg Rule Book, module T7) and training documentation should clearly state that when working beyond facing points lookouts should give a warning, and staff move to the position of safety, for all trains approaching those points in the facing direction (paragraphs 242 and 245).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.	
5 29/04/2007 04/2008 Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail should implement a national plan to reduce the proportion of weld repairs at points and crossovers undertaken in Red Zones so far as is reasonably practicable (paragraph 243).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions (by alternative means) in response to this recommendation. The RAIB notes that the proportion of maintenance activities carried out on lines that are open to traffic is continuing to fall. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.	
6 29/04/2007 04/2008 Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction Status: Implemented	Network Rail should introduce a procedure that mandates the briefing of Safety Bulletins to its staff within specified timescales (paragraph 246).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.	

	Date/ Report No/ Current Status		Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
7	29/04/2007	04/2008	Network Rail and the National Health Service (NHS) should take	Network Rail and the National Health Service (NHS) have
Track worker fatality at Ruscombe Junction		combe Junction	steps to correctly implement the existing protocol governing the landing of air ambulance	reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation.
Status: Implemented			helicopters at rail incidents and accidents (paragraph 250).	ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.