

Recommendation(s) Status: Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

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| Implemented: | All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed. |
| Implemented by alternative means: | The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation. |
| Implementation ongoing: | Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered. |
| In-progress: | The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this. |
| Non-implementation: | Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken. |
| Awaiting response: | Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation. |

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

| Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status | Safety Recommendation | Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body) |
|--|--|---|
| <p>1 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail's IMM Sussex should identify all welders in the Area who have only limited experience of working in the Red Zone. The IMM should ensure that all such welders that are qualified to act as COSS have the necessary skills, knowledge and experience to set up a safe system of work in the Red Zone (paragraph 191).</p> | <p>Network Rail has carried out a review in response to this recommendation. Network Rail proposes no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>2 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should update the COSS handbook and associated training material with the objective of ensuring that staff that are qualified to act as COSS are fully aware of the hazards associated with working in a Red Zone at locations beyond facing points and can set up appropriate safe systems of work (paragraphs 191 and 192). Included in the revised documentation should be a clear definition of the term 'approaching train' (paragraph 148).</p> | <p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>3 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should prohibit lookouts from being required to observe the position of points as a means of determining if an approaching train is routed towards the site of work. Associated rules (e.g. rule book, module T7) and training documentation should clearly state that when working beyond facing points lookouts should give a warning, and staff move to the position of safety, for all trains approaching those points in the facing direction (paragraphs 192 and 196).</p> | <p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>4 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should modify its management processes to require that all RT9909 'Record of Site Safety Arrangements and Briefing' forms issued to Controllers of Site Safety contain details of any high speed crossovers and/or points, the direction and speed of associated train movements and a specific warning about the hazards at such locations (paragraph 194).</p> | <p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions (by alternative means) in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>5 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should carry out a detailed assessment of the way in which Business Process Document 0019 and Standard Maintenance Procedure 0094 are being applied. This assessment should include a survey of Work Schedulers to assess the extent to which they feel able to question, or challenge, requests made to them. The results of this assessment should be used to inform a review of the effectiveness of the existing management arrangements and steps taken to rectify any deficiencies identified (paragraph 198).</p> | <p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |

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| <p>6 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should implement a process to ensure that any person requesting that a plan be prepared by a Works Scheduler checks that an appropriate safe system of work has been selected and the adequacy of the resulting 'Record of Site Safety Arrangements and Briefing' form. This check should include a review of the accuracy of data contained and completeness of hazard identification (paragraph 199).</p> | <p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>7 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should assess the feasibility of configuring the SOWPS to automatically check that the work site data entered in the system corresponds with the work site location (paragraph 199).</p> | <p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has taken actions in response to this recommendation and has carried it out by alternative means. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |
| <p>8 17/03/2007 43/2007</p> <p>Near miss involving a track worker at Tinsley Green Junction</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p> | <p>Network Rail should review the presentation of information in Table A of its Sectional Appendices with the objective of clarifying the direction of signalled train movements through junctions and crossovers (paragraph 200).</p> | <p>Network Rail has carried out a review in response to this recommendation. Network Rail proposes no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> |