## Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal collision between a Super Voyager train and car Copmanthorpe

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:


## Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.		
Implemented by alternative	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB		
means:	during the investigation.		
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being		
	delivered.		
In-progress:	gress: The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, i		
	in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.		

Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
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Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the
	recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

 $\Delta$  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

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1 25/09/2006 33/2007 Fatal collision between a Super Voyager train and car Copmanthorpe			There are no recommendations relating to the cause of the accident.	
	25/09/2006 sion between a Sup opmanthorpe plemented	33/2007 ber Voyager train	Network Rail should ensure that all cul-de-sacs currently leading directly to their railway are or have been assessed in line with the DfT guidance referred to in paragraph 58, and that their procedures enforce such assessment for any future changes to the highway infrastructure immediately adjacent to their boundary (paragraph 100).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
	25/09/2006 sion between a Sup opmanthorpe plemented	33/2007 ber Voyager train	Bombardier, in conjunction with HSBC, Voyager Leasing and Angel Trains, should review the protection provided to vulnerable components in the underfloor equipment areas of Class 220, 221 and 222 trains, and assess whether further improved protection against being struck by objects likely to pass under the train can be provided to reduce the risk of damage to safety or environmental related systems in accidents (paragraphs 104, 105, 107).	Network Rail confirm that all closed/downgraded level crossing cul-de-sacs have been identified and risk assessments completed. Also, new crossing closure remits include a requirement to consider new, modified, or residual risks, including vehicle incursion. Where such risks are identified, they are eliminated SFAIRP, or otherwise mitigated according to appropriate standards. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. Closed on 04 November 2008