

Recommendation(s) Status: Derailment of a freight train at Maltby North

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 28/06/2006 24/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Maltby North</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should implement a system to prevent 31 points at Maltby from operating as a train is approaching or passing over them (paragraphs 117 and 119). Time of operation locking of 31 points was implemented in May 2007 (paragraph 125).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 28/06/2006 24/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Maltby North</p> <p>Status: Non-implementation</p>	<p>Network Rail should find out whether there are other similar installations where time of operation locking is specified but not implemented. Based on this, Network Rail should implement appropriate control measures to control the risk of a similar incident occurring at these locations (paragraph 117).</p>	<p>Network Rail does not consider that it is reasonably practicable to implement this recommendation and is proposing no action. ORR has closed the recommendation.</p>
<p>3 28/06/2006 24/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Maltby North</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should design roster patterns for signal boxes that are manned by a single person such that the signaller is not subjected to undue fatigue (paragraph 121).</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>4 28/06/2006 24/2007</p> <p>Derailment of a freight train at Maltby North</p> <p>Status: Non-implementation</p>	<p>Network Rail should alter the design of the interlocking at Maltby so that movement of lever 31 positively destroys detection on the points until they have moved to the new position (paragraph 123).</p>	<p>Network Rail did not consider the recommendation to be relevant to the causation of the accident and is proposing no action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>