

Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
1 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	RSSB, in consultation with affected parties, should review the Rule Book module DC with a view to incorporating a specific provision prohibiting railway staff from stepping over a live conductor rail whilst passing between coupled vehicles (see paragraphs 213 and 214).	RSSB has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
2 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	Freight Operators in areas of DC electrification should provide specific training to all drivers and ground staff with the objective of ensuring that they are fully aware of safe working practices when attending trains on lines with conductor rails. This training should also reinforce the message that the conductor rail should always be treated as live within possessions (see paragraph 214).	Freight Operatorshas reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
3 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	EWS should take steps to control oil contamination of brake blocks during lubrication of the brake rigging so far as is reasonably practicable (see paragraph 215).	EWS has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. ORR has closed the recommendation.
4 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	RSSB should develop a Railway Group Standard provision to prohibit the wearing of shorts by persons who may require to step over or walk close to live conductor rail that is not fitted with guard boarding as part of their duties. The specification for any long trousers that may be mandated should allow for comfort in hot weather and enhanced electrical resistance (see paragraphs 187 and 213) .	RSSB has proposed a change to the rules to its relevant industry committee, which has rejected the RAIB's recommendation. ORR has closed the recommendation.
5 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	Recommendations to address staff behaviour in proximity to the conductor rail within possessions: RSSB, in consultation with affected parties, should review the Rule Book modules DC and G2 with a view to incorporating an explicit statement that staff should always consider the conductor rail inside possessions to be live unless they have been briefed by a person holding a valid conductor rail permit. This should be incorporated into the PTS hand book and the requirements for PTS training courses (see paragraph 216).	RSSB carried out a review and proposed change to module DC. This change was not supported by the Traffic Operation and Management Standards Committee. ORR has closed the recommendation.
6 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Non-implementation	Recommendations to address staff behaviour in proximity to the conductor rail within possessions: Network Rail should review the reference to isolation limits in the WONs with a view to modifying its wording such that railway staff are not misled or confused as to its meaning (see paragraph216).	Network Rail have carried out a review in response to this recommendation. Network Rail propose no further action. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
7 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	Recommendations to address staff behaviour in proximity to the conductor rail within possessions: Network Rail and Freight Operators, should jointly establish a regime for ensuring that all train crew working to and from engineering possessions are given a suitable safety briefing. In areas of DC electrification this should always include a reminder that the conductor rail inside the possession should be treated as live at all times (see paragraph 216).	Network Rail and Foc's A.Network Rail have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
8 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	Recommendations to address other matters observed during the investigation: RSSB, in consultation with affected parties, should review the Rule Book module DC with a view to clarifying the instructions to staff when attending a train in the absence of an insulating trough (see paragraph 218).	RSSB has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
9 29/07/2006 14/2007 Fatal accident involving a train driver, Deal Status: Implemented	Recommendations to address other matters observed during the investigation: Network Rail, in consultation with affected parties, should carry out a review of standards and specifications related to new and upgraded DC electrification systems with the objective of simplifying the arrangements for the taking of isolations, minimising the requirement for trackside staff, and permitting the extension of isolations to include a greater proportion of the associated engineering possessions (e.g. additional remote switching and remotely operated short circuit devices) (see paragraph 218).	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.