Recommendation(s) Status: Huntingdon train door incident

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status		
Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.	
Implemented by alternative	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB	
means:	during the investigation.	
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being	
	delivered.	
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is	
	in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.	

Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the		
	recommendation.		

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
1 15/02/2006 11/2007 Huntingdon train door incident Status: Implemented	FCC should ensure that driver training is reviewed with a view to increasing the emphasis placed on, and understanding of, aligning the unit correctly with the optimum viewing position of the monitor bank. The training should also identify what actions the driver should take if a person is observed to be in close proximity to the side of the train when the driver is taking power (paragraphs 102 and 105).	FCC has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. ORR has closed the recommendation.
2 15/02/2006 11/2007 Huntingdon train door incident Status: Implemented	Network Rail should ensure that the specification for replacement and new CCTV monitors require improved image contrast when viewed at an angle. The specified viewing angle should make a reasonable allowance for variation in a driver's stopping performance (paragraph 108).	Network Rail advises that DOO CCTV Design and Installation is on the Network Rail standards site with a formal publication date of 26/8/2008. Early communication of the requirements took place following document approval on 4/7/08 to ensure that those DOO CCTV projects in early stages of development could take cognisance of the changes. SMIS 10/11/2008 Closed on 04 November 2008
3 15/02/2006 11/2007 Huntingdon train door incident Status: Implemented	HSBC should review the design of the Class 365 Unit door seal and the door control mechanism so as to reduce the door closing forces, with a view to reducing, so far as is reasonably practicable, the forces required to extract trapped objects. This review should take into account existing standards (paragraph 104).	HSBC has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
4 15/02/2006 11/2007 Huntingdon train door incident Status: Implemented	Network Rail should review the position of the cameras associated with the CCTV system for DOO at Huntingdon station with the objective of minimising the likelihood that a passenger standing in close proximity to the train will obstruct the driver's view of passengers standing at other doors	Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. ORR has closed the recommendation.
5 15/02/2006 11/2007 Huntingdon train door incident Status: Implemented	Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) should review Railway Group Standard GM/RT2473 in terms of the correlation between the obstacle extraction test, seal design and the forces required to extract trapped objects or materials (paragraph 104).	Discuss ORR text 4 box concerning Industry 1
6 15/02/2006 11/2007 Huntingdon train door incident Status: Implemented	FCC should review and if necessary modify the signage and controls for emergency exits at doors on the Class 365 Unit in view of the passenger reaction in this accident so as to ensure 'best' passenger reaction in an emergency is achieved (paragraph 111). This review should be carried out in consultation with the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) and with reference to the existing ATOC standard	FCCI has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status **Safety Recommendation**

Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)

(Reference 13).