

Recommendation(s) Status: The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>NYMR and other operators of locomotives with blastpipes or blastpipe bases welded to the saddle plate, should carry out an immediate, where reasonably practicable, and appropriate NDT examination of the blastpipe base/saddle plate weld and, where necessary, make suitable repairs (paragraph 98).</p>	<p>The NYMR has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>HMRI and HRA should ensure that the forthcoming Code of Practice on the Maintenance and Repair of Locomotive Boilers provides guidance to those repairing existing welded blastpipe bases or constructing such designs from drawings. This should recommend that welds between blastpipe bases and saddle plates should, as a minimum, be sized as shown in the original drawings and that in sizing the weld, consideration should be given to the subsequent inspection periodicity, the arrangement of the adjacent plating and any intention to line the smoke box base with concrete or fire-brick (paragraph 99).</p>	<p>HMRI & HRA have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Non-implementation</p>	<p>Steam Powered Services Limited should have in place procedures to ensure that when defining and agreeing outsourced works to be carried out, the scope of any provision for mechanical inspections is explicitly defined (paragraph 99).</p>	<p>Steam Powered Services Ltd. Have confirmed that the failure that occurred in this instance will be covered in future contracts. The company does not know how the recommendation can be more generally applied.</p> <p>ORR has closed the recommendation.</p>
<p>4 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>NYMR and other operators of locomotives fitted with blastpipes or blastpipe bases welded to the saddle plate, should ensure that the maintenance procedures for those locomotives include NDT inspection of the welds at a periodicity determined by assessing the risk of failure prior to the next inspection (paragraph 99).</p>	<p>NYMR and other operators have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>5 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>When developing maintenance and overhaul schedules, NYMR should assess the hazards to operating staff and the public that the specific design of locomotive concerned presents, and develop the schedules to account for those hazards (paragraph 100).</p>	<p>NYMR has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> <p>ORR has closed the recommendation.</p>

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<p>6 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>HMRI and HRA should assess the applicability of Recommendation 5 to other steam locomotive operators and, if it is more widely applicable, incorporate the recommendation within the forthcoming Code of Practice for the Maintenance and Repair of Steam Locomotive Boilers and any other standards or guidance they issue on steam locomotive maintenance (paragraph 100).</p>	<p>HMRI and HRA have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p>
<p>7 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>NYMR should ensure that a first-aid kit is provided and its provision clearly indicated in all locomotive driving cabs (paragraph 102).</p>	<p>The NYMR have rejected this recommendation as impracticable. No HRMI view has reached RAIB. The RAIB considers that the recommendation should be implemented, give that may the railways have no public priority a satisfactory 1st Aid Kit in a steam locomotive cab. AJS understands now accepted - if so OK, otherwise would wish completed.</p>
<p>8 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>NYMR should use steel smoke box blower feed pipes as recommended by HMRI RSPG or, if copper is to be used, should put in place procedures to ensure that it is maintained in a fully annealed state (paragraph 103).</p>	<p>NYMR has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. ORR has closed the recommendation.</p>
<p>9 16/04/2006 04/2007</p> <p>The blowback of a locomotive fire at Grosmont on the NYMR</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>RSSB should allow the HRA direct access to the NIR system, both to raise NIRs and receive them (paragraph 104).</p>	<p>RSSB has taken actions to enable access to safety critical information for the heritage sector. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. Orr is considering whether to close the recommendation.</p>