## Recommendation(s) Status: Near Miss at Lewes station due to SPAD (Autumn Adhesion Part 2)

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:


## Key to Recommendation Status

| Implemented:               | All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.                                      |  |
|----------------------------|---|--|
|                            |   |  |
| Implemented by alternative | The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB    |  |
| means:                     | during the investigation.   |  |
|                            |   |  |
| Implementation ongoing:    | Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being     |  |
|                            | delivered.  |  |
|                            |   |  |
| In-progress:               | The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is |  |
|                            | in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.                  |  |

|  | Non-implementation: | Regulation $12(2)(b)(iii) =$ recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken. |
|--|---------------------|--|
|--|---------------------|--|

## Awaiting response: Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.





The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

| Number/ Date/ Report No/<br>Inv Title / Current Status                                     | Safety Recommendation   | Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)  |
|--|---|---|
| 1 30/11/2005 25/2006 Pt 2<br>Near Miss at Lewes station due to SPAD<br>Status: Implemented | Network Rail to: I conduct a review of the approach used to<br>assess the competence of new and existing signallers in their<br>use of emergency equipment and amend it as necessary to<br>ensure that he questions used probe a signaller's understanding<br>of how they would use the emergency equipment provided;   | Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response<br>to this recommendation.<br>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become<br>aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.                                  |
|  | use the training simulator at Redhill to test signallers employed<br>in the Sussex Route periodically on their response to rarely-<br>experienced scenarios such as the need to stop all trains and<br>specific trains in an emergency;   |   |
|  | review and modify as appropriate their current practice on other<br>routes to exploit the availability of simulators for testing<br>signallers periodically on their response to rarely-experienced<br>scenarios such as the need to stop all trains and specific trains<br>in an emergency (see paragraph 105).  |   |
| 2 30/11/2005 25/2006 Pt 2<br>Near Miss at Lewes station due to SPAD<br>Status: Implemented | Network Rail to enhance Clause 5.2 of the Occupational Health<br>& Safety Manual (NR/SP/OHS/00119) to include the requirement<br>for staff to be tested for drugs and alcohol when their actions or<br>omissions, under slightly different circumstances, could have<br>resulted in or contributed to the occurrence or consequences of<br>an accident or serious incident (see paragraph 105).   | Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response<br>to this recommendation.<br>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become<br>aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.                                  |
| 3 30/11/2005 25/2006 Pt 2<br>Near Miss at Lewes station due to SPAD<br>Status: Implemented | Network Rail, Sussex and Southern Railway to jointly review,<br>and modify as appropriate, their Control Room procedures<br>governing the communication of incident details to ensure that<br>they correctly identify the key information, including details of all<br>staff involved and ensure that appropriate action is taken to<br>promote the welfare of staff and the safety of the railway (see<br>paragraph 05).<br>The review should consider the need to amend procedure C32<br>of the Network Rail Control Manual, and if appropriate arrange<br>for the necessary amendments to be made and implemented. | Network Rail, Sussex and Southern Railway have reported that<br>they have taken actions in response to this recommendation.<br>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become<br>aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. |