

Recommendation(s) Status: Report on a runaway trolley between Larkhall & Barncluith Tunnel




This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into six categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
In-progress:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following.

-  The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.
-  The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.
-  The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on latest report from the relevant safety authority or public body)
<p>1 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Harsco should change the brake lining material used on their manually propelled trolleys to one that is capable of stopping a loaded trolley on a 1 in 30 gradient within a distance to be specified in a revised Railway Group Standard GM/RT/1310.</p>	<p>Harsco has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>2 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>RSSB should propose a change to the Railway Group Standard GM/RT/1310 to include appropriate stopping distances for a fully loaded manually propelled rail plant on a 1 in 30 gradient. This stopping distance should be achieved in conditions representative of operational conditions (ie including wet and dry conditions). The proposed changes should also recognise the requirements of EN 13977.</p>	<p>RSSB has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>3 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Harsco should change the design of the brake handle on the Type B trolley to prevent incorrect usage (completed).</p>	<p>Harsco has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>4 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Harsco should revise their user guidance on the use of the Type B trolley with particular reference to;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •the need for, and means of testing the braking system both at depot/works and at site as appropriate; •the risks and mitigations associated with braking performance on gradients; •the risk and mitigation associated with the braking performance in wet or icy conditions. <p>The risk and mitigation associated with contamination of the brake linings (all points completed).</p>	<p>Harsco has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>5 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Torrent Trackside should ensure that;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •their maintenance procedures take account of the guidance issued by Harsco as in Recommendation 4. <p>instruction is available to identify the operational checks required and risks associated with trolley operation taking account of the information in Recommendation 4. This should be issued to those using the trolley (for inclusion in method statements and risk assessments).</p>	<p>Torrent Trackside has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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<p>6 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Carillion should review its safety management system and related processes and introduce changes to;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •ensure that information that affects safety can be easily sourced by those staff preparing method statements, and site supervisors, through the IMS database. •ensure that staff engaged in hazard identification, risk assessment and the production of method statements or safety critical documentation are competent for these tasks and that they have access to appropriate source information. •ensure that if short notice changes to working arrangements are to be made they are supported by appropriate risk assessments and method statements that are documented and can be subject to safety validation and audit. •ensure project staff are aware of safety critical information. •implement a means of assessing the effectiveness of site briefings so that necessary improvements are made. <p>Ensure the national processes for checking competencies are adequately briefed and implemented.</p>	<p>Carillion has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>7 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Carillion should conduct a review of the supervision and audit arrangements of their safety management system including but not limited, to the Worksafe Procedures, to ensure that its policy intent is being delivered in practice and to enable suitable remedial action to be taken.</p>	<p>Carillion has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>8 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Carillion and Skyblue should ensure that there are auditable procedures in place to ensure all staff engaged upon safety management roles have the capability to manage the safety of relevant staff.</p>	<p>Carillion and Skyblue have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>9 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>RSSB should propose revision of the rulebook to recognise the risks associated with the braking performance of trolleys in wet or icy conditions, on gradients and with contaminated brakes, along with instruction to perform any necessary brake test to demonstrate the trolley brake is performing to its specification in all circumstances.</p>	<p>RSSB has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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<p>10 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should revise its training requirements to match the output of recommendation 9, and introduce a competency within the Sentinel system for a person in charge of trolleys.</p>	<p>Despite initial rejection of this recommendation, Network Rail has introduced a Sentinel competency to cover those in charge of trolleys.</p> <p>ORR propose to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>11 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Harsco to ensure that plant acceptance approval is obtained for all existing plant (Harsco are awaiting a Network Rail response and approval to the Type B design change submission made in January 2006).</p>	<p>Harsco has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>12 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should review their guidance on product acceptance processes and 'grandfather rights', with particular reference to plant, to ensure that there is clarity to relevant parties on the design change approvals criteria and particularly in respect where it affects 'grandfather rights'.</p>	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>13 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>All Infrastructure Controllers should brief relevant contractors and staff of the risks associated with braking performance on gradients, in wet/icy conditions, and with contaminated brakes.</p>	<p>Most Infrastructure Controllers have considered and taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>14 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail should carry out a risk assessment on the use of red lights on trolleys used in T2 sites and either;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •enforce the existing requirement for such lights, which will include the fitting of brackets to all existing and future trolleys on the network; •or propose a modification to Rule Book Module T2, paragraph 15.5, to remove the requirement for a red light on a trolley. 	<p>Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
<p>15 02/11/2005 20/2006</p> <p>Report on runway trolley between Larkhall and Barncluith Tunnell</p> <p>Status: Implemented</p>	<p>Network Rail and Carillion should review their instructions to staff and contractors to ensure that accidents and incidents are notified to RAIB as required by the RAIR Regulations 2005.</p>	<p>Network Rail and Carillion have reported that they have taken actions in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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Inv Title / Current Status**

16 02/11/2005 20/2006

Report on runaway trolley between Larkhall
and Barnclyth Tunnell

Status: Implemented

Safety Recommendation

Network Rail should review its procedures for accident investigation to ensure that lessons learned from such investigations are adequately reviewed as potential precursor events, and when so identified are briefed on an industry wide basis.

**Summary of current status (based on latest report
from the relevant safety authority or public body)**

Network Rail has reported that it has taken actions in response to this recommendation.
ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.