

ABP Humber Standing Notice to Mariners,
9th May 2003

ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS

STANDING NOTICE TO MARINERS

(No. S.H.19)

NOTICE TO SHIPOWNERS, AGENTS, MASTERS, **AUTHORISED PILOTS AND PILOTAGE** **EXEMPTION CERTIFICATE HOLDERS**

RESTRICTIONS ON ALL VESSELS CARRYING DANGEROUS **SUBSTANCES NAVIGATING THE HUMBER IN POOR** **VISIBILITY**

CLASS OF VESSELS

Pursuant to Section 6 of the General Directions for Navigation in the Humber (No. 1) of 1974, (Standing Notice to Mariners No. S.H.1) all vessels, including commercial river craft, carrying a dangerous substance (as defined in the Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987) in bulk, or in ballast and not gas-free are **PROHIBITED** from entry in, exit from, or movement within the Humber in visibility of 5 cables or less without the express permission of the Harbour Master, Humber.

If, however, a vessel which is already underway and navigating within the Humber encounters such conditions it may continue providing that the Master acting upon the advice of his Pilot, or the Pilot Exemption Holder is confident that it is safe to do so. In such circumstances, however, he should proceed at slow speed and with extreme caution.

Any vessel in the class specified seeking a sheltered anchorage within the Humber in conditions of reduced visibility shall be allowed entry at the discretion of the Master and/or Pilot, and with the agreement of the Harbour Master.

Standing Notice to Mariners No. S. H. 19 dated 1st January 2001 issued by Associated British Ports is hereby cancelled.

HARBOUR MASTER, HUMBER

9 May 2003

VTs Fog Log

ABP General Notice to Pilots
No 23/2004

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GENERAL NOTICE TO PILOTS

NO. 23/2004

ALSO FOR THE PARTICULAR ATTENTION OF AHMS AND PILOT LAUNCH CREWS

Ladies and Gentlemen

GROUNDING IN VICINITY OF SPURN LIGHT FLOAT (SLF)

On Wednesday, 17th November 2004 the vessel 'Travestern' grounded 2.5 cables west of Spurn Light Float whilst inbound and manoeuvring to embark his pilot.

The grounding occurred 1 hour before low water at Spurn in daylight and good visibility just moments after the pilot stepped aboard. The laden, 17,000 dwt double-hulled tanker was successfully refloated 1 hour after LW (tugs stood by but not assisting) without damage to the vessel or cargo.

Our internal investigation revealed that the ship's master had been to the Humber previously but this was his first approach for a low water berthing and he had not acquainted himself with the tidal set and had not clearly identified the shoal water which lies outside the channel to the north and west of SLF.

Having allowed insufficient time to make passage from the Humber Anchorage to SLF the vessel was running late on his ETA and was approaching the pilot boarding area at 12 knots. With the vessel 1 mile east of SLF and the pilot launch approaching from the west and in VHF contact some confusion arose as to which side the pilot would board – the ladder was rigged starboard side but the ship's OOW seemed to be indicating that it would be moved so that a port lee could be made. The delay caused by this confusion and the ship's approach speed resulted in the vessel being boarded to the west of SLF near to the northern edge of the channel and with a swing to starboard still being required to make a lee because the ship's crew had not rigged a port ladder, as indicated.

With the pilot aboard the ship's deck and the ship swinging back to port she grounded as the stern swung over the 5.5m ridge north of the channel (ships draught 8.6m, Spurn gauge 2.1m).

As can be seen from the foregoing the grounding was caused by a combination of factors and although successfully refloated without becoming a major incident, as a Competent Harbour Authority we must learn from this occurrence and ensure that we are as proactive as

possible with our procedures to safeguard against any recurrence.

Our agreed procedure for pilot boarding is that VTS guide the ship to the designated boarding position, the launch coxswain has responsibility for bringing his launch safely alongside the ship and the pilot has responsibility for his own safe transfer to the ship.

Within that procedure we must focus in particular on the following points:-

- 1) As vessels approach the Humber (especially larger, deep draughted ones) the AHM should be as proactive as possible in checking on the speed and line of approach having due regard to the state of tide. During communication with the vessel it should be established, inter alia that the master is familiar with set of tide and that his speed is adjusted appropriately for pilot boarding in the designated position to the east of SLF.

If vessels are required to board their pilot further inside (and this should only be due to stress of weather or other exceptional circumstances), the vessels position must be monitored closely and constructive advice given to the master to ensure that he stays within the navigable channel (on the flood with tide setting south he should be heading towards SLF whereas on the ebb with tide setting north he may require advice to steer towards the Alpha Buoy, draught permitting).

- 2) As the pilot launch is proceeding out to the vessel both pilot and coxswain should be liaising closely to organise safe boarding.

The coxswain must confirm with the ship as to which side the ladder is rigged. Pilot and coxswain would then use all available means (visual and radar) to check the ship's position relative to the navigable channel, as well as heading and speed and agree as to how the vessel should be swung to make a lee (where necessary). Such a plan should then be communicated clearly to the ship's master and confirmation of understanding sought. If doubt exists as to the vessel's position the assistance of VTS should be requested to verify the situation.

- 3) If there is concern about the safety of the boarding position or intended manoeuvre, VTS should, after consultation with the pilot launch, be proactive in directing the ship to abort and proceed to a safer boarding position.

By following these procedures we can better control pilot boarding and reduce the risks associated therewith.

HARBOUR MASTER, HUMBER

25th November 2004

www.humber.com