



concerned, and when airframe vibration was experienced it was not unexpected and attributed to frozen snow ruts. The commander then had considerable difficulty in preventing the aircraft yawing to the right even with full left rudder. He also noticed that the performance and acceleration of the aircraft seemed irregular and abandoned the take-off at approximately 65 kt. The aircraft left the runway to the right, the nose undercarriage collapsed as a result of coming into contact with the left hand edge of runway 33, and the aircraft came to rest on the right side of runway 33. The engine fire drills were carried out on both engines, and both bottles were fired. The Aerodrome Fire Service arrived very promptly, and assisted in the disembarkation of the passengers through the forward crew door. There was no fire or serious disruption to the aircraft. Two runway lights were damaged and were repaired that same evening.

The Flight Manual limitations for a take-off on a contaminated runway specify that there should be no tailwind component, the crosswind component should not exceed 8 kt if the braking action is reported as poor, and the depth of dry snow should not exceed 60 mm. The runway visual range (RVR) required for take-off on this runway was 150 metres. These criteria were all met.

The runway, grass, and accident site were examined the following morning, and it was noted that an Operational Readiness Platform (ORP) widened the first 260 metres of runway 35 by approximately 45 metres to the right. The first four right hand runway edge lights were flush fitted along the length of the ORP, bisecting the widened threshold area; the succeeding lights ran alongside the runway edge, and were 26 cm high.

Wheel tracks in the snow and grass on the right side of runway 35 were found to run continuously from halfway along the ORP. The main wheel tracks were either side of the flush runway edge lighting, with the nose wheel track following the line of the lights. As the right main wheel left the ORP and ran on to the grass, the marks indicated a slight yaw to the left with the nosewheel track running along the runway edge, and inside the raised runway edge lighting.

At a point 290 metres from the runway 35 threshold, the aircraft had yawed slightly to the right. At 400 metres all three sets of wheel tracks left the runway and ran along the grass almost parallel to the right hand runway edge. The right mainwheel had progressively sunk in the soft ground to a depth of 46 cm, and the width of the nosewheel track indicated that it was considerably offset from the fore and aft axis of the aircraft. Subsequent examination of the aircraft confirmed that the nosewheel was offset to the left when it struck the edge of runway 33 and collapsed. There was also considerable mud-spattering and some stone damage on the right side of the aircraft.

In their initial and independent statements, both pilots were convinced that the take-off was normal and on the runway centrelines until take-off was abandoned, and that the aircraft then left the runway. When the wheel track and associated evidence was found and passed on to the pilots, it was unequivocally accepted. They were aware that there was no runway centreline lighting at Aberdeen.

Runway 17 also has an ORP on its eastern threshold, and before taxiway centreline lighting from the eastern parking area was installed, CAA recorded three similar incidents on that runway.