

## AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT No 4/2010

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### REPORT ON THE SERIOUS INCIDENT TO BOEING 777-236, G-VIIR AT ROBERT L BRADSHAW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ST KITTS, WEST INDIES ON 26 SEPTEMBER 2009

<b>Operator:</b>	British Airways
<b>Aircraft Type and Model:</b>	Boeing 777-236
<b>Registration:</b>	G-VIIR
<b>Location:</b>	Robert L Bradshaw International Airport, St Kitts, West Indies
<b>Date and Time:</b>	26 September 2009, 2105 hrs All times in this report are UTC

#### Synopsis

The crew received the aircraft's takeoff performance figures for a takeoff from Intersection Alpha on Runway 07 at Robert L Bradshaw International Airport, St Kitts, West Indies. Having received taxi clearance to Intersection Alpha, the aircraft taxied to Intersection Bravo from where it subsequently took off; the crew believed they were at Intersection Alpha. Intersection Bravo on Runway 07 is not an authorised takeoff intersection for the Boeing 777. The estimated Take-off Run Available from Intersection Bravo was approximately 1220 m, which was 695 m less than the planned takeoff run from Intersection Alpha.

The AAIB was informed of the incident by the operator on 29 September 2009 who subsequently notified the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority (ECCAA)<sup>1</sup>.

#### Footnote

<sup>1</sup> The Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority, who are based in Antigua, has oversight for Robert L Bradshaw International Airport.

The investigation was then delegated to the AAIB which represents the State of Registration.

Three Safety Recommendations have been made.

The investigation identified the following contributory factors:

- 1 The airport authority had not installed any taxiway or holding point signs on the airfield.
- 2 The crew did not brief the taxi routing.
- 3 The crew misidentified Taxiway Bravo for Taxiway Alpha and departed from Intersection Bravo.
- 4 The trainee ATCO did not inform the flight crew that they were at Intersection Bravo.

**Findings**

- 1 Both the pilot and co-pilot were properly licensed and qualified to operate the aircraft.
- 2 The aircraft was certified, equipped and maintained in accordance with the existing regulations and approved procedures.
- 3 The crew had calculated the aircraft performance figures for a TORA of 1,915 m from Intersection Alpha.
- 4 The TORA from Intersection Bravo was 1,220 m.
- 5 The crew did not brief the taxi routing.
- 6 There were no taxiway or holding point signs on the airfield.
- 7 The crew misidentified Taxiway Bravo for Taxiway Alpha and departed from Intersection Bravo.
- 8 The ECCAA did not take appropriate action to ensure the findings of the 2006 airfield inspection were acted upon in a timely manner.
- 9 St Kitts had not filed any differences to Annex 14 with ICAO.
- 10 The lack of signage was not published in the ECAIP.
- 11 There was no formal means of incident reporting within ATC.
- 12 The operator had not conducted a physical survey of the airfield.

**Safety Recommendations**

The following Safety Recommendations have been made:

**Safety Recommendation 2010-047**

It is recommended that the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority ensure that Robert L Bradshaw International Airport, St Kitts, establishes a Safety Management System for its airfield operations.

**Safety Recommendation 2010-048**

It is recommended that the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority ensures that the infrastructure of Robert L Bradshaw International Airport, St Kitts, complies with ICAO Annex 14 Standards and Recommended Practices or any differences are filed. In the interim a NOTAM of outstanding deficiencies should be published.

**Safety Recommendation 2010-049**

It is recommended that British Airways review the process by which all new destination airfields are inspected to identify any operational issues.