

Jabiru SK, G-BYNL

AAIB Bulletin No: 12/2003	Ref: EW/G2003/06/32	Category: 1.3
Aircraft Type and Registration:	Jabiru SK, G-BYNL	
No & Type of Engines:	1 Jabiru Aircraft Pty 2200A piston engine	
Year of Manufacture:	1999	
Date & Time (UTC):	22 June 2003 at 1045 hrs	
Location:	Tatenhill Airfield, Staffordshire	
Type of Flight:	Private	
Persons on Board:	Crew - 1	Passengers - None
Injuries:	Crew - None	Passengers - N/A
Nature of Damage:	Damage to propeller, spinner and engine cowling	
Commander's Licence:	Private Pilot's Licence	
Commander's Age:	56 years	
Commander's Flying Experience:	250 hours (of which 94 were on type)	
	Last 90 days - 14 hours	
	Last 28 days - 7 hours	
Information Source:	Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot and further enquiries by the AAIB	

The aircraft was departing from Runway 08 on a flight to Retford (Gamston). During the latter stages of the take-off run the pilot observed that the indicated airspeed was less than he expected considering the aircraft's apparent groundspeed and the satisfactory operation of the engine. The pilot decided to continue since there was insufficient runway remaining to safely reject the takeoff. Once airborne the pilot maintained the engine at full power and the aircraft in a shallow climb in order to ensure a safe margin above the stall speed. He turned the aircraft downwind into a left-hand circuit and informed the airfield air/ground radio operator of the nature of the apparent instrument malfunction and of his intention to land back on Runway 08.

On the final approach the pilot assessed the surface wind to be close to the aircraft's crosswind limit. In addition, at about 50 feet above the runway threshold the flap lever, which had been set to the landing setting, slipped out of its detent, allowing the flap to move and causing the aircraft to drop suddenly. The pilot initiated a go-around. Whilst positioning for the next circuit he was advised that the wind direction was now straight down Runway 04 so he requested an approach to that runway.

Using a combination of engine power setting and aircraft attitude the pilot deliberately flew the approach at a speed that he estimated to be faster than normal. During the early stages of the approach his GPS indicated a ground speed of between 50 and 60 kt. In the final stages the pilot assessed, from the airfield windsock, that the surface wind had veered to approximately 080°. As a

result of its extra speed the aircraft touched down about half way down the runway and the pilot also found himself having to contend with a significant crosswind from the right. With tall trees ahead the pilot was committed to the landing; however, he realised that he was not going to be able to stop within the remaining runway available and that a five bar metal gate lay beyond it. To avoid running into this gate the pilot turned the aircraft to the left and it ran into a hawthorn hedge at a speed of approximately 10 kt before coming to an abrupt halt. There was no fire and the pilot, who was uninjured, was able to exit normally. The aircraft suffered damage to its propeller, spinner and engine cowling.

Subsequent examination of the pitot tube revealed that its inlet was blocked by a thin film of what appeared to be dried mud. There was also an obstruction further inside the tube which was identified as the work of an egg-laying wasp. Neither of these had been noticed when the pilot had removed the pitot cover during his pre-flight inspection.

The aircraft had last flown on 8 June. Following that flight the cover had been left off the pitot tube for about one week before eventually being replaced by the pilot who had flown the aircraft on that flight. It is probably during this period that the egg-laying wasp had entered the pipe connecting the pitot tube to the ASI.

The pilot involved in this accident commented that he should have aborted his second approach and then landed on Runway 08, which would have been more into the wind. However, he had been concerned that his continued presence in the circuit was inconveniencing another aircraft holding to the south and that the airfield fire vehicle was on stand by. These factors contributed to the pressure he felt to expedite his landing.

The pilot concluded that refitting the pitot cover during periods when the aircraft is not being flown would prevent a similar blockage in the pitot system. The incident also highlights the importance of checking the pitot tube for any obstructions during the pre-flight inspection.