Airbus A310, C-GRYI

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INCIDENT

Aircraft Type and Registration:	Airbus A310, C-GRYI
No & Type of Engines:	2 GE CF6 80CR turbofan engines
Year of Manufacture:	1986
Date & Time (UTC):	19 August 2000 at 2120 hrs
Location:	London Gatwick Airport
Type of Flight:	Public Transport
Persons on Board:	Crew - 9 - Passengers - 250
Injuries:	Crew - None - Passengers - None
Nature of Damage:	Top of left engine cowl punctured (12"x 6")
Commander's Licence:	Airline Transport Pilot's Licence (Canadian)
Commander's Age:	47 years
Commander's Flying Experience:	7,934 hours (of which 934 were on type) Last 90 days - 195 hours Last 28 days - 80 hours
Information Source:	Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot and report from the London Gatwick ODM

The incident

Stand 15 at London Gatwick Airport has Azimuth Guidance for Nose-In Stands (AGNIS) and Parallax Aircraft Parking (PAPA) systems. Emergency Stop buttons are available at ground level and in the jetty head. Activation of either button extinguishes both the AGNIS and the PAPA and a red STOP sign is illuminated in the area below the AGNIS.

The aircraft was taxied onto Stand 15 but the commander failed to bring it to a halt before the left engine cowl struck the underside of the jetty.

Commander's report

The company Airfield Plates for London Gatwick Airport did not contain any information on the stand entry guidance system in use.

As the aircraft turned onto the stand, the commander saw that both the green stand number '15' and the AGNIS system were illuminated. The remainder of the stand appeared to be in darkness and he did not notice the PAPA board. Both pilots concentrated on the AGNIS but periodically looked at the dark panel to the right of it. They expected to see some form of stopping information, similar to that they were accustomed to in, for example, Vancouver. The commander reported that he felt uneasy as the aircraft got closer to the terminal building but thought that the AGNIS would flash or go off if the aircraft was in any danger. He then decided that "something was just not right" and stopped the aircraft, set the park brake and shut down both engines. The crew felt no impact and it was not until later that the commander saw that the left engine had struck the jetty.

The commander reported that, about 5 minutes after the aircraft had stopped, he noticed the PAPA board and observed that the white vertical light was illuminated but "the front floodlights had not been turned on."

The commander had had a very demanding schedule over the previous two days which was made worse by rescheduling and delay. He considered that the consequent fatigue he felt may have been a factor in this incident.

Operations Duty Manager's (ODM) report

The ODM reported that the aircraft had overshot the A310 stop mark by about 8.7 metres and the No 1 engine had come into contact with, and slid underneath, the bridge section of the jetty. The jetty wheels were still in the parking position and the parking aids were still illuminated.

The dispatcher had activated the parking aids and was positioned at the jetty head. When it became apparent that a collision was about to occur, he pressed what he thought was the Emergency Stop button. Subsequent investigation by the ODM determined that the dispatcher had pressed the Jetty Emergency Stop button first; this isolates power to both the jetty and the parking aids; it removes power from the jetty head Emergency Stop button so the STOP sign did not illuminate when he did eventually press it.

The ODM also spoke briefly to the commander who told him that the strip light across the top of the PAPA board was not illuminated which made the board difficult to see.

Immediately after the incident, jetty power was restored and both the parking aid and Emergency Stop systems were tested; both were found to be fully operational.