

Cessna 340, G-KINK, 30 May 1996

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Aircraft Type and Registration:	Cessna 340, G-KINK
No & Type of Engines:	2 Continental TSIO-520-K piston engines
Year of Manufacture:	1972
Date & Time (UTC):	30 May 1996 at 1603 hours
Location:	1/2 nm north of Halfpenny Green Airport
Type of Flight:	Private
Persons on Board:	Crew - 1 Passengers - 2
Injuries:	Crew - Minor Passengers - Minor
Nature of Damage:	Aircraft destroyed
Commander's Licence:	Private Pilot's Licence with IMC and Night Rating
Commander's Age:	46 years
Commander's Flying Experience:	605 hours (of which 289 were on type) Last 90 days - 2 hours Last 28 days - 2 hours
Information Source:	Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot plus CAA Occurrence Report, video recording and telephone calls

Background

On the Cessna 340, fuel for each engine may be supplied by one of three different tanks per side: a main tank on each wing tip; an auxiliary tank in each wing and a locker tank in the rear of each engine nacelle. The locker tanks contain electric pumps which have to be switched by the pilot to transfer their contents into the main tanks when there is sufficient space in the main tanks for the additional fuel. Normally each engine is supplied by fuel from either the aux or the main tank on the same side but cross-feeding from a main tank is available if required.

The fuel valves are remote from the selectors and are actuated by cables. There is no separate cross-feed valve; each engine has its own rotary fuel valve selector on the cabin floor between the pilots' seats which may be set to a number of positions. The design of the valve selectors is such that there is a spring-loaded detent at each of four positions which are: LEFT MAIN TANK, AUX TANK, RIGHT MAIN TANK AND ENGINE OFF. A diagram of the fuel valve selectors is shown below.

Figure 1

Main or auxiliary tank contents can be shown on a twin (left-right) fuel quantity gauge on the instrument panel. A microswitch operated by each fuel selector causes the respective side of the fuel gauge to display the contents of the selected tanks, except in the case of cross-feed, when the contents of the main tank on the same side as the cross-feeding engine is displayed on the respective side of the gauge. Thus, for example, if the right fuel selector is positioned to the left main tank, the right needle of the fuel gauge will still display the contents of the right main tank. Each main tank is also fitted with a float operated switch that is intended to illuminate a 'low fuel' caution light on an annunciator panel when the fuel level is below approximately 160 lb (27 US gallons). Fuel is normally supplied to the engines by engine driven pumps backed-up by electrical fuel pumps in each of the main tanks. There are no back-up pumps in the auxiliary tanks; for that reason the fuel selector valves must be set to main tanks for take off and landing.

History of the flight

The pilot carried out extensive pre-flight checks of G-KINK which had been little used during the preceding six months. During these checks he established visually that the left main (tip) fuel tank was 30% full and the right main fuel tank was 40% full (the tanks can each hold 51 US gallons which equates to approximately 306 lb per side). Both wing (auxiliary) tanks were full but the locker tanks were empty.

At 1539 hrs the aircraft departed Halfpenny Green in CAVOK weather conditions for a brief local flight to the west of the airfield. After climbing to an altitude of 2,500 feet and establishing cruise power conditions, the pilot changed the fuel valve selectors from main to auxiliary tanks on both engines. A few minutes later, he set course for a return to Halfpenny Green and changed the fuel selectors back to main tanks on both engines. At this stage the left tank indicated 50 lb remaining and the right tank indicated 70 lb remaining but the pilot had established during his pre-flight checks that these tank gauges were over-reading.

About 13 nm from the airport the pilot lowered one stage of flap and obtained 'clearance' from Halfpenny Green Information for an overhead join for landing on Runway 16 from a left-hand circuit. The aircraft overflew the airport and after reducing engine power to 20 inches manifold pressure and 2,200 RPM, the pilot manoeuvred to the west of Runway 16 where he descended on the 'dead side' in preparation for the downwind leg.

In his report to the AAIB, the pilot stated that on throttling back, both engines faltered whereupon he checked that all the throttle, pitch and mixture levers were fully forward, the fuel pumps were switched on and that main tanks were selected on both engines. He then declared an emergency on the AFIS frequency and requested an immediate left orbit with the intention of landing on Runway 16. Initially power was restored on both engines and the pilot lowered the landing gear in preparation for a shortfield landing on Runway 16. However, at approximately 300 ft agl, whilst still travelling downwind, the left engine stopped. There was no time to feather the propeller but the pilot applied right rudder and, with the aircraft descending rapidly, he decided to force-land straight

ahead into a field of standing crop to the north west of the airfield. Unfortunately, whilst manoeuvring to avoid farm buildings, the aircraft's left wing tip struck electricity power lines. During the subsequent crash landing the aircraft slid about 50 yards and latterly it 'cartwheeled' in the standing crop and came to rest upside down. There was no fire and all three occupants remained suspended by their seat harnesses. The pilot noticed a strong smell of fuel which was dripping from the region of the fuel valve selectors. He switched off the battery master and engine magneto switches; he also attempted to select both fuel valves to the OFF position but initially he was unsuccessful.

After some difficulty, probably due to the weight of the now inverted boarding steps, the pilot succeeded in opening the main cabin door and together with his passengers, he vacated the aircraft and moved to a safe distance to await the arrival of the emergency services. However, before long, when he was convinced there was no longer any danger of fire, he returned to the aircraft to recover documents and valuables. At the same time he confirmed that the electrical switches were off and he succeeded in turning the left engine fuel valve selector to OFF. However, the right fuel valve selector could not be moved to the OFF position.

Examination of the Wreckage

Post accident checks of the wreckage revealed that both propellers were bent rearwards in a manner consistent with low power or windmilling. All the fuel tanks were disrupted and it was not possible to reconstruct the disposition of fuel in the various tanks. Nevertheless, there was fuel between the flow divider and the fuel injectors of the right engine but no fuel in the corresponding locations on the left engine indicating that it had stopped due to fuel starvation.

The aircraft maintenance organisation which recovered the wreckage stated that the fuel valves on the Cessna 340 must be operated with great care. The selectors have indicating bands which may be wider than the selectable range and the valves must be carefully placed in the correct detent by feel as well as by sight. Moreover, during an investigation into a similar accident to Cessna 340A, G-XGBE reported in AAIB Bulletin 11/93, it was noted that both valve selectors are positioned athwartships whichever of the two main tanks is selected. Therefore, it is possible inadvertently to run both engines off the same main fuel tank resulting in near simultaneous engine failure when the fuel in the tank is exhausted.

The senior fireman who attended the accident scene also attempted to move the right engine fuel valve selector to the OFF position without success. He reported that the selector was stuck and would not move in either direction. He remembered, although he could not be absolutely certain, that the selector was pointing to the "9 o'clock" position when viewed from the normal aspect which corresponds to selecting the right engine to feed from the left main tank. If this was indeed the case, and the left main tank ran dry, it is likely that the left engine would stop slightly before the right engine because its fuel lines from the left tank are shorter. This sequence of events is consistent with the sum of the evidence.