BAe ATP, G-MANC

AAIB Bulletin No: 3/2003	Ref: EW/G2002/10/10	Category: 1.1
Aircraft Type and Registration:	BAe ATP, G-MANC	
No & Type of Engines:	2 Pratt & Whitney Canada PW126 turboprop engines	
Year of Manufacture:	1992	
Date & Time (UTC):	12 October 2002 at 0540 hrs	
Location:	Manchester International Airport	
Type of Flight:	Public Transport	
Persons on Board:	Crew - 4	Passengers - None
Injuries:	Crew - None	Passengers - N/A
Nature of Damage:	Damage to right wingtip and aileron	
Commander's Licence:	Airline Transport Pilots Licence	
Commander's Age:	27 years	
Commander's Flying Experience:	3,985 hours (of which 3,413 were on type)	
	Last 90 days - 71 hours	
	Last 28 days - 22 hours	
Information Source:	Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot and further enquiries by the AAIB	

The aircraft was parked on Stand 3 at Manchester Airport while being prepared for departure on a scheduled passenger flight. It was raining heavily at the time. The flight crew were seated in the flight deck when they felt what they described as a violent shudder through the aircraft. The first officer looked out of her side window and saw that a bus had hit the right wing while reversing. The commander went out to inspect the damage and spoke with the driver of the bus who had been unaware, until then, that his vehicle had hit the aircraft.

Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 642 Airside Safety Management contains the following guidance:

Vehicles must not be driven in reverse on the manoeuvring area or apron unless directly engaged in aircraft manoeuvring or servicing. When reverse movement is essential, guidance should be provided to the driver by a person outside the vehicle.

The airport operator had issued an Airside Safety Instruction (ASI) in August 2001, which required all drivers to adopt the procedure of using a banksman to provide external guidance when reversing any vehicle on the apron. It specified that multi-crewed vehicles should use at least one person from the crew as a banksman while the vehicle was reversing. The ASI required organisations operating single crewed vehicles to provide the airport operator with a risk assessment for the reversing of their vehicles, but did not specifically require that a second person should be present. The ASI also indicated that the dangers of reversing were particularly high during an aircraft turnround where space is often limited.

In this case, with a single crewed vehicle, it was the responsibility of the driver to arrange suitable external guidance prior to reversing, but this was not carried out.