

ACCIDENT

Aircraft Type and Registration:	Pilatus Britten Norman BN2A 26 Islander, VP-AAG	
No & Type of Engines:	2 x Lycoming IO-540-E4C5 piston engines	
Year of Manufacture:	1969	
Date & Time (UTC):	2 February 2008 at 1420 hrs	
Location:	Wallblake International Airport, Anguilla	
Type of Flight:	Commercial Air Transport	
Persons on Board:	Crew - 1	Passengers - 2
Injuries:	Crew - 1 (Minor)	Passengers - 2 (Minor)
Nature of Damage:	Substantial	
Commander's Licence:	Air Transport Pilot's Licence issued by the FAA	
Commander's Age:	41 years	
Commander's Flying Experience:	4,217 hours (of which 693 were on type) Last 90 days - not reported Last 28 days - 17 hours	
Information Source:	Aircraft Accident Report produced by the British Virgin Islands office of Air Safety Support International	

Synopsis

The aileron gust lock was not removed prior to flight, resulting in loss of control after takeoff. Distracted by efforts to accommodate a non-revenue passenger on this cargo flight, the pilot did not complete a pre-flight check or check the full and free movement of the flight controls before takeoff.

the operator's Chief Engineer, who would be sitting beside the commander in the right hand seat. However, the commander asked the operator if he could take a family member with him to SXM. The operator agreed and an extra seat was fitted. Witnesses stated that the commander appeared "rushed" prior to departure.

History of the flight

The commander intended to fly the aircraft from Anguilla Wallblake International Airport (AXA) to the neighbouring island of St Maarten (SXM) to await cargo inbound on another flight. The cabin of the aircraft was configured for cargo operations with no passenger seats fitted, as the only other planned occupant was

The commander stated that he partially carried out the normal pre-flight inspection. He then started the engines. Before taxiing he realised that the nose landing gear chocks were still in place so he shut down the left hand engine, removed and stowed the chocks and then restarted the left engine.

The aircraft took off from Runway 10 at 1415 hrs. At between 100 ft and 150 ft the commander initiated a left turn but after some initial movement the ailerons jammed. When he discovered that he was unable to straighten the ailerons he attempted to return to land on Runway 10. The other flight controls did not appear to be restricted.

With the ailerons jammed, the aircraft continued to turn to the left, losing altitude as it flew over a settlement to the north of the aerodrome, until pointed directly at the Air Traffic Control tower, causing the Air Traffic Control Officer (ATCO) to abandon the tower. The commander judged that the aircraft was too fast and high to attempt a landing and therefore initiated a go-around, applying full power. He continued the left turn, losing height and speed to position the aircraft for another approach but, as the aircraft descended over the northern edge of the runway, its left wing struck the perimeter fence.

On impact the aircraft spun about its vertical axis with its wings level and continued sliding sideways on its right side for approximately 80 ft before coming to rest facing north-west. The commander made a radio call to inform ATC that everyone on board was safe. The aircraft was substantially damaged but there was no fire or obvious fuel leakage and no serious injuries to the three occupants. On vacating the aircraft the commander noticed that the left aileron gust lock was still in place between the inboard section of the aileron and the fixed trailing edge of the wing.

Aircraft examination

Examination of the left aileron and trailing edge revealed damage that was inconsistent with the impact sequence, indicating that the aileron and trailing edge had been deformed by an external object. There were no indications of an internal defect that would have

contributed to jamming of the aileron. A review of the technical logbook and previous aircraft scheduled maintenance work pack covering the previous 12 months did not reveal any irregularities.

Further inspection of the aileron gust lock revealed that it was not the type supplied by the aircraft manufacturer, which comprises two plates that clamp the aileron from above and below to prevent movement. The gust lock in use was a triangular metal cap positioned over the trailing edges of the wing and aileron and secured with a bungee cord. A hood on the opposite end of the bungee cord formed the pitot/static head cover. As the aileron gust lock had remained in place, so had the pitot/static cover, rendering the altitude, airspeed and rate of climb instruments unreliable. The aircraft manufacturer supplies a separate pitot/static cover.

Conclusions

The commander was probably distracted from his normal duties whilst arranging additional seating to accommodate the second passenger. He did not complete the requisite pre-flight check or the subsequent check of full and free movement of the flight controls, either of which would have revealed an obstruction to proper operation of the ailerons.

Overseas Territories Report

Please note that a more comprehensive report, produced for the Governor of Anguilla, by Air Safety Support International, is available from:

Governor's Office, Old Ta, PO Box 60, The Valley,
Anguilla AI-2640, West Indies

All accidents and serious incidents that occur in the United Kingdom Overseas Territories are now investigated directly by the AAIB and a full report published by the AAIB.