INTRODUCTION

The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games will be the largest sporting event ever to be staged in the United Kingdom. In securing the bid to host the Games, the UK Government guaranteed to undertake the measures necessary to ensure the safety and security of those participating in and attending the Games. We will take an intelligence led, risk based approach in achieving this.

This summary outlines the methodology used to identify the types of risk being considered that those charged with delivering a safe and secure Games have to manage.

The Olympic Security Directorate (OSD), part of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism within the Home Office, is working with partners to coordinate delivery of the Olympic Safety and Security Strategy on behalf of the Government.

The Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OSSSRA) will inform strategic level decision making by identifying and prioritising risk and the work required to mitigate the risks themselves or their potential consequences.
THE OSSSRA: AN OVERVIEW

The OSSSRA is a classified cross-government document which incorporates expertise from a wide range of Government departments and agencies. It contains assessments of the relative severity of a wide range of major accidents or natural events (collectively known as hazards) and malicious attacks (known as threats), as well as assessments of the potential risks that serious and organised crime, public disorder and domestic extremism may pose to safety and security during the Games. Crucially, the OSSSRA identifies those aspects of safety and security that are unique to the hosting of the Games and that require specific planning, over and above that which is carried out under normal circumstances through the Government’s and other agencies’ existing risk assessment processes.

The scope of the OSSSRA aligns to the scope of the Olympic and Paralympic Safety and Security Strategy (the Strategy) which ensures that:

• it assesses risks that may occur both during the design and build stage and during Games time, acknowledging that the emphasis will be on impacts on safety and security during the period of the Games themselves;
• it assesses risks to all Games locations, whether that be the sporting venues or the physical or electronic infrastructure that supports them;
• it assesses risks for the purposes of all five objectives in the Strategy: Protect; Prepare; Identify and Disrupt; Command, Control, Plan and Resource; and Engage\(^1\), and
• it only assesses those risks that have a safety and security element to them, not those risks that solely have an impact on the smooth running or continuity of the Games themselves; and
• it does not replace existing contingency and safety plans for Games venues or day to day emergency service activity.

TYPES OF RISK

The OSSSRA considers threats and hazards to safety and security during the Games emanating from five distinct areas:

• Terrorism;
• Serious and organised crime;
• Domestic extremism;
• Public disorder; and
• Major accidents and natural events.

In assessing the impacts of any potential risk, the OSSSRA will measures not only the harm that may be caused to individuals, for example through injury, death or damage to personal property, but also the disruption to critical services that support our ability to ensure a safe and secure Games, such as transport systems or the emergency services, and the reputational damage to the UK should a particular risk occur.

\(^1\) An unrestricted pdf version of the Strategy is available
The following section gives an indication of the types of risks that the UK might face during the London 2012 Games. They should be read in the context of the scope of the OSSSRA and in addition to the assessments made in the *National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies: 2010 Edition*. Figure one below gives an indication of these risks.

**Figure 1: An illustration of the risks contained within the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies**
Due to its unrestricted classification, this summary document cannot expand on the exact nature of the threats specified within the OSSSRA. However, the full range of possibilities has been considered.

**TERRORISM**

The UK faces a sustained threat from terrorism. Beyond traditional methods of attack, terrorists may have aspirations to conduct cyber attacks or use non-conventional methods such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances. As a high profile event, the Games are likely to present an appealing target to individuals or terrorist groups.

**ATTACKS ON CROWDED PLACES**

During the Games, London, in particular, will host large numbers of visitors in concentrated areas – both within the Games venues and at organised events such as open air TV screenings.

**ATTACKS ON TRANSPORT SYSTEMS**

There is likely to be an increase in passengers on all types of travel during the Games. Historical evidence suggests that, of the different malicious attacks considered, conventional attacks on open transport systems, such as the Underground are some of the more likely to be attempted. Attacks on air and maritime transport are potentially less likely due to the higher levels of security which are able to be maintained.

**NON-CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS**

These are defined as attacks using non-conventional - chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) - materials. The scale and impact of such an attack would depend on the substance used and also the location of the attack; on public transport, at a Games venue or elsewhere. It could cause longer lasting disruption than other types of attack because of the contamination of people and infrastructure.

Proportionate levels of protective and other security measures will be put in place – or enhanced during Games time – to reduce the risks posed by terrorists identified in the OSSSRA.

**CRIME, PUBLIC DISORDER AND DOMESTIC EXTREMISM**

**CRIME**

The experience at previous Games is that low-level crime falls at and in the vicinity of Olympic venues during their operational phase. An appropriate focus will be provided on the concentration of high-value assets and athletes at the Olympic Park and in the Athletes’ Villages.

**ORGANISED CRIME**

The fact that the UK is hosting the Olympic and Paralympic Games offers a number of opportunities to domestically and internationally based organised criminals, who will seek to make a profit at the expense of individual spectators and/or the delivery organisations. One likely manifestation of this is an attempt to instill fraud within the ticketing system.
CYBER ATTACK
The Games will rely on internet technology to an unprecedented extent and such reliance will present opportunities from a variety of quarters. This could include direct attacks against the Olympic website, the electronic infrastructure supporting the Games and sites linked to sponsors, as well as cyber-enabled ticketing fraud and e-crime carried out by organised crime groups. Cyber attacks could also occur on IT, communication and transport systems causing them to fail or enabling data to be exported, modified or deleted.

PUBLIC DISORDER
The experience of previous Games is that they provide a global stage which protestors seek to use to publicise diverse causes in both lawful and unlawful ways. Although targeted at the Olympics, these issues may have little relevance to the Olympic movement.

Domestic extremism: The Games potentially provide the opportunity for a range of activists (individuals or more organised groups) to seek to disrupt both preparation and delivery phases.

MAJOR ACCIDENTS AND NATURAL EVENTS
Major accidents: The possibility of accidents, for example involving transport or other key infrastructure, during the Games cannot be ruled out.

In addition, there are a number of natural events which could have an impact on the Games. These range from severe weather to human disease.

SEVERE WEATHER
Given the timing and location of the Games, the Met Office predict that a heat wave (defined as temperatures of 32°C or more) is the most likely form of severe weather to affect the safety of those attending the games. Although less likely, flooding as a result of sudden intense summer storms, could also represent a risk at some of the Games venues and associated infrastructure.

HUMAN DISEASES
These can take a variety of forms and their impacts can vary considerably. The likelihood of a new, or newly recognised, infectious disease like SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) spreading to the UK is low, but, with large numbers of visitors entering the UK at that time, we will need to be alert to these and to the more likely, but less serious, risk of a food borne illness or gastroenterinal outbreak such as norovirus.
RISKS TO GAMES CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Critical infrastructure can be defined in the Olympic context as those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the Games and those protecting and supporting them. The OSSSRA specifically considers risks to this physical and electronic infrastructure which could impact on safety and security. It looks across a range of possible factors – malicious or non-malicious – which could disrupt the critical infrastructure: from accidents, to technical failure, severe weather and malicious attacks.

THE RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION PROCESS

PHASE 1 – IDENTIFYING THE RISKS

The OSSSRA uses existing risk assessment processes, tailored for the specific requirements of hosting the Games. Broadly, it follows a three stage approach.

Identification: Up-to-date intelligence assessment of all threats to the build and delivery phases of the Games is used to create a comprehensive picture of potentially disruptive challenges. A wide range of experts across Government and other agencies is then convened and for each risk identified, a ‘reasonable worst case scenario’ is agreed in order that it can be scored in the next stages.

Assessment: The agreed reasonable worst case scenarios are assessed for impact and likelihood by the relevant experts. To assess the likelihood of natural events, statistical and scientific data are used. Where possible, the assessment looks forward to take account of known or probable developments in the run up to the Games that would affect likelihood. In the case of terrorism, the willingness of individuals or groups to carry out attacks is balanced against an assessment of their capacity – now, leading up to and, as far as possible, in 2012 – and the vulnerability of their intended target.

Impact assessments are also undertaken to assess, for each scenario, the likely number of fatalities and casualties, damage to property and assets, disruption to services and financial losses. The effect on Games events and on the reputation of the UK should a risk occur is also considered.

Comparison of the risks: Once assessed, risks are then mapped on to a risk matrix. In mitigating the risk, and planning for the impacts of emergencies, the Government must decide what types of risk, and what levels of consequence, to plan for. Putting a great deal of effort into mitigating risks that are either very unlikely to happen or are likely to cause relatively minor damage would not be the best use of time and resources. As all potential threats and hazards facing the Games are assessed against the same criteria, it is possible to make a comparative assessment of which of these present the greatest risk. Mapping the risks on an ‘Impact/likelihood’ matrix allows for ‘at a glance’ comparisons to be made, as illustrated in figure 1 below. The table also allows those providing mitigation of particular risks to assess to what degree the risk has been reduced by charting its pre and post mitigation positions.
The OSSSRA does not cover all of the possible safety and security risks to the Olympics; only those that meet the criteria outlined above and which are deemed significant enough for inclusion due to their likelihood or impact or both. However, as the likelihood of an event occurring or the potential impact of it increasing cannot be discounted as we approach the Games, threats and hazards will continue to be monitored on a regular basis and, if necessary, their status updated in future iterations of the OSSSRA.

Nor does the OSSSRA drive all the activity taking place to ensure we have a safe and secure Games. Other work is being undertaken in response to international conventions, for example in relation to the protection of visiting Heads of State, to address commitments made by the UK when bidding for the Games and to comply with domestic and international law. Where crime is identified it is the duty of law enforcement to respond.

**PHASE 2 – MITIGATING THE RISKS**

**Strategic Design Requirements (SDRs):** SDRs are high level statements of requirement needed to mitigate a particular risk by either reducing the likelihood of it occurring or reducing its impact should it occur. SDRs are similar to the planning assumptions used to aid planning to mitigate the risks within the government’s normal national risk assessment process. In addition to making us prepared to deal with the consequences of a risk occurring, they also direct activity to prevent a risk from happening.
The SDRs are used by the OSD to create commissions to partner agencies, such as the police or United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA). Our partners will then identify the tactical and operational requirements needed to be put in place to meet the requirements of the SDRs to ensure the most comprehensive mitigation possible will be delivered. There are currently 27 projects under commission from the OSD to delivery partners.

PHASE 3 – UNDERSTANDING RESIDUAL RISK

Risk reduction assessment: To ensure that projects deliver according to the commissions and that, as a combined whole, they provide a complete and proportionate safety and security overlay to the Games a risk reduction assessment (RRAt) process is being undertaken by the OSD. The RRAt process will ensure that duplication of effort and resource expenditure is avoided and that any gaps in safety and security mitigation are identified.

After assessing the contributions the various projects and business as usual activity from the OSD and our partners make to mitigating the risks in the OSSSRA we are able to determine the level of residual risk. Whilst it is impossible to eliminate all risk, the RRAt process helps Ministers, senior officials and operational commanders decide if the level of residual risk is acceptable or if more work needs to be done, thereby providing confidence that we have met, as far as is possible, the Government’s guarantee to deliver a safe and secure 2012 Games.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND REVIEW CYCLE

The OSSSRA process is managed by the Design Authority Team (DAT) within the Olympic Security Directorate. Working closely with the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) from the Cabinet Office, they use up to date intelligence assessment and bring together a range of subject matter experts from across Government, the security services and other agencies who are able to comment upon this assessment and the vulnerabilities which may lead to a threat becoming a risk.

Once all the information and likelihood and impact scores relating to the identified risks has been agreed the OSSSRA document is produced.

The OSSSRA is refreshed on a regular basis following on from a cycle of strategic threat assessment. This process can be speeded up to dynamically assess any new threat or hazard that may require immediate action either to change a current project or to commission a new project to mitigate its impact on the Games. The actual OSSSRA is a Secret document and circulated only to those involved in the safety and security planning for the Games.

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3 The number of OSD projects will vary, in the run-up to the Games