

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK

Last Updated: 01/02/2021

Status: Asset Freeze Targets

REGIME: Chemical Weapons

INDIVIDUALS

- Name 6:** AHMED **1:** FIRAS **2:** n/a **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Title: Colonel **DOB:** 21/01/1967. **a.k.a:** (1) AHMAD (2) AHMAD, Firas **Nationality:** Syrian **Position:** Head of Security Office at Institute 1000 of the SSRC **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0001 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifying Information): Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under the EU's Chemical Weapons and Syria sanctions regime). (UK Statement of Reasons): Colonel Firas Ahmed is the Director of the Security Office of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. He was involved in transferring and concealing chemical weapons related materials following Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Due to his senior position within Institute 1000 of the SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13749.
- Name 6:** ALEXSEYEV **1:** VLADIMIR **2:** STEPANOVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Position: First Deputy Head of the GRU **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0007 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons): Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev is the First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU). Given his senior leadership role in the GRU, Alexseyev is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent "Novichok" by officers from the GRU. **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13747.
- Name 6:** BORTNIKOV **1:** ALEKSANDR **2:** VASILIEVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
DOB: 15/11/1951. **POB:** Perm, Russia **a.k.a:** BORTNIKOV, Alexander **Nationality:** Russian **Position:** Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0014 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. (UK Statement of Reasons): Alexander Bortnikov is the director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation and, therefore, responsible for the activities conducted by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the FSB, and the extent of surveillance, there are therefore reasonable grounds to suspect that the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation was involved in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny using a toxic nerve agent. As director of the Federal Security Service, Alexander Bortnikov bears responsibility for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **Last Updated:** 08/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13972.
- Name 6:** CHEPIGA **1:** ANATOLIY **2:** VLADIMIROVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Title: Colonel **DOB:** (1) 05/04/1979. (2) 12/04/1978. **POB:** (1) Nikolaevka, Amur Oblast (2) Dushanbe, (1) Russia (2) Tajikistan **a.k.a:** BORISOV, Ruslan **Nationality:** Russian **Address:** Russian Federation. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List

Ref):CHW0008 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons):GRU Officer Anatoliy Chepiga (a.k.a. Ruslan Boshirov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent ("Novichok"). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Ruslan Boshirov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal, for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey, for the use and possession of Novichok, and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13751.

5. **Name 6:** KIRIYENKO **1:** SERGEI **2:** VLADILENOVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

DOB: 26/07/1962. **POB:** Sukhumi, Former USSR (now Georgia) **Nationality:** Russian **Position:** First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0012 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. (UK Statement of Reasons):As First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office of the Russian Federation, Sergei Kiriyenko is responsible for domestic affairs. The Presidential Office is a state body within Russia that provides support for the President's work, monitors the implementation of the President's decisions, and has responsibility for governmental policy and the regime's most important actions domestically. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. The activities and movements of Alexei Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020 were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **Last Updated:** 19/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13970.

6. **Name 6:** KOSTYUKOV **1:** IGOR **2:** OLEGOVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

DOB: (1) 21/02/1961. (2) 21/01/1961. **POB:** Amur Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation) **Nationality:** Russian **Position:** Head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU/GU) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW009 and CY0011 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. Listed under the Chemical Weapons and Cyber sanctions regimes. (UK Statement of Reasons):Igor Kostyukov is the Head of the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Department (GRU), and was previously First Deputy Head. In this capacity, Igor Kostyukov is responsible for cyber attacks carried out by the 85th Main Centre of Special Services (GTsSS), also referred to as Field Post Number 26165, APT28, Fancy Bear, Sofacy Group, Pawn Storm, Strontium. These attacks include the cyber attack against the German federal parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) in April and May 2015. The cyber attack against the German federal parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) targeted the parliament's information system and affected its operation for several days. A significant amount of data was stolen and e-mail accounts of several MPs as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel were affected. Igor Olegovich Kostyukov, given his senior leadership role as First Deputy Head of the GRU (a.k.a. GU) at that time, is responsible for the possession, transport and use in Salisbury during the weekend of 4 March 2018 of the toxic nerve agent "Novichok" by officers from the GRU. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13748.

7. **Name 6:** KRIVORUCHKO **1:** ALEKSEI **2:** YURIEVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

DOB: 17/07/1975. **POB:** Stavropol, Russia **Nationality:** Russian **Position:** Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0016 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. (UK Statement of Reasons):Aleksei Krivoruchko is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In this capacity, he has overall responsibility for armaments. This includes the oversight of the Ministry's stocks of weapons and military equipment. This includes the oversight of the Ministry's stocks of weapons and military equipment. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. The Russian Ministry of Defence has overall responsibility for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Given the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation and the evidence of the continued involvement of the Russian MoD in the Novichok programme, this could only be on account of intent by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given Aleksei Krivoruchko's senior role in the Russian military, the evidence suggests that he is responsible for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **Last Updated:** 08/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13974.

8. **Name 6:** MENYAILO **1:** SERGEI **2:** IVANOVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.

DOB: 22/08/1960. **POB:** Alagir, Russia **Nationality:** Russian **Position:** Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian

- Federation in the Siberian Federal District **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0013 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. (UK Statement of Reasons):Sergei Menyailo is the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Siberian Federal District and, therefore, responsible for ensuring the implementation of the constitutional powers of the President, including the implementation by public authorities of domestic and foreign policy of the state in the federal district of Siberia. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his recent journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August, were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation. The poisoning of Alexey Navalny took place at Tomsk Bogashevo airport in Siberia. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the scale of the operation involved, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Office. Given his senior leadership role in the Siberian Federal District, Sergei Menyailo bears responsibility for the providing support for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny in Tomsk, Siberia. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **Last Updated:** 08/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13971.
9. **Name 6:** MISHKIN **1:** ALEXANDER **2:** YEVGENIYEVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Title: Colonel **DOB:** 13/07/1979. **POB:** (1) Loyga (2) Kotlas, Russia **a.k.a:** PETROV, Alexander **Nationality:** Russian **Address:** Russian Federation. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0010 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons):GRU Officer Alexander Mishkin (a.k.a. Alexander Petrov) possessed, transported and then, during the weekend of 4 March 2018, in Salisbury, used a toxic nerve agent ("Novichok"). On 5 September 2018, the UK Crown Prosecution Service charged Alexander Petrov for conspiracy to murder Sergei Skripal, for the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal, Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey, for the use and possession of Novichok, and for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Yulia Skripal and Nick Bailey. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 01/02/2021 **Group ID:** 13744.
10. **Name 6:** NASRI **1:** KHALED **2:** n/a **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
a.k.a: (1) NATSRI, Haled (2) NATSRI, Mohammed, Khaled **Nationality:** Syrian **Position:** Head of Institute 1000 of the SSRC **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0005 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifying Information):Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria sanctions regime and Chemical Weapons regime). Works under Amr Armanazi and Salam Tohme, both listed under the Syria sanctions regime. (UK Statement of Reasons):Khaled Nasri is the Director of Institute 1000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for developing and producing computer and electronic systems for Syria's chemical weapons programme. As a result of his senior role at SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13745.
11. **Name 6:** POPOV **1:** PAVEL **2:** ANATOLIEVICH **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Title: General of the Army **DOB:** 01/01/1957. **POB:** Krasnoyarsk, Russia **Nationality:** Russian **Position:** Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0015 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (UK Statement of Reasons):Pavel Popov is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In this capacity, he has overall responsibility for research activities. This includes the oversight and development of the Ministry's scientific and technical capabilities, including the development of potential weapons, and modernisation of existing weapons and military equipment. The Russian Ministry of Defence took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed. The Russian Ministry of Defence has overall responsibility for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon - a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group - was used. Given the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation and the evidence of the continued involvement of the Russian MoD in the Novichok programme, this could only be on account of intent by the Ministry of Defence and its political leadership, which includes Pavel Popov. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given Pavel Popov's senior role in the Russian military, the evidence suggests that he is responsible for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender):Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **Last Updated:** 08/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13973.
12. **Name 6:** SAID **1:** SAID **2:** n/a **3:** n/a **4:** n/a **5:** n/a.
Title: Doctor **DOB:** 11/12/1955. **a.k.a:** (1) SAEED, Doctor, Said (2) SAEED, Sa'id (3) SAID, Doctor, Sa'id (4) SA'ID, Sa'id **Nationality:** Syrian **Address:** (1) Jamraya, Damascus, Syria.(2) Barzeh, Damascus, Syria.**Position:** Head of Security, Institute 3000 of the SSRC (a.k.a.Institute 6000 of the SSRC) **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref):CHW0004 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifying Information):Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under

both the Syria and Chemical Weapons regime). Works under Zuhair Fadhun (listed under the Syria sanctions regime). (UK Statement of Reasons): Said Said is a member of Institute 3000 a.k.a Institute 6000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) that is responsible for developing and producing Syria's chemical weapons. As a result of his role at SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13750.

13. **Name 6:** YARIN 1: ANDREI 2: VENIAMINOVICH 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.
DOB: 13/02/1970. **POB:** Nizhny Tagil, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Russia **Nationality:** Russian **Position:** Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0011 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. (UK Statement of Reasons): Andrei Yarin is the Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office. The Presidential Office is a state body providing support for the President's work and monitoring the implementation of the President's decisions and overall Governmental policies and most important action. Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny was the victim of an attempted assassination during his August 2020 visit to Siberia, in which a chemical weapon—a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group—was used. The activities and movements of Alexey Navalny during his journey to Siberia, from where he intended to return to Moscow on 20th August 2020, were closely monitored by the authorities of the Russian Federation, including the Federal Security Service (FSB). Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. Given the role of the state within the attack, and the scale of the operation against Navalny, it is reasonable to conclude that the poisoning of Alexey Navalny was only possible with the consent of the Presidential Executive Office. As Chief of the Presidential Domestic Policy Directorate in the Presidential Executive Office, Andrei Yarin bears responsibility for the preparation, support for and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 15/10/2020 **Last Updated:** 08/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13969.
14. **Name 6:** YASMINA 1: TARIQ 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.
Title: Colonel a.k.a: YASMINA, Tarq **Nationality:** Syrian **Position:** Liaison officer between the SSRC and the Presidential Palace **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0003 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifying Information): Employee Works at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria and Chemical Weapons sanctions regimes) (UK Statement of Reasons): Colonel Tariq Yasmina acts as the liaison officer between the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) and the Presidential Palace, and, as such, is involved in the use and preparations for the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. As a result of his senior role at SSRC, he is associated with the SSRC. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13743.
15. **Name 6:** ZUGHAIIB 1: WALID 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a.
Title: Doctor a.k.a: (1) ZGHA'IB, Doctor, Walid (2) ZUGHAYB, Doctor, Walid (3) ZUGHIB, Doctor, Walid **Nationality:** Syrian **Position:** Head of Institute 2000 of the SSRC **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0002 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020 (Further Identifying Information): Important employee at Scientific Studies and Research Centre (listed under both the Syria and Chemical Weapons sanctions regimes). Works under Amr Armanazi and Salam Tohme (both listed under the Syria sanctions regime). (UK Statement of Reasons): Walid Zughaiib is the Director of Institute 2000, the division of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) responsible for mechanical development and production for Syria's chemical weapons programme. As a result of his senior position within Institute 2000, he is also associated with the designated entity SSRC. (Gender): Male **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 13746.

ENTITIES

- Organisation Name:** SCIENTIFIC STUDIES AND RESEARCH CENTRE (SSRC)
a.k.a: (1) Centre De Recherche De Kaboun (2) Centre D'etude Et De Recherche Scientifique (3) Scientific Studies And Research Center (4) Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), Centre d'études et de recherches Syrien (CERS) **Address:** (1) Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), Barzeh Street, PO Box 4470, Damascus, Syria. (2) P.O.Box 4470, Damascus. (3) P.O.Box 31983, Barzeh. **Other Information:** (UK Sanctions List Ref): SYR0286 and CHW006 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. Listed under the Syria and Chemical Weapons sanctions regimes. (Further Identifying Information): Director or Management name is Amr Armanazi. Business Sector is Chemical weapon proliferation. (UK Statement of Reasons): The Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) is the Syrian regime's principal entity for the development of chemical weapons. The SSRC is responsible for the development and production of chemical weapons, as well as the missiles and artillery to deliver them, operating at a number of sites in Syria. Provides support to the Syrian army for the acquisition of equipment used for the surveillance and repression of demonstrators. Operating in the chemical weapon proliferation sector, it is the government entity responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons, including chemical weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. (Subsidiaries): (1) Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology (2) HISAT (3) National Standards & Calibration Laboratory (4) NSCL **Listed on:** 21/01/2019 **Last Updated:** 31/12/2020 **Group ID:** 12426.
- Organisation Name:** STATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR ORGANIC CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY (GOSNIIOKHT)
Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref): CHW0017 Date designated on UK Sanctions List: 31/12/2020. (UK Statement of Reasons): The Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GoSNIIOKHT)

is a state research institute with the responsibility for the destruction of chemical weapon stocks inherited from the Soviet Union. The institute in its original role before 1994 was involved in the development and production of chemical weapons including the toxic nerve agent now known as 'Novichok'. After 1994, the same facility took part in the government's programme for the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. Alexei Navalny was poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. The deployment of a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group would therefore only be possible due to the failure of the Institute to carry out its responsibility to destroy the stockpiles of chemical weapons. Russia had the technical capability to carry out the attack. The Russian State has previously produced Novichoks and would still be capable of doing so. Within the last decade, Russia has produced and stockpiled small quantities of Novichok. It is unlikely that Novichoks could be made and deployed by non-state actors (e.g. a criminal or terrorist group). Russia had the operational experience to carry out the attack. Russia has a proven record of state-sponsored assassination. It is highly likely that the Russian state was responsible for the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in Salisbury in 2018 using a similar type of nerve agent. During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of delivering chemical warfare agents, including investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents. Russia had the motive and opportunity to carry out the attack. Navalny was a high profile Russian opposition politician who vocally criticised the Russian administration and establishment. He was on Russian territory under surveillance by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation at the time of the attack. As the institute responsible for the destruction of chemical weapons within the Russian Federation, GoSNIIOKHT bears responsibility for the preparation and use of chemical weapons in the attempted assassination of Alexey Navalny. (Parent company): Russian Ministry of Defence
Listed on: 15/10/2020 **Last Updated:** 19/01/2021 **Group ID:** 13975.