



**Ministry
of Defence**

**JSP 471
Defence Nuclear Emergency Response**

Part 1: Directive

Foreword

The Secretary of State for Defence (SofS), through his Health and Safety & Environmental Protection (HS&EP) Policy Statement, requires each Top Level Budget Holder (TLBH) or Chief Executive of a Defence Executive Agency (CDEA) to set down and implement HS&EP management arrangements through a Safety and Environment Management System (SEMS) for activities in their Area of Responsibility (AoR). Where a Defence activity leads to a Risk to Life that requires management through enhanced safety management arrangements the TLBH or CDEA is to be appointed as the Senior Duty Holder, in addition to their legal HS&EP responsibilities.

As the Defence Nuclear Organisation (DNO), Strategy and Policy Director (DNO-Strat Pol Dir), I have responsibility for nuclear emergency planning and response policy involving Defence nuclear assets.

This Joint Service Publication (JSP 471), Defence Nuclear Emergency Response, provides the nuclear emergency planning policy requirements associated with the planning and response to an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets. Where Defence has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation.

The Directives set out in this JSP are mandatory and full compliance is required. It is the responsibility of commanders and line managers at all levels to ensure that personnel, including contractors, involved in the management, supervision and conduct of Defence Nuclear Enterprise activities are fully aware of their responsibilities.

Defence Nuclear Organisation, Strategy and Policy Director

Preface

How to use this JSP

1. JSP 471 sets Ministry of Defence (MOD) policy and context for planning and response requirements in the event of nuclear incidents and emergencies arising in Defence Nuclear Enterprise activities and sites. In particular, it sets policy for matters outside of those set by the Defence Safety Authority, Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DSA-DNSR)/Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) regulation of individual Authorisees/Licensees of Defence Nuclear Enterprise activities and sites. It is to be used by MOD staff and Defence Nuclear Enterprise contractors with responsibilities for such planning and response.
2. It consists of just one part and provides the direction that must be followed in accordance with statute or policy mandated by Defence or on Defence by Central Government.


Coherence with other Functional Leadership Policy and Guidance

3. Where applicable, this document contains links to other relevant JSPs which may be published by other Functions. Where particular dependencies exist, these Functions have been consulted in the formulation of the policy detailed in this publication.

Related JSP	Title
518	Regulation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme
538	Regulation of the Nuclear Weapon Programme
628	Security Regulation of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise
440	Defence Manual of Security, Resilience and Business Continuity

Hierarchy of Nuclear Emergency Response Documentation

4. Figure 1 shows where this JSP sits in relation to statutory regulation, MOD and wider Government policy and detailed emergency response plans.



*All applicable statutory regulation including Health and Safety

Further Advice and Feedback – Contacts

5. The owner of this JSP is DNO-Strategy and Policy Director. For further information on any aspect of this guide, or questions not answered within the subsequent sections, or to provide feedback on the content, contact:

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Record of Changes

Version	Description of Change	Date
1.0	First issue of revised JSP 471. Published prior to vesting day on 30 April 2012.	14 Dec 2011
1.1	First review of JSP 471. Inclusion of DSA-DNSR's role in the provision of technical advice. Further minor amendments throughout.	14 Nov 2013
2.0	Second review of JSP 471. Reflects the establishment of the Defence Nuclear Organisation, the Defence Nuclear Security Regulator, the Defence Safety Authority, and other minor amendments throughout.	1 Oct 2018
2.1	Clarification on the use of NERIMS	17 Dec 2019
2.2	<p>Transfer of policy responsibility for Defence Nuclear Emergency Response from DNO-Director Submarine Capability to DNO-Strategy and Policy Director</p> <p>Transfer of policy responsibility for the guidance on the operational application of the 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND)' policy in an incident or emergency involving a nuclear weapon, from DNO-Nuclear Policy to DNO-Emergency Planning Policy-AH.</p> <p>Reflects the formation of Security Policy and Operations (SPO).</p> <p>Reflects amendments to UK Statutory Regulations.</p>	20 Apr 2020

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JSP 518: Regulation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme
JSP 538: Regulation of the Nuclear Weapon Programme
JSP 440: Defence Manual of Security, Resilience and Business Continuity
JSP 628: Security Regulation of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise
JSP 441: Information, Knowledge, Digital and Data in Defence
JSP 832: Guide to Service Inquiries
JSP 576: Defence Nuclear Accident Response Supporting Information
Health, Safety and Environmental Protection in Defence – Policy Statement by the Secretary of State for Defence
Charter for the Defence Safety Authority
General Agreement between Ministry of Defence and Office for Nuclear Regulation for the Regulation of the Defence Nuclear Programme
Letter of Understanding between the Office for Nuclear Regulation and the Defence Nuclear Regulator
National Nuclear Emergency Planning & Response Guidance (NNEPG)
Enhanced Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) Guidance
Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02 - UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security - Third Edition
Defence Safety Authority (DSA) 01.1 - Defence Policy for Health, Safety and Environmental Protection
The Lead Government Department and its Role – Guidance and Best Practice.
Responding to Emergencies, The Central Government Response, Concept of Operations
Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP)
Defence Strategic Direction 2016 - Part 2: Direction and Defence Planning Assumptions
US/UK 1958 Agreement (Atomic Energy: Co-operation for Mutual Defence Purposes)

1 Introduction

1. Safety and security are paramount across the UK's Defence Nuclear Enterprise, incorporating the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP) and Nuclear Weapon Programme (NWP). Both programmes are highly regulated and emergency arrangements are in place which are regularly tested to meet UK statutory regulations¹, MOD and/or wider government policy.
2. Regardless of whether an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets or material arises from an accident, negligence or a malevolent act, recovery from such an event can only be achieved by taking effective life saving actions, mitigating radiation exposure, regaining control and providing useful, accurate and timely information to the media and the public. These actions can only be performed effectively if there are sound and tested plans in place which are effectively integrated as part of the national resilience framework. Such arrangements need to give due regard to the immense media, public, political and international attention that emergencies involving Defence nuclear assets are likely to receive.
3. The operational, or local response, will differ depending on the location, type of emergency, material/asset, etc. This response will be in accordance with site or operational specific emergency response plans integrated with wider crisis management arrangements and/or specific Local Authority off-site plans which will include reference to local/regional emergency response plans and/or responder organisations.
4. In addition to the local response, on declaration of an Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) or Nuclear Transport Emergency (NTE), MOD will stand up a national strategic level response co-ordinated through both the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) and MOD Main Building. Regardless of the type of emergency, it will require a wide range of military and MOD civilian assets as part of the response and may be augmented by additional Defence assets force generated by the Security, Policy and Operations Directorate (SPO) on request from the Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom) (SJC(UK)).

Defence Tasks²

5. Defence Tasks (DTs) provide the organising principles around which strategic planning activity is framed. They represent the authoritative source of direction for planning purposes. DTs cover the full range of activity that Defence undertakes or could undertake, as well as the routine activity that delivers the Department of State and maintains the Strategic Base. The DTs which, by implication, require a nuclear emergency response capability to be maintained in support of them are:
 - a. DT1 - Defence, Security and Resilience of the Homeland and Overseas Territories.
 - b. DT2 - Nuclear Deterrence and Defence Nuclear Enterprise.
 - c. DT4 - Influence through International Defence Engagement.

¹ Principally the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 (REPIR 19), the Ionising Radiation Regulations 2017 (IRR17), Gibraltar REPIR 2004 (as amended 2018) and Gibraltar IRR18.

² Defence Strategic Direction 2016 – Part 2 Direction and Defence Planning Assumptions.

Definitions of Defence Nuclear Incidents and Emergencies

6. Nuclear incident and nuclear emergency definitions are detailed at [Annex A](#). Declaration of an OSNE or NTE is to be treated, as a minimum, as a Serious Emergency³ for formally standing-up the UK Central Government response arrangements.

Language

7. The capability to respond to a Defence nuclear emergency will comprise military personnel, MOD Police (MDP), MOD civil servants and/or Defence contractors, hereafter referred to as MOD personnel. External agencies (e.g. police, fire, ambulance, Local Authorities and members of the public etc.) will have the descriptor 'civil' where this aids identification.

8. The Directives set out in this JSP are mandatory and full compliance is required. Within this document the terms 'is to' or 'are to' imply a mandatory requirement.

Funding

9. The funding, staff and equipment needed to maintain and implement nuclear emergency response plans and arrangements (including reasonable cost recovery for off-site plans to meet statutory and MOD policy requirements) are to be provided by relevant Duty Holders and/or allocated forces where appropriate.

Related Organisations

10. The purpose of the Defence Safety Authority⁴ (DSA) shall be to provide independent assurance to the SofS for Defence that his policy on safety (including Health and Environmental Protection) in Defence is being promoted and implemented in the conduct of Defence activities. This should be achieved through proportional and appropriate regulatory and evidence based assessments activity that supports Defence's operational imperatives.

11. To maintain DSA's independence and ensure organisational separation the DSA is led by a Director General who is only accountable to the SofS, and is also appointed by the Defence Council to be the primary Convening Authority for all safety related Service Inquiries.

³ Defined as an event that has, or threatens, a wide and prolonged impact requiring sustained central Government co-ordination from COBR under the leadership of the LGD and support from a number of Departments or Agencies. The Cabinet Office document - Responding to Emergencies, The Central Government Response, Concept of Operations dated March 2010, and revised Chapter 6 dated 19 April 2013.

⁴ [Charter for the Defence Safety Authority](#).

2 Principles of Nuclear Emergency Response Policy and Planning

Policy Statement

1. The SofS for Defence is answerable to Parliament for all Health, Safety and Environmental Protection (HS&EP) matters in Defence⁵. Specifically, SofS requires that:
 - a. within the United Kingdom (UK) we comply with all applicable HS&EP legislation.
 - b. overseas we apply our UK arrangements where reasonably practicable and, in addition, respond to host nations' relevant HS&EP expectations.
2. Where Defence has exemptions, derogations or dis-applications from HS&EP legislation, we maintain Departmental arrangements that produce outcomes that are, so far as reasonably practicable, at least as good as those required by UK legislation.

Nuclear Emergency Planning Policy Requirements

3. Planning for, and the response to, an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets is to:
 - a. meet the Department's statutory/legal obligations, i.e. the regulatory requirements of the ONR.
 - b. where statutory regulations are not applicable, meet the regulatory requirements of the DSA-DNSR.
 - c. ensure the safety of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise by preventing emergencies and making arrangements to respond to an incident or emergency which might also arise as a result of a terrorist event.
 - d. ensure that MOD's nuclear emergency response arrangements and planning assumptions are fully aligned with Authorisees/Defence Related Licensees, local/regional response, wider departmental/government crisis management and/or cross-government co-ordination arrangements.
 - e. have due regard to the consequences of a Defence nuclear emergency for national Defence policy and the public expectations of a government department.
 - f. ensure that the Department is able to effectively discharge its Lead Government Department (LGD) role and responsibilities.
4. The purpose of this JSP is to set the policy, context, planning and doctrine to meet the above.

Office for Nuclear Regulation

5. The primary national legislation under which nuclear sites are regulated is the 2013 Energy Act, the 1965 Nuclear Installations Act (NIA) (as amended) and the Health and

⁵ In accordance with SofS HS&EP Policy statement dated 20 June 2018.

Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA). The Energy Act is the enabling legislation for subsequent regulations and empowers ONR, as the statutory nuclear regulator through certain provisions of the NIA. Under Section 1 of the NIA, ONR licenses operators of nuclear facilities.

6. Relevant subsidiary legislation, from which the MOD is not exempt, comprises the 2017 Ionising Radiation Regulations (IRR17), and the 2019 Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPP19). ONR regulate all MOD sites, contractor operated and those under Crown control, and Nuclear Powered Warships (NPW) within UK territorial waters against this legislation.

Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator

7. Those safety aspects of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise which are exempt from legislation and therefore require 'Departmental arrangements' come under the purview of the DSA-DNSR. DSA-DNSR's regulatory requirements, including specific aspects of operational nuclear emergency response plans and associated guidance, are set out in JSP 518 (Regulation of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme) and JSP 538 (Regulation of the Nuclear Weapon Programme) and are specifically not addressed within this JSP.

8. There is a General Agreement between the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) that outlines the relationship between MOD and ONR in discharging their respective roles and responsibilities for nuclear, radiological and conventional health and safety (H&S) in respect of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise. It sets down how the MOD intends to fulfil its statutory duties under relevant health and safety legislation as it applies to Defence Nuclear Enterprise related facilities and activities. The General Agreement allows for Letters of Understanding (LoU) to be agreed when it is appropriate to further clarify working-level relationships between the Defence Regulators and ONR. The DSA-DNSR-ONR LoU provides the high-level intentions for coherent, complete and seamless regulation of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise which is achieved by working in a joined up manner sharing a common aim to regulate Duty Holders so that they achieve safe operating conditions, prevent accidents and provide for mitigation of accident consequences, thereby protecting workers and the public from undue radiological hazards resulting from their activities whilst holding the Duty Holders to account.

Defence Nuclear Emergency Policy and Plans

9. In response to statutory requirements, MOD and/or wider government policy, the MOD is to: plan for the range of nuclear emergency scenarios for which it is appointed as LGD; identify the risks; and understand the environment in which they will operate. MOD maintains a capability, including detailed 'operational' response plans, to respond to incidents and emergencies involving the following Defence nuclear assets:

- a. **UK Naval Reactor Plant.** Submarine reactors worldwide, both when berthed alongside and when at sea.
- b. **US and French Nuclear Reactors.** Reactors of US and French nuclear powered vessels when visiting the UK, within UK territorial waters or UK Overseas Territories.
- c. **US Nuclear Weapons.** Transported by US military aircraft, ships, submarines and support vessels in UK airspace or territorial waters together with any US nuclear weapons that may be stored in the UK pursuant to approved programmes for co-

operation for use by US forces or, under custodial arrangements, for use by other NATO states.

d. **Defence Nuclear Material.**

(1) Nuclear Weapons. UK nuclear weapons within the UK and worldwide.

(2) Special Nuclear Materials. Defence Category I and II Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) and, in specific circumstances, other radioactive material. This includes new and used fuel for RN submarine reactors, in storage, during fuelling/defueling operations and transit.

10. The policy for incidents and emergencies involving other Defence assets, including sealed radioactive sources and Defence Category III and IV SNM, are not included within the scope of this JSP⁶.

Departmental Responsibilities

11. The SofS for Defence has overall responsibility for nuclear safety in the MOD, including the effectiveness of the Department's nuclear emergency response arrangements. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Min AF) has ministerial responsibility for nuclear emergency response arrangements. The Permanent Secretary (Perm Sec) is the Process Owner for safety, including emergency arrangements. The DNO-Strategy and Policy Director (DNO Strat Pol-Dir) is responsible for high level nuclear emergency response policy⁷. DNO Strat Pol-Dir is supported by the DNO-Defence Nuclear Enterprise, Safety Security Strategy Deputy Director (DNO-DNE Safety Security Strat DD). Nuclear emergency response policy is overseen on a day-to-day basis by the DNO-Emergency Planning Policy, Assistant Head (DNO-EP Pol AH). As agreed by Director General Nuclear (DGNuc), the DNO-Submarine Capability Director (DNO-SubCap-D) (or a nominated deputy) retains responsibility for the DNO lead within the HQ DNEO, in the event of a Defence nuclear incident or emergency. This includes responsibility for the DNO and NSQEP personnel providing specialist support within the HQ DNEO.

12. Authorisees/Licensees and/or nominated Duty Holders are responsible for developing and maintaining adequate operator's emergency response plans to meet statutory and/or DSA-DNSR requirements.

13. In addition to specific statutory and/or DSA-DNSR requirements the MOD, as a Department of State, has to consider the sensitive and, in some circumstances, the unique political and operational nature of its activities, together with the wider consequences of an incident or emergency involving Defence nuclear assets for Defence operations and/or wider policy together with the Department's reputation.

Lead Government Department

14. In addition to its statutory and operational responsibilities, MOD is appointed as the LGD⁸ for emergencies involving Defence nuclear assets (other than an emergency arising

⁶ These materials are covered under the emergency arrangements provided via RADSAFE. 'RADSAFE is a Private Company limited by guarantee that offers mutual assistance in the event of a transport accident involving radioactive materials belonging to a RADSAFE member'. The MOD, DSA are RADSAFE members.

⁷ Including alignment with generic crisis management and specific cross government coordination arrangements.

⁸ The Lead Government Department and its Role - Guidance and Best Practice.

as a result of a terrorist event where the Home Office is appointed as the LGD). This is in line with the Central Government Concept of Operations (see page 2, footnote 3). The MOD's responsibility as LGD is for the response phase of the emergency. Again, in line with the Central Government Concept of Operations, the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the LGD appointed for the recovery phase (the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency) in England. The relevant Devolved Administration (DA) will be the LGD for the recovery phase for an emergency outside of England.

15. MOD is to ensure that its LGD responsibilities are included in Departmental business planning and that detailed operational response plans scope and fully align with local, regional, devolved and national crisis management arrangements, including operational/on-site plans and Local Authority off-site plans (which include local/regional emergency responders).

Defence Related Nuclear Licensed Sites

16. The Defence Related Licensed sites have contractual and legal obligations (NIA65 and other statutory provisions) for the cooperation and provision of emergency arrangements. As the LGD for Authorised and Defence Related Licensed sites the MOD will support arrangements made under Authorisation/Licence Condition 11, Emergency Arrangements.

Security

17. Where security aspects of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise are exempt from legislation, MOD maintains 'Departmental arrangements'. Security arrangements across the Defence Nuclear Enterprise are under the purview of the Security Policy and Operations, Defence Nuclear Security Regulator (SPO-DefNucSyR). SPO-DefNucSyR's regulatory requirements, including specific aspects of operational nuclear emergency response plans and associated guidance, are set out in JSP 628⁹ and are specifically not addressed within this JSP.

18. JSP 440, Supplement 1, outlines the security effects required to ensure the protection of Defence nuclear materials, assets or information. The aim of the required security effects is to exercise positive control over unauthorised access to nuclear materials, assets or information and to preclude damage, sabotage, espionage, theft, diversion or unauthorised detonation.

19. Duty Holders and Responsible Persons are to ensure that plans for responding to incidents or emergencies involving DNM or assets include, as appropriate, effective arrangements to ensure that positive control can continue to be exercised over the assets or materials involved or affected or is regained in the shortest time possible. These plans should satisfy the expectations of security regulation as articulated in JSP 628. Where the incident or emergency occurs outside MOD property, security and/or control arrangements are to be integrated with those of the civilian police.

Deconfliction

20. Deconfliction of nuclear transportation tasks is required to avoid over-commitment of MOD response forces and to meet the requirements of civil emergency services.

⁹ JSP 628 - Security Regulation of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise dated June 2017.

21. The policy for deconfliction applies to transport operations of DNM (i.e. Nuclear Weapons, Category I and II SNM, specific instances and quantities of other radioactive materials and Reactor Fuel). Constituted, but unloaded, nuclear weapons convoys are included within this policy. Planning of transport operations of DNM to achieve this policy is delegated to DNO-Warhead Delivery-Transport Operations Group Leader (DNO-W Del-TOGL).

22. There is to be only one road or rail movement in or one air movement over the same or adjacent Constabulary areas within England and Wales at any one time. In Scotland deconfliction is to be managed taking due cognisance of the geographical separation of any planned operations in liaison with Police Scotland when appropriate. Provided this condition is met:

- a. a single nuclear weapon road convoy and a single SNM road convoy may be carried out concurrently.
- b. a single rail movement and a single road convoy may be carried out concurrently.
- c. a single rail movement or a single road convoy may be carried out concurrently with a single air movement in UK airspace.

23. There are to be no transport operations of DNM during MOD Level 3 exercises (see Chapter 8 for exercise definitions).

24. The transport of DNM during all other nuclear emergency exercises is to be determined on a case by case basis by DNO-W Del-TOGL and in consultation with DNO-EP Pol-AH.

Business Continuity Planning

25. Effective Business Continuity arrangements are a core management function, and an integral part of the planning and management processes of every part of the MOD and wider crisis management community. JSP 440¹⁰ sets out the Department's Business Continuity responsibilities and accountabilities. Accordingly, all MOD nuclear emergency plans are to ensure that critical nuclear emergency response outputs and processes can be carried out following disruption to normal working conditions. Business Continuity Recovery Planning staffs at Defence nuclear sites, or those having responsibility for Defence nuclear transport operations, are to ensure that their Business Continuity-focussed plans are complementary to their emergency plans. **Where there is conflict, nuclear emergency response plans are to take primacy.**

26. Defence Nuclear Emergency continuity arrangements are to be sufficiently scalable to contribute to the continuity of government and commensurate with the Continuity of Government (COG) Planning Assumptions and Plans.

Terrorist Initiated Nuclear Incidents or Emergencies

27. Response plans are to include arrangements for responding to nuclear incidents or emergencies arising as a result of terrorist and/or malevolent acts. Different command and control structures will be established for these events, both within MOD and among the civil authorities, with the Home Office as LGD. Chapter 2, paragraph 14 applies.

¹⁰ JSP 440 - Defence Manual of Security, Resilience and Business Continuity, Part 1, Section 5, Chapter 2, Business Continuity Management.

28. All Duty Holders are to ensure that their operational response plans, and planning assumptions, would be coherent in the event of a terrorist initiated nuclear incident or emergency, and should support the civil authorities in developing similarly coherent multi-agency arrangements.

3 Governance Arrangements

1. It is a principle of the UK's democratic system of government that the Armed Forces remain under the control of Central Government and that civilian Defence Ministers are publicly accountable for the actions of the Armed Forces. The command structure of the Armed Forces is a single chain, stretching from the SofS for Defence to the individual unit and Service personnel.
2. When considering the civil emergency services, it is important to distinguish between the respective functions of single and multi-agency groups. Single agency groups have the authority to exercise a command function over their own personnel and assets and may term their own command and control levels, in ascending order, Operational, Tactical and Strategic. Multi-agency groups are convened to co-ordinate the involved agencies' activities and, where appropriate, define strategy and objectives for the multi-agency response as a whole. No single responding agency has command authority over any other agencies' personnel or assets. Where multi-agency co-ordinating groups are established to define strategy and objectives, it is expected that all involved responder agencies will work in a directed and co-ordinated fashion in pursuit of those objectives. MOD command and control arrangements in response to a Defence nuclear emergency are to link in with these arrangements.
3. Although most incidents are handled by Category 1 and 2 responders, with no direct involvement from central government, where there is a need for central government involvement, this is undertaken in accordance with the established concept of LGD.

Defence Crisis Management Organisation

4. On declaration of a Defence nuclear emergency, on behalf of the Authorisee/Duty Holder, and upon notification by CSDSO, DNO-EPPol personnel will activate the MOD Headquarters Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (HQ DNEO) in the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) as part of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO). The DCMO is a virtual organisation for managing crisis at the strategic level, and is chaired by DCDS (Military Strategy and Operations) (DCDS(MSO)), in the capacity as Director of Operations (D Ops).
5. The HQ DNEO Director will be ACDS(Commitments), supported by a Operations Directorate Chief of Staff. HQ DNEO Director has responsibility for HQ DNEO outputs, and will work with DNO-Submarine Capability-Director (DNO-SubCap-D) and DNO-Submarine Capability-Nuclear Propulsion-Deputy Head (DNO-SubCap-NP-DH) and the associated HQ DNEO NSQEP personnel to deliver the following executive functions:
 - a. Advise on MOD operational policy and provide military advice to the Central Government crisis management organisation;
 - b. Provide strategic guidance and direction for the military response and interpret policy decisions into clear unambiguous direction;
 - c. Advise Defence Ministers and senior officials on the status of the emergency, including any mitigating actions;
 - d. Represent the Department's LGD role within the Central Government response.

6. The role and responsibilities of HQ DNEO, together with the command structure of the Armed Forces, render it an integral part of the operational response to all emergencies involving Defence nuclear assets. All Duty Holders are to ensure that their operational nuclear emergency response plans include the interface with HQ DNEO. All Authorisees/Licensees are to provide DNO-EPPol-AH with an electronic copy of the relevant operator and Local Authority emergency response plans following every review cycle.

Multi-Agency Co-ordination and the Strategic Co-ordinating Group and the Tactical Co-ordinating Group

7. In response to a Defence nuclear emergency multi-agency meetings (known as Resilience Partnership(s) in Scotland) will be convened to co-ordinate the involved agencies' activities and, where appropriate, define strategy and objectives for the multi-agency response as a whole. The multi-agency meeting at the Local Strategic level is termed the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), located at the Strategic Co-ordinating Centre (SCC) and the equivalent at Tactical level is termed the Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG). The SCG, usually located at the local police headquarters and chaired by the Chief Constable or deputy, will exercise overall co-ordination and strategic direction of the local emergency response phase until public safety can be assured.

8. For a nuclear emergency response, the MOD's senior representative at the SCG will be the MOD Co-ordinating Authority (MCA). The recovery process begins from the moment the emergency begins with the establishing of a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG), chaired by the Chief Executive or deputy of the relevant Local Authority. It runs in parallel with the SCG. Once the emergency moves into the recovery phase, co-ordinating responsibility will pass from the SCG to the Local Authority. In parallel, the MOD lead will at this point change from the MCA to the Regional Point of Command (RPoC), who will provide support during the recovery phase and will command any military forces assigned to the task.

MOD Co-ordinating Authority

9. The MCA is the appointed NSQEP Executive Director of the MOD's operational response in the incident area. This is to be a 1* OF6 officer (or Senior Civil Servant (SCS) equivalent) or a delegated OF5 (B1/B2 if Civilian). The terms of reference for the MCA are at [Annex B](#).

10. The Central Government and DCMO/HQ DNEO interaction with the MCA and SCG is detailed at [Annex C](#).

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

11. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) representative will be located with the SCG chair. The MHCLG representative will work closely with the MCA and other members of the Government Liaison Team (GLT), and will also liaise closely with representatives of other Government agencies. The main duties of the MHCLG Representative are detailed at [Annex D](#).

Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom)

12. The strategic lead for the Defence contribution to Resilience in the UK comes from MOD SPO. On direction from the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) the operational lead is

Commander Home Command (Comd HC) who is the 3* appointed SJC(UK). SJC(UK) conducts UK Operations in accordance with Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02, UK Operations: The Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security. The role of SJC(UK) is detailed at Chapter 10.

Regional Points of Command

13. For the purposes of Defence contribution to UK resilience operations, Great Britain and Northern Ireland is divided into 10 Regional Points of Command (RPoC) areas¹¹. Each is commanded by an Army 1* Brigade Commander with the exception of London District (LONDIST) where the commander is an Army 2*, and HQ South West and North West where the commanders are OF5s.

14. The RPoC commander will routinely be assigned as the Joint Military Commander (JMC) against a named operation and exercise Operational Control (OPCON) of military capabilities allocated by SJC(UK). The RPoC commander may deploy to the SCG, or set up in the RPoC HQ.

15. The Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO) is the primary focus for the integration of UK operations with the civil authorities within their area of responsibility and will ensure that the activities of the Service Commands are coordinated to provide the optimum level of support when requested by the civil authorities. The JRLO will represent the Armed Forces at Regional Resilience Forums (RRF) and Local Resilience Forums (LRF) and their equivalents in Scotland and Wales. The JRLO is supported by Single-Service liaison officers (Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officers), who supplement the capability of the JRLO and provide specialist single-Service advice.

16. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, the JRLO or appropriate representative, from the RPoC will attend the SCG, deploying at 6 Hours Notice To Move (NTM). The role of the RPoC commander and the JRLO are detailed in Chapter 10.

17. The MCA is the primary focus for the direction and coordination of all MOD response activities in the incident area. Should additional military capability be required in addition to those pre-identified in existing Defence nuclear emergency plans, a request will be submitted to SPO via SJC(UK). If endorsed, the Service Commands will be directed to generate capability to be placed under the command of SJC(UK), and the RPoC commander in the role as JMC. The conduit for requests for such support will be the RPoC commander or JRLO at the SCG or an appropriate Military Liaison Officer (MLO).

Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator

18. In the event of the declaration of a Defence Nuclear Emergency, DSA-DNSR-Head or representative will deploy to HQ DNEO with their requisite support and fulfil the role of head of the Safety Cell and as a member of the SAGE. The Safety Cell will primarily assess the nuclear safety aspects of the emergency and review the technical aspects of the response, including mitigation, recovery and render safe activities, and provide independent advice and assurance to HQ DNEO, DG DSA and the DNSC. Membership of the Safety Cell will also include staff from the ONR as applicable. As a member of SAGE, DSA-DNSR-Head or representative will ensure nuclear safety issues are raised during meetings.

¹¹ The Royal Navy splits Great Britain and NI into 4 regions, the RAF adopts a 9-region model.

19. DSA-DNSR will also deploy staff to the Local Strategic location and the Operational location of the Defence Nuclear Emergency or at the most suitable support or reach-back location to provide regulatory support and advice and maintain oversight. For a Defence Nuclear Emergency involving the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme (NNPP), DSA-DNSR will attend the Technical Guidance Group (TGG) at MOD Abbey Wood to review the technical assessments being developed, and inspect the adequacy of the TGG assessment process under Authorisation Condition 11 (AC 11), Emergency Arrangements. Differences of opinion are to be resolved at this stage to avoid separate assessments from going forward. For a Defence Nuclear Emergency involving the Nuclear Weapon Programme (NWP), DSA-DNSR will attend at either the AWE Command Post, Royal Naval Armaments Depot (RNAD) Emergency Control Post, AWE Reach-Back Location or TGG depending on which Life Cycle Phase the Defence Nuclear Emergency occurs in.

20. For all emergencies across the Defence Nuclear Enterprise, DSA-DNSR will form a Regulatory Support Cell at MOD Abbey Wood to access information and secure systems and provide general/technical support as required, including support to staff members deployed elsewhere.

Lead Government Department

21. LGDs for the response to foreseeable emergencies are nominated by Cabinet Office in accordance with procedures set out in the Cabinet Office document 'The Lead Government Department and its Role - Guidance and Best Practice'.

22. The UK Central Government response to an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets will be handled in accordance with the LGD principle. Individual departments and DAs remain responsible for their respective policy areas.

23. The Central Government strategic objectives in response to a 'serious'¹² (National Tier Level 2) or 'catastrophic'¹³ (National Tier Level 3) emergency are to:

- a. protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment and alleviate suffering.
- b. support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest of opportunity; and
- c. uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

24. The MOD and Central Government response to an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets will be conducted from a number of dedicated emergency operations centres, maintained in a state of constant readiness. At the Central Government level they consist of:

- a. COBR.
- b. the Recovery Committee (Ministerial or Officials).

¹² Defined as an event that has, or threatens, a wide and prolonged impact requiring sustained central Government co-ordination from COBR under the leadership of the LGD and support from a number of Departments or Agencies.

¹³ Defined as one which has an exceptionally high and widespread impact and requires immediate Central Government direction and support. The Prime Minister would lead the national response from COBR.

c. the DCMC and dedicated meeting rooms in MOD Main Building, Whitehall.

25. All OGDs, DAs, Agencies, Regional and Local Authorities involved in responding to a Defence nuclear emergency have developed, and maintain, their operational plans and procedures to ensure that they are able to respond effectively to a Defence Nuclear Emergency.

26. The Central Government organisation, including LGD/HQ DNEO structure and its interaction with Strategic Command, is detailed at [Annex C](#). For a Defence nuclear emergency in Scotland, the Central and Scottish Government organisation is detailed at [Annex E](#).

Ministerial Notification and Reporting of Defence Nuclear Incidents

27. The Defence Ministerial Reporting Criteria ([Annex F](#)) categorises occurrences at Defence nuclear sites, Defence related licensed sites, Defence nuclear transport operations and/or deployed nuclear powered submarines or weapons – depending on their nuclear/radiological safety significance.

28. The arrangements, which mirror civil practice, ensure that Defence Ministers are informed in a timely manner to respond effectively to Parliamentary and media enquiries in relation to nuclear/radiological safety related issues involving the Defence Nuclear Enterprise.

29. The reporting arrangements are aligned with the more general arrangements for the reporting of routine issues related to the Defence Nuclear Enterprise and are the responsibility of DNO-Secretariat-AH and NAVY SEC-Deputy COMD Sec. DNO-Secretariat-AH and NAVY SEC are to notify Director General Nuclear.

30. Emergencies or incidents that require nuclear emergency plans to be invoked, as detailed at [Annex A](#) are to be reported in accordance with JSP 471 Chapter 5, paragraph 2.

Neither Confirm Nor Deny

31. It is UK policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any particular place or time; information on this subject is generally classified SECRET. Detailed guidance on how this policy is to be managed in the event of an incident or emergency involving UK or US nuclear weapons is detailed at [Annex H](#).

4 Central Government Response

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms

1. The Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) will be activated in support of the MOD in response to any National Tier Level 2 or Level 3 Defence nuclear emergency. The initial meeting of the NSC THRC is drawn from across government and will be chaired by the MOD in its role as LGD; it will be held in COBR within 2-4 hours of the emergency being declared. MOD LGD responsibilities will be discharged through the COBR facilities while HQ DNEO will provide the support and secretariat roles from MOD Main Building. Additional MOD support¹⁴ will be provided in the MOD cell in the COBR facility who will act as a conduit for information from HQ DNEO (see Annexes [C](#) and [E](#)).

Impact Management Group

2. The Impact Management Group (IMG) is formed as part of the Central Government response in conjunction with the activation of COBR. Where appropriate, it will operate as part of the wider Central Government crisis management machinery and support the senior decision making body in COBR. The IMG will provide detailed co-ordinated advice on all aspects of the Government's contribution to the emergency response and will ensure that any necessary central government preparations for the recovery phase are addressed, including establishment of a Recovery Committee (Ministerial) and (Officials), and timely appointment of a LGD. The IMG will have an important role in the early stages of a complex emergency in advising the COBR on measures to reassure the public, minimise disruption, and restore key services. Once the Recovery Committees have been established, the role of the IMG in recovery will normally cease.

Recovery Committee (Ministerial or Officials)

3. LGDs will consider the need to establish a Recovery Committee at the National level, to oversee recovery activity. The Ministerial Committee will involve necessary government departments and appropriate DAs and will be supported by an Officials Committee to operate as part of the wider Central Government crisis management machinery. In Scotland, recovery meetings will either be Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR) (Ministerial) chaired by the Minister of the Lead Department or SGoRR (Officials) where Government Officials and Partners will determine priorities and actions.

Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies and the Science and Technical Advice Cell

4. The Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)¹⁵ provides scientific and technical advice to support government decision making during emergencies. It is responsible for ensuring that timely and coordinated scientific advice is made available to decision makers to support UK cross-government decisions in COBR. SAGE is chaired by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) or a departmental CSA. The MOD has two CSA's, one specifically covering Nuclear.

¹⁴ Provided by a joint DNO/SPO team.

¹⁵ Enhanced SAGE Guidance: A Strategic framework for the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies.

5. SAGE membership will typically include experts from within government and specialists from academia and industry. Government and agencies include:

- a. MOD.
- b. Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC).
- c. Public Health England – Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (PHE CRCE).
- d. ONR.
- e. DEFRA.
- f. Food Standards Agency (FSA).
- g. Environment Agency (EA), and where appropriate the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA).
- h. Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) – Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET).
- i. UK Meteorological Office (Met Office).
- j. Government CSA's representative(s) (GO Science).
- k. COBR representative.

6. SAGE is to maintain a close linkage with the Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)¹⁶, when established at the local SCC. MOD representation at the STAC is to be determined as part of the multi-agency response plan but is to, as a minimum, include suitable technical expertise to provide authoritative advice regarding the prognosis of the emergency together with the actions being undertaken within the response phase of the emergency.

7. The disclosure of nuclear related information is limited in accordance with UK security classification policy and/or relevant bilateral Agreements¹⁷ – this includes the release or disclosure of information including: categories of SNM, release fractions, source terms, reactor inventories, design details, etc. These restrictions are to be rigorously applied during all tests and/or exercising of emergency plans, including in discussions with SAGE and STAC members.

8. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency being declared, MOD will arrange for relevant classified nuclear related information to be released/disclosed to ensure the protection of the public and/or the environment in accordance with JSP 628.

¹⁶ The Cabinet Office document, Provision of Scientific and Technical Advice in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre provides guidance on STAC procedures; it is published on the GOV.UK website.

¹⁷ US/UK 1958 Agreement (Atomic Energy: Co-operation for Mutual Defence Purposes) and The 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (as amended for Trident).

The Role of the Devolved Administrations

9. The DAs in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will, within their competencies and in areas within the responsibility of the administration, play a full role in responding to a Defence nuclear emergency¹⁸. They will have particular interest in the recovery phase and anything impacting upon it. They will, as necessary, have representation on the central co-ordinating body of COBR and in SAGE. Relevant Defence nuclear emergency plans are to take full account of the DA organisations and their responsibilities.

10. The relevant UK Central Government territorial department (The Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, Wales Office and Northern Ireland Office) will play an important role in managing the liaison between the UK Central Government and the DA.

11. Any requests from a DA, with the exception of retained matters, for additional Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA)¹⁹ will be routed to MOD via the respective territorial department (Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales Offices). Where a request is made through a COBR meeting and is accepted by a Defence minister, a written request will still be required to indicate that the LGD will meet costs and to indemnify the MOD. The written request should also make sure that all parties are absolutely clear on the nature of the effect that has been requested.

12. The DAs will mirror many of the tasks of the UK central crisis mechanism as well as fulfilling the same tasks as the English Regional structures. In every case, the precise balance of activity will depend on the competence of the DA involved (i.e. the terms of their devolution settlement) and the nature of the incident. The DAs maintain their own facilities to support their response to emergencies within their competence or affecting their territory.

13. In practice, even where formal accountability rests with UK ministers and Westminster, the devolved legislatures will expect to be briefed on developments where these significantly affect their territory. Likewise, national and local media will expect comments by devolved ministers, necessitating close co-operation and information sharing between UK departments and their counterparts in the DAs. The UK territorial departments – The Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, Wales Office and Northern Ireland Office – will play an important role in facilitating this process.

¹⁸ Matters of Government retained by Westminster are 'reserved' issues.

¹⁹ JDP 02 – UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security – Third Ed (Section 2).

5 Policy for Provision of Support

1. The Department is to have in place appropriate infrastructure to ensure an effective response to the range of nuclear emergencies for which it is appointed as LGD; to include the appropriate facilities, IT and communications equipment.

Alerting Responders to a Defence Nuclear Safety Alert, Incident or Emergency

2. A nuclear emergency alerting High Grade Messaging (HGM) signal is to be used by submarines at sea or in a foreign berth to alert all appropriate authorities in the event of a Defence nuclear Safety Alert, Incident or Emergency. For all other Defence nuclear Safety Alerts, Incidents or Emergencies the initial method of alert is to be via a telephone call out system, whether manual or automatic. The Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer (CDSDO) is the point of contact who will alert DNO-EPPol personnel. DNO-EPPol personnel are to initiate call out procedures via CDSDO following notification of a Defence Nuclear Emergency.

3. Appropriate facilities from which the Department can manage its response are to be capable of being set-up and in use within appropriate timescales.

DSTL

4. DSTL is appointed as the Radiation Protection Advisor (RPA) to MOD and in this capacity provides a range of radiological protection advisory support services to DNO-EPPol in the areas of nuclear emergency response and policy development; this includes:

- a. operational and subject matter expert advice and support covering nuclear reactors, nuclear weapons, reactor fuel and SNM emergency scenarios.
- b. providing ionising radiation protection advice, guidance and specialist technical support to meet UK statutory requirements, MOD and wider government policy.
- c. responding as part of HQ DNEO in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency and participating in Defence nuclear emergency exercises.

Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System

5. The Department's Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System (NERIMS) is the dedicated, resilient information management system used by MOD, AWE and DSTL, as the primary means for transferring information in the event of a Defence nuclear incident or emergency.

6. To enable effective information management, the full functionality of NERIMS is to be utilised by Duty Holders and is to be identified as the information management system in all MOD nuclear emergency response plans. NERIMS is to be populated as soon as possible with emergency information.

Resilience Direct

7. Resilience Direct (RD) is the UK's secure web-based platform that is available for use by the Resilience Community. RD is a useful tool that enables real-time sharing of

information and supports the working of the local resilience community alongside National Government Departments and Agencies. Registration to RD is controlled by the Cabinet Office, and MOD personnel who are likely to require access are advised to register. Access to Local Authority controlled sites within RD is granted by individual area Administrators and can be requested when needed.

Mapping/Geographic Information System Capability

8. The MOD is to maintain a mapping/Geographic Information System (GIS) capability and is to ensure that appropriate use of GIS is part of the planning process within the Department in accordance with Cabinet Office guidance.

Meteorological Office PACRAM Service

9. The Procedures and Communications in the event of a release of Radioactive Materials (PACRAM) Service provides meteorological advice on the atmospheric dispersion of radioactive materials that enables resulting contamination in the air and on the ground to be assessed. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, this service is to be provided to meet the requirements of the emergency response arrangements and as detailed in the Met Office Service Definition document.

6 Post Emergency

Post Emergency Investigations

1. There will be a number of different investigations and inquiries following a Defence nuclear emergency. These may range from a Ships Investigation or a Service Board of Inquiry, an Air Crash Investigation Board, a full Public Inquiry, and possibly a civil police criminal investigation depending on the circumstances of the emergency. MOD centre/HQ DNEO will take the lead in seeking advice from the Lord Chancellor's Department (or DA equivalent) on the precedence of such inquiries at the appropriate time, although a civil police investigation will take precedence over any other type of inquiry. If the emergency has resulted in fatalities a Coroner's Inquest (in England or Wales) will be undertaken to find out the facts surrounding the deaths. In Scotland this task will be undertaken by the Procurator Fiscal. MOD personnel are to co-operate fully with investigating officers from within and outside the Department. Director General DSA is appointed by the Defence Council to be the primary Convening Authority for all safety related Service Inquiries. Further information on post emergency investigations can be found in JSP 832 Guide to Service Inquiries.

Preservation of Records

2. MOD Policy for preservation of records can be found in JSP 441 – Managing Information in Defence. All MOD nuclear emergency plans and protocols are to include arrangements for the preservation of all records, actions and key decisions during the response to a Defence nuclear incident or emergency to provide the necessary audit trail for any subsequent investigations.

3. Records to be preserved as evidence for any follow-up inquiry are to include written media such as flip over charts, faxes, meeting minutes and records, as well as electronic data generated throughout the incident or emergency. NERIMS, as the main communications medium, will retain a database of all events and records logged on to it. All data on the NERIMS server associated with an event will be archived. Duty Holders are to maintain logs during an incident at all sites, which clearly identify which NERIMS stations were in use, the name of the operators and the period of time they were at the machine that was used (all times are to be in local).

Liability and Claims

4. There would, broadly speaking, be an absolute liability on the Department to meet any subsequent personal injury or property damage claims from civilians where it can be demonstrated that their injury or loss was attributable to a Defence nuclear emergency.

5. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency resulting in a radiological hazard, or an emergency involving a US nuclear weapon within the UK and its territorial waters, the SPO-Directorate of Judicial Engagement Policy - Common Law Claims and Policy (SPO-DJEP-CLCP) would be responsible for:

- a. on-site claims work as needed from the time of the initial alert.
- b. membership of HQ DNEO to handle all claims issues and to provide advice and assistance when required.

c. provision of registration forms for those in the area at the time of the incident.

6. Further details are contained in the SPO-DJEP-CLCP Claims Manual which may be obtained from the MOD Senior Claims Officer (Policy).

7 International

Standard Statement

1. In order to present a coherent and unified approach to foreign visits and access to nuclear information the Western nuclear powers have developed national Standard Statements that set out the basis for foreign visits by NPWs. In effect, the Standard Statement declares that ‘all safety precautions and procedures followed in connection with operations in home ports will be strictly observed in foreign ports.’ The Standard Statement also makes clear that the respective government ‘does not make technical information on the design or operations of its NPWs available’. Provision of the Statement is the sole condition of entry that the UK will meet. The UK policy of strictly adhering to the use of these statements ensures compliance with the UK/US 1958 agreement and also acts to cement the relationship with the US. Any off-site emergency plans, or planning arrangements, are a matter for the host nation. The provision of information to host nations to support the development of off-site response plans is to be in accordance with the provisions of the UK Standard Statement. The UK Standard Statement is reproduced at [Annex I](#).

Visiting Forces / US and French Nuclear Powered Warships

2. While Visiting Forces are covered by state immunity, SofS has, for the avoidance of doubt, exempted members of HM Forces and other persons working on behalf of SofS in respect of Visiting Forces, and Visiting Forces themselves, from the provisions of both the UK and Gibraltar IRR and REPIR in the interests of national security.

UK/US Third Tier Arrangement and Implementing Joint Operational Plans

3. The UK and US Governments recognise the need to provide a fast, efficient and co-ordinated response to an incident or emergency involving US nuclear weapons or nuclear components in the UK, including its internal waters and territorial sea. The policies and responsibilities of the UK MOD, the US Department of Defense (DoD), UK and US response forces, and other responsible UK and US authorities for dealing with an incident or emergency involving a US nuclear weapon in the UK, is specified in the UK/US Government to Government TTA²⁰.

4. The arrangements for dealing with an incident or emergency on land or where the effects have an impact on land are modelled on those in the UK Cabinet Office publication ‘Emergency Response and Recovery’. Arrangements for the integration of the joint military response are detailed in Implementing Joint Operational Plans (IJOPs).

5. The IJOP Part 1 provides policy interpretation of the TTA in respect of incidents or emergencies involving US nuclear weapons in the UK.

6. The IJOP Part 2 details the concept of operations to be adopted jointly by both nations in the event of an off-base US nuclear Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) incident or emergency involving US nuclear weapons or nuclear components.

²⁰ Third Tier Arrangement dated 27 Mar 14.

International Conventions and Notifications

7. The Convention on Early Notification in the event of a nuclear emergency describes the arrangements established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under which any signatory country that operates nuclear installations is obliged to inform the IAEA immediately of an emergency which could have consequences outside the country's own borders. The IAEA undertake to forward the notification of a nuclear emergency occurring anywhere in the world to the respective National Warning Points in member States. The Convention requires States to report the emergency time, location, radiation releases and other data essential for assessing the situation.

8. Although the IAEA Convention does not apply to Defence the MOD has agreed to provide information in accordance with the Convention, on a voluntary basis, in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency in the UK. The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is the UK Competent Authority for notifying the European Community. The MOD maintains a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with BEIS for the provision of information relating to Defence nuclear emergencies; such information will be provided by HQ DNEO.

The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

9. The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is a worldwide tool designed by the IAEA as a means of communicating to the public, in a consistent way, the safety significance of nuclear and radiological events; see [Annex J](#).

10. Events are classified on the scale at seven levels: Levels 1-3 are called 'incidents' and Levels 4-7 'accidents'. The scale is designed so that the severity of an event is about ten times greater for each increase in level on the scale. Events without safety significance are called 'deviations' and are classified Below Scale/Level 0.

11. The HQ DNEO, Safety Cell will classify a Defence nuclear emergency in terms of the INES scale before information is passed to BEIS. Once classified, the information will also be disseminated within the MOD response organisation. Subsequent updates, as required, will inform decisions on the requirements of the technical response.

8 Exercises and Assessment

Exercises

1. The testing of nuclear emergency response arrangements is an important element of the overall assessment of the adequacy of the Department's arrangements. Duty Holders are responsible for scheduling exercises of their arrangements in accordance with statutory and SDA-DNSR requirements. For convenience, broad definitions of different types of exercises (based on those developed within the civil nuclear programme) are detailed below.
2. MOD nuclear emergency PR and Media arrangements are to be tested, as appropriate, during Defence nuclear emergency response exercises, normally as part of exercises of the off-site response (Level 2 and Level 3 exercises).
3. Key elements of the HQ DNEO executive function and LGD plans are to be exercised each year in conjunction with an exercise of the off-site response (a Level 3 exercise). The exercise will be selected by DNO-EPPol-AH in conjunction with OGDs and stakeholders and will be de-conflicted with the national exercise programme.
4. Aspects of Central Government co-ordination arrangements are to be reviewed by DNO-EPPol in conjunction with the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat.
5. For national level exercises, DNO-EPPol-AH is to co-ordinate the completion of a Lessons Identified Report. Participants are to be invited to make a contribution to the report. The draft report is to be circulated to participants for comment and approval prior to it being published on the GOV.UK web site. Before they provide input, contributors are to be made aware that the report will become a public document.

Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise Definitions

Level 1

6. A test of the operator's emergency response arrangements. This may be a MOD only exercise or may include participation by off-site responders (e.g. the emergency services) where these form an integral element of the on-site arrangements. The overall objective is to test the Operator's on-site nuclear emergency response at the operational level.

Level 2

7. A test of the off-site emergency response arrangements. The overall objective is to test the response at the local strategic level. This may include, or be linked to, the testing of the operators plan or may be conducted separately (the operator's response being simulated).

8. All Level 2 exercises are to include, as a minimum, a test of the interface with the HQ DNEO and LGD arrangements. DNO-EPPol will provide support to test the upward interface from Strategic level as required.

Note: Level 1 or 2 exercises, as defined above, may be combined. For example, Level 1 and 2 combined exercises would test both the on-site and off-site response arrangements in a single exercise.

Level 3

9. Key elements of HQ DNEO and cross government arrangements for responding to an emergency involving Defence nuclear assets, as well as the on-site and off-site response arrangements (i.e. Level 1 and 2 exercise), will be tested during a Level 3 exercise. HQ DNEO will be closed up.

Assessment

10. Statutory regulation of Duty Holders' arrangements is by ONR, in conjunction with the non-statutory Regulator, DSA-DNSR and SPO-DefNucSyR, where applicable. Collectively the Regulators will optimise their assessment of exercises by working jointly, when appropriate, in line with the Security Informed Nuclear Safety (SINS) approach. Copies of both regulatory assessments and any self-assessments carried out by Duty Holders are to be provided to DNO-EPPol-AH.

9 Media and Communications

MOD Public Relations and Media Management

1. Effective communications with the Media, Parliament or directly with the public is a vital part of the MOD's strategy for responding to a Defence nuclear emergency.
2. The requirements set out here are separate from, and additional to, the specific communications requirements on Duty Holders to provide timely notification of an OSNE including, where appropriate, public safety advice.
3. The MOD, as the LGD in the event of a Defence Nuclear Emergency, must have a clear communications strategy to ensure the effective and efficient management of the departmental and Central Government communications issues.
4. Responsibility for the overall effectiveness of MOD's media and communications response lies with the Directorate of Defence Communications (DDC). HQ DNEO is responsible for ensuring that information for the public, parliament and the media is accurate, consistent, informative and issued promptly. The need for public safety and reassurance takes precedence over security requirements, although any relaxation of security requirements should only be considered where there is a demonstrable conflict between safety and security requirements, and this decision should be informed by the appropriate MOD authorities. This will include SDA-DNSR and SPO-DefNucSyR.

Preparation of Information

5. In so far as is practicable press statements are to be pre-prepared covering the immediate phase of the response. These statements are to allow for the inclusion of specific details relating to the location of the emergency and casualties. Background material is to be prepared covering topics which are likely to be required to be briefed in depth to the media. For example details about the operation, the nuclear asset, radiation and radioactive materials and medical aspects. Consideration should be given as to how this will be published i.e. the printed press or on the internet. Photographs or short film clips may be required. Where practical during the planning process, pre-prepared information is to be agreed with relevant civilian agencies such as the police and local authorities. Appropriate information is to be included in the IJOPs for US assets.

Central Government Co-ordination of Media and Public Information

6. In the event of a Defence Nuclear Emergency, it is likely that the Cabinet Office News Co-ordination Centre²¹ (NCC) will be activated to support the UK Central Government response.
7. Any emergency on a scale requiring a co-ordinated UK Central Government response will need national direction of public information from the outset. Central Government will be responsible for the national communications strategy for responding to the crisis, the development of which will be co-ordinated with the lead responder locally (normally the police).

²¹ The NCC is a cross-governmental emergency press office, set up in the event of a national crisis with implications for more than one department.

Responsibilities for Disseminating Information

8. MOD's DDC will manage the Central Government communications response to a Defence Nuclear Emergency. DDC will work through and with the Cabinet Office NCC, helping them to co-ordinate the national Government media and communications response by working with OGDs, agencies, and DAs as required and maintain close links with Local Strategic, supporting and supplementing their efforts as necessary.

9. The MCA's Public Relations (PR) personnel are to prepare information for the MCA to use at the Media Briefing Centre (MBC), in conjunction with civilian agencies. PR staff, DDC and HQ DNEO are to ensure that they keep each other fully informed of all the information disseminated, together with details of the reaction of the media at any briefings and the content of printed articles and broadcasts. In order to ensure consistency it is the MOD's aim to disseminate information from as few sources as possible.

Content of Information

10. The MCA's PR personnel and the HQ DNEO/DDC are to ensure that the information disseminated at local strategic, London or elsewhere is consistent, both in content and timing.

11. If there is any doubt whether the information to be supplied concerns MOD policy issues, PR personnel should clear statements with HQ DNEO.

12. HQ DNEO and DDC will address issues of a longer term nature, the need for and precedence of formal inquiries and matters of Defence policy.

Local Strategic Co-ordination of Media and Public Information

13. **Media Communications Cell (MCC)** (sometimes known as the Strategic Media Advisory Cell (SMAC) or Public Communications Group (PCG)). To ensure consistent Communication is delivered by all agencies involved in the response to a Defence Nuclear Emergency, a MCC will be set up at the SCC. The MCC will be established to ensure that the legal duty to warn, inform and advise the public in an emergency is carried out and there is adequate provision of timely, accurate, consistent information in support of the SCG aim and objectives.

14. **Media Briefing Centre.** A MBC may be set up, usually close to the SCC, to provide a single focus for the provision of information and facilitate liaison with the press and broadcasters. It will be the designated location for news conferences, media interviews and briefings and will give journalists access to responding organisations' spokespeople.

15. **Forward Media Briefing Point.** An appropriate location for a Forward Media Briefing Point may be identified if the situation allows. Ideally this location should provide safe and easy access from public areas and be within line of sight of the incident scene. If possible it will include a media vantage point for photographs and filming at the scene.

16. The provision of local press statements is the responsibility of the police.

MOD Emergency Website

17. In the event of a Defence nuclear emergency, the MOD will launch the emergency website pages on the MOD's home page on GOV.UK. The website will be managed and

operated by the DDC web team, with HQ DNEO Secretariat assisting with the provision of Defence information. It is essential that the dissemination of information is co-ordinated for content, accuracy and security. For this reason, Defence related information about the emergency will only be posted on the GOV.UK website. If local authorities, emergency services or OGDs wish to utilise their own websites to disseminate information, any Defence sourced information that is offered to these agencies for inclusion on their web pages will first be cleared by HQ DNEO.

SQEP MOD Personnel

18. MOD DNEO personnel required to present information or act as a spokesperson to the media are to be designated in emergency plans. They should be media trained and experienced, and Nuclear Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (NSQEP). Advice on media training and experience is to be sought from MOD DDC. MOD PR personnel are to advise the MCA on the selection of suitable personnel to provide briefings to the media.

10 Operations in the UK: Defence Contribution to Resilience

Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom)

1. SJC(UK)'s primary responsibility is to plan and exercise Operational Command (OPCOM) of forces generated by the Service Commands within the SJC(UK) Joint Operations Area (JOA) in support of the civil authorities, as directed by the SPO. Military support to a Defence Nuclear Emergency will, in accordance with existing emergency plans, involve pre-planned military support to the Defence response and may also involve additional military deployments under MACA arrangements.

2. Maritime operations both inside and outside UK territorial waters will generally be under the OPCOM of the Fleet Commander.

Military Aid to the Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation

3. Activation of the Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (DNEO) and its response is a pre-planned military operation led at the local level by the MCA under CDS's authority. SJC(UK) will provide co-ordination and oversight of Defence assets detailed in support of individual nuclear emergency response (NER) plans, where arranged in bilateral agreements between NER Plan Duty Holders and Single Service TLB or Defence Agencies²². If additional Military Force Elements (FE) are required by the MCA for contingent work to augment FE already assigned to any DNEO response, this is 'Defence supporting Defence' and MACA procedures (see below) do not apply. Requests for additional Military FE to augment FE already assigned to a DNEO response will be made on behalf of the MCA to the SPO via the JRLO or RPoC commander, and SJC(UK). Military FE will be commanded by SJC(UK), through the JMC, on behalf of the MCA. Military forces required to respond to a Defence Nuclear Emergency under standing arrangements/plans will remain under their own command chains.

4. The SJC(UK) supports the DNEO through planning and delivery of operational level command and control of FE allocated to nuclear emergency plans. In order to achieve that, all plans are to be submitted to SJC(UK) who will check that forces allocated are viable, available and suitable. Full details of the SJC(UK) roles and responsibilities are contained within the current CDS Directive to the SJC(UK).

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

5. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 02, Operations in the UK - the Defence Contribution to Resilience²³, defines the policy for operations in the UK in support of civil authorities. Following a Defence nuclear emergency, in addition to the pre-planned military support required by the MCA to deal with his tasks, the civil authorities may also require additional military aid which would be requested under MACA arrangements.

²² Bilateral agreements requiring military resource must first be endorsed by the Ops Dir.

²³ JDP 02 (Third edition) 2017.

6. Military support under MACA arrangements must always be at the specific request of the civil authorities and requires the authorisation of Defence Ministers²⁴. Requests for military support under these arrangements should initially be made to the JRLO. Once scoped and assessed viable, the civil authorities should forward a formal request through their chain of command to their LGD in accordance with normal MACA procedures.

Regional Point of Command Support to UK Resilience Operations

7. The RPoC commander is tasked with understanding the resilience challenges and establishing working relationships with local authorities and civil emergency services within boundaries. This liaison is undertaken, on behalf of the RPoC commander, by the JRLO who is the primary focus for the integration of UK Operations with the civil authorities. The JRLO²⁵ is the primary focus for the integration of UK Operations with the civil authorities. The JRLO will ensure that the activities of the Service Commands are coordinated to provide the optimum level of support when requested from the civil authorities.

8. The JRLO will provide situational awareness to HQ SJC(UK), advise the SCG chair on Defence capabilities and assist with the drafting of any MACA request for submission to the SPO via HQ SJC(UK). The RPoC commander may choose to deploy forward to the SCG but will most likely set up in the RPoC HQ.

²⁴ There are specific exceptions where there is an imminent threat to life, where the local commander can authorise assistance, or where support is limited to non-operational logistic support, which can be authorised within the Ops Dir. JDP 02 refers.

²⁵ But may also be a RNRLO or RAFLO.

11 Roles and Responsibilities

1. DNO-EPPol's roles and responsibilities are outlined as follows.

Policy and Plans

2. DNO-EPPol will:
 - a. sponsor and maintain the central high level MOD policy for nuclear emergency response - JSP 471.
 - b. sponsor and maintain the necessary plans and infrastructure to enable the MOD HQ response to a Defence nuclear emergency and the co-ordination of the Central Government response, including interface with the Cabinet Office, Civil Contingencies Secretariat and COBR; this will include maintenance of the HQ DNEO call-out alerting procedures.
 - c. sponsor and maintain the Government-to-Government arrangements for the response to a US nuclear weapon emergency in the UK as detailed in the joint UK/US TTA and for policy interpretation of this in the IJOP (Part 1).
 - d. sponsor and maintain the public Local Authority and Emergency Service Information (LAESI) document which describes the contingency arrangements for the transport of DNM.

Exercises and Training

3. DNO-EPPol will:
 - a. contribute to the planning and exercising of the HQ DNEO and/or LGD elements of the off-site arrangements.
 - b. lead, with DDC, on the arrangements for Defensive Newsbriefs or realtime media handling where required.

Services in Support of MOD DNEO

4. DNO-EPPol will ensure the provision of common services for MOD DNEO as follows:
 - a. Funding of the Meteorological Office services (including PACRAM).
 - b. Senior User and System Manager for the Department's NERIMS.
5. Defence Nuclear-Warhead Capability is responsible for sponsorship of AWE services for response to weapon and materials emergencies (including hazard prediction).

Other MOD Operations

6. DNO-EPPol will represent nuclear emergency response aspects in the planning for and support of other similar MOD Operations. DNO-EPPol is to be notified of any proposal to divert nuclear emergency response elements or equipment to support such operations in order that compensatory arrangements can be made, and Ministers can be informed, if necessary.

Liaison with Other Government Departments and National Bodies

7. DNO-EPPol will be the primary point of contact with OGDs, Government Agencies, Devolved Administrations and national bodies on Defence Nuclear Emergency Response policy matters. In particular it will:

- a. represent MOD in its LGD role in liaison with Cabinet Office and others.
- b. represent MOD on the Nuclear Resilience Co-ordination Committee (NRCC) and its associated Working Groups, the Forum for Integrated Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (FINEP) (when required), the CBRN Recovery Programme Board, the Nuclear Emergency Arrangements Forum (NEAF) and the Scottish Nuclear Resilience Group (SNRG).
- c. co-ordinate the departmental responses to proposed legislation, regulation and guidance on, or related to, nuclear emergency response.
- d. lead for MOD in any discussions with national bodies (e.g. The National Police Chief's Council, Chief Fire Officers Association, National Health Service, National Association of Local Councils, The Emergency Planning Society).

Liaison with Overseas and UK Dependency Governments

8. DNO-EPPol will be the primary point of contact on Defence Nuclear Emergency Response policy matters with foreign Governments and UK Overseas Territories, consulting with other MOD departments and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, including British Embassy Defence Staff, as appropriate. In particular it will:

- a. foster contacts on weapon emergency response with the US Department of Defence through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), US European Command (USEUCOM), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the US Department of Energy (DoE), under the 1958 agreement; this will include arrangements for the mutual observation of exercises.
- b. foster contacts with France through the joint Franco-British Nuclear Staff Talks; this will include arrangements for the mutual observation of exercises.
- c. foster contacts with France resulting from the UK/FR Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty signed on 2 November 2010.
- d. take the lead on the political aspects of reactor emergency response with UK Overseas Territories.
- e. take the lead in all aspects of reactor emergency response with overseas Governments (within the scope of the Standard Statement under which UK NPW visits are made).

ANNEX A - DEFINITIONS - DEFENCE NUCLEAR INCIDENTS AND EMERGENCIES

Event	Definition
Safety Alert (SA)¹	An abnormal event which poses a potential threat to, or causes serious concern for reactor plant, nuclear weapon, or SNM safety.
<u>Site²</u>	
Event	Definition
Site Nuclear Incident (SNI)	An abnormal event giving rise to a radiological hazard or potential radiological hazard which is confined in its effect to within the site boundary and which requires the site/operators response plan, or parts thereof, to be implemented.
Off-Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE)	A hazardous condition which requires the implementation of urgent countermeasures to protect the public.
<u>Transport³</u>	
Event	Definition
Nuclear Transport Incident (NTI)	An abnormal event, arising during the transport of DNM, giving rise to a radiological hazard or potential radiological hazard which is confined in its effects to the container(s) and/or load carrying vehicle(s).
Nuclear Transport Emergency (NTE)	A hazardous condition, arising during the transport of DNM, which requires the implementation of urgent countermeasures to protect the public from a radiological hazard.

¹ This would be reported as a Reactor Safety Alert, a Nuclear Weapon Safety Alert or a SNM Safety Alert as appropriate.

² Defined as the Licensed / Authorised site, including a nuclear submarine when at a fixed point mooring or alongside berth. A nuclear submarine is deemed to be its own site when a mooring or berth does not form part of a Licensed/Authorised site. Deployed submarines (i.e. those outside the boundaries of UK Ports where specific nuclear emergency response arrangements are in place) are included in this definition.

³ Defined as the movement of DNM (by road, rail or air), from the time loaded onto the vehicle for the purpose of transportation until finally unloaded. Any transfer of materials (e.g. from road to rail or air and vice versa) is considered part of the transport activity.

1. It is envisaged that a Reactor Safety Alert may progress through to declaration of an OSNE without a SNI being separately declared. In this situation, on declaration of the OSNE, the site/operator's response plan and the off-site response plan would be implemented simultaneously⁴.

Asset	Reactor
	Weapon
	SNM (to be defined on declaration)

Supplementary Qualifiers of an OSNE/NTE

Qualifier	Radiation Hazard Confirmed An OSNE/NTE in which a radiation hazard has been detected.
	Release of Radioactive Material Confirmed An OSNE/NTE in which a release of radioactive material to the environment has been detected.

Reporting Format

2. Reporting of an Incident or Emergency using the above definitions is to be in the format⁵:

Event – Asset – (Road/Rail/Air for Transport scenarios) – Qualifier

3. For example:

- a. OSNE – Reactor – Release of Radioactive Material Confirmed.
- b. NTE – Weapon – Road – Release of Radioactive Material Confirmed.

⁴ Defence Nuclear Emergency Arrangements Group (NEAG) Paper 05/09 Issue 3.

⁵ Safety Alert - Reactor and Safety Alert - Weapon may be reported by the more widely recognised terms Reactor Safety Alert (RSA) and Weapon Safety Alert (WSA).

ANNEX B - MOD COORDINATING AUTHORITY TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Duty Holders are required to appoint an NSQEP Executive Director, termed the MOD Coordinating Authority (MCA) to be responsible in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency for the control and direction of all MOD response activities in the area. The MCA is to:

a. In preparation:


- (1) be a senior official of 1* OF6 level (or SCS equivalent) or a delegated OF5 (B1/B2 if Civilian).
- (2) ensure that effective plans are in place appropriate to the emergency scenario for which they are appointed.
- (3) have a working knowledge of the response plan and the assets at their disposal.
- (4) understand the roles and responsibilities of other responding agencies.
- (5) have an understanding of the Department's LGD role.
- (6) maintain currency in the role of MCA by appropriate training and participation in exercises of the plan.

b. In the event of an emergency:

- (1) be the MOD's senior representative at Local Strategic level.
- (2) provide authoritative and timely advice concerning the progress or development of the emergency and the potential implications, including mitigation of operations to make safe and recover the asset during a transport emergency.
- (3) provide the Department's LGD input to the SCG, liaising with the JMC as required.
- (4) keep HQ DNEO informed on the status of the emergency and of the operational response to it.
- (5) act on strategic direction from HQ DNEO and seek any additional military FE required from the SPO through the JRLO, Regional Point of Command Commander (JRLO/RPoC Bde Cdr) and HQ SJC(UK).

2. The MCA will co-locate with the SCG Chair, who is usually a Chief Constable and attend SCG meetings.

ANNEX C - CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATION AND INTERACTION WITH THE LOCAL STRATEGIC CO-ORDINATING CENTRE



* The SCG Chair is usually a Chief Constable.

~ The MOD Co-ordinating Authority (MCA) is to be responsible in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency for the co-ordination of all MOD response activities in the area.

ANNEX D - ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE

1. The main duties of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) Representative are:

a. In the Emergency Phase:

(1) to support the MCA and GLT in the delivery of their duties.

(2) to assist in the co-ordination and provision of information on local consequence management to Central Government, ensuring MHCLG and Cabinet Office are fully briefed.

(3) to assist in recovery planning from the outset of preparation; this might be expected to start in the emergency phase. For this, the MHCLG Representative will attend meetings of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group in a supporting and continuity role with other representatives of the MCA/GLT.

(4) where necessary, MHCLG will activate an operations centre to facilitate national co-ordination and assurance for situation reporting on national consequence management; support MHCLG staff in discharging their role; engage other necessary bodies; and communicate Top Line Briefs to Local LRFs.


(5) where local responders are overwhelmed, or cross boundary or border co-ordination is necessary, the MHCLG Representative will facilitate preparation for and implementation of a response through the Response Co-ordinating Group

b. In the Recovery Phase:

(1) to support the MCA/GLT and ensure the handover of the GLT function to recovery at an appropriate stage as agreed with MOD.

(2) MHCLG RED will undertake the transition from response to recovery by ensuring an effective handover from the MHCLG RED Government Liaison Officers (GLOs) to LGD Officials taking up responsibility for supporting local responders and any Recovery Coordinating Group(s).

ANNEX E - CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION



ANNEX F - DEFENCE MINISTERIAL REPORTING CRITERIA

Scope

1. The Defence Ministerial Reporting Criteria categorises occurrences at Defence nuclear sites, Defence related licensed sites, Defence nuclear transport operations and/or deployed nuclear powered submarines or weapons which do not meet the criteria for Defence Nuclear Emergencies and the activation of emergency response plans ([Annex A](#)), but which may have a nuclear/radiological safety significance and need to be reported to Defence Ministers and senior officials.

Notification

2. The Defence Nuclear Organisation Secretariat (DNO-Secretariat) and NAVCOM Policy Secretariat (NAVCOM Pol Sec) are to lead on the reporting to Defence Ministers for nuclear/radiological related incidents which meet the Ministerial reporting criteria¹.

3. Notification of a nuclear/radiological incident is to come from the MOD Duty Holder² or their delegated representative, or for non-MOD Duty Holders³ their MOD customer, or from the DSA-DNSR to DNO-Secretariat or NAVCOM Pol Sec, normally within 24 hours of the event occurring (contact details are held separately by DNO-Secretariat and NAVCOM Pol Sec). The Duty Holder is to inform the ONR, EA or the SEPA site inspector as appropriate. DNO-Secretariat or NAVCOM Pol Sec should be notified of any incidents that have been reported to external regulators as soon as possible. DSA-DNSR is to give the Regulator's view on whether the incident is reportable to Defence Ministers. DNO-Secretariat or NAVCOM Pol Sec are to alert the DDC where there is a possibility of media interest, and provide lines-to-take, consulting as necessary with the policy/operational lead.

4. The notification timing requirement may be extended for submarines on patrol with restricted communications, but is to be achieved as soon as practicable. Notification of a nuclear/radiological incident onboard a submarine at sea, outside territorial waters, in a foreign berth, in an overseas territory or at a UK berth in fleet time is to be sent from the submarine by signal to FLEET COMMANDER (Duty Submarine Controller).

5. On receipt of notification of the nuclear/radiological incident, DNO-Secretariat or NAVCOM Pol Sec are to consult with the relevant policy and/or operational lead to confirm:

- a. that the incident meets the reporting criteria.
- b. the ministerial reporting arrangements.

6. In the case of an incident outside normal office hours DNO-Secretariat or NAVCOM Pol Sec are to assess whether it is necessary to contact the MOD Main Building MinDO, who may inform the relevant Minister, and is to contact the DDC Duty Press Officer if the incident is media sensitive or likely to attract public attention.

7. These arrangements do not apply in the event of a nuclear emergency or incident being declared which meets the definitions in [Annex A](#) of JSP 471, and which requires nuclear

¹ DNO-Secretariat and NAVCOM Pol Sec will consult and agree which department will lead, consulting with SDA as necessary.

² DNO-Warhead Delivery Team; SDA CSSE; NRP Authorisee; HMNB Clyde; HMNB Devonport.

³ AWE; Babcock Marine Division Devonport and Rosyth; BAE Systems Submarine Solutions, Barrow; Rolls Royce Marine Power Operations Ltd, Derby.

emergency response plans to be invoked. In such circumstances, the HQ DNEO is to notify Ministers.

External Notification

8. DAs, OGDs, foreign governments and overseas territories may need to be notified of nuclear/radiological related incidents depending on the nature and location of the incident. DNO-EPPol-AH is to be consulted, and if required will co-ordinate the relevant external notifications.

Approval

9. DNO-Secretariat and NAVCOM Pol Sec are to clear their respective Ministerial submissions through DSA-DNSR and the relevant policy and/or operational leads. Nuclear-SubCap-NP-EPPol-AH is to be included as a copy addressee, together with the MOD Duty Holder, and the Nuclear Propulsion Project Team (NPPT) or the Defence Nuclear-Warhead Delivery Team as appropriate. DSA-DNSR is to liaise with the ONR where the incident has occurred at a Defence related licensed site.

ANNEX G - DEFENCE MINISTERIAL REPORTING CRITERIA AND HIGH LEVEL GUIDANCE

Criteria are in bold text

Guidance is in italics

1. Dangerous occurrences reportable under the Nuclear Installations (Dangerous Occurrences) Regulation 1965. (Note: It is most likely that such occurrences would fall within the REPPiR definition of a radiation emergency and require implementation of emergency plans).

a. Any event on a Defence nuclear operators site¹ that involves the emission of ionising radiations or the release of radioactive or toxic substances that has caused or is likely to cause the death of, or serious injury to the health of, persons² outside the site or on the site at the time of occurrence.

b. Any event in the course of carriage of DNM that:

(1) has caused or is likely to cause the death of, or serious injury to the health of, any person by reason of the radioactive properties of such nuclear matter.

(2) involves the breaking open of any outside container in which such nuclear material is being carried.

c. Any explosion or outbreak of fire on a Defence nuclear operators site or in the vicinity of a vehicle carrying DNM that is affecting, or is likely to affect, the safe working or safe condition of the nuclear plant/facility or of the nuclear material. It would be appropriate to report any explosion or major fire affecting sufficient safety related plant such that the affected system is unable to perform its safety function.

d. Any uncontrolled criticality excursion.

2. Confirmed exposures to radiation of individuals which exceed, or which are expected to exceed, the dose limits specified in Schedule 3 to the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017.

a. Dose limits specified in schedule 3 to IRR17 are clear and objective. No guidance required.

3. Examination, maintenance, inspection, test or operation of any part of the plant revealing that safe operation or condition of the plant may be significantly affected.

a. Notification is required if discovery of a fault requires serious consideration of withdrawal or amendment of the Authority to Operate a Naval reactor plant.

¹ Site means: a licensed site; an authorised site; a site under the control of SofS for Defence; a submarine which may, or may not, form part of an aforementioned site or any movement of DNM.

² Medical confidentiality must be respected in all notifications.

b. Notification is required if discovery of a fault requires serious consideration of the need to make safe a nuclear device or component and review of conformance of the device³ or component with the safety case.

c. Notification is required if discovery of a fault on a Naval reactor plant or nuclear device or component that although in a safe condition at the time of discovery (e.g. shut down) nevertheless could have serious implications for the continued safety of other Naval reactor plant or nuclear devices or components.

4. A confirmed breach of, or discharge expected to breach, quantitative limits of a Certificate of Authorisation, or Letter of Agreement, for the disposal of radioactive waste issued under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 and the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016 (EPR 16).

a. Quantitative limits set under RSA93 and EPR 16 are clear and objective. No further guidance required.

5. Abnormal occurrences leading to a confirmed release to atmosphere or spillage of a radioactive substance which exceeds, or is expected to exceed, the limits set out in Column 4 of Schedule 7 of the Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017, except where the release is in a manner specified in an Authorisation/Agreement under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993.

a. Quantities and concentrations specified in column 4 of schedule 7 to IRR17 are clear and objective.

b. This criteria covers liquids, gases, aerosols and dusts. The term 'atmosphere' covers the internal environment of buildings/submarines/vehicles as well as the external atmosphere.

c. Reporting is not required where the spillage is in an enclosure or other such localised facility, so designed, maintained and used as to effectively prevent the release going beyond that facility. This exception would apply, for instance to glove boxes and purpose designed enclosures and benches in laboratories, in circumstances where the spillage would not be considered an 'abnormal occurrence'. However, this exception would not cover releases affecting whole rooms or buildings where people work and could receive a significant exposure to radiation as a result of the spillage.

6. Abnormal occurrences leading to a release or suspected release or spread of radioactivity, on or off site, which requires special action or special investigation by the Operator.

a. Any unplanned event that significantly increases radiation dose rates or surface or airborne contamination, for which an investigation report will subsequently be required. Any formal investigation into any such suspected occurrence outside the site boundary.

³ Nuclear device is taken to mean all those devices whose design intent is to be able to produce an uncontrolled nuclear reaction.

7. Any 'nuclear or radiological safety event' which does not meet the criteria at 1 to 6, but which the operator believes might attract media or public attention and for which a press release or response statement is to be issued.

a. Any unplanned event involving the Naval reactor plant, DNM, nuclear weapons or radioactive wastes generated as a result the Defence weapon or propulsion programmes.

b. Reporting is not required under this process if the only media-related action is the preparation of defensive lines for press officers. DNO-Secretariat and NAVCOM Pol Sec may, however, choose to make Ministers offices aware of the event.

8. If the incident is such that the relevant nuclear emergency response plan has to be invoked, the notification and reporting procedures in those plans are to be followed.

ANNEX H - GUIDANCE ON THE OPERATIONAL APPLICATION OF THE 'NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY' POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INCIDENT OR EMERGENCY INVOLVING A NUCLEAR WEAPON

General Policy

1. It is UK policy to neither confirm nor deny (NCND) the presence or absence of nuclear weapons at any particular place or time; information on this subject is generally classified SECRET¹. This policy is also upheld by the US² and by NATO. The primary rationale for the policy is that it contributes towards effective security of nuclear weapons, but to be effective it must be consistently applied, even on occasions where the presence or absence of nuclear weapons may be thought to be obvious³. DNO-Nuclear Policy is the lead for NCND policy matters, and should be consulted wherever possible in circumstances where questions on these issues arise.

2. The NCND policy does not apply to SNM.

Possible Exceptions in Case of Emergency

3. The following guidance applies to all situations involving UK nuclear weapons (including operations at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), nuclear weapons convoys, and operations at HMNB Clyde), arising from an incident or emergency or malicious intervention by a third party.

4. In certain circumstances, it will be necessary to set aside the NCND policy and confirm the presence of nuclear weapons to allow MOD to meet its health and safety and security responsibilities together with its common law duty-of-care to its employees, members of the public and emergency service personnel, namely:

- a. where not disclosing the presence of nuclear weapons would cause an unacceptable risk to the public or emergency services;
- b. to ensure the continued safety and/or security of any nuclear weapons present.

5. In these circumstances, the MOD commander on the scene (Convoy Commander, MOD Operational Commander or MOD Co-ordinating Authority (MCA), as appropriate) and the Senior Operations Officer (SOO) in the Joint Operations Cell (JOC) have the authority to set NCND aside, for the duration of the incident, confirming the presence or absence of nuclear weapons, and thus declassifying the information in question. Once information has

¹ The fact that nuclear weapons are routinely present in certain places – AWE Burghfield, RNAD Coulport and on board SSBNs – has been officially confirmed. It has also been officially confirmed that SSBNs in refit at Devonport, which will have offloaded their missiles before going into refit, are not carrying nuclear weapons.

² See DoD Directive number 5230.16 of 6 October 2015, Nuclear Radiological Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance.

³ It is acceptable in certain situations, especially where there is a justified desire to dispel false suspicions of the presence of nuclear weapons, to couple NCND with other existing official statements, such as the SDR statement that Trident is the UK's only nuclear weapon system and the obvious fact that Trident can only be carried on a submarine, to enable the hearer to draw their own conclusions. On the same basis, it is also acceptable to state whether a certain site has facilities for storing nuclear weapons. DNO-Nuclear-Policy should be consulted for forms of words that can be used in particular circumstances.

been disclosed to the civilian emergency services, even if it has not been directly or officially disclosed to the media, the assumption must be that the information is in the public domain⁴.

6. In the event that there is, or is likely to be, widespread public alarm (even where there is no radiological or other hazard requiring public information procedures to be activated), responsibility for addressing that public alarm will lie with the civil police. In setting the NCND policy aside, the SOO and MOD commander on the scene must first have spoken to agree the extent of the incident. NCND can be set aside for all the vehicles in the convoy. The SOO will send hazard information to the Civil Emergency Services and accordingly the details of the incident will be in the public domain.

7. In the circumstances set out in paragraphs 5 and 6, it must clearly be stated by MOD representatives that NCND is HM Government's policy and departing from it in any incident or emergency situation prevailing at the time does not invalidate its continuing application in future.

8. Before responding to any requests for information from the public or the media concerning the presence or absence of nuclear weapons where the circumstances set out in paragraphs 4 or 6 do not apply, the matter is to be referred to MOD HQ, Defence Nuclear Organisation, Emergency Planning Policy (DNO-EPPol) during office hours, or via the CDSDO out of hours; or in the event that this is not possible, the DNO-Warhead Delivery Transport Team, Joint Operations Cell (JOC) for nuclear weapon convoys.

⁴ Though in such circumstances the assumption is that the information may spread unofficially from members of the emergency services, the responsibility for public information will rest with the civil police. No information should be directly disclosed to the media by the MOD commander on the scene or by the MOD press office without the agreement of the civil police.

ANNEX I - STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT ON OPERATION OF NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIPS IN FOREIGN PORTS

1. The UK Government certifies that the reactor safety aspects of design, crew training and operating procedures of the nuclear propulsion plant of UK Nuclear Powered Warships (NPWs) are reviewed by the UK Defence Nuclear Safety Committee (DNSC) and other appropriate UK authorities, and are as defined in officially approved manuals. The UK Government also certifies that all safety precautions and procedures followed in connection with operations in UK ports will be strictly observed in foreign ports.
2. In connection with the operation of UK NPWs in foreign ports:
 - a. No effluent or other waste will be discharged from the ship which would cause an ascertainable hazard through an increase in the general background radioactivity of the environment; waste disposal standards are consistent with the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
 - b. During the period of the visit, the personnel of the NPW will be responsible for the radiological control onboard the ship and for environmental monitoring of the vicinity. The host Government may, of course, take such surveys as it desires, in the vicinity of the warship, to assure itself that it is not creating a radioactive contamination hazard.
 - c. The appropriate authorities of the host Government will be notified immediately in the event of an accident involving the reactor of the NPW during a port visit.
 - d. The UK Government assumes the responsibility to salvage or otherwise make safe any NPWs that might be incapacitated in a foreign port.
 - e. The UK Government does not make technical information on the design or operation of its NPWs available to host Governments in connection with port entry. The UK Government cannot, therefore, permit the boarding of its NPW for the purpose of obtaining technical information concerning their propulsion plants or operating instructions.
 - f. The Royal Navy will inform the appropriate host Government authorities as early as practicable, but normally at least 24 hours in advance, as to the estimated time of arrival and, pursuant to prior consultation with the host Government, the intended location of mooring or anchoring of its NPWs.
 - g. The United Kingdom will, of course, welcome the customary protocol visits to its NPWs by representatives of the host Government.
3. Claims arising out of a nuclear incident involving a visiting NPW will be dealt with through diplomatic channels in accordance with customary procedures for the settlement of international claims under generally accepted principles of law and equity.

ANNEX J - THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EVENTS SCALE

LEVEL / DESCRIPTOR	NATURE OF THE EVENTS	EXAMPLES
ACCIDENTS 7 MAJOR ACCIDENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External release of a large fraction of the radioactive material in a large facility (e.g. the core of a power reactor). This would typically involve a mixture of short and long-lived radioactive fission products (in quantities radiologically equivalent to more than tens of thousands of terabecquerels of iodine-131). Such a release would result in the possibility of acute health effects; delayed health effects over a wide area, possibly involving more than one country; long-term environmental consequences. 	<p>Chernobyl NPP, USSR (now in Ukraine), 1986</p> <p>Fukushima Dai-ichi, Japan, 2011 (Provisional)</p>
6 SERIOUS ACCIDENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External release of radioactive material (in quantities radiologically equivalent to the order of thousands to tens of thousands of terabecquerels of iodine-131). Such a release would be likely to result in full implementation of countermeasures covered by local emergency plans to limit serious health effects. 	<p>Kyshtym Reprocessing Plant, USSR (now in Russia), 1957</p>
5 ACCIDENT WITH OFF-SITE RISK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External release of radioactive material (in quantities radiologically equivalent to the order of hundreds to thousands of terabecquerels of iodine-131). Such a release would be likely to result in partial implementation of countermeasures covered by emergency plans to lessen the likelihood of health effects. Severe damage to the installation. This may involve severe damage to a large fraction of the core of a power reactor, a major criticality accident or a major fire or explosion releasing large quantities of radioactivity within the installation. 	<p>Windscale Pile, UK, 1957</p> <p>Three Mile Island, NPP, USA, 1979</p>
4 ACCIDENT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT OFF-SITE RISK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External release of radioactivity resulting in a dose to the critical group of the order of a few millisieverts. With such a release the need for off-site protective actions would be generally unlikely except possibly for local food control. Significant damage to the installation. Such an accident might include damage leading to major on-site recovery problems such as partial core melt in a power reactor and comparable events at non-reactor installations. Irradiation of one or more workers resulting in an overexposure where a high probability of early death occurs. 	<p>Windscale Reprocessing Plant, UK, 1973</p> <p>Saint-Laurent NPP, France, 1980</p> <p>Buenos Aires Critical Assembly, Argentina, 1983</p>
INCIDENTS 3 SERIOUS INCIDENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External release of radioactivity resulting in a dose to the critical group of the order of tenths of millisievert. With such a release, off-site protective measures may not be needed. On-site events resulting in doses to workers sufficient to cause acute health effects and / or an event resulting in a severe spread of contamination for example a few thousand terabecquerels of activity released in a secondary containment where the material can be returned to a satisfactory storage area. Incidents in which a further failure of safety systems could lead to accident conditions, or a situation in which safety systems would be unable to prevent an accident if certain initiators were to occur. 	<p>Vandellos NPP, Spain, 1989</p>

<p>2 INCIDENT</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incidents with significant failure in safety provisions but with sufficient defence remaining to cope with additional failures. These include events where the actual would be rated at level 1 but which reveal significant additional organisational inadequacies or safety culture deficiencies. • An event resulting in a dose to a worker exceeding a statutory annual dose limit an event which leads to the presence of significant quantities of radioactivity in the installation in areas not expected by design and which require corrective action. 	
<p>1 ANOMALY</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anomaly beyond the authorised regime but with significant defence in depth remaining. This may be due to equipment failure, human error or procedural inadequacies and may occur in any area covered by the scale, e.g. plant operation, transport of radioactive material, fuel handling, waste storage. Examples include: breaches of technical specifications or transport regulations, incidents without direct safety consequences that reveal inadequacies in the organisational system or safety culture, minor defects in pipework beyond the expectations of the surveillance programme. 	
<p>DEVIATIONS 0 BELOW SCALE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deviations where operational limits and conditions are not exceeded and which are properly managed in accordance with adequate procedures. Examples include: a single random failure in a redundant system discovered during periodic inspections or tests, a planned reactor trip proceeding normally, spurious initiation of protection systems without significant consequences, leakages within the operational limits, minor spreads of contamination within controlled areas without wider implications for safety culture. 	<p>NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE</p>

Glossary

Authorised Site. A defined site within which nuclear activities are controlled by an Authorisee in compliance with the Authorisation Conditions and Further Authorisation Conditions.

Authorisee. An individual authorised by the Chairman Defence Nuclear Environment and Safety Board (DNESB) to operate in compliance with the Authorisation Conditions and Further Authorisation Conditions.

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. The physical location, usually in Westminster, from which the central response is activated, monitored and coordinated.

Common Recognised Information Picture. As part of its role in an emergency the Cabinet Office Situation Cell at COBR develops and maintains a CRIP, which will be summarised on display boards in COBR, briefed at the outset of key meetings and shared as far as possible with responders at the regional and local level.

Defence Nuclear Material. A generic term covering UK Nuclear Weapons and Special Nuclear Materials for the Defence Nuclear Enterprise.

Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator. The MOD regulator of nuclear and radiological safety for the Defence nuclear programmes (comprising the NNPP and NWP).

Duty Holder. A person who has direct responsibility for, and control of, activities that influence, directly or indirectly, the safety of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise.

HQ Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation (HQ DNEO). HQ DNEO will be activated to respond to a Defence nuclear emergency, including one arising through terrorist acts, involving Defence nuclear assets. HQ DNEO deals with the MOD National Strategic aspects of the response to the emergency, as the nuclear operator, and has four key functions: Executive, public/media information, Parliamentary business and engagement with COBR.

Joint Regional Liaison Officer. An officer appointed to each Army Regional Brigade who is responsible for leading tri-Service liaison with local authorities, emergency services and other agencies involved in emergency planning.

Lead Government Department. The Cabinet Office nominated Government department which has responsibility for the planning, response and recovery to an identified emergency situation.

Licensed Site. A site in respect of which a Nuclear Site Licence has been granted by HSE under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (as amended), whether or not that Licence remains in force.

Licensee. The body corporate that has been granted a Nuclear Site Licence under the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 (as amended), which permits it to carry out a defined scope of activities on a delineated site.

Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System. Dedicated information management system used in the event of a Defence nuclear emergency.

Responsible Person. The person charged with managing the security risk as detailed in JSP 628.

Special Nuclear Material. Nuclear materials held by the MOD and defined by 4 classified categories. It includes new and used fuel for RN submarine reactors, in storage and transit, but not complete reactor and weapon assemblies.

Abbreviations

AAR	All Agency Report
AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment
Bde	Brigade
BEIS	Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Cdr	Commander
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CDSDO	Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms
COG	Continuity of Government
Comd HC	Commander Home Command
CRIP	Common Recognised Information Picture
CSA	Chief Scientific Advisor
CSSE	Chief Strategic Systems Executive
D Ops	Director of Operations
DA	Devolved Administration
DCDS Mil Strat Ops	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations)
DCMC	Defence Crisis Management Centre
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DDC	Director(ate) of Defence Communications
DEFRA	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DefNucSyR	Defence Nuclear Security Regulator
DG DSA	Director General Defence Safety Authority
DHSC	Department of Health and Social Care
DJEP-CLCP	Directorate of Judicial Engagement Policy, Common Law Claims and Policy
DNEO	Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation
DNM	Defence Nuclear Material(s)
DNO Secretariat	Defence Nuclear Organisation Secretariat
DNSC	Defence Nuclear Safety Committee
DNSR	Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator
DoD	Department of Defense (US)
DoE	Department of Energy (US)
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DSA	Defence Safety Authority
DSTL	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
DSTL CBR	DSTL – Chemical, Biological and Radiological Division

EA	Environment Agency
FE	Force Elements
FINEP	Forum for Integrated Nuclear Preparedness
FSA	Food Standards Agency
GIS	Geographic Information System
GLO	Government Liaison Officer
GLT	Government Liaison Team
HGM	High Grade Messaging
HMNB	Her Majesty's Naval Base
HQ	Headquarters
H&S	Health and Safety
HS&EP	Health, Safety and Environmental Protection
HSWA	Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IJOP	Implementing Joint Operational Plan
IMG	Impact Management Group
INES	International Nuclear Event Scale
IRR	Ionising Radiations Regulations
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JMC	Joint Military Commander
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Cell
JRLO	Joint Regional Liaison Officer
JSP	Joint Service Publication
LAESI	Local Authority and Emergency Services Information
LGD	Lead Government Department
LOU	Letters of Understanding
LRF	Local Resilience Forum
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authority
MBC	Media Briefing Centre
MCA	MOD Co-ordinating Authority
MCC	Media Communications Cell
MHCLG, RED	Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Resilience and Emergencies Division
MDP	Ministry of Defence Police
Met Office	Meteorological Office
Min(AF)	Minister of State for the Armed Forces
MLO	Military Liaison Officer
MOD	Ministry of Defence

MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVCOM	Navy Command
NCC	News Co-ordination Centre (Cabinet Office)
NCND	Neither Confirm Nor Deny
NEAF	Nuclear Emergency Arrangements Forum
NEAG	Nuclear Emergency Arrangements Group
NER	Nuclear Emergency Response
NERIMS	Nuclear Emergency Response Information Management System
NIA	Nuclear Installations Act 1965 & 1969
NNPP	Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme
NPW	Nuclear Powered Warship
NRCC	Nuclear Resilience Co-ordination Committee
NRP	Naval Reactor Plant
NSQEP	Nuclear Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel
NSS	National Security Secretariat
NTE	Nuclear Transport Emergency
NTI	Nuclear Transport Incident
NWP	Nuclear Weapon Programme
OGD	Other Government Department
ONR	Office for Nuclear Regulation
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense (US)
OSNE	Off-Site Nuclear Emergency
PACRAM	Procedures and Communications in the event of a release of Radioactive Materials
Perm Sec	Permanent Under Secretary
PHE	Public Health England
PHE CRCE	PHE – Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards
PNAF	Prime Nuclear Airlift Force
PR	Public Relations
RAFLO	Royal Air Force Liaison Officer
RD	Resilience Direct
RED	Resilience and Emergencies Division (MHCLG)
REPIR	Radiation (Emergency Preparedness & Public Information) Regulations
RCG	Recovery Coordinating Group
RIMNET	Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network

RN	Royal Navy
RNRLO	Royal Navy Regional Liaison Officer
RPA	Radiation Protection Advisor
RPoC	Regional Point of Command
RRF	Regional Resilience Forum
RSA	Reactor Safety Alert
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SCC	Strategic Co-ordinating Centre
SCG	Strategic Co-ordinating Group
SCS	Senior Civil Servant
SDA	Submarine Delivery Agency
SEPA	Scottish Environment Protection Agency
SGoRR	Scottish Government Resilience Room
SINS	Security Informed Nuclear Safety
SJC(UK)	Standing Joint Command (United Kingdom)
SMAC	Strategic Media Advisory Cell
SNRG	Scottish Nuclear Resilience Group
SNI	Site Nuclear Incident
SNM	Special Nuclear Material
SofS	Secretary of State
SOO	Senior Operations Officer
SPO	Security, Policy and Operations Directorate
SQEP	Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person
STAC	Scientific and Technical Advice Cell
TCC	Tactical Co-ordinating Centre
TCG	Tactical Co-ordinating Group
TGG	Technical Guidance Group
TLB	Top Level Budget
TLBH	Top Level Budget Holder
USEUCOM	US European Command