HM Treasury Advisory Notice: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing controls in higher risk jurisdictions

Requirement to apply Enhanced Due Diligence for higher risk jurisdictions

The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 (MLRs 2019) require the UK regulated sector to apply enhanced customer due diligence in relation to high-risk countries.

MLRs 2019 Regulation 33 (1) (b) requires regulated businesses (“relevant persons”) to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures and enhanced ongoing monitoring in any business relationship with a person established in a high-risk third country or in relation to any relevant transaction where either of the parties to the transaction is established in a high-risk third country. For these purposes, Regulation 33 (3) explains that:

- a high-risk third country means a country which has been identified by the European Commission in delegated acts adopted under Article 9.2 of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive. These delegated acts are set out in Delegated Regulation 2016/1675 (latest consolidated version);
- a relevant transaction means a transaction in relation to which the relevant person is required to apply customer due diligence measures under Regulation 27;
- being established in a country means:
  - in the case of a legal person, being incorporated in or having its principal place of business in that country, or, in the case of a financial institution or a credit institution, having its principal regulatory authority in that country; and
  - in the case of an individual, being resident in that country, but not merely having been born in that country.

MLRs 2019 Regulation (33) (6) (c) requires that relevant persons take into account “geographical risk factors” when assessing risk and the extent of measures which should be taken to manage and mitigate that risk. These risk factors are stated as including whether a country is identified by a credible source, including reports published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as not implementing requirements to counter money laundering and terrorist financing that are consistent with FATF recommendations.

As the international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) standard-setter, FATF regularly publishes statements that identify high-risk countries based on assessments of their AML/CTF regimes. In line with Regulation (33) (6) (c) HM Treasury would like to draw the regulated sectors attention to the latest publication by FATF on high risk jurisdictions.
FATF public statement

On 21 February 2020 FATF published two statements identifying jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in their AML/CTF regimes. These statements can be found at Annex A and Annex B respectively.

In response to the latest FATF statements, HM Treasury advises firms to consider the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HM Treasury Advice:</th>
<th>Consider as high risk and apply counter measures and enhanced due diligence measures in accordance with the risks</th>
<th>Take appropriate actions to minimise the associated risks, which may include enhanced due diligence measures in high risk situations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictions:</td>
<td>DPRK* Iran*</td>
<td>Albania The Bahamas Barbados Botswana Cambodia Ghana Iceland Jamaica Mauritius Mongolia Myanmar* Nicaragua* Pakistan Panama Syria* Uganda Yemen* Zimbabwe*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These jurisdictions are subject to financial sanctions measures at the time of publication of this notice which require firms to take additional measures. Details can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-regime-specific-consolidated-lists-and-releases
Background Information

1. This advice replaces all previous advisory notices issued by HM Treasury on this subject.

2. The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body established by the G7 in 1989 and today includes as members 37 jurisdictions and two regional organisations (the European Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council).

3. The Government’s strategy is to use financial tools to deter crime and terrorism; detect it when it happens; and disrupt those responsible and hold them to account for their actions. The FATF is central to the UK’s international objectives within this strategy.

4. The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 require firms to put in place policies and procedures in order to prevent activities related to money laundering and terrorist financing. Regulated businesses are also required to apply enhanced customer due diligence and enhanced ongoing monitoring on a risk-sensitive basis in certain defined situations and in any other case which by its nature can present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

5. The Financial Conduct Authority requires firms to take reasonable care to establish and maintain systems and controls for countering the risk that the firm might be used to further financial crime.

6. Other restrictive measures are applicable in the UK in respect of some of the jurisdictions listed in the content of this Advisory. More information can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/financial-sanctions-regime-specific-consolidated-lists-and-releases.

7. For further information about what the Treasury is doing to combat financial crime, and how to subscribe to financial crime alerts, visit: https://www.gov.uk/government/policy-teams/anti-money-laundering-and-counter-financing-of-terrorism
An "nex A: High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action – 21 February 2020

High-risk jurisdictions have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation. For all countries identified as high-risk, the FATF calls on all members and urges all jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence, and in the most serious cases, countries are called upon to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the country. This list is often externally referred to as the “black list”.¹

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.

Iran

In June 2016, Iran committed to address its strategic deficiencies. Iran’s action plan expired in January 2018. In February 2020, the FATF noted Iran has not completed the action plan.²

¹ This statement was previously called “Public Statement”.
² In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran’s high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Since 2016, Iran established a cash declaration regime, enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and its Anti-Money Laundering Act, and adopted an AML by-law.

In February 2020, the FATF noted that there are still items not completed and Iran should fully address: (1) adequately criminalizing terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups “attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism”; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (5) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; and (6) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information.
In October 2019, the FATF called upon its members and urged all jurisdictions to: require increased supervisory examination for branches and subsidiaries of financial institutions based in Iran; introduce enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions; and require increased external audit requirements for financial groups with respect to any of their branches and subsidiaries located in Iran.

Now, given Iran’s failure to enact the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions in line with the FATF Standards, the FATF fully lifts the suspension of counter-measures and calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, in line with Recommendation 19.3

Iran will remain on the FATF statement on [High Risk Jurisdictions Subject to a Call for Action] until the full Action Plan has been completed. If Iran ratifies the Palermo and Terrorist Financing Conventions, in line with the FATF standards, the FATF will decide on next steps, including whether to suspend countermeasures. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified with respect to countering terrorism-financing in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system.

3 Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and proportionate to the risks.

The Interpretative Note to Recommendation 19 specifies examples of the countermeasures that could be undertaken by countries.
Annex B: Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – 21 February 2020

Jurisdictions under increased monitoring are actively working with the FATF to address strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. When the FATF places a jurisdiction under increased monitoring, it means the country has committed to resolve swiftly the identified strategic deficiencies within agreed timeframes and is subject to increased monitoring. This list is often externally referred to as the ‘grey list’.4

The FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) continue to work with the jurisdictions noted below and to report on the progress made in addressing the identified strategic deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete their agreed action plans expeditiously and within the proposed timeframes. The FATF welcomes their commitment and will closely monitor their progress. The FATF does not call for the application of enhanced due diligence to be applied to these jurisdictions, but encourages its members to take into account the information presented below in their risk analysis.

The FATF continues to identify additional jurisdictions, on an on-going basis, that have strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing. A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF and FSRBs.

Albania
In February 2020, Albania made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in July 2018, Albania has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by enhancing relevant authorities’ understanding of terrorist financing risks in order to prosecute TF more effectively and establishing a legal framework to implement targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing. Albania will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) conducting additional in-depth analysis to understand its ML and other risks sufficiently, and enhancing institutional coordination and cooperation; (2) improving the timely handling of mutual legal assistance requests; (3) establishing effective mechanisms to detect and prevent criminal infiltration of the economy, including by strengthening competent authorities’ powers to take necessary action; (4) ensuring that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (5) increasing the number and improving the sophistication of prosecutions and confiscations for ML, especially in cases involving foreign predicate offenses or third-party ML; (6) improving the implementation of targeted financial sanctions, in particular through enhanced supervisory action and targeted, proactive outreach.

The Bahamas
In October 2018, The Bahamas made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. The FATF has made the initial determination that The Bahamas has substantially completed its action plan and warrants an on-site assessment

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4 This statement was previously called “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process”.

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to verify that the implementation of The Bahamas’ AML/CFT reforms has begun and is being sustained, and that the necessary political commitment remains in place to sustain implementation in the future. Specifically, the Bahamas has made the following key reforms: (1) developing a comprehensive electronic case management system for international cooperation; (2) demonstrating risk-based supervision of non-bank financial institutions; (3) ensuring the timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information; (4) increasing the quality of the FIU’s products to assist LEAs in the pursuance of ML/TF investigations, specifically complex ML/TF and stand-alone ML investigations; (5) demonstrating that authorities are investigating and prosecuting all types of money laundering, including complex ML cases, stand-alone money laundering, and cases involving proceeds of foreign offences; (6) demonstrating that confiscation proceedings are initiated and concluded for all types of ML cases; and (7) addressing gaps in the TF and PF TFS frameworks and demonstrating implementation.

**Barbados**

In February 2020, Barbados made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in November 2017, Barbados has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by updating the National Risk Assessment and developing mitigating measures. Barbados will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating it effectively applies risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; (2) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensure that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (3) increasing the capacity of the FIU to improve the quality of its financial information to further assist LEAs in investigating ML or TF; (4) demonstrating that money laundering investigations and prosecutions are in line with the country’s risk profile and reducing the backlog to complete prosecutions that result in sanctions when appropriate; (5) further pursuing confiscation in ML, including by seeking assistance from foreign counterparts.

**Botswana**

Since October 2018, when Botswana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Botswana has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by developing its national AML/CFT strategy and operationalising the country’s company registry to maintain beneficial ownership information. Botswana should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) assessing the risks associated with legal persons, legal arrangements, and NPOs; (2) implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervisory manuals; (3) improving its analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU; (4) implementing a CFT strategy, and ensuring the TF investigation capacity of the law enforcement agencies; (5) ensuring the implementation without delay of targeted financial sanctions measures related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing, and (6) applying a risk-based approach to monitoring non-profit organisations.

**Cambodia**
Since February 2019, when Cambodia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Cambodia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating an increase in domestic coordination and cooperation to enhance ML investigations. Cambodia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) providing a broad legal basis for MLA and conducting relevant training to LEAs; (2) implementing risk-based supervision for real estate and casinos; (3) implementing the risk-based supervision to banks, including through prompt, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement actions, as appropriate; (4) amending the AML/CFT Law to address the remaining technical compliance deficiencies; (5) enhancing its analysis of STRs and increasing disseminations to LEAs; (6) demonstrating an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions; (7) demonstrating an increase in the freezing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and property of equivalent value; (8) establishing and implementing a legal framework for UN targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing and enhancing the understanding of sanctions evasion.

Ghana
Since October 2018, when Ghana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Ghana has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by raising awareness of the supervisors and regulated entities to the identified ML/TF risks. Ghana should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) implementing a comprehensive national AML/CFT Policy based on the risks identified in the NRA, including measures to mitigate ML/TF risks associated with the legal persons; (2) improving risk-based supervision, by enhancing the capacity of the regulators and the awareness of the private sector; (3) ensuring the timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information; (4) ensuring that the FIU is focusing its activities on the risks identified in the NRA, and adequately resourced; and (5) applying a risk-based approach for monitoring non-profit organisations.

Iceland
Since October 2019, when Iceland made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Iceland has continued to take significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by increasing the FIU’s human resources to address the volume of STRs and strengthen strategic analysis as well as ensuring effective supervision for targeted financial sanctions compliance and establishing sufficient resources and supervisory procedures to assess TF risks in the NPO sector. Iceland should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies by (1) finalising the collection of accurate Beneficial Ownership information and demonstrating the imposition of appropriate sanctions for non-compliance; and (2) concluding work to introduce an automated system for STR filing.

Jamaica
In February 2020, Jamaica made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in November 2016, Jamaica has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by
amending its customer due diligence obligations. Jamaica will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risk; (2) including all FIs and DNFBPs in the AML/CFT regime and ensuring adequate risk based supervision in all sectors; (3) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensure that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis; (4) taking proper measures to increase the use of financial information and to increase ML investigations and prosecutions, in line with the country’s risk profile; (5) ensuring the implementation of targeted financial sanctions for terrorist financing without delay; and (6) implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

Mauritius
In February 2020, Mauritius made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2018, Mauritius has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including amending the legal framework to require legal persons and legal arrangements to disclose of beneficial ownership information and improving the processes of identifying and confiscating proceeds of crimes. Mauritius will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating that the supervisors of its global business sector and DNFBPs implement risk-based supervision; (2) ensuring the access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information by competent authorities in a timely manner; (3) demonstrating that LEAs have capacity to conduct money laundering investigations, including parallel financial investigations and complex cases; (4) implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes, and (5) demonstrating the adequate implementation of targeted financial sanctions through outreach and supervision.

Mongolia
Since October 2019, when Mongolia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Mongolia continues to take significant steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by demonstrating an increase in sanctions and remedial actions by financial supervisors for identified violations, and further seizing and confiscating falsely/non-declared currency. Mongolia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) improving sectoral ML/TF risk understanding by DNFBP supervisors, applying a risk-based approach to supervision, particularly in relation to dealers in precious metals and stones; (2) demonstrating increased investigations and prosecutions of different types of ML activity in line with identified risks; and (3) monitoring compliance by FIs and DNFBPs with their PF-related TFS obligations, including the application of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

Myanmar
In February 2020, Myanmar made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in September 2018, Myanmar has proactively made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and
effectiveness, including by introducing various legislative measures and establishing a regulatory framework for the registration of hundi operators. Myanmar will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating an improved understanding of ML risks in key areas; (2) ensuring the supervisory body for DNFBPs is sufficiently resourced, onsite/offsite inspections are risk-based, and hundi operators are registered and supervised; (3) demonstrating enhances in the use of financial intelligence in LEA investigations, and increasing operational analysis and disseminations by the FIU; (4) ensuring that ML is investigated/prosecuted in line with risks; (5) demonstrating investigation of transnational ML cases with international cooperation; (6) demonstrating an increase in the freezing/seizing and confiscation of criminal proceeds, instrumentalities, and/or property of equivalent value; (7) managing seized assets to preserve the value of seized goods until confiscation; and (8) demonstrating implementation of TFS related to PF, including training on PF sanctions evasion.

Nicaragua
In February 2020, Nicaragua made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in July 2017, Nicaragua has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including by increasing the use of financial information in the investigation and prosecution of ML offenses and fixing its legal framework for criminalizing TF. Nicaragua will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) developing a more comprehensive understanding of its ML/TF risk; (2) more proactively seeking international cooperation to support ML investigation, especially with the aim of identifying and tracing assets with confiscation and repatriation purposes; (3) conducting effective risk based supervision; (4) taking appropriate measures to prevent legal persons and arrangements from being misused for criminal purposes, and ensure that accurate and up to date basic and beneficial ownership information is available on a timely basis.

Pakistan
Since June 2018, when Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorism financing-related deficiencies, Pakistan’s political commitment has led to progress in a number of areas in its action plan, including risk-based supervision and pursuing domestic and international cooperation to identify cash couriers. Pakistan should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that remedial actions and sanctions are applied in cases of AML/CFT violations, relating to TF risk management and TFS obligations; (2) demonstrating that competent authorities are cooperating and taking action to identify and take enforcement action against illegal money or value transfer services (MVTS); (3) demonstrating the implementation of cross-border currency and BNI controls at all ports of entry, including applying effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; (4) demonstrating that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are identifying and investigating the widest range of TF activity and that TF investigations and prosecutions target designated persons and entities, and those acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated persons or entities; (5) demonstrating that TF prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (6) demonstrating effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions (supported by a comprehensive legal
obligation) against all 1267 and 1373 designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf, including preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets (movable and immovable), and prohibiting access to funds and financial services; (7) demonstrating enforcement against TFS violations including administrative and criminal penalties and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases; (8) demonstrating that facilities and services owned or controlled by designated person are deprived of their resources and the usage of the resources.

All deadlines in the action plan have expired. While noting recent and notable improvements, the FATF again expresses concerns given Pakistan’s failure to complete its action plan in line with the agreed timelines and in light of the TF risks emanating from the jurisdiction. To date, Pakistan has largely addressed 14 of 27 action items, with varying levels of progress made on the rest of the action plan. The FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by June 2020. Otherwise, should significant and sustainable progress especially in prosecuting and penalising TF not be made by the next Plenary, the FATF will take action, which could include the FATF calling on its members and urging all jurisdiction to advise their FIs to give special attention to business relations and transactions with Pakistan.

Panama
Since June 2019, when Panama made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GAFILAT to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime, Panama has taken some steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by drafting sectoral risk assessments for the corporate and DNFBP sectors and free trade zones. Panama should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) strengthening its understanding of the national and sectoral ML/TF risk and informing findings to its national policies to mitigated the identified risks; (2) proactively taking action to identify unlicensed money remitters, applying a risk-based approach to supervision of the DNFBP sector and ensuring effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions again AML/CFT violations; (3) ensuring adequate verification and update of beneficial ownership information by obliged entities, establishing an effective mechanisms to monitor the activities of offshore entities, assessing the existing risks of misuse of legal persons and arrangements to define and implement specific measures to prevent the misuse of nominee shareholders and directors, and ensuring timely access to adequate and accurate beneficial ownership information; and (4) ensuring effective use of FIU products for ML investigations, demonstrating its ability to investigate and prosecute ML involving foreign tax crimes and to provide constructive and timely international cooperation with such offence, and continuing to focus on ML investigations in relation to high-risk areas identified in the NRA and MER.

Syria
Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of
implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Uganda
In February 2020, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime. Since the completion of its MER in 2016, Uganda has made progress on a number of its MER recommended actions to improve technical compliance and effectiveness, including conducting its first national ML/TF risk assessment and amending the relevant legal frameworks to addressed the technical deficiencies in its ML and TF offences. Uganda will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) adopting a national AML/CFT strategy; (2) seeking international cooperation in line with the country’s risk profile; (3) developing and implementing risk-based supervision to FIs and DNFBPs; (4) ensuring that competent authorities have timely access to accurate basic and beneficial ownership information for legal entities; (5) demonstrating LEAs and judicial authorities apply the ML offence consistent with the identified risks; (6) establishing and implementing policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime; (7) demonstrating that LEAs conduct TF investigations and pursue prosecutions commensurate with Uganda’s TF risk profile; (8) addressing the technical deficiencies in the legal framework to implement PF-related TFS and implementing a risk based approach for supervision of its NPO sector to prevent abuse for TF purposes.

Yemen
Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Zimbabwe
Since October 2019, when Zimbabwe made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Zimbabwe has taken initial steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by establishing a legal framework to collect beneficial ownership information of legal person and arrangements. Zimbabwe should continue to work on implementing its action plan, including by: (1) improving understanding of the key ML/TF risks among the relevant stakeholders and implementing
the national AML/CFT policy base on the identified risks; (2) implementing risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs including through capacity building among the supervisory authority; (3) ensuring development of adequate risk mitigation measures among FIs and DNFBPs, including by applying proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to breaches; (4) developing a comprehensive legal framework and mechanism to collect and maintain accurate and updated beneficial ownership information for legal persons and arrangements, and ensure timely assess by the competent authorities; and (5) addressing remaining gaps in the TF and PF-related TFS frameworks and demonstrating implementation.

Jurisdictions No Longer Subject to Increased Monitoring by the FATF

Trinidad and Tobago
The FATF welcomes Trinidad and Tobago’s significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime and notes that Trinidad and Tobago has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed related technical deficiencies to meet the commitments in its action plan regarding the strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in November 2017. Trinidad and Tobago is therefore no longer subject to the FATF’s increased monitoring process. Trinidad and Tobago will continue to work with CFATF to improve further its AML/CFT regime.