



Department
for Education

Government evidence to the STRB

The 2020 pay award

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Summary

1. The Secretary of State wrote to Dr Patricia Rice, the Chair of the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB), on 18 September, asking for the STRB's recommendations on the September 2020 pay award and for additional advice to schools on the performance-related pay progression pathway for classroom teachers, including advisory pay points on the main and upper pay ranges.
2. The remit letter set out that to best support recruitment and retention and ensure the recently announced substantial increase in school funding is invested as effectively as possible, a significant uplift in the starting salary of classroom teachers is required. Following from this, it set out the government's intention to increase starting salaries to £30,000 nationally by September 2022. The letter also set out that there is a strong case for schools to move towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career, with lower average percentage increases between each pay point on the main pay range, alongside significantly higher starting and early career salaries.
3. This document provides the Secretary of State's evidence to support the STRB's consideration of the 2020 pay award for teachers, headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions.
4. The opening chapter sets out the case for change to the pay system. It highlights the extensive evidence that significant uplifts to starting and early career teacher pay are needed, alongside a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career with lower average percentage increases between each pay point on the main pay range. This will address where recruitment and retention is most challenging, target where the retention benefit is likely to be highest, and support improved educational outcomes. It will also bring the pay system better in line with international comparators.
5. The evidence sets out that a pay award leading to a 3% increase in the **total pay bill** per teacher is appropriate. This is in line with forecast growth in average earnings and would constitute the biggest sustained uplift to the teacher pay ranges since 2005. This will allow for a significantly larger than 3% increases in starting and early career pay, addressing our most pressing recruitment and retention challenges. Our proposals also mean **above inflation** increases of 2.5% to the upper pay range and leadership pay ranges, supporting an attractive career path for the whole profession. A pay award of this size will also allow schools to invest fully in other important resources and activities, alongside pay, which will also support improved outcomes for pupils.
6. The evidence provides the STRB with three possible approaches for the 2020 pay award which would each take significant steps towards a pay structure

better aligned with supporting recruitment and retention. Our preferred approach would see starting salaries uplifted nationally to £26,000 in 2020/21 and £27,200, £30,000 and £32,000 respectively in the three London pay Zones. This would be alongside significant increases to early career salaries. The upper and leadership pay ranges would see significant above inflation increases of 2.5%. All three of the possible approaches we outline would see above inflation increases for teachers on the upper and leadership pay ranges, new starters will not overtake those already in the profession and teachers will continue to earn more as they progress up the pay ranges. Our analysis suggests this revised structure could see around an extra 300 teachers retained, alongside additional recruitment.

7. The evidence also outlines what the pay structure could look like by 2022/23, with starting salaries increased to £30,000 nationally, with large rises in early career pay as well as real terms increases for both senior teachers and teachers in leadership positions. Our analysis suggests such a structure could see over 1000 extra teachers retained per year, alongside additional recruitment.
8. Of course, the reforms to the pay system form part of a wider set of reforms the government is pursuing to address the full range of factors affecting recruitment and retention. The evidence provides the STRB with details on these wider measures, particularly updating on the department's progress in implementing the recent recruitment and retention strategy.

The case for change

Recruitment and retention

9. The number of teachers in our schools remains high, with more than 453,000 working in schools across the country. There are 12,000 more full-time equivalent (FTE) teachers than there were in 2010¹ and teacher vacancy rates have remained low and relatively stable (at around 0.3% or below of all teaching posts)².
10. However, the government recognises that teacher recruitment and retention has been a challenge, particularly in the context of an improving economy and a strengthening graduate labour market.
11. With regards to recruitment, there were 29,580 new entrants to postgraduate Initial Teacher Training (ITT) courses in the academic year 2019/20. This means postgraduate recruitment is at its highest level since 2010/11. However, overall, given increased demand for new teachers this meant that we reached 89% of our target for postgraduate trainee recruitment.
12. The growing number of pupils of secondary age also means that we will need to recruit more teachers. By 2025 there will be 15% more pupils in secondary schools than there were in 2018³. The number of secondary school teachers will need to grow by almost 9,000 by 2025 to meet this demand⁴. Further to this, as outlined in the STRB's last report, the graduate-age population from which a significant proportion of new teachers are recruited is forecast to shrink over coming years (with a projected decrease of 8 per cent in the number of 21-year olds between 2019 and 2023⁵).
13. We know retention is particularly challenging amongst teachers in their early career and the challenge of retaining them has been getting more difficult in recent years. Previous analysis by the department⁶ and NFER⁷ has found that the probability of leaving the profession is highest in the first five years of a teacher's career and falls after that. Over 20% of new teachers leave the profession within their first two years of teaching, and 32% leave within their first five years⁸.

¹ Teacher numbers fell, however, between 2016 and 2017 (457,200 in 2016 to 451,900 in 2017)

² School Workforce in England: November 2018 (Department for Education, September 2019)

³ National Pupil Projections: July 2018 (2019 update) (Department for Education, July 2019)

⁴ TSM and initial teacher training allocations: 2020 to 2021 (Department for Education, October 2019)

⁵ [STRB 29th Report](#)

⁶ [Teachers Analysis Compendium 1](#)

⁷ [NFER research report on teacher workforce](#)

⁸ School Workforce in England: November 2018 (Department for Education, September 2019)

14. Recruitment and retention is more challenging for some subjects than for others. Recruitment targets in shortage subjects including maths, science and modern foreign languages, have consistently been missed. These subjects also have the lowest retention rates. Previous departmental analysis found modern foreign languages (MFL) was the subject with the lowest retention rate (in 2017 56% of MFL teachers were still in service after five years) and STEM subjects also had relatively lower retention rates. Paragraphs 93-94 in this document set out actions the department is undertaking to address some of these specific challenges, such as increased use of early career payments for teachers in these subjects and retention payment pilot schemes. We note that the STRB has proposed in the past that a remit to look at whether forms of differentiation (e.g. geographical, subject, phase) would be appropriate; whilst this is not part of the current remit, it is likely something we will need the STRB to return to in the future.
15. Retention challenges are most acute in schools serving areas of disadvantage, which face higher levels of turnover. More than one in ten teachers from the most disadvantaged secondary schools leave to teach in other schools each year: about twice the proportion who make the move from the least disadvantaged schools⁹.
16. In 2018 just 1.0% of headteacher posts are vacant or temporarily filled¹⁰. However, we recognise that recruiting and retaining teachers in leadership positions is a challenge for some schools. As set out in paragraphs 96-98, we are investing in the development of these teachers which will help to support recruitment and retention in leadership, as well as drive better outcomes for pupils. Furthermore, the reformed leadership pay arrangements we introduced in 2014, allowing schools to pay up to 25% above the headteacher pay range, and even more in exceptional circumstances, give governing bodies the flexibility to use pay where appropriate to address specific leadership supply issues.
17. At the start of this year the department published its recruitment and retention strategy. This sets out a number of steps to improving teacher retention and recruitment, tackling the full range of reasons that leads teachers to leave the profession early or not join in the first place. This includes bearing down on excessive workload, a number of measures to help build an attractive career offer and an expansion of early career payments, to help recruit and retain teachers of shortage subjects. The recruitment and retention strategy is described in more detail in this document in paragraphs 85-104.

⁹ [Schools Workforce 2010 to 2015: trends and geographical comparisons](#) p.54

¹⁰ Based on Schools Workforce Census 2018.

18. Of course, pay and the pay system also has a crucial role to play in addressing these issues. As the evidence below will set out, pay can play a particularly crucial role in addressing our early career retention and recruitment challenges. This year's remit provides the STRB with the opportunity to take the first step in reforming the pay structure so that it better addresses these challenges, in light of the government's view that starting salaries should rise to £30,000 nationally by 2022/23.

Starting salary, recruitment and raising the status of the profession

19. Reform to the pay structure is an opportunity to improve recruitment, raise the status of the profession and drive improvements in teacher quality.
20. In recent reports, the STRB has drawn attention to teacher starting salaries comparing unfavourably to alternative graduate options, particularly in comparison with prestigious graduate professions. The most recent available HESA data (from 2017) suggested average starting salaries for graduate professionals stood at £25,500, whilst the Institute of Student Employers and High Fliers 2018 data, focused more on large graduate scheme recruiters, suggested average graduate salaries of £28,250 and £30,000 respectively. Therefore, significantly uplifting starting salaries to £30,000 by 2022 will position teacher pay amongst the most competitive in the graduate labour market and make a career in teaching significantly more attractive to future cohorts of graduates. This is particularly true for those with skills in high demand in the wider labour market, such as STEM graduates.
21. Making teacher starting salaries significantly more competitive relative to alternative options is likely to significantly improve recruitment to the profession. Studies support the link between higher pay and improved recruitment to teaching e.g. Falch (2011)¹¹. Economic theory would also suggest that potential teachers are likely to place extra weight on the salary that applies to them in the short-run, as opposed to longer-term pay, when assessing the financial offer.
22. A starting salary of £30,000 is likely to have strong public impact and create a public perception of teaching as a well-paying and high-status profession. This change in perception is particularly important for improving recruitment, as research by High Fliers for the department found that 'Badly Paid' was amongst the six most common adjectives used by final year university students (potential recruits) to describe a career in teaching.
23. Further to this, High Fliers also found that final year university students significantly under-estimated the current starting salary for teachers – with

¹¹ Annex B contains further discussion on the methodological approaches and limitations of the available academic literature on pay and recruitment to teaching.

around three-quarters of all finalists, and four-fifths of those students focused on a career in teaching, expecting graduates to earn a salary of £22,000 or less for working as a teacher outside London. A memorable starting salary offer of £30,000 – rather than ‘twenty-something thousand’ which graduates may fail to distinguish as clearly from other career options – can ensure potential recruits are fully aware of the financial benefits of teaching, helping to boost recruitment.

24. A significantly more competitive starting salary offer should also help to increase the proportion of teachers moving from ITT into the classroom. Recent statistics show that only 81% of those who complete ITT go on to teach in a state-funded English school the following year¹² and a £30,000 starting salary could encourage more trainees to move into the classroom.
25. A £30,000 starting salary may also particularly appeal to career changers, for whom the reduction in salary when moving from a previous job to become a Newly Qualified Teacher could act as a particularly substantial barrier. Previous research has highlighted the particular significance of financial considerations for career changers who are training to become teachers¹³.
26. Higher starting salaries could drive greater competition to enter the profession, thereby driving up quality. Indeed, international evidence has found that a higher starting salary, relative to outside options, could lead to recruiting teachers who are more effective at raising pupil attainment on average¹⁴.

Pay, retention and early career teachers


27. The start of this chapter highlighted the issue of teacher retention in the early career. The start of a new career is challenging in most professions. However, as the department’s recruitment and retention strategy set out, this is particularly pronounced for new teachers, who must get to grips with a new set of skills and being constantly on show and in demand from multiple directions in each lesson. The Early Career Framework, in particular, is aimed at providing greater levels of support to new teachers to help address this. However, a starting and early career pay offer that is commensurate with these challenges is also critical to improving early career retention.

¹² [Initial teacher training performance profiles: 2017 to 2018](#)

¹³ [Porter, S and Bear, K \(2014\) The role scholarships play in graduate recruitment for Initial Teacher Training](#)

¹⁴ [Nagler et al \(2019\) Weak Markets, Strong Teachers: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Effectiveness](#)

28. A range of international studies have highlighted the positive impact of pay on retention¹⁵. There is support in the literature that pay has a greater impact on retention decisions for early career teachers than it does for more experienced teachers. For example, Hendricks (2014)¹⁶ estimates that early career teachers' turnover rates fall by approximately three times as much as more experienced teachers' in response to a 1% change in pay.



Source: Adapted by Sims, S from: Hendriks, M.D (2014) Does it pay to pay teachers more? *Journal of Public Economics*

29. This higher sensitivity of wastage rates to pay amongst early career teachers is what we would expect for a number of reasons:
- early career teachers are likely to be more mobile in the labour market on average, making them more responsive to the relative pay of alternative career options outside teaching;
 - early career teachers have higher wastage rates (as discussed earlier in the chapter), meaning there is a larger pool of potential teachers' minds to be changed by an improved pay offer;
 - increases to pay may be more important to teachers on relatively lower salaries, who are typically early career teachers.
30. This evidence on teachers' increased sensitivity to pay in the early career is supported by a recent survey by DfE of former teachers on their reasons for leaving the profession. This found that pay was a much bigger factor for teachers in their 20s than for older teachers (who are more likely to be

¹⁵ [Bueno and Sass \(2018 working paper\) The Effects of Differential Pay on Teacher Recruitment and Retention](#); [Feng & Sass \(2017\) The impact of Incentives to Recruit and Retain Teachers in "Hard-to-Staff" Subjects](#); [Falch \(2011\) Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment](#); [Clotfelter et al \(2008\) Would higher salaries keep teachers in high-poverty schools? Evidence from a policy intervention in North Carolina](#)

¹⁶ [Hendricks \(2014\) Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from Texas](#)

experienced)¹⁷. More widely, research from NFER looking at headteachers' reasons for leaving the profession did not highlight pay as a significant factor¹⁸.

31. This evidence of increased sensitivity to pay in the early years of the career is particularly significant for the STRB's consideration of changes to the pay structure to better address recruitment and retention, given the pressing retention challenges in the early career.
32. Furthermore, a pay system which better supports retention has important additional benefits. In the long run, it would reduce the cost to both taxpayers and schools of having to train new teachers to replace those who are leaving. This is particularly so for taxpayers given, as noted earlier, around 20% of those completing ITT do not progress into the classroom the next year meaning we have to recruit to ITT at a more than one for one ratio to replace each teacher who leaves.
33. More widely, evidence highlights that a pay structure which better addresses early career retention is particularly important as teacher effectiveness (i.e. when defined as impact on pupils' attainment) improves significantly over the first years of a teacher's career¹⁹. Improving early career retention, through a more competitive pay offer, would allow us to reduce the number of teachers leaving the profession after gaining those crucial first years of experience. This would prevent schools having to reinvest in providing that experience again to the new teachers who replace them, and help raise pupil outcomes.
34. Improving educational outcomes is also key to raising productivity in the long-term, given the strong evidence that better educational outcomes lead to better labour market outcomes. Previous departmental analysis has demonstrated how improving qualification outcomes, including at GCSE and A Level, leads to significant lifetime productivity gains²⁰. A pay structure which drives up the quality of recruits and better addresses early career retention then can also play an important role in improving economic productivity into the long-term.

¹⁷ [Analysis of school and teacher level factors relating to teacher supply \(Sept 2017\) – p.39](#)


¹⁸ [NFER \(2017\) Keeping Your Head](#)

¹⁹ [Kini, T. & Podolsky, A. \(2016\) Does Teaching Experience Increase teacher Effectiveness? A Review of the Research](#)

²⁰ The economic value of key intermediate qualifications: estimating the returns and lifetime productivity gains to GCSEs, A levels and apprenticeships (Dec 2014)

The pay structure in the international context


35. Given the evidence outlined above, it is striking that the English statutory starting salary levels are comparatively low²¹ before progressing relatively rapidly compared to other OECD countries²².
36. Statutory starting salaries are below both the OECD and EU23 average, as well as starting salaries in all other G7 countries and a wide range of economically similar countries. Starting salaries also lag behind our nearest and most similar teacher labour markets – Scotland and, following the most recent pay award, Wales.




37. However, statutory salaries after 15 years of experience compare more favourably – above both the OECD and EU23 average (except at upper secondary) as well as equivalent salaries in France, Sweden, Italy and Scotland.

²¹ Statutory salary comparisons focus on teachers with the most prevalent qualification in publicly funded schools.

²² Starting salaries in these international comparisons are based on the minimum of our main pay range and we assume for these comparisons teachers reach the maximum of our upper pay range by the 15 year mark.




38. This means that **English starting salaries as a proportion of statutory salaries after 15 years, are amongst the lowest in the OECD**. The reforms to the pay system set out in this evidence document would help to address this disparity.



39. Furthermore, OECD evidence shows England offers the highest premium for school heads compared to teachers²³, where the average actual salaries of school heads are more than twice that of teachers.

²³ Average actual salary comparisons include bonuses and allowances.

Actual salaries of lower secondary teachers and school heads (EAG 2019: Table D3.4)



Progression and advisory pay points

40. This year's remit asked the STRB to set out additional advice to schools on the pay progression pathway for classroom teachers, including advisory pay points on the main and upper pay ranges. This is to support schools with ensuring spending on pay is best directed at addressing recruitment and retention challenges.
41. The government's previous pay reforms for teachers have been successful in moving away from a system of automatic pay progression and establishing the link between pay and performance appraisal. We know from our evaluation of pay reforms²⁴, extensive school visits and from employers' evidence to the STRB²⁵ that headteachers are more confident progressing high-performing teachers faster and refusing pay progression in cases of underperformance.
42. However, we know schools overwhelmingly continue to follow the previous spine point system when progressing teachers up the pay ranges on the basis of performance. This is true in academies as well as maintained schools²⁶. As shown in the table below, currently teachers typically progress sharply up the main pay range from a relatively low starting salary, before seeing smaller uplifts on the upper pay range.

²⁴ [Teachers Pay Reform: Evaluation](#)

²⁵ NEOST evidence for STRB's 29th report.

²⁶ [Incomes Data Research \(2017\) Academies approaches to teachers pay](#)

Spine Point	Existing 19/20 Structure ²⁷	Percentage Difference Between Each Spine Point
M1	£24,373	NA
M2	£26,298	7.9%
M3	£28,413	8.0%
M4	£30,599	7.7%
M5	£33,010	7.9%
M6	£35,971	9.0%
U1	£37,654	4.7%
U2	£39,050	3.7%
U3	£40,490	3.7%

43. Given the evidence outlined above, such a progression pathway is unlikely to be optimal for best addressing recruitment and retention challenges. Indeed, while awaiting the relatively large typical increases through the first five years from a low starting point, one-third of teachers have left the profession. Further to this, the evidence of increased sensitivity to pay in the early years of the career has also led external commentators to call for higher early career pay with a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher’s career, with lower average percentage increases between each pay point on the main pay range²⁸. In the following chapter we present detailed possible approaches to advisory structures which can form part of the next pay award in which starting and early career pay is significantly increased but the percentage difference between each pay point is lowered.
44. In setting out advice on the pay progression pathway for teachers and advisory pay points, this is not only an opportunity to create a structure which better targets pay at recruitment and retention. It is also an opportunity to create a more transparent and coherent progression pathway for those joining and currently within the profession. This would be supported by moving to a consistent rate of progression between pay points rather than increases being much larger in the early years.
45. In setting out your advice on a revised pay progression pathway and advisory pay points, we would not expect to see a change in the time typically taken by a classroom teacher to progress from the bottom of the pay ranges to the top - such an approach would create a new and unexpected pressure on schools’ budgets. A significant increase to the bottom of pay range should be accompanied with an expectation of smaller incremental increases as teachers

²⁷ Based on published [NASUWT pay scales for outside London pay areas](#).

²⁸ [Sims \(2018\) *Increasing the quantity and quality of science teachers in schools: eight evidence-based principles*](#).

progress through the pay ranges. It will, of course, remain the case that schools are responsible for determining individual teachers' pay, and progression up any advisory pay points framework will be linked to a robust school-level performance appraisal at each point.

46. In considering your advice on the progression pathway and advisory pay points, you will also want to consider the role of progression to the upper pay range in the future. In particular, in moving to a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career, with more uniform increments across the whole teacher pay range and lower average percentage increases between each pay point on the main pay range, you will want to consider whether:
 - a) a separate upper pay range continues to be a valuable feature of the pay structure in the longer term; or
 - b) this offers an opportunity to simplify the framework and create a streamlined progression structure across a single classroom teacher pay range.
47. Recent research²⁹ has highlighted mixed views at school-level about the utility of the separate upper pay range. You will want to consider carefully the advantages and risks of any move away from a separate upper pay range. In particular, you will want to consider what is the optimal structure for supporting a clear career progression structure for the profession and for motivating and rewarding classroom teachers at all career stages.
48. Schools must be given adequate lead-in time to prepare for any significant change to the operation of the upper pay range and therefore any change should not be introduced in September 2020. In response to this remit you should set out initial views on the future of the upper pay range, with final proposals to be developed as part of the STRB's next remit.

Conclusion

49. The evidence outlined in this chapter presents a strong case for change to the current pay structure. In particular, significant uplifts to starting and early career pay are needed to address where recruitment and retention is most challenging, target where teachers are most sensitive to pay and support improved educational outcomes.
50. In turn, this should be accompanied by advice to schools on a revised pay progression structure where teacher pay starts significantly higher than

²⁹ [Teachers', leaders' and governors' views of the teacher pay framework; Incomes Data Research \(2017\) Academies approaches to teachers pay](#)

currently but performance-based increases are at a steadier trajectory. Such a pay structure would be closer in line with international comparators, as well as the wider evidence base on optimal pay structures.

51. Following from the evidence presented in this chapter, the next chapter sets out details on our specific proposed approach to the 2020/21 pay award and accompanying advisory pay points.

Proposed approach to the pay award

Overall Award

52. In the Spending Round the government announced funding increases for schools across the next three years. This will mean an additional £2.6 billion for 2020-21, £4.8 billion for 2021-22, and £7.1 billion for 2022-23 in cash terms compared to 2019-20. On top of this we are providing £1.5 billion each year to fund additional pension costs for teachers. This will bring the schools budget to £52.2bn in 2022-23, representing an overall increase school funding of £4.6bn above inflation. This increase includes funding to cover the anticipated growth in pupil numbers over the period.
53. In terms of distribution, this funding increase will allow every secondary school to receive a minimum of £5,000 per pupil, and every primary school £3,750 per pupil (rising to £4,000 per pupil in 2021-22). The funding floor in the schools National Funding Formula (NFF) will be set at 1.84% per pupil, in line with the forecast GDP deflator, to protect the NFF's per pupil allocations for all schools in real terms, as a minimum. Most schools' allocations will increase faster than this; schools that are attracting their core NFF allocations will benefit from an increase of 4% to the formula's core factors. Of course, individual schools' circumstances will change, year-on-year, and different schools will receive increases above and below this average. Funding increases will also vary from the national average depending on decisions taken by the local authority. Recommended pay increases should take account of the range of funding increases that will be received by different schools
54. In light of this additional funding we believe a pay award leading to a 3% increase in the total pay bill per teacher – equivalent to £455 million across the 7 months of the 2020-21 financial year affected by the 2020 teachers' pay award – is appropriate. This is in line with forecast average earnings growth in the wider economy³⁰ and would constitute the biggest sustained uplift to the teacher pay ranges since 2005. Furthermore an award of this size will allow for a significant increase in starting and early career pay, addressing our most pressing recruitment and retention challenges and bringing our pay structure in line with the evidence set out in the previous chapter. At the same time a pay award of this size will also allow for above inflation increases to the upper pay range and leadership pay ranges supporting an attractive career path for the whole profession. Greater detail on the possible pay structures for 2020/21 is provided in the section below.

³⁰ [OBR average earnings forecast](#)

55. An investment of this size in the workforce and teachers' pay, especially focused on improving retention and attracting talented graduates into the profession, would play an important part in improving educational outcomes. However, the additional funding we have announced is also intended to allow schools to invest in other resources and activities – such as school improvement activity, teacher continuing professional development, hiring additional teaching staff, pastoral support and teaching resources – which will also support improved outcomes for pupils. It is crucial that the final pay award leaves scope for schools to invest in these wider activities, alongside pay, and have the flexibility to decide on the right balance between their investment in pay and elsewhere.
56. Finally, it is important to be clear that the teachers' pay grant in respect of 2018 and 2019 will continue in 2020-21, and that we intend to roll this funding into the schools NFF from 2021-22, so that schools will continue to receive this support. This funding is part of the overall increases announced at the 2019 Spending Round, as set out above. We do not intend to increase the pay grant further in respect of the 2020 award, so the 2020 pay award needs to be affordable within the increases in schools' base budgets already announced.

Options for the 2020/21 pay award

57. We have set out above that a pay award leading to an overall 3% increase in the total pay bill is appropriate, ensuring schools are able to invest in other important priorities for improving educational outcomes alongside pay. Given the case for change to the pay system set out in the previous chapter, this will not translate into an even 3% award to all parts of the pay framework – significantly higher awards are needed in the early career balanced by lower than 3% increases higher up the pay framework. This section sets out three possible approaches to the 2020/21 pay award and advisory pay points. Each would be affordable within a 3% increase to the total pay bill and would create a pay structure which better addresses recruitment and retention challenges.
58. In each option below we have set out significantly higher than 3% uplifts for starting and early career salaries. This is in line with the evidence base set out in the last chapter, addressing where recruitment and retention is most challenging, targeting the teachers who are most sensitive to pay and tackling where pay is least competitive.
59. For each option we have also set out lower, though above inflation, pay awards for the upper and leadership pay ranges between 2.25% - 2.75%³¹. These lower proposed awards reflect the evidence showing less acute supply

³¹ [OBR forecast CPI inflation is 1.9%-2% for 2020/21](#)

challenges amongst more experienced teachers and teachers in leadership positions, with lower wastage and vacancy rates. Furthermore, it also reflects the evidence that pay is a lower relative priority for these teachers in their decisions whether to remain in the profession – in comparison to workload or flexible working opportunities that the department is addressing through our recruitment and retention strategy – and that salaries compare more favourably currently on the upper and leadership pay ranges. Our proposals for real-terms uplifts to the upper and leadership pay ranges would support an attractive career pathway for teachers, whilst also ensuring the 3% increase in the pay bill is targeted most effectively at recruitment and retention challenges.

Option A

60. This first option would see the sharpest rises in starting salaries and early career pay³². Starting salaries would be uplifted by 7.5% to £26,200, while advisory early career pay points would also see very significant uplifts. The average percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would reduce to 7%³³, taking a step towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career.
61. Within the affordable increase to the overall pay bill, above-inflation uplifts to the upper pay range, leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges of 2.25% could be made - the lowest amongst the three options.

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£26,200	£24,373	£1,827	7.50%
M2	£28,034	£26,298	£1,736	6.60%
M3	£29,996	£28,412	£1,584	5.57%
M4	£32,096	£30,599	£1,497	4.89%
M5	£34,343	£33,009	£1,333	4.04%
M6	£36,780	£35,971	£809	2.25%
U1	£38,501	£37,654	£847	2.25%
U2	£39,928	£39,049	£879	2.25%
U3	£41,401	£40,490	£911	2.25%

62. Our analysis suggests that this pay structure could see around an extra 290 teachers retained outside of the London pay areas, on top of additional

³² The modelling approach underpinning these options is outlined in annex B.

³³ Note the % progression between M5 and M6 in these options is larger than 7% because M6 has been protected to match the rise on the UPR.

teachers recruited due to a higher starting salary³⁴, compared to a counterfactual where the headroom for the pay award (3%) was distributed evenly across all pay points and ranges³⁵. The methodology underpinning our retention estimates is outlined in annex B.

Option B

63. The second option involves slightly lower increases in starting and early career pay than under option A, combined with higher uplifts to the upper and leadership pay ranges. Starting salaries would be uplifted by 6.7% to £26,000. Advisory early career pay points would again see very significant uplifts compared to those used typically in schools currently, though slightly lower than under option A. The average percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would again reduce to 7%, taking a step towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career.
64. Within the affordable increase to the overall pay bill, significantly above inflation uplifts to the upper pay range, leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges of 2.5% could be made - higher than under option A.

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£26,000	£24,373	£1,627	6.7%
M2	£27,820	£26,298	£1,522	5.8%
M3	£29,767	£28,412	£1,355	4.8%
M4	£31,851	£30,599	£1,252	4.1%
M5	£34,081	£33,009	£1,071	3.2%
M6	£36,870	£35,971	£899	2.5%
U1	£38,595	£37,654	£941	2.5%
U2	£40,025	£39,049	£976	2.5%
U3	£41,502	£40,490	£1,012	2.5%

65. Our analysis suggests that this pay structure could see around an extra 230 teachers retained per year outside of the London pay areas, compared to a counterfactual where the headroom for the pay award (3%) was distributed

³⁴ Given the lack of robust external evidence on the impact of higher salaries on recruitment to teaching a precise estimate cannot be calculated – annex B contains further details on this. .

³⁵ Retention estimates are subject to significant uncertainty in absolute terms. They are presented rounded to the nearest 10 to support comparing across scenarios and assessing expected relative impact.

evenly across all pay points and ranges. This is on top of additional teachers recruited due to a higher starting salary.

Option C

66. The third option involves lower increases in starting and early career pay than in the other two options, combined with higher uplifts further up the pay ranges. Starting salaries would still be uplifted by over 6% to £25,900. Advisory early career pay points would again see significant uplifts compared to those used typically in schools currently, though lower than the other two options. Again, the average percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would again reduce to 7%, taking a step towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career.
67. Within the affordable increase to the overall pay bill, a bigger uplift to the upper pay range of 2.75% could be given under this option. The leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges could be uplifted by 2.5%.

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£25,900	£24,373	£1,527	6.27%
M2	£27,713	£26,298	£1,415	5.38%
M3	£29,653	£28,412	£1,240	4.37%
M4	£31,729	£30,599	£1,130	3.69%
M5	£33,950	£33,009	£940	2.85%
M6	£36,960	£35,971	£989	2.75%
U1	£38,689	£37,654	£1,035	2.75%
U2	£40,123	£39,049	£1,074	2.75%
U3	£41,603	£40,490	£1,113	2.75%

68. Our analysis suggests that this pay structure could see around an extra 220 teachers retained per year outside of the London pay areas, compared to a counterfactual where the headroom for the pay award (3%) was distributed evenly across all pay points and ranges. This is on top of additional teachers recruited due to a higher starting salary.

2020/21 pay award for London Pay areas

69. The current pay structures for London pay areas are significantly different to the rest of England, with higher starting salaries and lower typical progression pay increases in the first years of the career – with this difference most exaggerated in the Inner London pay area. As such, the pay structures in the

London pay areas are already closer to the aims of our reforms. Consequently, the pay award for the London pay areas will involve slightly lower uplifts to starting salary than for the rest of England (given their more generous starting position). Below we set out what the London pay ranges could look like by 2022/23 with starting salaries of £35,500 in Inner London (+16.5%), £33,200 in Outer London (+17.1%) and £31,000 in London Fringe (+21%).

70. Annex A provides detailed tables of three proposed approaches - which broadly mirror the three different approaches outlined above in relation to the national pay structures - for the London pay areas in the 2020/21 pay award.
71. Option A would see the largest rise in starting and early career salaries, with starting salaries uplifted to £27,400 (+7.3%) in the London Fringe pay area, to £30,200 (+6.5%) in Outer London and to £32,200 (+5.6%) in Inner London. The average percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would reduce to 6.7% in London Fringe, to 5.8% in Outer London and to 5% in Inner London³⁶, moving towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career. Within the affordable increase to the overall pay bill, above inflation uplifts to the upper pay range, leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges could be made of 2.25% - the lowest of the three options.
72. Option B would see slightly smaller uplifts to starting and early career salaries than under option A. Starting salaries would be uplifted to £27,200 (+6.5%) in the London Fringe pay area, to £30,000 (+5.8%) in Outer London and to £32,000 (+5%) in Inner London. The average percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would reduce to 6.7% in London Fringe, to 5.8% in Outer London and to 5% in Inner London, moving towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career. Within the affordable increase to the overall pay bill, uplifts to the upper pay range, leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges could be made of 2.5%, higher than under option A.
73. Option C would see smaller uplifts to starting and early career salaries than under the other two options. Starting salaries would be uplifted to £27,100 (+6.1%) in the London Fringe pay area, to £29,900 (+5.4%) in Outer London and to £31,900 (+4.7%) in Inner London. The average percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would, as under the other options, reduce to 6.7% in London Fringe, to 5.8% in Outer London and to 5% in Inner London, moving towards a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career.

³⁶ Note, again, the % progression between M5 and M6, and in some cases between M4 and M5, in these options for the London pay areas may be larger than the average progression figure because M6, and in some cases M5, have been protected to match the rise on the UPR.

Within the affordable increase to the overall pay bill, the upper pay range could increase by 2.75%, the highest of any option, whilst the leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges could be made of 2.5%.

74. Our analysis suggests that this pay structure would see around an extra 100 teachers retained in the London pay areas for option A and around 80 extra teachers in options B and C, compared to a counterfactual where the headroom for the pay award (3%) was distributed evenly across all pay points and ranges.

Options analysis

75. Each of the possible approaches for the 2020/21 pay award, nationally and in the London pay areas, set out above would take a significant step towards a pay structure better aligned with supporting recruitment and retention and would be affordable within the parameters set out above.
76. However, in our view option B best balances providing the necessary increases to starting and early career salaries to address recruitment and retention challenges – making 29% of the necessary progress towards the £30,000 starting salary³⁷ - whilst providing a significant, real terms, increase to the upper and leadership pay ranges to support an attractive career pathway for teachers. Option A, with the highest starting and early career salaries of the three options - making 32% of the necessary progress towards the £30,000 starting salary - and has the highest estimated retention benefits (though the magnitude of difference is small and temporary as we move to a £30,000 starting salary). However, given option A provides the lowest uplifts to the other pay ranges, our view is that option B represents a better balanced approach overall.
77. Option C is the least desirable of the options presented in our view. Firstly, because it has the lowest uplift to starting and early career salaries, it has the lowest estimated retention benefits and likely the lowest impact on recruitment. It also makes the least progress (26%) towards a £30,000 starting salary in 2022/23 and therefore creates the least smooth path to the optimum structure in 2022/23. Secondly, while it provides the largest uplift for teachers on the upper pay range of the three options, the higher uplift for the upper pay range compared to leadership risks eroding incentives to progress into leadership.

The pay system in the longer-term

³⁷ The progress referred to in the text is in absolute cash terms. However, when the proposed increases to starting pay in each option are considered in percentage terms, each repeated award of the same percentage per year to September 2022 would make more progress in cash terms, due to being applied to a higher salary. For example, in Option C the 7.5% increase in September 2020, if repeated twice, would lead to a starting salary of £30,275.

78. This pay remit only requires recommendations on the 2020/21 pay award. However, the government has set out its view that starting salaries should rise to £30,000 outside of London by 2022/23. It is important then to consider your recommendations for 2020/21 in the light of the possible shape of the pay system in 2022/23. This is particularly important because your approach to this year's pay award will directly influence the awards you will want to make across 2021/22 and 2022/23 to achieve a £30,000 starting salary and a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career.
79. The below table sets out an example of one possible structure outside of the London pay areas in which starting salaries are raised to £30,000, within an envelope which the department considers affordable across all three years. Alongside the uplifts outlined below, average 2.5% uplifts to the leadership and all other pay and allowance ranges would be affordable in this example.

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£30,000	£24,373	£5,627	23.1%
M2	£31,467	£26,298	£5,169	19.7%
M3	£33,006	£28,412	£4,593	16.2%
M4	£34,620	£30,599	£4,021	13.1%
M5	£36,313	£33,009	£3,303	10.0%
M6	£38,172	£35,971	£2,202	6.1%
U1	£39,958	£37,654	£2,305	6.1%
U2	£41,904	£39,049	£2,855	7.3%
U3	£43,954	£40,490	£3,464	8.6%

80. The table below shows how the pay progression structure would change under this proposal. The average percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would reduce to 4.9%. On the other hand, percentage progression of the upper pay range would increase to 4.9%. Overall this would create a more coherent progression structure, with less steep pay progression compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher's career and a more uniform rate of progression between all pay points.

	Progression between each point	
	Existing	New structure
M1 to M2	7.9%	4.9%
M2 to M3	8.0%	4.9%
M3 to M4	7.7%	4.9%
M4 to M5	7.9%	4.9%
M5 to M6	9.0%	5.1%
M6 to U1	4.7%	4.7%
U1 to U2	3.7%	4.9%
U2 to U3	3.7%	4.9%

81. Our analysis suggests that this pay structure could see around an extra 810 teachers retained per year outside the London pay areas, compared to a counterfactual where the headroom for the pay award was distributed evenly across all pay points and ranges each year. These estimates are per year once the structure is fully realised in September 2022. These retention benefits are on top of additional teachers recruited due to a £30,000 starting salary.
82. As noted above, the London pay areas are starting from a different position to the rest of England – much closer to the aims of our reforms - with higher starting salaries and lower typical progression pay increases in the first years of the career. This difference starting position is most exaggerated in the Inner London pay area. Consequently, the pay award for the London pay areas will likely involve slightly lower uplifts to starting salary than for the rest of England (given their more generous starting position).
83. Annex A provides tables of example possible London pay areas structures in September 2022. These example structures would see starting salaries rise to £35,500 in Inner London (+16.5%), £33,200 in Outer London (+17.1%) and £31,000 in London Fringe (+21%). In common with the rest of England, average percentage progression between each pay point on the pay ranges would reduce to 4.9%, creating a less steep pay progression structure compared to what is currently typical in the early years of a teacher’s career and lower average percentage increases between each pay point on the main pay range.
84. Our analysis suggests that this pay structure could see around an extra 260 teachers retained in the London pay areas, compared to a counterfactual where the headroom for the pay award (3%) was distributed evenly across all pay points and ranges each year. This could mean a total estimated national

retention benefit of over 1000 teachers per year, arising from pay reform. These estimates are per year once the structures are fully realised in September 2022.

Maintaining a supply of high quality teachers and leaders

The teacher recruitment and retention strategy:

85. The previous chapters have set out how the pay system can be reformed to better support recruitment and retention. This reform to the pay system is part of a broader set of departmental efforts to address the factors that lead teachers to leaving the profession early or not joining in the first place. In January 2019 we launched the government's first ever integrated strategy to recruit and retain more teachers in schools. This provided an opportunity to take a long-term, strategic and coherent look at the teacher workforce and pipeline to determine how best to provide sufficient high-quality teachers.
86. The strategy focuses on four key priorities where our reform and investment will have the biggest impact:
- Create the right climate for headteachers to establish supportive school cultures
 - Transform support for early career teachers
 - Build a career offer that remains attractive to teachers as their careers and lives develop
 - Make it easier for great people to become teachers

Priority 1: Create the right climate for headteachers to establish supportive school cultures

87. This priority is about taking action to help headteachers reduce teachers' workload; supporting headteachers to strip away unnecessary tasks such as data entry; simplifying the accountability system; working with Ofsted to ensure staff workload is considered as part of a school's inspection judgement; and providing additional support to help headteachers meet key challenges.
88. School accountability is vital; however, we recognise that it can create unintended consequences that add unnecessary workload burdens and pressure. We are committed to creating a clearer, more transparent accountability system, which supports headteachers. Formal intervention, including forced academisation, now only results from an Ofsted 'inadequate' judgment. We are also no longer publishing or using the floor or coasting standards, and are instead using a new single, transparent method for identifying schools eligible for improvement support – Ofsted Requires Improvement.

89. Although findings from our 2019 Teacher Workload Survey suggest there has been a reduction between 2016 and 2019 in reported working hours for teachers, middle leaders and senior leaders of approximately 5 hours a week, we recognise that teachers' workload is still too high. We will continue to take action to address workload, improve work-life balance and provide support for schools. Alongside the survey, we updated the school workload reduction toolkit which provides practical tools and evidence-based solutions to enable headteachers, governors and teachers to streamline practice and remove unnecessary workload.
90. We are also working with Ofsted to drive down workload by tackling the audit culture. For example, Ofsted's new school inspection arrangements came into effect in September and set the expectation that in a good school, headteachers are aware of the pressures on staff and are realistic and constructive in the way they manage them, including their workload.

Priority 2: Transform support for early career teachers

91. Early career retention is now the biggest challenge that we face. And it is where government can help to make the biggest difference by investing significantly. That's why we are fully funding a transformation in the support given to teachers at the start of their career, through the Early Career Framework (ECF).
92. Designed collaboratively with the sector, the ECF underpins an entitlement to a fully funded, two-year package of structured training and support for early career teachers linked to the best available research evidence. We have committed to the early roll-out of the ECF in four key areas from September 2020 and national roll-out from September 2021. By the time the new system is fully in place, we anticipate investing at least an additional £130 million every year to support ECF delivery in full.
93. We will also provide financial incentives to stay in teaching, not just to train. Physics, mathematics, languages and chemistry trainees starting ITT in 2020/21 will receive three early-career payments of £2,000 each (or £3,000 each if teaching in local authority areas we have identified as having high need for teachers, as determined by our published data) in their second, third and fourth years of teaching.
94. We are continuing to offer [Teachers' Student Loan Reimbursement](#) in biology, chemistry, computing, languages and physics for those starting ITT in 2020/21. We have commenced a pilot of [retention payments for teachers of maths and physics](#), with £2000 retention payments available in 2019/20 and 2020/21 for maths and physics teachers in the first five years of their careers and who teach in the North East, Yorkshire and Humber and Opportunity Areas.

Priority 3: Build a career offer that remains attractive to teachers as their careers and lives develop

95. We aim to build on the foundation of the ECF to support teachers to pursue the right career opportunities for them. We are introducing specialist NPQs to support teachers to develop their career without needing to pursue a traditional leadership route. The NPQs will be linked to the core areas in which teachers receive training at the start of their career, such as: assessment, behaviour management, subject and curriculum expertise and pedagogy. We have also committed to developing a Teacher Developer NPQ, which will support the implementation of the ECF.
96. We are equally active in supporting the system to develop a strong and sustainable pipeline of talented, motivated staff in leadership positions. The reformed suite of National Professional Qualifications (NPQs) develops the skills and knowledge of teachers aspiring to leadership roles and leaders aiming to progress in their careers. The overhauled delivery system puts high-performing schools and leadership development organisations at the forefront of the design, development and assessment of these gold-standard qualifications.
97. Additionally, we are investing in creating the strongest development and progression opportunities for teachers working in the schools and areas that need them most. We have allocated £20 million in scholarships to drive take-up of the reformed leadership NPQs in the most-challenging areas, while the £42 million Teacher Development Premium will fund take-up of both leadership NPQs and the first specialist NPQs to complement early roll-out of the ECF.
98. Besides promoting take-up of the reformed NPQs, we continue to fund the High-Potential Senior Leaders programme, and the High-Potential Middle Leaders programme, which target aspiring headteachers and middle leaders in areas throughout the country which are most in need. The Women Leading in Education coaching pledge continues to offer women teachers expert advice on pursuing and securing leadership roles. Finally, the Equality and Diversity Leadership Fund supports schools to increase leadership diversity by raising the aspirations and skills of teachers covered by any of the protected characteristics defined in the Equality Act 2010 to progress into leadership.

Priority 4: Make it easier for great people to become teachers

99. We are radically simplifying the process for becoming a teacher, introducing new digital systems, such as an easy-to-use, one-stop application system, designed to make application much easier and more user-friendly. We have also launched a new Find Teacher Training service which enables applicants to search for ITT courses that are right for them.

100. We are reviewing the ITT market so that we can identify improvements that reduce costs for providers, ensure ITT supports more schools in challenging areas, and explore how we can encourage high quality providers – including in high-performing MATs – to extend their reach, deliver at scale and do more to support the wider system.
101. We want to encourage and enable more potential teachers to experience teaching. Last year, 13,000 people experienced life in the classroom through DfE programmes. We want to build on this and go much further. We are going to launch a Discover Teaching initiative which will provide a new breadth of opportunities for people to experience teaching.
102. We also remain committed to ensuring that all trainees have access to high quality teacher training. We have published a new framework of core content for ITT, which underpins a coherent training programme for all new teachers, beginning with updated core content for ITT, leading into the ECF once qualified.
103. Taken together, we expect the four priorities set out in the strategy to have a demonstrable impact on teacher recruitment and retention. We know, however, that we will need to do more to meet the growing challenge we face over the coming years. We will continue to work closely with the wider education sector to drive forward the strategy priorities and to ensure that teaching continues to be an attractive and rewarding profession.
104. For further information please see Annex D: Recruitment to teacher training and Annex E: Headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions.

Annex A: London pay options

Option A

Table A1: Inner London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£32,200	£30,480	£1,720	5.64%
M2	£33,810	£32,069	£1,741	5.43%
M3	£35,501	£33,740	£1,760	5.22%
M4	£37,276	£35,498	£1,777	5.01%
M5	£39,139	£38,229	£910	2.38%
M6	£42,416	£41,482	£933	2.25%
U1	£46,741	£45,712	£1,029	2.25%
U2	£48,834	£47,759	£1,075	2.25%
U3	£50,686	£49,571	£1,115	2.25%

Table A2: Outer London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£30,200	£28,355	£1,845	6.51%
M2	£31,952	£30,113	£1,839	6.11%
M3	£33,805	£31,976	£1,829	5.72%
M4	£35,765	£33,956	£1,810	5.33%
M5	£37,840	£36,836	£1,004	2.73%
M6	£40,935	£40,034	£901	2.25%
U1	£42,350	£41,419	£932	2.25%
U2	£43,917	£42,951	£966	2.25%
U3	£45,542	£44,540	£1,002	2.25%

Table A3: London Fringe

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£27,400	£25,543	£1,857	7.27%
M2	£29,236	£27,467	£1,769	6.44%
M3	£31,195	£29,581	£1,614	5.46%
M4	£33,285	£31,774	£1,510	4.75%
M5	£35,515	£34,179	£1,336	3.91%
M6	£37,987	£37,151	£836	2.25%
U1	£39,669	£38,796	£873	2.25%
U2	£41,093	£40,189	£904	2.25%
U3	£42,571	£41,634	£937	2.25%

Option B

Table A4: Inner London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£32,000	£30,480	£1,520	4.99%
M2	£33,600	£32,069	£1,531	4.77%
M3	£35,280	£33,740	£1,540	4.56%
M4	£37,044	£35,498	£1,546	4.35%
M5	£39,185	£38,229	£956	2.50%
M6	£42,519	£41,482	£1,037	2.50%
U1	£46,855	£45,712	£1,143	2.50%
U2	£48,953	£47,759	£1,194	2.50%
U3	£50,810	£49,571	£1,239	2.50%

Table A5: Outer London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£30,000	£28,355	£1,645	5.80%
M2	£31,740	£30,113	£1,627	5.40%
M3	£33,581	£31,976	£1,605	5.02%
M4	£35,529	£33,956	£1,573	4.63%
M5	£37,757	£36,836	£921	2.50%
M6	£41,035	£40,034	£1,001	2.50%
U1	£42,454	£41,419	£1,035	2.50%
U2	£44,024	£42,951	£1,074	2.50%
U3	£45,654	£44,540	£1,114	2.50%

Table A6: London Fringe

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£27,200	£25,543	£1,657	6.49%
M2	£29,022	£27,467	£1,555	5.66%
M3	£30,967	£29,581	£1,386	4.69%
M4	£33,042	£31,774	£1,267	3.99%
M5	£35,255	£34,179	£1,077	3.15%
M6	£38,080	£37,151	£929	2.50%
U1	£39,766	£38,796	£970	2.50%
U2	£41,193	£40,189	£1,005	2.50%
U3	£42,675	£41,634	£1,041	2.50%

Option C

Table A7: Inner London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£31,900	£30,480	£1,420	4.66%
M2	£33,495	£32,069	£1,426	4.45%
M3	£35,170	£33,740	£1,430	4.24%
M4	£36,928	£35,498	£1,430	4.03%
M5	£39,280	£38,229	£1,051	2.75%
M6	£42,623	£41,482	£1,141	2.75%
U1	£46,970	£45,712	£1,257	2.75%
U2	£49,073	£47,759	£1,313	2.75%
U3	£50,934	£49,571	£1,363	2.75%

Table A8: Outer London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£29,900	£28,355	£1,545	5.45%
M2	£31,634	£30,113	£1,521	5.05%
M3	£33,469	£31,976	£1,493	4.67%
M4	£35,410	£33,956	£1,454	4.28%
M5	£37,849	£36,836	£1,013	2.75%
M6	£41,135	£40,034	£1,101	2.75%
U1	£42,558	£41,419	£1,139	2.75%
U2	£44,132	£42,951	£1,181	2.75%
U3	£45,765	£44,540	£1,225	2.75%

Table A9: London Fringe

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£27,100	£25,543	£1,557	6.10%
M2	£28,916	£27,467	£1,449	5.27%
M3	£30,853	£29,581	£1,272	4.30%
M4	£32,920	£31,774	£1,146	3.61%
M5	£35,126	£34,179	£947	2.77%
M6	£38,173	£37,151	£1,022	2.75%
U1	£39,863	£38,796	£1,067	2.75%
U2	£41,294	£40,189	£1,105	2.75%
U3	£42,779	£41,634	£1,145	2.75%

Possible three year approach

Table A10: Inner London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£35,500	£30,480	£5,020	16.5%
M2	£37,240	£32,069	£5,170	16.1%
M3	£39,064	£33,740	£5,324	15.8%
M4	£40,978	£35,498	£5,480	15.4%
M5	£42,986	£38,229	£4,757	12.4%
M6	£45,093	£41,482	£3,610	8.7%
U1	£48,510	£45,712	£2,798	6.1%
U2	£50,682	£47,759	£2,923	6.1%
U3	£52,605	£49,571	£3,034	6.1%

Table A11: Outer London

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£33,200	£28,355	£4,845	17.1%
M2	£34,827	£30,113	£4,714	15.7%
M3	£36,533	£31,976	£4,558	14.3%
M4	£38,323	£33,956	£4,368	12.9%
M5	£40,201	£36,836	£3,365	9.1%
M6	£42,485	£40,034	£2,450	6.1%
U1	£44,238	£41,419	£2,819	6.8%
U2	£46,405	£42,951	£3,455	8.0%
U3	£48,679	£44,540	£4,139	9.3%

Table A12: London Fringe

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£31,000	£25,543	£5,457	21.4%
M2	£32,519	£27,467	£5,052	18.4%
M3	£34,112	£29,581	£4,532	15.3%
M4	£35,784	£31,774	£4,010	12.6%
M5	£37,537	£34,179	£3,359	9.8%
M6	£39,425	£37,151	£2,274	6.1%
U1	£41,306	£38,796	£2,510	6.5%
U2	£43,330	£40,189	£3,142	7.8%
U3	£45,453	£41,634	£3,819	9.2%

Annex B: Technical Annex

B1. To support thinking on reform of the classroom teacher pay offer, DfE has developed a model that estimates the cost of proposed pay structures, as well as the potential retention benefits associated with them.

Generating a new classroom teacher pay structure

B2. The model begins by allocating teachers to one of nine spine points, which are based on the spine points that existed prior to the reforms of 2014 being uplifted in line with subsequent awards – in line with those that continue to be published by teacher unions. Teachers are allocated according to individuals' FTE pay as reported in the School Workforce Census of November 2018.

B3. We make two adjustments to ensure we can allocate each teacher to a spine point:

- a. We remove from our calculations those teachers with salaries deemed unreliable, a methodology in line with the School Workforce Census publication.
- b. We also allow for the fact that pay freedoms have led to some teachers' salaries lying between the spine points. In this case, we allow a small buffer of £500 above the spine point, below which we round a teacher down to the nearest point on the scale, and above which we round a teacher up to the next point on the scale.

Table B1: Teacher workforce by allocated spine point, rest of England pay area

Spine Point	FTE teachers on each spine point in November 2018 (Rest of England)	As a percentage of classroom teachers (FTE)	Base pay spending on each point, as % of the classroom teacher base pay bill
M1	20,600	7.6%	5.3%
M2	18,300	6.8%	5.0%
M3	18,200	6.7%	5.4%
M4	17,400	6.4%	5.6%
M5	16,600	6.1%	5.7%
M6	34,700	12.8%	13.1%
U1	32,900	12.2%	13.0%
U2	29,800	11.0%	12.2%
U3	82,000	30.3%	34.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%

- B4. Separate versions of this table are calculated for the workforce in the Rest of England, London Fringe, Inner London and Outer London. In general, we find that London areas have a higher proportion of teachers on the lower end of the pay range. This is in line with the workforce tending to be somewhat younger in London, on average.
- B5. A target starting salary can then be input for each region for a given year. In our proposed scenario, this is £30,000 for Rest of England in AY 2022/23. It is set to £31,000 for London Fringe, £33,200 for Outer London and £35,500 for Inner London in our example pay structures in this document.
- B6. A constant rate of increase is set. This is the percentage difference between any two spine points. In our central scenario, this is set to 4.9% for all areas in AY2022/23.
- B7. The model also offers the option to apply a uniform award to all upper pay range points, or to differentiate these so that the constant rate of increase between points continues to apply, including across the gap between M6 and U1.
- B8. Finally, the model provides an option to protect all spine points in real terms as a minimum (or some other slightly higher level of protection e.g. Option B protects all points with a minimum 2.5% rise in September 2020). This functionality is particularly important for M6 in all regions; and for a number of points in Inner London due to previous pay awards introducing 'kinks' in the progression pathway e.g. the 2% award to the maximum of the main pay range in September 2015.
- B9. The model then generates the classroom teacher pay structure implied by these inputs. It does so by setting M1 to the selected starting salary and calculating the value of each of the other spine points to ensure:
- a. the constant rate of increase between any two points is applied to get the baseline structure;
 - b. a uniform award is instead applied to the upper pay range points, if selected;
 - c. the value of individual spine points is increased as much as necessary to protect it in real terms, if this option has been selected (see paragraph B8) and the above calculations cause that point to have received a lower than CPI inflation award per year
- B10. For our example scenario, by AY 2022/23 in Rest of England with real terms protection applied, this structure is below.

Table B2: Example national pay structure 2022/23

	New Structure	Existing Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£30,000	£24,373	£5,627	23.1%
M2	£31,467	£26,298	£5,169	19.7%
M3	£33,006	£28,412	£4,593	16.2%
M4	£34,620	£30,599	£4,021	13.1%
M5	£36,313	£33,009	£3,303	10.0%
M6	£38,172	£35,971	£2,202	6.1%
U1	£39,958	£37,654	£2,305	6.1%
U2	£41,904	£39,049	£2,855	7.3%
U3	£43,954	£40,490	£3,464	8.6%

Costing each proposal

- B11. Once the model has generated the new structure according to the criteria set, it assesses how much more costly it is compared to the status quo in September 2019.
- B12. It estimates the proportion of the classroom teacher pay bill spent on each spine point, accounting for both the proportion of teachers on that point and the relative value of the salary attached to each spine point. In table B2 above, these estimated proportions are presented for Rest of England teachers. M1, for example, accounts for 7.6% of FTE teachers but just 5.3% of the classroom teacher pay bill due to the salary being below the classroom teacher average.
- B13. These proportions can then be multiplied by the proposed percentage change to the value of each spine point. In the above scenario, M1 would increase by 23.1% between September 2019 and September 2022. This means that the proposed change to M1 in isolation would increase the classroom teacher pay bill by 1.2 percentage points over the period.

Impact on classroom teacher paybill of M1 increasing to £30,000:

$$23.1\% * 5.3\% = 1.2\%$$

- B14. When this calculation is done for each spine point, the individual percentage point impacts can be added together to get the total increase in the classroom

teacher pay bill under the proposed new structure. For the proposed structure above, this would be a 9.8 percentage point increase over the three years to September 2022 in the classroom teacher pay bill.

B15. By multiplying a uniform award for non-classroom teacher pay ranges by the proportion of total pay bill spending on each range, we can calculate the total impact on the overall pay bill of a proposed package.

B16. We estimate that approximately 23% of the base pay bill goes to the leadership range teachers in Rest of England; 44% to upper pay range teachers³⁸; 31% to main pay range teachers; and 2% to unqualified teachers. These proportions vary for the London areas.

B17. In our proposed scenario for academic year 2022/23, the leadership and unqualified pay ranges would receive a uniform 2.5% uplift per year³⁹. This is equivalent to a 7.7% increase over three years, due to compounding.

B18. We can therefore calculate the overall pay bill increase as:

$$\text{Leadership: } 7.7\% * 23\% = 1.8\%$$

$$\text{Qualified classroom teachers: } 9.8\% * (44\% + 31\%) = 7.4\%$$

$$\text{Unqualified teachers: } 7.7\% * 2\% = 0.1\%^{40}$$

$$\text{Overall: } 1.8\% + 7.4\% + 0.1\% = 9.3\%$$

B19. This overall increase in the pay bill is equivalent to a 3% per year uniform award, which would lead to an increase of 9.3% over the three years due to compounding.

B20. An important assumption in this methodology is that the distribution of teachers along the pay ranges does not substantially change over time. Table B3 shows that the estimated distribution is relatively stable over time. There appears to have been a gradual shift towards the main pay range accounting for a greater proportion of classroom teachers. However, there has also been a significant increase in leadership teachers since 2010 – the number of Assistant Heads has increased by more than 30% over the period – which may partially explain the reduction in the UPR share of classroom teachers. And while there is some volatility year-on-year in the proportion of teachers on

³⁸ We include leading practitioners in this upper pay range group. It is difficult to accurately identify all leading practitioners in the School Workforce Census; including them in the upper pay range group as U3 teachers makes a negligible difference to our cost calculations.

³⁹ Awards for individual teachers will depend on performance.

⁴⁰ 0.1% due to using unrounded numbers in calculation

any individual spine point – likely driven by data quality issues in reported base pay – this is limited to tenths of a percentage point.

Table B3: Change over time in proportions of classroom teachers on each spine point, rest of England pay area.

	% FTE per point, 2018	Percentage point difference in proportion of FTE on each point relative to 2018								
		2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010	
M1	7.6%	0.2%	-1.3%	0.4%	0.1%	-0.9%	-0.2%	-1.2%	-1.1%	
M2	6.8%	0.6%	0.8%	0.4%	0.2%	-0.2%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.7%	
M3	6.7%	0.2%	0.0%	-0.4%	-0.5%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.5%	
M4	6.4%	-0.3%	-0.3%	-0.6%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.9%	-0.6%	-0.6%	
M5	6.1%	-0.5%	-0.5%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.6%	-0.4%	-0.6%	
M6	12.8%	-0.6%	-0.8%	-1.1%	-1.0%	0.2%	-0.1%	-0.2%	0.0%	
U1	12.2%	-0.2%	0.6%	0.8%	1.2%	1.3%	1.7%	1.7%	0.8%	
U2	11.0%	-0.3%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	-0.1%	0.0%	-0.1%	
U3	30.3%	0.9%	1.6%	1.0%	1.5%	1.3%	1.7%	2.1%	2.7%	

- B21. A key element to this assumption holding is that the average time taken for a teacher to progress between each of the points remains unchanged post-reform.
- B22. This requires schools to continue with their current policies towards performance based pay for all teachers, allowing similar numbers of high-performing teachers to progress more rapidly as now, and likewise continuing to constrain pay progression for similar numbers of lower-performing teachers as now.
- B23. It also requires that the average time taken to progress between the higher points on the pay ranges – M6, U1, U2 and U3 – remains unchanged.
- B24. Analysis of the School Workforce Census (SWC) shows that of those teachers who were on spine point M6 in November 2017 and remained in service in November 2018, approximately 1 in 3 had been promoted beyond the main pay range by November 2018. This includes some teachers moving into leadership positions but the majority are moving onto the upper pay range. Analysis of previous years demonstrates this rate has remained relatively stable over time.
- B25. Longitudinal tracking of individual teachers allows us to look beyond the overall figure above and estimate the proportion of teachers who spend 1, 2, 3 or more years on M6. To do this, we find teachers who we can identify as being M5 (or below) teachers in November 2016 i.e. they are new to M6 in November 2017. We then estimate the proportion of these teachers who progress beyond M6 by November 2018. Just over 4 in 10 of those who

remained in service⁴¹ did so, meaning 6 in 10 remained on M6 for at least a second year. By looking at earlier cohorts, we can also estimate the proportion of these teachers remaining on M6 for a second year who progress beyond M6 by their third year. Again, this is just over 4 in 10 of those who remain in service in the third year. Of those who remain on M6 for a third year and are in service in the fourth year, approximately 1 in 3 progress beyond M6 by the fourth year. The progression rate continues to fall from this point onwards: for those teachers remaining on M6 for a fourth year, the rate of progression is closer to 1 in 4.

- B26. The same analysis for spine point U1 and U2 shows that again, for those teachers on each point in November 2017, approximately 1 in 3 teachers had progressed beyond by November 2018. Again, this includes some teachers moving into leadership positions.
- B27. Longitudinal tracking of individual teachers in the SWC shows that between 1 in 4 and 1 in 5 teachers remaining in service progress beyond U1 or U2 following their first year on each point. Fewer teachers advance immediately from these spine points than do from M6. However, a higher proportion of those in their second year on each spine point progress beyond it by their third year: around 1 in 2 of those remaining in service. Progression rates remain relatively high in the third year, at just under 1 in 2, before dropping to 1 in 3 for those still on each spine point for a fourth year. So typical time taken to progress appears more clustered at 2-3 years for U1 and U2, whereas for M6 time taken to progress appears a little more varied with a greater degree of immediate progression but analysis indicating there may also be a slightly larger proportion of teachers either staying on M6 for longer periods or who leave before progressing.
- B28. However, when interpreting this analysis it is important to recognise that tracking teacher pay progression using SWC data has some important limitations. This is mainly due to the timing of the SWC data collection in early November each year – before some teachers have had their annual performance reviews and associated changes to pay recorded. As a result, some teachers who have not had reviews may still have their previous year's pay reported. This is problematic for tracking progression, especially if in one year a teacher had their performance review before November and pay was correctly recorded but in the next year their performance review took place

⁴¹ In this analysis, our results refer to the proportion of teachers remaining in service. We remove from our calculations teachers who leave the state-funded sector that year. We do not attempt to track teachers who leave and return at a later point: teachers are excluded from our analysis from the point they are first seen to leave in the data. These teachers will be captured by our non-longitudinal methodology, which looks at all teachers on spine point M6 in November 2017 regardless of teaching history. We also exclude the relatively small number of teachers each year with data that implies they received negative pay progression, suggesting there is substantial risk the data is unreliable.

after data collection. Evidence of this can show up in ‘double bumps’ whereby teachers appear to have received no pay progression one year but progressed two spine points the next, creating issues for our analysis. Attempting to control for this causes our estimates to increase slightly, with approximately 2 in 5 teachers now progressing from each spine point each year.

- B29. Under our most positive assumptions, our estimates can reach as high as 1 in 2 for some spine points in some years but this appears to be an absolute upper bound.
- B30. If approximately 1 in 3 teachers on each of these spine points progress beyond it each year, this would imply teachers currently, on average, spend 3 years on each point per promotion. However, this average will be pulled up by the presence of some teachers who spend time on the point but *do not progress beyond it before leaving the profession* – for the subset of teachers who do subsequently progress, the average time taken would therefore be slightly less than 3 years. The average is closer to 2 in 5 when we attempt to control for data issues and implies an average time spent on each point of 2½ years. This is supported by the longitudinal analysis which, when extrapolated, suggests a teacher would spend approximately 2½ years on each spine point on average. This would suggest an average time taken to progress between each of the higher-end classroom teacher spine points of approximately 2½ years will need to be maintained under any reformed pay system to avoid additional costs beyond those modelled.
- B31. However, as the longitudinal analysis shows, the time taken for any individual teacher to progress will vary and be related to each teacher’s performance.
- B32. Moving forward, we will continue to assess whether the pay reforms lead to changes in recruitment and retention trends that affect the underlying distribution of teachers along the ranges.

Estimating the benefits of the new pay structure

- B33. There is support in the literature that pay has a greater impact on retention decisions for early career teachers than it does for more experienced teachers. For example, Hendricks (2014)⁴² estimates that early career teachers’ turnover rates fall by approximately three times as much as more experienced teachers’ in response to a 1% change in pay.

⁴² [Hendricks \(2014\) Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from Texas](#)

- B34. There are likely to be a range of reasons for this, including:
- a. Increases to pay may be more important to teachers on relatively lower salaries, who tend to be early career teachers. This is in line with economic theory on the diminishing marginal utility of each extra pound an individual earns.
 - b. Early career teachers are likely to be more mobile in the labour market, making them more responsive to the relative pay of alternative career options outside teaching.
 - c. Early career teachers have higher prevailing wastage⁴³ rates, meaning there is a larger pool of potential teachers' minds to be changed by an improved pay offer.
- B35. Of course, while pay is one factor that may particularly affect retention for early career teacher, the department is actively addressing the full range of factors which affect teacher retention at all career stages. Full details on the department's work to address recruitment and retention is included in the chapter on 'Maintaining a supply of high quality teachers and leaders'
- B36. One way of measuring the responsiveness of wastage rates to higher pay is as an elasticity. This measures the percentage reduction in the wastage rate to a 1% change in pay. For example, if the wastage rate for a group of teachers was 10 percentage points per year and the group's elasticity of wastage with respect to pay was 1.0, a 10% increase in their pay should reduce wastage by 1 percentage point to 9 percentage points.
- B37. Estimates of the 'elasticity' of wastage in response to pay vary in the literature depending on the study designs, location of the study and types of teachers included.
- B38. Some international studies⁴⁴ looking at the response of shortage subject teachers to pay supplements find relatively high elasticities of around 2.5 – 3.8. These employ robust quasi-experimental study designs that are likely to be effective at accurately isolating the impact of the additional pay on wastage (or turnover in some cases). However, they assess the impact of highly targeted interventions aimed at groups that are most likely to be responsive to pay e.g. early career teachers in shortage subjects, who are likely to be have competitive alternative labour market options and be mobile enough to access

⁴³ 'Wastage' rates refer here to the percentage of teachers who leave the state-funded sector each year


⁴⁴ [Bueno and Sass \(2018 working paper\) *The Effects of Differential Pay on Teacher Recruitment and Retention*](#); [Feng & Sass \(2017\) *The impact of Incentives to Recruit and Retain Teachers in "Hard-to-Staff" Subjects*](#); [Falch \(2011\) *Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment*](#); [Clotfelter et al \(2008\) *Would higher salaries keep teachers in high-poverty schools? Evidence from a policy intervention in North Carolina*](#)

them. They are therefore likely to find a high end impact that is not representative of our reforms affecting all teachers.

- B39. Studies that look at all teachers (or only early career teachers but across all subjects) tend to find smaller elasticities in the range of 1.0 – 1.5⁴⁵. This is expected as they are not targeting the specific groups that we would expect to be especially responsive, as the earlier papers do. They exploit existing variations in actual pay or variations in earning opportunities outside teaching for teachers in different regions and subjects. It may therefore be that the designs of these studies have greater difficulty isolating the impact of pay on wastage. This set of studies includes the only published estimates we are aware of for elasticities based on UK data.
- B40. We lean towards the more conservative estimates found in the studies containing all (or most) teachers. These are likely to be more representative of the average response of all teachers affected by the proposed reforms, which are targeted at early career but not by subject. Our central estimate is an elasticity of 1.5.
- B41. We apply this elasticity uniformly across teachers at all stages of their career. There is support in the literature that elasticities are in fact higher in early career but estimating the exact differences in magnitude to use in the modelling would involve a significant amount of judgement. Instead we are implicitly assuming that the greater responsiveness of wastage rates to pay amongst early career teachers is driven solely by the same elasticity being applied to a higher prevailing wastage rate – wastage rates are significantly higher in early career than later on (see Figure B1). Not directly accounting for other factors that might make early career teachers more responsive (e.g. those in paragraph B34, parts a. and b.) means our estimated retention benefits may be conservative.

⁴⁵ [Hendricks \(2014\) *Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from Texas*](#); [Dolton & Von der Klaauw \(1995\) *Leaving Teaching in the UK: A Duration Analysis*](#); [Allen et al \(2016\) *The Longer-Term Costs and Benefits of Different Initial Teacher Training Routes*](#).

Figure B1: Leaver rates in early career for teachers in consecutive service since qualification, split by experience⁴⁶



- B42. Based on this elasticity estimate, the model calculates the expected retention benefits of the new pay structure. For each spine point, the model:
- Calculates the percentage point change in pay relative to September 2019;
 - Multiplies this by the elasticity of 1.5 to find the percentage to reduce the prevailing wastage rate by;
 - Applies this to the prevailing wastage rate for teachers on that spine point (estimated by experience) to get the reduction in the wastage rate;
 - Multiplies this reduction in the wastage rate by the proportion of classroom teachers on that spine point in FTE terms to calculate the expected extra retention as a percentage of all classroom teachers;
 - Multiplies this percentage by the total number of classroom teachers to estimate the extra teachers retained.
- B43. However, these steps alone would lead us to overestimate retention gains. While classroom teacher pay will be increasing, the rest of the economy will also be moving on. We would reasonably expect that for pay to have a neutral impact on retention rates year-on-year, teacher pay would need to roughly keep pace with earnings growth across the rest of the economy i.e. the jobs

⁴⁶ This chart refers only to those teachers with consecutive service prior to the point of leaving. It is not directly comparable to table 8 of the School Workforce Census publication, which measures the proportion of teachers from each cohort still in service each year since qualification – so, for example, the 67.7% of teachers in service after five years for the 2013 NQT cohort will include some teachers who left during those five years and then returned.

which provide teachers' alternative employment opportunities. OBR forecast economy-wide earnings growth to be approximately 3.0% per year over the period to September 2022. We therefore adjust the percentage change in pay in step (a) in line with this wage inflation index. This reduces each change by approximately 9.3 percentage points.

- B44. The steps outlined above can now provide us with our estimated change in retention relative to an across-the-board 3% rise. This also demonstrates the gains due to the reformed structure, as opposed to the increased average award.
- B45. Our central estimate for the model outlined above and similar reforms for London is over 1,000 extra teachers retained per year by 2022. This would represent a reduction in the overall number of teachers leaving the profession of approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ of a percentage point – the leaver rate is currently 9.8 percentage points, according to the latest School Workforce Census. Smaller gains would be seen in the transitional years to 2022.
- B46. There is significant uncertainty around this estimate – as outlined above, there is a large range to the effects found in the literature, and no studies that assess a whole system reform of this type.
- B47. It also does not mean we will necessarily see the number of leavers from the profession fall by over 1,000 teachers in 2022 compared to 2019. That will depend on a number of economic and other factors which impact on the teacher labour market in the interim.

Estimating recruitment benefits of the new structure

- B48. Pay can attract a greater number⁴⁷ of more able⁴⁸ candidates to apply for individual jobs but much of this may be displacement of candidates who are already qualified / working in an industry. This is because firms in a particular industry or schools in a particular region could be considered to be in direct competition with each other for workers – they offer similar jobs where varying levels of pay are therefore likely to differentiate them significantly. In theory⁴⁹, we would expect to see recruitment gains roughly equal retention gains from higher salaries offered by an individual firm. Falch (2011) finds some support for this in a study of pay rises offered in a subset of Norwegian schools.

⁴⁷ [Falch \(2011\) *Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment*](#)

⁴⁸ Nagler et al (2017) *Weak Markets, Strong Teachers: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Effectiveness*; Finan, Bo and Rossi (2013) *Strengthening State Capabilities: the Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service*.

⁴⁹ [Manning \(2011\) *Imperfect Competition in the Labour Market*; Handbook of Labour Economics](#) p.1013

- B49. However, increasing pay at a whole-profession level means trying to attract potential teachers working in other professions (or considering working in other professions, in the case of new graduates). These professions are far more differentiated from teaching than the direct competition example, meaning that pay differentiation may not be quite as effective at increasing recruitment. We have found only limited evidence on the profession-wide recruitment impacts of higher pay⁵⁰.
- B50. Furthermore, we are interested not just in a simple overall increase to pay but to a change in the structure of the pay framework. It is not clear how potential teachers would view the changes to the structure as a whole. It is therefore extremely difficult to estimate the magnitude of any recruitment benefits.
- B51. We might reasonably expect that these reforms will improve recruitment to some unknown degree, though. As set out in more detail in paragraphs 19-26, reasons might include:
- a. Economic theory would suggest that potential new teachers will place a higher weight on starting salary than later career salary, so the move to increase starting pay significantly should have greater impact than a 3% uniform pay rise.
 - b. We also know that graduates often underestimate the starting pay offer for teachers⁵¹ meaning that the actual offer is not currently being incorporated into their decision making process when choosing a career. Introducing a memorable £30,000 starting salary may have the cut-through appeal to ensure graduates accurately assess the pay offer in teaching.
 - c. A higher starting salary may particularly appeal to career changers, for whom the reduction in salary when moving from a previous job to become a Newly Qualified Teacher may act as a particularly substantial barrier.
- B52. We do not therefore attempt to estimate the magnitude of any recruitment gains but we believe there is a strong case that these reform proposals will in fact provide much needed support for both recruitment and retention.

⁵⁰ [Chevalier, Dolton and McIntosh \(2007\) *Recruiting and Retaining Teachers in the UK: An Analysis of Graduate Occupation Choice from the 1960s to the 1990s*](#).

⁵¹ High Fliers research for the Department

Annex C: The teacher labour market

The teaching workforce⁵²

- C1. In November 2018 there were approximately 453,400 full-time equivalent (FTE) teachers in state-funded schools in England. Table C1 shows these teachers split by grade and phase. The majority of teachers are classroom teachers (383,400 FTE). There are approximately 70,000 FTE leadership teachers and 21,500 FTE unqualified teachers⁵³.

Table C1: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) by grade and phase, state-funded schools (England, November 2018, thousands)⁵⁴

	Nursery and primary	Secondary	Special	Centrally employed	Total
Heads	16.9	3.7	1.4	0.08	22.1
Deputy heads	12.2	5.2	1.3	0.06	18.6
Assistant heads	12.3	14.1	1.9	0.9	29.3
Classroom teachers	180.8	180.6	19.1	2.8	383.4
TOTAL	222.1	203.7	23.7	3.9	453.4
- of which unqualified	6.7	11.0	3.2	0.6	21.5

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018


- C2. 17% of all FTE teachers in publicly-funded schools were aged 50 and over, whilst 24% of teachers were aged under 30. Unqualified teachers have the largest percentage of teachers under 30 at 34%. Age distributions by grade are shown in Figure C1.
- C3. 74% of teachers at all grades are female. For classroom teachers the percentage is slightly higher at 75%. For the leadership group, the percentage of female teachers is 68%. Figure C2 shows the percentages of females and males for each grade.

⁵² All figures taken from the School Workforce Census (SWC) 2018 and are England only unless otherwise stated.

⁵³ An unqualified teacher in the LA maintained sector is either a trainee working towards QTS; an overseas trained teacher who has not exceeded the four years they are allowed to teach without having QTS; or an instructor who has a particular skill who can be employed for so long as a qualified teacher is not available.


⁵⁴ Where totals appear not to sum, this is due to rounding.

Figure C1: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools by grade and age (England, November 2018)



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

Figure C2: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools by grade and gender (England, November 2018)



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

C4. Table C2 shows the ethnic background of teachers in England by grade. The percentage of teachers with a non-white ethnic background decreases at higher grades. The highest percentage of teachers with a non-white background is observed for unqualified teachers and the lowest percentage of teachers with a non-white background is observed for headteachers.

Table C2: Distribution of full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) by grade and ethnicity in state-funded schools. (England, November 2018)⁵⁵

	Head	Deputy Head	Assistant Head	Classroom Teacher	Unqualified Teacher	Total
White	96.6%	95.1%	93.1%	91.0%	83.6%	91.2%
White - British	92.9%	91.2%	88.6%	85.3%	71.3%	85.6%
White - Irish	1.8%	1.9%	1.7%	1.6%	3.1%	1.7%
Any Other White Background	1.9%	2.1%	2.8%	4.1%	9.2%	4.0%
Black	1.0%	1.3%	1.8%	2.3%	5.9%	2.3%
Black - African	0.1%	0.3%	0.5%	0.9%	2.1%	0.9%
Black Caribbean	0.7%	0.8%	1.1%	1.0%	3.0%	1.1%
Any Other Black Background	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	0.9%	0.4%
Asian	1.4%	2.1%	3.4%	4.6%	6.3%	4.3%
Indian	0.8%	1.2%	1.7%	2.0%	2.6%	1.9%
Pakistani	0.4%	0.5%	0.9%	1.3%	1.8%	1.2%
Bangladeshi	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.6%	0.9%	0.6%
Any Other Asian Background	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.7%	1.1%	0.7%
Mixed	0.7%	1.0%	1.2%	1.4%	2.5%	1.4%
White and Black African	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%
White and Black Caribbean	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.9%	0.4%
White and Asian	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%
Any Other Mixed Background	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	1.0%	0.5%
Chinese	0.1%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.2%
Any Other Ethnic Group	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%	1.4%	0.6%

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018


Classroom teacher salaries

- C5. In 2019/20 the minimum salaries for classroom teachers in the Rest of England pay band (the lowest of the four regional pay bands) are £24,373 for a qualified teacher and £17,682 for an unqualified teacher.
- C6. In November 2018 the average (median) gross⁵⁶ pay of regular classroom teachers in state-funded schools in England was £36,800. This was an increase of 2.0% compared to November 2017 (£36,100).
- C7. Teachers' salaries are largely driven by the location of the school they work in and their level of experience. Figure C3 shows median salaries of classroom teachers by pay band and age. Classroom teachers typically see their salary rise much quicker in the beginning of their careers than in their later stages.

⁵⁵ Percentages are out of a total of those with ethnicity information recorded in the School Workforce Census (over 90% of all teachers)

⁵⁶ The gross pay is the base pay plus any allowances earned by the teacher.

Figure C3: Average (median) salaries of classroom teachers in state-funded schools, by age of teacher⁵⁷



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

- C8. However, analysis of the November 2018 School Workforce Census also shows that the overall level of pay varies between phase and sector. Figure C4 and Figure C5 show that average salaries for classroom teachers are higher in secondary schools than in primary schools, across both the maintained and academy sectors.
- C9. Average salaries in primary schools are higher in LA maintained schools than in academies (except London Fringe). Classroom teachers' average salaries are higher in LA maintained secondary schools than in secondary academies (except London Fringe). Analysis presented later in this section also suggests that on average academies use allowances less than in maintained schools. However, neither of these analyses allows for like-for-like comparison of school characteristics.

⁵⁷ Excludes centrally employed teachers, unqualified teachers and teachers with unreliable salary.

Figure C4: Average (median) salaries of classroom teachers in primary schools by region and school type⁵⁸



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

Figure C5: Average (median) salaries of classroom teachers in secondary schools by region and school type⁵⁹



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

C10. The average salary for a newly qualified teacher (NQT) in 2018 was £25,300, a rise of 3.2% on 2017. Teachers tend to see rapid pay progression in the early stages of their careers, especially compared to the rate in later years. For a

⁵⁸ Excludes special schools, free schools, City Technology Colleges (CTCs), University Technical Colleges (UTCs), studio schools, centrally employed staff and teachers with unreliable pay information.

⁵⁹ Excludes special schools, free schools, CTCs, UTCs, studio schools, centrally employed staff and teachers with unreliable pay information.

teacher with five years' experience, the estimated mean salary in FTE terms is £36,200. This rises to £43,000 when considering only teacher in Inner London⁶⁰.

Use of allowances

- C11. Table C3 shows the percentage of schools making use of different allowances by region. Nationally, 77.8% of schools were using allowances in November 2018. This represents an increase since November 2010, at 75.7%, though is still below the peak of 78.8% in November 2013. There is considerable variation between the regions as regards the use of allowances, with additional payments being used most in London (over 87% of schools using them), while only 70% of schools use them in Yorkshire and the Humber.
- C12. Teaching and learning responsibility (TLR) payments are the most widely used form of allowances, used in approximately 67% of schools. TLR payments are made to a teacher for undertaking a sustained additional responsibility for the purpose of ensuring the continued delivery of high-quality teaching. London schools make use of these payments most often and this pattern has been stable over time (since November 2010).
- C13. Recruitment and retention (REC) payments provide financial assistance, support or benefits to a teacher if such incentives are considered to be necessary for the recruitment of new teachers and the retention of existing teachers.
- C14. Table C3 shows that London schools use these payments the most often; this has long been the case. Given the competitiveness of the job market in London, schools may face more competition for teachers there than elsewhere, which may in turn drive the higher use of recruitment and retention payments.
- C15. The South East region has the most widespread use of special educational needs (SEN) payments but they are also widely used in the East of England, followed by London and the South West. 'Other payments', on the other hand, are used most widely in the West Midlands, Outer London and the South East. It could be that schools in some regions tend to record TLR / REC / SEN payments under 'Other payments'. These figures should therefore be interpreted with caution.

⁶⁰ The average salary figures in this paragraph have been calculated using an improved methodology and so are not directly comparable to similar figures in last year's evidence. For example, the five year salary now includes only those teachers with five full years of teaching in the state funded sector since qualification, removing teachers with breaks in service.

Table C3: Use of pay flexibilities, by region (England, November 2018)


Region	Total Number of Schools	Schools using REC payments		Schools using TLR payments		Schools using SEN payments		Schools using other payments		Schools using any payments	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
North East	1,134	82	7.2%	799	70.5%	183	16.1%	169	14.9%	862	76.0%
North West	3,163	161	5.1%	2,256	71.3%	578	18.3%	431	13.6%	2,510	79.4%
Yorkshire and the Humber	2,225	150	6.7%	1,367	61.4%	311	14.0%	333	15.0%	1,560	70.1%
East Midlands	2,042	115	5.6%	1,280	62.7%	351	17.2%	411	20.1%	1,441	70.6%
West Midlands	2,391	218	9.1%	1,664	69.6%	375	15.7%	749	31.3%	1,925	80.5%
East of England	2,540	344	13.5%	1,517	59.7%	653	25.7%	655	25.8%	1,915	75.4%
Inner London	1,023	181	17.7%	830	81.1%	238	23.3%	268	26.2%	892	87.2%
Outer London	1,552	278	17.9%	1,249	80.5%	382	24.6%	466	30.0%	1,360	87.6%
South East	3,332	490	14.7%	2,318	69.6%	938	28.2%	967	29.0%	2,752	82.6%
South West	2,348	119	5.1%	1,195	50.9%	517	22.0%	652	27.8%	1,711	72.9%
England	21,750	2,138	9.8%	14,475	66.6%	4,526	20.8%	5,101	23.5%	16,928	77.8%

Source: School Workforce Census, November 2018⁶¹

⁶¹ Classroom teachers in publicly funded schools for whom data is provided. A school is counted if they are paying a pay flexibility to at least one classroom teacher. REC payments represent Recruitment and Retention payments.

C16. Figure C6 shows the percentage of classroom teachers in receipt of TLR payments each year between November 2010 and November 2018. Maintained schools were more likely to use TLR payments than non-LA Maintained schools in the same phase, and TLR payments were more widely used in secondary schools than primary schools. The overall percentage of teachers in receipt of a TLR payment has been generally increasing over time, from 26.7% in November 2010 to 28.5% in November 2018 (though this is a 0.3 percentage point fall from November 2017). It is also worth noting that full-time teachers are almost twice as likely to be awarded a TLR payment compared to part-time teachers, with 32.6% of full-time teachers and 16.9% of part-time teachers having been in receipt of a TLR payment in November 2018.

Figure C6: Percentage of classroom teachers in receipt of a TLR payment⁶²




Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2018

C17. Figure C7 shows the median annual TLR payments by phase and sector paid to classroom teachers in November 2010-2018. It shows that TLR payments of all types were on average of higher value in secondary schools than in primary schools and that in recent years they have also generally been higher in LA maintained schools in comparison to academies and other state-funded non-LA maintained schools. In the most recent year the highest average TLR payments, of £4,200, were found in LA maintained secondary schools. Non-LA maintained secondary schools saw a decline between November 2010 and November 2013, increasing slightly since then to stand at an average of £3,700 in 2018. In LA maintained nursery, primary and special schools the average has been relatively stable since 2010, increasing very gradually to £2,700. LA maintained primary schools had slightly higher average TLR payments compared to non-LA

⁶² Excludes centrally employed teachers, unqualified teachers and leading practitioners. The number of teachers in non-LA maintained special schools prior to November 2012 as well those in non-LA maintained primary schools prior to November 2011 is not large enough to provide robust estimates and the respective figures are therefore not reported here. 'Not LA maintained' covers all state funded primary, secondary and special schools which are not maintained by LAs, e.g. academies, studio schools and UTCs

maintained primary schools, though this gap had closed considerably since November 2017.

Figure C7: Average (median) TLR payment for classroom teachers⁶³



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2018

Vacancies

- C18. Table C4 shows vacancy rates⁶⁴ by English regions between 2001 and 2018. The break indicates a change in data source prior to the final seven years in the series. From November 2010 vacancy rates are based on a census date in November (prior rates were based on a census date in January, a time of the year in which schools would be expected to have more vacancies than in November). A general decline in vacancy rates and the change in census date accounts for the large drop between January 2010 and November 2010.
- C19. Vacancy rates have marginally increased between November 2012 and November 2018 from 0.1% to 0.3%. The teacher vacancy rate nevertheless remains low and has stayed at around 1% or below for the past 15 years.

⁶³ Excludes centrally employed teachers, unqualified teachers, leading practitioners and classroom teachers without a TLR payment. The numbers of teachers receiving TLR payments in non-LA maintained special schools prior to November 2012 as well those in non-LA maintained primary schools prior to November 2011 are not large enough to provide robust estimates and the respective figures are therefore not reported here. 'Non-LA maintained' covers all state funded primary, secondary and special schools which are not maintained by LAs, e.g. academies, studio schools and UTCs

⁶⁴ Advertised vacancies for full-time permanent appointments (or appointments of at least one term's duration) and vacancies being filled on a temporary basis of less than one term as a proportion of full-time qualified teachers in post.

Table C4: Vacancy rates⁶⁵ in publicly funded schools by region in England, 2001 – 2018⁶⁶

Region	Jan-01	Jan-02	Jan-03	Jan-04	Jan-05	Jan-06	Jan-07	Jan-08	Jan-09	Jan-10	Nov-10	Nov-11	Nov-12	Nov-13	Nov-14	Nov-15	Nov-16	Nov-17	Nov-18
North East	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
North West	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Yorkshire and the Humber	0.5	0.9	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2
East Midlands	0.7	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.2
West Midlands	0.9	1.1	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
East of England	1.7	1.7	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4
London	3.5	2.7	2.1	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
South East	2.0	1.4	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
South West	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3
England	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
England (excl. London)	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3

Source: 618g Survey and School Workforce Census

⁶⁵ Based on advertised vacancies for full-time permanent appointments (or appointments of at least one term's duration). Includes vacancies being filled on a temporary basis of less than one term.

⁶⁶ From November 2010, vacancy rates are based on a census date in November which represents a break in the time series (prior rates were based on a census date in January). A general decline in vacancy rates and change in census date accounts for the large drop between January 2010 and November 2010.

- C20. At secondary level, Table C5 shows the number of full-time classroom teacher vacancies and temporary filled posts. At 1,725 in 2018, this was a small increase relative to 2017 and remained just below the peak of 1,731 in 2014. The vacancy rate as a proportion of teachers in post increased from 0.3% in 2011 to 1.0% in 2018. Above-average vacancy rates have been consistently observed for mathematics, information technology, all sciences, English and, since 2016, design & technology. In 2018, vacancy rates for geography fell below average for the first time since 2013.
- C21. Table C6 shows the proportion of hours taught by non-specialist teachers⁶⁷ in EBacc subjects. There has been a small increase in the percentage of hours taught by non-specialist teachers in most subjects; with the exceptions being maths and physics, which remained steady, and ICT and other modern languages, which saw a small fall. Although there are above average proportions of non-specialist hours for modern foreign language, this definition of 'specialist' does not take into account the native tongue of the teacher⁶⁸.
- C22. Table C7 shows the retention rates of teachers by the year of gaining qualified teacher status who were in service the following year and the percentage that were recorded in service in each year later. This includes teachers with a break in service.
- C23. Table C8 shows the leaver rates by post and region of qualified teachers who were in service in 2017 but not in service the following year. These figures include those who have retired or deceased.

⁶⁷ Specialist teachers are those with a degree in their relevant teaching subject in the week of the collection of the School Workforce Census.

⁶⁸ For example, a teacher who speaks French as a first language but who did not hold a post-A level qualification in French would not be counted as a specialist

Table C5: Full-time classroom teacher vacancies and temporary filled number⁶⁹ of posts⁷⁰ and rates in state-funded secondary schools and academies by subject⁷¹

	VACANCIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TEACHERS IN POST										NUMBER OF VACANCIES								
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
ALL VACANCIES	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	629	521	796	1215	1731	1490	1669	1693	1725	
MAIN TEACHING SUBJECT																			
Mathematics	0.7	0.5	0.7	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.2	124	102	143	220	292	279	283	299	287	
Information technology	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.6	39	32	33	63	88	77	72	61	53	
Computing	1.2	0.9	14	14	
All sciences	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.0	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.6	80	88	141	225	341	307	382	361	423	
Languages	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.6	27	37	54	37	81	70	76	102	71	
English	0.5	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	109	81	153	216	275	256	261	263	278	
Drama	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.2	0.4	10	3	2	16	16	15	22	7	16	
History	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	11	16	16	32	62	51	51	49	41	
Social sciences	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.7	1.4	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.6	19	14	26	32	58	41	46	42	24	
Geography	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	0.9	10	11	24	39	84	80	97	85	74	
Religious education	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.7	0.6	14	10	21	38	32	21	54	37	36	
Design and technology	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.1	0.9	2.1	1.2	1.2	38	20	37	64	106	82	86	101	106	
Commercial/business studies	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.6	18	3	12	22	46	29	30	38	62	
Art/craft/design	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	13	9	13	32	32	22	23	24	31	
Music	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.3	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.7	8	8	19	10	39	21	19	20	25	
Physical education/sport/dance	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	24	18	20	38	51	41	27	44	65	
Careers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Other main and combined subjects	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.3	1.5	0.8	52	45	47	85	86	68	93	101	72	
Unknown subjects	33	24	35	46	42	30	47	45	47	

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

⁶⁹ Advertised vacancies for full-time permanent appointments (or appointments of at least one term's duration). Includes vacancies being filled on a temporary basis of less than one year.

⁷⁰ Teachers in post include full-time qualified regular teachers in (or on secondment from) publicly funded secondary schools.

⁷¹ Totals may not appear to equal the sum of the component parts because of rounding.

Table C6: Number of 'specialist' teachers and percentage of hours taught by 'non-specialist' teachers in state-funded schools (England, November 2018)

EBacc subject	Number of 'specialist' teachers in subject	% of hours taught by 'non-specialist'	Number of additional 'specialist' teachers needed to teach the 'non-specialist' hours
Mathematics	27,200	12.9%	4,500
English	30,300	10.5%	4,000
Physics	4,200	24.8%	1,700
Chemistry	5,600	18.4%	1,400
Biology	7,800	6.9%	600
Combined / General science ⁷²	29,400	5.5%	1,800
History	12,600	9.1%	1,500
Geography	10,500	13.2%	2,100
French* ⁷³	9,100	17.3%	2,100
German*	2,600	19.8%	700
Spanish*	3,900	38.0%	2,900
Other modern languages*	1,000	42.2%	800
ICT	4,600	30.4%	2,700

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

⁷² Teachers qualified in biology, chemistry or physics are treated as qualified to teach both combined/general science and other sciences

⁷³ For the languages, there is no accounting for the native tongue of the teacher (e.g. a teacher who speaks French as a first language but who did not hold a post-A level qualification in French would not be counted as a specialist)

Table C7: Retention rates of teachers by year of gaining QTS (Source: Schools Workforce Census 2018)

Year qualified	Number of newly qualified entrants entering service	Percentage of teachers in regular service in the state-funded schools sector in England after:																					
		1 year	2 years	3 years	4 years	5 years	6 years	7 years	8 years	9 years	10 years	11 years	12 years	13 years	14 years	15 years	16 years	17 years	18 years	19 years	20 years	21 years	22 years
1996	18,092	91.0%	84.4%	78.6%	73.0%	70.6%	68.1%	66.6%	64.1%	62.5%	59.7%	58.4%	57.6%	55.9%	57.9%	57.0%	56.2%	55.1%	54.0%	52.1%	50.2%	48.0%	45.9%
1997	18,910	90.1%	83.4%	76.9%	73.7%	71.0%	68.8%	66.7%	64.7%	61.9%	60.5%	59.3%	57.8%	59.2%	58.4%	57.6%	56.5%	55.1%	53.2%	51.3%	49.4%	47.3%	
1998	17,771	89.4%	81.1%	76.9%	74.1%	72.0%	69.4%	67.5%	64.5%	63.0%	61.9%	60.3%	62.1%	60.9%	59.9%	58.5%	56.8%	55.0%	52.9%	50.7%	48.6%		
1999	18,268	88.4%	81.5%	77.2%	74.4%	71.2%	69.9%	66.7%	65.1%	63.8%	61.8%	63.5%	62.0%	60.9%	59.7%	58.2%	56.4%	54.5%	52.5%	50.6%			
2000	17,562	89.1%	82.8%	77.7%	74.3%	72.0%	68.8%	66.8%	65.8%	63.8%	65.1%	63.6%	62.8%	61.1%	59.5%	57.3%	55.5%	53.6%	51.9%				
2001	18,639	89.1%	82.5%	77.8%	74.8%	70.9%	68.5%	67.3%	65.6%	66.8%	65.3%	64.3%	62.4%	60.8%	58.8%	56.7%	54.8%	52.7%					
2002	20,683	89.0%	82.7%	78.5%	73.8%	71.7%	69.8%	67.8%	68.7%	67.0%	65.6%	64.1%	62.1%	60.1%	58.2%	55.8%	53.8%						
2003	23,008	89.6%	82.6%	76.9%	73.8%	71.6%	69.6%	70.3%	68.5%	66.6%	64.9%	62.8%	60.5%	58.3%	55.8%	53.6%							
2004	25,152	89.2%	81.0%	76.7%	73.7%	71.3%	72.0%	69.8%	67.9%	65.8%	63.9%	61.6%	59.3%	57.1%	54.8%								
2005	25,745	86.4%	80.5%	77.0%	73.8%	74.3%	71.8%	69.8%	67.7%	65.4%	62.8%	60.6%	58.1%	56.0%									
2006	24,000	87.1%	81.2%	77.2%	77.2%	74.0%	72.1%	69.5%	67.2%	64.7%	62.2%	60.0%	57.9%										
2007	24,397	88.0%	82.3%	80.6%	77.4%	74.6%	72.1%	69.6%	66.6%	64.1%	61.7%	59.2%											
2008	24,448	88.0%	84.4%	80.4%	77.8%	74.7%	72.3%	69.3%	66.7%	64.2%	62.0%												
2009	22,304	87.6%	83.2%	79.8%	76.7%	73.8%	70.8%	68.2%	65.3%	63.0%													
2010	24,060	86.5%	82.4%	78.0%	74.1%	71.0%	67.8%	65.2%	62.6%														
2011	22,034	88.1%	83.0%	78.1%	73.6%	70.1%	66.7%	64.4%															
2012	24,229	87.2%	81.5%	75.9%	71.8%	68.5%	66.0%																
2013	24,736	87.0%	79.9%	75.1%	71.0%	67.7%																	
2014	26,043	86.3%	79.3%	73.9%	69.9%																		
2015	26,832	86.0%	78.5%	73.4%																			
2016	25,615	85.1%	77.5%																				
2017	23,829	84.7%																					
2018	23,820																						

Table C8: Full time equivalent (FTE) leaver rates of teachers, by post and region⁷⁴

	East Midlands	East of England	North West	North East	Inner London	Outer London	South East	South West	West Midlands	Yorkshire and the Humber
Classroom Teacher	9.2%	9.8%	9.2%	8.7%	13.1%	11.8%	10.5%	9.8%	9.8%	10.2%
Assistant Head	6.0%	6.3%	5.9%	6.5%	8.1%	7.1%	6.1%	6.8%	6.6%	7.1%
Deputy Head	5.7%	6.5%	5.8%	5.9%	8.3%	7.6%	6.8%	6.7%	6.7%	6.9%
Head	9.9%	10.3%	7.9%	8.7%	8.5%	10.1%	9.5%	11.7%	9.4%	11.4%

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2017 – November 2018

⁷⁴ Leaver rates of teachers where the region was not known have been excluded.

Demand

- C24. Every year the department sets targets for recruitment to Initial Teacher Training (ITT) courses informed by the Teacher Supply Model (TSM)⁷⁵. The main purpose of the TSM is to determine the number of ITT places in England in order to match future teacher supply with future teacher demand as closely as possible. The future demand is determined using projected Pupil Teacher Ratios (PTRs) based on data from the School Workforce Census⁷⁶ and the Pupil Projections Model⁷⁷. It also takes into account other flows within the existing stock of teachers, such as those leaving the profession (wastage) and retiring, as well as those expected to return to teaching in the state-funded sector. Further information on recruitment to ITT is in Annex D: Recruitment to teacher training.
- C25. The 2019 update to the pupil projection model shows that the population in state-funded schools up to and including age 15 (at the start of the academic year, equivalent to the end of KS4) in 2018/19, the most recent actual data, was 7,698,000. This is projected to increase 2.7% to 7,908,000 by 2023/24 before starting to gradually decrease. The pupil population is projected to be 1.3% higher than in 2018/19, at 7,796,000, by 2027/28.
- C26. The numbers (in the same age range) in nursery and primary schools has reached 4,652,000 in 2018/19. The figures are projected to gradually drop going forward, dropping 3.8% to 4,473,000 by 2027/28.
- C27. The number in secondary school is still increasing, and reached 2,924,000 in 2018/19. This is an increase of 2.6% on 2017/18, lower than the 2018 projected increase of 3.2%. The projected peak in the secondary population is now forecast to be in 2023/24 (two years earlier) at 3,242,000. This is a 10.9% increase on 2018/19. After that year the figures are projected to very gradually drop to 3,190,000 in 2027/28.
- C28. When pupil numbers increase, it is expected that future teacher demand will increase. This is taken into account when calculating future teacher need as part of the TSM.
- C29. Whilst the department aims to estimate future teacher demand, decisions taken at school level will determine the actual number of teachers required. Increasing the proportion of ITT that is school-led gives schools greater scope to plan for local demand. Wider evidence of international experience shows that, even when

⁷⁵ The model is published [here](#)

⁷⁶ [The latest School Workforce Census can be found here.](#)

⁷⁷ [The latest Pupil Projections Model can be found here.](#)

supply and demand for teachers are in balance, many countries face shortages of specialist teachers and shortages in schools serving disadvantaged or isolated communities⁷⁸.

⁷⁸ OECD, [Preparing Teachers and Developing School Leaders for the 21st Century: Lessons from Around the World](#), (2012), Ch. 3. p58

Annex D: Recruitment to teacher training

- D1. Each year the government estimates the number of new trainee teachers that will be required in the next training year to ensure there are enough teachers in the state-funded school system (in England). The estimates extend over the following ten years, but it is the projection for the next year that is used in the Departments ITT recruitment publications.
- D2. Provisional recruitment data from DfE's ITT trainee census 2019/20, published in November 2019, show that we achieved 89% of the postgraduate target in all postgraduate secondary and primary programmes.
- D3. According to the estimate from the 2019/20 Teacher Supply Model, the number of postgraduate trainee teachers required to have started initial teacher training in September 2019, for both the primary and secondary phases, is 33,090.
- D4. Table D1 shows recruitment to primary phase against targets for the past four years. We exceeded the primary recruitment target in 2017/18 and 2018/19.

Table D1: Recruitment to postgraduate primary stage ITT 2016/17-2019/20

	Entrants	Target	Recruitment rate
2016/17	11,290	11,489	98%
2017/18	12,500	12,121	103%
2018/19	12,888	12,552	103%
2019/20 (provisional)⁷⁹	12,482	13,003	96%

Source: DfE, ITT Census 28 November 2019

- D5. Table D2 shows recruitment to secondary phase broken down for English Baccalaureate subjects.

⁷⁹ Provisional 2019/20 figures are based on published ITT Census data which includes those ITT trainees who started their course by the census date (9th October 2019) and 'forecast trainees' (those expected to start courses in the academic year after the point the statistics were collected). Final data for the 2019/20 academic year will be reported in the next ITT census publication, which is due to be published in November 2020

Table D2: Recruitment to postgraduate ITT courses for English Baccalaureate subjects – percentage of target

Subject	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
English	96%	88%	111%	110%
Mathematics	82%	77%	70%	64%
Physics ⁸⁰	79%	66%	47%	43%
Chemistry	96%	82%	80%	70%
Biology	113%	85%	153%	166%
Modern Foreign Languages ⁸¹	93%	91%	88%	62%
Geography	115%	78%	85%	119%
History	110%	100%	101%	127%
Computing	67%	62%	75%	79%

Source: DfE, ITT Census 28 November 2019

Table D3: Recruitment to postgraduate ITT courses broken down by gender 2019/20

Gender breakdown by phase	Provider led	School Direct (Fees)	School Direct (salaried)	Total
Males on primary ITT programmes	18%	17%	17%	17%
Females on primary ITT programmes	82%	83%	83%	83%
Males on secondary ITT programmes	40%	38%	38%	39%
Females on secondary ITT programmes	60%	62%	62%	61%

Source: DfE, ITT Census 28 November 2019

D6. Between November 2017 and November 2018, 44,610 (FTE) teachers started a job in English state schools. Of these, just over half (23,550 - 53%) are newly qualified teachers (NQTs), just over a third (16,430 - 37%) are returning to teaching, and just under one in ten (4,640 - 10%) qualified earlier but are working in the state sector for the first time⁸².

⁸⁰ Recruitment for physics includes courses designated as physics with mathematics.

⁸¹ Comprises modern foreign languages and classics.

⁸² Source: DfE, School Workforce Census 27 June 2019

- D7. We do not assume that all trainees will complete their training successfully and/or teach immediately in a state school, and that is built into our estimates of the numbers required.

ITT allocations 2019/20 academic year

- D8. The Department for Education (DfE) is responsible for regulating the volume of trainee teachers in England where training leads to the award of Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) and Early Years Teacher Status (EYTS). DfE aims to support recruitment across all initial teacher training (ITT) courses, with the objective of securing the right number of teachers to meet demand from schools in England against the Teacher Supply Model (TSM). We regulate recruitment to all subjects and routes by issuing permission to recruit to ITT courses to ITT providers and lead schools, while ensuring efficient use of public funds and minimising significant over-supply of teachers.
- D9. For the 2020 to 2021 recruitment cycle, we issued permission to recruit to ITT providers and lead schools, allowing them to list their courses as open for recruitment and to access any DfE funding associated with training courses. Recruitment to the majority of postgraduate ITT courses is unlimited, and ITT providers and schools have maximum flexibility to recruit to these courses. DfE has allocated places for postgraduate PE courses, undergraduate courses leading to QTS and early years courses leading to EYTS. ITT providers and lead schools must not recruit beyond the total number of places allocated for each course.
- D10. In formulating our approach, we considered recent recruitment patterns, the number of postgraduate trainee teachers required in each subject as estimated by the Teacher Supply Model (TSM), sector feedback, and the information supplied by ITT providers and lead schools during the July 2019 request period.

The quality of new recruits 2017/18

- D11. The provisional 2019/20 census data⁸³ show that the overall proportion of trainees with a 2:1 or higher is 73%. This is in line with the 73% seen in 2018/19. One in five postgraduate teacher trainees had a first-class degree in 2019/20 (20%) – up from 17% in 2014/15, and 10% in 2010/11.

⁸³ From 2015/16, the trainee number censuses include Teach First; these trainees were excluded on previous census publications.

Table D4: Proportion of first year postgraduate trainees with a 2:1 or higher classified degree, 2013/14-2019/20 (selected subjects only)

Subject	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20 (provisional)
English	84%	84%	84%	83%	84%	79%	80%
Mathematics	67%	64%	70%	65%	68%	65%	67%
Biology	74%	71%	75%	73%	75%	70%	73%
Chemistry	65%	63%	68%	66%	70%	68%	66%
Physics	65%	60%	63%	65%	66%	67%	66%
Modern Foreign Languages	80%	73%	78%	76%	74%	74%	72%
Geography	76%	76%	79%	76%	72%	74%	74%
History	88%	88%	88%	87%	85%	86%	81%
Total Secondary	75%	73%	76%	74%	75%	74%	74%
Primary	73%	74%	74%	74%	72%	71%	72%
Total	74%	73%	75%	74%	74%	73%	73%

Source: DfE, ITT Census 28 November 2019

ITT financial incentives

- D12. For 2020/21 we are offering a £26,000 tax-free bursary for all trainees with a 2:2 or higher in the highest priority subjects; physics, mathematics, languages, chemistry, biology, computing and classics.
- D13. Physics, mathematics, languages and chemistry trainees starting ITT in 2020/21 will receive three early career payments of £2,000 each (or £3,000 each if teaching in local authority areas we have identified as having high need for teachers, as determined by our published data) in their second, third and fourth years of teaching.
- D14. We are offering an increased £15,000 tax-free bursary for design and technology trainees with a 2:2 or higher. We have also introduced a new £9,000 tax-free bursary for art trainees and business studies trainees with a 2:2 or higher.
- D15. Bursaries for undergraduate teacher training courses, including the Troops to Teachers bursary, are unchanged for 2020/21. Tables D5, D6 and D7 show the bursaries available to trainees in 2020/21.

- D16. For 2020/21 we are continuing to offer grant funding to schools as a contribution to the salary and training costs of trainees on salaried ITT routes. School Direct (salaried) grant funding is unchanged for 2020/21. Tables D8 and D9 show the grant funding on offer to schools for these routes in 2020/21.
- D17. We are also continuing to pilot Teachers' Student Loan Reimbursement in biology, chemistry, computer science, languages and physics for those starting ITT in 2020/21. Individuals who train in one of these subjects and go on to teach in one of 25 local authorities will receive reimbursement of the student loan repayments they make for up to 11 financial years.

Table D5: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2020/21 – Postgraduate Bursaries and Scholarships

Subjects	Scholarship	Bursary (trainees with a 2:2 or higher)
Chemistry, Languages, Mathematics, Physics (ITT bursary as shown and followed by three early-career payments of £2k each ⁸⁴).	£28,000	£26,000
Computing		£26,000
Biology, Classics	-	£26,000
Geography	£17,000	£15,000
D&T	-	£15,000
English	-	£12,000
Art and Design, Business Studies, History, Music, RE	-	£9,000
Primary Maths	-	£6,000
Drama, Other, PE, Primary	-	£0

⁸⁴ Eligible teachers will receive three early-career payments of £2,000 each (or £3,000 each if teaching in local authority areas we have identified as having high need for teachers, as determined by our published data.) in their second, third and fourth year of teaching, if they have taught in a state-funded school in England since completing their teacher training course.

Table D6: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2020/21 – Undergraduate Bursaries

Subjects	Bursary⁸⁵
Maths	£9,000
Physics	£9,000
Languages	£9,000
Computing	£9,000

Table D7: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2020/21– Troops to Teachers bursaries

Subjects	Bursary⁸⁶
Biology	£40,000
Physics	£40,000
Chemistry	£40,000
Computing	£40,000
Mathematics	£40,000
Languages	£40,000

Table D8: School Direct (salaried) grant funding for 2020/21

Subjects	National	Inner London	Outer London	London Fringe
Chemistry, Classics, Computing, Languages, Maths, Physics	£19,000	£23,900	£22,600	£20,200
Primary Maths, Biology, Design and Technology, English, Geography, History, Music, RE	£14,000	£17,600	£16,600	£14,900
Primary (non specialist)	£9,000	£11,400	£10,800	£9,600
Art, Business Studies, Drama, Other, PE	No grant			

⁸⁵ Trainees who are on a 4-year undergraduate course that leads to both the award of QTS and a Master's degree receive a £9,000 bursary in both the third and fourth years of their course.

⁸⁶ The £40,000 bursary is paid over the final two years of the course, with £20,000 payable in each year.

Table D9: Postgraduate Teaching Apprenticeship grant funding for 2020/21

Subjects	National	Inner London	Outer London	Fringe
Chemistry, Classics, Computing, Languages, Maths, Physics	£14,500	£19,400	£18,100	£15,700
Primary Maths, Biology, Design and Technology, English, Geography, History, Music, RE	£9,500	£13,100	£12,100	£10,400
Primary (non specialist)	£4,500	£6,900	£6,300	£5,100
Art, Business Studies, Drama, Other, PE	No grant	No grant	No grant	No grant

- D18. We are continuing to offer prestigious scholarship schemes in six subjects for 2020/21; physics, maths, languages, chemistry, computing, and geography. Successful scholars will receive £28,000 tax-free in all subjects except geography, where scholars will receive £17,000 tax-free. Chemistry, languages, mathematics and physics scholars will be eligible for the same additional early-career payments as those trainees who received a bursary.
- D19. Scholarships are designed to recognise the very best applicants who have excellent subject knowledge and outstanding potential to teach. The organisations who award the scholarships set the bar high in their assessment and selection of ITT scholars. Table D10 provides details of performance in 2018/19, for trainees starting their initial teacher training in 2019/20.

Table D10: Provisional scholarship performance in 2018/19

Subjects	Scholarships performance in 2018/19		
	Number of scholarships available	Applications	Awarded
Chemistry	130	202	116
Computing	100	236	68
Maths	270	316	203
Physics	150	309	116
Languages	150	477	150
Geography	125	359	136
Total	925	1899	789

School-based ITT

D20. Table D11 shows the proportion of postgraduate trainees in 2019/20 who came through the routes recorded in the ITT Census.

Table D11: Proportion of trainees training through each ITT route 2019/20

	2019/20 Census (provisional)	
HEI	13,123	45%
SCITT	3,963	13%
School Direct (fee-funded)	8,058	27%
School Direct (salaried)	2,421	8%
PGTA	155	1%
Teach First	1,646	6%
Total	29,366⁸⁷	100%

Source: DfE ITT Census 28 November 2019

Teaching schools and school-based ITT

- D21. As of 1 September 2019, there are 754 teaching schools across 618 alliances. Teaching schools lead the school system in training and developing outstanding teachers. Their remit includes both the development of existing teachers through professional development opportunities, such as peer-to-peer training and coaching and mentoring, as well as training new teachers.
- D22. Teaching schools co-ordinate ITT in schools across their alliance in their role as system leaders, to improve the range and quality of trainees' experience.

School Direct

- D23. School Direct was launched as a pilot with the School Direct Training Programme (tuition fee places) in February 2012. The School Direct (salaried) route was introduced in 2013/14, offering employment-based places to career changers. Demand for School Direct places continues to increase. There were

⁸⁷ The total number of trainees including forecasted in-year starts is 29,580 trainees.

841 lead schools in 2015/16, 808 lead schools in 2016/17, rising to 848 in 2017/18, 851 in 2018/19 and 878 for 2019/20.

- D24. In 2018/19, 10,270 trainee teachers commenced training through School Direct. Published data shows that DfE provisionally estimate that of 2017/18 trainees awarded QTS, 83% on a School Direct (fee) course and 94% on a salaried course will be employed in state-funded schools in England within sixteen months of qualification. DfE have recently changed the way they calculate employment, so data is not comparable to previous years.

Teach First

- D25. We will also continue to support the Teach First programme. The programme is helping to recruit more teachers across England and place them in some of the most challenging schools, including in Opportunity Areas. Since its founding Teach First has trained over 12,000 teachers, with 1,208 starting in England in 2019/20.

Annex E: Headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions

- E1. The leadership group in the STPCD covers headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions. There is a single leadership pay range which includes eight headteacher groups (HTGs) for each of the four regional pay bands. The minimum on the Rest of England pay range is worth £41,065, and the highest on the Inner London pay range is worth £121,749.
- E2. The relevant body determines how the pay of leaders at its school relates to the leadership pay range by assigning the school to one of the eight HTGs, based on the number and age of the school's pupils, and then adopting the three-stage process recommended in the STRB's 23rd Report.

Salaries of headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions

- E3. In November 2018 the average (median) gross pay of regular headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions in publicly funded schools in England was £55,600. This was an increase of 1.0%⁸⁸ compared to November 2017 (£55,000).
- E4. Leaders in maintained secondary schools get paid significantly more than their counterparts in maintained primary schools. The average salary of leadership teachers in primary schools varied between £51,200 (average for academies in the Rest of England) and £61,300 (average for LA maintained schools in Inner London), compared to £57,900 (average for secondary academies and LA maintained schools in the Rest of England) and £69,800 (average for secondary LA maintained schools in Inner London).

⁸⁸ Calculated using unrounded figures.

Figure E1: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in primary schools^{89 90}



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

E5. Primary LA maintained salaries for the leadership group are higher than those in academies in all regions.

Figure E2: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in secondary schools^{91 92}



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

⁸⁹ Excludes special schools, free schools, CTCs, UTCs, studio schools, centrally employed staff, advisory teachers and teachers with unreliable pay information.

⁹⁰ This is based on School Workforce Census data. This data may not include some executive leaders e.g. executive heads and CEOs of academy trusts

⁹¹ Excludes special schools, free schools, CTCs, UTCs, studio schools, centrally employed staff, advisory teachers and teachers with unreliable pay information.

⁹² This is based on School Workforce Census data. This data may not include some executive leaders e.g. executive heads and CEOs of academy trusts.

E6. In Inner and Outer London, average salaries for the leadership group in LA maintained secondary schools are higher than those in academies. In the Rest of England, average leadership salaries are the same in LA maintained and academy schools. And in London Fringe, average leadership salaries are higher in academies than LA maintained schools.

Age

E7. Average salaries of leadership teachers increase with age. Table E1 and Figure E3 show that in all pay bands older headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions are paid more on average than younger teachers in leadership positions.

Table E1: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in state-funded schools, by age

	Under 30	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and over	Total
Inner London	£55,100	£60,000	£66,800	£70,300	£74,600	£64,000
Outer London	£50,000	£56,100	£62,100	£66,000	£71,800	£60,700
London Fringe	£45,400	£52,300	£58,700	£61,200	£66,200	£56,400
Rest of England	£44,500	£49,900	£55,600	£59,300	£62,300	£54,300
England	£46,400	£51,700	£56,900	£60,800	£64,700	£55,900

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018




Figure E3: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in state-funded schools, by age

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2018

Headship vacancies

- E8. The School Workforce Census shows a very low and fairly stable picture of overall headship vacancies at around 0.2%. The rate is calculated from the number of full-time permanent headship vacancies that were available on the census day each November, as a proportion of full-time heads in post. Vacancies recorded are those that have been advertised and remain unfilled. Vacancies must be available for a minimum of one term. They include those filled on a temporary basis for a period of less than one term.
- E9. Between 2011 and 2018 the proportion of schools reporting a headteacher vacancy or the headteacher post being temporarily filled decreased, from 1.2% to 1.0%, according to School Workforce Census data. Schools counted are those that reported vacancies that had been advertised and remain unfilled. These include posts filled on a contract of less than one term. Also included are schools where the headship post was filled on the census day where the post holder had a contract of less than one year irrespective of whether the post had been advertised or not.



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