

**DOWNSTREAM
GAS & ELECTRICITY
NATIONAL EMERGENCY PLAN**

(Incident Response Plan)

AUGUST 2006



Contents


1.	Purpose.....	Page 3
2.	Scope.....	Page 4
3.	Activation.....	Page 5
4.	Operation.....	Page 7
5.	Testing.....	Page 11
6.	Review.....	Page 12
7.	Glossary.....	Page 13
Annex 1	Contact Information	
Annex 2	Relevant Legislation	
Annex 3	Supporting Documentation	
Annex 4	Standard Situation Report (SITREP)	
Annex 5	Standard JRT Meeting Agenda	

Version Control		
Version 1.0	Revised structure and contents.	June 2006
Version 2.0	Including E3C comments.	July 2006
Version 3.0	Including final comments.	August 2006

1. Purpose

The Downstream Gas & Electricity National Emergency Plan (NEP) describes the arrangements for managing a gas and/or electricity supply emergency through the establishment of a Joint Response Team (JRT). The Joint Response Team has representation from industry, government and other agencies and is led by the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI). The aim of the JRT is to provide an essential link between industry and government in a potential or actual emergency. The NEP does not replace individual company emergency plans and procedures.

The Joint Response Team forms part of the overall emergency framework for responding to a major gas and/or electricity incident, as shown in Figure 1 below.



This document describes the role and responsibilities of the JRT, the triggers for activation and the arrangements for the operation of the team. The NEP is approved by the Energy Emergencies Executive (E3) as the emergency planning body for the gas and electricity industries and any amendments should be approved by that organisation.

E3 comprises DTI, Ofgem, National Grid and representation from other industry players. It is chaired by DTI and reports to the Energy Minister.

2. Scope

The scope of the JRT is shown below.

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To implement the NEP in the event of a potential or actual gas and/or electricity supply emergency.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To coordinate the industry response to a gas and/or electricity supply emergency.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To provide guidance to the Network Emergency Coordinator (NEC) with regard to the wider aspects of a gas supply emergency.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To undertake the role of the JRT in the implementation of the Electricity Supply Emergency Code (ESEC) and the Fuel Security Code (FSC).
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To provide advise and guidance to Other Government Departments (OGDs) and agencies on the consequences of the emergency.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To recommend the use of emergency powers, where appropriate.
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To develop and implement a media response plan in conjunction with the government News Coordination Centre (NCC).

3. Activation

The following table describes the triggers for the activation of the JRT. This list is for guidance and other situations may develop where it appropriate to establish the team. The JRT will be activated by the DTI Incident Controller with the advice and guidance of industry and/or OGDs.

Industry	
Loss of electricity supply to key locations and/or widespread areas for prolonged periods.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total loss of electricity supply (Black Start). 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirement to invoke ESEC. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirement to invoke FSC. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of gas supply to key locations and/or more than 50000 consumers. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NEC declares a potential or actual Network Gas Supply Emergency (NGSE), including GS(M)R storage monitor breach. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requirement to invoke Energy Act 1976 emergency powers. 	

Government	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notification of potential or actual upstream gas supply emergency. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notification of technical failure likely to have an impact on gas and/or electricity supplies. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notification of commercial failure of significant industry player likely to have an impact on gas and/or electricity supplies. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notification of potential or actual industrial action likely to have an impact on gas and/or electricity supplies. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Notification of potential or actual terrorist threat to gas and/or electricity Critical National Infrastructure (CNI). 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Escalating medical emergency, such as flu pandemic, likely to impact on gas and/or electricity industry workforce. 	

Other	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where, regardless of the scale of the incident, there are likely to be major consequences resulting from the supply emergency. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forecast or actual severe weather conditions or other environmental factors. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intense media interest resulting from a potential or actual incident. 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requested by Civil Contingencies Secretariat. 	

In the event of an industry led incident, as above, the relevant responsible person would contact the DTI Duty Officer via the Response Centre. The Duty Officer in conjunction with the DTI Incident Controller would decide if it was necessary to convene a JRT.

The Incident Controller would determine the required core team membership of the JRT as well as the location and advise the team members accordingly. Other potential team members (see section 4 below) will be notified of the activation of the JRT.

4. Operation

• Team Membership


The membership of the JRT is flexible and will depend on the nature of the incident. The membership of the team will be determined by the Incident Controller but will always include DTI, National Grid and Ofgem. Depending on the nature of the emergency it may be appropriate to consider including representation from other organisations, as shown in the following table.

	DTI	National Grid	Ofgem	Gas Network Operators	DNOs	Generators	British Gas Service	UKOOA	HSE	Communication (Press Office)	Civil Contingencies Secretariat	Other Government Departments	Other Agencies
Gas Emergency (no isolation)	Y	Y	Y	O	O			O	O	O	O	O	O
Gas Emergency (isolation)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	O	Y	O	O	O	O
Electricity Emergency	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y				O	O	O	O
Electricity & Gas Emergency (no isolation)	Y	Y	Y	O	O			O	O	O	O	O	O
Electricity & Gas Emergency (isolation)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	O	O	O	O
Black Start	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	O	Y	O	O	Y	Y	O
Developing Emergency (e.g. GS(M)R monitor)	Y	Y	Y	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O		
Y – Required O – Optional													

Contact details for the above organisations are included in Annex 1

- **Team Structure**

The structure of the JRT is shown in Figure 2 below.



Incident Controller

To manage the incident, coordinate the tactical incident teams, support COBR/CCC and brief Ministers/Senior Management.
<<DTI Senior Official>>

Support Manager

To provide guidance on application of emergency procedures, manage resources/facilities and support the Incident Controller.
<<DTI Official>>

Information Manager

To manage information flows, analyse data and evaluate options. Depending on the level of severity/complexity of the incident there maybe more than one Information Manager required.
<<DTI Official>>

Log Keeper

To maintain record of all key information, decisions and actions.
<<DTI Official>>

National Grid

To provide information on the incident and provide guidance on actions or powers required to manage the emergency.
<<National Grid Manager>>

Ofgem

To provide information and guidance on the operation of the gas and/or electricity markets during an emergency.

<<Ofgem Official>>

Note: In the event of a loss of gas supply to greater than 50,000 consumers within a single network then that network would also be represented at the JRT.


- **Location**

The JRT will normally be based in London. The Incident Controller will confirm the specific location.

If it is not practicable for all members of the JRT to convene at the specified location then the meeting can be conducted by teleconference or videoconference. The Incident Controller will confirm the communications arrangements for the meeting. Where possible all members should endeavour to meet at the specified location.

- **Process**

The JRT process is shown in Figure 3 below.



Assessment

The JRT is likely to require the following information in order make an effective assessment of the emergency.

Information	Providers
• Cause of the emergency	Industry
• Scale and duration of the emergency	Industry
• Timescale for restoration	Industry
• Government powers required	Industry/DTI
• Actions already taken	Industry/DTI
• Customer issues (including priority users)	Industry
• Market issues	Ofgem
• Gas/electricity supply/demand balance	National Grid
• Actions to increase gas/electricity supply	National Grid/Industry
• Actions to decrease gas/electricity demand	National Grid/Industry
• Societal impacts (health/transport/essential services)	OGDs
• Security issues	Security Services
• Media interest	Industry/DTI
• Media lines-to-take	Industry/DTI

All information should be provided in the Situation Report (SITREP) format shown in Annex 4. This will enable the information from all providers to be readily assimilated for communication.

Action Plan

The aim of the JRT is to develop a strategy and action plan that will result in appropriate and cohesive actions to manage the incident.

Specifically, the JRT will:

- Identify gas and electricity supply priorities arising from the incident.
- Identify the consequences of the emergency for OGDs.
- Develop and make recommendations to government on strategic options.
- Request emergency powers to manage the incident, as appropriate.
- Inform the NEC regarding the wider aspects of a gas supply emergency

In developing strategic options to address a gas and/or electricity supply emergency the JRT will take account of:

- Public safety
- Protection of property and key infrastructure
- Maintenance of national economic performance

Communications

The focus for media and public information handling on a company specific incident, which has not resulted in activation of the JRT but may lead to the activation of the JRT, will be with the company concerned. The company should keep the DTI and all other relevant organisations informed on a timely basis of all Press Releases and other public statements it makes concerning the incident.

If the JRT is established with the DTI assuming overall responsibility for the management of the incident then the communications strategy will be led by the DTI Press Office with support from industry. If COBR/CCC is established then the communication strategy and media response will be led by the News Coordination Centre (NCC) again with support from industry. The NCC will coordinate the use of public appeals to minimise or cease the usage of gas and/or electricity.

Stand-Down

The JRT can only be stood down by Incident Controller. This would normally take place when the emergency is over or when the JRT can take no further action to provide support to government or industry

DTI will hold the immediate contact details of the JRT members should the situation deteriorate and it is necessary to reactivate the JRT at short notice.

5. Testing

In accordance with the DTI Emergency Preparedness Policy the NEP will be subject to annual exercise. The effectiveness of the NEP and the JRT will be tested against a credible emergency scenario. Where appropriate this exercise can be carried out in conjunction with other exercises being carried out by industry, government and/or the NEC.

The scope of the exercise will be agreed with the Energy Emergencies Executive and an Exercise Director appointed. The Exercise Director will provide a full report to the Energy Emergencies Executive and the DTI including an action plan detailing improvements to existing arrangements and timescales for delivery.

6. Review

When the incident is over the Incident Controller will ensure that all records, information and logs are collected and securely stored. This Incident Controller will also arrange for a review of the incident to be held to determine the following issues.

- The nature of the emergency including cause, course and consequences.
- The effectiveness of the emergency response and the NEP.
- Quality and effectiveness of internal and external communications.
- Actual outcome against desired/anticipated outcome.
- Action plan to address identified deficiencies in the NEP.

The Incident Controller will provide, normally within one month of the incident, a report to the Energy Emergencies Executive and the DTI.

In addition, annually the Energy Emergencies Executive will undertake a full review of the NEP to incorporate identified best practice in emergency planning, learning from emergency exercises and changes to the process resulting from changes in the structure of the industry.

Glossary

CCC	Civil Contingencies Committee
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
CORGI	Council for Registered Gas Installers
CRIP	Common Recognised Information Picture
DNO	Distribution Network Operator (electricity)
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
E3C	Energy Emergencies Executive (committee)
ESEC	Electricity Supply Emergency Code
FSC	Fuel Security Code
GIUR	Gas Installation & Usage Regulations
GS(M)R 1996	Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996
HSE	Health and Safety Executive
JRT	Joint Response Team
LGD	Lead Government Department
MCM	Standard Millions of Cubic Meters
MCMD	Standard Millions of Cubic Meters per Day
MW	Mega Watts
MWh	Mega Watt Hours
NCC	News Coordination Centre
NEC	Network Emergency Coordinator
NEP	National Emergency Plan
Ofgem	Office of Gas & Electricity Markets
OGD	Other Government Department
POC	Point of Contact
SITREP	Situation Report
UKOOA	UK Offshore Operator's Association

Guidance for JRT Members on Communication and Management when Primary Communications are Disrupted

There will be times when the public communication infrastructure, particularly that supporting mobile telephones, is unable to fulfil its normal functions. This might be caused by loss of electricity supplies to the communications infrastructure, by call volume overload, some other technical failing or by a combination of all three. A failure of one system, such as the mobile networks, is likely to cause overload and congestion on other systems.

This guidance to JRT members has been written specifically to cover any emergency that might affect the energy industries where normal communications become unworkable.

The energy industries expect to rely on resilient landline communications as the main strategic communication route for the JRT to discharge its actions and to communicate with industry and OGDs. To this end a number of key energy company and government locations have resilient landline communications, these are detailed in the above list of secondary contacts. JRT members will make use of these communications routes should they not be able to utilise the primary communications routes.

Annex 2

Relevant Legislation & Powers

The following table shows the legislation and powers available to assist with the managements of a gas and/or electricity supply emergency.

- 1 Energy Act 1976
- 2 Petroleum Act 1998
- 3 GEIEC Communications Plan

ELECTRICITY

- 4 Electricity Act 1989
- 5 Electricity Supply Emergency Code
- 6 Fuel Security Code
- 7 Grid Code
- 8 Distribution Code
- 9 Balancing and Settlement Code

GAS

- 10 Gas Safety (Management) Regulations 1996
- 11 Network Emergency Coordinator Safety Case
- 12 Gas Safety (Installation & Use) Regulations
- 13 Unified Network Code (UNC)
- 14 E/1 Network Gas Supply Emergency Procedure
- 15 E/2 Local Gas Supply Emergency Procedure
- 16 Gas Transporter Safety Case(s)
- 17 E3C Resource Plan
- 18 DTI Upstream Crisis Management Briefing Pack

Annex 3

Supporting Documentation

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• DTI Emergency Preparedness Policy
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• DTI Emergency Operation Procedure
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• CCS Concept of Operations
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• NEC Safety Case
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• E/1 Network Gas Supply Emergency Procedure
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• E/2 Local Gas Supply Emergency Procedure
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• E3C Resource Plan

Annex 4

Standard Situation Report (SITREP)

Incident Controller: _____ Signature: _____

Information Manager: _____

Date & Time of Release:

Serial		
	Incident Report	What has happened?
		Where?
		When?
		How/Why?
	Current Situation	What is happening now?
		Which agencies are involved?
		Who is the lead/key POCs
	Risk and Impact Assessment	Key risks
		Worst case scenario
		Current impacts
		Future impacts

	Future Actions	Key timelines
		Options open
		Key decision points
		Contingency requirements
	Resource Implications	Industry Resource Issues
		DTI Resource Issues
		OGD Issues
	Media Lines	Industry actions
		DTI actions
		Forthcoming media actions
		Ministerial briefs
	Recommendations	Decisions Now
		Decisions in next 24 hrs
		Decisions in next 7 days

Annex 5

Standard JRT Meeting Agenda

Meeting: Date

 Time

Attendees

- Teleconference protocol to be used
- Update on Actions from Previous Meeting
- Documents Received/Sent since Previous Meeting
- Update Situation Report
 - Cause of Incident
 - Current Position (e.g. supply/demand balance)
 - Consequences
 - Worst Case Scenario
 - Media Response
- Interactions with OGDs/Industry
- Actions Required & Timings
- Time, Venue & Arrangements for Next Meeting