National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015

Third Annual Report

July 2019
Foreword by the Prime Minister, The Rt. Hon Theresa May MP.

Over the last year, the challenges our nation faces have continued to evolve. They have become more complex, driven by technology and increasing competition between states. They have required greater collaboration to form an effective deterrent. The UK has responded to these challenges, building on the commitments we made in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 and the National Security Capability Review 2018.

We have begun to realise the benefits of the new Fusion approach in dealing with national security threats. We are able to harness the full impact of our national capabilities, increasing our ability to respond at speed, improving coordination of our activity, both across Government and with partners. And it has focused our resources where they can have the greatest impact.

The United Kingdom’s response to the Russian use of a chemical nerve agent in Salisbury in March 2018 was an example of this successful approach. It resulted in a rapid, robust cross-Government response, involving over twenty departments and agencies, supported internationally by partners and allies and our world-leading diplomatic network. It demonstrated that there is a significant cost to those who choose to break international norms and threaten our citizens. The decontamination process has been one of the most complex in our history, and the hard work and determination of our emergency services, armed forces and the people of Salisbury and Amesbury has been recognised around the world. Our international leadership continues, with new sanctions regimes adopted against the use of chemical weapons, and the strengthening of the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Just a month on, our country stood alongside our French and American allies in striking a blow against the Syrian regime’s heinous use of chemical weapons against its own people. We sent a clear message to those, wherever they may be, that this behaviour would not be accepted. And we remain committed to responding to the use of chemical weapons.

I am confident in our ability to face these challenges and emerging threats and our resolve to do so has only strengthened. Our ability is amplified through the UK’s strategic alliances and partnerships. The resurgence of state based threats does not just threaten nation states but the rules-based international system upon which the shared security and prosperity of every nation depends. We must stand together to deter those who wish to undermine that system. But our partnerships are not sustained just through ‘solidarity’. They need a unity of values, trust, and a common belief in the rule of law. We have therefore made an unconditional commitment to the defence and security of our continent against shared challenges; from tackling illegal migration to preventing terrorist attacks on our citizens to deterring conventional and non-conventional threats to European security.

Serious and organised crime affects more UK citizens and is more prevalent than any other national security threat, eroding both our economy and communities. In 2018 we therefore launched a comprehensive strategy with a significant focus on those that cause the most harm, and those corrupt elites and criminals who seek to launder their money in and through the UK. And these efforts were recognised last year by the Financial Action Task Force, the global standard-setter for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, who stated that the UK has the strongest regime of over 60 countries in the current round of assessments.

Disruptions like the fourth industrial revolution, migration and climate change continue to complicate traditional threats. Climate change is rightly treated as a national security priority: we are already investing £5.8bn in international climate finance to encourage ambitious action from all sectors around the world, and
we have recently committed to achieving net zero emissions by 2050. And, as a global leader for climate change we have bid to host COP26, in partnership with Italy.

The UK remains an outward-facing nation: one that does not shy away from defending democratic and humanitarian principles across the globe, whilst ensuring British values are safeguarded at home. We remain the only country in the G20 to meet both the expenditure targets of at least 2% of GDP on defence and 0.7% of GNI on overseas development, driving forward the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. I am immensely proud that the UK will be hosting NATO leaders later this year to mark the 70th anniversary of the organisation.

This third Annual Report updates on the key commitments of both the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 and the National Security Capability Review 2018. It highlights the hard work and professionalism of our dedicated armed forces personnel, police, intelligence officers, diplomats and civil servants as we protect our people, project our influence and promote our prosperity.

These are individuals who work tirelessly to keep us all safe: I continue to pay tribute to their sacrifice, and give thanks for their service to our country.
Section 1: Change and Continuity in the National Security Context

1.1 On 23 November 2015 we published the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (SDSR 2015), which set out the United Kingdom’s National Security Strategy for the next five years, and how we intended to implement it. The National Security Council (NSC) commissioned a focused National Security Capability Review (NSCR) in support of ongoing implementation of SDSR 2015.

1.2 The NSCR introduced Fusion, our new national security approach. The NSCR updates the SDSR’s assessment of the challenges likely to drive UK security priorities over the next decade, sets out our Global Britain vision and values, and the actions we are taking as a result of the review. It also included the second annual report on progress against the commitments made in SDSR 2015.

1.3 This third annual report on the implementation of our strategy demonstrates the progress that we have made in delivering our key commitments in both the SDSR 2015 and NSCR, and explains how we have responded to major developments with national security implications over the previous year.

Vision, values and approach

1.4 SDSR 2015 set out our vision of a secure and prosperous United Kingdom with global reach and influence, which the NSCR reconfirmed. Our three overarching National Security Objectives: Protect Our People; Project Our Global Influence; and Promote Our Prosperity remain the core foundation of our work. In support of each of these objectives, we committed to specific actions and changes, on which cross-government work, overseen by a sub-Committee of the National Security Council (NSC), has continued and evolved.

1.5 Our Fusion approach to national security ensures that all of Government’s capabilities and policy levers are used to tackle complex national security questions. Fusion is a fundamentally new approach designed to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and accountability of government in support of national strategic objectives. It ensures that in defending our national security we make better use of all of our capabilities: from economic levers, through cutting-edge military resources to our wider diplomatic and cultural influence on the world stage. Fusion is underpinned by partnerships: within Government and with other parts of the public sector, but also with the private sector and academia. Fusion is about Government working more effectively in concert with the full range of potential partners to deliver against national priorities.

Reporting on SDSR and NSCR commitments

1.6 As in SDSR 2015 and the first Annual Report in 2016, we have structured this annual report with sections setting out our progress on each of the three overarching National Security Objectives, and on implementation and reform. In the annex, we have listed the 89 principal SDSR commitments and 27 principal NSCR commitments, indicating which have been completed.

1.7 The commitments in SDSR 2015 and NSCR 2018 set out the key policy and capability developments required as a consequence of our National Security Strategy. The commitments vary in scale and in the time needed for them to be implemented. Some, such as establishing the Armed Forces’ Joint Force 2025, will take a decade, while others, such as the Parliamentary vote on the nuclear deterrent, have already been delivered.
Change and continuity in the national security context

1.8 In SDSR 2015, we set out our response to the 2015 National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA), which concluded that the threats faced by the UK, including our Overseas Territories and our overseas interests, had increased in scale, diversity and complexity since 2010. Unfortunately, this analysis around the threats that we face has not changed. The world continues to evolve with long-term shifts in the balance of global economic and military power. SDSR 2015 and the NSCR 2018 ensured that we have the capabilities to respond to risks and threats to our security, including unexpected developments. Drawing from the 2015 NSRA, SDSR 2015 identified four main challenges and the NSCR added a further two:

- the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability;
- the resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition;
- the attack on the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats;
- the impact of technology, especially cyber threats and wider technological developments;
- the ongoing growth in serious and organised crime and its impact and;
- diseases and natural hazards affecting the UK.

1.9 The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability. Whether inspired by Islamist extremism, the far right, or the situation in Northern Ireland, the overarching goal of individual terrorists and the groups that support them is the same – to inflict harm, to inspire fear and, in so doing, look to undermine the very fabric of our society. Because the threat we face continues to be large and multi-faceted, the updated UK Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) has a much greater focus on systemic co-ordination across the public sector, in line with the Fusion approach.

1.10 The resurgence of state-based threats and intensifying wider state competition and the attack on the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats. The rules based international system is a network of agreements and institutions that requires our support if it is to continue to protect us and make us more prosperous. Attacks on the system come from both those who want to change the system and those who wish to undermine it. In recent years many countries have fallen victim to Russian state aggression, destabilisation or interference.

1.11 In March 2018, an attempted assassination was carried out against Sergei and Yulia Skripal using a nerve agent. Wiltshire police officer Nick Bailey, one of the first responders, also suffered contamination; in July Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley were subsequently poisoned by the same chemical, left behind by the original attackers, resulting in Dawn’s death. In September 2018, UK Counter Terrorism Policing and the Crown Prosecution Service announced criminal charges against two Russian nationals for the attack in Salisbury. We confirmed that the two individuals are serving officers in Russia’s military intelligence service, also known as the GRU. In response to what was the first use of chemical weapons attack on UK soil, the UK expelled 23 Russian undeclared intelligence officers. Our allies and partners joined the UK to condemn the act and Russia’s breach of the taboo on using chemical weapons: 27 countries and NATO Headquarters expelled a further 130 Russian intelligence officers, imposing reputational cost and practical damage to Russia’s global intelligence capability.

1.12 In the aftermath of the Salisbury attacks, the UK was at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to enable the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to attribute responsibility for chemical weapons attacks in Syria, and potentially more widely at the request of an affected state. The UK worked with EU partners to develop and introduce a new sanctions regime against the use of chemical weapons; in
January 2019, under this new regime, the EU imposed sanctions on four members of the GRU responsible for the Salisbury attack. In April 2018, the authorities in the Netherlands, working closely with their UK counterparts, disrupted a GRU attack on the OPCW headquarters in The Hague. In October, the Netherlands and UK publicised this operational success, the United States announced indictments and sanctions against the Russian officers responsible, and over 20 countries joined a public attribution of a series of other GRU cyber attacks.

1.13 The UK’s response to the Salisbury attack and cooperation with our allies is an example of what can be achieved when we take a whole of government approach in line with Fusion, combining our economic, security and influence capabilities across government to protect and advance our interests. For example, to achieve the attribution of the GRU cyber-attack against the OPCW, the UK acted on collated intelligence and assessment, working with several international partners, to identify the threat and apportion responsibility to Russia.

1.14 We seek to support and strengthen the rules based international system as the best way to pursue shared global prosperity and security underpinned by support for human rights. We are the only country that spends both at least 2% of our Gross Domestic Product on defence and 0.7% of Gross National Income on development.

1.15 The impact of technology, especially cyber threats and wider technological developments. Malicious cyber activity continues relentlessly and as we become more reliant on technology, the threat will grow in terms of intensity, complexity and severity. Capable states continue to target both the UK public and private sectors.

1.16 The ongoing growth in serious and organised crime and its impact. Serious and organised crime remains a significant national security threat faced by the UK, and persistently erodes our economy and our communities. Serious and organised criminals operating in the UK exploit and ruthlessly target the most vulnerable, ruining lives and blighting communities. Their activities cost us at least £37bn each year. We published a new Serious and Organised Crime Strategy in November 2018 which sets out our approach to prevent and defend against serious and organised crime in all its forms, and our unyielding endeavour to track down perpetrators and bring them to justice. We will allow no safe space for perpetrators, their networks or their illicit money in our society.

1.17 Diseases and natural hazards affecting the UK. In the UK, we are fortunate that our environment and climate are relatively calm and stable. However, due to climate change we are facing ever more weather extremes that could cause serious disruption to day to day lives. We faced record breaking wildfires and a heatwave over the summer. We are looking at ways not just to mitigate the impacts of climate change but to tackle it.

Global Britain

1.18 The United Kingdom continues to be at the forefront of discussions about global issues, remaining a confident, strong and dependable partner, playing a positive global leadership role to build wider security, stability, and prosperity through our Global Britain vision and delivery framework. We have a continued commitment to global security which includes; the second largest overseas military presence with 17 overseas military bases; world leading capabilities in a top tier military force. We are one of only a few NATO members who meet (and, in our case, exceed) the target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence. We are the biggest Defence spender in Europe and the third biggest in NATO. We are the world’s fifth largest economy, and the sixth largest exporter. We are ranked first in the Portland Soft Power index and maintain unique soft power through British global leadership in the creative industries, sports and organisations such as the BBC World Service.
The UK has a significant global presence. The completion of the Global Britain, EU and Africa uplifts will mean the UK has the largest number of sovereign missions of any European country, with 15,000 staff from 31 government departments and public bodies working in 180 countries and territories around the world. We are a permanent member of the UN Security Council, NATO, the G7, the G20 and commonwealth membership means the UK is well placed to champion a strong and effective rules-based international system. The bodies that comprise the rules-based component of the order, in turn, facilitate trade and investment, contribute to international peace and promote predictable and co-operative behaviour by states. We will therefore remain an important and credible voice in favour of the rules-based system.

Leaving the European Union

On 23 June 2016, the British public voted in a referendum to leave the European Union (EU). The UK invoked Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union on 29 March 2017, initiating the procedure for the UK to leave the EU. At time of publication, the UK is due to leave by 31 October 2019. The decision to leave the EU carries significant implications for the UK in many areas of political and economic engagement.

The threats and challenges to our national security have not fundamentally changed as a result of the decision to leave the EU. Only one of SDSR 2015's 89 principal commitments will be directly affected when the UK leaves the EU (Championing the EU/India Free Trade Agreement).

We remain unconditionally committed to European security. The Withdrawal Agreement provides for an implementation period in which the UK will have continued access to European Union security tools and measures. We will be able to continue participating in EU operations and missions. We will have access to external action programmes and projects.

The Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK provides for the broadest and most comprehensive security partnership the EU has ever had with a third country. In November 2018, the government published its assessment of the cooperation envisaged under the security partnership and compared this with security cooperation envisaged in a no deal scenario. The security partnership will bolster and complement our broader multilateral and bilateral security cooperation with European partners.
Section 2: National Security Objective 1 - Protecting Our People

2.1 Our aim is to protect our people – at home, in our Overseas Territories and abroad – and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure and way of life. We have made significant progress over the previous year in delivering SDSR and NSCR commitments. While some of the commitments we made involve long-term and complex programmes of investment and development, others have been delivered this year.

A. Protecting the UK, Overseas Territories and British Nationals Overseas

2.2 The Government’s most important duty is the defence of the UK and Overseas Territories, and protection of our people and sovereignty. It is essential for the preservation of our democracy and values to do all we can to respect and uphold this principle.

Modern Deterrence

2.3 As we set out in SDSR 2015 and in the NSCR, defence and protection remain at the heart of the UK’s national security policy, and we have adopted a Fusion approach to deterring existing and emerging threats. We must continue to deter catastrophic threats entirely, using the full range of capabilities available to us, while also contesting hostile activity that occurs below the level of wider conflict. The UK remains committed to NATO and retains its leading role in the Alliance. The July 2018 NATO Summit agreed a comprehensive package of modernisation across institutional and political areas in line with UK priorities, addressing cyber, hybrid warfare, resilience, irregular migration, the rules-based international order, global and regional instability, and NATO’s deterrence posture. Our membership of NATO provides for collective defence, and also for cooperative security arrangements with the Alliance’s partners. Within the Alliance and beyond, we will continue to engage a broad range of international partners, promoting a whole-of-government approach to deterrence and encouraging a consistent approach across likeminded states.

Our Sovereignty

2.4 We continue to use our full range of capabilities to defend our sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Joint Maritime Operations Coordination Centre (JMOCC) continues to coordinate our maritime security nationally and with international partners by enhancing joint working between law enforcement agencies and the Royal Navy. Since January 2018, JMOCC has continued to increase activity, handling over 75 tasks coordinating Royal Navy, Border Force, National Crime Agency and Police activities.

B. Our Armed Forces

2.5 Our Armed Forces continue to perform the critical task of defending the UK, supporting civilian authorities and promoting UK values internationally. We are one of the very few Allies to meet both NATO spending guidelines; we remain committed to spending at least 2% of our GDP on defence and spending 20% of annual defence expenditure on major equipment and associated research and development. We have also committed to increasing defence spending by 0.5% above inflation.

2.6 The Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) has continued the work of the NSCR and considered how the Ministry of Defence can deliver better military capability and better value for money in a sustainable way to support our national security objectives. The report of the MDP entitled 'Mobilising, Modernising and Transforming Defence', was published on 18 December 2018. Our achievements under the MDP have made Defence stronger. The MDP has established a set of policy approaches and capability investments that will help to keep us on track to deliver the right UK Defence for the coming decade. We
must sustain this momentum if we are to realise our long-term goals. There is more work to be done as we move towards this year’s Spending Review, to ensure we continue to make the right balance of investment across our Armed Forces, and deliver on our plans to make Defence a more effective and efficient organisation.

2.7 Supported by the additional £1.8bn announced in 2018, including the £1bn announced in the Autumn Budget, we will mobilise to make more of what we already have to ensure our Armed Forces are best placed to protect our security. We will modernise by embracing new technologies and assuring our competitive edge over our adversaries and we will transform by radically changing the way we do business and staying ahead of emerging threats.

2.8 We continue to invest in our front line defence capability, with £178bn committed to defence equipment and equipment support over the next decade. We spent £14.7bn on equipment and equipment support in 2016/17 and £15.3bn in 2017/18. In 2017/18, we achieved several significant milestones in procurement and support of equipment and successfully delivered the plan within budget, driving out significant costs through effective cost control and oversight. Highlights include the commissioning of HMS Queen Elizabeth, the biggest and most advanced warship ever built for the Royal Navy, and 17 F-35 Lightning aircraft. We also placed contracts for the seventh Astute class submarine and the next phase of the Dreadnought programme delivery; and received the first of the Army’s new family of Ajax multi-role armoured vehicles.

2.9 The Ministry of Defence contributes its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and works with other intelligence and security partners, to support cross Government understanding of state-based threats and to facilitate policy and capability responses.

2.10 We will provide significant new investment to enhance our Special Forces’ Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and global strike capability. We have made good progress on a range of essential equipment projects, including the RC-135W Rivet Joint which the Royal Air Force declared as fully operational capability ahead of schedule. It was initiated to replace the Nimrod R1 which retired in 2011 and to sustain the UK Airborne Electronic Surveillance capability against an evolving target set to 2035.

Joint Force 2025

2.11 We continue to develop a Joint Force 2025, with significant progress on the Land division with three brigades and a new Strike Force. On 18 August 2018, HMS Queen Elizabeth and her task group set sail from Portsmouth to Naval Station Mayport, Florida. The departure marked not only her first visit to the US, but also the beginning of WESTLANT 18; an 11-week series of trials designed to test the mettle of the new F-35 Lightning stealth jet. With more than 200 successful take-offs and landings completed – including a number performed by US military aircraft – the deployment was a resounding success, confirming HMS Queen Elizabeth’s status as an aircraft carrier for the future.

2.12 The Armed Forces continue to work with Ministers and officials across government as well as civil authorities to ensure appropriate support is available in the event of a major incident in the UK. Plans are in place to make available 10,000 military personnel as well as niche military specialists and equipment to assist the civil authorities at short notice in the event of a significant terrorist incident. Support provided by the armed forces to civil authorities in the UK is officially termed Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) and can be requested to support the civil authorities response to any major incident such as terrorist attacks or severe weather events, as well as to provide support for events of national importance such as the Olympics.
2.13 In October 2016, we announced the Government’s intention to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights in future conflicts, where this was appropriate in the precise circumstances of the operation in question. Any derogation would need to be justified and could only be made from certain Articles of the Convention. While our Armed Forces would still continue to operate to the highest standards and be subject to the rule of law, it would aid their operational effectiveness by maintaining our freedoms of operation. The MOD is continuing to work closely with interested departments to develop and deliver a package of further measures whilst ensuring that our Armed Forces will continue to operate under a comprehensive legal framework in accordance with Service Law and International Humanitarian Law. The MOD will consult in the near future on these measures, which will be intended to improve protections for service personnel and veterans in relation to operations outside the UK. The MOD will also establish, as soon as Parliamentary time allows, a no-fault compensation scheme that will pay the same level of compensation as a court would award for those injured, or the families of those killed, on combat operations.

Our people

2.14 The dedication, professionalism and expertise of our servicemen and servicewomen are our greatest asset. We remain committed to maintaining the size of the regular Armed Forces and to not reducing the regular Army below 82,000. We remain committed to achieving an inclusive working environment, and to building Armed Forces that are diverse and representative of UK society. As a step towards this goal, by 2020 the Armed Forces are aiming to recruit at least 10% Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic personnel and at least 15% women.

2.15 The new offer for future recruits to the Armed Forces work programme has evolved into two workstreams, which are looking to adapt the current pay model to better target reward across the Armed Forces and consider the reformation of the Early Departure Payment to deliver a more efficient and effective scheme to support retention.

2.16 We remain committed to make a new accommodation offer to help more Service personnel live in private accommodation, meet their aspirations for home ownership and to ensure that a career in the Armed Forces can be balanced better with family life. In addition, we have recently introduced a policy change to allow those Service Personnel in long term relationships to cohabit in surplus service families accommodation. We will ensure a cross Government approach to support Service personnel accommodation.

2.17 We are committed to making the changes necessary to enable our Armed Forces to work flexibly and reflect the realities of modern life. The Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Act 2018 became law on 1 April 2019 and the first Flexible Service arrangements are now in force. The Enterprise Approach is collaborating with industry to tackle the critical skills challenge by exploring innovative ways to access the skilled people we need, finding ways to share skills, and make it easier for people to move around different elements of the Defence sector. We are designing trials to test new relationships and interventions to increase agility in how Defence as a sector attracts, retains and maximises the talent needed.

2.18 We launched the first comprehensive Families strategy for the Armed Forces in 2016. Implementation continues through the Families Action Plan 2018-20. The Domestic Abuse Strategy and Action Plan was published on 6 July 2018 and is being delivered jointly with military and civilian stakeholders within MOD, across government and with external experts in the field.

2.19 We are committed to grow our reserves to 35,000. We have made significant progress over the last year and we recognise more needs to be done. Maintaining the quality of the offer for Reservists and the opportunities to train, work and deploy alongside Regulars is vital to this. We continue to develop the
offer made to both reservists and employers. The recommendations of the Reserve Forces’ and Cadets’ Association External Scrutiny Team, which reported in June 2018, continue to be addressed. Furthermore, over 3,400 employers and organisations have now signed the Armed Forces Covenant.

2.20 **The MOD has delivered a 35% reduction in our civilian workforce** since 2010, and remains committed to improving its efficiency while delivering the capabilities our Armed Forces need. As part of our new approach to transformation, we are re-examining how to utilise the talents of our entire workforce more effectively. This will have implications for the size and shape of our future workforce, which we will work through in detail as part of the Defence Transformation Programme. The outcomes of that work will supersede the civilian workforce assumptions made in SDSR15.

**Defence Estate**

2.21 **We continue to invest in key defence sites and aim to reduce the built estate by 30%, releasing public sector land for 55,000 new homes to support wider prosperity objectives.** We have generated £183.6m over the 2017/18 financial year from Land and Built Estate disposal receipts. Around 3,033 houses have been scored against the release target (including 1,765 Service family homes and single living accommodation) and land for up to a further 3,500 homes has been transferred to Homes England. Achievement of the 55,000 housing unit target remains a significant challenge for MOD with many of the sites identified for release forming part of the Defence Estate Optimisation Programme, which takes place over the long-term to 2040. There are complex interdependencies around the re-provision of military capabilities, and relocation of units to new sites, to enable release of the sites no longer required.

**C. The Nuclear Deterrent**

2.22 The UK’s independent nuclear deterrent is critical to our security and our sovereignty. As confirmed in the 2018 NATO Summit, our independent strategic nuclear forces as well as those of the United States and France have a deterrent role and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries.

2.23 **Work is underway to replace the Vanguard Class of nuclear-armed submarines with the new Dreadnought Class. The Submarine Delivery Agency** (SDA) was formally established on time as an Executive Agency of the MOD in April 2018. It, with BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce formed the Dreadnought Alliance to deliver the Dreadnought programme and harness closer relationships between MOD and industry. Delivery Phase 2 is underway, which continues the build of the first boat and commences the build of the second. We committed to publishing an annual report on the nuclear deterrent programme. On 20 Dec 2018, the Secretary of State for Defence published the seventh report, “The United Kingdom’s Future Nuclear Deterrent: 2018 Update to Parliament”. A copy has been placed in the Library of the House.

**D. Combating extremism and terrorism**

2.24 **On 4 June 2018 we published a strengthened version of the UK’s comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST.** This reflects the findings of a fundamental review of all aspects of counter-terrorism, to ensure we have the best response to the heightened threat in coming years. It also reflects the lessons from the attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 that claimed the lives of 36 innocent people. CONTEST’s overarching aim remains to reduce the risk to the UK and its citizens and interests overseas from terrorism, so that our people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.
2.25 Helping British citizens affected by terrorism at home and overseas is a top priority for the Government. We established the cross-Government Victims of Terrorism Unit (VTU) in March 2017 to coordinate support to victims, witnesses, and bereaved families. Through this unit, government agencies, national organisations and partners have worked together to ensure that British citizens affected by terrorist attacks receive swift and comprehensive support.

2.26 In 2018/19, on Counter Extremism we have taken further steps to improve the Government's understanding of extremism; confront and build resilience to extremist narratives; and promote a positive alternative.

2.27 Since the launch of the Counter Extremism Strategy three years ago, nearly all its commitments have now been delivered. The Building a Stronger Britain Together Programme is challenging extremism in local communities and promoting positive alternatives. £5.7m funding was awarded to 126 civil society organisations through our third call for grant support, and we now have over 240 civil society groups countering extremism in their communities, with 300 delegates from civil society, academia and local government coming together in October for the national conference. A network of Counter-Extremism Community Coordinators is in place across 40 partnership areas. We launched national campaigns focused on raising awareness of issues such as hate crime, worked with local authorities on campaigns to counter extremism at a local level as well as continuing focus on challenging narratives around British foreign policy. The independent Commission for Countering Extremism has met with over 400 experts and activists, and in November 2018 they launched their public call for evidence with aims to improve understanding of extremism and its impact on individuals, communities and wider society.

2.28 We have increased resources for counter-terrorism police and security and intelligence agencies to pursue terrorists through the 2015 Spending Review. By 2021, the security and intelligence agencies will have invested an additional £2.5bn in their capability to deliver against national security priorities. We are on track to recruit over 1,900 additional security and intelligence staff to deter and respond to those behind global threats.

2.29 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) introduced world leading oversight arrangements that strengthen existing safeguards that apply to the use of investigatory powers. In 2018 the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Sir Adrian Fulford was appointed and he published his first annual report in 2019. All the powers in Act are now in force with implementation of the final power to come into force (communications data acquisition) expected to be completed by the end of 2019. Following legislation to ensure independent authorisation of communications data requests, under the auspices of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, we have established the Office for Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA). OCDA began authorising requests from March 2019.

2.30 The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 received Royal Assent in February 2019, and the provisions updating terrorist offences increasing the sentencing powers of the courts and introducing a new power to designate an area outside the UK which it would be an offence for a UK national or resident to enter, came into force in April 2019. Other provisions in the Act, including the new hostile state activity ports powers, will be brought into force later this year.

2.31 The Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) pilots aim to better understand risk around individuals subject to national security investigation, in recognition that some of these people may continue to pose a risk. The initiative has brought together partners and established three pilots to develop and test the MAC approach. The objective is to reduce the likelihood of individuals engaging, or re-engaging, in extremist violence. Working with partners, mitigating actions are put in place to address vulnerabilities and reduce risk. In support of this approach, work has begun to pilot new models in partnership with local authorities, to better manage risk, improve consistency of processes, and drive efficiencies. In keeping with the
Operational Improvement Review, overseen by David Anderson QC, Security Agencies and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre are taking an increased role in the investigation and assessment of right-wing threats where they meet a terrorism threshold.

2.32 We are driving forward overseas Counter Terrorism campaigns as part of the revised 2018 CONTEST strategy. On aviation security we are supporting improvements in security standards in large numbers of airports overseas, including through galvanising international support for delivery of the Global Aviation Security Plan of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). By 2021, the joint Home Office and Department for Transport ‘Future Aviation Security Solutions’ programme will invest £25.5m to develop and exploit technology, capabilities and knowledge to provide a step-change to existing aviation security capabilities.

2.33 For maritime security, we are expanding our work to improve national capability and levels of implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPF) Code at key commercial ports in priority countries, to protect British shipping, crew and passengers as well as important economic exports to the UK from those countries.

2.34 We have significantly revised and updated our security regulations for domestic and international rail in 2017 and have worked with industry during 2018 to support their successful implementation. We also issued updated security guidance to the bus and coach sector in 2018. To help reduce the risk of the malicious use of rental vehicles in attacks, we developed and launched the Rental Vehicle Security Scheme in late 2018.

2.35 We published the Aviation Cyber Security Strategy in July 2018. It is clear that there are dependencies between cyber, physical and personnel security, therefore this strategy champions a joined up approach between government, regulators and industry, to tackle current and future cyberattacks or system compromises.

2.36 Cyber security in the maritime sector remains a priority, with a Maritime Cyber Security Strategy due to be published soon. The Network and Information Systems (NIS) Regulations make it mandatory for major ports to have in place cyber security functions. We continue to work with the sector as a whole providing support on cyber security by design for future installations, and also ensuring resilience and mitigations are in place.

2.37 We are also working with international allies on preventing terrorist use of the Internet, including through collaboration with the private sector such as through the work of the Global Internet Forum to counter terrorism. At the same time as these campaigns, we continue to strengthen our deployable expertise – through the HMG’s Stabilisation Unit. We have now established a Transnational Threats Cadre, consisting of over 100 advisors who can be rapidly sent overseas, either to build the capabilities of key CT partner countries, or carry out assessments of the impact of HMG interventions on the overall problem.

2.38 We continue to take robust action to tackle online terrorist content and support those who are challenging it. We have pressed the companies to do more to respond to the threat of terrorist content online, and to increase the use of technology to automate the detection and removal of content where possible so that terrorist content is ultimately not made available in the first place. Twitter announced in December 2018 that, between January and June 2018, 205,156 accounts were suspended for violations related to promotion of terrorism, and, of those suspensions, 91% were flagged using internal, proprietary tools.

2.39 Although we have had some success working with companies at a voluntary level to tackle terrorist content online, more needs to be done to address a wider range of online harms occurring across a
growing range of platforms and to ensure a more consistent response. The UK Government has published an **Online Harms White Paper**, setting out a range of legislative and non-legislative measures to tackle online harms and setting clear responsibilities for tech companies to keep UK citizens safe. The White Paper addressed a wide range of harms, including those which are illegal (such as terrorism), as well as those which are harmful but not necessarily illegal (such as cyberbullying).

2.40 In March 2018, we established a **Counter-Terrorism Accelerator Fund** (worth £25m per annum) to pilot innovative and transformative approaches and ways of working to meet the challenge of an increasingly complex and changing threat picture. We funded over twenty projects in 18-19 and 19-20, including a number of pilots to inform new approaches and maximise new technology. The projects address a variety of CONTEST objectives, aiming to drive change across the Counter-Terrorism system and increase cross-system agility.

2.41 The recruitment and full deployment of new staff for the **Counter Terrorism and Extremism Network** (CTEN) was completed in 2017 with additional staff deployed across five regional networks: Europe, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Gulf and Middle East, and Asia. Now fully functioning, and working closely with Whitehall colleagues, the Network delivers enhanced Counter Terrorism and Extremism diplomacy as well as managing overseas programmes and capacity building with host nations. We continue to review our output and footprint in order to ensure efforts remain focussed and relevant.

2.42 **We are enhancing the Armed Forces’ capability to work alongside the security and intelligence agencies to disrupt threats in the most challenging operating environments worldwide.** We continue to work with intelligence partners to improve governance structures and intelligence sharing capabilities. The Ministry of Defence contributes its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as broader capacity building activities and investigative capabilities, to support our intelligence and security partners in countering terrorist threats to the UK and overseas.

2.43 **We are creating a bigger and more capable global security and intelligence network to protect British citizens at home and abroad, and work with our partners.** The security and intelligence agencies’ global network has expanded over the current Spending Review period, both in terms of staff and what they are able to achieve with our partners overseas. These resources are deployed flexibly where they can contribute most effectively to protect British citizens at home and abroad. The increased agility of the network has also improved our response to meet emerging threats.

E. **Cyber**

2.44 The second five-year **National Cyber Security Strategy** was published in November 2016, setting out the government's approach to making the UK secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in a digital world. We continue to **implement the strategy**, in part through the £1.3bn investment in the **National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP)**. The first three years of funding (Financial Years 2016-2019) of £632m have now been invested and Government is well underway with projects extending into and planned for the fourth and fifth years of the programme. The NCSP is assessed through a performance system that draws on a range of quantitative and qualitative data. This data is used to determine performance assessments that support evidence-based balance of investment. This performance system is under continued development. Following the NSCR, Cabinet Office also has undertaken a review into the development of a cyber risk assessment framework, including consulting with industry and academia. The Programme has also benefited from recent reviews by the National Audit Office and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA). We are taking action in response to their recommendations.
2.45 We are building a new secure, cross-government network to improve joint working on sensitive cyber issues. We are on track to deliver this capability to relevant departments as well as additional users across Government. We have managed the technical and practical challenges of delivering new and complex specialist technologies with support from the relevant technical authorities, and governance led from the top of the Civil Service. Progress has been reviewed by the IPA.

Detection defence and response

2.46 The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has continued to invest in its capabilities to understand and counter cyber threats and published a range of tailored, technically authoritative advice that has helped public, private and third sector organisations to protect themselves better. The NCSC, along with partners in the National Crime Agency (NCA), responded to over 500 significant cyber incidents during the course of 2018, helping victims to mitigate the damage and others to avoid falling victim to similar attacks.

2.47 We continue to develop a series of measures to defend ourselves against cyber attacks. Our Active Cyber Defence (ACD) programme aims to make infrastructure, products and services automatically safer and easier to use by organisations. Through the programme, the NCSC has developed a set of measures for Government departments to improve basic cyber security; these are currently being implemented. Since its launch, ACD has reduced the UK’s share of visible global phishing attacks by more than half (from 5.3% to 2.4%) and removed nearly 140,000 phishing sites hosted in the UK between September 2017 and August 2018.

2.48 We are helping companies and the public to do more to protect their own data from cyber threats. Whilst there is some good practice, many UK organisations and citizens are not yet adopting the basic cyber security precautions needed to protect their networks and data. Government is helping organisations better understand and report the latest threats, and manage their own cyber security with products such as the Cyber Essentials Scheme, 10 Steps to Cyber Security and the Cyber Information Sharing Partnership. At board level, we continue to engage with a variety of organisations, including CNI, government suppliers and FTSE companies to support cybersecurity awareness and understanding. The law enforcement Cyber Protect Network operates at the national, regional and local tiers of law enforcement. This means that in every one of the 43 force areas there is someone dedicated to helping businesses and individuals protect themselves from cyber attacks. Cyber Aware aims to drive behaviour change amongst small businesses and individuals so they adopt simple, secure online behaviours. Cyber Aware now has over 700 partners from the public, private and third sector, supporting and amplifying the campaign through their own channels.

2.49 We have made significant progress in our efforts to ensure that consumer internet-connected products are secure by design. In October 2018, the Government published the Code of Practice for Consumer Internet of Things Security (IoT). The Code, developed with extensive industry consultation, brings together good security practice in thirteen outcome-focused and high-level guidelines. Its objective is to support all industry parties involved in the development and manufacturing of secure consumer internet-connected products.

2.50 The Government has also been leading on the development of an internationally recognised industry standard through ETSI, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute. ETSI operates globally, with 850 members across 65 countries. In January 2019, the relevant technical body of ETSI approved the standard, which is closely based on the UK’s Code of Practice.
We continue to cooperate and share information about cyber threats, with the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). We continue to work together to develop cyber resilience and response options.

**Cyber crime**

We are reinforcing law enforcement’s specialist capabilities; and we are working with industry to strengthen our ability to disrupt cyber crime. We are continuing transformative work to deliver an enhanced law enforcement response to cyber crime at the national, regional and local level. This work is being delivered through the NCA and the Police. The NCA continues to develop its techniques, approach and work with partners in building cyber ‘detection and response’ capabilities to disrupt and dismantle criminal networks. The NCA has rolled out national capability to Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCs) who in turn are supporting the 43 Police Forces across England and Wales where dedicated local cyber crime units have now been established. These local units will enable each force to investigate cyber crime more effectively, will provide protection and advice for victims, and prevent young, vulnerable people from engaging in cyber criminal activity.

We are funding the Cyber Specials and Cyber Volunteers programme, which sources volunteers from the private sector, to support law enforcement nationally, regionally and locally. Cyber Specials and Cyber Volunteers are individuals with high levels of technical expertise joining policing in their fight against cybercrime. The resulting ‘cyber special’ and ‘cyber volunteer’ (CSCV) programme has been recognised as a significant opportunity to augment police capability against the growing threat from cybercrime. CSCV’s are now deployed within the digital investigations teams in a number of UK police forces.

Action Fraud, the National Fraud and Cyber Crime Reporting Centre has launched an enhanced IT system which brings significant benefits: firstly providing a much improved victim experience through a streamlined, more intuitive portal for online crime reporting, and secondly with a significantly upgraded analytics engine.

We are continuing to invest in the new Cyber Prevent network within the Regional Organised Crime Units and have also completed a draft Cyber crime investigation manual.

The Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (ECVCU) pilot continues to work with vulnerable individuals who have been the victims of cyber crime. This will be expanded in 19/20 to three additional county police forces.

The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Data Protection Act in 2018 increases the protection afforded by the current Data Protection Act. These arrangements provide full and transparent assurance to the public that their data will be protected and used lawfully by the Government and in a way that is proportionate to the threat posed.

**Malign State Cyber Activity**

We are taking a whole of Government approach to safeguard elections in the UK. The Cabinet Office are coordinating existing work and expertise from across departments to promote the integrity of our electoral system, defend it from hostile state activity and disinformation, as well as ensuring that the regulatory framework around elections is as watertight as possible.

As part of that, the Government has already committed to launching a consultation on electoral integrity, which will seek to strengthen the current provisions which protect UK elections from foreign influence. The Cabinet Office will be publishing the consultation and potential measures in due course.
2.60 In December 2017 the UK and its allies attributed the WannaCry cyber attack to North Korean actors. Since then we have taken a leading role internationally to build coalitions that can deter and respond to malicious cyber activity. This has resulted in:

- 12 Partners supporting the attribution of the NotPetya cyber attack to the Russian military in February 2018;
- Attributing a multi-year computer network exploitation campaign targeting universities around the world, including in the UK, to the Mabna Institute based in Iran in March 2018;
- 19 partners, the EU and NATO supporting the attribution of a global campaign of cyber attacks targeting political institutions, businesses, media and sport to the Russian military intelligence in October 2018;
- 14 partners supporting the attribution of a campaign of malicious cyber activity targeting intellectual property and sensitive commercial data in Europe, Asia and the US to the APT10 group, acting on behalf of the Chinese Government, in December 2018 and
- The EU agreeing to introduce a cyber sanctions regime and the UK adopting that regime.

2.61 In calling out this activity, coupled with other responses in private, we hope that states engaging in malicious cyber activity will respond by engaging constructively and upholding established principles, including the norms of responsible state behaviour agreed at the UN in 2015.

F. Serious, organised and economic crime

2.62 We published a new Serious and Organised Crime Strategy in November 2018. Since the previous strategy was published in 2013, we have made substantial progress, with new powers, legislation and partnerships leading to significant increases in convictions, seizures and number of children safeguarded. But the threat is growing. Serious and organised crime affects more of us, more often, than any other national security threat and costs the UK at least £37bn each year. We have therefore launched a more comprehensive strategy to keep pace with the activities and tactics of serious and organised criminals.

2.63 The aim of the new strategy is to protect our citizens and our prosperity by leaving no safe space for serious and organised criminals to operate against us within the UK and overseas, online and offline. The new approach will target the highest harm networks and the most dangerous and determined criminals exploiting vulnerable people, using all the powers and levers available to the state to deny them access to money, assets and infrastructure. We will also work with the public, businesses and communities to help stop them from being targeted by criminals and support those who are, alongside early intervention work for those at risk of being drawn into criminality.

2.64 We have made community engagement a cornerstone of our response. Within the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, the second overarching objective is to build the highest levels of defence and resilience in vulnerable people, communities, businesses and systems. To do this, we will remove vulnerabilities in our systems and organisations, giving criminals fewer opportunities to target and exploit. We will ensure our citizens better recognise the techniques of criminals and take steps to protect themselves. This includes working to build strong communities that are better prepared for and more resilient to the threat, and less tolerant of illegal activity. We will also identify those who are harmed quicker and support them to a consistently high standard.

2.65 The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy also focuses on preventing people becoming SOC victims or offenders through interventions. Our approach diverts those vulnerable to becoming
involved in SOC (as victim or offender) to more positive pathways through building trusted relationships and providing education and training. To drive this work, we have piloted the SOC Community Coordinator programme in five areas, which improves the local partnership response to SOC, builds resilience in the community and funds interventions to help the vulnerable and divert those at risk of becoming SOC offenders. These have reached thousands of young people in England and Wales and the pilot is now expanding to cover eight areas.

2.66 We are taking a whole-of-government approach to tackle serious and organised crime. A new Director General within the Home Office was appointed in 2018 to oversee the response to serious and organised crime. The Director General also acts as Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) with officials supporting the Home Secretary and the SRO in developing, implementing and evaluating the 2018 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. Our response to serious and organised crime is continually managed and monitored. The SRO chairs a National Security Strategy and Implementation Group for Serious and Organised Crime, which brings together senior operational and policy leaders from across government, the devolved administrations, law enforcement agencies and the security and intelligence agencies to coordinate activity and ensure implementation and evaluation of the strategy.

2.67 Policing and crime matters are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland and the responsibility of the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Executive. Both jurisdictions work to their own respective strategies and have their own oversight arrangements to which they are accountable for delivery and performance. The UK government, the Devolved Administrations and Police and Crime Commissioners will continue to work together and with a shared recognition of the threat posed across the UK by serious and organised crime, ensuring that our respective strategic responses are aligned. This close collaboration will help to ensure that we are collectively able to fulfil the objectives of all our strategies.

2.68 In 2018 the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) Serious and Organised Crime Board established a new Lifetime Offender Management portfolio and appointed a senior lead to work across policing and partners to coordinate and drive the implementation of lifetime offender management of priority offenders before, during and after custody.

2.69 We are continuing to deliver a targeted response overseas to tackle the inherently transnational nature of the threat. We have expanded our overseas work by creating a policy network of officials working on serious and organised crime and illicit finance (SOCnet) which draws on all our levers (including political, law enforcement, diplomatic, security, and military) to help dismantle the business models of high harm transnational organised crime groups and to stop abusers travelling and operating online. This network supports the activity of over 80 overseas posts in prioritising approaches to serious and organised crime in our bilateral engagement with host governments. We will place particular focus on multilateral global campaigns to raise awareness of, and improve global resilience to, priority issues for the UK such as illicit financial flows, child sexual exploitation and abuse, anticorruption and modern slavery. These are areas of particular concern where concerted and large scale action is needed across the international community to raise global standards of protection. We will continue to ensure persistent and significant disruption of serious and organised criminals posing threats to the UK or crime being perpetrated overseas by UK nationals. We will also seek to create resilience in countries vulnerable to transnational crime.

2.70 We have committed to an overseas Protect and Prepare programme to address socio-economic, governance and criminal justice factors that inhibit the ability of key countries and regimes to tackle serious organised crime.

2.71 The NCA is developing its single version of the intelligence picture and threat posed by serious organised crime through the parallel development of the National Assessment Centre (NAC) and National Data Exploitation Capability (NDEC). Working with partners the NCA, in its unique position and
supported by legislation, is developing the NDEC on behalf of all UK Law Enforcement and across all threat areas. This ambitious and challenging programme will establish an initial operating approach within two years. The programme will ultimately have access to and exploit multiple data sets, including those already identified and new ones as they arise. Foundation work has already taken place to upgrade datasets and infrastructure.

2.72 The border remains a unique intervention point for stopping criminals and harmful goods coming to our shores. We have advanced capabilities to identify and prevent people and harmful goods arriving in the UK. We are now working to require more complete and accurate data from aviation, maritime and rail carriers about passengers and freight, whilst upgrading our ability to analyse the data at pace to detect and target threats before they come to the UK. We will continue to trial and develop the use of innovative biometric technologies to increase our ability to verify travellers’ identities.

Illegal Firearms

2.73 We are continuing our work to choke off the supply and availability of illegal firearms to prevent their use by criminal or terrorist groups in the UK. We are working with national and international partners to reduce this threat, including cutting supply and availability through both illicit international trafficking and movement within the UK of firearms from the lawful to unlawful market. We are, therefore, ensuring that we have the right intelligence, detection and enforcement capabilities and policies internationally, at the border and within the UK.

2.74 As set out in the new Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, we are focussing on the highest harm networks and providing a whole of system response for tackling serious and organised crime. We will also better align efforts for tackling the threat from firearms. Threat detection at the border remains a priority with continued investment in projects led by our Science and Technology Programme.

2.75 We established a multi-agency firearms unit jointly led by the NCA and Counter-Terrorism Policing, to coordinate law enforcement activity to improve our understanding of the threat from firearms.

2.76 Further work is in train to strengthen controls on legally held firearms within the UK and prevent them from falling into criminal hands, as set out in the Serious Violence Strategy. This includes greater regulation of antique firearms, consulting on statutory guidance on firearms licensing and tightening controls on firearms dealers.

Economic Crime and Corruption

2.77 We created a new government taskforce in January 2019 which will work with senior figures from the UK private sector to tackle economic crime. The new Economic Crime Strategic Board, jointly chaired by the Home Secretary and Chancellor, meets twice a year to set priorities, direct resources and scrutinise performance against the economic crime threat, which is set out in the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. In its inaugural meeting in January 2019, the Board commissioned the development of a shared public-private Economic Crime Plan and the development of a joint public-private threat update. The Plan was approved by the Board at its July meeting and was published on 12 July 2019. The Plan sets out the public and private sectors’ collective ambition to combat economic crime and outlines a series of concrete actions that both sectors will collectively undertake to enhance the UK’s economic crime response. Alongside the Economic Crime Plan, the Home Office also published the Asset Recovery Action Plan. This sets out how we will work across Government and with stakeholders to reform asset recovery, disrupt serious crime, and deprive more offenders of the proceeds of their offending, with a clear ambition to see a return to year on year increases in assets recovered.
2.78 We have set up the multi-agency **National Economic Crime Centre (NECC)** in the National Crime Agency. The NECC works with Law Enforcement to coordinate the fight against economic crime. NECC will be fully operational by July 2021. A bank referral into the NECC has already resulted in partners freezing 95 UK bank accounts, freezing an estimated £3.6 million. Alongside this work we are reforming the **Suspicous Activity Reports (SARs)** regime, and extending related financial intelligence capabilities.

2.79 In summer 2018, we published draft legislation to establish a public register of overseas owners of property in the UK. In October 2018 the **Anti-Corruption Champion** also launched an international beneficial ownership transparency campaign, which seeks to raise international standards and practices. This builds on UK support to other countries to open up company ownership. UK Aid funds the innovative Global Beneficial Ownership Register which has over 5 million entries.

2.80 Within the **Serious and Organised Crime Strategy** and the **Anti-Corruption Strategy (2017)**, we have introduced new measures to make the UK a more hostile place for those seeking to move, hide or use the proceeds of crime and corruption or to evade sanctions. In December 2018 the Government published its UK Anti-Corruption Strategy Year 1 Update, which sets out UK action taken over the last year to implement the Strategy. The update highlights the Government’s sustained efforts through a range of action that has been taken both at home and abroad and details the significant progress we have made across many of our extensive commitments. **We are taking a whole-of-government approach to disrupting high-harm organised crime groups and corrupt elites.**

2.81 The UK also received positive reviews under the **OECD Anti-Bribery Convention** and **UN Convention Against Corruption**. In March 2019, the UK updated the OECD Working Group on Bribery on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the UK’s 2017 Phase 4 review of the OECD Convention. This outlined the significant progress against many of the key recommendations for the UK such as enhancing law enforcement co-operation and engagement with the private sector. The **UNCAC UK Review Executive Summary**, published in May 2019, also demonstrated the UK’s significant structures, standards, measures, policies, rules and legislation in place to meet the requirements under the Convention.

2.82 In the past five years, NCA activity has led to over 12,800 arrests in the UK and overseas. NCA targeting of criminal assets has resulted in £27 million of cash forfeited, £42 million of civil recovery and tax receipts and £53 million worth of confiscation orders paid. NCA activity has also resulted in the seizure of over: 1,800 guns, 19 tonnes of heroin and 430 tonnes of cocaine. UK Aid funds the International Corruption Unit of the NCA to investigate money laundering through the UK from developing countries and bribery overseas by UK companies. Since 2006, the International Corruption Unit and its predecessors have secured 30 prosecutions and almost £800m of stolen assets has been restrained, recovered or returned to developing countries.

2.83 We have passed and are implementing the **Criminal Finances Act 2017**, which introduced **unexplained wealth orders**; made it easier to seize criminals’ money from bank accounts; made it harder for criminals to launder money through property, precious metals and stones, and casino chips; and made it possible to confiscate assets from people guilty of gross human rights abuse.

2.84 We have also agreed a new **International Illicit Finance Strategy** to drive and direct a more ambitious whole-of-government response to the cross-border threat enabled by the global financial system.

2.85 We continue to score well in international economic crime rankings. The **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)**, the international standard setter for anti-money laundering and counter terrorist finance, assessed the UK in 2018. The FATF Mutual Evaluation Report gave us its highest possible rating for four of its central measures, including how the UK understands and coordinates its response to the threat of illicit
finance, how it tackles terrorist financing, and how it promotes the effective use of financial sanctions against terrorists and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also received the second highest possible rating in four other measures, meaning overall, out of the 60 countries assessed, the UK has one of the toughest anti-money laundering regimes in the world.

2.86 In preparation for the UK’s exit from the European Union, Parliament passed the **Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act**, which received Royal Assent in May 2018. The Act provides the legal framework for the UK to impose sanctions autonomously and meet its international obligations. The government could use these powers to address corruption, where this meets one of the purposes set out in the Act, for example, furthering a UK foreign policy objective.

**Modern Slavery and Organised Immigration Crime**

2.87 **We are ensuring we have the right capabilities in the UK and overseas, and a comprehensive action plan, to better identify, disrupt and dismantle the criminal networks involved in modern slavery, human trafficking and organised immigration crime.** We remain committed to ensuring we have the right capabilities to tackle the Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) facilitating organised immigration crime in the UK and overseas through the **Organised Immigration Crime (OIC) Taskforce** which is currently working in 17 countries, sharing intelligence and conducting joint operations with international partners. In 2017/18, immigration enforcement achieved 417 disruptions against criminals involved in organised immigration crime.

2.88 **The Modern Slavery Taskforce**, continues to drive action to eradicate Modern Slavery both domestically and across the globe. Total direct Government spend on modern slavery has increased year-on-year, estimated at around £39m in 2017/18 and £61m in 2018/19.

2.89 In the year to December 2018, the police recorded 4,578 modern slavery offences. This is a 46% increase compared with the previous year (3,145 offences). The number of live police operations has increased from 188 police operations in December 2016 to over 1,204 at present.

2.90 **Our approach to eradicating modern slavery worldwide is comprehensive and ambitious.** Our international efforts to fight slavery are supported by a £200m UK Aid commitment to tackle the root causes of slavery and trafficking – and includes strengthening law enforcement and wider criminal justice capacity and improving victim protection. We launched the Call to Action to End Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking in 2017 and to date has secured 88 endorsements from other States who will use it as a framework for national action and international partnership to accelerate action.

2.91 In July 2018, we announced an independent review of the UK’s landmark Modern Slavery Act 2015 to ensure the UK’s world-first legislation keeps in step with this evolving crime. We received the reviewer’s final report in March and are now considering its findings.

2.92 In 2017/18, 239 suspects were charged in connection with modern slavery offences, a 27% rise from the year before. In the same period, police referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service increased to 355 – the highest ever recorded – and a total of 185 modern slavery and human trafficking convictions were secured. We are working cross Government Departments and agencies to increase the overall numbers of prosecutions, convictions and other justice outcomes, such as use of **Slavery and Trafficking Risk Orders**. We have provided additional funding totalling £3.1m for 2019/20 to the police modern slavery transformation programme to support the ongoing improvement to the operational response.
Child Sexual Exploitation

2.93  We continue to strengthen our approach to tackling online child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA). We will be investing an extra £21m over the next 18 months to improve how our law enforcement agencies reduce the increasing volume and severity of offending, including pursuing the most dangerous offenders. This includes further funding of the ROCUs to target online grooming of children. We have published a White Paper which sets out our plans for world-leading legislation to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online and hold companies to account for tackling a wide range of online harms. This includes an overarching statutory duty of care on companies which will be overseen and enforced by an independent regulator: this will place a legal responsibility on companies in scope to take reasonable steps to keep their users safe and tackle illegal and harmful activity in their services.

2.94  The regulator will issue codes of practice that set out what companies should do to fulfil their new duty of care, particularly for companies to take robust action to tackle CSEA content. The Government will publish interim codes of practice providing guidance about tackling online CSEA later this year.

2.95  Coordinated activity by the NCA and UK policing against this threat is arresting 400 offenders each month, and since its inception the NCA has safeguarded over 10,500 children.

2.96  In November 2018, we co-hosted a Hackathon with Microsoft, at which leading companies worked to develop a prototype tool to detect online grooming to be provided licence-free to small and medium companies worldwide. We urged US-based social networks and other technology companies to promote the use of the new prototype and to encourage further action to tackle sexual abuse of children online.

2.97  In 2018, the WePROTECT Global Alliance achieved the first ever Global Threat Assessment on online child sexual exploitation and abuse in partnership with NCA, Interpol and US Department of Justice. This provides a deeper understanding of the online threat at the global level and how it is evolving, and creates a baseline to monitor the positive impact of interventions.

G. Crisis response and resilience

2.98  We are continuing to enhance the UK’s ability to prepare for, respond to and recover from disruptive challenges. Over the last year the UK’s arrangements for responding to crises at home and abroad have been activated including in response to wildfires, Novichok poisoning in Amesbury and in supporting the international response to the October 2018 earthquake in Indonesia. Recognising that the impact from an emergency can be long-lasting, we have also supported efforts to help communities recover including those affected by the chemical attack in Wiltshire. We have a robust process in place to capture good practice and identify lessons from every crisis.

2.99  We will continue taking a whole of Government approach to enhancing National Resilience, ensuring we identify how we can better utilise shared and risk-agnostic capabilities to effectively meet the challenges of traditional and hybrid threats to the UK. We are delivering on the NSCR commitments on National Resilience through the cross departmental National Resilience Project. This includes building a set of Resilience Standards to help Local Resilience Forums and reinforcing local mutual aid systems during disasters.

2.100  We continue to make sure that the Government has the right regulatory framework to ensure that our Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) is resilient to future threats. We keep the evolving risk landscape under continual review to identify impacts to the security and resilience of UK CNI, and any changes to regulatory frameworks required. We have introduced or amended cross-cutting regulation as necessary to combat emerging risks, with recent examples including the Network and Information
System Regulations (NIS Regulations), and the amendment to the Enterprise Act 2002, both of which came into force in May 2018. We have also published a White Paper on 24 July 2018 with more substantive proposals for a new regime governing how national security implications of foreign investment are scrutinised. Departments continue to examine the impact EU Exit will have on the security and resilience of CNI and any need for changes to regulatory frameworks.

2.101 We published a National Bio-Security Strategy on 30 July 2018. We have drawn together for the first time the work taking place across government to protect the UK and its interests from significant biological risks, no matter how these occur and no matter whom or what they affect. We have set out the nature of the biological risks and the opportunities we face, looks at how this landscape is continuing to evolve, and explains what our response is to these challenges.

2.102 We continue the work to appropriately protect the UK from widespread power failure, while also ensuring it has the correct capability to respond to a power outage scenario. We are co-ordinating a programme of work across Government and relevant industry partners to mitigate both the risk of a large-scale power outage occurring, and its consequences for essential services. We are also collaborating with the Devolved Administrations and local contingency planners to ensure that coherent response plans are developed across the UK at a national and local level.

2.103 We have completed the review to integrate infrastructure policing further as set out in the SDSR, and are working with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence on the feasibility, benefits and risks of creating a national infrastructure police force, bringing together the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport Police.

2.104 In early 2019 we initiated a series of workstreams to identify and act to protect our most critical space assets and services. Defence operations, Critical National Infrastructure and our international security policy interests are all heavily underpinned by access to space systems. We are committed to preserving and promoting the safety and security of space, tackling threats from malicious counter-space technologies and non-malicious hazards such as space debris. We are also committed to international cooperation to create legal frameworks for the responsible use of space and support the growth of a robust and competitive space sector, with a target of the UK taking a 10% share of the global space market by 2030.

Consular Services

2.105 Helping British nationals in difficulty overseas is a vital part of the work of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). We provide advice and assistance and support to British nationals travelling overseas. There were 72.8 million visits overseas by UK residents in 2017, an increase of 3% when compared with 2016. Although the majority of those are trouble free, if things go wrong our dedicated staff on the ground and back in the UK, are there to help.

2.106 We continue to respond rapidly to crises overseas, such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters and outbreaks of conflict or public disorder, in order to protect British nationals and British interests. If needed, we help people to leave a country, and in extreme situations we organise evacuations. Our strong relationships overseas enable us to secure cooperation and assistance from host governments in times of crisis.
Section 3: National Security Objective 2 - Projecting Our Global Influence

3.1 We aim to project our global influence – reducing the likelihood of threats materialising and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners. As we have gone through the negotiation process for exiting the European Union, we have continued to strengthen our global influence to protect and promote our values and interests with allies and partners as well as building new strategic partnerships. To support the implementation of the Fusion doctrine, we have established a Global Britain National Security Strategy Implementation Group (NSSIG) to coordinate Global Britain activity across departments, agencies and our overseas network.

Defence Engagement

3.2 Defence engagement (DE) is a funded Ministry of Defence task and is the means by which we use Defence assets and activities, short of combat operations, to achieve influence in support of our national interests. This includes everything from major exercises, troop deployments, through to capacity building and high-level visits. DE is enabled through our permanently deployed network of Defence Attachés, civilian defence advisors, Loan Service personnel, overseas exchange and liaison officers, permanently established overseas training teams and those who deliver our respected and valued international defence training and education, as well as those who run specific projects. Defence, including all of the single Services, is developing relationships and influence over a longer term horizon, to achieve our objectives in a period of significant uncertainty and change.

3.3 Having UK defence personnel engaged with other nations on conflict prevention, security sector reform and capacity building, increases our national capacity to identify and understand potential threats to peace and security early on. Engaging in upstream conflict prevention also ensures that we are in a better position to respond more effectively if and when conflict occurs. This has proven to be a key factor in maintaining and influencing our relationships with both traditional and emerging allies and partners.

3.4 We have one of the world’s largest Defence Attaché networks with resident Defence Attachés and Advisers in 83 countries. We also have 288 Loan Service Personal in 15 countries and 86 Embedded Exchange Officers in 8 countries.

3.5 We have established new British Defence Staffs in the Middle East, Asia Pacific, Eastern Europe, and Africa, which provide new focal points for our activity and investment in these regions.

3.6 We have increased the training we offer to our international partners. International defence training is recognised as a key element of defence engagement, building on defence diplomacy and contributing to objectives such as capacity building, security sector reform, conflict prevention and stabilisation. We created 2,269 places on courses in Financial Year 2017/18 from 2,240 in 2016/17 and 1221 places in 2015/16.

3.7 Exercise Trident Juncture (Ex TRJE) which occurred throughout October and November 2018 is the largest in a series of long-planned NATO exercises to ensure that NATO forces are trained, able to operate together and ready to respond to any threat, from any direction. Over 30 nations, involving 40,000 personnel took part. This NATO exercise demonstrated and developed the extensive military capabilities that NATO Allies need to protect our people and keep our Nations safe.
3.8 **Exercise Combined Joint Atlantic Serpent 2018** (Ex CJAS 18) is the annual collective training event for deployed hospital care within the Joint Medical Group. 400 personnel from 6 nations worked alongside each other in a simulated field hospital environment practising realistic deployed hospital scenarios. The medical teams that deploy on NATO and other coalition operations are typically multinational teams; Ex CJAS 18 provided an opportunity for these nations to work and train together to provide the highest standards of medical care when on operations. Since 2014, UK and US medical personnel have been working closely together and this year the international participation has expanded to include up to sixty personnel not just from the United States but also from Canada, Germany, Norway and Estonia.

**Soft Power**

3.9 **We are creating a cross-government soft power strategy.** We are developing a more strategic approach to supporting the activities and institutions which comprise UK soft power, without compromising on their independence. In October 2018, we announced we will place focus on the cause of media freedom. This includes hosting an international conference in London in July 2019 intended to shine a spotlight on media freedom issues.

3.10 In December 2018, the first annual report published of the current UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018 to 2022 (NAP), reviewed UK progress in delivering our commitments over the past year. The Plan formed part of wider efforts to ensure that the UK’s foreign policy consciously and consistently protects and includes women and girls. The report provided an update on how the government is implementing the 5-year strategy. It captures how we will meet our commitments under UN Security Council Resolution 1325 to reduce the impact of conflict on women and girls, through promoting their inclusion in conflict resolution and peace building. The NAP applies globally, but the report focused on how we are implementing it in the 9 focus countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.

3.11 **The UK’s global diplomatic network** is a unique and powerful asset which builds, supports and capitalises on our ability to project influence worldwide. By the end of 2020, our network will gain over 1000 new positions with the number of overseas roles for UK based officials increasing by almost a quarter on top of our current baseline. This includes the opening of two new embassies, six new High Commissions, an upgrade to our offices in Chad and Niger and the opening of a new mission to ASEAN in 2018. In October 2018 we announced the opening of a new UK Mission in Djibouti. A further announcement was made in December to open a new embassy in Maldives. The opening of these Missions, in addition to 11 which were announced earlier in 2018 will extend our reach and impact with sovereign missions in 161 countries, more than any other European country.

3.12 **The cross-government Network Board has set out a detailed implementation plan that identifies measures to further strengthen the overseas platform.** We completed a comprehensive Internal Audit of One HMG in November 2018, and made recommendations on the governance and continuous improvement of the platform, and on the delivery of value for money. The recommendations are being actioned in full following agreement with all other Government Departments, and include a Vision Implementation Plan and steps to improve customer perceptions of corporate service provision at One HMG posts. In addition, there have been joint departmental visits to key posts, and enhanced engagement with Heads of Missions, Deputy Heads of Missions and Corporate Service teams on all aspects of platform operation. Our collaboration has been further enhanced with a formalised customer relationship arrangement between partners and the expanded One HMG team.

3.13 To further enhance the UK’s diplomatic skills and knowledge, **we continue to develop and deepen our country expertise in areas that are vital to our security and prosperity.** The Diplomatic Academy
offers a range of learning and development opportunities, including programmes of learning and seminars on priority and topical areas. We continue to invest in language training, especially in priority languages. 79% of our Heads of Mission in speaker roles have passed their target level examination for the language of their host country and in our priority languages we have seen improvements over the last year in Russian, Spanish, French, Japanese, Portuguese and Turkish. It is these skill sets which will allow our officials to understand the countries they are working in and build the relationships necessary to deliver UK objectives.

3.14 The International Education Strategy published in March 2019 has outlined HMG’s approach to higher education exports. This is a holistic approach with broader resonance, supporting wider HMG objectives such as the soft power strategy, and supporting low-income countries. Policies such as the Mandarin Excellence Programme and UK-China Maths Teacher Exchange highlight the values of the UK education sector to a global audience & contribute to UK-China bilateral relations, as does the Department for Education (DfE) funding uplift to £1m for UK-US international exchanges through the Fulbright Commission. In addition to this DfE has contributed £5m towards Queen Elizabeth Scholarships for Commonwealth citizens in low to middle income countries.

3.15 Our prestigious Chevening, Marshall and Commonwealth scholarship schemes continue to attract high quality applicants from around the world, enabling the most able candidates to benefit from and contribute to UK higher education institutions, and building a strong international network of scholars with a strong affinity for the UK.

3.16 We continue to invest in the British Council, to develop the organisation’s cultural relations and educational opportunities as well as building lasting relationships between the UK and other countries. It is an essential part of our international effort to promote British values and enhance UK soft power. This includes, for example, the £30m Cultural Protection Fund which exists to safeguard heritage of international importance threatened by conflict in countries across the Middle East and North Africa as well as English Connects, an innovative programme to connect the UK with over 2.5m young Africans and future leaders through the English language.

3.17 We have invested £85.6m each year to 2017/18 in the BBC’s digital, TV and radio services around the world to build the global reach of the World Service and increase access to news and information. Throughout 2017 and 2018 the BBC World Service launched twelve new languages, including Korean, Serbian and languages used in India, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Eritrea. In existing languages, the BBC have developed their digital offer to meet the demands of twenty-first century audiences, including enhancing services for Russian speakers, more regionalised content for BBC Arabic, new programming for Thailand, the Gulf and North Africa and the enhancement of World Service English. The weekly reach of the World Service was 279m, up from 269m in 2016/17.

Allies, partners and global engagement

3.18 Our alliances and partnerships across the world are as critical as ever to ensure our global ambitions are successful. Only global cooperation can tackle global challenges such as climate change and unequal economic growth, avoiding the pitfalls of totalitarianism, war, and intolerance that marked the last century. We have used our permanent membership of the UN Security Council to deliver results through the UN on significant and key issues affecting our interests and values such as in response to priorities from the Salisbury attacks to developments in Burma, Yemen or the Democratic Republic of Congo.

3.19 While the NSCR recognised that we should deepen our relationships with the US, Europe and Asia-Pacific, the Global Britain uplift also boosted our breadth of engagement, being more present in more places and capable of influencing on issues that matter. Our ability to engage at a deeper level with
regional organisations and small states allows us to work together on issues such as climate change, and counter corrosive regional pressures that could undermine the rules based international system.

3.20 We continue to work particularly closely with G7 and G20 partners. At the G7 summit in June 2018 we focused on our shared efforts to promote the rules-based international order; to advance free and fair global trade by making the global economy work for everyone; to strive for equal opportunities for all our citizens; and to drive further action to protect the environment, and in particular our oceans.

3.21 The G20 summit on 30 November to 1 December, enabled the first visit to Buenos Aires by a British Prime Minister, and only the second visit to Argentina since 2001. We agreed, along with the other G20 leaders, on the need for important reforms to the World Trade Organisation to ensure it responds to changes in international trade. We pursued our objective of making sure that the global economy works for everyone and the benefits are felt by all. We called for greater action in the fight against modern slavery and tackling climate change.

Euro Atlantic Cooperation

3.22 We continue to work with the United States of America to deliver more for global stability and our shared interests. We have a unique, strong and enduring partnership with the US, in foreign, defence and security policy. We have worked closely together on these issues over successive administrations and continue to do so.

3.23 Over the course of 2018, the UK and US have provided joint-leadership on a number of foreign policy challenges, including the united response against Russia’s actions in Salisbury and upholding the norm against the use of chemical weapons. In December, the US supported UK-led efforts to secure UN Security Council Resolution (2451) on Yemen, to bolster the peace process and encourage an end to the violence.

3.24 Coordination between the UK and US, through five meetings of the UK/US Trade and Investment Working Group, has also laid the groundwork for a future free trade agreement. As a ‘Tier 1’ US partner on F-35 from the outset of one of the biggest Defence equipment programmes, the UK produces 15 percent of every aircraft built and has brought unique British-made capabilities into the development of that stealth fighter. In September 2018, F-35s landed for the first time on the UK’s new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.

3.25 We welcomed the President to the UK in July 2018 and in June 2019; the visits allowed for discussion of the full range of foreign, security and economic issues. In July 2018, the UK hosted the first visit by President Trump. This working visit included a dinner at Blenheim Palace, a demonstration of the UK’s military capabilities at Sandhurst, bilateral talks at Chequers and a meeting with HM the Queen at Windsor Castle. In June 2019 the UK hosted the State Visit of President Trump as well as a major D-Day commemoration event.

3.26 We continue to strengthen cooperation with France. The Lancaster House Treaty continues to be the cornerstone of cooperation and collaboration across the domains of defence equipment capability, operations, science and technology and counter-terrorism. We maintain regular and frequent Ministerial and senior official contact with French counterparts including meetings of the Defence Ministerial Council in May and September 2018.

3.27 In line with the priorities agreed at the UK-France Summit in January 2018, around 40 Royal Navy and Royal Marine personnel and two Wildcat helicopters joined the French naval task force, Jeanne D’Arc, from April to July 2018 during a deployment to Far East. Our personnel took part in amphibious exercises
and Defence Engagement. This built on the our very successful participation in the previous year’s Jeanne D’Arc mission, demonstrating a shared commitment from both countries to enhance their maritime cooperation in home waters and around the world, in support of global security and prosperity and protection of freedom of navigation.

3.28 Our Armed Forces continued to work together against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, and alongside the US and France launched strikes against Syrian chemical weapon sites in order to alleviate the overwhelming humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people, aggravated by the use of chemical weapons. In July 2018 we deployed three Chinook helicopters to Mali to provide logistical and troop movement support to French military operations in the region. British and French forces also operate together as members of NATO, with France agreeing to contribute troops to the UK-led enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup in Estonia in 2019.

3.29 These deployments are part of the UK’s wide-ranging programme of bilateral defence cooperation with France, which includes the successful Sea Venom missile tests within the wider One Complex Weapons programme, the development of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, a rapidly deployable joint UK-French force that can respond to crises, and the construction of a joint nuclear facility in France to model the behaviour of nuclear warheads to guarantee their long-term reliability and safety of nuclear warheads.

3.30 We are at the forefront of tackling the drivers of conflict and uncontrolled migration around the world. We have supported our European partners in tackling the migration crisis in the Mediterranean by upstream work in source and transit countries and the deployment of naval assets and expertise. Under the Sandhurst Treaty, signed in January 2018, the UK and France have agreed to adopt a ‘whole of route’ approach to tackle illegal migration and to reduce migratory pressures at our shared border. We have committed €50m in order to implement a range of agreed actions under the terms of the Treaty. The programme of work agreed under the Treaty includes significant improvements to security infrastructure at the border, supporting France in returning migrants with no legal right to be in Europe and the exchange of liaison officers to facilitate operational cooperation between the two countries. Funding has also been committed under the Sandhurst Treaty to improve access to French domestic asylum procedures and to providing support to vulnerable migrants. Additionally, the Sandhurst Treaty calls for stronger cooperation upstream to address people smuggling and human trafficking. Against this backdrop the UK and France are initiating a programme to build cross-border collaboration between Niger and Nigeria to address human trafficking and people smuggling.

3.31 Following an increase in the numbers of migrants crossing the English Channel in small boats, the Home Secretary and French Interior Minister signed the UK-FR Joint Action Plan on Small Boats in January 2019. Under this declaration, it was agreed that our two countries would coordinate our efforts on land and at sea to prevent further crossings. Furthermore, we committed a package of funding to support French detection efforts and to increased cooperation on returning migrants to countries of origin.

3.32 We continue to further strengthen our close security and defence relationship with Germany. We signed a Joint Vision Statement in October 2018, setting out our shared ambition for European defence and security, and our intent to deepen the already strong UK-German relationship. In February 2019 we launched the inaugural UK-Germany Defence Ministerial Council, the “Oxford Format”, increasing defence co-operation across a range of areas, from tackling violent extremism to building new military capabilities. These developments come after the announced plans that British troops will remain in Germany beyond 2020 and will see increased joint working between British and German forces. Minden will continue to be used as an amphibious capability training area for both the British Army and the German Army. Germany will spend €46m to upgrade and improve the training facilities at Augustdorf, this will particularly assist
training for British tanks. We have pledged to keep the Sennelager base which has the capacity to train up to 2,000 personnel at one time.

3.33 Their Majesties King Willem-Alexander and Queen Máxima of the Netherlands came to the UK on 23 and 24 October for their first state visit. The visit showcased the breadth and depth of the relationship between the UK and the Netherlands, including through trade, innovation and security. Together we continue to work to further peace and security across the globe, tackling threats from terrorism and cyber and promoting values of freedom.

3.34 We remain committed to our key strategic relationship with Poland. In 2018, we have witnessed that relationship deliver on our shared priorities. We took note of our achievements across 3 broad areas: security; prosperity; and people and ideas. We have made good progress – implementing the Defence and Security Cooperation Treaty signed at our last consultations; agreeing jointly funded strategic communication projects in Eastern Partnership Countries worth £5m; and working together internationally including in NATO and the UN Security Council. We brought together over 150 UK and Polish companies for the first UK-Poland Business Trade and Investment Forum and supported closer collaboration between innovators and academics through the 2018 Year of Entrepreneurship Science and Innovation.

3.35 A number of important and capable European countries look to UK for leadership on defence and security issues. Following the establishment of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in April 2014 at the Wales NATO Summit, the Comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding (CMoU) was signed on 28 June 2018 by the UK and eight partner nations: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. The JEF’s core purpose is focused upon the Baltic Sea, North Atlantic and High North regions, with the ability to co-ordinate action short of war. The CMoU marked Full Operational Capability and ensures that the components of policy, strategic communications and strategic decision making are in place.

3.36 In July 2018 the UK hosted the Berlin Process Western Balkans Summit, bringing together interior ministers from the Western Balkans and European partners. This resulted in a joint declaration on information, a Small Arms and Light Weapons Roadmap, endorsement of the Call to Action on Modern Slavery, and a series of anti-corruption pledges.

3.37 Operation ORBITAL was established in Ukraine in 2015 to provide defensive, non-escalatory training to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) in order to build their resilience and capability. Over 13,000 UAF members have now been trained. ORBITAL will expand into maritime training in 2019.

The wider world

3.38 The NSCR committed us to deepen our relationships with emerging powers to shape global rules, financial systems and capital flows, and to improve the provision of global public goods. We are building and maintaining a set of relationships with global and regional powers, including China, India and South Africa, to allow us to influence their development policy and practice, and support a positive contribution to the international order and global economic system. Our country-level analysis of the drivers of poverty and instability will, depending on the context, include our understanding of the impact of these powers.

3.39 Our enduring security partnership remains with the Five Eyes community (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and is vital including in the fight against the threats of terrorism, child sexual abuse, serious and organised crime and hostile state activity. In August, we committed to an agreement to expand the sharing of information about known or suspected terrorists; a joint statement outlining the expectations of the digital industry in identifying, countering and removing illicit and illegal
online content such as child sexual abuse and terrorism and a commitment to work collectively to confront the threat posed by hostile state activity. The next Five Country Ministerial event will be held in the UK.

3.40 As part of our work with some of our closest security partners, we hosted the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Canada for an intelligence partners meeting in April 2018. Our relationship with Australia was reinforced through the annual Australia-UK ministerial talks (AUKMIN) in July 2018. We met with their defence and foreign affairs counterparts to discuss foreign policy, defence and security issues affecting both countries. We also hosted New Zealand Prime Minister, in January 2019 which included a security briefing and bilateral talks.

3.41 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) is important for our national security and prevents Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Following the US's withdrawal in May 2018, the UK and the other remaining parties to the agreement have worked to preserve the deal, and will continue to do so. We are concerned by recent steps by Iran to reduce compliance with the deal and are pressing them to reverse these. The deal remains in our shared security interests. As part of our JCPoA commitments we have sought to ensure practical measures for continued sanctions relief to Iran. One important means has been work by the UK, France and Germany to register the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) on 31 January 2019, an E3-led Special Purpose Vehicle to support trade relations with Iran and the delivery of sanctions relief. At the same time, we have worked to address Iran's destabilising activities in Europe and the Middle East, including its development and proliferation of ballistic missiles; these issues continue to be of serious concern. We supported EU sanctions against elements of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security in relation to a disrupted attack plot in Paris in June 2018. We continue to make clear to Iran that such destabilising activity is unacceptable.

3.42 The UK and India will continue to strengthen their defence and security relationship, with the two countries working closer together than ever before to tackle terrorism and threats to cyber security. Both nations benefit from vibrant digital economies and will design, create and manufacture technologies that will help protect citizens and businesses against malicious cyber attacks. In addition, work is underway on building a long-term approach to the UK and India's defence industry-to-industry relations, allowing our Armed Forces to share technologies and learn skills from each other. These new military links are among several ways the UK and India are working closer together across several departments, announced during a visit by Prime Minister Modi.

3.43 The Royal Navy works increasingly closely with their Indian counterparts to ensure the safety and prosperity of the Indian Ocean region – tackling piracy and drug trafficking, as well as protecting freedom of navigation rights. We already play an active role in maritime security in this region through counter terrorism, counter piracy and maritime security operations because a free and open Indo-Pacific area is in the interests of the UK and the international community.

3.44 We are committed to NATO's capacity building mission in Afghanistan and at the NATO Summit in July 2018 agreed to increase the number of UK troops to around 1,100. The UK plays a leading role in NATO, and this troop uplift will make the UK the third largest contributor to Afghanistan. The additional troops will bolster the UK’s existing contribution to the UK-led Kabul Security Force, which plays a critical role in enabling NATO advisors in the city to undertake engagement with the Afghan Government. They will also continue to mentor the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces who are responsible for security in the capital.

3.45 We have set out our vision of our future relationships with partners in the Gulf region in our Gulf Strategy. We continue to build a permanent and more substantial UK military presence. We continue to increase the range and depth of activity in support of our Gulf partners. Our work reflects both our historic relationships and the long term nature of both challenges and opportunities within the Gulf.
3.46 Exercises such as **SAIF SAREEA 3** in October 2018 are a demonstration of our commitment. Some 5,500 UK Regular and Reserve military personnel participated in the Exercise alongside over 60,000 **Omanis** from the Sultan’s Armed Forces. The Exercise shows the UK’s commitment to international allies and our ability to conduct a strategic deployment of a warfighting force to the Middle East. It serves to strengthen our tri-Service relationships with Oman and will help develop their joint interoperable defence capabilities.

3.47 The new Justice and Accountability Partnership with **Pakistan**, announced in September 2018, aims to help tackle corruption, and support the return of assets, including through appointment of a new Justice and Accountability Envoy.

3.48 Our relationship with **China** is broad and deep, bringing enduring benefit to both countries. Above all our policy on China remains clear-eyed and evidence based. It is firmly rooted in our values and our interests.

3.49 During a visit to China in January 2018, we reaffirmed the importance of UK-China relations. Our discussions with President Xi and Premier Li helped progress ambitious trade and security agendas. These included new initiatives to deepen our people-to-people exchanges (particularly in education) and the launch of a joint trade and investment review. The visit also helped secure new commercial deals worth over £9bn, and enabled new measures to improve UK firms’ access to the Chinese market.

3.50 The Foreign Secretary attended the Strategic Dialogue in Beijing in July 2018 with his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi. We underlined how our strong partnership with China improves the prosperity of our people and how together we have forged constructive collaboration on shared challenges, such as climate change and security issues. The Secretary of State for International Trade attended the Joint Economic and Trade Commission in August 2018 and visited the China International Import Expo in November 2018, two visits which delivered more than £2bn in commercial deals for the UK. There were other successful visits from the Secretary of State for Health and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

3.51 This year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer visited Beijing in April to attend the second Belt and Road Forum and for bilateral meetings. While there he highlighted how UK expertise can help Chinese overseas investments deliver sustainable development outcomes, agreed dates for the 10th UK-China Economic and Financial Dialogue and raised UK market access concerns.

3.52 Our broad and deep relationship with China allows us to have constructive and positive dialogue on major global issues; we are clear and direct where we disagree. We have regularly raised human rights and developments in Hong Kong throughout 2018/19, including during the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary’s visits in 2018. Furthermore, we regularly discuss with China the importance of upholding the Rules Based International System, particularly where China’s actions are at odds with this: for example, the APT10 group cyber-attacks.

**Strengthening the rules-based international order and its institutions**

3.53 We have continued to demonstrate our commitment to defending and strengthening the rules-based international system. The UK remains committed to engaging on the full range of issues of international concern in the international organisations of which we are a member. In response to the Salisbury attacks, **we led international condemnation of the Russian position and support for strengthening the counter-proliferation regimes.** We helped lead the debate in the European Union on maintaining tough sanctions against the Russian Federation for its illegal annexation of Crimea. More recently in March, together with international partners we sanctioned individuals responsible for Russian action against Ukrainian vessels in the Kerch Strait in November 2018. We secured tougher sanctions against **North**
Korea for conducting further nuclear tests in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions. We joined EU and G7 partners in expressing deep concern at the situation in the South China Sea, urging respect for international law.

3.54 The UK is also taking steps to ensure the UK is well-represented in the multilateral architecture, through gaining senior jobs (such as the Deputy Secretary-General of the International Telecommunication Union and the Chair of the OECD DAC Committee, which has a key role on development spending). The structures put in place domestically to best channel the UK’s influence are ensuring that HMG efforts on international representation are effective.

United Nations

3.55 In September 2018, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution which established a mechanism to collect and preserve evidence of atrocities in Burma. The UK played a leading role in working with the EU and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to secure this resolution which received substantial support, with 35 countries voting in favour, demonstrating international commitment to ensuring there will be no immunity for such serious human rights violations. We provided strong support to UN Secretary General Guterres in his pursuit of substantive reform of the UN. We worked with partners to ensure the OECD rules on overseas development assistance (ODA) were fit for purpose.

3.56 We remain committed to UN peacekeeping operations, by deploying over 600 personnel in 2018. Our largest contingents remain in supporting the UN Mission in South Sudan and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. We have additional personnel in Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali, supporting UN aims with experts and staff officers.

3.57 At the UN General Assembly in September 2018, the Call to Action to End Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (launched by the PM in 2017) achieved endorsement by over 85 countries. We also launched a set of public procurement principles (developed alongside the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia) for nations to adopt to tackle modern slavery in global supply chains.

3.58 We support the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), and actively engaged in their development process. Both Compacts were adopted at the end of 2018. The GCR embeds long-term, sustainable solutions for refugees and host communities alike, while the GCM sets out what a well-managed global system of migration looks like, and the policy and operational mechanisms that states may draw from to achieve this. Taken together, the compacts offer an internationally agreed, cohesive and forward-leaning framework to improve the way the international community responds to large movements of people.

The Commonwealth

3.59 The Commonwealth is a diverse community of 53 nations that work together to promote prosperity, democracy and peace. Across the Commonwealth, member states face common challenges and threats to our shared values of democracy, good governance and inclusivity as set out in the Commonwealth Charter. The three pillars of the Commonwealth - the Commonwealth Secretariat, its members and its organisations and networks – mean it is uniquely placed to respond to these challenges.

3.60 In April 2018 the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) brought together leaders from all the member countries in London and Windsor to reaffirm our common values, address the shared global challenges we face and agree how to work to create a better future for all our citizens, particularly young people. The summit’s theme was: ‘Towards a Common Future’. It aimed to build links
between countries to offer young people access to knowledge and skills; and give them a voice on key issues such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

3.61 At the summit, leaders committed to:

- a fairer future: Leaders agreed the importance of full social, economic and political participation for all its citizens in order for democracy and sustainable development to thrive. They pledged to ensure all girls and boys across the Commonwealth have access to at least 12 years of quality education and learning by 2030, with the UK committing £212m. We expressed regret that discriminatory legislation continues to affect the lives of people across the Commonwealth. We offered to support any Commonwealth country wishing to reform outdated legislation that discriminates on the grounds of sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation.

- a more prosperous future: Leaders agreed a unanimous statement on the need to resist protectionism – the first Commonwealth Meeting to do so and with the ambition of increasing intra-Commonwealth trade to beyond US$2 trillion by 2030, Leaders agreed a Connectivity Agenda for Trade and Investment.

- a more sustainable future: Leaders celebrated the ratification by all members of the Paris Agreement and recommitted to pursuing efforts to limit the increase in global average temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Leaders also launched the Commonwealth Blue Charter to sustainably develop and protect the ocean with the UK co-chairing with Vanuatu the action group on tackling marine plastic pollution through the Commonwealth Clean Oceans Alliance. Leaders also pledged to halve malaria across the Commonwealth by 2023 and agreed to take action to improve access to quality eye care and eliminate blinding trachoma.

- a more secure future: Leaders stressed unanimous opposition to the use of chemical weapons and committed to strengthen the effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They also agreed the Commonwealth Cyber Declaration, the world’s largest and most geographically diverse intergovernmental commitment on cyber security co-operation and capacity building. The UK committed £15m to help member states boost their cyber security capabilities.

Global Economic Architecture

3.62 We continue to build the inclusivity of International Financial Institutions’ membership and decision-making, so they continue to command credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of their members. We play an active role at both the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to ensure the institutions are inclusive. With our support, AIIB membership rose to 97 this year and the Bank was granted permanent observer status at the UN. EBRD membership increased to 69, including India – an important new voice in the institution which expands its international shareholding.

3.63 The OECD is the place where global challenges are addressed, standards and best practice set and quality driven up by peer review. We play a leading role at the OECD for example by placing UK specialists to develop the Recommendation on artificial intelligence: the first international, consensus-based legal instrument on AI. We are pushing to strengthen the OECD Multi National Enterprise Guidelines, setting high standards in the global economy by improving investment of Multi National Enterprises overseas. The review of the OECD Codes of Capital Liberalisation, a unique international instrument in setting standards to regulate the international movement of capital, was led by a UK chair. The OECD itself has facilitated the G20 Global Forum on Excess Capacity which addresses the issue of excess capacity in the steel sector by bringing together major steel producers.
3.64 As part of a capital increase agreed for the World Bank Group last year, we supported increased representation for developing and transition economies, helping to ensure more inclusive decision making at the Bank which better represents the views of all shareholders.

3.65 We worked closely with the G20 in 2018 to move forward the Argentinian Presidency’s two key priorities on addressing the infrastructure financing gap and the Future of Work. In particular, we played a leading role developing the G20 Principles for the Infrastructure Project Preparation Phase which will support countries to develop infrastructure projects that can attract private sector capital. We are also working with the G20 to consider how governments and international institutions can promote inclusivity in infrastructure. We have also worked collaboratively across Government in the G20 International Financial Architecture Working Group to improve the effectiveness of International Finance Institutions (IFIs) in supporting developing countries by lobbying for better IFI coordination and collaboration in a number of areas, including support in macro-economic crisis, country platforms and value for money in Multilateral Development Banks.

3.66 We continue to engage fully in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agenda to encourage inclusivity. In particular, we continue to argue for an adequately resourced IMF throughout negotiations on the 15th General Review of Quota. We have also continued to promote diversity amongst Fund staff through the IMF’s Combined Compensation and Benefits Review. The Fund is currently reviewing its lending instruments to Low Income Countries (LICs). We have sought to ensure that LICs needs are reflected in the review, by ensuring longer-term engagement from the Fund and greater access to Fund resources.

3.67 Our development budget and expertise will aim to be used to deliver inclusive growth and shared prosperity. At the heart of the approach is job creation and the private sector is key to driving the inclusive growth that will deliver more and better jobs. To help bring about this private sector investment, we announced an ambitious scale up of our Development Finance Institution, CDC Group, and deeper partnership with the City of London as a leading hub for international investment. We have also been increasing our sharing of expertise – supporting partner countries in developing their business environments and institutions, integrating into global value chains, building ties with investors and tackling barriers to growth. All of these measures are vital for progress towards the UN’s 2015 Sustainable Development Goals and in our national interest.

Standards and laws

3.68 We are engaging across government and developing new capacity, to promote UK interests on global regulatory issues and standard setting. These efforts will help to ensure that the UK’s recognised strength in regulation carries the weight it merits internationally. More broadly, developing HMG’s capacity to engage globally on regulatory matters will underpin several of the UK’s cross-cutting international objectives, including improving the global trading environment and supporting the rules-based international system.

3.69 We continue to refine sanctions governance to ensure the best coordination of policy, implementation and enforcement. Interested Departments across Whitehall agreed in September 2018 to develop guiding principles for better cross-Whitehall working on sanctions, following withdrawal from the European Union. In preparation for our departure from the European Union, the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act received Royal Assent in May 2018. The Act gives us the powers to impose, amend and lift sanctions autonomously. We laid the first statutory instrument to implement the Act in November 2018 and, in preparation for a possible no-deal exit from the EU in March 2019, laid secondary legislation to transfer or retain EU regimes in UK law.
3.70 We hosted an international conference about the illegal wildlife trade on 11 to 12 October 2018. The conference brought together global leaders to help eradicate illegal wildlife trade and better protect the world’s most iconic species from the threat of extinction.

3.71 At the 2018 Meeting of G7 Security Ministers in Canada, they agreed a set of nine commitments to tackle human trafficking. Shortly after, at the G20 Summit in November 2018, the PM announced that we will publish our own transparency statement, setting out the steps we are taking to identify and prevent slavery in the UK Government’s supply chains. We also give our full support to the G20’s strategy to eradicate modern slavery from the world of work.

Visas

3.72 We are developing options to improve visa service delivery. We are undertaking a significant programme of service and technological improvements. Changes to the application process will ensure that the public receive a more flexible, efficient and consistent service, whether applying from within the UK or overseas.

3.73 95% of overseas applications are now made online and 95% of in-country application routes are available for people to apply online via UK Visas and Immigration’s single, global online application service (Access UK). Application forms have been streamlined and simplified, making it easier and quicker for customers to apply, pay, and book an appointment to complete their application. Customers also have access to improved digital immigration content on the GOV.UK website, with more customer-centric and intuitive content, grouping content into descriptive customer needs. A free digital support service (Assisted Digital) has been available since September 2017 to customers who experience barriers to applying online. Customers receive support face-to-face in participating libraries, over the phone or during a home visit.

3.74 A new UK Visas and Citizenship Application Service launched in November 2018. Customers in the UK can now submit evidence and personal information to support their application quickly and securely through the national network of 57 service points. Over 62,000 applications have been made since its launch. Improvements are also being introduced to the overseas application service to tailor the process to meet customer needs through added-value and flexible ‘on demand’ services, offered through a new seamless online journey from Access UK to the relevant commercial partner’s website.

3.75 Customers can now self-upload supporting evidence ahead of their visit to an application service point using a computer or smartphone, reducing time spent producing physical documentation. The technology is available in the UK and has rolled out to 163 countries / territories overseas. New biometric enrolment technology is also being introduced to allow customers to self-serve during their appointment – reducing time spent in application centres and providing the opportunity for kiosks to be introduced in non-application centre locations around the world in the future. The technology is available in the UK and continues to roll out to the overseas network.

Tackling conflict and building stability overseas

3.76 Last year as we celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we remain committed to the promotion and protection of the human rights of all people around the world. We have been and will continue to be at the forefront of efforts to tackle the drivers of conflict and uncontrolled migration around the world. Through our membership of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and our bilateral diplomacy we continue to promote human rights.

3.77 We have spent at least 50% of the Department for International Development’s budget in fragile states and regions. Provisional data shows that the target to spend 0.7% of Gross National
Income (GNI) on international development was met in 2018. We have spent at least 50% of the Department for International Development’s budget in fragile states and regions. We continue to deliver strong results addressing poverty in fragile states and enabling access to healthcare, education, water and sanitation. Within that 50%, the biggest share is spent in the most fragile places across the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

3.78 In keeping with the 2016 Building Stability Framework, we are increasing the focus of our aid spend in fragile states on tackling the underlying causes conflict and fragility. In responding to the needs of the poorest, we are also tackling the underlying causes of a range of national security threats to the UK, including violent extremism and terrorism, mass migration and climate change. The current global context requires us to work in new ways to address increasingly complex development challenges and manage risks, particularly in fragile states and regions. 59% of the world’s poor live in middle-income countries, which are also growing contributors to climate change, and projections show that in future, extreme poverty is likely to be concentrated in fragile countries affected by conflict, instability and poor governance.

3.79 We have increased the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) from £1bn in 2015/16 to £1.3bn by 2019/20. The cross-government CSSF is a critical tool to deliver our top priorities, as set by the National Security Council. Combining cross-government expertise and resources has allowed the CSSF to deliver activities in the UK’s national interest, protecting UK citizens from threats as well as helping to build stability in fragile regions. The total allocation for 2018/19 is £1.26bn (of which £606.6m is Overseas Development Assistance).

3.80 Over the last four years, the CSSF has transformed the way we respond to conflict and insecurity. It has reached over 70 countries and touched millions of lives at home and abroad.

3.81 In Lebanon, we are supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure their border with Syria for the first time. Farmers are now farming border territory, some retuning to land they have not seen in 50 years.

3.82 We are supporting the Government of Colombia to implement the peace agreement, rejuvenating local communities and tackling the threats from serious and organised crime and deforestation.

3.83 We are supporting Pakistan’s Election Commission’s campaign to bolster women’s participation in elections which led to the inclusion of an additional 3.1 million women to the electoral roll. According to media reports, around nine million more women voted in July 2018, compared to last general elections in 2013.

3.84 Following Hurricane Irma in September 2017, the CSSF has continued to support the recovery and redevelopment of Anguilla. Funding has supported the repair and refurbishment of Anguilla’s only hospital and the opening of a temporary structure at the island’s single ferry terminal, improving access to the island, supporting tourism and business opportunities which are vital to Anguilla’s economic recovery. Designs have been produced for five primary schools, Anguilla’s only secondary school, three health clinics, and a permanent ferry terminal and search and rescue facility. This will be the largest infrastructure programme ever undertaken on the island.

3.85 In Iraq, the CSSF has contributed to the UN’s Development Programme Funding Facility for Stabilisation (FFS) fund, which has rebuilt essential infrastructure in areas liberated from Daesh. The fund has provided essential basic services in five Iraqi governorates, benefitting 5.5 million people, as some 4.2 million people have returned to their homes. CSSF funded a number of projects including the rehabilitation of 27 schools, the renovation of a lecture hall and Computer Centre at the Technical Engineering College and the supply of medical equipment for eight public health clinics in Mosul.
3.86 We have supported governments in the Western Balkans to disrupt serious and organised crime and to limit its impact on governance and stability.

3.87 We have doubled the existing Good Governance Fund (GGF) to support economic and governance reforms in the eastern European neighbourhood to £40m per year. The GGF is a responsive, flexible, demand-led fund, providing technical assistance in support of governance and economic reform in Eastern European and Western Balkans countries, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Georgia, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine (and from April 2018, Armenia and North Macedonia). Specific areas the fund supports include: anti-corruption measures, improving the business environment, judicial reform, key sector reforms (e.g. banking and energy), strengthening the rule of law and supporting an independent media. The GGF plans to spend £33m for 2018/19, rising to £36m in 2019/20, and is on track for an increase to £40m by 2020/21.

3.88 We have enhanced the cross-government funds by improving strategic direction through the Fusion Doctrine, governance through a new Ministerial committee, and efficient administration by merging the secretariats into a single Funds Unit. A new Joint Funds Unit (JFU) was launched in April 2018 to manage the Funds. It has taken over the responsibilities previously held separately by the secretariats for the Prosperity Fund and CSSF. Although part of the National Security Secretariat, the JFU continues to be hosted by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. A new ministerial Sub-Committee, reporting to the National Security Council and chaired by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, was established in April 2018 to provide greater strategic and Ministerial oversight of the Funds. It has met twice in this review period.

3.89 We will ensure our development capability responds to changes in drivers of global poverty and works in more innovative ways. In many instances the drivers of poverty alleviation are ‘beyond’ aid, including financial flows like foreign direct investment and remittances as well as changes in international trade, tax and other policies. Conflict, insecurity, injustice and weak governance are also likely to become even stronger drivers of poverty over the coming years. The Government remains committed to using expertise from across Government to tackling complex global challenges as set out in the 2015 Aid Strategy.

3.90 We launched the Global Anti-Corruption Programme in December 2018, a £45 million programme over four years, funded by the prosperity fund. The programme helps middle-income countries to reduce levels of corruption and enable inclusive growth. It is delivering nine projects through multilateral partners, such as UNODC, OECD and World Bank, and also bilaterally in eight countries across Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Key themes of the programme include transparency in public procurement, extractives sector and company beneficial ownership; law enforcement cooperation to recover stolen assets; and technical assistance to policy and legislative reform.

3.91 We have and will continue to campaign to increase the number of countries that have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). We have already surpassed our 2020 ratification target of 90 States Parties. In December, Mozambique became the 100th State Party to the ATT. We will continue to work hard to keep focus on UK priorities such as: re-invigorating work on industry outreach and focussing enlargement efforts on engaging key arms exporting and importing states on the aims of the ATT.

Climate change

3.92 UK International Climate Finance (ICF) plays a crucial role in addressing this global challenge. Government Departments have responsibility for investing the UK’s £5.8bn of ICF between 2016 and 2021. Following achievement of the previous commitment to £3.87bn of climate
finance over five years, the UK has spent over £2bn of climate finance during the first two years of this latest five-year commitment from 2016.

3.93 We are investing in low carbon development to limit future growth in harmful greenhouse gas emissions, assisting developing countries to be better equipped to cope with the impacts of climate change already locked in, and supporting work to halt deforestation and create new supply chains that are both profitable and sustainable.

3.94 Over the last seven years, our climate finance investments have supported 47 million people to cope with the effects of climate change, improved access to clean energy for 17 million people and reduced or avoided 10.4 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions.

3.95 The United Nations major climate change conference COP24 in December 2018 brought together representatives from governments across the world along with experts from science, business and finance to advance work on tackling climate change and build on the Paris Agreement 2015. We recognise the need for all countries to demonstrate higher ambition in their international commitments, and pushed for a robust set of rules to underpin the Paris Agreement. This is why the UK is co-leading on climate resilience and adaptation with Egypt at the United Nations Security General's climate summit in September 2019. Our aim for the summit is to fundamentally change the way we prepare and invest to secure food and water and reduce the impact of disasters. We are bidding to host COP26 in 2020.

3.96 We have established a National Strategy Implementation Group on Climate Change in order to develop and implement a cross-government climate change strategy, enhancing our collective response to climate change through the principles of the Fusion Doctrine.

3.97 The Global Climate Action Summit occurred in San Francisco on 13-14 September 2018 where Governments, businesses and civil society came together to discuss efforts to reduce carbon emissions and to transition to low carbon economies. Throughout the summit, we showcased a range of national and international commitments to tackle climate change, from driving the development of the zero emissions transport sector, to our support for small states and vulnerable communities to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

3.98 The Powering Past Coal Alliance has also announced ten new members from across the US, Europe, and Australasia. Jointly initiated by the UK and Canada, the coalition of 74 governments, businesses, and other organisations is committed to ending the use of unabated coal power in support of the Paris Agreement.

3.99 We also held the first ever Green Great Britain Week on 15 October which was designed to highlight the opportunities that clean growth offers and raise awareness of how business and the public can tackle climate change.

Global Health Security

3.100 Global health security is a global public good, as well as being in the UK’s national interest. Infectious diseases, which can cross international borders, and antimicrobial resistance (AMR), the growing resistance to the drugs that we use to treat infections, constitute major threats to human health, and affect global prospects for security, prosperity and progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

3.101 This section sets out the UK’s contribution to addressing global health threats through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) that we spend in support of developing countries. This action ranges from
specific activities to address global health threats, and essential underpinning work to support countries in strengthening their health systems and support global leadership on health, including health security. We also take seriously the links between human, animal and environmental health – **One Health** – and work to address these in an integrated way.

3.102 Functioning, resilient health systems are essential for ensuring global health security as well as underpinning progress towards **Universal Health Coverage** (UHC) – access to high quality health services for all – and achieving the SDGs. The UK is a major contributor of funding and technical expertise to support countries to develop and strengthen their health systems so that they can meet the needs of their populations. We also work to address the causes of infectious disease in developing countries through programmes which provide immunisation, better nutrition and improved access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH).

3.103 The **World Health Organisation** (WHO) provides the global health leadership and the UK currently provides around £19.5m per annum in core funding, and around £140m per annum in overall funding. As part of its total ODA spend, the UK has committed at least £10m a year until 2020 to the WHO’s Health Emergencies programme (WHE), which provides operational leadership and support in health emergencies. The UK is a major contributor to WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), a fund specifically established to ensure that WHO has financial reserves to quickly establish a response when emergencies occur.

3.104 The UK also has a track record of deploying expert support to respond to emergencies such as the outbreak of plague in **Madagascar** in 2017 and the Ebola outbreaks in **west Africa** and the **Democratic Republic of Congo**. The UK Public Health Rapid Support Team (UK-PHRST) is a team of public health specialists who are rapidly deployed to outbreaks of infectious diseases to prevent them from becoming global threats. The UK-PHRST also conducts research and capacity building to improve epidemic preparedness. The UK Emergency Medical Team (EMT) was established in 2012 and has deployed to humanitarian responses including Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the Nepal earthquake and the Gaza conflict. Together with the UK-PHRST, it forms a highly effective UK offer for overseas humanitarian medical response.

3.105 The UK has programmes which are directly designed to build countries’ capacity to prevent, detect and respond to disease outbreaks:

3.106 The **Global Anti-Microbial Resistance (AMR) Innovation Fund** (GAMRIF) is a £50m fund that supports early-stage research in underfunded areas of AMR research and development (R&D). It uses a One Health approach, and supports AMR research for the benefit of people in low and middle-income countries (LMICs). GAMRIF was set up in response to Lord O’Neill’s 2016 independent Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, which recommended increased funding for much needed research and innovation in AMR. GAMRIF works with governments, research organisations, and industry to support a variety of research programmes across human, animal and environmental health, funding R&D that has the potential to become future innovations to tackle AMR in LMICs, and to prevent the spread of AMR globally.

3.107 We also fund **animal health programmes** that work at the interface with human health. The Zoonoses and Emerging Livestock Systems (ZELS) programme aims to reduce the impact of zoonotic diseases (diseases that spread between animals and humans) on poor people in LMICs and build the capacity of the research community to respond to emerging threats globally, though improved and/or new rapid field tests, drugs, vaccines and control interventions.

3.108 The **Fleming Fund** is a UK investment of up to £265m ODA through the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to tackle drug resistance in low and middle-income countries. Strong partnerships are
being built with 24 priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South and South-East Asia, including many Commonwealth countries, through a comprehensive country and regional grant and fellowships programme. Grants will strengthen laboratory capacity and sustainable surveillance of AMR through a One Health approach, covering human health, animal health and agriculture, supporting countries to generate, share and use crucial AMR data to optimise the use of antibiotics. This reflects closely the results of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which called for greater and more coordinated action on drug resistance at local, national, regional and global levels, noting: "no single nation can act alone on such transnational threats".

3.109 The International Health Regulations (IHR) strengthening project is a capacity building programme delivered by Public Health England through a £21m investment from DHSC ODA funding. It works with selected countries to review and strengthen health systems to meet the requirements of the IHR (2005).

3.110 The UK’s Tackling Deadly Diseases in Africa Programme (TDDAP) supports more than twenty African countries to strengthen their capabilities to comply with the IHR, enhance governance and accountability mechanisms for health security and preparedness, and strengthen the development and use of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) mechanisms. The IDSR is a comprehensive regional framework for strengthening national public health surveillance and response systems in Africa. From 2019 TDDAP is expanding to partner with three Sahel countries – Niger, Chad and Mali. In addition, increased numbers of the UK’s technical and policy experts are building stronger partnerships with key regional public health institutions and international partners to support effective, African-owned, health security and preparedness capabilities.

3.111 Our cross-government portfolio of programmes to strengthen global health security (including TDDAP and the IHR Strengthening Project) is expanding to support the capacity of African public health institutions in high-risk regions, such as the Sahel.

3.112 The UK is a major investor in research to enable enhanced global health security. We fund WHO’s R&D Blueprint (a global strategy and preparedness plan that allows the rapid activation of R&D activities during epidemics) and mechanisms to rapidly commission multi-disciplinary research during health emergencies. We also fund numerous initiatives to develop new products, tools and systems to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease threats.
Section 4: National Security Objective 3 - Promoting Our Prosperity

4.1 We aim to promote our prosperity – seizing opportunities, working innovatively and supporting UK industry. We are seizing opportunities to promote our prosperity, harnessing innovation to strengthen our national security, and working with industry to ensure that we have the defence and security capabilities and equipment that we need. The modern UK Industrial Strategy is our long-term plan for preparing and investing in the areas that strengthen our economy and can create big opportunities for us in the future.

4.2 Our ambition was to address the foundations of the economy by focusing on areas such as research and development, developing skills, upgrading our transport and digital infrastructure and how we can support communities throughout the UK and around the globe.

A. Economic security and opportunity

4.3 The £1.2bn cross-government Prosperity Fund, (running from 2016-2023) was created to deliver progress against the national security and UK Aid objectives of promoting global prosperity. The primary purpose of the Prosperity Fund is to support the inclusive economic development needed to reduce poverty in partner countries, aligning with the UN Sustainable Development Goals. The Fund achieves this through improving the global business environment, strengthening institutions, and encouraging greater global private investment. The Fund is also well placed to help leverage UK based private sector interest and investment.

4.4 The Prosperity Fund’s portfolio of 27 multi-year programmes focus on a range of areas, including: investment in infrastructure and human capital; innovation and technology; increasing trade; financial and economic reform; and ease of doing business. Priority countries and regions include Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Nigeria, South Africa, China, India, Turkey and Southeast Asia. Interventions draw on cross-government and other expertise in areas such as tackling illicit finance flows which distort economic development, and expanding access to the financial products and services people need to improve their lives. The Fund’s Anti-Corruption programme for example has resulted in a multilateral agreement that will enable US$321m to be returned to Nigeria; and the Mexico programme supported the design of Mexico’s Financial Technology (FinTech) law, which will help drive financial inclusion in a country where only 37% of the adult population have a formal bank account. The Fund’s second Annual Report was published in November 2018.

Emerging Markets

4.5 We are investigating whether our own impact is limited by the financial instruments that are currently available to us; and if so, which new instruments we may want to utilise. We are looking closely at the development needs of a wide range of countries that have transitioned out of extreme poverty in recent years, but still face challenges, particularly of growth and job creation.

4.6 We have continued to strengthen our relationships with emerging powers, including through the Economic and Financial Dialogues we have with China, India and Brazil. We hosted the Third UK-Brazil Economic and Financial Dialogue in London in August 2018. Brazil and the UK reaffirmed their commitment to the multilateral, rules-based trading system and the principles of free trade. Ministers emphasised the importance of a stable and predictable global trading system which is of benefit to all countries and committed to strengthening the contribution of trade in goods and services to our economies.
4.7  We are sharing knowledge and technical expertise to support partner governments to develop and deliver strategies for inclusive economic growth. Global prosperity is vital for poverty reduction. No country can eradicate poverty or transition from aid without inclusive economic growth, jobs, investment and trade. We are committed to achieving growth that transforms economies; that creates productive jobs and private sector investment; and that spreads benefits and opportunities right across society. The economic empowerment of women and girls, and other marginalised groups, is central to our approach of making sure that no one is left behind. Progress overseas also benefits the UK at home. Our cross government and sector work is helping to build our trading partners of the future to seize opportunities for closer ties with the world’s emerging economies. Our focus on economic opportunities in fragile states will also help tackle causes of mass migration, instability, insecurity and conflict.

4.8  We want to improve our offer to businesses seeking to succeed in emerging markets and fast-growing developing countries. We announced the cross-HMG Business Integrity Initiative (BII) in Africa (2018). The BII provides practical guidance on issues such as bribery and human rights concerns to help businesses trade with and invest in new markets. This support helps firms protect and strengthen brand reputation, enjoy sustainable commercial success, and minimise the risk of prosecution.

B. Science and Technology

4.9  The Government Chief Scientific Adviser is taking action to help strengthen science and technology for national security. He and the scientific community across government are developing a National Security Science and Technology Strategy. The strategy will set out ambitions for optimising the conditions that allow S&T to flourish for national security. It will focus on mechanisms that will improve the R&D ecosystem and innovation across the national security sector, and strengthen academic, government and private sector partnerships.

C. Innovation

4.10  Innovation drives the UK’s economic strength, productivity, and competitiveness. As SDSR 2015 and NSCR noted, innovation and our exploitation of science and technology are also vital to our national security. By taking a more coordinated approach to technology and experimentation, with better central oversight, we are pursuing opportunities for modernisation more aggressively and accept higher levels of risk pursuing novel ideas. We committed to work with the private sector to make both government innovation and private sector contributions to national security more effective.

4.11  We have established a National Security Innovation Working Group, chaired by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser. The group explored options for enhancing joint working on innovation and concluded that the commitments within the national security science & technology strategy will accelerate innovation within government and across the UK, and help strengthen our national security capabilities.

4.12  We launched the Defence Innovation Initiative in September 2016 to enable the Armed Forces to maintain military edge into the future and develop an innovation ecosystem to capitalise on innovative expertise and fertile partnerships with innovators in industry. Across Defence there is now a vibrant innovation community including Hubs in each of the Front Line Commands; supported by a Defence Innovation Advisory Panel and a Defence Innovation Directorate. The Directorate incorporates the Defence and Security Accelerator and the Defence Innovation Unit, who deliver innovation policy, provide co-ordination across Defence and administer the Defence Innovation Fund.

4.13  The Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA), exists to find and fund exploitable innovation to support UK defence and security quickly and effectively, and supports UK prosperity. DASA supports the Home Office, Department of Transport as well as Ministry of Defence in bringing together the private
sector, academia, and Government organisations to find innovative solutions. DASA has managed over 40 defence innovation challenges and competitions, including the Open Call for Innovation to address some of Defence’s most pressing problems. For example, this includes a crowd safety app produced by Krowdthink which is supported by the Home Office and is being used at a major London location and Montvieux has created a prediction toolset which has multiple uses across Defence and Security.

4.14 The **Defence Innovation Advisory Panel** of external entrepreneurs and leaders advises, scrutinises and challenges the MOD, identifying opportunities to improve innovative practices and thinking, and develop a more innovative culture. The first independent annual Panel report on Defence’s approach to innovation was published in 2018. The report identifies four themes; Priorities & Exploitation, Acquisition & Processes, Data & Information Systems, and People & Culture. The MOD’s response to the Panel’s findings includes commitments to act on these findings, and to continue working with the Panel to support Defence’s progress and in the implementation of change.

4.15 The **Innovation and Research InSight Unit** (IRIS) is based in Defence Science and Technology and works to MOD’s Chief Scientific Advisor. It continues to provide thought leadership through bespoke studies that assess the opportunities, threats and long-term implications of emerging science and technologies for Defence, and advice on how we should respond – to inform thought leadership in the Department and guide innovation opportunities.

4.16 A **Defence Innovation Fund** of around £800m over 10 years aims to incentivise changes in behaviours, providing freedoms to pursue and deliver innovative solutions, and help to overcome identified barriers to the realisation of the Initiative as a whole. The Department has so far invested in over 160 innovation projects with around £25m spent from the Defence Innovation Fund to March 2019. These projects include:

- a Spearheads Portfolio which will allow us to be more innovative in the way we procure, emphasise experimentation, take appropriate risks and rapidly exploit successes.
- Using Artificial Intelligence to predict maintenance requirements in warships to improve performance and increase time on operations.
- Piloting the use of Internet of Things sensors to provide remote monitoring and asset tracking to streamline logistics and save money.
- Using Additive Manufacturing technologies to produce bespoke military packaging.
- A Progressive Total Reward App to communicate reward packages to aid retention and recruitment of military personnel.

4.17 The **SDSR reaffirmed the commitment to dedicate 1.2% of the Defence budget to science and technology (S&T)**. This sustained, long-term investment in S&T is fundamental to all Defence activity. It supports operations overseas and at home (including the response to the 2018 chemical weapons attack in Salisbury); accelerates Defence modernisation and delivery of flagship capabilities (such as the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carrier and the F-35); drives longer term transformation through development of game-changing technologies and underpins relationships with key international partners.

4.18 The **National Cyber Security Programme continued to fund important world-leading cyber security research activity**. Four research institutes with a focus on important cyber security problems have been established, with funding also allotted to the Alan Turing Institute and the PETRA hub, which specialises in the security of internet of things devices. 28 PhD students have also been sponsored ensuring the UK is supporting our best and the brightest minds in furthering cyber security research and innovation.
4.19 We continue to encourage the growth of a vibrant and sustainable cyber security sector to ensure the UK has access to the products and services to meet its needs. We are making successful interventions at each stage of the growth lifecycle. The HutZero entrepreneur boot camp has completed four cohorts, with applications for the fifth now open, providing support and guidance for those with ideas for new cyber security companies. January 2019 marked the completion of the second round of the Academic Startup programme which helps academics to commercialise their research.

4.20 In the start-up space, the third cohort of participants has started at the NCSC Accelerator in Cheltenham, while the London Cyber Innovation Centre (Lorca) opened in 2018, with the first cohort graduating the same year and the second group of starting in January 2019. A ‘Cyber Exchange’ run by the Cyber Growth partnership is providing a way for organisations across the UK with an interest in cyber security to connect, engage and collaborate. We are also progressing with an innovation fund for cyber security, and providing export advice to help cyber security companies to help them scale up their ambitions.

D. The defence and security industries

4.21 Our defence and security industries also make a major contribution to our prosperity and in delivering advanced capabilities for our Armed Forces, law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies.

4.22 The Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSaRC) was established with a core mission to deliver a joint government/private sector focus to respond to Government Security challenges. This delivers several key outcomes:

- The shaping and creation of new markets to raise security standards.
- Private sector investment in projects that deliver security.
- The bringing together of Industry and Academic knowledge and expertise that jointly drives rapid development of capabilities that they, government and UK citizens all benefit from.
- Greater success in capturing security export and overseas trade opportunities. In 2017 the UK security industry exported £4.85bn of goods and services, JSARC directly supports the Department for International Trade’s Defence and Security organisation to promote UK private sector security capabilities internationally.

4.23 We have refreshed our defence industrial policy successfully. On 14 March, a Written Ministerial Statement provided an update on the Defence Prosperity Programme which aims to grow Defence’s contribution to the UK economy; it was informed by our refreshed Defence Industrial Policy (December 2017) and Philip Dunne’s independent review (published in July 2018). Activity focuses around four areas: embedding prosperity into the Department’s policy, processes and culture; quantifying the defence contribution to UK economy; sustaining an internationally competitive and productive UK defence sector; and, growing exports and inward investment. We continue to work with our international partners to seek opportunities for the UK supply chain; for example, in 2018 we supported a supply chain event in St Louis, Missouri which involved nearly 40 UK companies.

4.24 We are taking action to enable Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) and non-traditional suppliers to bid for defence and security contracts more easily. We want to work with more small businesses across the UK. SMEs are the lifeblood of the economy. By 2022, the Government as a whole, plans that one third of its spend on goods and services will be with SMEs, either directly or through the supply chain. In Financial Year 2017/18 16.5% of MOD’s procurement spend went to SMEs.
4.25 All Departments have created SME Action Plans which are spend targets, developed according to the potential to increase accessible procurement for SMEs. This means that some departments have targets above our 33% aspiration and some below. Targets are comprised of direct and indirect spend through SMEs.

4.26 The Ministry of Defence published its plan in March 2019. The plan sets out how MOD will achieve its target that 25% of procurement spend will go directly and indirectly to SMEs by 2022, including working with our major suppliers to improve engagement throughout the defence supply chain. SME spend targets are agreed proportionately for each department, according to the potential to increase accessible procurement spend to SMEs, and each department’s starting position. This means that some departments have targets above our 33% aspiration and some below. Targets are comprised of direct and indirect spend through SMEs.

4.27 A new functionality allowing sub-contract advertising was introduced on Defence Contracts Online in September 2018. Each of the Ministry of Defence’s 19 Strategic Suppliers has been encouraged to sign up to use this functionality.

4.28 The National Shipbuilding Strategy is intended to place UK naval shipbuilding on a sustainable long-term footing. It has laid the foundations for a modern and efficient sector capable of meeting the country’s future defence and security needs. The Strategy ensures that we can design and build efficiently to deliver the ships the Royal Navy needs, while maximising the export potential of the UK shipbuilding industry and sustaining valuable UK skills. Further to Sir John Parker’s independent report to inform the new National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSBS), Sir John begun a review of the implementation of the NSBS beginning in January 2019.

4.29 The Combat Air Strategy provides a clear roadmap for the future, aligning national programmes and investment decisions to deliver our Future Combat Air Capability. Air power is critical to the UK’s ability to deliver our national security with the Strategy supporting our vision for a strong, prosperous, influential and Global Britain. The Strategy re-affirms the SDSR 15 commitment to the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative, designed to retain the UKs national advantage and freedom of action and sustain our technical ability to deliver next generation capability.

4.30 We continue to support responsible defence and security exports, working collaboratively with UK industry to take a more strategic and joined up approach to defence exports, recognising that exporting is key to sustaining the UK’s industrial base in the long term. Examples of successes include support to exports as demonstrated by Qatar Typhoon contract effectiveness and the Australian and Canadian down selection of the T26 design, which will open further export opportunities for British industry.

E. Defence and security skills

4.31 We are developing initiatives for the Ministry of Defence workforce, including apprenticeships, focused on science, technology, engineering and maths and entrepreneurial skills and we have met our target of starting 50,000 learners on apprenticeships by 2020 ahead of schedule. As of December 2018, Defence had achieved 50,919 apprenticeship starts.

4.32 We are expanding the number of cadet units in schools and are on track to meet our target. The Cadet Expansion Programme will increase the number of cadet units in schools across the UK from 354 (in March 2015) to 500 by March 2020, funded by £50m received in LIBOR fines. As of December 2018, 444 cadet units are parading in schools across the UK.
4.33 We are accelerating the provision of targeted training for those who wish to pursue careers in cyber security, looking to address the UK’s current skills shortages while also identifying and inspiring the next generation of cyber security experts and entrepreneurs. In December 2018, we published the Initial National Cyber Security Skills Strategy, opening a call-for-views period that ran until March 2019. Alongside the Initial Strategy we published our response to the consultation on 'developing the UK cyber security profession', launching a competitive grant process to identify the delivery partner for establishing a new UK Cyber Security Council.

4.34 To amplify Government's efforts to increase cyber security skills and to help draw the current landscape of activity together, the CyberFirst brand is expanding to encompass all Government cyber skills initiatives. We are continuing to run our flagship Cyber Discovery and CyberFirst courses and programmes that bring together real-world cyber expertise and educational experience to find and nurture the next generation of cyber security technical leaders. We also continue to drive initiatives right across the skills pipeline and have launched the Cyber Skills Immediate Impact Fund (CSIIF) that aims to rapidly increase the diversity and numbers of those working in the cyber security sector.

4.35 To make it easier for people to move between different elements of the ‘Whole Force’ over their career, the MOD is continuing to collaborate with Industry on the Critical Skills challenge facing the Defence Sector. This Enterprise Approach Concept is examining ways in which people as a capability can be shared more widely than traditionally as a means to reduce skills gaps, create broader and agile skills groups, while enhancing operational capability further still. The concept is proven, but not yet assured, and we will seek to formally test interventions to assess whether modelled outcomes can be realised for mutual benefit.
Section 5: Implementation and Reform

5.1 The Prime Minister continues to oversee progress against the commitments set out in SDSR 2015 and now the NSCR, through the NSC and the National Security Adviser. The NSC (SDSR) sub-Committee was established to oversee and drive implementation of SDSR 2015 and now the NSCR. Cyber security is now also within the remit of the committee. The NSC (Cyber) Committee has merged with the NSC (SDSR) Committee and in 2018, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was appointed to chair it. The NSC (SDSR) is supported by a senior officials group, chaired within NSS, to monitor and escalate issues as required. Both the Committee and the senior officials group continue to be supported by the SDSR team and NSC Secretariat within National Security Secretariat (NSS).

Members of the National Security Council (Strategic Defence and Security Review Implementation) sub-Committee

- Chancellor of the Exchequer (Chair)
- Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office
- Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
- Secretary of State for the Home Department
- Secretary of State for Defence
- Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
- Secretary of State for International Development
- Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport

Other ministers will be invited to attend as required.

5.2 Our enhanced national security structures promote and support the Fusion approach to national security. Our SDSR implementation team within NSS, continues to provide the secretariat to the Committee and oversees implementation by Departments.

5.3 NSS and SDSR Implementation processes have benefitted from the close interest of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy (JCNSS). In March 2018 the Committee published a report — ‘National Security Capability Review: A Changing Security Environment’, in which it considered what the NSCR should cover and our review process so far. Other relevant inquiries were on the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund; Cyber Security of the UK’s Critical National Infrastructure (including skills) and the work of the National Security Adviser.
5.4 We continue to benefit from highly capable data analytics and horizon-scanning capabilities, drawn from expertise across government, and working increasingly closely with the private sector and academia. We have completed a review of strategic intelligence assessments in government in early 2018, which developed recommendations on how to ensure they are as effective and efficient as possible in providing evidence to inform and underpin national security policy and decision making. The recommendations are being taken forward with a plan for implementation.
Embedding Fusion

5.5 Since its announcement in 2018, Fusion has enabled a significant change in how we approach national strategic objectives. It is now widely accepted as the right way to conduct national security business, and underpins our work to tackle a range of priorities.

5.6 In our pursuit of a Chilcot compliant approach to strategy making we have developed new structures to support that Fusion focussed approach. Working through the full set of UK interest and objectives each NSC priority has been assigned a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) who is supported by a cross-government National Security Strategy Implementation Group (NSSIG) or National Strategy Implementation Group (NSIG) (depending on the objective). NSSIGs and NSIGs have representation from across Government and not just from the traditional national security community, enabling the broadest range of skills and expertise to be utilised in addressing national security challenges. SROs are empowered to decide how their NSSIG/NSIG operates, with the focus on impact and approach rather than a prescriptive process. It results in better alignment of resources and ambition and is able to identify decisions for Ministers. Both Fusion and its structures are already having a positive impact on the quality of choices provided to the NSC for each priority.

5.7 The last year has made it clear that we need Fusion now more than ever. As the challenges to our national security diversify, and when international norms are changing the traditional national security operating model, Fusion provides the basis for effective whole of government working and improved strategy development and implementation. Success requires us to bring to bear the right mix of our capabilities in pursuit of our objectives. This is supported by the experience of Fusion in the last year and the findings of the Government’s first internal national security posture review (see below). The Salisbury example, cited earlier in this report, shows what can be achieved when government is truly fused in its response to priorities.

5.8 The UK’s strategic approach to Africa is a further example of Fusion in action. Fusion has been built into the UK’s strategic approach from the start, driven by a cross-Departmental joint unit that draws on a wide range of expertise and is informed by deep, shared analysis of key trends and drivers across Africa. This has enabled the development of a genuinely new and transformational long term strategic approach, partnership working with African nations and institutions for mutual benefit. It is based on collective identification of the UK’s comparative advantage and an understanding of where the full range of UK capabilities could most effectively assist African partners to deliver the change Africans want. In other words, Fusion has made it possible to identify the UK catalytic contribution in tackling shared priority areas with our international partners.

5.9 Fusion has also started to shape work on priorities outside traditional national security areas. It has formed the basis of work towards enabling digital trade, creating global conditions that support this growing part of the UK economy, using a variety of levers. Examples include the UK-led Commonwealth Cyber Declaration in 2018, the widest declaration of its type made on behalf of 2.4bn people. The declaration was designed to encourage states to agree a common vision for a free, open, inclusive and secure cyberspace, ensuring the internet remains free and open across the Commonwealth, and supported by HMG capacity building funding to strengthen cyber capabilities and respond to incidents.

5.10 In the coming year, we will continue to build on our progress to date, focusing our efforts to refine how Fusion is applied, including through the structures that have been created, empowering a wider range of officials to tackle priorities using Fusion principles and building on efforts to ensure Fusion is the default way of working. As detailed in the NSCR, Fusion is underpinned by partnerships, both within Government and in the public and private sectors – as the application of Fusion is broadened out, so too will the range of partnership working with organisations and individuals who can offer expertise, information and
capabilities towards achieving UK strategic objectives. These partnerships, in conjunction with robust analysis and insight from SROs, will also inform how we use and develop UK capabilities to ensure we can continue to respond to evolving threats to our national security.

The Annual Posture Review

5.11 The First Annual Posture Review provided insight into how the new Fusion structures are bedding in and the experience of SROs and practitioners, and identified areas for the continued implementation of Fusion.

5.12 Notable findings from the APR include:

- Fusion is bedding in well in its first year of operation and has been used to challenge traditional mindsets and encourage a genuinely cross-Government approach to pursuing UK national security priorities.
- Fusion is already having an impact on national security policy, by improving the strategy making process more broadly and through the NSSIG structure which is helping to convene and direct work in new and positive ways. The structure will be refined as lessons are learnt and to ensure it remains the right way to support fused working on our national strategic priorities.
- Greater use is being made of a broader range of UK levers and expertise that can be deployed to achieve our strategic objectives. We must continue to build on this progress across all priorities and do more to take a truly Fusion approach to ensuring we have the right blend of levers and expertise.

National Security Communications

5.13 As a result of the NSCR, the dedicated National Security Communications Team (NSCT) was established in March 2018. During its first year of operation it has led, convened and co-ordinated cross-Whitehall communications expertise and resources in response to some of the most pressing and challenging security threats faced by the UK. This included leading the cross-Government communications response to the Salisbury poisoning; coordinating local, national and international activity across multiple government departments, Counter-Terrorism police and local agencies to reassure the public, counter disinformation and support diplomatic efforts. We have also developed high profile campaigns in disinformation and modern slavery in conjunction with partners. We are also responding to the NSCR challenge to embed strategic communications into national security decision making, working closely across the community with a particular focus to address hybrid threats and hostile states in a Fusion approach. A long term programme to build specialist capacity and capability for national security communicators domestically and internationally is underway as part of the function’s core responsibilities.

Diversity and Inclusion

5.14 Our national security community is made up of talented professionals who serve to protect our society and economy from harm. Combating these constantly evolving threats requires a diverse and inclusive workforce that reflects the communities we are protecting. Diversity is an operational imperative for national security organisations, which is why we are purposefully and unashamedly ambitious in our goal of recruiting the best from different backgrounds, whose perspectives and alternative ways of thinking empower us to innovate and meet our complex, interconnected and fast-moving national security challenges.

5.15 National Security Council Officials recognise that diversity and inclusion are critical enablers and are committed to putting the national security community at the forefront of the Civil Service’s drive to
become the most inclusive employer in the country. We take better decisions, and implement them better, when we challenge ourselves, consider diverse perspectives and reduce scope for human error and unconscious bias. Just as we would work to tackle any complex national security challenge, we are working across all of Government to achieve diversity and inclusion in our workforce, business processes and culture. Building on existing departmental programmes, we are undertaking a series of initiatives to attract individuals with the necessary skills, talents and experiences of all sectors of our society to reflect, protect and promote our values, and keep our nation safe.

5.16 We expect all of our leaders to champion diversity and inclusion in their individual organisations, empowering everyone in our community to contribute. The Cabinet Secretary has appointed his two deputies as Senior Sponsors for Diversity and Inclusion. A Senior Responsible Owner has been appointed to drive a cross-government work programme and build on what departments are already doing. We are supporting this work with a full-time Programme Lead in the National Security Secretariat; a cross-government Steering Group and by strengthening and extending our National Security Community Diversity and Inclusion Network. We will improve our data to build a more complete picture across the national security community so that we are better able to assess our progress and impact.

5.17 We are committed to building a more inclusive national security culture that enables challenge. We will complete a comprehensive inquiry to explore the impact of the national security community’s culture on policymaking, operations and on public perceptions so that we develop the understanding we need to make improvements. We will improve the level of challenge we bring to key policymaking processes, including by enhancing the impact of the National Security Council (Officials) Shadow Board, which is now in its second year of operation, and explore ways demonstrably to embed our values in our decision-making processes.

5.18 We are committed to gearing our business processes to support diversity and inclusion. We will increase our collaboration across the community on key processes including outreach, talent development, recruitment, and vetting. We will learn from each other, from our international partners and other sectors.

5.19 We are committed to increasing the diversity of our workforce, creating an inclusive community that gives our people a sense of belonging, allows them to be authentic and ensures they have a voice.

5.20 We will enhance essential support for staff and have extended the remit of the Staff Counsellor to ensure that there is a service available to any current or former member of the national security community to consult on matters of conscience arising from national security work. We will encourage and enable every single member of the national security community to contribute to making us more diverse and inclusive, embedding the principles and practices of our ‘Mission Critical’ diversity and inclusion toolkit across government.

Virtual National Security Academy

5.21 Work on a virtual National Security Academy is well underway. Sharing, developing and maintaining critical skills and knowledge across the national security community is an important component of enabling a whole of government approach to tackling our national strategic priorities. This is a joint effort with departments working together to improve access to existing learning and development opportunities, developing new training as required, and sharing experiences of best practice and lessons learnt to refine fused working.

5.22 We are developing a cross-government International Capability to increase international expertise. The Global Britain NSSIG in July 2018 endorsed the creation of a light touch profession or
capability to improve international skills and expertise across Whitehall. This resulted in extensive consultation across Whitehall to develop options on the scope, ambition and resourcing. This ran from July to October 2018. An implementation plan to 2021 was agreed at the NSSIG in December 2018. The FCO Diplomatic Academy, supported by a cross-HMG steering group, is taking forward this work.
# Principal Commitments from SDSR 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Green = In Progress / Ongoing</th>
<th>Blue = Complete</th>
<th>Grey = No Longer Applicable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong> We will recruit and train over 1,900 additional security and intelligence staff across the agencies to respond to, and deter those behind, the increasing international terrorist, cyber and other global threats.</td>
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<td><strong>2</strong> In NATO, we will lead a renewed focus on deterrence to address current and future threats.</td>
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<td><strong>3</strong> We will enhance joint working between law enforcement agencies and the Royal Navy to increase patrolling in our territorial waters.</td>
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<td><strong>4</strong> We will continue to meet the NATO target to invest 2% of GDP on defence.</td>
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<td><strong>5</strong> We will spend around £178bn over the next decade on equipment and equipment support.</td>
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<td><strong>6</strong> We will develop a new Joint Force 2025</td>
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<td><strong>7</strong> We will enhance the Armed Forces capability to work alongside the security and intelligence agencies to disrupt threats in the most challenging operating environments worldwide</td>
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<td><strong>8</strong> We will develop proposals to ensure that the Armed Forces can operate effectively overseas and are not subject to unjustified legal claims that undermine their ability to do their job.</td>
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<td><strong>9</strong> We will work with France to develop an Unmanned Combat Air System programme, and collaborate on complex weapons.</td>
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<td><strong>10</strong> We are committed to maintaining the size of the regular Armed Forces and to not reduce the Regular Army below 82,000.</td>
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<td><strong>11</strong> We will make the changes necessary to enable our Armed Forces to work flexibly, reflecting the realities of modern life.</td>
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<td><strong>12</strong> We will make a new accommodation offer to help more Service personnel live in private accommodation and meet their aspirations for home ownership.</td>
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<td><strong>13</strong> We will develop a new Armed Forces offer for new joiners, which better meets the expectations of future recruits and targets resources on those with the skills we need most.</td>
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<td><strong>14</strong> We will continue to grow our Reserves to 35,000.</td>
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<td><strong>15</strong> We will launch the first comprehensive families strategy for the Armed Forces.</td>
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<td><strong>16</strong> We will reduce the number of civilians employed by the MOD by almost 30%, to 41,000, by the end of this Parliament.</td>
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<td><strong>17</strong> We will invest in key defence sites and reduce the built estate by 30%, releasing public sector land for 55,000 new homes to support wider prosperity objectives.</td>
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<td><strong>18</strong> We will replace the Vanguard Class of nuclear-armed submarines with a new class of four submarines, currently known as Successor.</td>
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<td><strong>19</strong> Working with industry, we will confirm and implement the organisational, managerial and contractual changes needed to deliver the Successor programme.</td>
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<td><strong>20</strong> We will hold a debate in Parliament on the principle of Continuous At Sea Deterrence and our plans for Successor, and will continue to provide annual reports to Parliament.</td>
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<td><strong>21</strong> We will update CONTEST in 2016 through a new National Security Council committee on Counter-Terrorism, chaired by the Prime Minister.</td>
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<td><strong>22</strong> We will implement our new Counter-Extremism strategy.</td>
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<td><strong>23</strong> We will increase the resources for the counter-terrorism police and the security and intelligence agencies to pursue terrorists.</td>
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<td><strong>24</strong> In 2016, we will legislate to consolidate the investigatory powers that the public authorities require, with robust oversight, transparency and safeguards, and to ensure that the law keeps pace as communications technology advances.</td>
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<td><strong>25</strong> We will provide significant new investment to enhance our Special Forces’ Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and global strike capability.</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>We will more than double our spending on aviation security around the world.</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>We will create a bigger and more capable global security and intelligence network to protect British citizens at home and abroad, and work with our partners.</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>We will increase our network of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism experts in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>We will invest £1.9 bn over the next five years in protecting the UK from cyber attack and developing our sovereign capabilities in cyber space.</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>In 2016, we will publish a second five-year National Cyber Security Strategy.</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>We will launch a further five-year National Cyber Security Programme.</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>We will invest in capabilities to detect and analyse cyber threats, pre-empt attacks and track down those responsible.</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>We will develop a series of measures to defend ourselves against cyber attacks.</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>We will create a new National Cyber Centre to lead this response.</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>We will build a new secure, cross-government network to improve joint working on sensitive cyber issues.</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>We will help companies and the public to do more to protect their own data from cyber threats.</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>We will reinforce law enforcement’s specialist capabilities; and we will work with industry to strengthen our ability to disrupt cyber crime.</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>We will create a new intelligence unit dedicated to tackling the criminal use of the ‘dark web’.</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>We will continue our work to choke off the supply and availability of illegal firearms to prevent their use by criminal or terrorist groups in the UK.</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>We will introduce new measures to make the UK a more hostile place for those seeking to move, hide or use the proceeds of crime and corruption or to evade sanctions.</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>We will ensure that we have the right capabilities in the UK and overseas, and a comprehensive action plan, to better identify, disrupt and dismantle the criminal networks involved in modern slavery and immigration crime.</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>We will strengthen our approach to tackling online child sexual exploitation and abuse.</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>We will publish a national bio-security strategy in 2016.</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>We will make sure that the Government has the right regulatory framework to ensure that our CNI is resilient to future threats.</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>We will enhance the UK’s resilience to power disruptions.</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>We intend to integrate infrastructure policing further and we will review options to do this.</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>We will publish a National Space Policy with a Ministerial committee to coordinate action on both prosperity and security.</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>We will extend deep country expertise to wider areas that are vital to our security and prosperity, including language ability in Mandarin and Arabic and we will extend expertise on Russia.</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>We will fund and administer approximately 2,200 awards a year for young people of high ability to study in the UK, through the Chevening, Marshall and Commonwealth scholarship schemes.</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>We will make defence engagement a funded, core MOD task for the first time.</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>We will establish British Defence Staffs in the Middle East, Asia Pacific and Africa in 2016.</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>We will increase the training we offer to our international partners.</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>We will continue to invest in the British Council.</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>We will invest £85 million each year by 2017/18 in the BBC’s digital, TV and radio services around the world to build the global reach of the World Service and increase access to news and information.</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>We will strengthen the interoperability with the US of our Armed Forces so that they are better able to work together when required through regularly planning and training together.</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>We will work with the US to deliver more for global stability and our shared interests.</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>We will further strengthen the UK-France defence and security relationship.</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>We will work to intensify our security and defence relationship with Germany.</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>We will set out our vision of our future relationships with partners in the Gulf region in our new Gulf Strategy. We will build a permanent and more substantial UK military presence.</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>We will build a deeper partnership with China, working more closely together to address global challenges.</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>We will champion an EU-India Free Trade Agreement to help make it easier for UK companies to do business in India.</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>We will double the number of military personnel that we contribute to UN peacekeeping operations</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>We will work to build the inclusivity of International Financial Institutions’ membership and decision-making, so they continue to command credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of their members.</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>We will review sanctions governance to ensure the best coordination of policy, implementation and enforcement.</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>We will campaign to increase the number of countries that have ratified the Arms Trade Treaty.</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>We will spend at least 50% of DFID’s budget in fragile states and regions in every year of this Parliament.</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>We will increase the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund from £1 bn in 2015/16 to £1.3 bn by 2019/20.</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>We will double the existing Good Governance Fund to support economic and governance reforms in the eastern European neighbourhood to £40 million per year by the end of this Parliament.</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>We will increase UK climate finance for developing countries by at least 50%, rising to £5.8 bn over five years.</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>We will establish a new rapid response team of technical experts to deploy to help countries investigate and control disease outbreaks; and expand our Emergency Medical Team to provide medical assistance to help contain outbreaks when needed.</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>We are creating a Prosperity Fund of £1.3 bn over the next five years.</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>We will launch a defence innovation initiative.</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>We will create a new, cross-government Emerging Technology and Innovation Analysis Cell.</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>We will establish a defence and security accelerator for government to help the private sector, allies and academia turn ideas into innovative equipment and services faster for national security users.</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>We will encourage the creation and growth of a vibrant cyber security sector, including launching two innovation centres; supporting the best up-and-coming cyber SMEs and helping to commercialise research in universities.</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>We will develop initiatives for the MOD workforce, including apprenticeships, focused on science, technology, engineering and maths and entrepreneurial skills.</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>We will refresh our defence industrial policy and take further action to help the defence and security industries to grow and compete successfully.</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>We will publish a new national shipbuilding strategy in 2016.</td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>We will take action to enable SMEs and non-traditional suppliers to bid for defence and security contracts more easily.</td>
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</table>
We will further enhance our support to the defence and security export sector.

We will spend £50 million to increase the number of cadet units in schools, bringing the total across the UK to 500 by 2020.

We will train at least 50,000 apprentices in Defence between now and 2020.

We will speed up the provision of targeted training for those who wish to pursue careers in cyber security.

We will establish a new NSC committee to oversee implementation of this strategy. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will chair it.

We will launch a review of how we support the NSC and COBR during crises.

We will review the structure for strategic assessment within central government.

We will establish new policy-making and delivery joint units in 2016.

We will establish a security and defence diversity network, sharing best practice and addressing our shared challenges, to drive development of a more diverse and inclusive national security community.

We will establish a virtual National Security Academy.

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**Principal Commitments from NSCR 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Green = In Progress / Ongoing</th>
<th>Blue = Complete</th>
<th>Grey = No Longer Applicable</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>We have commissioned the Modernising Defence Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>We will publish a new counter-terrorism strategy, which will include measures to improve our ability to disrupt terrorist plots in their early stages and improve frontline integration of our counter-terrorism response</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>We will continue to implement the National Cyber Security Strategy and ensure it keeps pace with the threat, including through the National Cyber Security Centre</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>As we leave the EU, we want to protect our cyber cooperation so that we can continue to share information about cyber threats, work with the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENSIA) and Europol, deepen industrial collaboration and work together to develop cyber resilience and response options</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>We will take a whole-of-government approach including with the Devolved Administrations to tackle serious and organised crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>We will establish a new intelligence framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>We will take a whole-of-government approach to disrupting high-harm organised crime groups and corrupt elites</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>We will create a National Economic Crime Centre in partnership with the private sector</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>We will reform the Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) system</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>We will make community engagement a cornerstone of our response</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>We will continue to deliver a targeted response overseas to tackle the inherently transnational nature of the threat</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>We will improve our strategic intelligence capability further by integrating the knowledge and expertise held by our border organisations to produce comprehensive strategic threats assessments</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
13. We will continue to build a set of Resilience Standards which set expectations, help Local Resilience Forums assess themselves, and act as a basis for assurance and continuous improvement.

14. We will identify ways to reinforce local mutual aid systems during disasters.

15. We will work across services, including with the voluntary sector and charities, to continue to develop a holistic approach to supporting victims of all major and serious incidents.

16. We will establish a Global Britain Board to coordinate Global Britain activity across departments, agencies and our overseas network.

17. We will strengthen our overseas network to support our ambitions for Global Britain.

18. The cross-government Network Board will set out a detailed implementation plan that identifies measures to further strengthen the overseas platform.

19. We will create a cross-government soft power strategy.

20. We will develop options to improve visa service delivery.

21. We will continue to demonstrate global leadership through a rolling calendar of international summits and conferences.

22. We will significantly expand the National Security Communications Team.

23. We will use the Fusion Doctrine to integrate economic goals and capabilities throughout national security.

24. We will ensure our development capability responds to changes in drivers of global poverty and works in more innovative ways.

25. We will increase our efforts on security and justice.

26. We will share knowledge and technical expertise to support partner governments to develop and deliver strategies for inclusive economic growth.

27. We will enhance the cross-government funds by improving strategic direction through the Fusion Doctrine, governance through a new Ministerial committee, and efficient administration by merging the secretariats into a single Funds Unit.
Annex B: SDSR and NSCR Commitment Delivery Progress 2018

SDSR 2015

NSCR 2018