JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-00

CAMPAIGN EXECUTION

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as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine)

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JDP 3-00

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country’s armed forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in JDPs. From time to time, Interim JDPs (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed through Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). To ensure timeliness, they are not subject to the rigorous staffing processes applied to JDPs, particularly in terms of formal external approval. Raised by the DCDC, they seek to capture and disseminate best practice or articulate doctrinal solutions from which this can be developed for operations and training.

Details of the joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 Joint Doctrine Development Handbook.

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1 Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).
CHANGE 1

Change 1 to JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution (3rd Edition) was promulgated in July 2012. Change 1 recasts the original Chapter 3 Campaign Execution into 2 chapters; Chapter 3 Joint Action and Chapter 4 Campaign Execution. The original Chapter 4 Assessment has been renumbered Chapter 5 Assessment. It should be noted that there are no content updates in this chapter. The new Chapter 3 Joint Action and Chapter 4 Campaign Execution also provides updated or new doctrine on:

- **Joint Action.** The original Joint Action model has been revised to recognise that:
  - Influence is central to all military activity. Accordingly, labelling a discrete activity set as Influence Activities is unhelpful and misleading. Change 1 renames these as Information Activities.
  - A wider range of activities other than fires, manoeuvre and information activities contribute to campaign execution. To reflect this, capacity-building activities (such as security sector reform) have been grouped together under the heading of outreach.
  - Within the operating space we interact with a wide range of actors and not simply adversaries.

- **Strategic Communication.** Building on JDN 1/12 Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution and JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning (2nd Edition Change 1), Change 1 to JDP-3-00 explains how campaign execution is nested within the overall campaign narrative and themes.

- **Full Spectrum Targeting.** If influence is the overall outcome, a holistic approach to targeting is required from the outset. This is enabled by a deep understanding of target systems and their critical vulnerabilities. With this understanding planners will be better able to select the most effective and appropriate activity, lethal or non-lethal, to apply.

- **Consequence Management.** In an environment where information flow is increasingly prevalent, headquarters must be prepared to react to incidents and events that may threaten campaign process.
1. **Purpose.** JDP 3-00 *Campaign Execution (3rd Edition)* describes the integration, coordination, synchronisation and prioritisation of deployed multinational and national joint operations. JDP 3-00 flows directly from JDP 01 *Campaigning (2nd Edition)* and together with JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning (2nd Edition)*, is the UK authority for the conduct of deployed joint operations. It is aimed primarily at those responsible for the execution of operations, specifically the Chief of Staff (COS) Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and component headquarters’ COS and their respective staffs. It is a key document in delivery of joint command and staff training.

2. **Structure.** JDP 3-00 comprises 2 discrete parts: Part 1 *Campaign Execution* and Part 2 *Assessment*:

a. Part 1 is divided into 4 chapters:

   (1) **Chapter 1 – Forming the Force.**Chapter 1 describes the command and control of a joint force, focusing on the requirements of a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), and other aspects of force generation. Initially, it describes a model where the UK is in command of a Joint Force Headquarters, it then explores the most likely case; the UK as a contributing nation with a national contingent headquarters.

   (2) **Chapter 2 – Component Contributions to Joint Operations.** Chapter 2 describes the characteristics of 5 generic components. Other joint force elements and their respective contributions to, and integration within, a Joint Task Force are also described. Critically, it sets out alternatives to this model, such as fully integrated headquarters, and the circumstances under which they might be employed.

   (3) **Chapter 3 – Joint Action.** Chapter 3, and its annexes, explore the concept of Joint Action as a mechanism for brigading types of military activity to deliver synergy and achieve influence effect.

   (4) **Chapter 4 – Campaign Management.** Chapter 4 describes some of the mechanisms and considerations by which the JTFC integrates, coordinates and prioritises the activities executed by the components to achieve the campaign end-state.

b. Part 2 comprises a single chapter. **Chapter 5 – Assessment** describes the principles and processes of operational-level assessment.
JDP 3-00

LINKAGES

3. JDP 3-00 is linked with:
   
   
b. JDP 01 Campaigning (2nd Edition).
   
c. JDP 04 Understanding.
   
d. JDP 2-00 Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (3rd Edition).
   
e. JDP 3-70 Battlespace Management.
   
f. JDP 3-80 Information Activities Series.\(^2\)
   
g. JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning (2nd Edition Change 1).

4. Multinational Operations. The UK is most likely to work within multinational coalitions led by NATO, the US or France. Although this doctrine is compatible with that of our major allies, it is not identical. Knowledge of UK military doctrine is insufficient to prepare headquarters staff for commanding a multinational operation or working within a multinational headquarters. Staff must be intimately familiar with the equivalent doctrine of the lead nation or organisation.

   a. Allied Doctrine. While coherent with the thrust of Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) such as, AJP-01 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine and AJP-3(A) Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations, JDP 3-00 reflects important points of national emphasis highlighted in recent operations. It has been designed to flow from JDP 01 Campaigning (2nd Edition) which offers specific guidance for JTFCs and national contingent commanders. Where there are variances with multinational doctrine, UK joint doctrine has primacy for UK national, and UK-led, operations.

   b. Other Multinational Doctrine. Useful guidance on operating within an ad hoc coalition can be found in the Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide. Equivalent US doctrine is centred on Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations and French doctrine on Doctrine Inter Armée (DIA) -03 Command.

\(^2\) Due to be promulgated in 2013.
CAMPAIGN EXECUTION

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Lexicon
Chapter 1 describes the Command and Control (C2) of a joint force, focused on the requirements of a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), and other aspects of force preparation. It sets out 2 broad models: where the United Kingdom (UK) is in command - a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), and where the UK is a contributing nation - a national contingent headquarters.

Section I – Introduction
Section II – Joint Task Force Command and Control
Section III – National Contingent Command and Control
Section IV – Force Preparation

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

101. Operations are almost invariably joint, multinational and inter-agency. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-00 Campaign Execution provides a JTFC or national contingent commander with the broad structures and processes to design a headquarters or staff structure that allows UK forces to operate effectively. Specifically, Chapter 1 articulates how a JTFC exercises C2 over the force and how the JTFHQ might be constructed to assist. It also considers the overall force preparation process.

102. Ideally, the construct of a force, its desired order and means of arrival in theatre should be driven by careful analysis of the specific situation. Set within a context of clear political direction, this analysis should be informed through estimates at both the military strategic and operational levels. However, such clarity is rare. In practice the diplomatic situation will be dynamic as the UK Government is subjected to both internal and external pressures. This may obscure any early articulation of strategic intent or the means to achieve it. It may also preclude an early display of national commitment or, alternatively, demand ongoing adjustments to policy and direction. As a consequence, military planning and preparations may have to be made with ambiguous strategic direction. This may constrain the military options available. Alternatively, diplomatic requirements might demand a rapid demonstration of intent or intervention that compresses military planning timelines, with options driven by readiness profiles. Even when time is available, resource and financial constraints may be key determinants for shaping the force structure, rather than military logic alone. Therefore, the generic model for forming the force described in this Chapter is a guideline only and will require much judgement in its application. Throughout, an appreciation of the political context and the flexibility to work within it will be crucial.
Crisis in the Gulf emerged in the context of an end to the Cold War, from which the Treasury was keen to draw a peace dividend. Initial deployment was driven by that which was available and sufficient to demonstrate political solidarity with the Gulf states, while avoiding the commitment of significant resources or portraying an overly aggressive stance, which might complicate diplomatic efforts.

On the weekend of the initial invasion 2 squadrons of Tornado F3s (air defence variant) were, by chance, at RAF Akrotiri. Their availability and defensive nature was in line with the political dynamic – they deployed. At the same time, Jaguar aircraft represented the only easily deployable ground reconnaissance capability. As an added bonus it could be supported by The Sultan of Oman’s Air Force, who also operated the Jaguar – they deployed too.

It was only following this initial deployment that Air Vice Marshal Wilson asked the question, “What capability do we need?” The answer was offensive counter air and tactical reconnaissance. Although Tornado GR1 and GR1A were ultimately deployed, the Secretary of State, who had made public statements concerning “defensive deployments only”, took much convincing. Indeed, serious consideration was given to basing GR1s in Akrotiri, despite the crews’ lack of air-to-air refuelling currency, which would have made credible air operations difficult.

Joint Operations

103. Joint operations involve contributions from 2 or more environments, and other joint force elements, under a unified command structure. These contributions may be brigaded into components, as shown at Annex 1A, particularly during major combat operations. However, there are alternatives to the traditional component structure, which the doctrine covers in more detail at Chapter 2.

Multinational Operations

104. Combining the military capabilities of different nations brings depth and breadth to a force. It also generates complexity, uncertainty and risk, in almost direct proportion to the number of nations involved. In practice, international consensus and legitimacy, rather than military preference or operational necessity, may drive multinational involvement and a commander must occasionally be prepared to accept the former at the expense of the latter. The UK may operate with its formal allies on combined operations, or with others as part of ad hoc coalitions. Annex 1B provides more detail on multinational operations.
105. **Fully Integrated Forces.** Fully integrated forces, to which nations may contribute in unequal shares, are commanded on a rotational or *pro rata* basis, from an integrated multinational headquarters, and often from fixed infrastructure. Fully integrated forces can be used for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5 Crisis Response Operations and other medium to large scale operations.

106. **Framework Nation.** Forces generated under a framework nation are commanded by an officer from that nation, which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the headquarters. It is also likely to dictate the procedures adopted.

107. **Lead Nation.** Forces generated under a lead nation are also commanded by an officer from that nation, from his own JTFHQ (augmented with liaison officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute national contingents and national contingent commanders.

### Multinational Command and Control

108. **NATO Command Arrangements.** NATO uses: Operational Command (OPCOM); Operational Control (OPCON); Tactical Command (TACOM); and Tactical Control (TACON). These are defined at Annex 1C, together with similar, but not identical, US terms at Appendix 1C1. It should be noted that:

   a. OPCOM of UK forces is retained by the UK (usually the Joint Commander), except when granted to a NATO commander for Article 5 operations.

   b. OPCON is usually delegated to an appropriate NATO commander.

109. **Non-NATO Command Arrangements.** For national and non-NATO multinational operations with a UK lead, C2 architecture and doctrine generally mirrors the NATO model, with a UK JTFC or national contingent commander selected from the Joint Force Command Group. These commanders then normally pass TACOM to multinational or national subordinate tactical commanders.

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1 Certain command posts are permanently earmarked for the Joint Force Command Group, maintained to provide a pool of potential Joint Task Force (JTF), component, contingent or national contingent commanders. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) makes the final selection.
Comprehensive Approach

Joint Inter-agency Headquarters

‘Management of the campaign was founded on a joint inter-agency task force approach, essential for operations amongst the people. Other Government departments were given real influence over direction and, once empowered and properly resourced, proved both willing and able to deliver specific components of the campaign plan. They added breadth to the military perspective. The plan established 3 interdependent ellipses of operation: security; governance; and social and economic development, all focused on Iraqi needs and measured by cultural sensitivity.’

Major General Salmon, General Officer Commanding Multinational District (South East) (MND(SE)) Post Operational Report Operation TELIC 12-13

110. Creating the conditions necessary to achieve desired outcomes requires a mixture of diplomatic, military and economic measures, as well as effective collaboration between military and non-military actors, both across Government and including other national and multinational institutions, agencies and organisations. When building the JTFHQ, advisers and representatives from other government departments should be embedded from the outset. However, some agencies will have a presence in a crisis area prior to military intervention and many may retain functional or other responsibilities after military forces have achieved their objectives and departed. Once deployed, therefore, an even wider range of actors should be brought into the consultation, planning and execution processes of the JTFHQ. Within certain context, the situation may demand that a bespoke headquarters is developed, which is not only joint but also genuinely inter-agency. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is an example of a joint and inter-agency headquarters and further details of its structure are at Annex 1D.

US AFRICOM

‘The designers of AFRICOM clearly understood the relationships between, development, diplomacy and prosperity in Africa. As a result, AFRICOM reflects a much more integrated staff structure, one that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and other US Government agencies involved in Africa. The command also seeks to incorporate partner nations and humanitarian organisations, from Africa and elsewhere, to work alongside US staff on common approaches to shared interests.’

2 www.africom.mil
SECTION II – JOINT TASK FORCE COMMAND AND CONTROL

111. The UK may either:
   a. Act unilaterally under a UK JTFC and JTFHQ.
   b. Lead a multinational force from a multinational JTFHQ.
   c. Provide a UK contribution and national contingent commander/national contingent headquarters to a multinational force led by another nation.

Joint Task Force Headquarters

112. The standing Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) provides the nucleus for a UK-provided JTFHQ/national contingent headquarters, but there are a number of options:

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<th>Type</th>
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<tr>
<td>Model A</td>
<td>Small, stand-alone headquarters comprising some or all of JFHQ. Default for small-scale operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model B</td>
<td>JFHQ augmented by the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), front line commands and/or the Augmentation Manning List. Default for a UK operational level headquarters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model C</td>
<td>Single-Service deployable headquarters with integrated JFHQ staff, augmented as necessary.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model D</td>
<td>Single-Service headquarters adapted to form a JTFHQ/national contingent headquarters.</td>
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<td>Model E</td>
<td>Bespoke headquarters with staff from all Services.</td>
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Table 1.1 – Alternative Joint Task Force Headquarters

113. **Structure.** The mission, size and nature of the force, the extent of collaboration required with other actors and the preferences of the JTFC/national contingent commander are key factors in the JTFC’s C2 Estimate and are used to determine the structure and procedures of a particular JTFHQ or national contingent headquarters. JFHQ provides a model comprising:

   a. **Command and Staff Element.** A permanent cadre of approximately 55 joint staff officers, clerical and administrative support staff, led by a 1* Chief of Joint Force Operations, augmented by up to 300 additional staff.

   b. **Command Support Element.** The command support element provides Communications and Information Systems (CIS), as well as expeditionary life support and force protection for the headquarters.
114. Deployment of a headquarters may be phased, its eventual composition reflecting a balance between capacity, endurance, agility, efficiency, footprint and multinational and multi-agency representation. A JTFC should exercise command from wherever he judges he can best influence events, usually from within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The optimum location will depend upon the nature of the operation and such factors as:

   a. The need to interact with other elements of the force, indigenous forces, regional leaders and locally-based non-military agencies.
   
   b. The ability to reachback to higher headquarters. With adequate CIS, reaching back from a small deployed headquarters allows a small footprint, a wider choice of locations and reduced logistic/force protection requirements.

115. **Augmentation.** The Defence Augmentation Cell provides a JTFHQ with specialist staff and enables 24-hour manning. Primary augmentees are pre-nominated specialists held at high readiness to fill specific posts. Secondary augmentees are general staff officers, held at lower readiness, with less definitive job specifications. Selection is determined by qualification, recommendation and availability. The receiving headquarters should integrate augmentees as soon as possible after identification, especially if they have no previous experience together, in which case pre-deployment training is critical. Operational requirements should be balanced against routine requirements, such as training and career development.

**Command**

116. **Commander.** A JTFC\(^3\) is likely to have held previous command appointments as a component or contingent commander and have experience in joint and multinational headquarters. His experience of working with other agencies may be variable. A JTFC may benefit from the advice and counsel of an appointed mentor.

117. **Deputy Commander.** A deputy commander, if deployed, provides continuity when a JTFC is away from his headquarters. Ideally, he should be senior to the subordinate tactical/component commanders and, in the interests of diversity, may be chosen from a non-lead or framework nation. It is essential, however, that a deputy understands not only the JTFC’s intent but also his approach to command, in order to maintain tempo and avoid unnecessary friction.

**Headquarters Staff Roles and Organisation**

118. Table 1.2 contains guidance on staff roles and organisation.

\(^3\) Depending on the scale of an operation a UK Joint Task Force Commander can be anything from 4* to OF5.
Integration - Staff assist the JTFC to integrate augmentees within the headquarters. Permanent staff are key to instilling unity of effort amongst multinational staff and augmentees.

Planning - Although planning is focused in the J5 Division, all staff have a planning role, providing either direct assistance to the development of the plan or specialist input.

Execution and Assessment - Staff coordinate and synchronise activities and, supported by assessment, provide feedback to the JTFC to inform iterative planning. They keep higher commanders and headquarters informed on progress and represent the interests of subordinate formations to the JTFC.

Decision Making - Staff should have clear guidance on what decisions they are empowered to take, and what levels of risk they are authorised to carry.

Ad-hoc Multi-Discipline Groups - bring staff together under temporary leadership to deal with particular issues and, on completion, the groups dissolve.

Proponents - appointed to take forward, in a coherent manner, issues that cut across divisional boundaries.

Permanent Re-organisation - for the duration of the campaign:

Planning Focused - for example, J3 and J5 staffs assigned to specific plan, refine and execute groupings.

Output Focused - to support, for example, particular outputs or functions. Permanent functional structures have been trialled by the US. They see headquarters organised into the 6 functional directorates of: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Effects; Manoeuvre; Protect; Sustain; and CIS.

Joint Staff Officers - form the core of the headquarters. They are required to think and act at the operational level, yet understand tactical implications.

Multinational Staff Officers - or embedded staff, provide expertise in functional areas and play a full part in the planning and conduct of multinational operations.

Personal Staff - who support the JTFC, may include any or all of the following: military assistant, aide de camp, personal assistant plus close protection and interpreters.

Liaison Officers - high grade, motivated and empowered liaison officers from nations and subordinate tactical formations, make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of a JTFHQ. Translators or interpreters may be required to make liaison officers fully effective.

Table 1.2 - Headquarters Staff Roles and Organisation
The content of this publication was incorporated into AJP-3, Allied joint doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (Edition C) published by NATO in February 2019.

It is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
Principal Staff Officers and Advisers

119. **Chief of Staff.** A Chief of Staff (COS) is responsible for operations, operations support, plans and intelligence. He coordinates work across the headquarters, with particular responsibility for information management. He is pivotal to the efficient running of the headquarters; a good COS can engender and sustain mutual trust and understanding between individual staff members, advisers and subordinate headquarters.

120. **Deputy Chief of Staff.** A Deputy COS (DCOS) coordinates logistics, personnel and often finance. Though normally of equivalent rank, the COS is *primus inter pares*.

121. **Policy Adviser.** The Policy Adviser (POLAD) advises a JTFC on the international, regional and local political context, as well as UK Government policy.

122. **Legal Adviser.** A Legal Adviser (LEGAD) provides legal advice and is pivotal to all aspects of planning and execution. Targeting and rules of engagement, for instance, will demand his close scrutiny and input.

123. **Media Adviser.** Proactive engagement with the media is crucial to the maintenance of campaign authority and therefore strategic effect, both internationally and locally. While the JTFC cannot control the media, he must understand how to interact positively with it in order to maintain confidence and influence, if not overt support. A media adviser, ideally from Director Media Communications’ department, brings technical and cultural understanding of media processes and agendas. This shapes not only direct media engagement, but also wider activity, through better understanding of how events are likely to be reported and perceived.

124. **Scientific Advisers.** Scientific Advisers (SCIADs), when embedded, provide operational analysis support to planning, execution and assessment.

125. **Subject Matter Experts.** A JTFC may employ subject matter experts to advise on local or regional issues. They may, for example, be indigenous or foreign academics who provide guidance on culture, economy and religion.

126. **Interpreter or Translator Support.** Skilled and experienced interpreters or translators enhance a JTFHQ considerably. However, locally employed civilians, while readily available, may not always be impartial or reliable.

**Staff Divisions**

127. **J1 - Personnel and Administration.** The principal role of J1 is personnel support for manpower accounting (including operational location tracking), casualty reporting and tracking, management of welfare enablers (including the Deployed
Welfare Package (Overseas), discipline, honours and awards. J1 staff set theatre policy for prisoners of war, internees and detainees.

128. **J2 - Intelligence.** J2 responds to the commander’s intent and specifically to the commander’s critical information requirements. It answers, but also shapes, the requirements of the JTFC and others, using information and intelligence from PJHQ, the Defence Intelligence Staff, national and multinational agencies, and that provided by organic resources within the JOA. An Operational Intelligence Support Group, if deployed, provides assessed and fused intelligence from national agencies. A crucial relationship is that which is forged between the commander and his Chief of Intelligence. Only when J2 properly comprehend the commander’s intent can J2 staff effectively hunt for the critical information requirements. JDP 2-00 *Intelligence* provides more detail.

129. **J3 - Operations.** J3 is the focus for execution and continuous assessment. It is responsible for the production and issue of directives and Operation Orders (OPORDs), liaison and reporting. J3 is organised into functional cells:

   a. **J3 - Current Operations.** The role of the Current Operations (J33) Cell is to *execute* plans and draft Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs). J33 monitors and manages the immediate situation, including measurement of activity, through the Joint Operations Centre. Within this Centre, the Operations Coordination (Ops Coord) Cell ensures that information is appropriately managed, through reports and returns.

   b. **J3 - Future Operations.** The Future Operations (J35) Cell *develops* and *refines* Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Contingency Plans (CONPLANs), produced by J5, to form OPORDs. Responsibility between J33, J35 and J5 is usually defined by time: for example; up to 96 hours (asking the question *what is?*); 96 hours to 7 days (*what if?*); and beyond 7 days (*what next?*). The time lines will vary with the level of headquarters and operational tempo.

   c. **J3 - Operations Support.** The Operations Support Cell is the focus for specialist and pan-JTFHQ Operations Support activities. It encompasses fires and influence activities, air defence, force protection and measurement of effect. Other specialists, such as joint force engineers, may also be brigaded here.

130. **J4 - Logistics.** J4 sets theatre logistic policy and establishes logistic and movement priorities within the JOA, providing an interface with the Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC)/National Support Element. J4 has discrete cells for supply, movement and transportation, equipment support, contractors deployed on operations, contracted logistics and medical support.
131. **J5 - Plans.** J5 develops the JTFC’s campaign plan, produces the Campaign Directive and coordinates the production of the Force Instruction Document. J5 conducts regular campaign effectiveness assessment, and plans for future operations through the development of OPLANs. It coordinates planning with both higher and subordinate formations, as well as other agencies. J5 also develops CONPLANS in conjunction with J35. JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* provides more detail.

132. **J6 - Communications and Information Systems.** J6 and Commander Joint Force CIS provide CIS for operations and meet the information exchange requirement. They plan and control in-theatre CIS architectures, including integration at the strategic and tactical interfaces, supported by a joint network centre responsible for network engineering. At medium-scale and above, a joint force CIS element, drawn from within PJHQ J6, is configured to coordinate CIS effort across the JOA. JDP 6-00 *Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint Operations* provides the detail.

133. **J7 - Doctrine and Training.** J7 provides doctrine, training, lessons and standards support.\(^4\) For joint exercises and force preparation, J7 conducts special-to-JOA and in-theatre training to assist a JTFC and some tactical/component commanders. J7 is responsible for after-action review and contributes to the Defence lessons process, using the Defence Lessons Identified Database, and post operational reporting. J7 also supports the development of doctrine by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre.

134. **J8/J9 - Finance/Civil Secretariat.** The scale and complexity of an operation determines whether separate J8 (Finance) and J9 (Civil Secretariat) Divisions are required. J8 acts as the focus for contracts and budgets, although some aspects may be delegated to the DCOS or subordinate tactical/component commanders. The POLAD is responsible for J9.

135. **Joint Force Elements.** Joint Force Elements, which provide specialist cross-component capabilities, demand C2 at the JTF level. They are likely to be brigaded under the control of a specific commander, and his supporting staff, normally embedded within the JTFHQ. Specialist coordination at this level provides a pan-Joint Operational Area view and the ability to re-balance resources across the JTF. Further details are at Chapter 2.

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\(^4\) Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) only. There is no J7 division in JFHQ. This function is discharged by J3/7 when not deployed.
SECTION III – NATIONAL CONTINGENT COMMAND AND CONTROL

136. Any UK contribution to a multinational operation commanded by another nation is termed a national contingent, commanded by a national contingent commander (or equivalent at multinational tactical/component level). Illustrative C2 arrangements are at Annex 1E. At small scale, where UK forces may be assigned without a national contingent headquarters, the Joint Commander, in consultation with the Ministry of Defence (MOD), should nevertheless nominate a senior UK officer to represent UK force elements.5

137. National Contingent Commander. As a contributing nation to a multinational force, the UK usually embeds a national contingent commander within the JTFHQ. The UK force, which should be self-sustaining, may consist of a range of environmental contingents with commanders placed within respective tactical/component headquarters. The JTFC exercises command across the Joint Task Force (JTF), subject to delegated national C2 authority, while a national contingent commander directs the employment of UK forces in the execution of their allocated tasks. He retains a minimum of OPCON but is likely to pass TACOM to appropriate JTFC/component commanders. In addition, he informs the MOD of developments that may affect national political objectives, rules of engagement, and the tasking of UK forces. Further detail is given within Chapter 2.

138. Relationship between the UK Joint Commander and the National Contingent Commander. When operating as a contributing nation within an alliance or coalition, both the PJHQ and national contingent headquarters will be required to interact with the multinational JTFHQ, in order to shape the conduct of operations. Notwithstanding any formal delegation of C2 authority from the Joint Commander to a national contingent commander, the division of responsibility between PJHQ and the national contingent headquarters, particularly at the operational level, must be made explicit within the Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS’) and Joint Commander’s Directives. Appendix 1E1 provides an example.

139. Emphasis within a National Contingent Headquarters. Although a national contingent commander may not have discrete operational planning responsibility, it is essential that he fully integrates his J5 staff into the overall planning process. This allows a national contingent commander to track and influence the development of the campaign plan, in order to ensure best use of UK forces and avert conflict with national objectives. Though a national contingent headquarters will not replicate all

5 Choices include: the commander of the national support element; or the senior UK commander of a relevant port of disembarkation; or another specially nominated commander.
JTFHQ staff functions, nor conduct a similar range of activities, it should still be robust, with a 24/7 capacity to link out to and across national and international networks, both military and inter-agency. When UK interests are to the fore, a national contingent headquarters may need to respond swiftly to reinforce cohesion, allay domestic concerns, promote success or minimise the impact of unforeseen setbacks.

140. **Embedded Staff.** UK staff officers should be embedded within any multinational JTFHQ. They should focus on direct support to the headquarters, rather than national issues; their role is discrete from that of national contingent headquarters staff. Nevertheless, they should ensure that JTF planning and activity is conducted with a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities, limitations and constraints of UK forces, so maximising their potential. Though operating within disparate staff branches, embedded staff will be represented nationally by a senior British military adviser who, in the absence of a national contingent headquarters, acts as the principal link to PJHQ. Once a national contingent headquarters is deployed, the Senior British Military Adviser is likely to become the principal liaison officer between the JTFHQ and national contingent headquarters. At lower levels, embedded JTFHQ staff should liaise closely with relevant staff branches within the national contingent headquarters.

141. **Lead or Framework Nation Staff Procedures.** Staff procedures within a JTFHQ are likely to be dictated by the lead or framework nation: most likely the US. UK staff at all levels, whether embedded or interacting with the JTFHQ as part of a national contingent, component or tactical headquarters, should therefore develop, prior to an operation, an intimate understanding of the lead/framework nation’s command and staff approach, culture and detailed processes. Not only will this generate greater clarity, situational awareness and, ultimately, tempo but also help build confidence, trust and mutual respect. In particular, UK staff with previous experience of training and operating with the lead/framework nation should be fully exploited.

“The American battle rhythm was extraordinary. It was really intensive, and between the GOC and I, we conducted 6 Video Teleconferences in person to MNC-I every week, in addition to producing all the Situation Reports (SITREPs) and responding to the American Reports and Returns (R2) requirements. Their divisional headquarters generate huge amounts of staff work. **You have to take what they ask for seriously. You have to be demonstratively contributing to the Coalition, you have to be transparent, and you have to be honest and open in your dealings with them.** We ended up using the American staff products like Story Boards and Combined Information Data Network Exchange, most of which were very good indeed.”

Colonel D C M King, COS MND (SE) Operation TELIC 12-13
SECTION IV – FORCE PREPARATION

142. **Graduated Readiness.** Maintaining large deployable forces at high readiness is inefficient. The UK operates the principle of graduated readiness, by which Armed Forces are held at varying levels of preparedness to ensure an effective response by an appropriate force when required. The warning time is the period between first indication of a potential crisis and the point at which committed forces are to be ready for operations in theatre. Its main elements, illustrated at Figure 1.3, are:

   a. **Lead-In Time.** The period from first indication of a crisis until the political decision to deploy forces.

   b. **Decision to Deploy.** A decision to deploy effectively authorises those activities that force elements must complete in order to be able to deploy within their readiness times, for example: recall of regular personnel; outload of stores from depots; logistic uplift; mobilisation of reserves; and focused training specific to the operation.

   c. **Activation Time.** The time from when a decision to deploy is made until deployed forces are able to deliver the desired effect.

   d. **Readiness.** The time required for force elements to be ready for deployment.

   e. **Deployment.** The period required to deploy force elements into theatre. It is largely a function of the size and composition of the force, distance and available lift.

   f. **In-Theatre Preparation.** The time required to be ready for operations, including acclimatisation, integration and tactical deployment.

**Figure 1.3 – UK’s Preparedness Model**

143. Annex 1F describes the process of force preparation in detail.
ANNEX 1A – ILLUSTRATIVE TEMPLATE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A UK LED NATIONAL OR MULTINATIONAL JOINT OPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Commanded by</th>
<th>Abbreviated Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>Joint Force Maritime Component Commander</td>
<td>JFMCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Joint Force Land Component Commander</td>
<td>JFLCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Joint Force Air Component Commander</td>
<td>JFACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander</td>
<td>JFSFCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistic</td>
<td>Joint Force Logistic Component Commander</td>
<td>JFLogCC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1A.1 – C2 of UK Led National or Multinational Joint Operation

Note: In some circumstances the integration of component headquarters into a single headquarters may be more appropriate. This is explored in depth within Chapter 2.
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ANNEX 1B – MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1B1. United Kingdom (UK) participation in multinational operations is conducted under the auspices of a mandate using forces allocated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), under different alliance arrangements, or on an ad hoc basis. Any mandate will be derived from international law, not exclusively from a United Nations Security Council resolution. When an operation is not led by NATO or the European Union (EU), it is known as a coalition operation with the member states known as coalition partners.

1B2. **Multinational Cooperation.** Effective interaction and cooperation with multinational partners stems from the following principles:

   a. **Rapport.** Effective personal relationships between politicians and military leaders will influence multinational cooperation at all levels and commanders must strive to develop a genuine rapport.

   b. **Respect.** Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs and values of participants strengthens relationships. The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) should foster a constructive culture, which focuses on the positive aspects of national contributions.

   c. **Knowledge.** Time taken to understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends. It is important that nations are given a role commensurate with their capability.

   d. **Patience.** Differences of opinion, perspective and understanding may generate friction. Effective cooperation takes time and patience to develop.

1B3. **Advantages of Multinational Cooperation.** Multinational cooperation allows political and military objectives to be achieved when unilateral action would be insufficient or undesirable. Merging the capabilities of different military forces adds depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities), as well as providing access to national and regional infrastructure and, potentially, logistics, information and intelligence.

1B4. **Risks in Multinational Operations.** The more obvious risks are:

   a. **Mission Development and Mission Creep.** Mission development is the maturing of the mission as a result of a logical review of the campaign plan through detailed assessment. Mission creep, however, is involvement in activities that are not directly related to the achievement of the agreed end-state. The consequences of mission creep could be significant in a multinational context, where national political and military aims may be substantially different.
b. **Lack of Interoperability.** A lack of interoperability may introduce significant risk. Procedural, tactical and technical differences may prevent force elements from working effectively together. An inability to communicate, exchange information or use common logistic assets can cause friction.

c. **Tempo.** The level of multinationality and extent of integration impacts on tempo. High tempo is difficult to achieve in the early stages of a campaign, particularly where coalitions consist of unfamiliar partners.

d. **Rules of Engagement.** All participants within a multinational force should adhere to common and consistent Rules of Engagement, agreed prior to a campaign. This will avoid ambiguity or inconsistency. However, nations inevitably impose restrictions, which commanders must understand and factor into operations.

1B5. **Other Factors.** Additional factors that can affect the execution of multinational operations include:

a. **Decision-Making.** A JTFC should recognise the need to involve participating nations within his decision-making and conduct regular briefings. In particular, face-to-face engagement and constant dialogue will significantly improve shared understanding, both of the challenges faced and the solutions required. Conversely, limited engagement and weak dialogue risks misunderstanding and miscalculation.

b. **Language.** The lead or framework nation decides upon which language will be employed within the Joint Task Force Headquarters and for communication between levels of command. English is invariably used when the UK or US is involved. This may, however, affect understanding within other nations’ staff and force elements. Language difficulties can be ameliorated by early identification of interpreter requirements. When employing contractors, however, headquarters staff should apply appropriate security procedures.

c. **Culture.** An appreciation of the cultural differences within a multinational force and between the force and an indigenous population is important. All troops should receive cultural awareness training. Commanders should then consider more in-depth courses for personnel working closely with the local population. They should also consider employing subject matter experts to provide cultural advice and contribute to analysis and assessment.
d. **Sovereignty.** J5 staff should consider sovereignty at an early stage in the planning process. Issues include local assistance and basing, overflight rights, air and sea ports of disembarkation, information and intelligence gathering and general access to areas adjacent to the Joint Operations Area.

### Standardisation Mechanisms

1B6. **Standardisation in doctrine, procedures and equipment with allies and potential coalition partners is a practical expression of cooperation.** It will impact directly upon the extent to which the commander can integrate force elements, and thus his freedom of action. There are 3 levels of standardisation: commonality, interchangeability and compatibility. While the commander will be unable to influence levels of standardisation once the campaign is underway, an appreciation of standardisation levels between force elements, and the mechanisms by which they are generated, will shape the planning and conduct of activities. The UK participates in several standardisation programmes.

1B7. **North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.** The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) standardisation process encompasses the promulgation of standardisation agreements and allied publications, which are based on standardisation objectives, derived from the NATO Standardisation Programme and standardisation proposals. The Director of the NATO Standardisation Agency coordinates it.

1B8. **American-British-Canadian-Australian Armies.** The American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Armies organisation (which also includes New Zealand) is instrumental in exchanging information, establishing standards and conducting exercises to promote standardisation.

1B9. **Air Standardisation Interoperability Committee.** The Air Standardisation Interoperability Committee is the US, UK, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand air forces standardisation organisation. It establishes mutual air standards and where appropriate adopts NATO standardisation agreements.

1B10. **AUSCANNZUKUS Organisation.** In 1978, the navies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US created a naval Command and Control (C2) board to establish a seamless information infrastructure across all nations. In 1996 the organisation shifted its principal focus from communications to information management.

1B11. **Combined Communications-Electronic Board.** The Combined Communications-Electronic Board comprises senior Communications and Information Systems (CIS) staff from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US. Its purpose is to examine CIS interoperability; the majority of current allied communications publications have been developed by the Board and endorsed for NATO use.
1B12. **Multinational Interoperability Council.** The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) comprises senior operations, doctrine, C2, communications and intelligence officials from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, UK and US. It provides a forum for identifying interoperability issues and articulating actions which, if nationally implemented, would contribute to more effective coalition operations.

1B13. **Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference.** The Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference is a 1* grouping comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US. Its aim is to facilitate interoperability across the 5 nations, particularly at the operational and strategic levels.

1B14. **Five Power Defence Agreement.** The Five Power Defence Agreement, which includes Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK, was established in 1971 to assure the security of Malaysia and Singapore following the withdrawal of UK forces from Suez. While defence capabilities of Malaysia and Singapore have improved substantially and security is no longer the principal driver for perpetuating the agreement, all nations continue to place great importance on it. Nations collaborate on a range of defence issues, notably through multinational exercises.
### ANNEX 1C – COMMAND STATE DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMAND</th>
<th>FULL (1)</th>
<th>OPCOM (2)</th>
<th>OPCON (3)</th>
<th>TACOM (4)</th>
<th>TACON (5)</th>
<th>UC ADMIN LESS (6)</th>
<th>UC ADMIN (7)</th>
<th>UCDM (8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assign Separate Employment of components of Units/Formations</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assign Missions</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Assign Tasks</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Delegate Equal C2 Status</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X(9)</td>
<td>X(9)</td>
<td>X(9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Delegate Lower C2 Status</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Coordination of local movement, real estate and area defence</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. CSS responsibilities</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

1. **Full Command.** Authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has Full Command over forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only OPCOM or OPCON.

2. **Operational Command.** Authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate OPCON/TACON as necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration.

3. **Operational Control.** Authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that he may accomplish specific missions or tasks, usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned nor does it include administrative or logistic control.

4. **Tactical Command.** Authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

5. **Tactical Control.** The detailed direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks.

6. **Under Command for Administration (with caveats).** When the temporary nature of command makes a complete change of administrative command unnecessary, a formation or unit may be placed under command for certain matters, or for admin less certain matters (UK only).

7. **Under Command for Administration.** This implies complete transfer of administrative/logistic command. Includes J1 matters (UK only).

8. **Under Command for Daily Maintenance.** When the temporary nature of command makes it unnecessary to effect a complete change of administrative command, a formation or unit may be placed under command for certain specific matters, or administration less certain administrative matters (UK only).

9. Only with agreement of the commander holding the higher level of command status.
APPENDIX 1C1 – COMPARISON OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES USING NATO AND US TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Most control</th>
<th>Least control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US COCOM</td>
<td>NATO OPCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct authority to deal with DOD, US diplomatic missions, agencies</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate CINC boundary</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted to a command</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegated to a command</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set chain of command to forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign mission/designate objective</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct/employ forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish manoeuvre control measures</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain OPCON</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate TACOM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain TACON</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy forces within theatre</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local direction/control designated forces</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign separate employment of unit components</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive authority for logistics</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct joint training</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execrprise command of US forces in MNF</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign/reassign subordinate commanders/officers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct internal discipline</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- X has this authority
- has this authority or not specifically granted

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ANNEX 1D – UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND - AN EXAMPLE OF A MULTI-AGENCY HEADQUARTERS

AFRICOM contains approximately 1,300 Staff, half of which are civilians. Civilian personnel are drawn from military and non-military agencies of the US Government.
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JDP 3-00
ANNEX 1E – ILLUSTRATIVE TEMPLATE FOR MULTINATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WITH UK AS A PARTICIPATING NATION IN MULTINATIONAL MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS

Legend
- Command
- National Command
- Coordination

Notes
1. Formed around the logistic staff of the framework nation. It should be noted that the MJLC does not have national command arrangements. It performs a coordination function only.
2. C2 of SF will be promulgated on a case by case basis.

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# APPENDIX 1E1 – COMPARISON OF PERMANENT JOINT HEADQUARTERS AND NATIONAL CONTINGENT HEADQUARTERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)</th>
<th>National Contingent Headquarters (NCHQ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operational</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prepare, Project &amp; Sustain</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tactical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Commander commands all UK forces.</td>
<td>• Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MOD/front line command interface.</td>
<td>• National command of UK forces executing authorised tasks in the JOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• National command of UK forces executing authorised tasks in the JOA.</td>
<td>• Staff UK issues arising in JOA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Planning</strong></th>
<th><strong>Intelligence</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Deployment, sustainment and recovery of UK forces.</td>
<td>• Influence multinational activity and integrate national effort into multinational plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Brief military strategic authority.</td>
<td>• Identify changes to agreed UK tasks, scope and confirm acceptability through Joint Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Obtain agreement to changes in agreed UK tasks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Intelligence</strong></th>
<th><strong>Logistics</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Intelligence fusion (other agencies).</td>
<td>• Provide PJHQ with the Joint Desired Order of Arrival Staff Table as agreed with the multinational JTFC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evaluate Joint Operations Area (JOA) assessments.</td>
<td>• Direct sustainment priorities for the coupling bridge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Personnel</strong></th>
<th><strong>Medical</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Interpret MOD policy.</td>
<td>• Responsible for health of deployed UK force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Issue J1 direction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Finance</strong></th>
<th><strong>Media</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• MOD policy for clinical/operational medical support and clinical governance/audit.</td>
<td>• Operational level media nexus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Coordinate all JOA bookings.</td>
<td>• Release authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monitor, direct &amp; guide.</td>
<td>• Consequence management with MOD, in parallel with PJHQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Longer term media strategy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The deployed headquarters will also interact directly with other MOD, and wider national, agencies, both providing and receiving intelligence products.

2 The National Contingent Headquarters will not only address issues of organisational and structural integration but will also act as the conduit for national intelligence feeds into the Joint Task Force Headquarters.

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ANNEX 1F – FORCE PREPARATION

Identification of Force Requirements

1F1. **Permanent Joint Headquarters Operations Teams.** Once an operation is underway, the focus of Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) staff effort moves from J5 to J3. Contingency Planning Team members form the nucleus of an Operations Team under the J3 Operations Team Leader. The Operations Team controls deployment, sustainment and recovery and in due course acts as the single interface between the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), the Defence Crisis Management Organisation, front line commands and multinational or multi-agency partners. JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning* provides more detail.

1F2. **Joint Force Headquarters Situational Awareness.** The Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) forms a Situation Awareness Group to monitor any developing crisis in parallel with PJHQ. Though limited in capability, it is the focus for briefing and initial planning. If the JFHQ is not subsequently chosen as the JTFHQ, the Situation Awareness Group is still likely to migrate initially to the headquarters selected. Situational awareness is promoted by the deployment of an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.

1F3. **Transition from an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team to a Joint Task Force Headquarters.** Should an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team transition into a JTFHQ, without returning to the UK, it must be configured to command from the outset. The headquarters must be operational before the Joint Task Force (JTF) is built.

1F4. **Joint Statement of Requirement.** On completion of the military strategic estimate, PJHQ J5 produces a Joint Statement of Requirement. It includes: the Joint Commander’s intent, outline courses of action and capabilities required, an outline sustainability statement, and constraints.

1F5. **Joint Force Element Table.** The Joint Statement of Requirement is issued to front line commands, Defence Equipment and Support and other force element providers, who then generate single-Service force element tables to meet the demands of concurrent operational level planning. The PJHQ J4 Joint Mounting Cell consolidates the force element tables into a Joint Force Element Table, which provides an authoritative list of assigned force element tables. It also assists in managing deployment, including changing notice to move, manning levels and sustainability.

1F6. **Joint Desired Order of Arrival.** The Joint Force Element Table, with force elements prioritised, provides the Joint Desired Order of Arrival. This then allows the Defence Supply Chain and Operational Movements Group to plan strategic lift.
1F7. **Assignment of Force Elements.** The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) assigns force elements to subordinate tactical or component commanders in accordance with his initial Concept of Operations (CONOPS). 4 levels of assignment are used:

a. **Allotment.** Allotment is a temporary change in the assignment of force elements between subordinate commanders. Authority to allot is held by the commander with Operational Command (OPCOM), normally the Joint Commander.

b. **Apportionment.** Apportionment is the JTFC’s responsibility. It determines the total expected effort for an operation, activity or area over a given time by percentage and priority.

c. **Allocation.** Allocation is a tactical/component commander’s translation of apportionment into specific force elements required, by unit number and type.

d. **Tasking.** Tasking is the process of translating the allocation of force elements into orders, and passing them to units.

1F8. **Constructing a Multinational Joint Task Force.** PJHQ will convene a troop contributing nations’ meeting to develop the Joint Statement of Requirement early in the planning process. This establishes a common understanding of the situation and a baseline for national planning. The JTFHQ Chief of Staff (COS) and Deputy COS (DCOS) assess potential capabilities and their employment, without constraining the JTFC’s freedom of action. They should, however, avoid promises concerning specific roles at this stage. The task of integrating force elements begins here but will fall largely to JTFHQ divisional heads. Following this meeting national contingent commanders may undertake reconnaissance of the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

**Deployment**

1F9. **Pre-Deployment Headquarters Training, Validation and Rehearsals.** The UK has an established tiered training scheme to maintain joint currency. The JTFC and staff should also endeavour to make use of operational level training, conducted by PJHQ J7. Where possible, training should involve relevant other government departments and agencies.
1F10. **Mounting the Joint Task Force.** Mounting the JTF involves implementation of a detailed deployment plan, based on the finalised Joint Force Element Table, Joint Desired Order of Arrival, strategic movement instructions and the Load Allocation Table. It is directed and controlled by PJHQ (J3 operations team with J1/J4). Mounting activities, involving front line commands and Defence Equipment & Support, include: identification and preparation of force elements, their equipment and stores; pre-deployment training and briefing; and transportation to the point of embarkation.

1F11. **Deployment Flow.** The Detailed Deployment Plan should enable deployment in accordance with the JTFC’s intent. In practice, however, the complexity of the mounting process and competition for early strategic lift will inject the risk of an unbalanced, prolonged or interrupted deployment. It is crucial that force elements required in theatre in advance of the main body – for enabling, intelligence and shaping activities – arrive sufficiently early. The deployment requires the constant attention of PJHQ, JTFHQ, front line commands and Defence Equipment & Support.

1F12. **Force Projection.** The speed with which a force can deploy will be driven by: the composition of the force; the availability of UK assets and their proximity to the JOA; access to strategic lift; and the availability of appropriate regional air basing to shorten lines of communication. Mutual support between multinational partners will also be key.

1F13. **Training and Rehearsals En-Route.** Where possible and appropriate, training and rehearsals en-route may be employed to demonstrate intent and shape the perceptions of other actors. This alone may provide sufficient deterrence to achieve the desired outcome.

**In-Theatre Preparation**

1F14. **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration.** Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) describes the activities that enable force elements to attain Full Operating Capability (FOC) once in theatre. It is a national responsibility unless directed otherwise. During multinational operations, national forces may conduct RSOI concurrently, requiring extensive coordination and deconfliction. The Reception, Staging and Onward Movement element is usually coordinated by the Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters (JFLogCHQ) and it is vital that J4 staff are involved early in reconnaissance and planning. Integration will be conducted both within and across components and is J3 led.

1F15. **Joint Task Force Commander’s Priority List.** The JTFC controls changes to the Detailed Deployment Plan by issuing and updating a priority list. This may adjust priorities for arrival of force elements, additional force elements, equipment issues and sustainment.
1F16. **Operating Capability.** The point at which a JTF achieves Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is largely a subjective judgement. It is, however, useful in expressing a halfway-house between initial deployment and FOC. The declaration of IOC is the JTFC’s responsibility and will be pre-defined. FOC is achieved once all force elements are in the JOA, have completed preparation and are ready to commence operations. Some elements may, however, already be engaged.
CHAPTER 2 – COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT OPERATIONS

Chapter 2 describes the evolution of componency. It sets out a traditional component and joint force elements model, which retains broad utility in larger scale alliance and coalition combat operations, where this construct prevails, but explores the value of using more integrated headquarters’ models for national and smaller scale operations.

Section I – Componency
Section II – Maritime Component
Section III – Land Component
Section IV – Air Component
Section V – Special Forces Component
Section VI – Logistic Component
Section VII – Joint Force Elements

SECTION I – COMPONENCY

Operation PALLISER

“Components and Joint Force Elements remain a valid approach, but we must remain pragmatic and open to ideas about delivering joint capability in other ways (for example, at small scale or in coalitions/multinational operations). There is a danger that the growth in standing staffs and headquarters, all needing coordination and resources, may over-shadow the delivery of the effects and associated force elements. A Command and Control (C2) estimate is a necessary element of the planning process”.¹

201. Individual single-Service component headquarters evolved post-World War 2 influenced principally by: the large spans of control associated with abundant force elements; the rapid development of diverse single-Service operational techniques; and – recognising a fundamental truth that is too often ignored – single-Service rivalries. The maturity of current UK joint organisations, from education and training establishments to operational headquarters and force elements, now enables more integrated approaches to operational headquarters design. This is helped by communication technology and accelerated by operational experience. Commanders should also seek closer cooperation with other government departments and agencies in order to promote comprehensive approaches to operations. Moreover, nations rarely act in isolation, even where national interests are at stake. Therefore, commanders should consider a joint, multinational and inter-agency approach from the outset of headquarters design. However, not all nations can, or will, develop at the

same rate and alliance obligations drive the UK to be compatible with different C2 frameworks. Therefore, the UK must also operate within a traditional single-Service component framework for some multinational operations, but for national and small scale operations, an integrated headquarters is the preferred option.

Multinational Context

202. This chapter articulates the component model and assumes the UK can, if required, take the lead or act as the framework nation. It is recognised, however, that the UK is likely in many (and probably most) circumstances to operate as a contributing nation within an alliance or coalition, particularly at the larger scales of effort. Within this latter context, the UK national contingent would deliver only discrete force elements, unified under a national contingent commander, but within components led by another nation.

Types of Operation

203. Major Combat. The component model has particular utility during large scale major combat operations, which employ the full gamut of military capability and formation level manoeuvre. The associated tempo and span of control associated with transforming the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC’s) direction into the spectrum of tactical activities, as well as contributing to Joint Task Force (JTF) level planning, demands the provision of independent, self-sustaining component headquarters. This construct allows the JTFC to remain focused on the operational level.

204. Security, Stabilisation and Peace Support. Security, stabilisation and peace support may also involve combat and security activities to support the process of stabilisation, as well as enduring peacekeeping and periodic peacetime military engagement. They will not, however, mirror the intensity and scale of manoeuvre envisaged within major combat. Though complex in their own right, the enduring nature and reduced tempo of such operations might negate the need for an additional tier of C2, favouring instead a fully integrated Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), to which force elements work directly. This would also better enable the integration of the many other agencies that characterise such operations. Indeed, when high tempo is required, additional layers of command might act as an obstacle to it, increasing the breadth of the JTFHQ’s task and in turn the headquarters’ size. Conversely, smaller C2 footprints reduce deployment overheads and minimise the drain on scarce equipment, particularly communications, and manpower.

205. Environmental Focus. A campaign with an environmental bias further supports the concept of an integrated JTFHQ. Within a counter-insurgency context, for example, where physical presence is important, it is likely that the land environment will have the lead. In such a situation, an integrated JTFHQ, with rationalised maritime, air, Special Forces (SF) and logistic headquarters elements,
exercising direct C2 of fully synchronised force elements, should bring resource efficiencies and, more importantly, generate greater tempo than discrete component headquarters operating in traditional supported or supporting roles. Indeed, the JTFHQ might be formed from the senior land formation headquarters, with augmentation from the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) and other front line commands. This principle applies equally to a campaign with a maritime, air, logistic or SF focus.

Scales of Effort

`The UK Approach to Componency – An Audit of National Operational Architecture and Best Practice`

“Common practice for constructing a JTF has been to deliver additional and bespoke battle staffs and component headquarters to form an operational interface with the JTFHQ. At small scale, and just above, this assumption produces high deployment overheads, reduces agility and is certainly not consistent with streamlining our force ratios or deployment footprint.”

“I see no reason why at small scale operations or above we cannot embed rationalised (environmental) component headquarters in a JTFHQ deployable infrastructure...As we migrate to medium scale operations it would be interesting to determine at what point the independent deployment of component headquarters delivered an effects efficiency.”

Brigadier D A Capewell – October 2004

206. Maturing of the component model has seen a concomitant growth in the size and complexity of associated headquarters. However, the deployment of larger headquarters comes at a penalty to tempo and coherence, and it stretches the coupling bridge. At lower scales of effort, (small to medium) therefore, where environmental or functional contributions might be a single formation or even unit, an integrated JTFHQ, exercising direct C2 of force elements, is more efficient and effective. This is particularly true within a small scale very high readiness scenario – characterised by high tempo and agility with a light footprint and limited duration – which demands a small, agile staff with a minimum of C2 layers between commander and task unit. But any architecture deployed must have the flexibility to adapt to the component model as the campaign and its scale of effort develops over time. An integrated JTFHQ might be formed by a standing or bespoke operational level headquarters augmented by rationalised headquarters elements from front line commands, Director Special Forces or by augmentation of the most appropriate tactical environmental headquarters. The C2 estimate should influence the size and shape of all headquarters elements, including the JTFHQ.
While C2 of specialist or scarce joint force elements could be retained at the operational level, wider environmental capabilities may be brigaded into components under the JTFC’s unifying command. The 5 components that may be established by the UK are the Joint Force Maritime, Land, Air, SF and Logistic Components (JFMC, JFLC, JFAC, JFSFC and JFLogC respectively). The context and environmental focus of the operation will shape the size and structure of each, which may require adjustment as the campaign develops. While force elements within each component will predominately reflect its environmental focus, components are likely to exchange capabilities, on either a permanent or a temporary basis, in order to maintain agility.

Component Command and Control

A designated commander and his headquarters exercises C2 of each component. Front line commands in consultation with the Joint Commander (usually Chief of Joint Operations (CJO)) normally nominate environmental component commanders. Director Special Forces nominates the JFSFCC, while the JFLogCC is normally the Standing JFLogCC. The headquarters’ role may be fulfilled by a standing component headquarters, a bespoke headquarters generated for the operation, or by the senior deployed environmental formation headquarters.

The responsibilities of a component commander and his staff span both the operational and tactical levels. Balancing the conflicting demands of each level will be a significant challenge:

a. **Tactical Level.** The component commander’s principal focus will be the tactical C2 of his component and the **decentralised planning and execution of the activities** required of it, in order to deliver the JTFC’s supporting effects. This may demand the **integration of joint capabilities** assigned from the operational level. The component commander must translate the JTFC’s direction into executable orders for his subordinate elements, then conduct **detailed sequencing and coordination** once execution is underway. Supporting effects may be achieved through the activities of multiple components. At the same time, each activity may see a component commander in either a supported or supporting role. As such, constant **consultation, coordination and liaison** between components is vital. Further detail can be found within Chapter 3.

b. **Operational Level.** The JTFC and his staff have responsibility for campaign planning and execution. They provide direction to component commanders, in the form of a campaign plan, Operation Plans (OPLANs) and, ultimately, specific Operation Orders (OPORDs), which clearly articulate the
JTFC’s intent and component missions. The complex relationships between activities, the requirement for components to exchange capability and the competition for limited resources needs to be orchestrated at the operational level, prior to and during execution. Component commanders should, however, be intimately involved at all stages of the planning process, providing specialist input and advice. They should shape planning to maximise the effectiveness of component capabilities, and thus the Joint Task Force (JTF) as a whole. Equally, during execution they will be pivotal to the coordination, synchronisation and assessment of activities and effects.

Supported and Supporting Command Relationships

210. The principal way in which a JTFC expresses the requirement for cross-component coordination is by designating component commanders as either supported or supporting. This does not abrogate responsibility, but defines the underlying basis of inter-component relationships. Supported and supporting relationships may change during an operation. A component commander may be both supporting and supported on different lines of operation.

211. **Supported Commander.** A supported component commander ‘has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by higher authority’\(^2\) and details the support required from the supporting component commanders, through the JTFC.

212. **Supporting Commander.** A supporting component commander advises the supported component commander on the optimum employment of his assets then delivers capability or support to him, prioritising tasks as required. The supporting component commander may develop a discrete supporting plan but will invariably direct the specific activities of his component elements.

Integration of Components into the Joint Task Force

213. Integration of components should start prior to the operation. It demands thorough joint (and possibly multinational/multi-agency) preparation and training to develop mutual trust and understanding, and instil unity of effort. Successful operations are invariably characterised by constant liaison and effective communications. Training and liaison are inter-related; neither is fully effective alone. Both will also compete for scarce time and resources; the Joint Commander and JTFC should ensure that those of the JTF are afforded due priority.

214. **Location of the Component Commanders.** The JTFC should allow each component commander appropriate access to him, without national or service bias. While robust communications can mitigate the disadvantages of physical separation, they cannot entirely replace the benefits of regular personal contact, which the

\(^2\) Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions.*
collocation of component commanders and the JTFC brings. For some component commanders this may, however, prejudice their ability to exercise effective tactical command, demanding that a balance be struck between the benefits of collocation with the JTFC and proximity to component elements. For the full Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC), the balance favours collocation with the JTFC. For the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) and JFLogCC it is less clear-cut; the judgement depends entirely upon the circumstances.

215. Component Representation in the Joint Task Force Headquarters. Each component commander should have an empowered and competent representative within the JTTHQ. If the loss of expertise does not hurt the losing headquarters, it is probably the wrong person for the role. Component commanders may also need specialists to represent them at boards, meetings and other coordination mechanisms within the JTFHQ’s campaign rhythm.

216. Liaison between Components. Liaison between components, as well as with the JTTHQ, is essential. Inter-Component Coordination and Liaison Teams ensure that critical information is rapidly assessed and disseminated across the JTF. Some may play a fully integrated role within their host-component headquarters but they remain responsible to the donor component commander. The employment of high quality individuals as liaison officers is critical to component integration. The construct for inter-component coordination and liaison is at Annex 2A.

Joint and Combined Training

217. If an operation is to be enduring, senior commanders should consider major restructuring at the earliest possible stage in order to institutionalise all aspects of education, training, equipment procurement, pre-deployment preparation and – crucially – the ability to hunt out lessons and action them in order to adapt the force quickly in contact. This may involve significant investment in home-based as well as deployed infrastructure.

Operational Training and Advisory Group

When the first units deployed to Northern Ireland (NI) on Operation BANNER in 1968 they did so without any form of pre-deployment training. It was not until 1972 that the Northern Ireland Training and Advisory Team (NITAT) was established to prepare units for this specific theatre. Following the example of the ‘Bullrings’ in 1916, established to deal with the constant flow of units deploying to the Western Front, and the Jungle Warfare School, which prepared those deploying to Malaya in 1948, NITAT was highly successful. With the advent of the crisis in the Balkans the NITAT model provided the basis for the development of Operational Training and
Advisory Group (OPTAG), which sought to deliver theatre specific pre-deployment training for all units across all theatres. Initially, focused on NI (counter-insurgency) and the Balkans (peacekeeping/enforcement) missions, OPTAG’s remit has grown to meet the breadth and complexity of UK deployments on enduring operations, demanding ever increasing resources across the spectrum of time, manpower and equipment.

218. The UK has a standing joint training regime, designed to develop and practise both JTFCs and JTFHQs, as well as component commanders and their staffs, by providing:

a. Individual and collective joint training, and readiness assessment.

b. A tiered approach to JTF and component collective training, which will include the participation of other government departments and agencies where possible:

(1) **Tier 1.** Tactical level training, managed by front line commands, of force elements to operate as part of their respective components.

(2) **Tier 2.** Training of components to operate as part of a JTF; Tier 2 training is focused on improving component interoperability. Front line commands/Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) arrange Tier 2 training.

(3) **Tier 3.** Operational level training for a JTF to conduct national/multinational operations under the auspices of the CJO.

(4) **Tier 4.** Higher level training involving multinational partners and, where practicable, other agencies.

c. A planning capability developed to include situational understanding, mission analysis, evaluation of objects and factors, course of action development and iterative planning supported by assessment.

d. A training and validation capability to deliver JTFCs/component commanders at very short notice, which is interoperable with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), other multinational partners, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) and other government departments.

**National Contingent Command**

219. Where the UK is not acting as a lead or framework nation, but is instead providing a force contribution to an alliance or coalition, the UK should be represented at the operational and tactical levels. In this case, the framework headquarters may be
deployed as a national contingent headquarters, with an embedded national contingent commander.

220. **Responsibilities of a National Contingent Commander.** The principal role of a national contingent commander is to integrate national elements into a multinational force, advising on capabilities and constraints. This will ensure that component commanders are not distracted from tactical missions. Specific national contingent commander tasks include:

a. Exercising, under strategic direction, national command of forces. The national contingent commander may work directly to PJHQ, or through a national joint contingent commander.

b. Informing national strategic authorities of the current situation, future plans, and developments, which may affect national objectives, require changes in rules of engagement or commitment of additional resources.

c. Recommending changes to national command arrangements under which forces are assigned or attached to a multinational component.

d. Influencing planning and execution in accordance with national objectives, through a personal relationship with the JTFC and staff engagement at lower levels.

e. Conducting longer-term force planning, to ensure integration into component plans and that national resources are in place when required.

f. Harmonising Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and integrating intelligence architecture.

**SECTION II – MARITIME COMPONENT**

221. The JFMC provides a broad, agile and scalable capability, which can operate within all environments from the open ocean to the littoral, and across benign to combat conditions. It can also enable the delivery or integration of JFLC and JFSFC assets and staging of air operations. It is capable of contributing to political and economic, as well as military, objectives. BR1806 *British Maritime Doctrine* provides detailed guidance on the employment of maritime power.³

³ This is developed in AJP-3.1 *Allied Joint Maritime Operations* and supported by BR 4487(1) *Fighting Instructions Volume I – The Maritime Commander’s Handbook.*
Characteristics

222. The enduring characteristics of maritime forces – access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, poise and leverage – bring utility across a broad range of operations, which may be engaged in simultaneously or consecutively. These operations are grouped under the 3 general categories of military, constabulary and benign, and can be conducted at a scale that ranges from individual units to carrier and littoral manoeuvre task groups.

223. Identification of a Crisis. Maritime forces operating in international waters can provide a valuable surveillance asset from the outset of a crisis. Intelligence gathering may focus initially at the strategic level before transitioning to the operational and tactical as the campaign develops.

224. Sea Control. Sea control (and denial) brings the JTFC differing levels of freedom of action; allowing him to exploit JTF capabilities, while protecting its combat power.

a. Blockade, Containment and Area and Barrier Operations. Sea control may involve blockade of enemy ports, the containment of surface and subsurface forces, or both. Area and barrier operations might also be possible in certain straits, approaches, convoy assembly or dispersal areas, as well as areas selected for amphibious operations or theatre entry.

b. Sea Lines of Communication Protection. Sea control operations may provide protection to reinforcement and resupply shipping. This may be conducted as a discrete operation involving the escort or screening of important units or even full convoys. Particular emphasis should be placed on straits and other choke points but such operations could involve significant resources across extended distances.

225. Force Protection. Multi-role JFMC assets can contribute to the protection of the JTF. Assets may be employed individually or collectively to create a mobile area of control. Force protection is achieved through anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasure disciplines.

226. Force Projection. The JFMC is able to project a force ashore in order to conduct the full range of activities – non-combatant evacuation operations, amphibious operations, maritime air support, as well as surface and sub-surface land

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1 Military application is one in which combat is used or threatened or which presupposes a combat capability; Constabulary application is where forces are employed to enforce law or to implement a regime established by international mandate; Benign involves tasks in which violence has no part to play in their execution. BR1806 Chapter 4.

2 The early and covert deployment of Tomahawk Land Attack Missile armed SSNs can also pose a threat to valued land targets.
attack, for example. Force projection demands a robust C2 system and detailed coordination between components and across environmental seams.

227. **Sustainment.** Once the focus of an operation moves ashore, the JFMC effort may shift from enabling to supporting. In addition to enhancing land manoeuvre through the application of force, tasks are likely to involve force protection, protecting sea lines of communication and logistic support to forces ashore and afloat through sea basing, possibly as an alternative to host-nation support.

228. **Campaign Termination, Recovery and Redeployment.** The ability to poise offshore provides a sea base with secure, capable communications to support C2, as well as the protection of logistic assets (including medical) necessary during overwatch or withdrawal.

229. **Maritime Trade Operations.** Merchant shipping activity will demand close coordination between national military, commercial and government organisations in order to meet the operational need, while maintaining safety. Maritime trade operations incorporate measures including naval cooperation and guidance for shipping and the protection of merchant ships, as well as their world-wide movement and harbour operations where the UK has an interest. Maritime trade operations should be included in all aspects of planning where merchant ships may affect, or be affected by, operations. It is effected through a 4-tier graduated response from the onset of crisis. This process is supported by constant peacetime dialogue.

**Contribution to Joint Operations**

230. **Fire Support.** A maritime task group can deliver fires using carrier-based aircraft, long range precision attack missiles and medium range gun munitions. As well as engaging targets, it can also integrate fire support and conduct battle damage assessment using aircraft.

231. **Force Protection.** A carrier strike task group, formed around an aircraft carrier, can provide limited air defence (both offensive and defensive counter-air) and protection to ground forces through close air support and air interdiction. A landing platform helicopter, with a tailored air group, or other craft are also capable of recovering personnel if required.

232. **Mobility.** A maritime task group may be the principal means of initial deployment for an intervention force. It can project significant forces and materiel over 400 miles in 24 hours then provide sea basing thus minimising risk to land forces, generating tempo and maximising surprise.

233. **Amphibious Operations.** An amphibious task group is focused on the projection of amphibious forces ashore, normally in conjunction with a carrier strike task group. The 4 principal types of amphibious operation are: demonstration, raid,
assault and withdrawal. The need for detailed coordination across all environments makes amphibious operations extremely complex.

234. **Support by Organic Air.** Aircraft from a carrier strike task group will contribute to counter-air, anti-surface force and combat support air operations in conjunction with land-based aircraft, when available. Maritime air operations should be integrated across the force and coordinated and synchronised by the JFACC.

235. **Surface and Sub-Surface Land Attack.** Surface and sub-surface land attack missiles may provide the primary means of organic long range attack, especially in the early stages of an operation, and have particular utility for coercion. They will subsequently complement other air interdiction forces. Naval fire support may also conduct advanced bombardment, then complement land artillery once deployed and is available to any ground unit operating in the littoral.

**Command and Control**

236. The JFMCC has a planning function within the JTFHQ that provides input to the campaign plan, but exercises command at the tactical level.

237. **Selection of the Maritime Component Headquarters.** The Joint Force Maritime Component Headquarters (JFMCHQ) is formed from the standing staffs of either Commander UK Maritime Forces or Commander UK Amphibious Forces. They are supported by four 1* commanders: Commander UK Task Group; Commander Carrier Strike Group; Commander Amphibious Task Group; and Commander 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. The exact construct of the deployed headquarters will be determined by the nature and scale of the operation.

238. **Location of the Maritime Component Headquarters.** While it may appear logical for the JFMCC to be afloat, the tempo of planning and execution, combined with the requirement for robust digital communications, may support his collocation with the JTFHQ or other component headquarters. The location ultimately selected for the JFMCC and his staff will be driven by operational imperatives. When afloat, a suitably configured platform cannot only meet all the JFMCC’s planning and execution needs, particularly robust communications, but also provide high levels of force protection.

239. **Command and Control of Amphibious Forces.** The C2 of amphibious operations is detailed in either the Joint Commander’s Mission Directive (see JDP 5-00 *Campaign Planning*, Annex 2C) or the JTFC’s Campaign Directive (see JDP 5-00, Annex 3F). These directives specify the command relationships between the Commander Amphibious Task Force, the Commander Landing Force and other component commanders involved. It also states the command relationships which will apply on termination of the amphibious operation. Conventionally, Commander
Amphibious Task Force and Commander Landing Force are under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the JFMCC, although Commander Amphibious Task Force may also be the JFMCC when the sole, or primary, maritime operation is an amphibious one. The Commander Amphibious Task Force may, however, act under direct OPCON of the JTFC when it is impractical for the JFMCC to exercise OPCON of the Amphibious Task Force. In this case, C2 arrangements between the Commander Amphibious Task Force and other component commanders must be clearly defined to ensure effective cross-component coordination and synchronisation.

240. **Task Organisation.** Maritime forces are grouped functionally for operations into a task organisation consisting of a maximum of 4 levels: task forces, task groups, task units and task elements. The use of these levels is flexible and bears no direct relationship to levels of command or planning.

241. **Multinational Operations.** Task organisation and widespread adherence to standardised tactical procedures amongst Allied navies, permits integration of multinational maritime forces as low as unit level. Standing naval forces, such as the standing NATO maritime groups, may provide the nucleus of a larger multinational naval expanded task force. Other bilateral arrangements, such as the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, also provide alternative standing multinational maritime forces.

**SECTION III – LAND COMPONENT**

242. Land forces are required to engage decisively at close quarters with conventional or irregular adversaries, operating close to, or amongst, the population. At the same time they need to interact at first hand with a multitude of other actors to deliver both physical and psychological effects. The intimacy of this environment presents a distinctive level of complexity and friction. This demands not only technical skill but also considerable initiative, resilience, cultural awareness and sensitivity at every level. The UK doctrinal authority for land operations is Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) *Land Operations*.6

243. Land forces must be balanced and agile, enabling them to undertake the full range of activities within hostile to benign environments, as well as transition rapidly between them. However, a combat ethos defines land forces. The complexity, uncertainty and stress - mental and physical - of this endeavour presents the greatest military challenge. Only through preparedness for its demands can the full range of military tasks be undertaken.

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6 ADP *Land Ops* is currently under review and will be promulgated in 2010.
Characteristics

244. **Core Functions.** The JFLC uses the core functions of *Find, Fix, Strike and Exploit*, within the framework of operations to visualise operations and allocate purpose. These may be consecutive or simultaneous, and apply across the full range of operational activities. *Finding* endures throughout and spans locating, identifying and assessing an opponent. *Fixing* is to deny an opponent his goals, or to distract him and thus deprive him of his freedom of action, while ensuring one’s own. *Striking* involves having the freedom of action to manoeuvre into a position of advantage from which force can be threatened or applied. *Exploitation* is the seizure of opportunity in order to realise an aspect of the commander’s intent.

245. **Combined Arms Groupings.** Land forces must be structured, equipped, trained and prepared to provide, on an independent or integrated basis, formations capable of tactical manoeuvre. They must have the combat power to defeat or destroy an adversary, while maintaining the flexibility to adapt to a broader range of activities. As such the prosecution of land operations is characterised by its combined arms nature: a mix of combat forces (such as infantry or armour), combat support forces (such as artillery or engineers) and combat service support forces (such as logistic or medical). This is then structured within a hierarchical C2 framework enabled by CIS. The JFLC is normally task organised, with combat, combat support and combat service support assets allocated accordingly.

246. **Divisional Level.** For independent operation within a deliberate intervention context, the ideal level of combined arms capability is considered as the *Division*, within and supported by a *Corps* framework. Its range of capabilities and span of C2 enables the Division to tackle the simultaneity and tempo of operations, orchestrating activities in concurrent tactical engagements. Moreover, it provides the resilience and versatility to tackle, either simultaneously or sequentially, an array of other activities. At lower scales of effort a brigade may deploy under a 2* headquarters or battlegroup under a 1* headquarters.

**Contribution to Joint Operations**

247. Land forces provide a unique capability to conduct close combat and dominate ground, which will be essential to the defeat of an intractable opponent. The additional capacity to seize and secure terrain, establish and maintain human contact with civilian populations, enable and work with civilian agencies and contribute to deterrence effect, will also provide crucial depth and breadth to a JTF.

248. The deployment of military forces is a clear demonstration of political intent. The most striking impact upon an adversary, as well as the indigenous population and its leadership, will, however, be achieved by the physical presence of forces in the land environment.
249. The land contribution to operations consists principally of 3 types of forces:

a. **Reconnaissance Forces.** Reconnaissance forces act as either combat or combat support elements. Their primary purpose is to gain information.

b. **Ground Manoeuvre Forces.** Ground manoeuvre is the coordination of ground forces that enables a land commander to conduct activity in support of the JTFC’s campaign. It is supported by 3 types of force, heavy, medium and light, which will usually operate in combination.

c. **Air Manoeuvre Forces.** Air manoeuvre forces exploit the mobility of aircraft to provide reach and agility. They include: attack, support and reconnaissance helicopters; air assault and airborne infantry; and combat support and combat service support elements. Their operations should be closely integrated with close air support, air interdiction and other strike or reconnaissance aircraft.

**Command and Control**

250. C2 of land forces will be situation dependent. The land commander must have the experience and authority to not only influence the employment of land forces through the operational planning process and direct interaction with the JTFC and other component commanders, but also command land forces at the tactical level. Inherent tension will exist between these conflicting responsibilities.

251. **Selection of the Land Component Headquarters.** The selection, structure and size of a JFLCHQ will again be situation dependent and may vary considerably. The tempo and agility required of a land headquarters, for major combat in particular, may demand that a separate JFLCHQ be designated above a formation headquarters. At lower scales of effort and tempo, a headquarters may be capable of exercising all aspects of command of land forces. A JFLCHQ is normally formed around a standing formation headquarters:

a. **The Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.** Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) became the focus for national land componency issues in November 2004. It has significant practical experience and comprehensive Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the role of JFLC on a NATO operation.

b. **The Division.** Deployable divisions are capable of land component and national land contingent command. Of these, component command is the lowest priority for both training and readiness. Divisional SOPs and standardisation have gone some way to addressing headquarters structures.
c. **The Brigade and Battlegroup.** Both Joint Rapid Reaction Force brigades (16 Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade) are capable of commanding a JFLC during short notice, expeditionary intervention operations. Indeed, ongoing development seeks to increase the capacity for independent action by brigades within a joint context. Though technically possible, it is highly unlikely that a battlegroup would fulfil this role in an operational environment.

252. **Location of the Land Component Headquarters.** The JFLCHQ is likely to be geographically separated from the JTFC and reliant on embedded environmental experts. The choice of the JFLCC’s senior representative at the JTFHQ, in whom he must have complete confidence, is a critical issue.

253. **Responsibilities.** The JFLC will be required to operate intimately with other components and interact with a variety of external actors across its area of responsibility. Should the JTFHQ not be deployed in theatre, many of its liaison and staff functions may also be subsumed by the JFLCHQ. In such circumstances the headquarters would require augmentation.

254. **Multinational Operations.** JFLCs do not generally mix national contributions below brigade level. Greater multinationality is acceptable where: a high degree of interoperability or confidence pre-exists, such as with NATO Response Forces; niche capabilities are being provided; or the assessed threat level or mission complexity is low.

### SECTION IV – AIR COMPONENT

255. In conventional military operations, all-weather precision air attack can decisively shape the battlespace. However, despite advances in sensor technology and improvements in C2 for time sensitive targeting, the majority of air systems are not optimised to find, track and engage well hidden and fleeting targets in urban areas and amongst wider populations. Therefore, while air power has immense utility for conventional combat operations, the use of air attack in complex terrain must be fully integrated with surface forces to be most effective. AP3000 *British Air and Space Power Doctrine* (4th Edition) provides detailed guidance on the employment of air power.

### Characteristics

256. Air power is characterised by its **speed, reach and height**, which allow **ubiquity** – the ability to range almost everywhere within and beyond the Area of Operations – and **agility** - the ability to respond quickly and provide early deterrence. Height continuity and modern sensors also provide a distinct **perspective** and a major contribution to situational awareness. In combination, these provide the JTFC a means...
of independently and rapidly influencing a wide variety of actors, even prior to deployment of the main force.

257. Air power has limitations. Technology is, however, increasingly overcoming weather conditions and fragility, while air-to-air refuelling and unmanned aerial vehicles are enabling air power to partially surmount impermanence. Airlift also has a limited payload compared with surface means but speed and reach offset this. In addition, air power needs intensive training and coordination to be effective in complex terrain. Finally, air assets should be employed concurrently rather than sequentially for concentration of force and not generally held in reserve due to limited aircraft numbers. That said, sortie rates can periodically be surged.

Contribution to Joint Operations

258. There are 4 fundamental air power roles. Control of the air enables freedom of air and surface manoeuvre and, therefore, the ability to retain initiative. Air control is a vital pre-requisite for joint operations, but is rarely absolute; adversaries frequently contest the lower airspace with hand held missiles and small arms. Air mobility and lift enable global, regional and local deployment of personnel and materiel. Mobility and lift are also fundamental enablers of surface manoeuvre, with particular utility for light and special forces. Situational awareness reflects an ever-increasing emphasis on the find function, but there are limitations to what air and space systems can locate. However, air power contributes significantly and, with current surveillance and reconnaissance systems, can provide a virtually ‘unblinking eye’ as the first step to promoting situational understanding. Precision attack at range is one of air power’s key strengths, which can be employed at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. It can engage a range of mobile and static targets across multiple theatres of operation. One of precision attack’s greatest strengths is its ability to coerce an adversary by holding him at continuous risk. Air power’s reputation for precision attack can also be exploited for significant psychological effect through the show of force or strength.

259. Air power can transition rapidly between a range of defensive and offensive operations that extend from its 4 fundamental roles. Strategic air operations are an extension of precision attack that can disrupt or destroy vital target sets. They have most utility in conventional state-on-state or force-on-force operations. Counter-air operations achieve an appropriate level of air control, through the destruction, degradation or disruption of enemy defensive systems, in order to provide freedom of air and surface manoeuvre. Counter-space operations on the other hand attain and maintain control of space, enabling the exploitation of friendly capabilities, while negating those of an adversary. Counter-land operations shape the battlespace through the targeting of ground forces and their infrastructure, while counter-sea operations exploit sea surveillance and reconnaissance, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures.
Airlift operations move and sustain forces while air logistics operations deploy, sustain, distribute and recover personnel, equipment, supplies and extract non-combatants. Airborne operations deliver ground combat power to seize ground or installations through the airdrop or air landing of land forces. Aeromedical evacuation transports ill or injured personnel under medical supervision to appropriate medical treatment facilities and personnel recovery operations recover personnel from hostile environments. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) operations support planning, execution and situational understanding for joint operations and special air operations use modified equipment and training in unconventional applications against strategic and operational objectives. Electronic warfare operations gain and maintain control of the electromagnetic spectrum. Air-to-air refuelling operations increase the range, endurance, payload and flexibility of other aircraft. Air traffic control operations guide, control and support civil and military air traffic within the framework of the Airspace Control Order. Position, navigation and timing from space based systems provides accurate location and time references to support operations. Geospatial support operations produce high quality material, including geographic and meteorological data, to support mission planning, execution and situational understanding.

Space. Even relatively unsophisticated opponents can exploit space-based assets, on which the military is increasingly dependent. Satellite communications are the bearer for Global Positioning System position, navigation and timing. They also provide a significant ISTAR contribution. Although tasking of space assets is controlled at the strategic level, the JTFC may have access to their products. The JFACC is the focus for space operations.

Command and Control

Air assets are expensive, relatively small in numbers and need significant lead time for planning in order to integrate individual missions effectively. This drives the principles of planning and execution:

a. **Unity of Command.** Command at the highest practicable level allows the optimum balance of priorities to be established.

b. **Centralised Planning.** Centralised planning ensures efficient and effective integration of all activities. However, air planning teams can usefully be embedded at any level of command – and should be – where the integration requirements are stringent and the tempo of air-surface operations high.

c. **Centralised Control.** Centralised control invests the responsibility and authority for planning air operations in a single headquarters, which orchestrates all activities. However, where operations are widely dispersed,
potentially across multiple theatres, and different in character from event to event, the JFACC should delegate resources and control to the lowest practical level. Some low density/high value assets will, however, be so scarce that they must always be centrally controlled.

d. **Decentralised Execution.** Responsibility for execution is delegated to subordinate commanders to encourage maximum initiative through mission command.

263. The JFACC’s rank may vary from 3* to OF-5. The JTFC will normally delegate to him responsibility for all air operations within the Area of Operations as the Airspace Control Authority. The JFACC will be required to balance, coordinate and synchronise the air effort at the operational level, as well as command the tactical activities of assigned assets. He may also be appointed Area Air Defence Commander.

264. **Selection of the Air Component Headquarters.** The Standing JFACHQ, provides support to the JFACC and core of the deployable headquarters.

265. **Location of the Air Component Headquarters.** The JFACC may exercise command afloat, ashore in a rear area, forward in theatre, or airborne in a suitably configured aircraft. Location will be situation dependent. There are, however, considerable advantages to collocation with the JTFC. Moreover, air-land integration is enhanced by the collocation of the JFACC and JFLCC.

266. **Functions of the Air Component Headquarters.** The primary role of the JFACHQ is to support the JFACC in the prosecution of air operations across 3 areas.

   a. **Support to Air Operations.** Support to air operations involves the planning, tasking and supervision of joint air operations.

   b. **Battlespace Management.** Battlespace management involves: the implementation of airspace coordination measures; air defence C2; electronic warfare and electromagnetic spectrum management; military use of space; and data link management, while contributing to the coordination of ISTAR activities and fires.

   c. **Support to the Air Component.** Support to the JFAC encompasses all aspects of component planning and execution.

267. **The Air Planning Cycle.** In consultation with the JTFC and other component commanders, the JFACC produces the Joint Air Operations Plan. This is implemented through the Airspace Control Order and Air Tasking Order. The cycle may be from 48 to 72 hours, but can accommodate amendments at any stage, including airborne re-tasking. The Air Tasking Order captures all air activity down to the lower tactical level, detailing units, tasks and targets. It must reflect the Joint Air Operations Plan,
but is also shaped by the current situation, additional JTFC guidance and the immediate needs of components. The Joint Coordination Board and joint effects meetings ensure that air operations continue to meet the JTFC’s intent.

268. **Task Organisation.** Flying squadrons are normally brigaded into wings, which are tasked directly through the Air Tasking Order. The changing operational situation may demand reorganisation and reconfiguration of assets for each cycle. It is not uncommon for individual aircraft to be tasked through the Air Tasking Order.

269. **Multinational Operations.** The air environment has established largely common international C2 procedures, although tasking cycles can be longer, typically up to 96 hours. Commonality is reinforced by the use of English as the accepted language of the air. In addition, common training, doctrine, tactics and procedures assist integration.

SECTION V – SPECIAL FORCES COMPONENT

270. The UK doctrinal authority for SF is JDP 3-05 *Special Forces Operations.*

Characteristics

271. SF have utility across the full range of operations and environments. As a limited resource, they should be focused on objectives with strategic or operational impact. At the strategic level they may decisively engage targets, in order to affect an opponent’s will, understanding or capability, and thus his long term military effectiveness. At the operational level SF action should support the JTFC’s main effort. It might be decisive in its own right or allow exploitation by other elements.

272. The specialist selection, training, equipment and organisation of SF brings the capacity to operate in hostile territory, often isolated from the main force. The JFSFC also has greater agility than other components; it can respond rapidly to deliver precise action with extended reach and endurance. **SF operations are complex and potentially high risk, yet can offer disproportionate gains.**

Contribution to Joint Operations

273. SF have 3 main functions, which can be used in isolation or to complement one another:

a. **Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** SF conduct covert ISTAR by land or sea in a static or mobile role and can provide timely information to commanders at all levels. In addition, they may contribute to the general

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7 The considerations for the employment of SF are: employed for strategic effect, commanded at the highest appropriate level, use of directives, timely decision-making, access to intelligence and security. Further detail is within JDP 3-05, *Special Forces Operations.*
intelligence picture, embellish information from other systems and cue systems to confirm intelligence or trigger interdiction. SF may also provide a more appropriate means of obtaining information in hostile terrain or climates. Where ambiguity exists, the ability of SF to act on initiative and interpret information can provide ground truth, while the capacity to reach and communicate with civilians and indigenous forces may be key.

b. **Offensive Action.** Offensive action is designed to achieve a focused effect with a minimum of unintended consequences. Actions are directed against high value strategic or operational targets, which may require covert infiltration or specialist techniques. Offensive action may be conducted in patrol to multiple squadron strength, independently or supported by conventional forces.

c. **Support and Influence.** Support and influence activities are often conducted in support of other government departments, usually as part of wider political or military objectives. The role encompasses: training tasks to support foreign and security policy; support or influence of third parties, such as, forward presence, training and liaison with allies and other relevant parties; hearts and minds support to, and influence of, indigenous populations; raising, training and supporting indigenous forces; and influence activities. Although SF operations are normally conducted covertly the product may be used to support the Information Strategy.

**Command and Control**

274. Command of SF is retained at the highest appropriate level to ensure best use of available resources. Routine support is provided by the SF Support Group. Other regular elements are, however, also earmarked to support SF operations. Where assets are assigned to SF, the JTFC may delegate OPCON, Tactical Command (TACOM) or Tactical Control (TACON) to the JFSFCC. If C2 is not transferred to the JFSFCC, then direct liaison authority is normally given to ensure cooperation during planning and execution.

275. During joint operations SF C2 is exercised at one of 2 levels. Operations may be mounted by the Joint Commander using SF assigned by Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) or a JFSFC may be assigned to a JTF. Operational Command (OPCOM) of assigned SF is normally delegated to the Joint Commander, in accordance with CDS’ Directive, and exercised through Director Special Forces, as Commander SF. OPCON may be delegated to a national or multinational commander and exercised through a JFSFCC. OPCON is normally delegated to the JTFC when SF tasks fall

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8 In certain circumstances SF may conduct operations, under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence, which will be conducted under the OPCOM of Director Special Forces, who is responsible to Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).
within his Joint Operations Area (JOA). The JTFC normally then delegates TACOM, or occasionally OPCON, to the JFSFCC.

276. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander.** The responsibilities of the JFSFCC include, but are not limited to, planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking SF based on the JTFC’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Specific JFSFCC responsibilities include:

   a. Acting as a JTFC in his own right drawing together elements from other components for a SF-led operation.
   
   b. Contributing to the JTFC’s estimate and developing, maintaining and implementing SF operations that best support the JTFC’s intent.
   
   c. Acting as a supported or supporting component commander.
   
   d. Providing functional advice to the JTFC on the correct employment of SF and contributing to planning as appropriate.
   
   e. Coordinating with the other component commanders to ensure unity of effort.
   
   f. Exercising C2 of SF and other assets assigned by the JTFC.

277. **Joint Force Special Forces Component Headquarters.** The JFSFCHQ is normally deployed alongside a JTFHQ. In multinational operations, it would form part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, normally with a liaison party at the JTFHQ. The JFSFCHQ could be deployed independently but would require logistic support and has only a limited step-up capability. The specific responsibilities of the JFSFCHQ include:

   a. Deploying, sustaining and recovering SF task groups.
   
   b. Issuing planning guidance; analysing courses of action, developing CONOPS, identifying and securing supporting assets.
   
   c. Ensuring rules of engagement are appropriate and requesting changes where necessary.
   
   d. Approving, controlling, de-conflicting and monitoring the execution and sustainment of SF operations, and evaluating results.
   
   e. Placing coordinating teams in the requisite headquarters and nominating liaison officers within the JTFHQ.
278. **Task Organisation.** The UK JFSFCC can command up to three SF task groups within the JOA. Each is led by a SF unit commander supported by his own headquarters and comprising a number of SF sub-units, task-organised for the mission.

**SECTION VI – LOGISTIC COMPONENT**

279. A JFLogC provides the focal point for logistic support and optimum means of controlling logistic assets spread across components. While component logistics are focused forward, the JFLogC not only looks forward to provide logistic support to them but also looks back to monitor the logistic activities of the strategic base. A JFLogC is likely to be deployed when the scale or complexity of the operation exceeds the capacity of JTFHQ J1/J4 staff. The JFLogC undertakes the more practical aspects of operational and tactical logistics, allowing JTFHQ J1/J4 staff to concentrate on critical campaign logistic factors. Additional detail on the JFLog C is within JDP 4-00 *Logistics for Joint Operations.*

**Characteristics**

280. The JFLogCC delivers coherent support to the JTF by taking responsibility for activities of benefit to 2 or more components, coordination between components and the appropriate use of their logistic resources. Some low level systems may, however, continue to operate directly between components and the strategic base.

281. The JFLogC manages the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM)\(^9\) of force elements and sustains the operation. It controls the theatre end of the coupling bridge and ensures that stocks arrive in theatre and are distributed in accordance with the JTFC’s priorities.\(^10\) A JFLogC is not responsible for the detailed management of component logistics but does exercise a coordinating function to ensure that the JTFC’s priorities are met. A JFLogC may be allocated a specified Area of Operations, for which it has force protection and other responsibilities. If this is not the case, close liaison with the headquarters performing this function is necessary. The specific JFLogC responsibilities are to:

- **Command all logistic assets assigned to the JFLogC in the JOA.** It contributes to the JTFHQ estimate process and liaises with coalition partners, deployed contractors and the host nation.

- **Coordinate in-theatre logistic support, in accordance with the JTFC’s priorities, through activation and maintenance of robust lines of communication.** Components retain command of their integral logistic assets,

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\(^9\) The JFLogC will be responsible for the RSOM element of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI). It will assist in the integration process but this is a J3-led activity.

\(^10\) The JTFC’s priorities will be reflected within the Theatre Priorities List but will be overlaid by strategic priorities from PJHQ.
unless otherwise directed by the JTFC. However, to maximise efficiency, the JFLogC is normally given coordinating authority.

c. Establish and manage the Recognised Theatre Logistic Picture, as part of the Joint Operating Picture.

282. **National Support Element.** A national support element provides the national logistic focus to a Joint Commander within a multinational operation. It delivers a coordination and liaison function between the UK, other coalition forces and the Joint Commander. A JFLogC may adopt the role of national support element; however, the complexity of multinational logistic coordination may demand a separate national support element. A national support element is responsible for coordinating national operational logistic activity across the force. National support elements, therefore, have a wider involvement in component logisties than a JFLogC, representing national requirements at all levels to the Joint Commander. The complexity of the operation, number of nations and the need to act as a logistic lead nation or logistic role specialist nation will determine the nature of a national support element.

**Contribution to Joint Operations**

283. A JFLogC is critical to preparing, projecting, sustaining and recovering the JTF and carries out a range of specific functions in support of a deployed force:

a. **Theatre Activation.** The Theatre Activation Party conducts reconnaissance and implements in-country resource arrangements for the receipt of a larger enabling force and JFLogCHQ. Its size is dictated by the range of skills required to supplement a deployed Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.

b. **Movement Control.** JTFHQ movement staff set intra-theatre and, in conjunction with PJHQ, inter-theatre transport and movement policy and priorities. They have a close relationship with the JFLogCHQ, which is responsible for conducting RSOM. The Joint Force Movement Staff, who initially execute the movement plan, deploy early but may re-deploy to support other operations once the JFLogC is established.

c. **Establishing In-Theatre Movement and Life Support.** The JFLogC is responsible for coordinating intra-theatre movement, including related life support. This normally requires joint control to optimise transport assets.

d. **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration.** Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) is a complex joint C2 operation. It draws together the movements and administrative functions necessary to move, process, accommodate and provide life support to a transiting force. The RSOM element is normally controlled by the
JFLogCHQ, in liaison with the JTFHQ, in order to provide a timely response to late force element table changes. The integration element involves all components; the JFLogC is likely to deliver some aspects of integration for the whole force and may well enable other aspects, such as the provision of ranges. Control of integration activity is likely to be primarily a component responsibility in conjunction with J3.

e. **Intra-Theatre Supply.** The JFLogC controls intra-theatre air transport and usually main supply routes.

f. **Logistic Support.** Effective joint support to operations depends upon the JFLogCC exercising coordination authority over all in-theatre logistic assets, as well as command of those units which provide joint support. Force level logistic support encompasses supply and distribution, movements, maintenance, infrastructure, provision of fuel, water, electrical power, temporary deployable accommodation as well as medical and personnel administrative support. This support may be provided from UK or multinational sources, from the host nation, from contractors or from other in-country resources.

g. **Force Supply and Distribution.** Inventory control and prioritisation is fundamental to the efficiency of a line of communication. Routine demands do not normally pass through the JFLogCHQ, and are extracted using the appropriate supply systems. However, the JFLogC monitors the joint supply chain to ensure it meets operational requirements. Supply and distribution units under command of the JFLogCC are responsible for the receipt, storage, control, maintenance, accounting and distribution of operational logistic stocks for environmental components, in accordance with the JTFC’s priorities.

**Command and Control**

284. **Standing Joint Force Logistic Component.** The UK maintains a 1* Standing JFLogCHQ under OPCOM of Chief Joint Operations. It consists of personnel drawn from all 3 Services and is commanded by the Commander Joint Force Logistic Operations. The headquarters is held at very high readiness to provide a rapidly deployable logistic C2 node for contingent operations. It forms the core of a deployed JFLogCHQ at medium scale, drawing augmentation from the authorised Augmentation Manning List and embedded headquarters specialists from all 3 Services and Defence Equipment and Support.

285. **Joint Force Logistic Headquarters.** The JFLogCHQ is task-organised. It will vary in size and range of staff capabilities according to the nature of the operation. In a multinational operation the JFLogCHQ is likely to contribute a substantial slice of the UK national support element.
286. **Single Component Headquarters.** The deployment of a JFLogCHQ affects component C2. The JTFC can brigade assets under a JFLogC for specific phases of the operation. Component logistic staffs coordinate and develop their elements of the JTFC’s campaign in conjunction with JFLogCHQ. Components normally maintain C2 of forward support, 1st and 2nd Line and afloat support as there is no inherent benefit in imposing joint logistic structures at this level. Occasionally, a component is given the lead to assume specialist tactical level logistic responsibility for a JTF, particularly where other component contributions to the operation are minimal.

287. **Logistic Detachments.** In any joint operation there are likely to be JFLogC units positioned in areas separated from the main supply area, such as forward mounting bases and forward logistic sites. Consequently, the JFLogCHQ needs to establish logistic detachments that can provide essential logistic support functions at dispersed locations.

**SECTION VII – JOINT FORCE ELEMENTS**

288. Some specialist, and often scarce, force elements provide critical cross-component capabilities. To ensure efficient employment they demand C2 at the JTF level and are not generally delegated to component commanders. They are referred to collectively as joint force elements. Discrete national contributions, as well as embedded component assets, may be brigaded under the control of a specific commander within the JTFHQ. Specialist coordination at the operational level provides a pan-JOA view and the ability to re-balance resources across the JTF. Joint headquarters may provide a force generation function in support of front line commands or actually deploy supporting headquarters elements, possibly embedded within the JTFHQ. The following list is not exhaustive.

289. **Joint Ground Based Air Defence.** The JTFC normally tasks the JFACC with the roles of Area Air Defence Authority and Air Control Authority. The JFACHQ Combined/Joint Air Operations Cell exercises TACOM/TACON of all assigned ground based air defence; when assigned, component commanders will exercise TACOM/TACON. The Joint Ground Based Air Defence Headquarters generates force elements and augments the JFACHQ. It does not deploy as an independent headquarters.

290. **Joint Force Engineers.** Guided by the JTFC’s CONOPS, the Joint Force Engineer controls all JTF engineer assets and sets their priorities. In particular, he should determine the balance between force and combat support. Joint Force Engineer staff and force elements are likely to be some of the first enablers to deploy. Subsequently, the staff will be embedded within the JTFHQ. The standing Joint Force Engineer is Commander 8 Force Engineer Brigade.
291. **Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** Joint explosive ordnance disposal is an operational explosive ordnance disposal capability maintained by all 3 Services for use in their respective environments. However, enhanced synergy is achieved by C2 through the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Cell, from within the JTFHQ.\(^{11}\)

292. **Joint Helicopter Force.** A single joint helicopter force may be formed from component battlefield helicopters from the outset. The Joint Helicopter Force Headquarters provides a focus for the C2 of all battlefield helicopter force elements. The joint helicopter force commander may sit within the JTFHQ, in order to provide direct advice, or deploy within a stand-alone headquarters. To undertake all of the endorsed roles of battlefield helicopters, a mixed fleet is required.

293. **Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Regiment.** The Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Regiment provides CBRN protection support for operations. It is an essentially modular organisation designed to address different elements of the CBRN hazard and will be deployed on a threat-based, task-organised basis. The regimental headquarters, potentially with other multinational CBRN headquarters, is likely to be located within the JTFHQ but could be subordinated to component level.

294. **15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group.** Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) planning should start as a crisis develops. 15 (UK) PSYOPS Group may commence work prior to DCMO planning activities. They are, subsequently, likely to be consulted during the production of strategic direction. At the operational level the Joint Commander’s Directive will provide guidance within the Information Operations (Info Ops) annex. Within the JTFHQ, PSYOPS will be the responsibility of J3 (Operations Support) augmented by a PSYOPS Support Element from 15 (UK) PSYOPS Group. Tactical PSYOPS teams are deployed at component level.

295. **Joint Force Communications and Information Systems.** The complexity of joint CIS will usually demand a Commander Joint Force CIS. The Joint Commander’s Directive will set out responsibilities for the direction of CIS and information communications services to meet the JTFC’s intent. Typically, Commander Joint Force CIS will be delegated OPCON of all CIS assets, less SF. He will draw core staff from JFHQ J6, augmented by staff from PJHQ, front line commands and other organisations. The Commander Joint Force CIS is likely to be either Commander 1 or 11 Signal Brigade.

296. **Joint Data Link Management Organisation.** The Joint Data Link Management Organisation is responsible for the planning, design coordination, management and execution of data link activities in line with the JTFC’s direction. Joint Data Link Management Organisation elements may, however, be delegated to,\(^{11}\) The Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Cell is always commanded by the Joint Force Engineer.
and physically located with, a lead component headquarters. When deployed the Joint
Data Link Management Organisation is specifically responsible for:

a. The provision of Link 16 network designs.
b. The coordination of data link frequency clearance requirements.
c. The planning and development of data link architectures.
d. The tasking of data link operations via the multi-data link management plan and OPTASK LINK and associated monitoring and management.

297. **Military Stabilisation and Support Group.** Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is the practical application of a comprehensive approach and a means by which the JTFC may achieve, indirectly, psychological effect. It is critical that it is woven into the campaign from the outset and, given the diverse range of actors, managed at the operational level. Organic CIMIC staff will be embedded within the JTFHQ. In addition, the Military Stabilisation and Support Group will act as a source of staff augmentation and provide CIMIC Support Teams, to conduct field assessments, functional specialists and liaison officers. Related tasks may demand the allocation of manpower and material resources by the JTFC, particularly Joint Force Engineer.

298. **The Defence Operational Languages Support Unit.** The ability to communicate effectively with the full range of actors while maintaining Operations Security (OPSEC) is critical. The Defence Operational Languages Support Unit is responsible for delivering high level\(^{12}\) operational language capability to the JTF. The range of functions to be supported and the relative dispersion of headquarters and force elements will shape the force element table. Support is likely to reflect a mix of military personnel, contracted civilians and locally employed civilians. Trained military personnel will be employed when OPSEC or deployability considerations preclude the use of civilians with first language skills. The Defence Operational Languages Support Unit will provide advice and assistance regarding training and deployment of trained unit language personnel as low level\(^{13}\) operational language capability. High level linguists should be managed centrally in theatre by SO2 Language Capability Management, who will also advise Labour Support Unit staff on the hiring and training of locally employed civilians.

299. **Operational Intelligence Support Groups.** An Operational Intelligence Support Group (OISG) provides a deployable and scalable facility to complement the organic J2 capability. It is able to reach out to national intelligence support and

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\(^{12}\) ‘High level’ refers to linguists that are NATO STANAG SLP 3 or higher and employed primarily as linguists.

\(^{13}\) ‘Low level’ refers to linguists that are NATO STANAG SLP 2 or lower and whose language skills are secondary to their primary duties.
specialist capabilities in order to provide assessed material and fused multi-intelligence product, particularly at higher levels of classification. When deployed it should be placed at OPCOM CJO and OPCON Chief J2. It is able to:

a. Operate with the All Source Analysis Cell.
b. Contribute to targeting.
c. Form a key element in intelligence exploitation.
d. Process material from UK sources and produce fused intelligence product.
e. Provide releasable intelligence to Allies.
f. Support the Intelligence Requirements Management process.
g. Prepare sanitised product for local dissemination.

300. Each OISG is structured to meet specific theatre and operational needs, but it is likely to contain:

a. **Analytical Element.** The analytical element links the OISG specialist intelligence elements and the J2 staff structure. It includes a bespoke intelligence database and supporting CIS. A Defence Intelligence Staff analyst is often included in the analytical element.

b. **Specialist Intelligence Elements.** National intelligence organisations are represented by specialist intelligence elements, which facilitate direct reachout to parent organisations. The elements listed below have a limited processing capability and not all will be represented:

(1) **Human Intelligence Specialist Intelligence Element.** Either the Defence Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Unit or UK national agency provides the HUMINT Specialist Intelligence Element. It provides coordination between national and military HUMINT operations.

(2) **Signals Intelligence Support Element.** The Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) element is drawn from the Transportable Cryptological Support Group of the National Signals Intelligence Organisation. It provides the focus for SIGINT analysis and dissemination within the OISG.

(3) **Geospatial Intelligence Team.** The Geospatial Intelligence Team provides geospatial intelligence expertise to the OISG and J2, including geographic information and intelligence. It also supports the
analysis in a common spatial context of intelligence from other specialist elements and the All Source Analysis Cell. The Geospatial Intelligence Team usually has its own geospatial analyst and additional support from local geospatial elements can be provided through them. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and imagery derived measurement and signature is provided by deployed assets, including the Tactical IMINT Wing, by reachout to the National Imagery Exploitation Centre and access to Allied capabilities.
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JDP 3-00

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ANNEX 2A – INTER-COMPONENT COORDINATION AND LIAISON

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<tr>
<th>Donor Component</th>
<th>Recipient Component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maritime (M)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MCE(A)</td>
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<td>(See Note 3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land (L)</td>
<td>BCD(M)</td>
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<td>BCD(A)</td>
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<td>(See Note 2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air (A)</td>
<td>ALE(M)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>(See Note 4)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key:
- ACCE - Air Component Coordination Element
- ALE - Air Liaison Element
- MCE - Maritime Coordination Element
- BCD - Battlefield Coordination Detachment
- LO - Liaison Officer

Notes:
1. MCE(A) and ALE(M) are complementary peacetime staff billets.
2. Special Forces (SF) LOs are not routinely provided to the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFMCC and Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) do not routinely provide LOs to the Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC). LOs will be allocated on a case-by-case basis (SF has dedicated air support assets which provide their own LOs at the tactical level).
3. Commander UK Maritime Force is complemented with his own logistic team who provide support to all units under command of the JFMCC.
4. The Standing Joint Force Logistics Component Headquarters (SJFLogCHQ) establishes bespoke liaison structures for each operation, on a case-by-case basis.
5. Land has dedicated logistics brigades. The JFLog C directs the logistic affiliations for Army units deployed in direct support of other components.
6. Organic support to deployed RAF units is provided by the Air Logistic Cell, which is part of the JFACHQ.
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CHAPTER 3 – JOINT ACTION

Chapter 3 describes how the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), assisted by his Chief of Staff (COS), orchestrates the capabilities and activities within Joint Action to realise his intent.

Section I – Strategic Communication
Section II – Joint Action
Section III – Types of Activity
Section IV – Freedom of Action
Section V – Joint Action Bedrock Capabilities

301. A JTFC’s role is to direct and orchestrate the tactical activities of the components; refocusing effort when necessary, to achieve the best synergy between tactical formations or components. While tactical or component commanders possess the means to conduct military activities at the tactical level, their capabilities are invariably most effective when integrated and synchronised.

302. The complexity of conflict allied to the dynamic nature of the information environment means that prescriptive plans are unlikely to prove successful against an adaptive opponent. As a consequence, resilient but pragmatic mechanisms are required to assess the progress of operations and adjust where required. A JTFC requires not only formal contingency plans to address outcomes that have been foreseen, but also the agility to cope with uncertainty and the unexpected.

303. Once execution is underway, orchestration becomes ever more challenging and a JTFC needs to maintain a clear perspective of the underlying purpose of activities and the desired effects. This will allow him to respond rapidly and effectively to events.

SECTION I – STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

304. The MOD defines strategic communication as: advancing national interests by using all defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people. It is the mechanism by which the levers of power are integrated in support of the overall information strategy. Its purpose is to ensure that the MOD’s words and actions are coordinated, both within the MOD and across government, to achieve the desired effect on target audiences.

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1 The information environment consists of the domains (physical, virtual and cognitive) and the inter-relationships within them. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/11 Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution.

2 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database (8th Edition). This definition is a clear, succinct distillation of the National Security Council’s definition.

305. Chief of Defence Staff’s (CDS’) Directive to the Joint Commander will contain a strategic communications plan setting out desired target audience behaviour and the key themes and messages set within a strategic narrative. The Joint Force seeks to influence audience behaviour by delivering its message through its words, images and actions together with those of its allies and partners. As part of his planning process, the JTFC uses a focus on desired behaviours and information effect as the basis of his campaign design. Consequently, it defines both his theory of change and his concept of operations. The plan is then delivered through the integration and synchronisation of activities under Joint Action.

306. The JTFC’s campaign plan will include key themes and messages derived from the information and targeting annexes contained in CDS’ Directive and linked to the behavioural objectives. They will be based on an understanding of target audiences and provide further basis for the crafting of operational/tactical actions by components, thus ensuring that tactical activities are coherent with the strategic communication campaign.

SECTION II – JOINT ACTION

307. **Definition of Joint Action.** Joint Action is defined as: the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to affect an actor’s will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve influence. Joint Action is implemented through the orchestration of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Activities</th>
<th>To manipulate information, or perceptions of information, to primarily affect understanding</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fires</td>
<td>The deliberate use of physical, or virtual, means to achieve, primarily, physical effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach</td>
<td>Outreach includes stabilisation, support to governance, capacity building, and regional/local engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manoeuvre</td>
<td>Used to gain advantage in time and space</td>
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</tbody>
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4. This includes broadcast mediums of print, loudspeaker, radio, television and internet.
5. The JTFC’s theory of change is his big idea of how the operation will change the current operational conditions to the future desired conditions, JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning (2nd Edition Change 1).
6. This is a new definition which replaces the definition in JDP 0-01.1 (8th Edition).
7. Computer Network Operations (CNO) or cyber.
8. Revised definition.

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This definition of Joint Action recognises:

- the centrality of influence as an objective;
- the integration of activities to realise it; and
- our need to influence not only an adversary but a range of actors including our own population and forces, allies, civilian partners and regional audiences.

Although an integral part of the UK’s approach to campaigning, Joint Action is neither a new capability nor an activity in its own right. Instead, it is a framework for considering the integration, coordination and synchronisation of all military activity within the battlespace. Throughout, it must be cognisant of, and coherent with, non-military lines of operation.

308. **Joint Action and the Manoeuvrist Approach.** The manoeuvrist approach to operations applies strength against identified vulnerabilities, involving predominantly indirect ways and means of targeting the intellectual and moral component of an opponent’s fighting power. Emphasis is placed on achieving objectives through ingenuity and even guile, rather than simply physical destruction of capability. Thus it is equally applicable to contemporary operations and campaigns where the campaign objectives are centred on behavioural outcomes. The manoeuvrist approach and Joint Action are inextricably linked as both seek to undermine an actor’s will by affecting his understanding and capability.

**Bringing Influence to Bear**

309. Influence is achieved when the behaviour of a target group is changed through the combination of words, images and actions. These will be interpreted through the prism of a target’s culture, traditions, environment and perception, which together comprise his understanding of a situation. This understanding is linked to a will to act, or not act, and a capability to do so; thus determining the effectiveness of a target group.

310. **Understanding.** In the context of decision-making, understanding is defined as: the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making. An actor’s understanding of the situation will underpin his decision-making process. It comes from situational awareness which, once analysed, provides comprehension or insight. Applied judgement will provide foresight, which in turn will be influenced

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12 In intelligence usage, situational awareness is: the ability to identify trends and linkages over time, and to relate these to what is happening and what is not happening. JDP 0-01.1 (8th Edition).
by preconceptions. Culture and intellect, as well as doctrine, also shape thinking, perceptions and decisions. Understanding is relevant in many ways:

- an actor’s understanding of his core narrative; his fighting strength and that of his opponent;
- his understanding of the effectiveness of his own activities and those conducted against him; and
- his understanding of his vulnerabilities and the future threats that face him.

These are neither certain nor absolute, and understanding will be driven by the specific information an actor receives, and his particular perspective, rather than reality. An actor’s understanding of the situation, together with his understanding of ours, affects his perceptions and, so, his will. As a campaign develops so will understanding. This requires a JTFC and his staff to maintain a flexible approach, have an adaptable campaign plan, continually test assumptions and, if necessary, formally conduct a new estimate.

311. Capability. An actor’s capacity for action is dependent upon his physical capability and its use in context. Although quantity and quality tend to confer advantage, other factors also impact effectiveness. Some factors, such as time and space, are contextual, but others, such as apportionment of resources, are subject to commanders’ discretion and hence susceptible to influence. Consequently, the denial of certain aspects of capability, such as communication nodes (aids to understanding) and information technologies (aids to exerting influence including media), may have a disproportionate impact on overall effectiveness. However, when planning the denial of such capabilities, it is critical to consider whether they may be of future use to the friendly campaign.

312. Will. Will is the faculty by which a person decides upon, and initiates, a course of action. It encompasses the will to act or resist. At the strategic level, it is likely to be based upon national culture, ideology and political resolve. At the operational and tactical levels, it is likely to be based upon the social unity of communities of interest or armed groups, their morale, esprit de corps and cohesion. There are parallels between will and the moral component of fighting power. An actor’s will can be affected directly; concentrated fires can dissuade an opponent from further resistance. It can also be affected indirectly; an opponent who is denied the ability to understand his situation, for example, may lose the will to act and be inclined to compromise or acquiesce. There is also considerable potential for activities to have significant unintended and undesirable effects. For example, fires may cause collateral damage of such political, social or ideological significance that an opponent’s will to act or resist is strengthened, despite his capability being depleted.
313. **Cohesion.** Both will and cohesion remain fundamental to a group’s ability to exert influence, fight or resist effectively. The manoeuvrist approach is based upon breaking an opponent’s collective will and shattering his cohesion. Collective will mobilises a gathering of individuals and groups in pursuit of common goals. Adherence to collective will may be based upon a variety of motivations, ranging in strength from tacit acceptance, through active subscription, to absolute allegiance. A group’s cohesion reflects the extent to which these motivations successfully bind individuals together as a cooperative body. At a more practical level, cohesion enables an actor to exploit his understanding and effectively use his capabilities. Cohesion, enhanced by interoperability, may enable shared situational awareness, facilitate battlespace management and allow effective force integration. Where such close cooperation is not possible, or is interrupted, disparate force elements may be less effective.

314. **Relationships.** The relationships between understanding and capability may vary between different actors and situations. Understanding that these elements are inter-related, and that they are also linked to cohesion and capacity, is fundamental to a full appreciation of how to affect them.

**SECTION III – TYPES OF ACTIVITIES**

315. Through the operational planning process, the JTFC and his staff will have developed an understanding of the wider operational context as well as the specific supporting effects to be realised in the physical, virtual and cognitive domains. This includes: information activities; fires; outreach activities; and manoeuvre.

316. **Information Activities.** Information activities provide a range of non-lethal tools tailored specifically to deliver information in such a manner as to affect understanding or perceptions. These include Information Operations (Info Ops), Media Operations (Media Ops), and Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and provide the capability, or perceived capability, to affect the character or behaviour of someone or something. Information activities affect understanding through the manipulation of information in both the physical and virtual domains. A lack of accurate situational understanding impacts an actor’s effective use of capability; potentially affecting, indirectly, his will to act. While activities in the physical domain undoubtedly have such effects, the focus for information activities in the cognitive domain is to achieve psychological effects. Information activities may deliver significant effect for comparatively few resources. However, their orchestration and assessment can be especially challenging because:

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13 Information operations includes Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and deception.
a. The number and variety of actors involved tend to frustrate simple causal relationships. Individuals’ responses to information activities will vary according to their culture, values and perceptions.

b. Compared with fires, information activities take effect in unforeseen ways and timescales, and their measurement and assessment pose different challenges. The Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) should supplement objective measures with more subjective assessments, including those of the JTFC, with his unique access to key stakeholders and pan-theatre perspective.

c. Unforeseen, unintended and undesirable effects may either negate intended effects, or make their achievement too costly. For example, information activities often have less foreseeable unintended consequences.

d. In some cases the JTFC will not own the capabilities required to deliver cognitive effects as they may be part of other agencies or on the non-security lines of operation. The JTFC should give due weight in his command and control (C2) estimate to his connectivity and relationship with other agencies.

317. **Fires.** Fires are defined as: *the deliberate use of physical and virtual means to achieve the realisation of, primarily, physical effects.* They can be both lethal and non-lethal, and conducted in both the physical and virtual domains. They are mainly focused on an actor’s capability (through destruction and attrition) including that which enables his understanding. However, they may also be employed to directly, or indirectly, realise a wide range of psychological effects by shattering cohesion, degrading capability and thus impacting on will.

318. **Outreach Activities.** Outreach comprises a range of activities that are often, though not exclusively, linked to stabilisation operations. They include security sector reform as well as infrastructure projects and support to governance, including Rule of Law. These activities will often be conducted by, or with partners and offer opportunities for delivering a coordinated message supporting the overall information campaign. Often linked to capacity building, they will have an impact on partners’ capability and a cognitive effect on a wider range of actors. Therefore, they must be integrated and synchronised with the other elements of Joint Action.

319. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre is defined as *the coordinated activities necessary to gain advantage within a situation in time and space.* It enables fires, information activities and outreach but may also realise effects in its own right. For example, the act of deploying a capability to a position from which to conduct fires may deter an opponent from acting to the extent that the fires themselves become unnecessary.

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16 Refined definition proposed in this Change 1 to JDP 3-00 Campaign Execution (3rd Edition).
Figure 3.1 – Illustration of How Activities May be Used to Affect Will, Understanding and Capability
320. While convenient to visualise activities in terms of physical or psychological effects, as shown at Figure 3.1, any one effect may require orchestration of many different types of activity. The effect which activities may achieve, and within which domain, should be viewed with an open mind. The *raison d’être* of Joint Action, is to synchronise purposeful activities thus enhancing their effect to achieve influence. Brigading them by type simply provides structure, aids the allocation of planning and execution responsibility and, through integration, avoids stove pipes.

**Balancing Effort**

321. The relationships between fires, information activities, outreach and manoeuvre, and their corresponding effect upon an actor’s capability, understanding and will, are likely to be complex and dynamic. Analysis of these relationships is critical to a thorough comprehension of how to influence the situation.

322. The contemporary operating environment is characterised by complexity and uncertainty, with campaigns focused on delivering a particular behavioural effect within a target group. Therefore, the traditional relationship between fires, information activities, outreach and manoeuvre, with fires and manoeuvre having primacy, is reversed with all activities in all domains being focused on supporting the information strategy to achieve influence. This does not mean that in some circumstances fires, and/or manoeuvre, will not be decisive; rather, it is that they are supporting an influence plan rather than being an end in themselves.
323. Availability of precision-guided munitions has greatly improved the discriminatory capability of fires. However, even in those situations where conflict is multi-faceted and complex, there may still be a requirement for accurate massed fires rather than simply precision ones. In all scenarios, the employment of fires should be subject to rigorous planning to optimise weapon effect and balance against the risk of collateral damage. In an operating environment where information flows freely, unforeseen effects such as unintended collateral damage, can limit a JTFC’s freedom of action and undermine coalitions and alliances. Similarly, in situations with multiple armed groups, the depletion of one opponent’s capability may simply provide another opponent with greater freedom of action. A conventional force’s fires may be only partially effective in countering irregular activists. Their typically agile tactics and techniques may mitigate the impact of superior mass, technology and communications, while their ideological conviction may make them more resistant to the impact of physical degradation. Nonetheless, they may remain vulnerable to psychological attack, aimed at diminishing their collective will, support among the population, or, in the case of proxy opponents, their sponsors.

324. Information activities are also unlikely to be decisive in isolation, and their impact almost always relies upon the use or credible threat of force. Information activities and fires, in conjunction with outreach and manoeuvre, should be mutually reinforcing.

SECTION IV – FREEDOM OF ACTION

325. Initially, the extent of a JTFC’s freedom of action will be shaped by national and multinational strategic decision-making leading to the direction inherent in the strategic narrative and the required information effect. This context, and the force levels and capabilities allocated, may impact the JTFC’s ability to conduct operations within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Constraints will be context-specific and key factors at the operational level are likely to include legitimacy, sustainability and force protection.

Legitimacy

326. Legitimacy directly impacts the utility of force, conferring a freedom (even an obligation) to act, as well as a constraint on military activity at the operational level. It provides the justification for any use of force and affects how it is applied. It is an essential foundation upon which the JTFC builds and sustains campaign authority. Moreover, it bolsters morale and promotes cohesion within the Joint Task Force (JTF) as well as between multinational and multi-agency partners. Legitimacy results from an amalgam of action that is compliant with national and international law and what is

17 Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces once committed; it forms an essential element of campaign authority. BDD (4th Edition).
judged ethically and morally acceptable. It is bounded, and constrained, by what is politically directed and what is militarily feasible.

327. **Rules of Engagement.** Rules of engagement will be issued as part of the Joint Commander’s Directive. They provide clear guidance on the circumstances and limitations under which forces can initiate and continue combat. The JTFC, and all members of the force, must understand them prior to deployment so that they become a freedom rather than a constraint.

328. **Sustainment.** Sustainment is a critical campaign enabler. It is the means by which fighting power and freedom of action are maintained. It includes:

- the maintenance and repair of vehicles;
- equipment and materiel; the provision of combat supplies; and
- the evacuation, treatment and replacement of casualties.

A JTFC is responsible for the identification, planning and prioritisation of sustaining activities. Operational-level sustainment and support is inherently joint, although the interface between it, and tactical provision, tends to be context-specific. Early, and continued engagement by a JTFC, with clear direction from the outset, optimises the subsequent sustainment, support and therefore his freedom of action.  

**Force Protection**

329. Force protection is the means by which operational effectiveness is maintained through countering the threats from opponents, as well as natural and human hazards, to ensure security and freedom of action. The JTFC must balance the effort between protecting his force, and undertaking the necessary shaping and decisive engagement to achieve the end-state. It demands an awareness of the capabilities over which he has control and the appetite for risk. The requirement for force protection varies with the situation and strategic imperatives. A JTFC should be wary of undue caution or, the over-commitment of resources to guard against every perceived threat. This may be particularly relevant in multinational and multi-agency operations, where nations and agencies may have differing views of the level of protection required and different perceptions of changes to the prevailing situation. The JTFC should assess and manage the risks associated with different force protection options to enable mission accomplishment whilst sustaining political resolve.

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18 JDP 4-00 *Logistics for Joint Operations* (3rd Edition).
20 JDP 3-64 *Joint Force Protection*. 

It is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

JDP 3-00
SECTION V – JOINT ACTION BEDROCK CAPABILITIES

330. Joint Action relies upon a variety of functions and activities that allow the JTFC to integrate and synchronise single Service combat power within its Joint, inter-agency and multinational operating framework. This is the natural operating context and the foremost requirement is a well structured Joint, inter-agency and multinational command and control capability. Where command and control is sound, a commander can:

- respond better to unanticipated events;
- more easily coordinate the relationship between fires, manoeuvre, outreach and information activities; and
- be in a better position to achieve direct and indirect impact on capability, will and understanding.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

331. Intelligence is pivotal to Joint Action. It allows the JTFC to conduct his decision-making with a comprehensive understanding of the context and the most timely and relevant information available. Intelligence helps to frame the problem and to illuminate specific elements.

332. Intelligence has traditionally focused on 2 overlapping and complementary subjects.

- The actors – their characteristics, culture, capabilities, locations, intentions, relationships, objectives and vulnerabilities.
- The physical environment (geospatial) within which they operate.

In the contemporary operating environment there is a third subject – the information environment, its composition and how it is used by the actors to receive information and transmit their narratives. Intelligence helps to identify objectives by producing a detailed contextual picture of different actors. Basic and current intelligence supports planning and initial execution of activity. As the operation proceeds, the emphasis may shift from direct support to targeting and to providing time-sensitive information and intelligence. Intelligence also supports assessment, enabling the JTFC to adjust his plan accordingly. JDP 2-00 Understanding and Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (3rd Edition) addresses intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in detail.

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21 Intelligence is: the directed and coordinated acquisition and analysis of information to assess capabilities, intent and opportunities for exploitation by leaders at all levels to further the national interest. JDP 0-01.1 (8th Edition).
22 Actors refers to friendly, neutral and adversarial.
Targeting – A Full Spectrum Approach

Joint Action depends upon comprehensive, accurate and timely targeting; this is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them, taking account of the operational requirements and capabilities. It involves:

- understanding what effects need to be achieved;
- identifying the node or target through which the effect can be realised; and then
- applying the appropriate resourced activity against that node or target.

This approach, known as Full Spectrum Targeting is represented pictorially in Figure 3.2. It begins at the start of any planning process with a detailed target systems analysis. This underpins the orchestration of all activities to ensure that they are focused on intended effects; all of which are set within the overarching narrative and executed in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. The JTFC commands the targeting process at the operational level, which will have a substantial impact on campaign rhythm. Annexes 3B and 4A expand upon the detailed mechanisms and structures that support this process.

Figure 3.2 – Effects-Nodes-Action-Resources Model

Scrutiny. All targeting is subject to different levels of legal and policy scrutiny to ensure legal compliance under national and international law. The targeting directive provides direction and guidance to commanders and staff to meet

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23 A target is any area, structure, object, person, organisation, mindset, thought process, attitude or behaviour which can be influenced by a capability – thus targeting in its widest sense applies to all activity sets and not simply fires.
these legal and policy requirements. Operational-level targeting must fuse tactical activities within the Joint Operations Area with those directed by strategic decision-makers, using strategic resources (such as Special Forces). Moreover, given the potential for significant political, economic and legal ramifications, the decision to engage some targets may be subject to national ministerial control and multinational political influence.

335. **Targeted Activity.** Target systems analysis identifies potential target groups and considers their conditions, perceptions, attitudes and vulnerabilities. The process:

- identifies which targets must be affected in order to achieve the JTFC’s objective;
- defines the activity that will deliver that effect; and
- allocates resources against it.

Within the framework of Joint Action, it is equally applicable to, and must encompass, information activities, outreach and the psychological effects they deliver. Physical targets may be easily established, appropriate fires identified, undesired effects accurately assessed and results measured. In every aspect the targeting of information and outreach activities will be more challenging and the results less immediate and tangible. However, the JTFC and his staff must be no less cognisant of distinction, proportionality, humanity and military necessity when operating outside the physical domain. To be fully effective, the targeting process, and the activity it generates, should be conducted as an integrated activity with other government departments and agencies, as part of an integrated approach. Further details on targeting, together with illustrative cycles and the Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix, are at Annex 3B.

336. **Unforeseen Consequences.** Any activity conducted (in either the physical, virtual or cognitive domains) will result in intended and/or unintended effects; these can be desired or undesired. The extent will depend largely on our level of understanding at the time of execution. Potential consequences can be foreseen during the planning process in the form of best/worst case scenarios and contingency plans developed. The intent will be to see our actions achieve the desired result with as few unintended effects as possible. Unforeseen consequences must be addressed as they arise; such consequences are not always negative and may provide opportunities for exploitation. Careful planning of Joint Action will reduce the potential impact of unintended effects upon the diplomatic and economic levers of power.

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24 The Targeting Directive is an annex to the CDS’ Directive to the Chief of Joint Operations and is produced by Targeting and Information Operations Department.

25 The *UK Joint Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment Policy* paper, Vice Chief of Defence Staff endorsed, September 2005, established baseline principles primarily for fires.

26 JDP 04 *Understanding*, Chapter 2.
337. **Prevention of Collateral Damage.** When employing fires, both physical and virtual (including offensive cyber operations), intelligence gathering assists in the identification of civilian structures, residences or networks within effective weapon radius. Planners should take additional care to reduce, or eliminate entirely, the potential for civilian casualties, as well as to minimise damage to property and infrastructure. Although difficult to assess and measure, the requirement to minimise the impact of unintended or unforeseen psychological effects, through fires or information activities, is equally important. It could also be potentially critical in terms of the operational end-state and strategic aims.

338. **Assessment.** Assessment is a key component of campaign management and critical to the successful application of Joint Action. Targeting activity must be assessed through the J2 collection process. While processes to support the assessment of physical effects are more refined and provide earlier information than those for cognitive effects, commanders and staffs must understand the different timelines associated with physical and cognitive effect. They must resist the temptation to default to the former if progress with the latter appears to be slow.

**Coordination, Synchronisation and Integration**

339. During planning, the JTFC and his staff define the effects required, the specific activities necessary to realise them, and the synergy within an integrated approach. During execution, they orchestrate activities through detailed coordination, synchronisation and integration (based upon explicit priorities), applying capabilities when, and where, required. This continual process of campaign management is the core JTFHQ function and reflects a combination of inter-related staff activities and decision-making processes. Though individual headquarters may vary in some respects, the process will broadly be based on the construct of *plan, refine and execute*. Key considerations are detailed below.

340. **Battlespace Management.** Battlespace management is defined as: *the adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activities.*\(^{27}\)

It contributes directly to achieving physical and psychological effects, across all dimensions of the battlespace.\(^{28}\) It is an inherently joint process; planning should be driven by the JTFC and woven into the basic framework of his campaign plan. He should consider, from the outset, the requirement for the integration of all force elements and other agencies operating in the Joint Operations Area. However, the JTFC is unlikely to exercise command over all actors within the operating space, particularly within complex multinational and multi-agency operations.\(^{29}\)

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\(^{27}\) JDP 0-01.1 (8th Edition).

\(^{28}\) There are 7 dimensions: maritime, land, air, space, information (including the internet), electro-magnetic and, time.

\(^{29}\) Operating space represents all aspects of a Joint Operations Area in which activities, both military and non-military, take place. It therefore differs from battlespace which, although being the same geographic area, applies to purely military activity.
manage the battlespace, but not the whole operating space. Battlespace management must be supplemented by cooperation, or at worst de-confliction, with others. Planning should be conducted on a centralised and collaborative basis, while execution should be decentralised, with much of the dynamic control being devolved to the tactical level. The extent to which force elements and other actors interact will vary, from close integration to independence. These different levels of interaction require different levels of battlespace management. The JTFC must continuously manage and review the battlespace management plan, adjusting priorities and arbitrating between components as the situation develops.

341. **Combat Identification.** Combat Identification is defined as: the process of combining situational awareness, target identification, specific tactics, training and procedures to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. It is a battlespace management measure that should provide the JTFC with rapid, secure, positive identification of platforms, equipment and personnel in, or approaching, the Joint Operations Area. Within prevailing rules of engagement, this will not only enhance freedom of action, efficiency of fires and exploitation of the battlespace, but also reduce fratricide. Incidences of fratricide, exacerbated by media coverage, will erode combat power, undermine the moral component of fighting power and create rifts within coalitions. While combat identification within the construct of Joint Action has impact principally on fires and manoeuvre, the requirement to avoid information fratricide demands the same coherence across information activities. Despite technological advances, combat identification remains a complex and multifaceted challenge with a pivotal human element. It depends, in many cases, on the physical and cognitive performance of highly trained, yet fallible, individual service personnel. The UK doctrinal authority for combat identification is JDP 3-62 *Combat Identification*, which deals with the process in detail.

342. **Situational Awareness.** Fed by intelligence, situational awareness provides the comprehension which is key to effective battlespace management and combat identification. A common operating picture can significantly enhance decision-making and enable effective management of the battlespace. An operating picture is not necessarily an electronic representation of the environment, force lay-down and intelligence picture. Although this is a common format, it may sometimes be a simple pen picture of how the commander sees the battlespace. The JTFC is responsible for ensuring that situational awareness is shared across his force and, where appropriate, with other actors. Due to limitations in the information available and the fog of war, perfect situational awareness will be unachievable. A JTFC should therefore continually assess what represents sufficient situational awareness. Situational

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50 The process that allows the immediate determination of a contact’s identity by friendly, discrete platforms or individuals. JDP 3-62 *Combat Identification*.

51 JDP 0-01.1 (8th Edition).
awareness is also influenced by differences in perception, interpretation and understanding. Training, doctrine and experience enable a JTFC, his staff and subordinates to develop a common frame of reference for situational awareness. Shared situational awareness is especially challenging in multinational and multi-agency operations. Particular effort should be made to ensure that such understanding, much of which is implicit, is made as explicit as possible, with any differences in interpretation and understanding resolved.
ANNEX 3A – THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRES AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

Coercion

3A1. UK Defence doctrine describes hard power as the threat of coercion to influence the behaviour of states, groups or individuals.¹ To coerce is ‘to persuade an unwilling person to do something by using force or threats.’² Military coercion therefore, involves deterring people from, or compelling them to do, something. It works by making the consequences of an actor’s undesirable behaviour look unappealing while making alternatives seem attractive. Incentives work well in tandem with threats and a good coercive strategy will involve graduated pressure and an integrated approach that uses all available capabilities. The Joint Action model offers a mechanism that considers many different activities to execute this type of strategy.

Fires

3A2. Figure 3A.1 illustrates how various effects may be realised both directly, and indirectly, through fires. In practice, a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) plans fires to achieve a myriad of effects, giving emphasis to diminishing an opponent’s effectiveness directly (by attrition of his capability) or, indirectly (via his will and understanding).

Figure 3A.1 – Potential Effects of Fires

² An adaptation of work by Dr Karl Mueller and others, including Robert Pape, Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Jeremy Shapiro.
3A3. **Strategic Communication.** At the strategic level we seek to achieve influence by using all levers of power, of which the military represents just one. The military contribution to strategic communication is defined as: *advancing national interests by using all means of defence communication (words, images and deeds) to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people.* Strategic influence may be delivered by different activities to realise both physical and psychological effects. Military information activities, however, are conducted at the operational and tactical levels. They are primarily focused on achieving psychological effects. They should be coherent with the activities of other diplomatic and economic actors.

### Information Activities

3A4. **Information Activities.** Information activities seek to achieve psychological effects by manipulating information, including its receipt or exchange, or perceptions of that information once received. They are focused on altering another actor’s understanding and, hence, indirectly, his will to (re)act and the ability to employ his capability effectively. Fires, information activities and their intended effects, are not mutually exclusive. Cyber activity is a good example of fires intended to impact directly both an opponent’s understanding and capability.

3A5. **Types of Information Activities.** Information activities encompass a variety of activities and supporting functions. Some are undertaken by a Joint Task Force (JTF) (presence, posture and profile), others by a JTFC directly (key leadership engagement). Some may be under JTFC control (Information Operations (Info Ops)); some may simply present opportunities to shape the activities of others (Media Operations (Media Ops)). They may be distinguished, and hence better understood, in a number of ways:

a. Offensive activities in cyberspace can manipulate the means by which information is received. Other activities provide, or deny, an actor access to information, such as key leadership engagement, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) or Operations Security (OPSEC).

b. Other information activities, such as presence, posture and profile, may directly affect an actor’s will rather than his situational understanding per se. Fires may also be used for a similar expressive purpose (to influence behaviour, attitudes or decisions) as well as their more obvious instrumental purpose (to destroy someone or something).
c. Activities such as deception and PSYOPS seek to alter perceptions and hence behaviour. They are different. Falsification may be inherent in deception. PSYOPS are intrinsically truthful and usually attributable.

d. Some categories of information activities describe how or what is done, such as key leadership engagement and presence, posture and profile, while others indicate why certain measures are taken, such as deception.

3A6. Figure 3A.2 provides an illustration of how various effects may be achieved, both directly and indirectly, through information activities. A JTFC will plan information activities giving more or less emphasis to diminishing an opponent’s effectiveness by undermining his understanding or eroding his will to (re)act.

![Diagram of Information Activities]

**Figure 3A.2 – Potential Effects of Information Activities**

3A7. **Categorisation.** The discrete categorisation of activities is less important than the inter-relationships between them, their intended target audience(s) and the desired effects sought. However, to provide a framework within which to understand information activities, they are brought together under the sub-headings of Info Ops, Media Ops, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and OPSEC. This structure is represented at Figure 3A.3. It recognises the contribution of each to psychological effects, the need for close coordination and synchronisation, and thus, unified command. But, it also acknowledges the requirement for a degree of presentational separation.
3A8. **Information Operations.** Info Ops, and supporting staff, provide a coordinating function for information activities and related capabilities, over which the commander has control. They include:

a. **Psychological Operations.** PSYOPS are planned, culturally sensitive activities directed at approved target audiences within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) to influence behaviours and attitudes. They will normally be truthful and attributable in order to achieve political and military objectives.

b. **Deception.** Deception involves deliberate measures to manipulate the perceptions and condition the behaviour of an opponent, in order to achieve and exploit an advantage. The aim of deception is to persuade an opponent to adopt a course of action that disadvantages him. The rationale for deception is
not simply to fool an opponent but to further exploit the anticipated change in his perceptions or behaviour.

c. **Key Leader Engagement.** The ability of a JTFC (and other senior commanders) to influence neutral, friendly and hostile actors through key leadership engagement may be significant. Key leadership engagement, while time-consuming and not always immediately effective, often merits considerable effort and long-term investment. It may, on occasion, be a JTFC’s personal main effort.

d. **Special Capabilities.** Special capabilities include both UK and 4-Eyes capabilities, and the development of mission-specific capabilities (activity specific collaboration). A nominated officer, able to brief the JTFC and coordinate activity, is required to closely control these capabilities.

3A9. **Media Operations.** The aim of Media Ops is: *to provide factual information to a number of audiences via the media to support the aims of the UK Information Strategy.* Critically, its main effort is to communicate the principal themes and messages to the appropriate audiences in pursuit of the desired effect, while remaining sensitive to media interests. Media Ops ensure timely, accurate and effective provision of public information and implementation of public relations policy within an operational environment. Though focused primarily on maintaining public and political support, they influence a far wider audience including allies, other partners, neutrals and opponents. The media environment represents a critical conduit for the delivery of psychological effect; the JTFC should exploit it. In conjunction with Info Ops, CIMIC, outreach and OPSEC, the JTFC should incorporate Media Ops into all aspects of planning and execution. However, while the JTFC can shape the media, he cannot control it. He needs to be careful not to undermine the underpinning principles of Media Ops and with it the confidence of media agencies. The structural distinction between Info Ops, CIMIC, outreach, OPSEC and Media Ops provides reassurance of the necessary separation between each area.

3A10. **Civil-Military Cooperation.** CIMIC represents the operational and tactical level application of an integrated approach, which recognises the need for unified multi-agency effort to achieve agreed outcomes. It should be an integral part of planning from the outset. The CIMIC function allows the JTFC to shape the operating space to the mutual benefit of both the military and civil agencies, through effective, regular interaction. There are 2 key types of CIMIC activity:

   a. **Civil-Military Liaison.** Civil-military liaison provides the necessary interaction to support the planning and conduct of coherent activity.

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7 4 Eyes: US, UK, Canada and Australia with New Zealand as an affiliate member.
8 JDP 3-45.1 *Media Operations.*
9 The principles of Media Ops are articulated in full within JDP 3-45.1.
b. **Civil-Military Operations.** Civil-military operations may be undertaken using JTF resources alone, or in combination with civil resources. Such operations will benefit from the specialist advice and coordination provided by civil-military liaison.

3A11. **Outreach.** Outreach activities encompass a number of actions normally associated with stabilisation, such as:

- security sector reform;
- infrastructure; or,
- governance projects.

Some will involve elements of other information activities such as key leadership engagement and CIMIC, but all offer opportunities for delivering a coordinated message and must be integrated with the wider information strategy.

3A12. **Operations Security.** OPSEC is the discipline which gives a military operation or exercise an appropriate level of security, using active or passive means, to deny a target decision-maker knowledge of essential elements of friendly information.\(^{10}\) The denial of essential elements of friendly information\(^{11}\) will impact directly upon an actor’s understanding and thus, indirectly, his ability or will to (re)act. Any lack of situational understanding will also affect an actor’s effective use of capability, increasing vulnerability to friendly force activities and further undermining will, while also protecting the JTF. Though the psychological effects of OPSEC may be decisive in their own right, a lack of understanding may be exploited using the full range of activities to realise both physical and psychological effects. OPSEC is a risk management process that addresses the additional protection demanded beyond the scope of standing security measures. It focuses on protecting critical exploitable information to reduce risk, without overly constraining freedom of action. Owned by the J3 branch, OPSEC underpins information activities and should be considered throughout the planning and execution process.

3A13. Related Activities.

a. **Cyber Contribution to Information Operations.** Cyber activities provide a capability to access digital networks to either disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy their capability, or alternatively to intercept and use them as a delivery mechanism for PSYOPS products.\(^{12}\) The potential for computer

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\(^{10}\) JDP 3-80.1 *OPSEC, Deception and PSYOPS.*

\(^{11}\) JDP 3-80.1 describes essential elements of friendly information as items of critical exploitable information, concerning friendly dispositions, intentions, capabilities, morale, knowledge and potential vulnerabilities that, if compromised, could threaten the success of friendly forces.

\(^{12}\) Products such as BLOGs, Twitter or on other social media sites.
network information operations to affect an actor’s will, capability or understanding will be subject to an actor’s dependence on these systems.

b. **Presence, Posture, Profile.** The presence, posture and profile of a JTF impacts on neutral and friendly actors, as well as opponents. A fine balance between aggressive, or antagonistic and disciplined low-key behaviour, may serve to weaken or strengthen, campaign authority, as well as undermining the will and understanding of an opponent. Presence, posture and profile are an integral part of influence and should be used to portray the JTF as a credible, committed force with a clear intent.

c. **Physical Destruction.** See paragraph 3A2.

3A14. **Cultural Understanding.** Security and stabilisation experience has underlined the requirement to develop a nuanced understanding of host nation and regional culture. It includes the range of actors, and the influences upon them. This understanding will shape the ways of the campaign to realise effects – both physical and psychological. Cultural understanding enables the commander to optimise Joint Action and ensure that the most appropriate mix of fires, manoeuvre, outreach and information activities is applied in order to extend campaign authority.

3A15. Coordination and Synchronisation of Information Activities.

a. **Strategic Level.** The Information Strategy including the strategic narrative provides a single coherent strategy to which all aspects of government must work. It articulates policy and the desired outcome, which is then translated into government activity, using all instruments of power. It encompasses both the management of information (in the form of themes and messages) and the specific actions to be conducted with the intention of promoting a desired message. Strategic communication staff within Targeting and Information Operations (TIO) supported by Defence Media and Communications staff, formulate the MOD’s contribution to the Information Strategy. This is reflected in the Strategic Communication Effects Action Plan, containing influence themes, objectives and identifying the target audiences, which is in turn embodied within the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS’) Directive. The latter will include the strategic, or operational, narrative together with the desired information effect the campaign seeks to achieve.

b. **Operational Level.** At the operational level, Chief of Joint Operations will issue a directive, the main body of which will have detail of the information strategy including the narrative, desired effects in terms of

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13 Coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences in support of policy objectives. JDP 3-45.1 Media Operations.

14 JDN 1/11 Strategic Communication: The Defence Contribution, describes the information effect as the resultant attitudes and behaviours of audiences produced by the combination of words, images and actions.
behaviour as well as key themes and messages. This will be amplified in the targeting directive which includes Info Ops and Media Ops which the JTFC, in conjunction with CIMIC, outreach and OPSEC, must fuse into a coherent and mutually supporting approach. There should be synergy between all aspects of information activities. Care is required to avoid giving the impression that the media is being manipulated by the military. Delineation between Info Ops, CIMIC, outreach, OPSEC and Media Ops is required. The responsibility for the coordination and synchronisation of information activities within a JFHQ normally falls to the Operations Support Branch. This organisation brings unity of effort to information activities. SO1 J3 Operations Support ensures that they are properly represented at the Joint Coordination Board and across all aspects of mainstream execution and planning.
ANNEX 3B – JOINT ACTION TARGETING PROCESS

3B1. This Annex explains the targeting process within Joint Action. This is the principal catalyst for the close coordination and synchronisation of fires and information activities with manoeuvre and outreach.¹

3B2. Targeting is the process of selecting targets² and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities.³ Joint Action requires focussed and prioritised targeting to coordinate and synchronise the full range of the Joint Force’s capabilities to cohere with the themes and messages articulated in the information strategy and derived from the strategic narrative. The targeting process will have a substantial impact on campaign rhythm and it requires the personal interest of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).

3B3. Full Spectrum Targeting. Full spectrum targeting is defined as: a holistic approach to targeting reviewing all targets together and apportioning action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign information strategy and desired behavioural objectives.⁴ The targeting process starts with a target systems analysis which examines potential target audiences and networks analysing behaviours, attitudes, perceptions and vulnerabilities to identify how they may be influenced and what effects, either physical or psychological, could achieve that influence. This allows identification of behavioural objectives, the effects that will be required to achieve them and the activities and resources required to deliver those effects. All activity, whether lethal or non-lethal, must be conducted within the bounds of necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality. Targeting of individuals and particular groups to achieve psychological effects will often be sensitive and require levels of delegated authority in the same manner as lethal targeting.

Principles of Lawful Targeting

3B4. Successful targeting should ensure that all activity is focused on achieving the desired influence on the target in support of the campaign end-state. The targeting process is bounded by international law and UK domestic law. Only members of the armed forces may lawfully take part in hostilities. Wherever they serve, UK Service

¹ The UK Joint Service Publication (JSP) 900 UK Joint Targeting Policy, 2009 provides policy guidance.
² A target is any structure, object, person, organisation, mindset, thought process, attitude or behaviour which can be influenced by a weapon. JSP 900, dated 2009.
³ Allied Administrative Publication (AAP-6) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting, dated May 2008, defines joint targeting as: the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritising targets, and the synchronisation of fires with other military capabilities and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. This definition ascribes to joint targeting an extremely broad remit that, for the UK at least, would only be accurate if preceded by an expression such as in relation to planned supporting effects and activities – for it is through planning that the requisite effects and actions are identified.
⁴ New definition.
personnel remain subject to Service discipline and, through the Armed Forces Act 2006, the Criminal Law of England and Wales.

3B5. **Law of Armed Conflict.** The Law of Armed Conflict is based on customary law, the principles of humanity, and international conventions, treaties and agreements. To ensure that obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict are met, appropriate training is to be given to military commanders and Service personnel who should be supported by a Legal Adviser (LEGAD) at the appropriate level. Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 gives direction as to targeting and can be regarded as a primary source. The 4 fundamental principles which underpin the law of armed conflict are:

a. **Military Necessity.** Military necessity permits a state engaged in an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.

b. **Humanity.** The concept of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or destruction not necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes. Once a military purpose has been achieved, further infliction of suffering is unnecessary.

c. **Distinction.** Offensive action must be directed against military objectives and combatants only, making a clear distinction between them and civilian objects and civilians. Military objectives are objects, which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers definite military advantage. All feasible precautions are to be taken in the choice and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, or at least minimising, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Particular care must be taken when considering sites of religious or cultural significance and specially protected objects. The word feasible means that which is practicable, or practically possible, taking into account all of the circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations. Indiscriminate attacks are those that are not directed at specific military objectives, those that employ a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective and those that employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited. Consequently, indiscriminate attacks are those that strike military objectives and civilians, or civilian objects, without distinction. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. A disproportionate attack is also considered to be indiscriminate.
d. **Proportionality.** An attack will be disproportionate if it is expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The military advantage anticipated refers to the advantage from the attack considered as a whole, and not only from isolated, or particular parts, of the attack.

3B6. **Self-Defence.** Self-defence is an inherent right in the law of England and Wales, both in Common Law and in Statute. It allows for a person to use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances as he honestly believes them to be, in the defence of himself, or of another, against attack. As well as being reasonable, the use of force must be necessary. Lethal force may only be used in self-defence as a last resort, where there is an honest belief of an imminent threat to life, and there is no other way to prevent that threat.

3B7. **Other Law.** The wide utility of information activities extends the need for legal conformity beyond the Law of Armed Conflict. The virtual domain is pervasive, with few clear boundaries of identity, ownership and attribution. Information activities may impact third parties not involved in the crisis and those outside the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Additionally, it may be desirable to commence information activities before the deployment of UK forces. There should be careful scrutiny of information activities to ensure compliance with all applicable law, both international and domestic.

3B8. **Prevention of Collateral Damage.** Collateral damage is defined as: *damage to personnel and property adjacent to, but not forming part of, an authorised target.*\(^5\) Potential for civilian casualties and unintended consequences\(^6\) should be mitigated or eliminated by use of particular measures such as precision guided munitions, timing of the attack and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE).\(^7\) Intensive intelligence effort must be applied to identify civilians or civilian structures in the vicinity of weapon aim points as well as those whose functionality could be impaired by loss of support services, such as hospital power supplies.

**Role of the Targeting and Information Operations**\(^8\)

3B9. **Strategic Communication.** The National Security Council will establish a communications team for a particular crisis who will articulate the Information Strategy including the Strategic Narrative. Coordination with other government

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\(^5\) Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01.1 UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions.

\(^6\) For example, disruption of hospital power supplies.

\(^7\) Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) can be conducted using collateral damage modelling tools or as field CDE by a pilot or authorised observer.

\(^8\) Targeting and Information Operations (TIO) contains a Strategic Communication planning element that seeks to integrate all words, images and actions to achieve information effect.
departments is achieved through pan-departmental strategic communication steering and working group meetings as required.

3B10. MOD Targeting and Information Operations (TIO) is responsible for integrating strategic fires and information activities’ policies towards achieving Joint Action within the information strategy. The role of TIO is to:

a. Provide specialist military advice to Ministers.

b. Provide target systems.

c. Develop and review the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS’) Targeting Directive in consultation with Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) for specific operations. The Targeting Directive contains detail of physical and psychological objectives that have been developed in the Strategic Communication Actions and Effects Plan.

d. Coordinate strategic input to operational information activities and monitor implementation of strategic guidance for information activities.

e. Develop and review MOD rules of engagement profiles in conjunction with MOD Central Legal Services and PJHQ.

f. Manage the process of Ministerial clearance for specific targeting of fires and information activities.

g. Coordinate Defence Intelligence support to campaign effectiveness assessment.

3B11. **Target Support and Information Operations Products.** On receipt of a Defence Engagement Board Directive and strategic guidance, TIO will produce a target systems analysis for the area of interest. This in-depth analysis of the physical and human terrain attempts to expose vulnerabilities which, when targeted correctly, should contribute to the realisation of desired campaign objectives.

a. TIO strategic communication staff in conjunction with staff from Defence Media and Communications (DMC), will develop a Strategic Communications Actions and Effects Plan to ensure coherence of MOD words, images and actions from which a strategic communications synchronisation matrix is developed.

b. **Fires and Information Activities.** The Master Target List is generated by TIO. Targets whose deliberate, or inadvertent, damage would be sensitive for legal, political or cultural reasons are placed on a No Strike List. The remaining targets are consigned to the Joint Target List, which is grouped into
target categories for validation. Individual target sets may be identified by authorised Ministers for further analysis by Defence Intelligence and ultimately prosecution by strategic assets. Ministerially-approved target sets, delegated authority, supporting rules of engagement and amplification of targeting methodologies are issued to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) via the TIO Targeting Directive and Rules of Engagement Profile. This is attached to CDS’ overarching directive for the campaign.

3B12. **Execution.** During the conduct of an operation, TIO may receive target clearance requests from PJHQ that fall outside PJHQ’s delegated authority. PJHQ Targets staff will prepare a target pack for CJO together with a Target Summary Sheet (TSS), which is then passed to TIO and used in the staffing process to gain Ministerial approval and as a legal record of decisions. Unless delegated to commanders, Ministerial approval is also required before the employment of cyber operations or special capabilities.

3B13. **J3 Operations Planning.** CDS’s Directive contains a TIO Targeting Directive incorporating an Information Operations annex. This forms the basis of the targeting and information annex to CJO’s Directive. Additional decisive conditions and supporting effects coherent with the information strategy may be added as the operational plan develops. J3 Joint Effects staff take the campaign objectives and define desired effects and associated targeting priorities. From this they will refine the given target audiences and distil the overall strategic themes into specific military messages all nested and coherent with the strategic narrative. Information activities risks should be identified, while considering capability and resource requirements.

3B14. The full spectrum targeting process is coordinated by J3 Joint Effects. Once behavioural objectives are identified, detailed Target Audience Analysis (TAA) is conducted to specify which approach (lethal or non-lethal) is most likely to achieve the desired effect. TAA is not simply cultural understanding, although this provides a start-point. It requires a thorough analysis of the motivations and internal dynamics of particular groups supported by hard statistical data. The process depicted diagrammatically in Figure 3B.1 is as follows:

a. Determine the desired behaviour of target audiences.

b. Analyse the targets to identify critical vulnerabilities and levers.

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9 Target categories are grouped by function. An extract from the Modernised Integrated Database will contain fixed targets only. Individuals, groups or mobile targets may appear as a target set but will not have complete information included in the Joint Target List.

10 This usually refers to delegated casualty threshold authority but may encompass the use of specific weapons or requirement to prosecute targets on the Restricted Target List (lawful targets that are temporarily or permanently restricted from engagement).

11 Developed from a model designed by Dr Lee Rowland.
c. Decide on the best type of activity to achieve the desired effect.

d. Execute the activity either as Information or Outreach, or as Fires or Manoeuvre.

e. Monitor the audience and the environment to measure any change in behaviour or move towards the original behavioural objective.

Figure 3B.1 – Audience-based Effects Process

3B15. Figure 3B.2 illustrates a similar process or Full Spectrum Targeting Cycle which is aligned with the traditional Joint Targeting Cycle. Following direction on targeting priorities, J2 develops understanding of target sets using collection assets including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), information from the

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12 Commander’s direction, target development, capability matching, force planning and assignment, execution, assessment. AJP 3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Targeting.
host nation and allies, as well as engagement with local and regional actors. As understanding improves, target sets are refined, enabling vulnerabilities and levers to be identified indicating which capabilities are likely to achieve the desired behavioural effect. This could be a lethal or non-lethal approach or a combination of both. Most activity will be coordinated at component level using a 4-stage tactical targeting process of: Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A). Assessment is a phase in both the tactical and operational cycles and is critical in determining opportunities to exploit and to contribute to the overall campaign assessment process. Subordinate units and headquarters may use a further mechanism known as: Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse (F3EA).\(^{13}\)

![Diagram of the Joint Effects Cycle](image)

**Figure 3B.2 - Joint Effects Cycle**

**Targeting**

3B16. Plans for activities against specific target sets will be produced as Full Spectrum Targeting Plans, detailing the range of activities both lethal and non-lethal to be conducted. An example is at Figure 3B.3.

\(^{13}\) See JDP 3-05 *Special Forces Operations* and Land Forces Doctrine Note 10-15 *Land Force Tactical Targeting Process*. 

The content of this publication was incorporated into AJP-3, Allied joint doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (Edition C) published by NATO in February 2019. It is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
JDP 3-00

3B17. **Fires.** Targeting is a collaborative process between targeting staff in the deployed JFHQ and PJHQ. JFHQ submit the Joint Target List (JTL) and a copy of the No Strike List (NSL) to PJHQ. MOD retains control of the NSL and must authorise any amendments. This collaborative approach makes efficient use of staff and improves target knowledge between the 2 headquarters. Certain targets on the JTL, although valid military targets, may have an adverse effect on the campaign plan and can be placed on the Restricted Target List (RTL). The JTL and RTL are approved by PJHQ before being issued to JFHQ. Once issued, the JTL and RTL are controlled by JFHQ. Details of each target will be contained within a target folder, which provides an audit trail to determine whether a target is a valid military objective and can be cleared for attack. CJO will issue a targeting directive to JFHQ, delegating authority within his chain of command and providing any amplifying guidance.

3B18. **Execution.** Following the issue of CJO’s Directive to JTFC, the Joint Effects Branch maintains close contact with JFHQ Operations Support (Ops Sp) staff to ensure that information activities’ issues are staffed through the appropriate Contingency Planning Team or Operations Team. The Branch also conducts liaison with coalition partners, as well as maintaining resource balance through contact with

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**Figure 3B.3 – Full Spectrum Targeting Plan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Set</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>General population – regime cannot maintain control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Abandon the regime or face consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>C2 Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>-12</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>+12</th>
<th>+24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Target Set</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GR4</td>
<td>Lethal strike on command bunker at:</td>
<td>Destroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLAM14</td>
<td>Lethal strike on radio mast at:</td>
<td>Destroy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMANDO</td>
<td>Radio broadcast</td>
<td>Persuade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLO</td>
<td>Leaflet drop around C2 bunker and radio mast</td>
<td>Deter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

14 TLAM: Tomahawk Land – Attack Missile.
PJHQ J1, the service commands and the Operations Directorate in MOD. During the conduct of the operation, PJHQ may run a Target Coordination Board (TCB) to approve targets within CJO’s delegated authority (or staff those outside CJO’s delegated authority, through TIO, for Ministerial approval). The branch also assists with the passage of information for measures of effectiveness and campaign effectiveness assessment.

**Role of Joint Task Force Headquarters**

3B19. JFHQ staff will translate the direction and intent of the JTFC into synchronised activities that the components will conduct to achieve his intent. The headquarters’ battle rhythm will consist of a series of meetings and working groups, orchestrated by the COS. The output will be a Joint Action synchronisation matrix to track and monitor all elements of Joint Action. An example is at Figure 3B.4. Details of these meetings are given in Annex A to Chapter 4.

![Figure 3B.4 – The Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix](image-url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Strategic Dates</th>
<th>Independence Day</th>
<th>Start of Ramadan</th>
<th>UN SC Mtg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Activities</th>
<th>Radio Broadcast</th>
<th>JFTC Press Conference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engage with regional leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fires &amp; Manoeuvre</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JFSFC</td>
<td>Shaping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFMC</td>
<td>Interdict X Naval Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFAC</td>
<td>Conduct SEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFLogC</td>
<td>Activate SPOD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| JFLC | Conduct Training |
| JFAC | Interdict C2 targets |
| JFLogC | Conduct inload |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide military training to Y forces</td>
<td>Provide initial support to governance for Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-Agency</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Diplomacy continues</td>
<td>Inload of Aid stocks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

- JFSFC - Joint Force Special Forces Component
- JFMC - Joint Force Maritime Component
- JFAC - Joint Force Air Component
- JFC - Joint Force Land Component
- JFLogC - Joint Force Logistic Component
- SEAD - Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
- UN SC Mtg - United Nations Security
- Council Meeting

The content of this publication was incorporated into AJP-3, Allied joint doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (Edition C) published by NATO in February 2019. It is no longer authoritative and has been archived.
3B20. **The Air Tasking Order.** JFHQ sets the battle rhythm across the joint force, one element of which is the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO cycle normally allows two thirds of available time for planning and one third for execution on a rolling basis; typically over a 72 hour period. Adherence to this cycle makes the most efficient use of resources and wherever possible targets allocated to the Air Component (both lethal and non-lethal) should comply with this rhythm. The ATO cycle is inherently flexible and can facilitate targeting inputs at every stage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Spectrum Targeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. As part of a wider operation designed to protect the civilian population from attack and the threat of attack by an oppressive regime within a designated country a specific operation has been developed which seeks to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target key capabilities and symbolic structures of oppression, across the range of effects, in order to protect the population of the Capital City from attack and the threat of attack.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The aims of the operation are to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disrupt, degrade, deter and deny the oppressive capabilities of the ruling regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reassure civilians that the UK is resolute in protecting them from further attack and human rights abuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reassure civilians that their future is secure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The operation has been developed and planned using the principles of Full Spectrum Targeting, which is illustrated by the matrix below. Note that some effects may be delivered by less than lethal means such as Computer Network Operations (CNO).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Full Spectrum Targeting Matrix over page.

---

15 This example is based on a Full Spectrum Targeting Plan developed during a real operation; it is included for illustrative purposes to show examples of capabilities, effects and target sets that may be used during this process and should not be considered a rigid template.
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It is no longer authoritative and has been archived.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attack Helicopter</th>
<th>Computer Networks Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Image Intelligence</td>
<td>Find Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warn Find</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Image Intelligence**
- Battle Damage Assessment
- Inform Reassure civilian population of UK’s resolve to protect them by informing them what/why we have struck
- Inform Reassure civilian population of Capital City
- Inform Reassure following attacks on CCTV and SAT TV uplinks

2 Days

**Find**
- Shape/Fix
- Strike
- Mitigate/Exploit

**Strike**
- militias and mercenaries acting for regime
- military targets to demonstrate UK’s resolve to protect the civilian population
- CCTV and Sat TV uplinks to protect civilian population from threat of attack

**Undermine/Reassure**
- militias and mercenaries acting for regime
- civil population of UK’s resolve to protect them by informing them what/why we have struck
- militias and mercenaries ‘we will strike again’
- civilian population across the country, and especially the capital of strikes against the military

**Discourage**
- informing

**Reassure**
- civilians on the future to ensure stability post-conflict
- civilian population from threat of attack

**Inform/Reassure**
- civilian population following attacks on CCTV and SAT TV uplinks
- civilian population of the Capital City

** Strike**
- capital city tools of oppression (checks points, internal security, HQs, etc) to protect civilian population from attack, and threat of attack

**Reassure**
- militias and mercenaries ‘we will strike again’
- Inform Reassure civilian population of UK’s resolve to protect them by informing them what/why we have struck the Capital City
The content of this publication was incorporated into AJP-3, Allied joint doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (Edition C) published by NATO in February 2019.

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CHAPTER 4 – CAMPAIGN MANAGEMENT

Chapter 4 describes some of the mechanisms and considerations by which the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) integrates, coordinates and prioritises the activities executed by the components to achieve the campaign end-state.

- Section I – Command Factors
- Section II – Campaign Rhythm
- Section III – Consequence Management and Adaptation
- Section IV – Information Superiority

401. Balancing the effect of each activity against its impact on achieving the information effect, and ultimately the campaign objective, the risks that it entails and the resources required for it, is complex and requires a variety of control mechanisms. Campaign management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. Campaign management is enabled by campaign rhythm which regulates and maintains control of a campaign through a regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a Joint Task Force (JTF).\(^1\) Campaign management ensures that all the activities contributing to Joint Action conducted by all elements of a JTF are coherent and in concert with other non-military actors.

402. The combination of coordination, synchronisation and prioritisation is the basis for overall orchestration of a JTF, providing the ‘who, what, when and where’ of military activity throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

a. **Prioritisation.** Coordination and synchronisation highlight competing demands for time, space and finite resources; prioritisation determines their allocation, in accordance with the Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC) Concept of Operations (CONOPS). As circumstances change, a JTFC should review priorities to ensure that risks are analysed and managed appropriately, and that opportunities are exploited as they arise.

b. **Coordination.** Coordination is the process by which different JTF capabilities and activities are combined into an efficient and effective relationship. Complementary aspects are united to promote mutual support, while incompatible aspects are de-conflicted to preserve and make best use of available capabilities.

c. **Synchronisation.** Coordination is enhanced through synchronisation, which sequences activities at appropriate tempo. The dependency between

\(^1\) JDP 01 *Campaigning* (2\(^{nd}\) Edition).

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events, and the availability of resources, determines the degree of concurrent, sequential or independent activity.

### Coordination, Synchronisation and Prioritisation - Operation JUST CAUSE

In the early hours of 20 December 1989, JTF Panama conducted multiple, simultaneous forced entry operations to begin Operation JUST CAUSE. Parachute assaults seized key lodgements, which were then used to build up forces and launch immediate assaults against the Panamanian Defence Force. The JTFC synchronised forced entry with numerous other operations involving virtually all JTF capabilities. The parachute assault strategically deployed at staggered times from US bases. One formation experienced delays due to a sudden ice storm – its operations and timings were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for the assault because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SF recce and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

The forced entry, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy C2 facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralysed enemy decision-making.


403. Campaign management has 2 interrelated facets:

- the implementation of plans and orders; and
- the anticipation of future activities based on current and predicted progress.

A significant amount of the JTFC’s and his staff’s time will be taken up with external engagements, including interaction with superior headquarters and other agencies. The JFHQ should at all times retain the capacity to respond, at short notice, to unforeseen events or a change in the political landscape that necessitates a review of operating procedures or current tactics.

**SECTION I – COMMAND FACTORS**

404. The JTFC will prioritise and improve campaign management efficiency by delegation of responsibility; his principle tools are his CONOPS and mission command:

a. **Concept of Operations.** The CONOPS, or theory of change, represents the essence of the JTFC’s plan. The CONOPS communicate to staff and tactical commanders what the force is to do and why. The CONOPS ensure that their actions are executed in the right context nested within the overall strategic narrative, as well as when, where, who and how. The CONOPS should include intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort and is described
further in JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning (2nd Edition). In articulating his vision the JTFC also indicates to his subordinates the likely nature and scope of subsequent orders and plans.

b. **Mission Command.** The JTFC seeks to ensure that his tactical commanders are given appropriate freedom to act. The JTFC’s direction includes, as a minimum, a clear statement on how he sees the operation unfolding and its context within the narrative along with key campaign themes. The JTFC also identifies those operational-level decisions which rest on his shoulders, while offering necessary latitude to his subordinates. Thereafter, he expects tactical commanders to determine their implied tasks and keep him, and each other, informed of progress or risks. The JTFC will use this feedback to inform his operational level decisions including resource apportionment.

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**Mission Command – Von Moltke’s Approach**

As Chief of the Prussian (and then German) General Staff Von Moltke promulgated the concept of *Auftragstaktik* (or mission tactics), which stressed the need for initiative and decentralised decision-making within an overall strategic design. He understood that as an operation progressed its uncertainties diminished the value of initial planning and that commanders had to make decisions based on a fluid, constantly evolving situation – ‘no plan of operations extends with any degree of certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force.’ *Auftragstaktik* encouraged commanders to be agile and react immediately to changes in the situation as they developed. It replaced detailed planning with delegation of decision-making authority to subordinate commanders within the context of the higher commander’s intent. He took great care to encourage initiative by commanders at all levels, only issuing the most essential orders, which provided the principal objective and specific missions: tactical details were left to subordinates. For Moltke, ‘the advantage which a commander thinks he can attain through continued personal intervention is largely illusory. By engaging in it he assumes a task that really belongs to others, whose effectiveness he thus destroys. He also multiplies his own tasks to a point where he can no longer fulfill the whole of them.’

c. **Befehlstaktik.** While mission command should be the norm, under exceptional circumstances, the JTFC may have to take charge of the tactical situation and issue direct orders with clear detail as to how they are carried out. This approach or *Befehlstaktik* should be used sparingly, and only where fleeting opportunities for decisive exploitation or risks of failure present themselves.

405. To provide the JTFC with a broader or alternative perspective of the campaign he may augment his formal decision-making process with a variety of command
groupings, ad hoc forums or support from key individuals. The use of senior ex-military mentors is increasingly commonplace, as is the employment of ex-military and civilian cultural, development, governance, academic, media and other advisers, either in theatre or through reachout. These may be brought together in a commander’s consultation, initiative or ‘Prism’ Group.²

SECTION II – CAMPAIGN RHYTHM

406. The JTFC will ensure that his headquarters and campaign design have the capacity to accommodate multiple and concurrent demands for information, clarification and external engagement while maintaining routine campaign rhythm.

407. Campaign management is supported by assessment (Chapter 5), which forms an integral part of the campaign rhythm; similar cycles and forums are used for both. The relationship between them is demonstrated in the 3 concurrent and inter-related JFHQ review cycles:

a. **Activity Review.** The JFHQ manages the activity currently under execution to implement the JTFC’s Operation Plan (OPLAN)/Operation Order (OPORD). Measurement of activity informs the process, which may require adjustment to priorities, activities, the apportionment of assets and resources, or the employment of any operational reserves.

b. **Effects Review.** Informed by the measurement of effects, progress towards the supporting effects articulated in the JTFC’s OPLAN/OPORD, is also reviewed by the JFHQ. It is possible to combine effects review and activity review, but this is unlikely to be practical or productive and effects reviews should take place over more protracted timescales. The distinct functions of the effects review are to generate fresh direction from the JTFC to component commanders to redress shortcomings or reinforce success in achieving supporting effects, or to respond to changes in circumstance, activating Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) and the issue of Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) to promulgate branches and sequels. J3 Operations Support are responsible for the effects review.

c. **Campaign Review.** In conjunction with the effects review, the JTFC continually reviews progress towards decisive conditions and his operational end-state. This process is informed by campaign effectiveness assessment, which includes periodic review of the whole campaign plan. J5 is responsible for the campaign review. Depending upon the extent of assessed progress towards his immediate objectives (those supporting effects contained within

² These groups sit outside the normal headquarters structure and examine the campaign from a variety of different angles to introduce a wider scope of analysis, judgements and recommendations into the headquarters decision making process; they are particularly useful in countering groupthink.
published OPORDs), the JTFC initiates additional planning effort, to generate subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs. This process of continual, iterative planning is described in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5-00 Campaign Planning (2nd Edition Change 1).

408. No individual, not even the JTFC, should become indispensable. The headquarters should be operated in shifts with some staff working on fixed shifts, others on extended days, or on-call when needed. In cases when there is no dedicated deputy commander, the JTFC appoints another commander to oversee the operation at times when he is absent. At the heart of the JFHQ’s internal regulatory mechanism are a series of meetings, briefings and planning groups, as well as informal and specialist gatherings used to coordinate activity and aid synchronisation. Representation across the spectrum of meetings and briefings should encompass, where possible, the breadth of staff branches. Moreover, there should be regular and coherent representation from other agencies. The commander will set this battle rhythm. The principal meetings are detailed at Annex 4A.

409. The relative importance and content of each meeting will be driven by the type, scale and intensity of the operation. For example, on disaster relief operations there is unlikely to be a requirement to cover physical destruction within a joint effects meeting, but the weight given to Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and information activities may be greater. Consequently, the internal campaign rhythm is inherently flexible, allowing the Chief of Staff (COS) to decide whether the business of some meetings can be incorporated into others. His aim is the efficient and effective flow of information to inform timely decision making; to that end, every meeting must have a valid output.

410. The outputs of these forums are:

a. A common understanding of the situation achieved through the exchange of information, assessment and the application of judgement.
b. Dealing with key issues and making operational-level decisions.
c. Integration, coordination, synchronisation and prioritisation of activities, and allocation of resources to match them.
d. Issuing further direction and guidance.
e. Focusing staff effort over the next period.

411. **Influences on Campaign Rhythm**. While principally driven by the tempo of operations, campaign rhythm will also be influenced by the following factors:

a. **Time Zones**. The campaign rhythm should balance the requirement to inform the strategic level campaign rhythm against the battle rhythm of the
components. This will be especially testing on multinational operations where widely varying time zones, and the requirements of the lead nation’s capital, can cause dislocation.

b. **National Imperatives.** To allow the MOD Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) to both inform and advise politicians, and to make decisions, COS JFHQ must provide timely information through Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). In addition to formal Situation Reports (SITREPS) and assessment reports, there will be a constant stream of requests and points for clarification. Wherever possible, subordinated headquarters should be protected from these.

c. **Political Considerations.** As military activity is subject to political authority, the information flow up the chain of command to politicians must be accurate and timely. Military networks must be responsive to real-time 24/7 media reporting, which enables ministers to be aware of incidents before the formal chain of command acquires all the relevant facts (see paragraph 414). The nature of tactical events which provoke immediate political interest should be identified and promulgated to support rapid reporting.

d. **Parallel Briefing.** In cases where the UK is not the lead nation but has provided a national contingent commander, there will be a requirement to provide briefings to the national chain to satisfy the national and political considerations outlined above. Headquarters staff and components should be prepared for this, but remain aware that it is an additional requirement and subordinate to the need to satisfy the JFHQ reports and returns requirement.

e. **Multinational Influences.** Multinational operations add to the briefing requirement. The timing of briefings to international authorities or organisations such as the UN, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and coalition partners, will place significant demand on the JTFC’s personal diary, to the extent where it can become his principal activity. The JTFC must guard the critical vulnerabilities that often lie along inter-organisational fault lines.

f. **Media.** Media deadlines, particularly those for specific morning and evening time slots, should be factored into the campaign rhythm. Often the staffing times required either to rebut or confirm incidents will be tied to these deadlines.

412. **Harmonisation with Component Commanders’ Battle Rhythms.** Where the component construct is used, their operational tempos may vary. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), for example, achieves high tempo through maximising sortie rate. Since JFACC designated targets include those with strategic, as well as operational and tactical significance, the targeting process should include
time for political decision-making, and air operations are typically planned 48-72 hours in advance. The ability, therefore, of COS JFHQ to coordinate and synchronise component activity will have a significant impact on JTF synergy.

413. **Reports and Returns.** In addition to formal meetings and gatherings, an important strand of activity within the campaign rhythm is the production of formal daily reports and returns. JTF synergy will be enhanced by a coordinated rhythm.

**SECTION III – CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT AND ADAPTATION**

414. **Definition of Consequence Management.** Consequence Management is defined as: *the process by which a headquarters plans for, and reacts to, the consequences of incidents and events which have a direct physical or psychological effect on people.*

In this instance, incidents refers to things that have come about as a result of what has been said, or done, by the task force (for example, a culturally insensitive PSYOPS product or collateral damage from an artillery strike). Events are things that happen which are outside the task force’s control, but can have an effect on people within the Joint Operations Area, and lead to incidents that could impact on the mission. An example of the latter is Pastor Jones’s *Burn the Koran Day* in Florida in 2010.

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**Pastor Terry Jones**

In 2010, an obscure Pastor from Florida announced that he would hold an International *Burn the Koran Day* on 11 September 2010. This dominated the international headlines for many days. Many people in the West viewed the Pastor as simply an eccentric, but his plan sparked indignation in Muslims worldwide and caused significant problems for NATO forces in Afghanistan. In addition to the stoning of ISAF convoys in Kabul, serious riots erupted in the city of *Qalat in Zabul* province and there was concern that these would spread to other cities. The commander of NATO forces General Petraeus, was concerned enough to make public statements and the wider fallout had to be managed by the remainder of the NATO force.

415. **Planning for Consequence Management.** Although unplanned and potentially damaging, if handled correctly, the damage to the mission and reputation of the task force, can be mitigated and opportunities to seize the initiative may be presented. To achieve this, COS should establish a rapid response mechanism. Unexpected activities can include:

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1 New definition, based on Op HERRICK Task Force Helmand Standing Operating procedure (SOP) entitled, *Consequence Management.*
a. **Significant Incidents.** Significant incidents are normally reported up the chain of command but, increasingly, the media drive the speed with which related information reaches the public domain. The definition of a significant incident will vary according to the type of operation but will be detailed in the Force Standard Operating Instructions. In some instances this definition is ameliorated as the campaign progresses, in that what is, and is not, considered a significant incident in the initial phases of a campaign may change as the campaign progresses.

b. **Conducting Consequence Management.** On notification of a significant incident or developing event, J3 Operations Coordination (Ops Coord) desk, within JFHQ, task organises an incident team responsible for developing an understanding of what has happened, monitoring and reporting the event and making recommendations on actions to take. This will be a cross functional team with a nominated lead and include as a minimum, a Legal Advisor (LEGAD), a Political Advisor (POLAD), as well as Media Operations (Media Ops) and Information Operations (Info Ops) staff. Component liaison officers are also a key element and act as the primary conduit between the component headquarters and JFHQ. Certain incidents (for example, loss of an aircraft, mass or civilian casualties, fratricide, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents, etc.) should have pre-defined incident plans, often referred to as Military Information Operations Action Plans (MIOAPs) while others are managed as they develop. Incident plans should include an information plan for dealing with the media and other agencies. These should be predicated on sharing truthful information as quickly as possible to avoid exploitation by opponents. The incident team keeps the Ops Coord desk informed, and in turn, they inform PJHQ, the components and contingents.

c. **Rebuttal.** All incidents and events generate a demand for information, often at Ministerial level, frequently at very short notice, and often requiring subsequent media briefing. In most cases, time will be critical and opponents will exploit gaps left by incomplete or absent media briefings from JFHQ. Within guidelines JFHQ media staff should seek to be first and fast with providing as much truthful information as is available. This will require shared understanding of key audiences and messages by JFHQ, media staff in PJHQ (Media), the MOD and any multinational partners together with constant communication to ensure coherence. In many cases it is best to engage the media at the tactical level with support through coherent, continuous, proactive and command-led media engagement drawing from the strategic narrative and the themes within it to build trust and mutual understanding. JTFHQ should consider opportunities to shape the information space through media briefings and key leader engagement prior to specific operations effectively conducting prebuttal.
d. **In Theatre Corporate Memory.** It is vital that all facts relating to incidents or events that triggered them including what happened, what was done about it, and recommendations for the future are recorded on a database within JFHQ and retained for future reference. This is particularly important for enduring campaigns where such a database provides a useful tool for rebuttal in the event that the media or other actors make allegations based on historical events.

**Operational Records and Lessons Identified**

416. **Operational Records.** The JTFC is accountable for maintaining operational records, which should be periodically sent to the Chief Information Officer’s Corporate Memory Branch in the MOD. He ensures that all Services comply with their respective operational records policies. Each of the Services has an established mechanism for the maintenance and archiving of operational records, providing a key source of information in the compilation of the post operational report.

417. **Operational Lessons Capture and Reporting.** Commanders, often down to sub-unit level, are required to produce post operational reports, mindful that lessons capture is a continuous process that commences from initial planning to eventual recovery. The JTFC is directed in the Joint Commander’s Directive to produce a high-level lessons report, which, in most cases, provides the bulk of the post operational report. It covers, but is not limited to, lessons of:

- critical importance to the Joint Commander;
- special consideration, which may have long term, far reaching implications across all Defence lines of development; and
- significance to training establishments.

418. **Anticipate, Learn and Adapt.** Adversaries will seek to exploit our vulnerabilities and they may adapt rapidly in order to do so. Military organisations, at all levels, must respond by anticipating, learning and adapting if they are to seize and maintain the initiative. The philosophy and ethos to sustain a culture of continuous improvement and adaptation will come from the JTFC. He should be aware of cultural and institutional interests that may stifle, and obstruct, attempts to learn. He should counter them with an innovative ethos, instilled through education and training.

**SECTION IV – INFORMATION SUPERIORITY**

419. Operational advantage can be gained by managing, in relative terms, the information flow better than your adversary; this is known as information superiority.\(^4\) Conceptually, the flow of information has 3 component parts.

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\(^4\) JDP 0-01.1 *UK Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database (8th Edition).*
a. The commander specifies his information requirements.

b. The commander uses the information to gain a degree of understanding and situational awareness of the battlespace. This understanding, which is influenced by his experience and intuition, enables him to make his operational decisions.

c. The commander’s decision on a course of action is disseminated within the organisation so that they can enact his direction.

420. Technological advance has not changed the nature of the 3 components but has changed their character. Although technology has enhanced the range, speed, and volume of the bearers, and provided new formats for information and an improved ability to manipulate information, it has not necessarily enhanced either understanding or information exploitation. The volume of information, the requirement to integrate numerous information sources and the speed of reaction can result in information overload, and consequently decision paralysis. It can also lead to dependency on specific technology, applications or bearers to deliver mission critical information; this leads to reliance on potential single points of failure.

421. The flow of information between, and within, the 3 component parts is achieved by a combination of bearer systems that transfer data, applications\(^5\) that convert data into information, and staff functions to understand the information and then exploit it. Information exploitation is a function for all staff branches, as the commander and his staff use their understanding of information to enable their decision-making. Information management\(^6\) combines the requirement to manipulate information with gaining understanding from the information. It is a core activity requiring leadership as well as dedicated specialist support. The JTFC must maximise information flow across the battlespace within available resources. This will lead to the requirement for the commander to prioritise mission critical services. To maximise the benefits of information, COS should engender a culture of sharing and collaboration pan-headquarters and between organisations. He must strike the right balance between security, which implies a responsibility to protect information, and effective inter-agency cooperation through information sharing. Further information on information superiority, management and exploitation can be found in JDP 6-00 Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint Operations.

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\(^5\) The bearers and applications are known as Communication and Information Systems (CIS). CIS are: the assembly of equipment, methods and procedures, and if necessary personnel, organised so as to accomplish specific information, conveyance and processing functions. Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6 NATO Glossary of Terms, 2010.

\(^6\) Information management is: the integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. JDP-01 Campaigning (2nd Edition).
ANNEX 4A – JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS’ GROUPS, BOARDS AND MEETINGS

4A1. Campaign management is enabled through a series of groups, boards and meetings that constitute the Joint Task Force Headquarters’ (JTFHQ) campaign rhythm. These forums, together with a variety of other ad hoc and bespoke activities, may be used to conduct activity, effects and campaign reviews respectively. It is imperative that the JTFHQ establishes a detailed schedule of meetings to ensure the consistent and reliable participation of all elements of the JTFHQ, as well as harmony with superior headquarters and across the Joint Task Force (JTF). This must be carefully balanced against the competing demands on the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and his staff.

Briefings, Video Teleconferences and Meetings

4A2. Commander’s Briefs. Commander’s briefs are normally conducted twice daily and set the direction for staff effort and briefing for the next period. The JTFC is briefed on the last 12 hours in detail and the next 24 hours in outline. The briefs are given by the outgoing shift and should be attended by all available staff. They usually conclude with the JTFC, or national contingent commander, emphasising certain aspects and giving specific direction and guidance. When the Commander has departed, Chief of Staff (COS) will give further points of guidance and direction. A Commander’s Secrets meeting at which STRAP Top Secret material is briefed will normally precede or succeed the JTFC’s morning brief. When the UK is not lead nation but provides a national contingent commander, national briefs will normally precede his attendance at multinational JTFC briefings. Briefing material prepared for the Commander’s briefs should be archived for the official Commander’s War Diary.

4A3. Joint Task Force Commander’s Telephone Call to the Joint Commander and Permanent Joint Headquarters Operations Team Teleconference/Video Teleconferences. Following the JTFC’s morning briefings his staff will engage at desk level with the PJHQ Operations Team Leader. Subsequently, the JTFC will conduct a telephone call with the Joint Commander, with COS in attendance. This is supplemented by an Operations Team VTC at some stage within the campaign rhythm (synchronised with the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) process within the MOD), which the JTFC/national contingent commander will normally attend. The purpose of this, and the JTFC’s telephone call to the Joint Commander, is for the JTFC to receive guidance from the Joint Commander and output from the DCMO process. It also provides the opportunity to discuss any areas of concern. This

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1. Even within this detailed brief, staff should focus on key commander’s issues only.
2. The period covered in general may vary to suit the tempo and intensity of operations, the nature of the headquarters and the JTFC’s personal preference.
3. The JTFC’s attendance will be driven by the availability of the Joint Commander.
VTC is normally only attended by the JTFC, his closest advisors, and subject matter experts as necessary. Essentially, it takes a longer-term view and acts as a catalyst for dedicated staff effort. This formal activity is likely to be supplemented, or on occasion replaced, by regular interaction between the Joint Commander and JTFC,\(^4\) either by VTC or telephone.

a. **Principals’ Meeting.** The Principals’ Meeting is the key meeting of the day to address wider cross-government aspects of the integrated campaign. It will normally be chaired by Her Majesty’s Ambassador, with the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) (if appropriate), the JTFC, other key advisors and, potentially, key local leaders in attendance.\(^5\)

b. **Coalition Briefs.** Where the UK commands a multinational operation, additional briefings may be held to keep national contingent commanders and component commanders of the other nations informed of progress.

### Initial Planning

4A4. **Joint Command Group.** The Joint Command Group initiates campaign planning meetings as required at the outset of a crisis, and on a regular basis once the campaign has begun. Core membership of the Joint Command Group is the JTFC, COS, Deputy COS (DCOS), Political Advisor (POLAD) and Legal Advisor (LEGAD). It may grow depending on the size of the JTFHQ to include Assistant COS (ACOS) and lead functional officers from the staff branches. In particular, ACOS J2/3/5 should be included at an early stage in his potential role as Chief Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). He does not head the ISR Cell, but will ensure early coordination and synchronisation across staff branches from an intelligence and ISR perspective. Component commanders, force elements, allies, coalition and other multi-agency partners, either in person or via VTC, may also participate. Early representation from appropriate multi-agency partners, is essential for the overall coordination and synchronisation of the campaign. The role of the Joint Command Group is to prioritise the planning effort and provide direction and guidance. Within the estimate process (see Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP 5-00) *Campaign Planning* (2nd Edition), Chapter 2) the Joint Command Group develops overall understanding, conducts mission analysis, and assists the JTFC by providing direction on the formulation of potential courses of action.

\(^4\) Similar interaction will be undertaken at COS level.

\(^5\) Some participants may be linked by VTC.
4A5. **Joint Planning Group.** The Joint Planning Group is the principal working level planning group for JTFHQ. Under the direction of the COS and led by J5, it fuses planning by drawing representation from across the staff branches. Importantly, it also includes component representation. Notwithstanding the requirement for cross-headquarters participation and input, J2 representation will be fundamental to the conduct of, and products from, the Group. J2 will provide the group with understanding of the environment and the actors within it together with any strengths or vulnerabilities. This will assist in developing an understanding of the conditions required to deliver the JTFC’s campaign objective or information effect. Through this mechanism, emerging issues and concerns are addressed, priorities assigned and the developing plan endorsed. Initially, the Group meets only when necessary, although this should be at least daily to allow J5 to outline and update the planning schedule, and highlight deadlines or points for clarification or direction. In this way, emerging thinking can be tempered by factors and constraints. Within the estimate process, the primary function of the Joint Planning Group is to: evaluate objects and factors; to develop and validate courses of action; evaluate their relative merits for JTFC selection; and produce the campaign directive.

**Coordination, Assessment and Iterative Planning**

4A6. Once the campaign has begun, the JTFHQ should adapt planning to the changing situation, guided by assessment, through a series of planning forums which begins with the Joint Force Planning Group.

4A7. The Joint Force Planning Group is chaired by COS. Its role is to assess the campaign and its immediate phases, refine planning accordingly, monitor ongoing planning activity, approve completed plans and initiate contingency planning. Operational tempo dictates its frequency. It is attended by all staff division heads, with specialist advisors as necessary. J2/ISR representation will be pivotal to ensuring shared situational understanding. The Group reviews assessment in response to changes in the situation or as dictated by the campaign review cycle. The Group can be considered the start of the campaign review process, and it will revisit assessment at various stages in the production of Operation Plans (OPLANs) and Operation Orders (OPORDs). The meeting is divided into 2 parts straddling both J3 and J5 areas of responsibility, with J2/ISR embedded in both. On occasion, the JTFC may attend.

a. **J35 (Present Phase).** Led by COS, discussions start with an assessment of effects and activities currently being progressed. J35 then outlines the intentions of the component commanders, followed by Operations Support and DCOS. The COS gives direction on the way he sees the phase developing, making adjustments to planning as necessary. The output of this sub-session will be formulated by J35 Plans and may include revising the

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6 Likely to be every 4/5 days as a minimum.
supporting effects priority list, commander’s guidance\(^7\) or a redistribution of resources including an amended air apportionment plan.

b. **J5 (next phase).** J5 assesses campaign progress, evaluates the requirements for changes in sequencing and the need for Contingency Plans (CONPLANS), branches or sequels or whether a new OPLAN is taken forward for the next stage of the campaign. The JTFC, through the COS, directs contingency planning.

4A8. **Operational Planning Teams.** Operational Planning Teams are small planning groups focused on specific, or specialist planning activity, with bespoke membership. A number of Operational Planning Teams may run concurrently with leadership devolved to the most appropriate staff branch. Following the break-up of the Joint Force Planning Group, the headquarters may form Operational Planning Teams to staff discrete aspects of the campaign. They will report to COS with recommendations. Within an established deadline.

4A9. **Joint Coordination Board.** The Joint Coordination Board (JCB) is the JTFC’s principal meeting. It assists the detailed coordination and synchronisation of JTF activity and effects, issues commander’s guidance on priorities across components and resolves disagreement. The frequency of the JCB is dictated by campaign tempo but could be daily. It is chaired by the JTFC but orchestrated by COS. The DCOS, component commanders (in person, by VTC, or represented by their senior liaisons), POLAD, LEGAD, J2/ISR, Targeting, and J3 Operations Support staff, and other individuals attend as required. The JTFC gives direction on the output from the Joint Effects Meetings (JEMs), decides on the assignment of forces, approves targeting priorities and sets the context for execution out to approximately 120 hours.\(^8\) The main function of the meeting is to ensure that activity accords to the tempo required by the JTFC. The JTFC dictates the agenda, which is likely to include:

a. A short update by component commanders and staff on recent developments. This may include an intelligence update.

b. Measurement of activity and measurement of effect, presented by J3 Operations Support. This will be influenced by the campaign tempo; measurement of activity is generally reviewed as part of the daily campaign rhythm cycle (often linked to the Air Tasking Order production cycle). Review of measurement of effect may be required daily, particularly in the case of specific desired effects on an opponent’s physical capability through

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\(^7\) The key output of the Joint Coordination Board (JCB) that then drives both Joint Force Planning Group and Joint Effects Meetings.

\(^8\) National contingents should also run parallel meetings where they will ensure their contingent is synchronised with the host component.

\(^9\) The JCB will be preceded by a meeting to review its agenda and key actions, and be followed by a closed-group meeting to further discuss sensitive issues.
high tempo, largely lethal activities. Where the effects sought are cognitive, seeking attitudinal or behavioural shifts in disparate individuals and groups, then measurement of effect takes place over a much longer period to generate meaningful information.

c. Back-briefs from components and branch heads.

d. A summary of key events over the next 24 hours.

e. JTF/C national contingent commander’s intent and guidance out to 120 hours.

f. Campaign effectiveness assessment, presented by J5, which underpins the JTF/C’s campaign review and informs his decisions to initiate further planning (for example, CONPLANS and OPLANS). Due to its all-encompassing nature, and the planning and assessment effort necessary to review campaign progress properly, campaign effectiveness assessment will be conducted to a timetable that best meets the needs of the particular campaign.

g. Environmental assessments and intelligence.

h. Direction given for the development of discrete CONPLANS.

i. Rules of engagement considerations.

j. Major logistic issues.

4A10. Joint Effects Meetings. Two JEMs take place to support the JCB with their frequency related to campaign tempo and that of the JCB. Both consider the same agenda. The first meeting, (JEM 1) is a working level meeting held soon after the Joint Coordination Board. JEM 1 initiates the necessary interaction between components and the JTFHQ for effects development. The second meeting (JEM 2) is chaired at COS or ACOS level, and is held immediately prior to the JCB. Its function is to resolve inconsistencies in the desired effects and differences of opinion. The 2 meetings (supported throughout by J2/ISR) and the work generated in between, represents the joint effects process. They aim to coordinate and synchronise the application of lethal and non-lethal activities within the campaign. The joint effects process performs the following specific functions, which are finalised at the JEM 2, for endorsement by JCB:

a. Review measurements of effects associated with the extant OPORD to inform subsequent recommendations on apportionment, resources and modifications to the current plan.

10 The Joint Effects Meetings process is supported by a number of working groups including the Joint ISR Coordination Meeting, Joint Battlespace Management Working Group and the Joint Targeting Working Group.
b. Issue joint effects guidance to inform component planning up to 120 hours ahead.

c. Draft and review target priorities, both for fires (out to 48 hours) and information activities (out to 120 hours and possibly beyond).

d. Endorse component plans for joint effects execution up to 24 hours ahead.

e. Provide a forum for the coordination of battlespace management by J35 staff.

f. Update the various lethal and non-lethal target lists.

4A11. **Joint Collection Management Board.** J2 should chair a daily Joint Collection Management Board to coordinate collection activities between components and complementary national agency activity. This should be attended by the ISR Cell, a subject matter expert from each intelligence discipline, single intelligence environments (including targets) or national agencies and representatives from the components. The purpose is to achieve the best possible mix of ISR activity to meet priority information and intelligence requirements during a set period (normally the air tasking cycle). It may be necessary to produce and maintain a Joint Collection List that components can contribute to. A Joint Integrated and Prioritised Collection List can be developed from this, which shapes the allocation of the most significant or immediate requirements, or tasks.
CHAPTER 5 – ASSESSMENT

Chapter 5 describes the principles and practices of operational level assessment.

Section I – Overview
Section II – Assessment Categories
Section III – Assessment Planning
Section IV – Gathering Evidence
Section V – Evaluating Evidence
Section VI – Assessment Support to Decision Making

SECTION I – OVERVIEW

Purpose of Assessment

501. Assessment, defined as: the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making, is fundamental to successful campaigning. It provides the means for keeping the situation, and campaign progress, under continual review. Within a dynamic environment assessment draws together intelligence and information to inform a Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC’s) judgements on the progress of operations, within a given timescale, and supports his subsequent decisions. Assessment of progress must be relative to time; certain effects must be achieved within specific timeframes. As a recognisable step in any decision cycle, assessment should be continuous and conducted concurrently at all levels.

Commander’s Judgement

502. The physical effects of fires are comparatively easy to measure. The psychological effects of fires and influence activities are, however, likely to be less self-evident, with causal relationships between activity and effect far more difficult to establish. At the same time, the means of measurement may also be more subjective, drawing largely on perception, comment and belief; all of which may be shaped by limited understanding, culture and a variety of pressures unrelated to the activity undertaken. Furthermore, many of the means (such as polling) may be unachievable within a non-permissive security environment. Assessment will, therefore, be as challenging as it is vital.

503. In principle, as each required effect is established during planning, so should the means by which to measure and assess it, with resources allocated accordingly. Moreover, a JTFC must decide how to display the results. However, the JTFC and his staff should not become slaves to process. Assessment should support not drive the

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1 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 (2nd Edition) Campaigning.
commander’s decision making process. Empirical, objective evidence may be difficult to attain or too costly to deliver. In some cases metrics may even be inappropriate. Regardless of the availability of assessment data, which should inform his decisions, the commander’s subjective judgement, based on his experience, awareness and feel for the situation, will be crucial. The assessment process should not become mechanistic. The framework set out within this Chapter requires judgement in its application and should have sound military judgement, based on sufficient information, at its heart. Measures and processes that are cumbersome, self-serving, unnecessarily complex and that occupy a disproportionate amount of staff time will consume too many resources. That is not a suitable alternative to incisive decision making and risk taking.

Joint Operations – Insights and Best Practice – July 2008
Joint Warfare Centre – US Joint Forces Command

“There is a danger in over-engineering and over-structuring assessment. A balance is needed between a quantitative and qualitative approach. Assessment, especially of the operational environment and the campaign, is tough, and in many cases subjective. Because of the difficulty in measuring and documenting progress on attainment of operational or strategic objectives, we’ve seen many staffs over-engineer assessment, building massive quantifiable briefings. These do not always logically or clearly support a commander’s assessment requirement or assist him in developing guidance and intent.......We find that quantitative indicators should only serve as a potential start point for commanders’ and staffs’ subjective assessment based on their observations and experience.......As best practice, commanders should balance a possible staff tendency toward a quantitative solution, limit the amount of time and effort their staffs put into quantifying assessments, and recognise their personal role in applying their experience, intuition, and own observations in an ‘art of war’ approach to assessment.”

General (Retired) Gary Luck

Assessment and Campaigning

504. Assessment falls under 3 categories; measurement of activity, measurement of effect and campaign effectiveness assessment, which are described at Section II. Each contributes to campaigning in 3 ways:

a. Initial Campaign Planning. Early consideration given to all categories of assessment pays dividends. If staff understand the desired outcomes, they are better placed to design the measures of activity, intended effects and overall campaign effectiveness.
b. **Iterative Planning.** Assessment supports iterative planning once the campaign has begun. It enables a JTFC to issue definitive and timely orders, as well as retaining the ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances.

c. **Changing Situation.** Assessment also has a broader role; the validation of initial planning assumptions and the detection of changes in the situation beyond them. Moreover, it deepens a JTFC’s, (and his staff’s), understanding of the operating environment.

**Operational Art**

505. Like other aspects of campaigning, assessment is a manifestation of operational art, the ‘orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical activity, in order to achieve a desired outcome’.

Successful assessment is thus a further embodiment of a JTFC’s skill:

a. **Ways and Means.** Most activities within a campaign can be measured. However, a JTFC must decide which aspects of his campaign can benefit most from assessment and prioritise them.

b. **Operational Ideas.** Implementing assessment needs creative thought, or operational ideas, principally from the JTFC.

c. **Making Decisions.** Assessment informs a JTFC’s decisions, which will be coloured by his broader view of proceedings, developed through personal engagement with subordinates and partners, and the views of higher commands. Scrutinising and challenging assessment data is an important part of his broader decision-making repertoire.

**Campaign Design and Management**

506. The staff are responsible for the processes within campaign design and campaign management that comprise assessment:

a. **Planning Assessment.** While the JTFC provides guidance and direction on what he wishes to assess, detailed planning falls predominantly to the staff.

b. **Gathering Assessment Evidence.** The JTFC’s assessment intentions place responsibilities upon subordinate tactical commanders for the gathering

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2 JDP 01 (2nd Edition).
3 ‘Campaign design develops and refines the commander’s (and staff’s) ideas to provide detailed, executable and successful plans.’ (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).
4 ‘Campaign management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress.’ (JDP 01 (2nd Edition)).
of data. Assessment at the operational level also draws on the views of strategic headquarters and those of multinational and multi-agency partners.

c. **Evaluating Assessment Evidence.** The JTFC guides evaluation of evidence. This draws on a range of expertise and techniques, but ultimately military judgement takes precedent.

d. **Assessment Support to Decision-Making.** Assessment data must be presented in a manner which is tailored to, and best supports, the JTFC’s decision-making.

507. **Headquarters Practices.** Headquarters assessment practices are dependent upon the type of campaign and available resources. This chapter draws examples from the practices of a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and other headquarters. During multinational and multi-agency operations assessment practices may differ and are likely to be complicated by the requirement for national, multinational and multi-agency evidence gathering and contrasting approaches to evaluation. In such situations, a JTFC should manage expectations for evidence gathering and evaluation, striving where possible for simplicity and clarity.

**SECTION II – ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES**

508. Campaigning envisages a hierarchical relationship between campaign objectives, decisive conditions, supporting effects and activity. Their relationship with the 3 categories of assessment are shown in Figure 5.1. Measurement of activity, measurement of effect and campaign effectiveness assessment feature at different stages in a headquarters’ campaign rhythm.
509. **Measurement of Activity.** Measurement of activity is defined as ‘assessment of task performance and achievement of its associated purpose’.\(^5\) It is an evaluation of what actions have been completed rather than simply what has been undertaken – **did we do, properly, the things we planned to do?** For example, in an attack on a Command and Control (C2) installation, measurement of activity would be concerned with the level of physical destruction to C2 facilities, as opposed to the number of sorties flown. Although it may give an approximation of the outcome, measurement of activity primarily provides an initial *test and adjust* function. It informs decisions on whether activity should be repeated or altered. The JTFC may draw on measurement of activity to inform his decisions, but it is essentially tactical business. Battle damage assessment is the most common form of measurement of activity. In general there is a quantitative and qualitative nature to measurement of activity. Measurement of activity is generally reviewed within the daily campaign rhythm, under the activity review cycle.

510. **Measurement of Effect.** Measurement of effect is defined as ‘the assessment of the realisation of specified effects.’ Measurement of effect considers what effects, intended and unintended, have been realised – **did we do the right things?** Drawing on various forms of measurement and perspectives, yet avoiding *unnecessary* proliferation and complexity, it is used to monitor and assess progress, and highlight

\(^5\) JDP 01 (2\(^{nd}\) Edition).
setbacks. Measurement of effect is used, predominantly, to support current and imminent planning decisions. The effects review cycle may be required daily, but is more likely to be protracted, especially where desired effects are more disparate and subtle, such as influencing a group’s will.

511. **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment.** Campaign effectiveness assessment is defined as ‘evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of **subjective and objective** measurement in order to inform decision-making.’ It considers the *timely* progress of the campaign – *are the right things, done properly, getting us where we want to go or need to be within the desired timescale?* Campaign effectiveness assessment is, predominantly, the JTFC’s concern. Due to the planning and assessment effort necessary to review campaign progress properly, campaign effectiveness assessment is conducted to a timetable that best meets a JTFC’s needs, based on the scale, complexity and tempo of operations. Campaign effectiveness assessment *may* be carried out daily or weekly, but is likely to occur on a monthly (or longer) basis. During TELIC 1, a daily campaign review cycle was employed initially, while International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) IX reviewed the campaign every 2 months.

**SECTION III – ASSESSMENT PLANNING**

**Assessment and Operational Planning**

512. Assessment planning is an intrinsic element of operational planning. As decisive conditions, supporting effects and activities are derived, assessment measures are developed for each. Equal focus should be given to the identification of potential unintended effects. Associated evidence gathering will use Joint Task Force (JTF) resources, and subsequent planning, which will be conducted collaboratively with component staff, should include intentions for what is to be gathered, when, and by whom.

**Deriving Measures of Effect**

513. **Guiding Principles.** Measurement of effect *should* provide succinct indications of change and effect. However, absolute, unequivocal measurement will rarely be achievable. In particular, influence activities, which seek to realise subtle psychological effects, sometimes over protracted periods, may frustrate this goal. Imagination and a thorough appreciation of the context is required. While lessons from previous operations can provide a useful starting point, there is no guarantee that different situations will follow similar patterns. A prerequisite of measurement of effect derivation is, therefore, thorough analysis.

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6 JDP 01 (2nd Edition).
514. **Physical, Virtual and Cognitive Domains.** JDP 01 (2nd Edition) 

*Campaigning*, Annex 3A describes 3 domains: the physical, virtual and cognitive. An effect could be realised in several domains and measurements of effect should strive to consider a range of relevant perspectives, while avoiding unnecessary proliferation of measures. While the physical is often easier and quicker to measure, the virtual and cognitive domains provide insights of equal or greater importance. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2.

![Figure 5.2 – Effects in the Physical, Virtual and Cognitive Domains](image)

515. **Metrics.** Not everything can be measured precisely. Some measurements of effect are suited to quantitative analysis and the application of metrics, others are more qualitative and demand greater subjective judgement; conflict is an essentially human activity and measurement may be driven by intuition. Metrics provide useful supporting evidence, but gathering supporting data must not be the overriding consideration.
516. **Measuring.** The JTFC should draw a distinction between what he seeks to measure and the means of gathering data to measure it. For example, polling is not a measurement, whereas the numbers expressing their intention to vote in an election is. While the means must be evaluated to ensure that they are appropriate, this is not an integral part of the assessment of the activity or effect being measured.

517. **Causality.** The link between activity and effect is often apparent – for example, between fires and their physical effects. This may be less well defined in other types of activity, however. The attribution of psychological effects, like the mood of a population or the will of a leader, to specific activities is often more difficult. Thus, while changes in behaviour and attitude may be associated with an activity, only a historical perspective can argue with conviction that eventual effects were caused by specific activities. However, causality is worth deep investigation in the formulation of plans. Some effects may not prove enduring, and an understanding of why they have been realised, and how own activity has contributed to them, supports iterative planning and execution. There are a variety of reasons for this, but most commonly the target audience or individual becomes desensitised to activity being undertaken against them. Cultural modelling, in particular, may provide significant additional clarity, while operational analysis staff may provide useful advice.

518. **Deception.** The manipulation of perceptions is the modus operandi of deception; consequently, an adversary could use measurement of effect to deceive the JTFC. Equally, there is potential for self-deception, where evidence gathered is used selectively to reinforce a pre-conceived view – a form of group-think. In formulating measurements of effect, therefore, the JTFC and staff must seek a range of perspectives – drawing on red teams and subject matter experts, supported by cultural modelling techniques – to expose contradictions and defend against deception.

519. **Monitoring Progress.** Assessment of progress may be monitored using baselines, success criteria and thresholds. A graphical, traffic light system (see Figure 5.3) may be useful in visualising movement towards objectives. However, red should not necessarily be taken to signify failure, nor green to indicate overall success. Indeed, the delta between baseline and success may be marginal and inappropriate for reflection as a transition between red, through amber to green. Headquarters could place baselines and success criteria anywhere across the spectrum, with baselines for each effect placed to indicate their relationship to time or importance:

a. **Baseline.** Baselines are ‘criteria to which assessments of progress are referred for correlation’. Establishing a proper baseline is often important, particularly when deriving intangible measurements of effect. Baselines represent an understanding, whether subjective or with supporting metrics, of

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7 New definition, developed from Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6, for this publication and for future UK doctrine.
expected norms. If possible, they should include expectations of indigenous populations, historic analysis and the views of subject matter experts. Baselines should not, necessarily, be set at the level encountered during a breaking crisis. For example, if a particular measurement of effect were based on the availability of electric power, it is important to understand what levels existed well before the crisis erupted. However, expectations of the indigenous population are a fundamental baseline driver, which are likely to be amended by intervention. Setting baselines, therefore, at pre-conflict/crisis levels may not always be appropriate.

b. **Thresholds.** Thresholds are ‘criteria identifying progress’,\(^8\) and may be used to identify milestones in the realisation of effects. These may include both subjective statements or metrics.

c. **Success Criteria.** Success criteria are ‘criteria identifying achievement of success’\(^9\). They consist of statements, supported by quantifiable objectives, and may be time-related, or more likely, conditions-based.

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**Figure 5.3 – Baselines, Success Criteria and Thresholds**

**SECTION IV – GATHERING EVIDENCE**

520. Gathering evidence in support of assessment draws on a range of headquarters specialists, tactical formations, strategic headquarters, and multinational and multi-agency partners. This requires significant coordination and liaison. The JTFC must establish mechanisms appropriate to what he wishes to know, as well as the context of the campaign. A JTFHQ often uses a Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet, developed and coordinated by J3 Operations Support. This ensures that tactical evidence gathering serves tactical requirements and complements those of the JTFHQ.

521. **Joint Task Force Commander.** A JTFC should add his unique, pan-theatre, insights to the evidence presented by his staff. It is a **sense of perspective that distinguishes effective evaluation from mere measurement.** Ultimately, it is for a JTFC to take an overview of developments, including the views of other government

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\(^8\) New definition developed for this publication and for future UK doctrine.

\(^9\) New definition developed for this publication and for future UK doctrine.
departments, allies and coalition partners, and any guidance from superior commanders. Conversely, the staff may have evidence that changes the JTFC’s personal assessment of the situation.

522. **J2 Intelligence Reporting**. J2 is the origin of a range of evidence used in assessment. In addition to a detailed understanding of the actors, J2 collect general and specific information and intelligence that informs measurements of activity and measurements of effect. A range of sources, in particular Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), underscore a variety of cognitive measurements of effect, through insights into the intentions, morale, and behaviour of leadership and other important figures. HUMINT also supports the formulation of views on the moods and opinions of the local population. Planning should identify these requirements.

523. **Battle Damage Assessment**. Battle damage assessment is used to assess the consequences of fires, through collection and analysis of evidence. While the raw data primarily serves measurement of activity, suitably analysed, it can also inform measurement of effect and campaign effectiveness assessment through 3 phases:

   a. Phase 1 – Physical Damage Assessment.
   
   b. Phase 2 – Functional Damage Assessment.
   
   c. Phase 3 – Target System Assessment.

524. **J3 Reporting**. In its simplest form, J3 reporting provides measurement of activity in addition to the more specific battle damage assessment associated with fires. It can also provide cognitive insights, such as the attitudes and activity of indigenous populations. Examples include numbers in school, estimates of power usage, flow of water supplies, recruits to new security force structures, numbers of refugees or internally displaced persons, volumes of economic activity and numbers of non-governmental organisations at work. Subordinate/component commanders have a significant role to play, not only in reporting but also in analysis and assessment of data, in the context of their intimate experience at the tactical level. This reporting may be enhanced through the addition of ethnographic research techniques.

525. **Human Factors Research**. Human factors research has developed as the primary means of measuring psychological effect. It is provided through a range of complementary techniques available in theatre or from the home-base:

   a. **Opinion Polling**. Opinion polling provides an objective measurement of perceptions. Once analysed, it is probably the most effective means of quantifying any shifts in attitude. To be meaningful, however, polling must be conducted against an understanding of local mores and expectations. An initial survey to baseline prevailing perceptions amongst target audience(s) is
therefore essential. This survey should endeavour to provide an assessment of both existing and desired attitudes, providing an indication of how far attitudes need to be changed and signposting what steps need to be taken to achieve change. In addition, it is important to frame questions in a culturally sensitive manner in order to elicit the required responses. There are a number of pragmatic challenges that need to be accounted for when considering using polling techniques. For example:

(1) The likely delay between data gathering and analysis, as polling is frequently conducted through locally employed field agencies.

(2) If military intervention is opposed in any way, polling of the indigenous population is only possible after a presence has been established on the ground. Internet polling can partially ameliorate this problem if the target population is technically accessible.

b. **Focus Groups.** Focus group techniques can provide an effective measure of changing attitudes and lay the groundwork for polling. They should take place from the outset of a campaign, providing access to the target audience is possible.

c. **Personality and Group Profile Assessments.** Personality and group profiles, conducted remotely or by in-theatre HUMINT assets, can provide key insights and support a range of cognitive measurements of effect.

526. **Media Output Analysis.** It is often uncertain to what extent the media reflects or shapes public attitudes. Media output analysis is, however, a simple means of gauging public opinion. It goes beyond just monitoring – simply because a story is reported by the media may not mean that it has affected the public:

a. **Broadcast and Printed Media.** For the traditional media, the JTFC and his staff should account for the influence of particular stations or journals, or even the reputation of their journalists. They should then make an assessment of how widely a given theme has developed. Analysis of both UK domestic, regional and local media coverage can yield valuable insights. Unlike high frequency research, it can be undertaken from afar and through open sources. Additionally, it provides a culturally sensitive assessment that places specific events in a wider context. It is, therefore, helpful in gauging their impact on perceptions.

b. **On-Line Media.** The World-Wide Web offers a further source of material that potentially reflects public attitudes. Web-logging (blogging), chat-rooms and on-line surveys offer third party analysts a potential means of
assessing attitudes. It does, however, rely on an audience’s technical literacy, and is extremely vulnerable to hostile manipulation and influence.

527. **Other Government Department Assessments.** The JTFC and staff should also consider other government department reporting as a means of informing measurement of effect, for example diplomatic telegrams, or Stabilisation Unit stability assessments.

**SECTION V – EVALUATING EVIDENCE**

528. The staff evaluate assessment evidence in order to inform a JTFC’s decision-making. This evaluation must not tell the JTFC what he already knows, but offer him considered, evidence-based conclusions. The mode of evaluation will depend upon the nature and level of the decision – whether regarding adjustments to current orders and plans or the campaign as a whole. Annex 4A describes the boards and meetings in which assessment is developed and presented.

529. **Evaluating Measurement of Activity Evidence.** Different types of measurement of activity require varying levels of evaluation. Battle damage assessment Phase 3, for example, can take 24-hours or more to conduct. In high tempo operations, this may become a limiting factor in the JTFC’s decision-making. In a JTFHQ, J35 and J3 Operations Support lead measurement of activity, supported by subordinate tactical commanders and superior commands.

530. **Evaluating Measurement of Effect Evidence.** The challenge facing the analyst is discerning whether an effect is being achieved. Operational analysis staff and metrics support the process, but military judgement is the key. Data is then scrutinised, including any apparent discrepancies that could be relevant. The established baselines, thresholds and success criteria provide a framework for this evaluation, and steer staff away from median assessments in the absence of clear trends. J3 Operations Support leads evaluation of measurement of effect. The Joint Coordination Board and Joint Effects Meetings debate the conclusions.

531. **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment.**

   a. **Measurement of Effect.** Aggregate measurement of effect should normally inform campaign effectiveness assessment. Given the potential number of measurements of effect associated with a campaign, however, this may be a resource intensive task. Instead, a JTFC may elect to monitor selected measurements of effect, perhaps focusing on those effects that are the subject of current and imminent plans and orders, or key measurements of effect across the whole campaign.

   b. **Joint Task Force Commanders Perspective.** While the staff may assist him in his deliberations, campaign effectiveness assessment is the
predominant concern of the JTFC, as it is his judgement of campaign progress, based on his appreciation of strategic level imperatives and assessment of tactical progress. The JTFC’s takes an overview of developments and decides where the campaign will go next. It is most often structured around assessments of progress towards decisive conditions and wider campaign objectives, and periodic reviews of the selected centre(s) of gravity. J5 provide the lead, drawing on J3 Operations Support as necessary. Their recommendations are developed during Joint Force Planning Groups, and presented at the Joint Coordination Board.

c. **A Changing Situation.** Campaign effectiveness assessment also looks beyond original planning assumptions, to question whether the situation has changed beyond those on which the campaign was founded. The staff should therefore be attuned to evidence that may indicate this. This leads to updates in ongoing analysis.

SECTION VI – ASSESSMENT SUPPORT TO DECISION-MAKING

532. The ultimate purpose of assessment is to inform a JTFC’s judgements on the progress of operations, and support his subsequent decisions. Accordingly, assessment should strive to answer 2 key questions: what decisions does the JTFC need to make and how can assessment be presented to best support them?

**Joint Force Commander’s Decisions**

533. Assessment informs 2 types of JTFC decision-making, that take place at different stages in the campaign rhythm:

a. **Current Plans.** Measurement of activity and measurement of effect inform reviews of progress against current orders. Activity is monitored regularly through measurement of activity, to confirm that what was planned and directed has occurred, and if not, prompt corrective action. Measurement of effect monitors the achievement of those supporting effects sought through the execution of current orders. It indicates when those orders are nearing completion or require amendment. This may take place daily, for high tempo, largely kinetic activities, or over much longer periods where the desired effects are more subtle.

b. **Future Plans.** Campaign effectiveness assessment assists a JTFC to determine how a campaign is progressing and informs decisions on what to do next. Campaign effectiveness assessment is presented by J5, supporting a JTFC's campaign review and providing a timetable for decisions about further planning.
Presenting Assessment to Support Decision-Making

534. The JTFC’s particular decision-making style should be supported by assessment data and evaluations presented in a focused, concise fashion. The staff are guided by his preferences and any specific questions posed.

535. **Measurement of Effect.** Options, illustrated at Annex 5B, include:

a. **Option 1 - Fused Measurements of Effect.** Progress on each effect is presented as a single fusion of the evaluated measurement of effect data. This may be done as a traffic light, or sliding bar. Baselines, thresholds and success criteria are included as statements or figures along the bar. It can also be used to depict trend analysis. Its disadvantage comes from the fusion process that underpins it. Although a weighting technique may be applied in fusing the data, a subjective judgement is required, which may mask differences between measurements of effect that in fact highlight important information.

b. **Option 2 - Individual Measurements of Effect.** This technique presents the full range of measurements for each effect, usually in a traffic light system. This is a useful tool for evaluating where the campaign stands, as a snap-shot of progress. Additionally, it should highlight discrepancies between different sources of evidence. This system can, however, lead to ambiguity, as it offers only limited ways of characterising each threshold. It may not be clear whether a yellow light is almost green or almost red, for example, or whether red means that a particular measurement is likely to recover rapidly, or is on the verge of collapse. The rationale and meaning of each colour should, therefore, be explicit.

c. **Option 3 - Graphs and Charts.** Fused measurement of effect data or individual measurements of effect may be tracked over time using charts or graphs. This technique lends itself to trend analysis and forecasting, as well as pictorial representation of baselines, thresholds and success criteria. It is more applicable to quantitative data, though cognitive measurements of effect may be plotted subjectively (Low–Medium–High).

d. **Option 4 - Forecasting.** As well as graphical techniques, staff should develop detailed statements for each effect. They attempt to forecast what the situation should look like in the future if the plan is successful. These statements can then be used as a check on progress.

536. **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment.** Campaign effectiveness assessment is usually presented using the JTFC’s campaign schematic. A tiered approach, it should broadly describe progress along key lines of operation, prioritise key conditions in line
with the JTFC’s direction and present measurement of effect. Annex 5C illustrates some examples. Again, these schematics can include trend analysis.

537. Tailored Presentation Techniques. The JTFC and his staff can also tailor presentation to the specific context, or to answer specific questions. Annex 5D shows 2 examples.
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ANNEX 5A – THE MEASUREMENT OF EFFECT ASSESSMENT SHEET

5A1. The Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet provides a framework for assessment planning and gathering of supporting evidence. An example is at Appendix 5A1. The Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet identifies how measurement of effect will be reported, detailing responsibilities. Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) Divisions and subordinate tactical or component commanders could all be expected to contribute to it. Multinational and multi-agency partners, as well as strategic headquarters, may also report against this format. Relevant force instruction documents or Operation Orders (OPORDs) direct the frequency with which the Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet is completed. A reporting matrix appendix (see Appendix 5A2), where reporting commands and organisations can include their own objective and subjective evaluations, supports the Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet. Textual remarks are accompanied by evaluations of progress against baselines, thresholds and success criteria using a colour grading system. An example is shown at Figure 5A.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colour key</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Success Criteria - A statement of what the favoured or desired situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Threshold - A statement of what significant success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Threshold - A statement of what partial success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Baseline - A statement of what the current situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures) based on baseline assessments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5A.1 – The Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet Colour Code**

5A2. An arrow descriptor may be included, either to show trends or provide a prediction of progress over a specified period, as shown in Figure 5A.2. This projection is grounded in military judgement, supported by metrics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Progress key</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve(d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsen(ed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5A.2 – The Measurement of Effect Assessment Sheet Prediction Arrows**
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### APPENDIX 5A1 – EXAMPLE MEASUREMENT OF EFFECT ASSESSMENT SHEET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting Effect Number (a)</th>
<th>Description of supporting effect as detailed in OPLAN/OPORD (b)</th>
<th>Measurement of Effect (c)</th>
<th>Baseline Thresholds Success Criteria (d)</th>
<th>Evidence (e)</th>
<th>Remarks (f)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Effect No.</td>
<td>Description of supporting effect as detailed in OPLAN/OPORD.</td>
<td>Measurements of effect that will be used to track and measure the progress of the supporting effects. These should include a mix of physical and psychological, quantitative and qualitative, as appropriate to the supporting effect.</td>
<td>Baseline, thresholds and success criteria for each (or key) measurement of effect. These may be as subjective statements, or with additional metric data. Percentages or raw data may be applied, for example: - Generic percentage improvements (25%, 50% etc) requiring subjective judgements. - Specific measures expressed as a percentage (such as daily electricity supply). - Number of incidents or events (such as Improvised Explosive Device incidents per month).</td>
<td>This section should detail what evidence will be used in tracking and measuring effects (J2, J3 and other staff branch reporting, battle damage assessment, Human Factors Research, media output analysis, Foreign and Commonwealth Office reporting, Stabilisation Unit/Department for International Development reporting, military partner reporting), and who has responsibility for gathering them. This will be supported by the assessment liaison architecture, which may be included in the Force Instruction Document.</td>
<td>This section should provide any additional information required to understand what the Joint Task Force Commander’s intent is for this supporting effect and what is intended from the supporting measurement of effect. It may also detail how the gathering of evidence will be coordinated with, and de-conflicted from, the conduct of the campaign.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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APPENDIX 5A2 – EXAMPLE MEASUREMENT OF EFFECT REPORTING MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supporting Effect</th>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>SE Justification</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Effect as detailed in OPLAN/OPORD.</td>
<td>Assessment of level progress.</td>
<td>Arrows signifying direction of progress.</td>
<td>Justification for the assessment of the measurement of effect for this supporting effect. This should provide quantitative and qualitative assessment of performance/progress.</td>
<td>Measure(s) upon which the assessment has been made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success Criteria</td>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Not assessed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Progress key**
- Improve(d)
- No change
- Worsen(ed)

**Colour key**
- Not assessed
- Success Criteria - A statement of what the favoured or desired situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Threshold - A statement of what significant success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Threshold - A statement of what partial success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Baseline - A statement of what the current situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures) based on baseline assessments.
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ANNEX 5B – PRESENTATION OF MEASUREMENTS OF EFFECT

| SE 1.1 - Transitional Government Established |  
| SE 1.2 - Regional Governance Re-established |  
| SE 3.1 - Western Regional City Secured |  
| SE 3.2 - Military Leadership of 'X' Deterred |  
| SE 3.4 - Insurgency Subdued |  
| SE 3.7 - Insurgency Camps Disrupted |  
| SE 4.1 - 'B' Militia Repatriated |  
| SE 5.1 - Electoral Process Established |  
| SE 7.2 - Resource Infrastructure Protected |  
| SE 7.3 - Resource Infrastructure Restored |  

Progress on each supporting effect is presented as a single fusion of the analysed measurement of effect data, presented here as a sliding bar. Baselines, thresholds and success criteria are shown by the colour code, supplemented with statements or figures along the bar if required (not shown). Trends and forecasts are provided by arrow keys.
**OPTION 2 – INDIVIDUAL MEASUREMENTS OF EFFECT**

Supporting Effect 3.2 - Military leadership of country 'X' deterred

| Measurements of Effect 1 - Level of X Military Mobilisation | Measurements of Effect 4 - Public Levels of Aggression of Key Leaders |
| Measurements of Effect 2 - Levels of Military Hostility | Measurements of Effect 5 - Behavioural Patterns of Leaders |
| Measurements of Effect 3 - Level of Own Capability | Measurements of Effect 6 - Reporting of own Deterrence Message |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Progress key</th>
<th>Colour key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve(d)</td>
<td>Not assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Success Criteria - A statement of what the favoured or desired situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsen(ed)</td>
<td>Threshold - A statement of what significant success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This technique presents the full range of measurement of effects for each supporting effect usually in a traffic light system. Its advantage is that discrepancies between measurement of effects and evidences are likely to be highlighted and discussed, which will assist in unearthing where the situation is changing in unpredicted ways. A weakness is that the traffic light system can lead to ambiguity, as it is discrete and offers only limited ways of characterising each threshold.
OPTION 3 – GRAPHS AND CHARTS

Supporting Effect 3.2 - Military leadership of country ‘X’ deterred

This Technique tracks progress over time, through charts or graphs. It is more applicable to quantitative data, however, psychological measurement of effect can be plotted on ‘subjective’ scales (LOW - MEDIUM - HIGH). Either individual measurement of effect may be plotted, or fused to show the progress of individual supporting effects. It lends itself to both trend analysis and forecasting, as well as pictorial representation of baselines, thresholds and success Criteria (shown in the chart example).

Colour key

- Not assessed
- Success Criteria - A statement of what the favoured or desired situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Threshold - A statement of what significant success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Threshold - A statement of what partial success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Baseline - A statement of what the current situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures) based on baseline assessments.

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OPTION 4 – FORECASTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D + 30 Days</th>
<th>D+60 Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Militias/bandits do not confront JTF. At meetings they are deferential.</td>
<td>• Number of known local militias/bandits, as a result of JTF/Police presence and action disbanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• JTF travelling freely throughout ‘X’ (FP measure)</td>
<td>• Number of weapons handed in to Police increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Murder rate fewer than 100/week</td>
<td>• Violent, anti-ethnic, mass demonstrations infrequent; shows of JTF force nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mass murder of &gt; 50 not more than 1/month</td>
<td>• Murder rate fewer than 100/week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Breaches to ceasefire no greater than platoon strength/skirmish</td>
<td>• No incidents of mass murder (&gt; 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amnesty initiative for hand in of illegal weapons begun by Police</td>
<td>• Non-Governmental Organisations/International Organisations travel unescorted, in daylight throughout ‘X’, provincial capitals and major population centres, and along main supply routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Piracy incidents reduced by ?%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGOs/IOs requests for JTF presence infrequent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Demobilised child soldiers increase (NGO statistics)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supporting Effect 4.1

‘W’

Militia Repatriated

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ANNEX 5C – PRESENTATION OF CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT

EXAMPLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coerce</td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Defeat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Operation 1</th>
<th>Line of Operation 2</th>
<th>Line of Operation 3</th>
<th>Line of Operation 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2 Capability</td>
<td>Attrition</td>
<td>Contain</td>
<td>Isolate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colour key:
- Not assessed
- Success Criteria - A statement of what the favoured or desired situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Threshold - A statement of what significant success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Baseline - A statement of what the current situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures) based on baseline assessments.
- Decisional Condition (DC)

Progress key:
- Improve(d)
- No change
- Worsen(ed)

Campaign End-State: Surrender of Country 'A' garrison on island 'B'.
EXAMPLE 2

Campaign End-State
A lasting peace in which the threat of violence and civil war has been removed, and Country ‘X’ has mature political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure and governance, providing prosperity and security for all its people.

Thematic Line of Operation 1
Governance

DC 1
Interim Governance Provided

DC 2
Self-Governance Established

Thematic Line of Operation 2
Security

Interim Governance Provided

DC 3
Secure Environment Maintained

DC 4
Self-Sustaining Security Established

Thematic Line of Operation 3
Political Process

DC 5
Electoral Process Reformed

DC 6
Elected Government Empowered

Thematic Line of Operation 4
Reconstruction

DC 7
Key Infrastructure Restored

DC 8
Sustained Infrastructure Established

Operational Centre of Gravity
(National Coherence)

Colour key
- Not assessed
- Success Criteria - A statement of what the favoured or desired situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Threshold - A statement of what significant success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Threshold - A statement of what partial success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).
- Baseline - A statement of what the current situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures) based on baseline assessments.
- DC - Decisive Condition

Progress key
- Improve(d)
- No change
- Worsen(ed)

Current Situation
Near Civil War

Favourable Situation
Lasting Peace
EXAMPLE 4

Campaign End-State
A lasting peace in which the threat of violence and civil war has been removed, and Country 'X' has mature political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure and governance, providing prosperity and security for all its people.

Self-Sustaining Security Established

Elected Government Empowered

Operational Centre of Gravity (National Coherence)

Interim Governance Provided

Self-Governance Established

Secure Environment Maintained

Political Process Reformed

Electoral Process Reformed

Sustained Infrastructure Established

Key Infrastructure Restored

DC 1

DC 2

DC 3

DC 4

DC 5

DC 6

DC 7

DC 8

Progress key

Improve(d)

No change

Worsen(ed)

Colour key

Not assessed

Success Criteria - A statement of what the favoured or desired situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).

Threshold - A statement of what significant success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).

Threshold - A statement of what partial success looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures).

Baseline - A statement of what the current situation looks like, which may include associated metrics (as percentages or raw data figures) based on baseline assessments.
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ANNEX 5D – TAILORED ASSESSMENT PRESENTATION
EXAMPLE 1 – SPECIFIC OPERATION ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Objectives (Examples)</th>
<th>Minimum Success</th>
<th>Partial Success</th>
<th>Significant Success</th>
<th>Mission Success</th>
<th>Recommendations (Examples)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe access to country achieved</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Maintain diplomacy and liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled personnel identified</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Increase support to FCO Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled personnel transferred to a place of safety</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Request increased air transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK resolve demonstrated</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Orange</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Increase media exposure of JTFC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assessment presentation may be modified to the nature and scale of the operation. In small-scale operations, for example, the JTFC may wish to assess progress simply against tasks or objectives. The example provided here is representative, and is based on a Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation.
EXAMPLE 2 – MONITORING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

In this example, a Disaster Relief Operation, the assessment presentation technique has been modified to represent the key aspects of the situation that need to be addressed and to track them individually using a pie-chart technique.
This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations and terms/definitions used in this publication. For fuller reference on all UK and NATO agreed terminology, see the current editions of AAP-6 and JDP 0-01.1, *The UK Supplement to The NATO Terminology Database* (formerly known as the *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*).

**PART 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American-British-Canadian-Australian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCE</td>
<td>Air Component Coordination Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>African Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCD</td>
<td>Battlefield Coordination Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDD</td>
<td>British Defence Doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Collateral Damage Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications and Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJO</td>
<td>Chief of Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJOC</td>
<td>Combined Joint Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTFC</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3A</td>
<td>Decide, Detect, Deliver, Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Defence Crisis Management Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMC</td>
<td>Defence Media Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3EA</td>
<td>Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operating Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGAO</td>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HUMINT  Human Intelligence
IOC    Initial Operating Capability
IMINT   Imagery Intelligence
Info Ops Information Operations
ISR    Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

JCB    Joint Coordination Board
JDP    Joint Doctrine Publication
JEM    Joint Effects Meeting
JFACC  Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC    Joint Force Commander
JFHQ   Joint Force Headquarters
JFLCC  Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFLogC Joint Force Logistic Component
JFLC   Joint Force Land Component
JFMCC  Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSFC  Joint Force Special Forces Component
JOA    Joint Operations Area
JP     Joint Publication
JTF    Joint Task Force
JTFC   Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ  Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTL    Joint Target List

LEGAD Legal Advisor

Media Ops Media operations
MIAOPS Military Information Operations Action Plans
MOD   Ministry of Defence
MSE&SC Military Strategic Effects and Strategic Communication

NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCC   National Contingent Commander
NCHQ  National Contingent Headquarters
NEO   Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation

OISG  Operational Intelligence Support Group
OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control
Ops Coord Operations Coordination

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published by NATO in February 2019

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PART 2 – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Agency
a distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

Allotment
the temporary change of assignment of forces between subordinate commanders. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having OPCON. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

Analysis
the examination of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain a thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated future operational context. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Analysis
in intelligence usage, a step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which information is subjected to review in order to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation. (AAP-6)

Apportionment
the quantification and distribution by percentage of the total expected effort, in relation to the priorities which are given to the various air operations in geographic areas for a given period of time. (AAP-6)

Area of Operations
a geographical area, defined by a Joint Force Commander within his Joint Operations Area, in which a commander designated by him (usually a component commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations. See also Joint Operations Area. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Area of Interest
the area of concern to a commander, relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his Joint Operations Area/Area of Operations and adjacent areas. See also Joint Operations Area and Area of Operations. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Assessment
the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision-making. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Baseline
the criteria to which assessments of progress are referred for correlation. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)
Battlespace
all aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which military activities take place subject to Battlespace Management. See also Battlespace Management and Joint Operations Area. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Battlespace Management
the adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synchronisation of activities. (JDP 0-01.1 8th Edition)

Campaign
a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within a Theatre of Operations or Joint Operations Area, which normally involves joint forces. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Campaign Authority
the authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous government or organisation. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Note: It is an amalgam of 4 inter-dependent factors:
- the perceived legitimacy of the authorisation or mandate for action;
- the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising the mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively;
- the degree to which factions, local populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate;
- and the degree to which the aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.

Campaign Design
campaign Design develops and refines the commander’s (and staff’s) ideas to provide detailed, executable and successful plans. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Campaign End-State
the extent of the Joint Force Commander’s contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Campaign Effectiveness Assessment
evaluation of campaign progress based on levels of subjective and objective measurement, in order to inform decision-making. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Campaign Management
campaign Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)
Campaign Objective
a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the National Strategic Aim. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Campaign Plan
a campaign plan is the actionable expression of a Joint Force Commander’s intent, articulated to subordinate commanders through plans, directives and orders. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Campaign Rhythm
the regular recurring sequence of events and actions, harmonised across a Joint force, to regulate and maintain control of a campaign. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Civil-Military Cooperation
the process whereby the relationship between military and civilian sectors is addressed, with the aim of enabling a more coherent military contribution to the achievement of UK and/or international objectives. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

Centre of Gravity
characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Coalition
an *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Combat Identification
the process of combining situational awareness, target identification, specific tactics, training and procedures to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Command
the authority vested in an individual to influence events and to order subordinates to implement decisions.

*Note:* It comprises 3 closely inter-related elements: leadership, decision-making (including risk assessment) and control. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Commander’s Intent
a concise and precise statement of what a JFC intends to do and why, focused on the overall effect the Joint Force is to have and the desired situation it aims to bring about. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)
Components
force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

Consequence Management
the process by which a headquarters plans for, and reacts to, the consequences of incidents and events which have a direct physical or psychological effect on people. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition Change 1)

Contingency Plan
a plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning. (AAP-6)

Contingency Planning
planning, in advance, for potential military activity in the future. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Contingents
force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Control
the coordination of activity, through processes and structures that enable a commander to manage risk and to deliver intent. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Crisis Management
the process of preventing, containing or resolving crises before they develop into armed conflict, while simultaneously planning for possible escalation. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Crisis Response Planning
planning, often at short notice, to determine an appropriate military response to a current or imminent crisis. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Current Operations Planning
planning to manage a current operation, to prevent escalation, and to sustain the necessary military activity to achieve the desired outcome. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Decisive Condition
a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)
Desired Outcome
a favorable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Directive
a military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (AAP-6)

Domain
there are 3 Domains:
1. Physical Domain. The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated are upon capability.
2. Virtual Domain. The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information. The principal effects generated are upon understanding.
3. Cognitive Domain. The sphere in which human decision-making occurs as a result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The principal effects generated are upon will and understanding. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition) 
Note: The internet is part of the virtual domain.

Essential Elements of Friendly Information
items of critical exploitable information, concerning friendly dispositions, intentions, capabilities, morale, knowledge and potential vulnerabilities that, if compromised, could threaten the success of friendly forces. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Fires
the deliberate use of physical and virtual means to support the realisation of, primarily, physical effects. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition, Change 1)

Force Protection
the coordinated measures by which threats and hazards to the Joint Force are countered and mitigated in order to maintain an operating environment that enables the joint commander the freedom to employ joint action. (JDP 0-01.1 8th Edition)

Framework Nation
forces generated under a ‘framework nation’ are commanded by an officer from that nation, which also provides a significant proportion of the staff and support to the headquarters. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Note: The framework nation is also likely to dictate the language and procedures adopted.
Full Spectrum Targeting
a holistic approach to targeting, reviewing all targets together and apportioning action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign information strategy and desired behavioural objectives. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition, Change 1)

Influence Activities
the capability, or perceived capacity, to affect the character or behaviour of someone or something. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Information Management
the integrated management processes and services that provide exploitable information on time, in the right place and format, to maximise freedom of action. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Information Strategy
coordinated information output of all government activity, undertaken to influence approved audiences in support of policy objectives. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Intelligence
the directed and coordinated acquisition and analysis of information to assess capabilities, intent and opportunities for national exploitation by leaders at all levels to further the national interest. (JDP 0-01.1 8th Edition)

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
the activities that synchronises and integrates the planning and operation of collection capabilities, including the processing and dissemination of the resulting product. (JDP 0-01.1 8th Edition)

Joint
adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two Services participate. (AAP-6)

Joint Action
the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on an actor’s will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve influence. (JDP 3-00 3rd Edition, Change 1)

Joint Commander
the Joint Commander, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)
Joint Coordination Board
the Joint Coordination Board (JCB) is an operation synchronisation meeting used to promulgate the JTFC’s guidance and objectives to component commanders. It is his method of ensuring unity of effort. The board will review the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List to ensure that it reflects the JTFC’s Campaign Plan and is in line with Her Majesty’s Government objectives. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Joint Effects Meeting
the Joint Effects Meeting is a staffing board whose role is to ensure that the Joint Fires process (which includes targeting) takes full account of the JTFC’s prioritised objectives within the overall campaign plan. It is also responsible for the coordination and de-confliction of JTFC controlled assets. It will produce the daily Target Nomination List from the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List for later approval by the Joint Coordination Board. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Force Planning Group
the Joint Force Planning Group, attended by the Joint Force Commander and normally chaired by his COS, is the forum where progress against the Campaign Plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or indeed help to offset or overcome setbacks. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Force
a force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Force Commander
a general term applied to a commander authorised to exercise operational command or control over a Joint force. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List
a prioritised list of targets, approved by the Joint Task Force Commander and maintained by a joint task force, which includes the Component Commanders’ requirements. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Integrated Target List
a list of strategic and operational targets, coordinated by the PJHQ, to meet the Joint Commander’s objectives. (JDP 0-01.1)

Joint Operations Area
an area of land, sea and airspace defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JDP 0-01.1)
Joint Targeting
the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritising targets, and the synchronisation of fires with other military capabilities and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. (AJP-3.9)

Lead Nation
forces generated under a lead nation are commanded by an officer from that nation, from his own Joint Force Headquarters (augmented with Liaison Officers, and potentially staff officers, from across the multinational force). The lead nation is responsible for planning and executing the operation, to which others contribute National Contingents and National Contingent Commanders. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Lines or Groupings of Operation
in a campaign or operation, a line or grouping linking Decisive Conditions, and hence Campaign Objectives, in time and space on the path to the Campaign End-state. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Manoeuvre
the coordinated activities necessary to gain advantage within a situation in time and space. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition Change 1)

Manoeuvrist Approach
an approach to operations in which shattering the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Measurement of Activity
assessment of the performance of a task and achievement of its associated purpose. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Measurement of Effect
assessment of the realisation of specified effects. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Mission Command
a style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)
Multi-agency
activities or operations in which multiple agencies, including national, international and non-state organisations and other actors, participate in the same or overlapping areas with varying degrees of inter-agency cooperation. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Multinational
adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. See also Joint. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

Non-Governmental Organisation
a voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Operating Space
all aspects of a Joint Operations Area within which activities, both military and non-military, take place. See also Joint Operations Area. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Operation Order
a directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (AAP-6)

Operation Plan
a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation ‘plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (AAP-6)

Operational Analysis
the use of mathematical, statistical and other forms of analysis to explore situations and to help decision-makers resolve problems. Facts and probabilities are processed into manageable patterns relevant to the likely consequences of alternative courses of action. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

Operational Art
the orchestration of a campaign, in concert with other agencies, involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical activity in order to achieve a desired outcome. (JDP 01 2nd Edition)

Operational Level
the level of warfare at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives and synchronise action, within theatres or areas of operation. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)
Operations Security
the discipline which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using active or passive means, to deny a target decision-maker knowledge of essential elements of friendly information. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Reachout
access to external expertise, information or functions. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Situational Awareness
1. generically, the understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer) mission (or task).
2. in intelligence usage, situational awareness is the ability to identify trends and linkages over time, and to relate these to what is happening and what is not happening. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Strategic Communication (in Defence)
advancing national interests by using all defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people. (JDP 0-01 8th Edition)

Success Criteria
criteria identifying achievement of success. (JDP 3-00, 3rd Edition, Change 1)
Note: They consist of statements, supported by quantifiable objectives, and may be time-related, or more likely, conditions-based.

Supported Commander
a commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority. See also Supporting Commander. (JDP 0-01.1, 7th Edition)

Supporting Effect
the intended consequence of actions. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Supporting Commander
a commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. See also Supported Commander. (AAP-6)

Target
the object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation, neutralisation or destruction by military forces. (AAP-6)

Targeting
the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them, taking account of the operational requirements and capabilities. (AAP-6)
Theatre of Operations
a geographical area, or more precisely a space, defined by the military-strategic authority, which includes and surrounds the area delegated to a Joint Force Commander (termed the Joint Operations Area), within which he conducts operations. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Threshold
the criteria identifying progress. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Time Sensitive Targets
those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high pay-off, fleeting targets of opportunity. In practice TST are specific target sets designated by the JFC. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)

Understanding
the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making. (JDP 0-01.1, 8th Edition)