Governance for Growth, Stability and Inclusive Development

DFID Position Paper

March 2019
Foreword from the Secretary of State

The United Kingdom stands for freedom, democracy, co-operation, the rule of law and human rights. We hold these values not just because they are right, but because open and free societies everywhere are critical to ending poverty and are firmly in all our interests. Open societies are the means to deliver long-term growth, stability and inclusion, and to counter corruption, violence and repression.

Open societies allow ideas to flourish and people to achieve their potential. When people can engage in the decisions that affect their lives they improve the effectiveness of governments, businesses and civil society; and they take charge of their own development. In turn, this supports international prosperity, contributes to our security, reinforces global democratic norms, and bolsters the rules-based international system.

Corruption, violence, or repression abroad threaten our prosperity and security at home. They make it harder for British and other businesses to sell to new markets, they incubate new security threats, and mean we have fewer reliable partners to tackle the big global challenges such as poverty, climate change and international security. Of course, corruption also does untold damage to the country where it occurs, allowing the powerful to abuse the poorest, removing finances from the country, and slowing development.

Progress on the Sustainable Development Goals is inextricably shaped by politics. Getting the governance right is the bedrock for progress on all the Goals. It is vital for building the businesses that will sustain future growth, for maintaining stability in divided societies, and for ensuring billions of women and girls reach their full potential.

Governance underpins all of DFID’s efforts. We’re making a difference on the ground by helping partner governments collect the taxes they need to fund their public services and supporting civil society to make sure everyone’s views are represented in policy making. We’re pushing forward the boundaries of the global debate on issues like anti-corruption and transparency.

But we can and must do better if we are to end poverty. That is why this position paper sets out the critical role of politics and governance in development, committing us to redoubling our efforts to understand each country context and support politically feasible reforms that can deliver growth, stability and inclusion. It focuses on the long term, making sure our support means states and societies develop the capacity and institutions to solve development challenges for themselves. So they can move beyond aid to a partnership based on trade, mutual prosperity, and the sharing of expertise.

How we trade, how we communicate, how we live, is being reshaped by a rapidly changing world. New opportunities are emerging, along with new stresses. But our values remain the same. This paper is an essential part of adapting to change and putting those values into
practice. It commits us to building democratic space for the 21st century, supporting free media in a digital world, and pressing the global fight against corruption. It reaffirms our commitment to SDG 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions – a goal that is valuable in itself and also integral to delivering the entire 2030 Agenda.

The road to better governance requires relationships, cooperation and leadership – across the UK government, with new partners on the ground, and with regional and global partners. That is why this paper prioritises innovation and a new approach to how we measure long-term results.

The pressures on freedom around the world are as serious as they have been in a generation. It is now more important than ever that we reach out and support countries to build those open societies. For their benefit and for ours.

Rt Hon Penny Mordaunt
Secretary of State for International Development
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Open, inclusive, accountable governance is fundamental to delivering sustainable development and tackling global challenges. And it supports our national interest by contributing to international prosperity, security, and the rules-based international system.

The global context for governance and development is changing rapidly. This paper sets out how DFID will adapt to those trends, building on what we have learned about how governance can help deliver the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The UK will continue to prioritise the importance of institutions and politics in lifting people out of poverty and addressing global challenges. To maximise our impact, we will implement **four cross-cutting shifts**:

- **Thinking and working politically across all our work** – ensuring that we go further in our analysis to assess different forms of power. For example, around gender and other forms of exclusion, and consistently apply it to the design and implementation of policy and programming.
- **Integrating governance for growth, stability and inclusion** – delivering a stronger inter-disciplinary approach, taking portfolio level decisions to encourage better governance.
- **Being confident in our values** – focusing on the beneficiaries of our work and ensuring that respect for dignity, human rights, democracy and equality are reflected in the choices we make.
- **Keeping DFID at the cutting edge of governance work** – working with a wider variety of organisations and individuals, taking advantage of digital opportunities and supporting experimentation and learning.

The paper sets out how we will promote a coherent use of all our instruments and levers to deliver these shifts through our work in partner countries, our influence and partnerships at the regional and global level, and our collaboration with the rest of government in the UK. It will mean:

- **Bringing a governance perspective to the full range of DFID efforts in-country** – building lasting partnerships, supporting long-term inclusion, growth and stability and developing strong institutions.
- **Providing concerted UK international engagement on governance** - leading on anti-corruption measures, tackling illicit flows, and building democratic space. Seizing opportunities to implement SDG 16 and connect governance across all the SDGs.
- **Working more closely across the UK government** to make more effective use of different departments’ capabilities and remits to pursue governance related goals and support the national interest.
1. Introduction

1. Governance is about the use of power, authority and how a country manages its affairs. It concerns the way people mediate their differences, make decisions, and enact policies that affect public life. It shapes whether people are poor or prosperous, free or oppressed. It is central to whether a young person can get a job, whether a woman can own land, or whether a life is cut short by violence. In many developing countries, governance is the dominant constraint to inclusive growth.

2. The global context for development is changing rapidly and our approach needs to change with it. Technological, geopolitical, societal and environmental changes are transforming the governance landscape. The SDGs have recast how the world approaches global development, paving the way for greater collective focus on the pursuit of inclusive, open, peaceful societies (Goal 16) and the empowerment of women and girls (Goal 5). The World Development Report 2017: Governance and Law was a watershed moment, highlighting the importance of politics for development outcomes, and challenging the international community to develop more effective approaches.

3. This position paper sets out a refreshed strategic direction for DFID’s commitment to governance as fundamental to delivering sustainable development outcomes. It considers the significant trends shaping the governance environment and what we have learned about governance initiatives. It sets out a framework for action at different levels: our work in partner countries; our influencing and partnerships at the regional and global level; and our collaboration with the rest of the UK government.

4. The paper upholds the centrality of governance to UK policy agendas, and the importance of taking politically informed approaches in all that we do. Strengthening global security, peace and governance is one of the four pillars of the 2015 UK Aid Strategy. The 2017 National Security Capability Review identifies governance and human rights as core to delivering stable societies. In her speech in Cape Town, August 2018, the UK Prime Minister spoke about unstable and threatened states, underlining the need to build strong institutions, and develop trust between those institutions and the people who are governed by them. The UK Anti-Corruption Strategy and DFID Transparency Agenda set out ambitious approaches to drive global transparency standards and tackle impunity.

5. DFID’s international leadership and country engagement on governance play a critical role in addressing global challenges, confidently promoting our values and supporting our national interest. Open, inclusive societies reduce the risk of the spread of instability. Safe, open information environments guard against disinformation and polarisation, while helping to tackle illicit financial flows, serious organised crime, and a culture of impunity. Accountable institutions help to promote
more equitable, sustained economic growth, contributing to global prosperity and future markets. Our work at the global level on governance, democratic values and anti-corruption strengthens the rules-based international order and the role of the multilateral system in promoting peace and human rights and in delivering the SDGs. It contributes to our new strategic approach to Africa, particularly to its pillar on increasing security and stability, and tackling serious and organised crime.

6. This paper aims to build on these UK policy agendas and our outward, global facing role to provide a comprehensive position on our strategic approach on governance. It deliberately takes a broad overview and does not delve into what we should do in each sub-thematic area of governance. And is primarily intended to guide DFID’s policy decision making and portfolio choices; providing a narrative for communicating externally, and engaging with other UK government departments and with international partners.
2. Governance for Sustainable Development

7. Development is essentially about change. Sustainable change cannot be achieved by external imposition but only by countries charting their own path.

8. It involves the establishment of political bargains, among elites and with citizens, that can endure or adapt to the turbulence of rapid change. It is shaped by the evolution of stable, accountable, legitimate institutions that can foster inclusive, peaceful debate, enabling citizens to engage in the decisions that affect their lives – the political process.

9. It relies on government willingness and capacity to perform core functions such as providing security, the rule of law, and justice. It is shaped by the way governments develop policy, implement reforms, and respond to citizens’ demands; and how they raise and allocate resources for services, and ensure these deliver for the public good. It depends on the existence of organisations in society independent from the state. For example, businesses, media, civil society and academia and their ability to influence the public discourse and decision making.

10. Development is not a simple, linear process that lends itself to technical fixes. Political settlements, the way that people and power holders interact through power structures, are messy and change takes place over years. On any issue, at any time, there is an ongoing contest between those who currently hold power and those who seek it; each group framing and reframing ideas, mobilising and demobilising reform. Informal, hidden power and norms in informal structures can be as important as formal position. Positive change can take place quickly at disruptive moments but can also inevitably slide back at other times.

11. Fairness and inclusion within formal and informal political processes and power structures shape the scope for poverty reduction. Powerful elite actors in control of political systems that work to their benefit rather than for the poor, or emerging middle classes, may be reluctant to allow change. 

“Development happens when political decisions benefit the common good, rather than narrow elite interests and when institutions that deliver public goods and services are accountable to citizens in their spending and delivery”

World Development Report 2017: Governance and Law
12. Social and political progress does not arise from replicating development processes or transplanting institutional arrangements from one context to another. Rather, it comes from people and their leaders debating and developing ideas, getting together with others, solving problems and changing the way societies think and work. And then developing the capacity and practice to implement those changes.

13. Only by seeking to understand and engage with those power dynamics and incentives, focusing on politically feasible approaches, do external efforts have a chance of supporting partnerships for sustainable change.

Governance for growth, stability and inclusion

14. Open, inclusive and accountable governance is valuable in itself. It enhances human rights and values, and reduces intolerance and repression. It also has an instrumental role in freeing people from the threat of violence, in promoting prosperity, and in ensuring that prosperity is shared: three issues that every society should care about.

15. Security, the rule of law, justice, domestic revenue mobilisation, financial and macroeconomic management are essential for states to govern their territories. Governments need a minimum level of administrative capacity to deliver their core functions and facilitate sustainable development.

16. Governance determines progress on economic growth, stability and inclusive outcomes that leave no one behind. DFID’s country diagnostics have consistently found that governance is one of the principal barriers to development:

- Governance matters for economic growth: The nature of politics, institutions, and a society’s informal rules play a vital role in kick-starting and sustaining growth. Effective institutions are fundamental to creating markets, shaping investment opportunities, and creating the stable incentives the private sector needs to invest and innovate. A capable state and committed political leadership can drive economic transformation. Sustained growth requires market failures to be managed in a way that is feasible for the political context. As set out in DFID’s 2017 Economic Development Strategy, inclusive growth depends on the existence of accountable institutions that prevent narrow vested interests from capturing economic benefits at the expense of the economy overall, and ensure that opportunities are spread across society. For example, more transparent countries have higher foreign direct investment inflows and lower borrowing costs.

- Governance matters for stability: Violent conflict is more likely in divided societies, with political, social and economic inequalities between different groups that can be manipulated by elites. Governance failures lead to violent conflict. Fair power structures and
legitimate, accountable governance institutions are essential for peacefully managing tensions, negotiating between elite interests, and preventing the emergence or recurrence of violent conflict. They are also essential for the long-term management of protracted crises, and maintaining immediate openings for our humanitarian interventions. Governance is a critical part of delivering DFID’s Building Stability Framework\textsuperscript{14} and the UK’s Humanitarian Reform Policy.\textsuperscript{15}

“The answer to security challenges is not purely military or operational – it is also political. The new partnership I am proposing means working with African leaders who are driving progress, taking on the political challenges and vested interests to ensure that benefits flow to all their people.

*Growth cannot be fair and inclusive if markets, whether domestic or international, are not governed by transparent and effective rules that are actively enforced*.

Prime Minister, Theresa May 28 August 2018

- **Governance matters for inclusion**: Those in power do not automatically govern in everyone’s interests. Women, people with disabilities, and other groups marginalised by race, religion, ethnicity, age, geography or sexuality are often excluded from decision making processes and denied the benefits of development. Where people cannot make their voices heard, development is unlikely to be equitable, sustainable or inclusive.\textsuperscript{16} Overall, there is significant evidence that functioning democracies perform better on a wide array of human development indicators, including infant mortality, life expectancy, immunisation coverage, and educational enrolment ratios.\textsuperscript{17} Countries with a strong civil society tend to have less corruption and more equitable allocation of funds for the public good. There is also evidence that social accountability processes can help to deliver better services.\textsuperscript{18}

17. **The correlation between governance and these three areas works in both directions.** Each context is different. Change will be gradual, messy and is not likely to progress evenly on each area. However, open, inclusive and accountable governance promotes growth, stability and inclusion. Progress on equitable growth, stability and inclusion are essential for advances on open, inclusive and accountable governance.
- **Growth matters for governance:** When those that have the power to undermine political stability are receiving economic rewards, then political arrangements generally become more stable.\(^{19}\) Inclusive economic growth – putting resources in the hands of more people, empowers groups in society to challenge elite capture, and to strengthen institutional quality and government capability.\(^{20}\)

- **Stability matters for governance:** Illicit economies and criminal networks thrive on fragility. But where stability is achieved in the right way – as a politically informed process that tackles the political, economic and/or social exclusion underlying violence – it leads to strengthened governance structures and more capable states.\(^{21}\) These states are able to administer their territories, listen to and respond to the demands of their citizens, and deliver better services for all. The development of central state presence to deliver human security, maintain law and order and respond to shocks also helps strengthen legitimate and effective governance.\(^{22}\)

- **Inclusion matters for governance:** Where different groups of citizens are empowered to articulate their needs, and represented in formal and informal institutions (for example, parliaments, media, social movements, budget processes), societies can coordinate demands. They can create feedback loops and accountability that improve the quality and equity of decision making and public expenditure.\(^{23}\) Women in politics are more likely to prioritise public goods and services that benefit the whole community.\(^{24}\) When women are meaningfully involved in conflict resolution, peace accords are 35% more likely to last for 15 years or more.\(^{25}\) Marginalisation based on faith and ethnicity can fuel grievances, identity-based mobilisation, potential radicalisation, and violence.

UK Aid in Bangladesh Credit: DFID
3. Responding to trends

18. **We live in a time of rapid, unpredictable change.** New opportunities and challenges are emerging and old ones are taking on new forms and relevance. The impacts reach across borders, influencing both how global development will happen and UK interests at home and overseas. These trends affect developed and developing countries, posing new policy questions that will require collective approaches and new partnerships.

- **Rapid advances in technology are transforming communication and production,** supporting us to solve problems of ever increasing complexity and fundamentally changing how we interact. Digital technology has the potential to generate over $2.2 trillion in additional GDP and 140 million new jobs in the developing world. But technological change is also establishing new patterns of exclusion, driving division, and posing new challenges around data protection, privacy and cybersecurity.

- **People are more mobile than ever before.** In 2018, 244 million people migrated globally. Forced displacement is at an historic high and rural-urban migration continues on a massive scale. By 2040 over 50% of Africa’s population will be living in urban areas. Young, mobile populations can bring great benefits, but also significant stresses.

- **Demographics are changing rapidly.** The working-age share of global population peaked in 2012. Developing countries, currently managing youth bulges, are ageing rapidly. By 2050, nearly four in five people aged 60 or over will live in the developing world. This will have far-reaching implications for economic development, employment, poverty and social protection.

- **The frequency and magnitude of climate related disasters are increasing, often affecting the poorest the most.** In 2017, total losses from weather and climate-related events were estimated at $320 billion, the highest on record.

**Trends in politics and governance**

19. **The last fifty years have seen considerable democratic consolidation and improvements in governance.** In Africa 37 of 54 countries have registered an improvement in overall governance in the last decade and popular enthusiasm for democracy remains strong.

20. **However, trends have been much more mixed in the last ten years. In many places political rights and civil liberties are under pressure and democracy is being eroded.** There are more elections than ever before but beneath these formal democratic processes, authoritarian and extractive
politics often prevail, buying loyalty through patronage networks, often dependent on corruption to remain in power.

21. Repressive tactics for regime survival are being replicated, attacking the space for democratic public debate, independent media and civil society, facilitated by advances in technology. Media autonomy, freedom of expression and information, and the rule of law have all reduced significantly. The internet has opened new spaces for free expression but information environments are increasingly captured and divisive, undermining accountability and exacerbating fractures in society. Anti-democratic civic activism is growing. The result, in many places, is the consolidation of political settlements that are unfavourable to political openness, democracy, and inclusive, accountable governance.

22. Rising powers are increasingly influential in how their regions and the international system operate. They also have growing say in developments beyond their regions, for example across Africa. This brings opportunities such as increased financing for development priorities. However, in some areas, such as liberal democratic norms, they may not share our objectives. As global economic power rebalances from west to east, China and Russia are becoming increasingly assertive. Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are evolving. And global governance under the international rules-based system and its role in protecting peace, and promoting global public goods and human rights is at risk of erosion.

23. Illicit financial flows are substantial and likely to be growing. They are undermining development, especially in countries rich in natural resources and fragile and conflict-affected states. Estimates suggest that Africa may be losing over $60 billion a year in illegal outflows and price manipulation. Most of the proceeds leave the country, reducing the resources available to governments to invest in public services. Corruption in the extractive industries remains a particular challenge.

24. Despite this there are significant global opportunities. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including Goal 16 on peaceful, just and inclusive societies, have set a framework for global progress and a new partnership in support of shared universal goals. They present an unprecedented platform to pursue sustainable development underpinned by open, inclusive and accountable institutions and action against corruption and bribery. Goal 16 is integral to progress on all the other goals.

25. And the international platforms for cooperation are increasingly diverse. Multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Open Government Partnership (OGP) have opened a new, exciting avenue for progress. It has built new forms of civil society/government/private sector collaboration and established new norms on open policy making and transparency. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), has driven the international standard for open and accountable management of natural resources, which has now been adopted in 51 countries.
Trends in the role of governance in growth, stability and inclusion

Growth

26. After a decade of strong growth at the start of the 21st century, developing countries will face stronger headwinds in the decades ahead. Global growth is likely to be weaker and manufacturing is becoming more capital and skill intensive.

27. Technological change, including automation and artificial intelligence, are changing the nature of work and future pathways to inclusive growth. To take advantage of technology countries need to establish effective regulation, finding a local balance that favours innovation but also protects citizens and helps ensure growth benefits all in society. Developing, middle-income, and developed countries are all struggling to establish that balance.

28. Cities can be powerful engines of development but the poor are increasingly concentrated in urban areas. Urbanisation, if well managed, can be an enabler of inclusive growth. Unmanaged urbanisation creates cities that are crowded, disconnected, and costly and acts as a cross-cutting constraint to inclusive growth. The opportunity cost in lost jobs of poorly managed urbanisation is huge.

Stability

29. More complex and intractable forms of violent conflict are on the rise. Proxy regional and international conflicts are prolonging civil wars as emerging and regional powers pursue their geopolitical interests more assertively. In violent conflicts, international humanitarian law and norms are increasingly disrespected. Access to humanitarian aid is being hindered.

30. Governments are struggling to rise to the challenge of managing the turbulent diversity of modern societies. The role of the state is being challenged by alternative sources of power, with economic and political influence held by multi-national corporations, non-state actors and sub-national governments. There has been a rise in terrorism and organised crime that is deepening sub-national and trans-national instability. Increasing levels of violent criminal behaviour are now causing more loss of life than battlefield deaths. Trends which may have positive global implications, such as youth bulges, often cause acute pressures for fragile states and lead to conflict over access to jobs and natural resources.

31. The spread of the internet, mobile phones, and proliferation of radio and television stations are creating new platforms for rapid dissemination of rumour, sensationalism and disinformation. They can foster distrust, stoking identity-based conflict and threatening stability in fragile democracies.
Inclusion

32. **Changes in demography, mobility and technology are changing patterns of power and inclusion.** Groups remain consistently excluded not only on the basis of their sex, but because of disability, location, economic group, ethnicity, race, religion or sexual orientation. Only one-in-seven people globally lives in a society where political power is distributed at least somewhat equally by gender and socio-economic status.\(^\text{38}\)

33. **The global shrinking of civic space has restricted opportunities to expose problems, express concerns or propose alternative solutions.**\(^\text{39}\) The role of civil society organisations in amplifying grassroot voices is increasingly challenged.\(^\text{40}\) Human rights defenders and journalists are experiencing an unprecedented level of threat.\(^\text{41}\) Offline inequalities are replicated and sometimes heightened online.\(^\text{42}\) However, civic activism continues, and in some ways, intensifies as citizens find new, less formal means of activism beyond the traditional NGO domain, including large-scale spontaneous protests, and new forms of online activism.\(^\text{43}\)

34. **Around the world, more women can now access decision-making power and influence,** over more aspects of social, political and economic life, than ever before. But there remain huge gaps. Few women are elected at the local level and globally only 24% of parliamentarians are women. While increasing the number of women in public positions is important, too often they lack real authority or autonomy. **Violence against women and girls remains pervasive.**\(^\text{44}\) As women’s political activity has grown, so has the frequency and degree of violent responses to their presence, including in the online sphere.
4. How DFID should support governance

35. DFID has long been recognised as a global leader in governance policy, research and practice, prioritising the importance of institutions and politics in lifting people out of poverty. While we will not be the global partner that offers the largest financing for infrastructure or direct budget support, we can link partners and approaches, adapt to rapid change and help countries solve complex development problems.

36. At the global level we have catalysed global action on anti-corruption (2016 Anti-Corruption Summit), extractive industries transparency (helping to establish EITI), and tax for development (2015 Addis Summit). The Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s 2018 report found that “Much of the work we saw in Nepal and in Uganda is making a real difference to the systems of governance and the institutions, which should result in tangible improvements to people’s lives in both countries.”

37. Our large cadre of governance experts work on a range of issues, including security and justice, public financial management, political accountability, and service delivery. Our programming portfolio has a strong focus on tackling the challenges in fragile and conflict affected states; and indeed, the drivers of state fragility. The leading recipients of governance funding are Somalia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone.45

38. DFID has been a pioneer in the integration of Political Economy Analysis (PEA) to international development approaches. Evidence shows that programming that is politically smart, works iteratively, puts national and local governments and civic actors in the lead, and brokers relationships, can achieve success where more conventional programming has failed.46 We have integrated PEA into our country diagnostics and supported others to think and work politically. In 2018 over half of DFID’s governance spend was integrated into other sector programmes such as work on forestry or improving service delivery in education and health.

39. We continue to lead in this area, trying to understand different forms of power, informal politics and how analysis can best be applied in programming. We know we need to go further. Better analysis is not yet systematically influencing policy and strategy or consistently leading to substantially different interventions. But effective support is not only about understanding power and politics. Local capacity, skills and resources matter. An inter-disciplinary approach, using political analysis to inform how, when and where to deploy technical governance skills and other resources is needed.
40. DFID’s approach to governance has long focused on promoting a joined-up UK government approach to manage trade-offs and enhance impact. Given the complex, long-term nature of change, particularly where the political incentives are unfavourable to poverty reduction, we have learnt that a coherent use of all our levers and instruments is more likely to deliver positive change. On anti-corruption, for example, DFID has worked over many years with the Home Office, National Crime Agency and Cabinet Office to connect domestic and international action.

41. In our partner countries, DFID and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) work together to promote human rights as a fundamental objective of UK foreign policy, integral and inseparable from sustainable development and delivering the government’s Leave No One Behind promise in line with the UN Secretary General’s leadership. We collaborate to assess the human rights context; raise concerns with partner governments; and engage jointly in policy dialogue about governance, elections and political change.

Four shifts

42. To maximise DFID’s impact, we must build on all we have learned about effectively supporting governance and adapt our approach to global, national and local trends. To do this we need to implement four cross-cutting shifts.

   i. Thinking and working politically across all our initiatives
   ii. Integrating governance for growth, stability and inclusion
   iii. Being confident in our values
   iv. Keeping DFID at the cutting edge of governance work

i. Thinking and working politically across all our initiatives

43. Development interventions still too often underperform because they do not understand local politics and incentives or take politically feasible approaches that recognise the long-term, and difficult nature of change. Moving forward we will continue to prioritise the importance of thinking and working politically. For example, as we have done, integrating PEA in our Country Development Diagnostics and Inclusive Growth Diagnostics to guide strategic portfolio decision making.

44. But we need to take the next, more challenging step and consistently apply PEA to the design and implementation of all programming and policy dialogue. Political analysis will inform how, when and where we deploy our technical governance skills and other capabilities; keeping the analysis fresh (for example, everyday political economy tools) and incentivising staff to act on that analysis. Working politically requires continued investment in our long-term relationships with a variety of partners in-country and drawing on the wealth of expertise and knowledge of our locally appointed governance experts.
45. We can also improve the depth of our political analysis in terms of understanding different forms of power and exclusion. For example, considerations of disability and gender, as well as the role of transnational and regional drivers. And we will work with the global Community of Practice on Thinking and Working Politically to build the collective evidence base.

ii. Integrating governance for growth, stability and inclusion

46. Although we have long prioritised the integration of governance across our sector work, there can still be incentives to work in advisory silos. Governance is more strongly integrated in some sectoral areas than others.

47. We will promote a stronger inter-disciplinary response to development challenges, and take portfolio level decisions to support a coherent approach to open, inclusive, accountable governance. We will do more governance programming that is explicitly targeted towards economic growth, stability and inclusion objectives. We will continue to ensure that sector programming integrates PEA and governance objectives into its design and implementation. And we will make more effective use of the multiple political and programming tools we have in the UK government from the local to the global level.

Case study: Between 2008 and 2016, the State Accountability and Voice Initiative in Nigeria brought citizens, civil society organisations, media outlets and the Nigerian government together to work jointly towards more responsive, accountable and inclusive state-level governance. The UKAid programme delivered education, health, financial management, environment, infrastructure, gender and social inclusion impacts. Building on this model, the Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn programme is applying this to delivering inclusive growth through private sector development, creating linkages between government, citizens and the private sector to deliver results.

iii. Being confident in our values

48. Global trends in civic space and fundamental freedoms are deteriorating. We will show courage and collaboration, focusing on the beneficiaries of our work and integrating beneficiary feedback into our programming; ensuring that respect for human dignity, human rights, freedom, democracy and equality are reflected in the choices we make; standing up for gender equality and those most at risk of being left behind.

49. We will ensure the way we work supports the development of increasingly open and inclusive institutions. This will support the spread of independent organisations and empowering citizens and civil society organisations to ensure the benefits of development are shared and sustained. This should continue to make effective use of our Partnership Principles and all the instruments available to support human rights and open, inclusive, accountable governance.
iv. Keeping DFID at the cutting edge of governance

50. The power to influence development outcomes lies within and beyond the state, in society, through commerce, traditional and religious power structures, and across regions, and internationally. We will ensure long-term strategic impact by working innovatively with a broader variety of organisations and individuals that have influence over development outcomes. For example, businesses, social movements, and traditional power structures. Drawing on the principles of human-centred design will enable us to take a more realistic view of behaviour, norms and decision making.

51. We need to be more creative and adaptive to the context. This means moving quickly to help shape and support moments of rapid change when they do occur and ensure our structures and rules support experimentation, adaptation, and iteration. We are developing a new approach to how we measure long-term results across our portfolio, using technology to link DFID evaluations with evidence so that we can better trace our contribution to positive changes and aggregate and synthesise the extensive information generated about our governance programmes.

52. Given the rapid pace of developments in digital technology and the impacts on information ecosystems and political structures, we must seize the opportunities and mitigate governance risks. We have long supported the adaptation of technology in political processes, for example, electronic voter registration, but we will do more to consider the risks of new technology to electoral integrity.

53. Implementing these shifts requires a clear approach, delivered consistently in-country, internationally, and with our partners across government, reflecting our values and delivering for development and the national interest. How we will do that is set out across the three pillars below.
Pillar 1: In-country work

54. Integrated policy and programming at the country level is a core strength of DFID’s governance work. Taking a governance approach, thinking and working politically, can effectively deliver long-term systemic change. It also supports UK values and delivers for the national interest.

55. We will deliver a country-specific offer, tailored to different contexts that delivers the right mix of political know-how and technical expertise:

56. On growth: We will build on the Economic Development Strategy, making our governance agenda more focused on state-business relations, working more directly with the private sector as agents for positive institutional change, shaping how a country is governed. We will concentrate our governance expertise on reducing critical market failures in transformational sectors – working on the governance reforms that support more and better investment and focusing on the minimum reforms needed to attract more private investors. We will prioritise support for sectors and parts of the private sector that can help shift, not reinforce, exclusive elite incentives towards a more ordered, rules-based system in the long term.

57. We will pursue transparency and anti-corruption initiatives in domains such as infrastructure, land and extractives. And we will do more to consider the challenges of urban governance, taking advantage of the potential to promote growth and reducing the risks of poorly managed cities for inequality and violence.

*Case study: Governance for growth.* Nepal is heavily dependent on hydroelectricity to meet its energy demands and, potentially, as a resource for export. UKAid’s support has tackled governance barriers to investment – working with the government to establish an independent national investment board to broker and negotiate hydro deals. Chaired by the Prime Minister it is run by a high profile private sector professional, is connected across the political spectrum, and able to draw on UKAid funded staff to inform and support the Board’s influencing strategies. The Board has successfully brokered £1.4 billion of initial investment in hydropower agreements, empowering Nepal’s government to pursue a development trajectory independent of regional influences.

58. On stability: We will continue to ensure our crisis interventions do no harm. Our PEAs must capture the historical drivers and informal power structures beneath the surface of current conflicts. Where we have to act quickly to save lives through our humanitarian interventions, we must ensure they are not empowering conflicting parties, or creating economies where continuing violence pays.

59. Building stability is an inherently political process. We will support implementation of the Building Stability Framework, developing fair power structures that broaden inclusion and accountability over time, while managing tensions to prevent violence in the short term. This is a long-term agenda requiring realism and a deep understanding of how power is distributed, used and perceived. A range of political reforms may help to accelerate progress such as elections, constitutional reforms, or decentralisation at moments of transition. Support to the political
participation of excluded groups for example, through political parties and parliaments may open up new avenues.51

60. We will strengthen institutions in fragile environments that help build trust and legitimacy. For example, scaling up our work on improving the quality of and access to security and justice to enhance the rule of law, fight corruption and prevent violence against women and girls. And enhancing fairness and accountability in service delivery. Governance issues that drive conflict must be addressed, such as land, poor management of extractive industries, and access to natural resources, thinking beyond the state to consider the transnational dimensions of fragility and conflict.

**Case study: Governance for stability.** Somalia has limited central authority, high levels of violence, and serious development challenges. Since 2012, the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) has worked politically to strengthen local governance and address instability. A locally implemented, arms-length fund, the SSF takes a problem-driven, flexible approach, seizing opportunities and taking on higher levels of programming risk. It has achieved impressive results – playing a central role in supporting landmark political negotiations around Somalia’s emerging federal structure and contributing to delivery of infrastructure investment projects in Balanbale and Abudwak, and a reconciliation process between Galmadug State and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a armed group.

61. **On inclusion:** Building on DFID’s Strategic Vision for Gender Equality to support girls’ and women’s voices, we will increase meaningful and representative participation and leadership in informal and formal power and decision-making structures. Where democratic space is under threat we will support democratic institutions such as Parliaments, political parties and the role of the Judiciary in upholding the rule of law and civic freedoms.

62. We will support the development of healthy information ecosystems: promoting transparency, supporting platforms for dialogue and independent media (including in the digital sphere), and developing independent civil society. Given the growing concerns around the safeguarding of privacy as well as internet clampdowns, and the online abuse of women in politics, we will do more to support safe, open digital spaces.

63. Our governance work will also help to strengthen fiscal transparency so that marginalised groups have more say in the budgetary decisions that affect their lives, working with oversight institutions and civil society groups to promote accessible open data and public scrutiny. And as part of our support to domestic resource mobilisation to help governments to finance sustainable growth and service delivery, we will support countries to make informed choices about the fairness and equity of their tax systems.

**Case study: Governance for inclusion.** Education interventions in Pakistan have traditionally been geared to large spend – building schools, training teachers and providing education materials. In 2013, 26 million children remained outside the school system. Only 40% of girls were being enrolled in primary education. Years of spending were not delivering results for the most marginalised. DFID worked on the political incentives to deliver quality education for all, with a focus on girls. We supported public discussion of girls’ education ahead of elections, working with local communities and civil society organisations to generate locally-led coalitions for change. Girls’ education has become an important electoral issue in Pakistan, with politicians held to account for its delivery. Since 2013, there has been a 55% increase in the annual national budget
allocation for education, and a year-on-year decrease in the number of girls outside school across the country.

64. Every country context will require a different emphasis and approach to building inclusion, stability and growth, managing the trade-offs between different priorities and ensuring we deliver for the long-term national interest. For example, we know that growth, especially short-term can be associated with less inclusive outcomes and democratic transitions can lead to instability. Figure 1 below provides a ‘handrail’ for analysis of those different challenges, recognising each country is likely to face multiple challenges.

![Figure 1: Context specific approaches](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development challenge</th>
<th>Learning for action on approaches that might be applicable to the context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Active conflict and humanitarian response | - Working politically with all those who are influential in the conflict, even when they oppose our values, to establish elite bargains that end violence.  
- Broadening inclusion in political settlements at the right time to support stability.  
- Incentivise better behaviour in conflict, upholding International Humanitarian, Refugee and Human Rights Law |
| Fragile contexts | - Long-term commitment to stability. Support fair power structures, effective and legitimate institutions that bridge fault lines in society. Foster rule of law within the state.  
- Bring in firms and support development of independent organisations and voices for development.  
- Support the state to increase development impact of what it is doing.  
- Support the health, education and social protection systems to improve resilience to crises. |
| Non-democratic political systems | - Engage pragmatically to support growth and inclusion whilst acknowledging dilemmas and working toward inclusive institutions.  
- Build capacities for public debate, develop independent organisations, facilitate coalitions and promote local forms of collective action.  
- Be prepared not to commit funding, but move quickly to support moments of rapid change. |
| Stable but stuck | - Support country-owned strategies for progress on growth and inclusion.  
- Work toward the gradual development of independent organisations and inclusive institutions. Develop public debate, facilitate coalitions, and promote local forms of collective action.  
- Be ready to move quickly to support in moments of rapid change. |
| Middle income/transition/prosperity focused geographies | - Focus on inequality and exclusion. Support for evolution of the growth model, using politically informed approaches to shift incentives towards economic stability and public service provision.  
- Develop the public debate, anti-corruption, build independent organisations and inclusive institutions. |
Pillar 2: Working regionally and internationally

65. Focused, concerted regional engagement and global leadership are vital to complement our country-led approach. Transnational challenges such as inequality, protracted crises, and migration are complex problems that require effective responses at national, regional and international levels. We will promote that leadership; taking advantage of the global framework provided by the SDGs to more effectively leverage the multilateral system, and project our global influence.

66. We will focus our global efforts on two cross-cutting areas of governance. These respond to our comparative advantage and build on DFID’s global leadership on the HMG Anti-Corruption Strategy, Transparency Agenda, and the National Security Council (NSC) Strategy on Illicit Financial Flows. They target our efforts towards governance challenges that are vital for progress on stability, prosperity and the rules-based international order and thus our national interest. They support our outward facing role, enabling us to seize the opportunities to integrate anti-corruption, values and business integrity into our future global relationships and trade. We will not develop independent centrally managed programming on areas where multilateral institutions have a comparative advantage.

- **Tackling corruption, reducing illicit flows, and improving transparency:** The ease with which the proceeds of corruption, organised crime and corporate tax abuse move across borders incentivises criminality and extractive politics. We will make new efforts to deter them by engaging with financial centres whose operations impact on DFID priority countries. This will involve raising international standards, through policy development with relevant global institutions. We will continue to be prominent in the UK’s campaign to make public registers of company beneficial ownership a global norm, while continuing our funding of UK-based law enforcement for recovering stolen assets. We will work within UK government for energetic use of new UK tools such as Unexplained Wealth Orders and anti-tax evasion laws. We will expand our work with our investment vehicles to drive private sector funding with high governance standards; support transparency of capital markets; and explore new models of corporate governance which embed social and environmental considerations.

- **Protecting democratic space:** Global democratic norms and sanctions are critical to whether governments feel they can interfere in elections, clamp down on opposition, or control the information space. The platforms on which these are negotiated are increasingly global. We will work with global initiatives and be vocal advocates of democratic norms and values, campaigning against closing civic space and attacks on media freedom in international fora. We will continue to promote free, open, peaceful and secure information spaces (both online and offline) and protect the rights of groups that are marginalised or discriminated against, particularly women and girls.
67. We will build our relationships with rising powers such as China, Turkey, South Africa, India and Indonesia, to influence their positive contribution to the rules-based international order and improve the provision of global public goods. We will enhance our understanding of the influence that different emerging powers are exerting on governance at the country and regional level. Where appropriate, we will work together on areas of joint interest, for example, tackling illicit financial flows. We will work through mechanisms such as the G20 and use our development diplomacy capability to discuss governance challenges and promote international norms where relevant.

68. We will continue to work intensively with likeminded donors, sharing experience and co-ordinating our initiatives including through the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and Nordic plus groupings.

69. We will harness the comparative advantage of regional approaches, to address issues which are cross-country border or transnational in nature such as regional connectivity and the management of shared water resources. Work at the regional level is also critical for the prevention, mitigation and adaptation to the risks associated with climate change and environmental degradation, irregular migration and border insecurity, and regional extremist and serious organised crime networks. These issues are best tackled through actions at regional level and complemented by global and in-country level engagement.

70. The UK will continue to be an influential donor on governance to multilateral institutions. We will seek to generate more impact on governance priorities from our multilateral partnerships, for example influencing World Bank IDA allocation and work on fiscal transparency with the International Monetary Fund. Different agencies have different comparative advantages, including the World Bank on public financial management and procurement, and the unique legitimacy of the UN system across a range of democratic governance priorities. For example, UNDP is strongly aligned with our objectives, and has an important role in developing norms and delivering governance programmes. We will work with our multilateral partners to build on their respective strengths on governance.

71. We support multilateral partners to play their role on SDG16, encouraging the UN to step up and seize the opportunities to connect governance across the SDGs for more effective working on behalf of those most likely to be left behind by poor governance. This will include supporting the role that UN partners play in coordinating governance assistance in-country through the SDGs, particularly in conflict settings.

Supporting implementation of SDG 16 by:
- Developing methodologies for new indicators
- Establishing new and inclusive partnerships
- Leveraging new forms of finance from the private sector and others
- Building sustainable systems for demonstrating and reporting progress
72. Building on the conclusions of the World Bank’s *World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law*, we will continue to partner with multilateral institutions to deepen the extent to which initiatives are designed and implemented in more politically aware, locally-led ways, while acknowledging respective individual mandates. DFID is an international thought leader on building stability through development, and we encourage our multilateral partners to focus their approaches on addressing the underlying causes of instability. Through our funding commitments and policy influencing, we will drive greater coherence between partners, including different UN agencies the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank and African Union, to take a politically informed approach to delivering impact. We will continue to support high-level cooperation to uphold international humanitarian principles and human rights law such as the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative.

73. We will continue to invest in multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the OGP, EITI and a new land transparency initiative to drive up international standards and norms on governance and transparency, building exciting cooperation between civil society, national governments, and global organisations. We will support the Open Contracting Partnership’s global work to make public procurement more transparent, as an area that is particularly vulnerable to corruption.

**Pillar 3: Working across government**

74. We will also ensure that our aid-funded governance work makes a full contribution to UK global influence and the national interest. Making a persuasive case for inclusive, accountable politics not only has an instrumental value for promoting the rules-based international system but can also establish partnerships and alliances amongst developing countries with (or with aspirations to) inclusive political systems. This can create a multiplier effect for reinforcing the rules-based order against challenges from other models that show less respect for universal values and human rights.

75. DFID programming and influencing are only a part of what is available to the UK to influence development outcomes. We must make more coherent and coordinated use of all the means available across HMG – jointly setting clear priorities, connecting local action with global engagement, coordinating
programming with policy. We will develop our development diplomacy capacities, making more effective use of structured influencing and investment in international frameworks and communications. See Figure 2. In order to effectively work across government, we need to ensure coherence within DFID Country Office portfolios, centrally managed programmes and policy.

Figure 2: Working with other HMG government departments to connect local action with global engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• DFID programming (in-country and centrally managed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cross-governmental funds e.g. Conflict Stability and Security Fund, Prosperity Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Programming led by other government departments e.g. Magna Carta Fund on Human Rights and Democracy.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influencing</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• DFID Partnership Principles Assessments and related policy dialogue often undertaken jointly with the FCO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• HMG’s global overseas network, leveraging broader UK relationships (on development, commerce and trade, and security).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Influencing action by bilateral partners and multilaterals in-country (including working with rising and regional powers).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Investing in lobbying, communications and research to change the terms of the discussion and tackle global challenges.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International organisations and frameworks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• International fora and with international organisations (including through multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the EITI, Open Contracting Partnership, new Beneficial Ownership Transparency Network, Infrastructure Transparency Initiative (CoST), OGP, Open Ownership).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Influencing the monitoring and evolution of regulatory frameworks – e.g. anti-money laundering standards and associated sanctions, financial regulation or international tax transparency.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76. Making more effective use of different departments’ capabilities, remits and interests will help us to pursue governance related goals in the UK national interest. We will improve our mechanisms to identify and reconcile any trade-offs and choices, between departmental interests and between short-term progress and the long-term development of institutions, to deliver policy coherence for development. This means improving our joint, long-term analysis and strategies, in particular, seeing a step-change in how we engage with the NSC.

| Case study: Joint working on governance across HMG. | The Business Integrity Initiative (BII) is an example of successful collaboration across HMG to deliver development and prosperity objectives. The BII is a joint DFID, Department for International Trade (DIT), and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) initiative designed to provide practical guidance to help companies overcome barriers to doing business in frontier markets – such as human rights concerns and how to deal with requests for bribes. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) can now access tailored anti-corruption consultancy services on HMG’s platform for business, great.gov.uk. The BII will help more businesses operate with integrity, leading to reduced corruption and human rights abuses, increased and more sustainable trade and investment, and an enhanced UK reputation. |
77. In fragile contexts, we must work coherently across HMG on the political dimensions of conflict, establishing clear strategic thinking on short-term compromises within long-term interests. We must proactively contribute to our security and defence engagement, to mitigate the risks of strengthening the coercive capacities of elites to the detriment of development.

**Case study: The joint DFID-FCO Good Governance Fund** operates programmes over seven countries in Eastern Europe and Western Balkans that help deliver NSC Strategy objectives. In Ukraine, the GGF has sought to take a holistic approach to promoting resilience and stability through mutually reinforcing governance interventions that: support transparent and accountable elections and women’s political empowerment; strengthen anti-corruption institutions and sectoral responses to corruption; build the transparency and accountability of the Ukrainian state through e-services, e-procurement and open data; promote independent media; and enhance two-way communication between citizens and government on key reforms. By linking both FCO and DFID programming and policy to NSC objectives, including through collaborative implementation, we have placed the UK at the heart of strategic reform efforts in Ukraine.

78. We will continue to draw on UK expertise and the opportunities of peer to peer partnership approaches to support global development. We will coordinate to better ensure that UK domestic action complements international agendas. Given the demand from developing countries for technical assistance on the development of Beneficial Ownership Registers we will work more closely with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy on beneficial ownership. Given the FCO’s global work on media freedom and democracy we will work together on our response on democratic space. We will collaborate with the Department of International Trade on building markets for UK trade and investment opportunities.

**Case study: Joint working on governance across HMG, through analysis, funds and units.** DFID and the FCO have a complementary mix of skills, experience and resources. FCO with political networking and high-level access; DFID with programmatic expertise and capacity for long-term analysis. Joint units such as the North Africa Joint Unit (NAJU) have operationalised cooperative working. Housed in a single location, NAJU brings multi-disciplinary expertise to the development challenges of the region: DFID programme managers and advisers manage a £280m North Africa Good Governance Fund portfolio on FCO systems, and FCO desk officers work with DFID staff to develop policy and programme responses. The Unit takes a politically informed approach, addressing inequitable growth, political exclusion, and instability, leveraging the short-term annual programming cycle of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund to deliver against long-term development objectives, in coherence with national security interests.

79. Significant amounts of Official Development Assistance are being spent by other government departments, and we must work more closely with their policy and programming to support their initiatives to implement effective governance approaches and deliver on long-term UK interests.

80. We will work closely with the cross-departmental funds to support synergies and their analysis, ability to think and work politically and make a long-term contribution to open, inclusive, accountable governance. For example, the Conflict Stability and Security Fund can work at speed and take risks; and it has been particularly effective when diplomacy, policy and programme has been brought into alignment. We will promote links between its Strategic
Communications projects to strengthen media independence and help governments communicate with their citizens constructively, and DFID’s work on values and democratic space.

81. We will use diplomatic levers where appropriate and improve the sharing of analysis at post, including our PEAs and diagnostics. We will ensure the connections built through our programming enhance the UK network in-country.
5. Conclusion: What success will look like

82. This position paper sets out a refreshed strategic direction for DFID’s governance work, adapting to the changing global context and reasserting our commitment to open, inclusive and accountable states and societies. It puts governance and politics at the heart of delivering sustainable development, and prioritises working closely with the rest of government to maximise the contribution the work delivers for the national interest.

83. At a time when the UK is redefining its role in the world and the global context is shifting, the paper both consolidates knowledge and practice and recommends changes to how DFID works.

84. Success will mean:

85. At a country level – DFID country portfolios applying political analysis and putting governance at the heart of how we work:
- A clearly differentiated governance offer for different contexts.
- Joined-up governance and sector programming, thinking and working politically to deliver on inclusion, growth and stability.
- An inter-disciplinary approach taking decisions at the country portfolio level to support open, inclusive, accountable governance.
- More innovation in programming and policy to adapt to trends, understand and work with different sources of power, particularly focusing on digital, democratic space, gender equality, urban and working with business.
- Refined analytical tools and programme delivery processes to support politically informed approaches across sectors.

86. At a regional and international level – the UK providing bold global leadership on open, inclusive, accountable governance:
- Focused international engagement on two priority themes: Corruption, transparency and illicit flows, and democratic space.
- Refreshed engagement with international partners seeking new opportunities and cooperation on governance. Effective implementation of SDG 16 and integration of governance approaches across the SDGs. More effective multilateral engagement on governance. Well-established approach to development diplomacy, building relationships with rising powers.

87. At a cross-government level – HMG managing trade-offs effectively through greater coherence in achieving development and UK national interest goals, making better combined use of programming, influencing and global engagement:
- Improved capacity to identify and manage trade-offs. Priority NSC strategic papers for governance spend in different government departments are clearer on support to open, inclusive, accountable governance.
- More joined up cross-government programming on governance. DFID staff spending more time working with Other Government Departments on governance approaches, to improve delivery of UK priorities.
- Sharing analysis, enhancing benefits of DFID PEA tools and networks to the rest of government and building the outward-facing UK network.

88. Across all levels – identifying ways to connect country, HMG and international action for impact:
- Stronger links between centrally managed governance initiatives and country programmes.
- DFID Country Offices working with HMG partners locally to identify opportunities to implement global norms and standards.
- Learning and evidence from the country level feeding into HMG strategy and international influencing work.
- Measuring success and building a robust evidence base on governance; taking into account the long-term messy nature of political change and governance reform. Continuing support to cutting edge governance research programmes.
- Using our new approach to measuring long-term results across our portfolio to better communicate the impact of our governance work.
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In 2017/18

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The Partnership Principles (PPs) help decide how we provide development assistance through our bilateral country programmes. They are a commitment to reducing poverty and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (Global Goals); respecting human rights and other international obligations; strengthening financial management and accountability, and reducing the risk of funds being misused through weak administration or corruption; and strengthening domestic accountability. Our assessment of a partner government’s commitment to these principles is one important factor in influencing the extent to which – and the manner in which – we work with the government in that country.

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