**What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?**

Electricity generation accounts for over 20% of UK greenhouse gas emissions. Historically, market incentives had not been sufficient to meet the UK’s climate change commitments. To this end, the Feed in Tariff scheme for small-scale low-carbon generation has been successful in supporting over 6GW of deployment to date.

After the scheme closes in March 2019, an underdeveloped private market presents a significant barrier for small-scale generators being able to capture the value of the electricity they export. Some groups of generators may not hold the required information or commercial expertise to negotiate private contracts with suppliers or end users, whilst revenue streams for small-scale generators are limited under current market structures. Without intervention it is unlikely that competition with larger generators will take place on a level playing field.

**What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?**

The policy objective is to support the transition of small-scale low-carbon generators from the Feed in Tariff scheme by ensuring generators receive payment for exported electricity, whilst allowing the space for market competition and innovation. The intended effect is that market led tariffs can come forward which capture the value of this electricity.

**What policy options have been considered, including any alternatives to regulation? Please justify preferred option (further details in Evidence Base)**

- **Option 0 – Do nothing.** No further policy support will be put in place for small-scale generators following the closure of the Feed in Tariff scheme in March 2019.

- **Option 1 – Introduce the Smart Export Guarantee.** Under the SEG, Government would legislate for large suppliers (those with more than 250,000 domestic electricity supply customers) to offer remuneration to small-scale low-carbon generators for the electricity they export to the grid. The tariffs offered would be available to all the technologies currently eligible for the FIT scheme up to 5MW in capacity.

**Will the policy be reviewed?** It will be reviewed. If applicable, set review date: 01/09/2022

| Does implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements? | No |
| Are any of these organisations in scope? | Micro No | Small No | Medium No | Large Yes |
| What is the CO₂ equivalent change in greenhouse gas emissions? (Million tonnes CO₂ equivalent) | Traded: -0.03, -0.08 | Non-traded: 0 |

I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that, given the available evidence, it represents a reasonable view of the likely costs, benefits and impact of the leading options.

Signed by the responsible Minister: _______________________________ Date: _______________________________
Summary: Analysis & Evidence: Policy Option 1
Description: Introduction of the Smart Export Guarantee – Large suppliers are mandated to offer an export tariff to small-scale low carbon generators

FULL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price Base Year: 2017</th>
<th>PV Base Year: 2019</th>
<th>Time Period Years: 42</th>
<th>Net Benefit (Present Value (PV)) (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low: -£27m</td>
<td>High: £5m</td>
<td>Best Estimate: N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COSTS (£m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Transition (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Total Cost (Present Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Description and scale of key monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’
Under this policy option the deployment of small-scale low-carbon generation increases relative to the 'Do Nothing' baseline. As the level of the export tariff and new generators' response is uncertain, the amount of deployment is unclear. Therefore, a range is estimated with no central best estimate, to give an indication of the potential impact rather than an exact estimate. We welcome evidence as part of the consultation.

The key monetised cost identified is from the higher resource cost associated with generation from small-scale low-carbon technologies compared to marginal grid plants. (Valued at PV £1m to £47m).

Other key non-monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’
Non-monetised costs identified for this policy option are:
An increase in administration costs for suppliers and the scheme administrator.

BENEFITS (£m)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Transition (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)</th>
<th>Total Benefit (Present Value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best Estimate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Description and scale of key monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’
The benefits of this policy option are also driven by the estimated increase in small-scale low-carbon generation, again estimated as a range with no central best estimate. The key monetised benefits identified are greenhouse gas abatement from displacing marginal grid plants which are more carbon intensive (valued at PV £6m to £20m).

Other key non-monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’
Non-monetised benefits identified for this policy option are:
- A potential increase in employment, relative to the do-nothing option, in the low-carbon sector from increased deployment (qualitatively assessed).
- An improvement in air quality from displacing marginal grid generation, which features more thermal generation such as gas, with small-scale low-carbon generation (qualitatively assessed).

Key assumptions/sensitivities/risks
Discount rate (%): 3.5
The largest single uncertainty in this analysis is the choice of deployment scenarios for small-scale low-carbon generation under all the policy options (including Do Nothing). These underpin all the monetised costs, benefits and support costs presented in this assessment. To reflect this uncertainty this assessment does not present a single central scenario. Rather it considers a spectrum of deployment scenarios and presents two specific scenarios in this appraisal. This appraisal considers 7 years of deployment.

BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (Option 1)

Direct impact on business (Equivalent Annual) £m:
Costs: N/A | Benefits: N/A | Net: N/A

Score for Business Impact Target (qualifying provisions only) £m: N/A
N/A
Section 1: Background, and problem under consideration

The Feed-in-tariff scheme closure

1. The Feed-in-Tariffs (FIT) scheme was introduced to support the widespread adoption of proven small-scale (up to 5MW) low-carbon electricity generating technologies. The scheme was intended to give the wider public a stake in the transition to a low-carbon economy and in turn foster behavioural change that would support the development of local supply chains and reductions in energy costs.

2. From March 31st 2019 both the generation tariff (payment for every kWh generated for a defined tariff period) and export tariff (additional payment for every kWh exported to the local electricity network) will be closed to new applications from small-scale generators.1 Government has considered evidence on what level of support is required for small-scale low-carbon generators post FITs and is currently consulting on the proposed policy outlined in this impact assessment.

Section 2: Rationale for intervention

3. Electricity generation has been a significant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and historically government intervention has been necessary to ensure market incentives are sufficient to meet the UK’s climate change commitments. To this end the FIT scheme has been one of the key enablers in driving the uptake of a range of small-scale low-carbon electricity technologies with over 6GW of low-carbon electricity deployed under the scheme. As costs decline2 and new, smart technologies become accessible, market incentives are beginning to align with government objectives.

4. However, after the FIT scheme closes in March 2019, an underdeveloped private market presents a significant barrier for small-scale generators being able to capture the value of the electricity they export. Some groups of generators may not hold the required information or commercial expertise to negotiate private contracts with suppliers or end users, whilst revenue streams for small-scale generators are limited under current market structures. Without intervention it is unlikely that competition with larger generators will take place on a level playing field.

5. As the UK moves to a smarter and more efficient energy system, small-scale low-carbon generators are likely to play a significant role, therefore it is important that a route to market for generators is established.

6. The specific intervention considered in this impact assessment (IA) is the introduction of the Smart Export Guarantee (SEG). For more information see section 4.

Section 3: Policy objectives

Smart Export Guarantee

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1 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/feed-in-tariffs-scheme
2 See 2015 FIT review or more recent evidence from BNEF.
7. The policy objective is to support the transition of small-scale low-carbon
generators from FITs by ensuring small-scale generators receive payment for
exported electricity. The tariff that large suppliers are mandated to provide aims to
facilitate market interaction between generators and suppliers, such that
competition and innovation drives new opportunities for generators to secure
tariffs reflective of the value of the electricity they export in a given time period.
Over time, this is expected to have the transformative effect of incentivising small-
scale generators to optimise consumption and export profiles with respect to
market conditions and price signals, in turn bringing the sector in line with the
wider movement towards a smarter energy system.

Section 4: Description of options considered

Option 0: Do nothing

8. This is the counterfactual against which the policy options are compared. The
counterfactual considers the level of small-scale low-carbon generation without
any policy support. This reflects the government’s decision to close both the
generation tariff and export tariff from March 2019. The net costs and benefits of
this option are zero.

Option 1: Introduction of the Smart Export Guarantee

9. This option is the introduction of the Smart Export Guarantee (SEG). Under the
SEG, larger electricity suppliers (those with more than 250,000 domestic
electricity supply customers) would be required to offer small-scale generators a
tariff (price per kWh) for the electricity they export to the grid with a floor price of
zero at times of negative pricing. Smaller suppliers would be able to opt in
voluntarily to provide a SEG tariff.

10. The consultation document outlines the range of possible tariff options under the
SEG.

11. As part of the consultation, we are considering whether to require Ofgem to
publish appropriate guidance on what constitutes a fair tariff under the SEG. The
consultation outlines what principles the guidance may follow. As such, the exact
form of the guidance is not yet known, therefore this analysis doesn’t not attempt
to differentiate between an option where guidance is set by Ofgem and one where
it isn’t.

12. For the purposes of this appraisal we assume the SEG will run for seven years as
set out in the consultation document.

Section 5: Costs and benefits

5.1 Approach to assessing the policy options

13. The framework for assessing the impact of the policy options is based around
deployment scenarios of small-scale low-carbon generation under the SEG
(policy option 1) and the counterfactual (Do-nothing option). These deployment
scenarios are highly uncertain, therefore we have not sought to estimate actual
14. Based on these deployment scenarios, the following monetised impacts are estimated and included in the cost-benefit analysis:

- **Generation costs** – The resources (capital, operating, financing and development costs) used to generate electricity. Primarily this analysis compares the costs of generation from small-scale low-carbon capacity against those of meeting the same level of generation from the GB electricity grid.

- **Value of greenhouse gas emissions** – Varying the mix of small-scale low-carbon generation and generation from the GB electricity grid will affect the levels of greenhouse gas emitted, as a significant share of power from the GB grid – at least in the near term – is from fossil fuel sources.

15. Details on how these impacts are estimated and monetised is in section 5.4. The monetised costs and benefits are calculated and discounted in accordance with HM Treasury's *Green Book* and supplementary guidance on valuing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions.  

16. Not all of the anticipated impacts of the policy options can be quantified, and for some where they can be quantified it is not possible (or appropriate) to include them in the cost-benefit analysis – for example because of methodological differences or double-counting with impacts already captured under ‘Monetised impacts’ above. The non-monetised impacts considered in this assessment are:

- **Impact on jobs** – in scenarios where the introduction of the SEG increases deployment of generation capacity, it is likely that levels of employment in the small-scale low-carbon sector will change. These effects are assessed qualitatively, as based on the evidence available it is not possible to robustly quantify these effects.

- **Air quality** – similarly to greenhouse gas impacts, where electricity demand is met from the GB grid rather than from small-scale low-carbon generation, there will be a greater use of thermal generation technologies (such as gas) under the counterfactual. This will likely have an impact on the air quality around sites where these plants are located. There will also be air quality improvements as less anaerobic digestion generators would be expected to deploy in this scenario. This is assessed qualitatively at this stage.

- **Consumer bills** – The overall impact on consumer bills is uncertain however there is not expected to be a direct impact on consumer bills from the introduction of the SEG. As suppliers under the SEG set their own tariff for exported electricity, tariffs can be set so that net costs to suppliers are avoided. The SEG is therefore unlikely to carry any policy costs which are typically paid for by final consumers. Other potential consumer bill impacts are outlined in section 5.6.

- **Fuel poverty** – Where onsite generation leads to reduced bills for those households on low incomes facing high energy costs, this can alleviate fuel poverty while also contributing to the Government’s 2030 fuel poverty target and interim milestones.

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• **Administration Costs** – The introduction of the SEG is expected to result in an administration cost for suppliers and the scheme administrator. These have not been estimated at this stage due to uncertainties about the how obligated suppliers would intend to implement the SEG and the role of the scheme administrator. We welcome evidence as part of the consultation.

### 5.2 Deployment scenarios

17. The appraisal methodology in this assessment uses a scenario-based approach to take account of the uncertainty surrounding future deployment. Multiple scenarios, encompassing varying trajectories of future deployment and generation, are first established and then used to ascertain the potential impact of Option 1 relative to the counterfactual of the Do-nothing option.

18. The deployment scenarios that drive the impacts described here assume that the SEG scheme is implemented for 7 years after 31st March 2019. The impacts are assessed over a 42 year period, reflecting the asset lifetime of 35 years from the last installation that is assumed to be made in the year 2026 (the last assumed year that the SEG would be available in).

**Deployment ranges**

19. As proposed the Government would set the framework for the SEG but would not set the tariff level – this would be for participating suppliers to do. The response to any tariff offered will in turn depend on the business model adopted by prospective small-scale low-carbon generators. Given there are a wide range of possible business models that small-scale generators could deploy under, the deployment scenarios chosen for this analysis are not intended to be forecasts but illustrative of a range of different potential impacts that the SEG may have on deployment. The deployment scenarios are summarised in Table 1.

20. The difference between the deployment scenarios is driven by changing assumptions about how much generators can consume the power they generate on-site. On site consumption means generators can avoid drawing power down from the grid at the retail price of electricity. This means that by generating on-site they can generate bill savings which are expected to be significantly greater than any available export payment. A greater level of self-consumption increases bill savings and the overall revenue stream for generators, leading to a greater return on investment. The greater the possible return on investment, the larger the number of generators that should be in scope to benefit from the SEG. The extent to which higher levels of on-site consumption is possible (e.g. via the use of battery storage) is uncertain, therefore we vary this assumption between the two scenarios.

21. Figure 1 demonstrates the effect that self-consumption rates have on revenue and consequently the difference in deployment rates under the two illustrative SEG scenarios. If the SEG incentivises deployment at lower levels of self-consumption, as in Scenario 1, the revenue stream is restricted by higher levels of export therefore the LCOE of those generators would have to be relatively low in order to be able to deploy. Consequently, deployment is restricted as only a small number of generators can operate at lower levelised costs. On the other side, if the SEG provides an additional incentive to deploy amongst generators
that can achieve high self-consumption rates, the total revenue streams will be
greater, meaning the LCOE would not be required to be as low. When the LCOE
requirement is relaxed, a greater number of generators are in scope to benefit
from the scheme. The Government welcomes any evidence or views on
deployment under the SEG as part of the consultation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Details of assumption behind scenario</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsupported (counterfactual)</td>
<td>In most cases the most valuable revenue stream for generators is bill savings, therefore it’s likely some generators that can operate at high levels of self-consumption will deploy independently of whether the SEG is in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEG Scenario 1</td>
<td>Assumes that the SEG incentivises increased deployment from generators that can’t achieve high levels of self-consumption and therefore can’t deploy without a guaranteed export payment in place. Typically, generators that could deploy in this scenario would only be ones that can generate at a low cost as measured by the levelised cost of electricity (LCOE). As a result, deployment levels would be relatively low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEG Scenario 2</td>
<td>Assumes generators that can achieve higher levels of self-consumption are incentivised to increase deployment with the introduction of SEG. This means that even plants that cannot achieve the very lowest generation costs are able to increase deployment and therefore translates as increased deployment across generators with higher levelised costs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Illustration of self-consumption and impact on deployment rates under the SEG

5.3 Generation and deployment

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4 This is intended to be a graphical representation rather than estimates of different revenue streams and levelised costs.
22. Table 2 shows the illustrative deployment trajectories for the two scenarios under Option 1, net of the counterfactual, for each small-scale low-carbon technology under the SEG. Note there is no central deployment scenario, reflecting the uncertainty on future deployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 Additional capacity per year against the counterfactual (MW)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mCHP⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEG Scenario 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mCHP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Generation resulting from the deployed capacities has been calculated by taking the load factor assumptions outlined in the 2015 FIT impact assessment and applying these to the cumulative capacity for the relevant technology in our deployment scenarios.

5.4 Monetised costs and benefits

24. The monetised costs and benefits of the policy options, net of the counterfactual, are combined into a net present value estimate. The net present value is calculated as the discounted value of all benefits less the discounted value of all costs. The social discount rates specified in the Green Book guidance have been applied in this assessment.

Additional generation costs

25. The generation costs of option 1 compared to option 0 results in cheaper, larger scale technologies via the GB electricity grid being displaced by small-scale low-carbon generation technologies. Specifically, this is calculated as the difference between the levelised cost⁶ of small-scale generators and the long run variable cost (LRVC) of electricity supply from the GB grid. Typically, small-scale generators have a higher levelised cost, in £/MWh, than the LRVC and therefore there is a net resource cost from implementing option 1. Levelised costs are significantly lower under scenario 1 as a smaller amount of low-carbon generation is being deployed and at a lower cost.

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⁵ mCHP deployment is rounded to 0
Value of changes in greenhouse gas emissions

26. Small-scale installations under the SEG are low-carbon generators and increasing their deployment will result in the displacement of larger amounts of more carbon intensive generation from the rest of the GB electricity system. This assessment therefore estimates the value of the decrease in greenhouse gas emissions associated with increasing deployment of small-scale generators. Specifically, the costs associated with increased deployment of solar, wind and hydro projects are considered. This is estimated by taking the two scenarios of increased generation through implementing Option 1 and the long run marginal generation based emission factors in the Green Book supplementary guidance. Carbon volumes are then assigned a value by using the centrally traded carbon values set out in the Green Book supplementary guidance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: £m, total discounted costs (2017 prices)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“SEG Scenario 1”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“SEG Scenario 2”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Net present value (NPV)

27. The NPV from implementing options 1 range between -£27m and £5m. Note there is no central value reflecting the underlying uncertainty on deployment.

28. Scenario 1 returns a positive NPV, however for Scenario 2, the monetised costs outweigh the monetised benefits. As discussed, the key difference between the scenarios is the assumed levelised cost of deployment, therefore the analysis shows that if the SEG incentivises deployment across the most cost-effective business models, as in Scenario 1, then there is a higher probability of the economic impact from SEG being positive. The impact on different business models is uncertain, however the fact that the magnitude of the NPV under scenario 2 is small - particularly over an appraisal period of 42 years - gives confidence that any negative economic impact from the SEG would be minimal, especially as this analysis hasn’t quantified other potential benefits such as increased employment and improved air quality. As the NPV estimates are close to zero, it is important to consider a range of sensitives on key assumptions.

29. To reflect the uncertainty in this analysis, the following chart outlines how the NPV changes when the key inputs are changed. Specifically, these inputs are the long run variable cost of electricity supply (LRVC), and value of greenhouse gas emissions. The LCOE for SEG technologies are fixed for each scenario, so there is no individual sensitivity analysis for this assumption. Broadly speaking, a higher LCOE will decrease the NPV, a higher LRVC will increase the NPV, and higher carbon costs will increase the NPV. These inputs are all assessed individually in

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7 Note that the carbon savings from increased deployment of anaerobic digestions or MCHP have not been quantified as part of this appraisal.
the chart below before a highest and lowest NPV case is presented based upon a combination of the inputs.

30. The sensitivity analysis shows that the magnitude of the NPV doesn’t change significantly when key assumptions are changed, given the length of the time period considered for this appraisal.

31. The overall result is sensitive to changes in key assumptions for scenario 1. A low LRVC results in a negative NPV compared to the positive NPV returned before varying the key assumptions. This demonstrates that if the cost of supplying electricity from the grid decreases, then the resource cost associated with small-scale low-carbon generators increases to the point that it offsets the value of carbon savings. This introduces some additional uncertainty over whether the introduction of the SEG would result in a positive or negative NPV.

32. Overall, the NPVs returned in the central test and sensitivity tests are marginal, indicating that the SEG is unlikely to have a significant economic impact. The central test does present a negative NPV under Scenario 2, however under different cost assumptions a positive NPV is returned in Scenario 1. BEIS projections for small-scale levelised costs indicate a downward trajectory, suggesting that the resource cost in future years may be minimal or even reversed to a resource benefit for some technologies. If this is the case, then any costs associated with supporting small-scale low-carbon generators in the short term may be offset by providing the foundation for growth and further cost reductions over the medium to long term. On balance, the negative NPV under scenario 2 isn’t sufficient enough to suggest that the SEG would not be the most preferred option to meet the intended policy objectives.

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8 Note that this is the change relative to the central estimate, not the actual NPV returned
5.5 Non-monetised Impacts

Impact on jobs

33. Under policy option 1 the assumed increase in deployment of small-scale generators will likely result in increased employment in the small-scale sector relative to the do-nothing option. Although it is not possible to quantify the impacts, there is evidence that the SEG will help to support a sector which supports a significant number of jobs. The 2017 REA KMMG report\(^9\) said the low-carbon energy industry employed close to 126,000 people – anaerobic digestion (AD) 2,952, hydro 5,778, wind (including offshore) 41,766 and solar PV 13,687. The ONS low-carbon survey\(^10\) said solar employment in 2016 was 5,000 FTE and onshore wind 5,500 FTE.

Air quality impacts

34. Under policy option 1, small-scale low-carbon generation replaces power from the GB grid, which includes generation from thermal plants (such as gas) that can affect air quality. Conversely, an increase in some small-scale generation, such as AD, could lead to a small reduction in air quality. It has not been possible to quantify these impacts in this assessment.

Administration Costs

35. The SEG is expected to impose an additional administration cost on both suppliers and Ofgem. These have not been estimated at this stage due to uncertainties about how obligated suppliers would intend to implement the SEG and the role of the scheme administrator. We welcome evidence as part of the consultation.

5.6 Consumer bill impacts

36. It is expected that suppliers will set tariffs so that any administration costs incurred through the SEG are offset and that a surplus can be made in the retail market. As a result, there is a minimal risk that consumers could face any direct policy costs passed on to bills from the SEG.

37. There are two avenues through which the SEG could lead to reduced consumer prices. Firstly, if suppliers offer a tariff lower than the wholesale price, this would represent a cost saving which could be passed on to consumers. Secondly, increased small-scale generation may decrease demand in the wholesale market in turn reducing the wholesale price.

38. On the other hand, increased behind the meter deployment under the SEG will increase the policy and network costs paid by other consumers. Behind the meter generators currently avoid these costs, therefore increased deployment will result in a redistribution to other consumers. At the levels of additional deployment

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presented in this analysis it is expected that the marginal costs attributable directly to the SEG would be small.

39. Where onsite generation leads to reduced bills for those with relatively high energy bills and low incomes, this can lead to a reduction in fuel poverty. Respondents to the call for evidence highlighted the benefits that on-site generation from renewable technologies have brought to those in fuel poverty and the importance of an export tariff for these projects.

5.7 Risks and Uncertainties

40. The largest uncertainty in this analysis is the deployment of small-scale generators with and without the SEG. These underpin all the monetised costs and benefits presented in this assessment. To reflect this uncertainty this assessment does not present a single central scenario. Rather it considers a spectrum of deployment scenarios and presents two specific scenarios in this appraisal. With higher levels of additional deployment under the SEG, the magnitude of the NPVs would increase. Given there is uncertainty around deployment levels there is a risk that the overall economic impacts are understated. The Government welcomes evidence on potential deployment impacts as part of the consultation.

41. Closely associated with deployment scenarios are future capital cost reductions. Costs are expected to decline alongside technological development; however, there is uncertainty in estimating at what level. Different levelised cost estimates were not tested in the sensitivity analysis as ‘low’ and ‘central’ estimates are one of the main differences between the two illustrative deployment scenarios, however under Scenario 1, where only low-cost deployment increases, the NPV is positive, highlighting that net resource costs are not significant when small-scale technology costs are lower.

42. There is also uncertainty in estimating the value of greenhouse gas emissions associated with implementing option 1 as this will depend on times of day and seasons that SEG technologies generate in. For example, if onshore wind with a SEG tariff generates under option 1 at a similar time to when offshore wind under the CFD is the marginal plant on the GB electricity grid, then the greenhouse gas impacts from introducing the SEG scheme would be zero. Whereas if a gas plant is the marginal plant there would be an increase in the benefit of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the introduction of the scheme. This level of granularity is not factored in to our analysis. There is a risk that not taking this into account could change whether the NPV was positive or negative, however given the magnitude of the NPVs would most likely remain small, the impact of this risk is judged to be low.

43. An additional area of uncertainty is the overall impact on the electricity system. The analysis has considered the impact of small-scale deployment on generation costs but at this stage it has not been possible to assess the wider impacts on the electricity system such as network, transmission and balancing costs.

44. Uncertainties have, where possible, been tested quantitatively through a broad range of sensitivity analysis. The results are sensitive to different estimates for key assumptions, however given the magnitude of the NPVs is not significant under the different tests, it’s unlikely that the SEG would have a substantial economic impact, giving confidence in the conclusion drawn from this analysis.