



Stabilisation Unit

# **Working with Civilian Advisers A Guide for Military Staff**

Stabilisation Unit  
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### TERMINOLOGY

The terms ‘Partners Across Government’ (PAG) and ‘Other Government Departments’ (OGD) are in common and interchangeable use. Neither has been doctrinally defined in JDP 3-40 but both have a similar meaning in that they relate to stakeholders within the Integrated Approach.

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Purpose**

This briefing note aims to provide military staff with guidance on how to most effectively work with civilian advisers embedded in military headquarters. It addresses the following questions:

- What tasks will civilians undertake?
- How are they organised?
- How are they recruited?
- How can they best be used?
- Administrative issues

It is provided by the Stabilisation Unit (SU) as part of its ongoing efforts to strengthen the UK's civil-military coherence in support of National Security Council objectives. A partner Guide aimed at civilians is provided in the 'Deployee's Guide to Working in a Military HQ'.

### **Rationale**

A military deployment will take place in support of a political objective. Understanding this strategic context and then working within it requires close co-ordination by all security and civilian agencies. In order to deliver mission success there is a need for teamwork alongside clear lines of authority, accountability and responsibility.

Leadership of such programmes lies with the National Security Council (NSC). The council will produce the campaign plan and then delegate tasks and objectives to the relevant Ministries. No element works in isolation – the military function is to set the security conditions which will allow political and development progress to occur. In simple terms this means providing freedom of movement. If the population of the host nation can conduct their daily business without fear of being impeded then stabilisation has a chance.

The military must have a constant understanding of the requirements of other agencies if it is to apply its influence effectively. Equally, these agencies (the supported effort) need to articulate their priorities to provide a planning framework for security force activity.

Co-ordination is about the exchange of information. The old adage 'form follows function' still holds true and the physical location of assets (including people) is determined by how this sharing is best achieved. Each military deployment will be different in terms of the command and control structure it finds itself working with. A non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) will require a very different approach to an enduring capacity building effort. Nevertheless in contemporary operations it is now virtually inevitable that regardless of task, other agencies will be engaged and that one of the consequences will be civilian staff within the HQ on a full time or drop in basis.

## **Civmil and the Integrated Approach**

Crisis management requires a collective response that works across the civil and military (civmil) spectrum to ensure that the strategic agenda is properly harmonised with the supporting “security” (ie military) effort. In UK terms, the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review describes this UK response to crisis, conflict and instability - using all the tools of national power available (diplomacy, defence, development, intelligence, etc), coordinated through the National Security Council - variously as an ‘integrated’, ‘whole-of-government’, and ‘full spectrum’ approach. This is complemented by our intent to ‘invest more in our alliances, build new stronger partnerships, and persuade potential adversaries of the benefits of cooperation, to multiply what we can achieve alone’. To avoid confusion, throughout this Guide we will use the term ‘integrated approach’ to describe this concept (it has been in use since the 2010 SDSR and so is generally more familiar). It is the approach adopted in what the military calls the Combined, Joint, Intra-Government, Inter-Agency, Multinational (CJIIM) environment.

An integrated approach recognises that no one Government Department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation contexts, and that by making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of government departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing. The intent behind HMG’s terminological shift from “comprehensive” to “integrated” approach in 2010 therefore was to establish greater cross-government collective analysis, leading to more coherent strategy development, followed by collective operational delivery of HMG, rather than departmental priorities delivered in siloes. Note that other governments and international organisations (e.g. NATO and EU) sometimes use “whole of government” or “comprehensive” to describe similar collaboration, with ‘comprehensive’ being NATO’s preferred term.

Within a military HQ, one manifestation of the integrated approach is the introduction of civilian staff into a military HQ on operations or exercise. Working under the collective title of Civilian Advisory Team (CAT) their aim is to deliver support to the military to ensure their plans are consistent with political intent, and liaison with Other Government Departments (OGD) and agencies.

At the operational level the diagram below illustrates the stakeholders and their relationships within the Integrated Approach.




Figure 1: Illustrative Civ-Mil Organogram for a UK operational Military HQ

Note the following:

- The shape of the organogram will be dictated by operational demands. The model shown will not be uncommon but each operation will have a bespoke structure
- It is assumed that the FCO and DFID main effort will be physically located in the main diplomatic centre (Embassy/High Commission). Under these circumstances the Stabilisation Adviser (STABAD) will act as a Liaison Officer on their behalf to the HQ
- POLAD and LEGAD are permanent staff to the HQ. Their formal chain of command is to PJHQ and it is from here that they will take direction.

This Diagram has been enlarged and copied at Annex B for ease of reading.

## TYPES OF ADVISOR

The range of accepted adviser roles has seen a sharp increase as the IA has developed. The following table identifies the appointments which are now commonplace:

<b>Title</b>	<b>Accountable to:</b>	<b>Task</b>
Policy Adviser (POLAD)	PJHQ/MOD	To advise on MOD policy
Political Adviser (POLO)	FCO	To advise on political affairs as they relate to the Task Force.
Development Adviser (DEVAD) or Humanitarian Adviser (HUMAD)	DFID	To advise on longer-term development and/or humanitarian policy and provide link to IO/NGO community
Legal Adviser (LEGAD)	MOD (Mil)	To advise on rules of engagement, captured enemy combatants and relevant legal affairs
Cultural Adviser (CULAD)	MOD (Mil)	To support 'understand' effort
Gender Adviser (GENAD)	MoD	To represent gender issues
Stabilisation Adviser (STABAD)	SU	Generic civil support as necessary. Focused on stabilisation but able to engage on other civilian adviser functions
StratCom Adviser	Cabinet Office	To direct an integrated strategic communications programme

**Augmentees** – Most posts will usually require augmentees to fill them. POLAD and LEGAD will normally be permanent members of the HQ staff

**Civil Servants or Contractors?** - Circumstances will dictate whether advisers are full time civil servants or contractors. Due to OGD resource limitations, serving officers will most likely be thin on the ground. This operational reality will mean that the civil servants' work base will predominantly be in the Embassy where they will lead delivery of the supported effort, while contracted advisers embedded within the HQ provide a liaison and reach-back function

**Subject Matter Expertise** -Alongside the more mainstream roles there is also a requirement for single subject matter expertise. This usually requires a 'one-off' commitment so where possible the contribution from such experts should be sourced on a 'reach-back' basis. Does the task actually need people to be physically present in the operational area? Such links can be accessed through Whitehall or PJHQ

**Gender Advisers** - Gender Advisers (GenAds) are currently supplied in the main by OGDs and SU. However, MOD is currently training its own GenAd capability (in line with international commitments), so this resource will increasingly be coming from within the military system.

**Stabilisation Adviser (STABAD)** –The STABAD provides an all round generalist capability and, in the absence of mainstream representation from FCO or DFID, the STABAD can act as the HQ link to the Embassy. The STABAD will usually be experienced in the stabilisation, foreign or security policy issues of conflict zones.

**Continuity** – If the HQ is running a 24/7 battle rhythm consideration should be given to how civilian sustainability is delivered in the face of challenging workloads.

## **CIVILIAN TASKS**

All staff, whether civil or military, are deployed because they add specific value to the crisis management jigsaw. Whether they wear a uniform or not is irrelevant – it is the expertise that matters. If the HQ wishes to accommodate civilians then it should be absolutely clear what it wants from them rather than hold them on a ‘just in case’ basis. In establishing its requirements the HQ should guard against replicating what is being done elsewhere. The distinction between supported and supporting effort should be remembered at all times.

There is no definitive list as to which tasks civilian advisers may be asked to deliver, but the following offers some of the more likely options:

- **Liaison** – The exchange of military liaison officers between commands is a long established principle. Civilian agencies should not be exempt. Of particular value to the Commander is an LO to manage the link with the Embassy or High Commission. This task might be given to the Defence Attaché but dedicated capability to manage the supported/supporting link is a significant benefit. It should be noted that the relationship between the HQ and in theatre IO/NGOs is managed by military CIMIC officers.
- **Planning** – The military devote considerable resources to planning and the development of their operations plan could be said to be a defining moment for the long term future of the HN. Civilian planners within the J5 branch therefore ensure all planning remains balanced between civil and military requirements. This engagement should commence at the earliest possible opportunity.
- **Key Leader Engagement (KLE)** – Where appropriate, civilian staff are well placed to support the Commander in co-ordinating engagement activities with Host Nation and external agencies (IO/NGO). It is recommended that FCO/DFID representation is a feature of every meeting and that civil non-inclusion is an exception.
- **Subject matter expertise** – There are a host of single subject tasks on which civilian expertise may be required. The HQ should follow the general principle of addressing only those issues which relate to delivery of the supporting effort. Predominantly this means policing. Otherwise SME’s should be managed as part of the FCO/DFID remit.
- **Alternative view** – Civilians bring a different viewpoint and culture to the HQ. Used carefully this alternative approach can stimulate new ideas within the Command Group. Their inclusion in red team activity is strongly encouraged.
- **‘Civil conscience’** – Civilian advisers offer a constant reminder to the staff that there is more to the campaign than just the application of military influence. The role of ‘civil conscience’ ensures that throughout the plan-refine-execute process the supported effort is appropriately represented.

In addition, the following table represents a ‘top ten’ of recurring themes and issues which civilian advisers may frequently be considering and raising on either operations or exercises. These are not prescriptive, but do give a sense of ‘where they are coming from’:

<b>Theme</b>	<b>Description - Civilian Intent</b>
Understanding the local context	The short term nature of military deployments must be reconciled against the long term commitment necessary to build an accurate understanding of the Host Nation (population, power, politics, governance, conflict dynamics, etc). There is a significant risk that early action will be based on incomplete knowledge leading to alienation of elements of society. The STABAD must encourage the HQ to seek out reliable sources for understanding the context, recognising and emphasizing that this runs contrary to immediate action.
The role of the Host Nation	The HN is often overlooked during the planning phase and becomes a marginal presence, especially in exercise play. Engagement of the HN is central to enduring campaign success and they must not be allowed to be a peripheral presence at any time.
Importance of Gender	Promoting and protecting women’s rights is the morally right thing to do, we are legally obliged to do so, it is frequently central to our mandate (as part of Protection of Civilians), key to our intelligence/ understanding (50% of population), and makes achievement of stability more likely. It is central to the understand and influence campaigns and should therefore be given appropriate weight in the military planning effort.
The use of the word ‘Stabilisation’	‘Stabilisation’ is widely used as a catch all phrase to demonstrate campaign success. It is most frequently used to describe the period after decisive operations when what the user really means is ‘secure’. The STABAD should be prepared to question both context and meaning to ensure that it does not create an assumption of premature success.
Maintaining the correct balance between supported and supporting effort (military contribution to the 3Ps <sup>1</sup> )	As the supporting effort, the role of the military is to provide the secure environment within which a political settlement can be sought and assistance provided. The challenge for the military is to avoid becoming too forward leaning into the political arena thereby replicating or confusing the political LOO, or too proactive in delivering project support (see below for examples).
Key leader engagement (KLE)	KLE must not be undertaken by the supporting effort in isolation. KLE is led by the supported political effort and should be co-ordinated as such.

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
- Protect political actors, the political system and the population.
- Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes
- Prepare for longer-term recovery

<p>In extremis support to Humanitarian agencies (HAs)</p>	<p>Generally HAs are looking for freedom of movement and look to the supporting effort to deliver this. They will, on occasion, look for in extremis assistance but this will be an exception rather than the rule. Whilst the military should conduct contingency planning for such tasks it should be discrete and low key. Military involvement in delivery can rapidly compromise the independence, impartiality and neutrality that HA's rely on for their access and protection. The HQ should recognise that HAs are very competent and will ask for help as and when they need it.</p>
<p>Local projects as a force protection measure</p>	<p>Sometimes 'economic development' will be used as justification for conducting local project initiatives. This ignores the strong potential of 'doing harm' (militarising humanitarian assistance; substituting state service delivery [generally unsustainable and may directly undermine state/local authority legitimacy]; often creating divisions within and between communities [who's gaining, who's being ignored, who's winning our contracts, etc). Recognise that activities such as these are largely for force protection and highlight potential risks and dangers. If undertaken (in response to requests by local authorities), apply conflict sensitivity principles and be aware of potential impact on local cultural and societal norms.</p>
<p>The local police and their role in delivering security</p>	<p>A reliable and disciplined police force is essential in setting the conditions for stability. This cannot be created by a military force – community policing requires the application of specialist skills and these are not learned quickly. The military should be encouraged to reconcile this thorny issue with the Host Nation who should be encouraged to lead the capacity building programme. The implications of slow training cycle must be grasped at an early stage.</p>
<p>Targeting for hard or soft effect (influence)</p>	<p>Political considerations must drive the influence programme. Targeting boards should have all stakeholders represented and also reflect the host nation view.</p>
<p>Civilian casualties</p>	<p>The implications of civilian casualties are well understood by all stakeholders within the HQ. Where civcas occur the STABAD must ensure that transparency is a key principle in the investigation process. Where mistakes occur they must be admitted to and remedial action taken as appropriate.</p>

## SOURCING ADVISERS

The make up of the civilian cohort will be agreed by the sponsor Ministries. This capability which should be kept under constant review – as operational circumstances change so too should the workforce to meet the needs of a dynamic environment. Where will the incumbents come from?

Civilians are not a homogenous group. Each will bring a different capability and work under varied terms and conditions. The different ‘types’ are best illustrated by the following chart:



It should be stressed that whilst this is the most common model it is by no means the only one. The structure can be complicated by multilateral commitments and SME’s may be ‘plugged in’ at any point and from any source. Conversely some commitments may not be filled at all. Nevertheless the essential distinction between serving civil servants and contractor or third party capability needs to be recognised

**Serving Civil Servants** - The role of the civil servant attached to the HQ will be determined by their parent organisation in consultation with the MOD. Their presence is central to delivery of the Integrated Approach. Each will have a distinct line of accountability to the parent department. However, as mentioned earlier, resource constraints frequently mean civil servants will not deploy full time into military HQs, but will rather remain in their operational Embassy. In such circumstances, contractors may be used to provide corresponding subject matter expertise and a liaison link to that department. The SU is usually able to provide contractors with broad experience of working in or with these departments.

**Contractors** - Where a capability gap exists, one option is to fill it with contracted civilians. Sourced and employed by the Stabilisation Unit, contractors can be either specialists or generalists. If the former they will usually bring some thematic expertise such as human rights, rule of law, gender or policing which will help develop the HQ's understanding and thereby assist planning. Their terms of reference will need to be written by the HQ around very specific tasking, and funding for such posts should be agreed between the MOD and the augmentees' parent ministry.

One of the roles of the Stabilisation Unit is to source and formally employ contractors. In some instances HQs will directly contract and, in such cases, the duty of care and associated risk lies with the contracting authority. SU provided Stabilisation Advisers are funded by the CSSF and derive their authority through the SU and NSC and, ultimately, from the references to the UK's Integrated Approach as articulated in the 2015 SDSR/NSS. They will be expected to be familiar with and be able to promote the key concepts of: The UK Approach to Stabilisation (2014), The Principles of Stabilisation and The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011) and the Chilcott Report (2016) (all available on the SU's public website).

## **USING THE ADVISER – SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS**

**Style** - Each adviser will bring their own style to the HQ. Their role is to apply best practice and, within reason, challenge military thinking. Both tasks can sometimes be an uncomfortable experience for an organisation in which the emphasis is on a clearly defined chain of command. However the adviser's perspective should be heard – it is the reason they are there in the first place. Equally the advisers, for their part, must respect their position and be constructive.

**Command Group** - Access to the Commander should be built into the battle rhythm. How the COS delivers this is his call, but a daily session of the Command Group allows for an orderly forum, and avoids the Commander facing individual demands for special hearing.

**Administration** - Administration for the civilians should require no long-term special effort. However, it may be prudent to identify a single Non-Commissioned Officer as the first point of contact. The reality is that civilians are, initially at least, relatively high maintenance as they adapt to the new environment. IT operating procedures can be particularly problematic.

**Pulling their weight** - However, any support provided should not create a dependency culture. The civilians are part of the team and should be expected to pull their weight. If, for whatever reason, the mix is not working then it needs to be addressed sooner rather than later. If the HQ wishes to replace an adviser then it should do so, but on a properly justified basis.

**Chain of Command** - Civilians tend to come with blurred lines of accountability, responsibility and authority. They also come as individuals rather than as a structured group with common procedures and internal chains of command. Where the deploying agencies agree, senior civil managers may be appointed to coordinate the civilian input. But this is certainly not always the case - in multilateral deployments it would be unusual. It would be wrong to make too much of this issue but HQ staff should be aware that points of inter-civil friction can arise.

**Hostile Environment** – Civilian advisers deployed through the SU will all have received training in living and working in a hostile environment. It would be prudent however for the HQ staff to take them through a familiarisation session on immediate action drills. This would also allow for an equipment check for such items as helmet, body armour, CBRN PPE etc

**Checklist** – A checklist of considerations is attached at Annex A. This summarises those practical issues which the HQ staff will need to address.

## EXERCISE CONSIDERATIONS

For civilians within the HQ there should be no real difference in management issues between operational and exercise deployments. However there will be a requirement on exercise for civil support to EXCON. It is recommended that the following issues are addressed:

**Applying the Integrated Approach** – the involvement of OGD's in an exercise is something that should always be encouraged. However, as they have limited resources and sit outside the military chain of command co-ordinating their input can often prove challenging. Nevertheless it is a nettle which must be grasped.

EXCON planning must be realistic in its expectations. Departmental representation will most likely be fleeting and so short term engagement should be planned for. There is a far greater chance of the involvement of Partners Across Government (PAG) for a 24 hour period than there is for a full 2 week exercise. For senior staff input a 3-4 hour commitment might be anticipated. These should be regarded as planning figures only – there will of course be exceptions – but it is better to err on the side of caution.

Faced with such a situation the PAG engagement needs to be carefully planned to ensure their contribution is delivered accurately and by the appropriate staff. Departments in Whitehall are extremely supportive when bespoke solutions are required but in the absence of the lead Ministry representation the Stabilisation Unit (SU) provides a safety net for civilian support. They can offer coordination, continuity and expertise and might be considered as a one stop shop in terms of developing the exercise civmil component.

**Early civil engagement in exercise planning** - the principle of early engagement is critical. It ensures a more balanced and hence more realistic exercise. This engagement should be sustained until any post exercise review is completed. It is strongly advised that a Civilian Planner is attached to EXCON as soon as the exercise support task has been agreed by the SU. This need not be a full-time commitment but it should be a constant one. The planner will not only provide continuity but will ensure that the exercise scenario is properly shaped to ensure that the political context is established. To aid familiarity and continuity, it is helpful if this Planner subsequently acts as adviser to the J5 Branch during their development of the Operational Plan (OPLAN) before the CPX phase .

**Training Objectives** – the TO's relating to the civmil interface remain largely consistent between exercises. Rather than reinvent the wheel each time it is recommended that the following text represents a starting point:

*Use the Integrated Approach to provide the supporting security effort to set the longer-term politically-led conditions for stability in (Host Nation) This should reflect: close working relationships between UK Military and Government Departments, taking full account of UK strategic political direction and the objectives and capabilities of the Host Nation; and collaborative planning and information sharing between military and non-military organisations, primarily with UK civilian partners but also with those IOs/NGOs identified as*

*having a significant longer-term contribution to make towards conflict resolution and stability in (Host Nation)*

**Grey Cell** - The following Grey Cell staff appointments should be considered:

Controller	Responsible for the overall management, co-ordination and quality control of political component of exercise
Subject Matter Expertise	As required. Provide the HQ with guidance on thematic issues such as Rule of Law (including the Police), Human Rights, Gender etc.
Evaluator	To provide the HQ with best practice guidance and to identify lessons learned.

The shape of the civilian cohort will be determined by EXCON. The final numbers will be a balance between perceived need and available resources but there is no set organogram which is consistently applied. Funding for posts will be found from various sources within MOD and SU.

**Evaluation** – if resources allow a civilian evaluator should be appointed. Attached to Grey Cell but working as a free runner, the evaluator is able to provide guidance to the HQ on the overall use of civilians and their effectiveness.

**Personal Performance Reporting** – The Stabilisation Unit will require the military employer to write a short report on the adviser. The Stabilisation Unit will provide a format for this report but, essentially, it will be asking whether the adviser met the objectives provided in their Job Description and whether the military employer would be prepared to work with this adviser in the future.

## GETTING THE MOST OUT OF THE CIVILIAN AUGMENTEE

Finally there are a number of things that the staff might consider in order to get the best out of their advisers

- **Get them in early** – if budgets allow, get them into the HQ before CPOE/JOPG and get them fully integrated into the OPLAN process
- **Use them** – advisers are invariably keen to get stuck in. Use them. If you don't they won't come back
- **Listen to them** – advisers have a different perspective. You don't have to agree with them but at least listen to what they have to say.
- **TLC** – they may not be soldiers but they are sharing the same environment. Look after them and be prepared for a little hand holding
- **.....but don't overdo it** – next time look harder at 'reachback' systems
- **ICT systems** – make sure they can communicate both internally and externally. Think about where they are going to sit
- **Briefings** – give them a platform for formal and informal briefings
- **Lessons Learned** – they will have plenty to say about the exercise. Remember, many will have more operational experience than many uniformed colleagues

**RECRUITING CIVIL ADVISERS – A CHECKLIST**

<b>CONSIDERATION</b>	<b>EXAMPLE ISSUES</b>
<b>Have the adviser's terms of reference been clearly defined?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are they going to do?</li> <li>• What are their lines of accountability, authority and responsibility?</li> </ul>
<b>Does the adviser need to be permanently in the HQ?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can the info/service they provide be managed from the Embassy/reachback?</li> </ul>
<b>Where is their workspace?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do they have the means to work – table, chair, laptop, comms?</li> <li>• Do they have access to SOI's?</li> </ul>
<b>Do they have a reporting schedule?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are they expected to formally contribute to ASSESSREP/DOWNREP?</li> <li>• How will the HQ receive a post-exercise Lessons Identified report from the adviser?</li> </ul>
<b>Security clearance issues?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Correct clearance and supporting certification?</li> <li>• Access to CIS systems?</li> </ul>
<b>What duty of care does the HQ have?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Who looks after their day to day admin?</li> <li>• Movement limitations?</li> <li>• Is accommodation MOSS compliant?</li> <li>• Close protection?</li> <li>• Who will write the performance report on the adviser?</li> </ul>
<b>Are there any admin issues that need to be addressed?</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leave rotation. How will their duties be covered? How will their leave be coherent with military colleagues?</li> <li>• Will they need any kit issue (and associated training – e.g. CBRN)?</li> </ul>




Figure 1: Illustrative Civ-Mil Organogram for a UK Operational Military HQ

## **Generic Requirement and Terms of Reference for a Stabilisation Advisor to a Military Headquarters**

### **Background**

The SU is providing X generalist Stabilisation Advisers to support Exercise Y / Operation Z. These ToRs define the breadth of work the Stabilisation Advisor may undertake and shows their utility in all phases of campaign planning.

### **Description of Exercise or operation**

Eg. This Exercise is a Tier 3 annual exercise for UK armed forces and will be centred on Joint Force HQ with a land component but practising the Integrated Approach in a fictitious fragile and conflict afflicted state.

### **Objective**

The aim of the Stabilisation Adviser is to provide informed civilian perspective and advice into the military planning and execution processes in order to help maximise the military contribution to a politically led, Integrated Approach to the exercise scenario/operational challenge.

**Scope/Activities/Methodology:** *(to be refined to match the specific requirement of the task)*

All Stabilisation Advisers are expected to;

- Advise on political, development and security considerations in the absence of departmental representation in a HQ and/or act as a link to those departments (facilitator of the Integrated Approach).
- Remind the HQ and, where necessary, challenge emerging military plans to ensure an appropriate military contribution to the wider, politically led HMG or coalition effort (eg. military contribution to Protection and Promotion of political processes and Preparing for recovery), highlighting longer-term politically led integrated outcomes, risks and mitigation.
- Assist in constructing and maintaining relationships between the HQ and other government departments and stakeholders, while retaining a degree of independence that allows them to engage across government as required.
- Promote the need to consult with and, where appropriate, defer to host nation views and direction at all times; act as the link to many of the host nation civilian authorities (together with military CIMIC officers).
- Advise on what IOs and NGOs would likely be thinking/doing, and act as a link to IOs and NGOs, both international and host nation (together with military CIMIC officers).
- Advise on likely short and long term impact on the civilian population of different courses of military action.
- Advise on second and third order effects of military action on chances of successful stabilisation, conflict resolution and eventual peacebuilding.
- Promote consideration of gender in the understanding of the conflict and stability context, of the impact of the conflict and military action on women and girls / men and boys, and of the potential role of women in promoting stability and peace.

- Be prepared to provide ad hoc briefings on matters relating to non-military aspects of stabilisation and conflict response to individuals and syndicates.
- Analyse information, inject civilian considerations and highlight and respond to gaps in understanding.
- Work with headquarters syndicates to provide constructive, balanced civilian support aimed at enabling syndicates to achieve their learning or deployment objectives. This will likely be delivered through an approach that combines mentoring, teaching and advising.
- Work with the other civilian advisers of all specialisms (in particular those less experienced) to share particular expertise and experiences, in order to maximise the contribution of the entire team to the exercise or operation.
- Provide feedback to the SU Liaison Officer on exercise construct and challenges of integrating civilian considerations into headquarters thinking, in order to help strengthen future exercises or operations (this will include completion of a post tour or exercise brief).

### **Key skills/experience:**

#### Essential

- Broad generalist appreciation of the civilian challenges related to conflict prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding/state building that will affect a military HQ's planning.
- All-rounder with basic familiarity with (and confidence to speak on) stabilisation, humanitarian, political, human rights, development, gender issues and security matters in the context of the UK's integrated approach to responding to conflict and instability.
- Understanding of the respective roles of the SU, FCO, MOD, DfID and other NSC departments in supporting the integrated approach.
- Familiarity with, and understanding of, the key multilateral, international, regional and non-governmental organisations commonly active in contexts of security and instability.
- Good knowledge of the processes of transition from crisis to stabilisation to peace building /state-building.
- Excellent team member with strong diplomatic, facilitation, communication and analytical skills.
- Comfortable working in (or willingness to work in) a military environment.
- Ability to work under pressure; in possession of strong time management skills.

#### Preferable

- Previous (civilian) HMG experience.
- Previous experience working alongside the UK (or other) military on operations or exercises.

Stabilisation Advisers are funded by the CSSF and derive their authority through the SU and NSC and, ultimately, from the references to the UK's Integrated Approach as articulated in the 2015 SDSR/NSS. They will be expected to be familiar with and be able to promote the key concepts of: The UK Approach to Stabilisation (2014), The Principles of Stabilisation and The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011) and the Chilcott Report (2016) (all available on the SU's public website).