



Stabilisation Unit

Working in United Nations Missions

Deployee Guide

Stabilisation Unit

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Acronyms

AFP	Agencies, Funds and Programmes
AU	African Union
CCA	Common Country Analysis
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
CT	Country Team
C2	Command and Control
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DaO	Delivery as One
DFID	Department for International Development
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
D/SRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EU	European Union
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IFI	International Financial Institution
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PKO	Peace Keeping Operation
PSM	Peace Support Mission
RC	Resident Coordinator
SSAFE	Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments
SG	Secretary-General
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPM	Special Political Mission

SRS	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SU	Stabilisation Unit
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDSS	UN Department for Safety and Security
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNSC	UN Security Council
USAID	US Agency for International Development

Introduction

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) is an integrated civil-military operational unit which reports to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). It is designed to be agile, responsive and well-equipped to operate in high threat environments. It combines in-house staff expertise with the ability to draw on a larger pool of civilian expertise for specialised, longer term or larger scale taskings. It ensures lessons from practical experience are captured as best practice and used to improve future delivery by Her Majesty's Government (HMG).

Deployee Guides are to be read in the policy and resource context of HMG's: Building Stability Overseas Strategy; Conflict Pool; Conflict, Stability and Security Fund;¹ UK Approach to Stabilisation, and UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes;² and other relevant guidance from HMG Departments. They are aimed primarily at the SU's own practitioners and consultants, and those of other HMG Departments. They are not a formal statement of HMG policy.

This Deployee Guide to working in United Nations missions (UN) has been written for first time staff and consultants being deployed by the SU to work in UN missions.³ It is intended to provide practical advice on how best to prepare for such a deployment - how to function comfortably and maximize the effectiveness and contribution of staff within an often complex and unique environment. It covers a wide variety of issues including the structure and organization of the UN system, mission organisation, tasks and personnel issues - while providing a coherent introduction to working on integrated political missions, including in Country Team offices and UN agencies such as UNDP. The guide is based on the experiences and feedback of staff who have undertaken a multitude of roles including Stabilisation Advisers in UN missions and various documents (see UN Key Resources at [Annex A](#)) that cover topics relevant to working in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) as well as issues related to the personal and professional challenges that one may be faced with.

An "At a Glance" checklist for deployees can be found at [Annex B](#). Deployees needing more detailed information on UK policy relating to their deployment should ask SU staff for relevant points of contacts in HMG Departments.

¹ Announced in June 2013, for FY 2015-16, the £1 billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF, the successor to the Conflict Pool) pools new and existing resources across Government to prevent conflict and tackle threats to UK interests that arise from instability overseas. The National Security Council (NSC) will set priorities for the Fund, drawing on the most effective combination of defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence.

² The UK Approach to Stabilisation and the UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes can be found on the Stabilisation and Conflict Learning Resource under Publications: sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk

³ This paper has been written by Gregory Wilson on behalf of the Stabilisation Unit.

Stabilisation Unit Publications

The Stabilisation Unit produces a number of publications in order to inform key stakeholders about a range of topics relating to conflict, stability, security and justice. The publications can be found at our new [Publications web page](#).

A brief introduction to the different series and existing titles is below.

Stabilisation Series

Core guidance on the UK perspective on stabilisation; how it should be delivered.

[The UK Approach to Stabilisation \(2014\)](#)

[The UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes](#)

[Security Sector Stabilisation](#)

Issues Note Series

Short papers aimed at policy makers, programme managers and deputy heads of mission to inform them about key issues in thematic areas.

[Analysis, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation](#)

What Works Series

These are long paper intended for programme managers, project officers and deployees. They include detailed tools and frameworks that can be applied to thematic or programmatic areas.

[Policing the Context](#)

[Analysis](#)

[Planning](#)

[M&E](#)

Deployee Guide Series

Practical guidance intended for first time or seasoned deployees.

[United Nations Missions](#)

[EU CSDP](#)

[Military Headquarters](#)

[OSCE](#)

Feedback on this Deployee Guide can be sent to the SU Lessons Team at: SULessons@stabilisationunit.gov.uk.

UN Missions

A deployment to a UN mission can be a hugely rewarding experience - the input, influence and contributions of those deployed can have an immediate and direct impact on contributing to the fulfillment of the UN mandate of establishing peace and security. UK personnel can usefully enhance UN peacekeeping operations but *how* this is achieved is of critical importance. However, for first time staff seconded to missions, the participation in a sometimes chaotic UN mission or Agency environment working in difficult and challenging situations can be a culture shock. This guide identifies some of the lessons learned to improve the experience and effectiveness of those deployed in future.

There are a number of types of UN missions. As conflict is inextricably tied to politics, political missions are at the centre of UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. Special Political Missions (SPMs) can include the deployment of: special envoys; sanctions panels and monitoring groups; and field-based missions. At the time of writing the latest SPM is the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia in 2013. The second broad mission type is the peacekeeping operation (PKO). Peacekeeping missions and special political missions sit under DPKO and DPA respectively, both are mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Modern Peacekeeping operations are rarely limited to one type of activity. The boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. PKOs are typically much larger and more costly, given the significant blue helmet element (and often large police contingents).

Working in UN missions, SPMs, PKO, or in an Agency, Fund or Programme (AFP), demands a high level of understanding, cooperation and coordination between various stakeholders and agencies operating in a wide variety of mission types including stabilisation environments. To help achieve the UN's mandates, an increasing number of UK personnel are being seconded to UN missions to provide support, advice and expertise to local and international authorities. This support and advice encompasses a broad range of functions, and staff inevitably operate in a wide variety of complex and difficult locations. The growing international response to conflict and increasing numbers of stakeholders within FCAS has led to a tendency for multi-dimensional interventions – with many nations and multilateral organisations working together. This has necessitated ever greater coordinated approaches to stabilisation efforts. The resulting “integrated” approach adopted by the UN and other agencies has led to more effective interventions, although challenges still remain - largely focused on coordination between the multitude of stakeholders and their competing objectives and issues concerning potential conflicts between the political and humanitarian objectives of a mission.

UN missions often operate in areas where there are other large multilateral (international or regional) organisations working on the ground, such as NATO, the EU and the AU. Roles undertaken by UK staff in UN peacekeeping and political missions include stabilisation

advisers, analysts and military and stabilisation planners, police advisers, and sector specialists operating in demanding situations. Recent deployees have found themselves in places such as Afghanistan, South Sudan and Somalia.

Preparation for the Deployment

General Preparation - Pre-Deployment Understanding

Understanding United Nations peacekeeping and the wider UN family

The UN system is complex and has grown over the years as more and more specialised agencies and bodies have been established. The UN is made up of multiple political arenas – including the Security Council, General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and Economic and Social Council. It also works in a wide range of fields including development, conflict prevention, humanitarian operations, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. The system is further complicated by the individual efforts of agencies, funds and programmes, as varied as the UN Development Programme and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Annex B depicts an overview of the UN system in all its complexities. Furthermore, there is no recognised overall coordination in the UN system as a whole, so it is not difficult to find criticism of UN structures, coordination and decision making. However, there are studies that demonstrate that the UN is still an effective and cost efficient tool to tackle peacekeeping and peacebuilding.⁴

No two missions are the same. There is no fixed model for how a PKO or integrated mission operates. Each mission varies in structures and procedures depending on numerous factors, including: the nature of the mandate/mission, country context, and the leadership preference of executive personnel and their nationalities. These factors may differ as developments occur within a mission, such as a changed mandate, new ideas and procedures are introduced (a factor not uncommon when dealing with stabilisation and new developments in principles and policies), or even a change of key personnel. Notwithstanding this, feedback from previous deployees has identified some essential aspects of working in UN missions and AFPs that may be broadly abstracted and fairly consistent across the board. The following section identifies some of these aspects.

Before deployment to a UN mission it is important that staff have a basic understanding both of the mission and the organisation in which they are to work.⁵ If the deployment is to an AFP, it is useful to understand its composition, how it fits in the broader mission hierarchy and the stabilisation community and how that organisation is structured within

⁴ Rand Corporation (2005). The UN's Role in Peacekeeping: From the Congo to Iraq.

⁵ Most missions have their own websites, see for example: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/index.shtml>

the overall UN country presence. For a guide to UN organisational structures staff are advised to read the document commonly referred to as the Capstone Doctrine.⁶

Depending on time available, this basic knowledge could be supplemented by a more in-depth understanding of the broader responsibilities and main areas of work of the specific organisation - and its policies, plans and assessments of performance to date. It is also useful to understand how the mission/organisation is funded, as this has an important impact on who influences what it can and cannot do in the field. AFPs are voluntarily funded and donors may choose to prioritise/fund certain activities, whereas the debate on what UN missions do is decided via the UNSC mandate process in New York. It may be possible to attend a UN pre-deployment training and familiarisation course to know what to expect. Sweden, Germany and other donors, through implementing partners, run these regularly. Inquiries can be made of your sponsoring HMG Department.

Structure of a typical Peace Support Mission

A UN Peace Support Mission is created when the UNSC approves a mandate, and hopefully one that is clear and achievable. This is done on a case by case basis carefully considering the options open to the UN and the resources available. Rules of engagement are also relevant to how the nations carry out their mandates. To facilitate the planning process the UN has adopted an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) discussed below in more detail. The UN Secretary-General (SG) appoints a Special Representative (SRSG) to head the peacekeeping mission. The SRSG is the senior UN representative in-country and reports to the SG through the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping in New York. The peacekeeping operation (PKO) is its own entity and the SRSG has deputies (D/SRSGs) and heads of components, cells and centres within the PKO. When a mission is “integrated” this essentially describes a strategic partnership between a multi-dimensional PKO and the UN Country Team under the leadership of the SRSG and the D/SRSG.⁷

The UN organisational structure is hierarchical. UN Peacekeeping Operations exhibit similarities to the more rigid rank structure apparent in military operations. It is also worth noting that the star (*) system typically used for defining ranks in the military is not used in non-military UN jargon.⁸ UN peacekeeping has evolved into a complex, multi-dimensional enterprise, involving personnel from a wide range of nationalities, disciplines and professional cultures pursuing multiple lines of activity.

There are currently 16 peacekeeping operations led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). UN DPKO Fact Sheets on current missions are regularly updated and can

⁶ The Capstone Doctrine sets out the guiding principles and core objectives of UN Peacekeeping operations. It is also intended to provide a basis for the development of training materials for military, police and civilian personnel preparing to serve in the field - http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

⁷ This can result in long mission names, such as the one in Mali established in 2013: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, MINUSMA.

⁸ One-star is normally equated to a Brigadier, two-star a Major General.

be downloaded from the relevant website.⁹ In 2013 the DPA supported over 35 Special Political Missions (SPMs)

The DPKO has a number of key roles which are broadly similar and performed across most missions.¹⁰ MONUSCO in the DRC is currently the largest PKO with more than 25,000 personnel - nearly 20,000 of that being military personnel.

The key staff and their roles are described in more detail in Annex D.

Command and Control (C2)

The figure below demonstrates a typical structure of Command and Control (C2) from the strategic level to the field exercised through the Head of the relevant mission.¹¹ Not all missions will look precisely like this.




Figure 1 United Nations. (p.67, 2008) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine).

⁹ For the latest fact sheet see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote314.pdf>.

¹⁰ SRSG, DSRSG, COS, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, Director Mission Support and the normal sub-components: Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Military Component, Police Component, Rule of Law, DDR, Human Rights, JMAC, JOC, JLOC, UNDSS – usually sits inside the Mission, Air Ops, Protection Unit, HIV/AIDS, Gender Unit, MovCon.

¹¹ Capstone Doctrine, p.67.

There is an additional C2 factor in PKOs that deployees should understand. The UN does not have a standing army and therefore the Military Component of a PKO is comprised of various national contingents. These national contingents will report to the SRSG through the Force Commander. This can at times produce problems for national contingents with the primary chain of command directly to their national headquarters in their home countries. Therefore, the Force Commander in a PKO is at times, more realistically, a Force *Coordinator* and orders and directives to the peacekeeping force can be a more difficult and contentious affair than one might expect. It should be noted that the senior military figure in the UN system is a *Military Adviser* and has no command authority. There are many good and bad reasons why UN C2 can appear over-complex. A deployee should make an effort to understand the moving parts. The different capabilities, training, equipment and resources of each contributing nation also inform the subsequent behaviour and capabilities of the mission to respond in various situations. Note also that each nation may also have history and relations with the host government which may impact on the mission.

UN Agencies and Programmes and the UN Country Team

UN Agencies Funds and Programmes (AFPs) are grouped together as the UN Country Team under the Regional Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator who holds the rank of D/SRSG. However, the AFPs also report directly to their own separate headquarters, mostly in New York or Geneva. Therefore, the SRSG does not have real authority to give orders or directives to the AFPs. There are many good reasons for this, not least that many AFPs are funded bilaterally, which also explains why the “Integrated Mission” concept is based on intent and indeed may not be achievable in reality. There are different reporting lines, and budgets, staffing, and support resources are all separate. There is no single model for what an integrated mission should look like, but a key part of the SRSG role is to co-ordinate a strategic, integrated approach across all UN actors on the ground to achieve a “One UN” vision. It is only by all of the people working in UN agencies co-ordinating their work that this has a chance to be effective. Whilst there are few limits on the ability of the SRSG and his/her deputies to influence the peacekeeping process and to direct the work of the UN in the field, much will depend on the experience and skills of the individual.

In order for an integrated mission to maximise its effectiveness in a region, there needs to be coordination and coherence across the entire UN system, in conjunction with external stakeholders. One of the most important channels through which coordination with all the UN Agencies working in an integrated mission is enabled through regular, usually weekly, meetings of the UN Country Team. The UNCT is usually chaired by the DSRSG/Resident Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) position. The theory behind this meeting of the Agencies is that the UN system can reinforce itself to greater effect by mobilizing their comparative and collective strengths, their wide range of skills, mandates and assets together - mutually benefiting from working coherence. The objectives are noble: coherence through the development of shared objectives; closely aligned planning and agreed results;

and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at regular meetings.¹² Examples of existing consolidation methods between UN departments include Strategic Policy Groups and Integrated Strategy and Planning Teams. Experience has shown that uncoordinated efforts between UNCTs and other departments have led to parallel structures emerging and creating tension between different stakeholders, hindering the effectiveness of the overarching mission.¹³

The principles of modern peacekeeping were elucidated in the Brahimi Report (2000),¹⁴ and taken forward through the Peace Operations Agenda (2010) and through subsequent restructuring in DPKO. Running in parallel with the need to be more effective in peace operations was a growing concern with coordination across all of the UN.

The Delivering as One (DaO) agenda is the UN system's response to the global reform process on aid effectiveness. It builds on the reform agenda set by UN Members States, which aims to increase the coherence, effectiveness and relevance of UN operations in the field. The main objective of the Delivering as One initiative is to enhance the UN system's impact, by building on the achievements to date, increasing host government ownership, delivering more coordinated, effective and efficient assistance to the country, and ensuring a smooth transition of the UN mission.¹⁵

The effectiveness of this agenda depends on coordination between various stakeholders. First time deployees should therefore be aware of the multitude of stakeholders within the mission and the ancillary stakeholders - and have an understanding of their respective plans, priorities and policies. Following from this, staff should understand the engagement with other departments within the broader UN system and other organisations. Key inter-agency documents such as the Integrated Strategic Framework, Common Country Analysis (CCA), United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) are meant to be synchronised and can provide a good strategic overview of the mission's strategy and core multi-year plans. However, problems exist with different parties not aware of the plans or making other ad hoc plans. This is in addition to the strategic plans prepared by UN Agencies and plans with other partners such as Poverty Reduction Strategies often drafted with the World Bank. There may also be specific joint stabilisation plans - an example being the "International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo". There is scope for considerable confusion when the real challenges lie in implementation.

¹² Metcalfe, V, Giffen A. And Elhawary, S. (2011). UN Integration and Humanitarian Space: An Independent Study Commissioned by the UN Integration Steering Group. Humanitarian Policy Group.

¹³ See Eide, E, Kapsersen, A, Kent, R. And Hippel, K. (ND). *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*. An independent Study commissioned by the United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, p. 19.

¹⁴ Available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/305

¹⁵ United Nations (UN) (2006), Delivering as One, Report of the Secretary General's High Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, UN.

If possible, given the time limitations, one should understand the programmes of key mission partners in the UN Country Team including the key recovery and development programmes such as UNDP and targeted funds such as UNICEF. Local stakeholders will vary greatly depending on the role and function being undertaken. Furthermore, some Agencies will have key personnel that stand out as competent and focussed on success. There will also be external entities such as UK/international/host nation government departments and Agencies, the World Bank and other IFIs, NGOs, key civil society representatives etc. An integrated approach requires a clear understanding of all these stakeholders and their individual perspectives, and that they in turn understand the aims and objectives of the UN mission.

UN Standards of Conduct

The United Nations and other specialized agencies have a fundamental responsibility to uphold and progress the ideals set out in the standards of conduct for the international civil service. This relies on maintaining competence, integrity, impartiality, independence and discretion when representing any humanitarian organisation, including the UN. Those seconded to UN civil military missions should always be aware of the broader goals that representatives of the international civil service should strive towards: peace, respect for fundamental rights, economic and social progress, and international cooperation. It is therefore incumbent on international civil servants to adhere to the highest standards of conduct. Policy documents are available for staff to gain a more in-depth understanding of the international civil service and more specifically how to effectively pursue one's mandate while maintaining conduct standards.¹⁶

UN Standards of Conduct are based on three key principles:

1. Highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity;
2. Zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse;
3. Accountability of those in command who fail to enforce the Standards of Conduct.

Some policies apply to all UN personnel, and others have been developed for specific categories of personnel, for example, civilian, military and police personnel.¹⁷

Since 2005, training on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse has been mandatory for all personnel serving in a UN peacekeeping mission.¹⁸

Deployed and seconded staff will be expected to comply with all UN rules, regulations, instructions, and directives including on-line training, and all security requirements even if they remain contracted by their sponsoring organisation. Security responsibilities will be

¹⁶ See the UN Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) website: <https://cdu.unlb.org/>.

¹⁷ CDU: <http://cdu.unlb.org/UNStandardsOfConduct/CodeofConduct.aspx>.

¹⁸ The mandatory list is much longer, including: security, integrity, discrimination and harassment, sexual exploitation and abuse, HIV/AIDS, ethics and gender.

contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UN organisation and the relevant HMG Department.

DPKO has also produced a useful Civil Affairs Handbook for staff deployed in missions.¹⁹

The Civil Affairs Handbook

The UN DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook was developed jointly by the Policy and Best Practices Service of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support and the Training for Peace Programme at ACCORD. It provides staff with a comprehensive guide to working as an international civil servant. Although roles can greatly vary from mission to mission, some fundamental aspects remain at the core of successful peacekeeping missions: building relationships with local actors at the community level; listening to, liaising with and supporting local efforts at stabilisation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding; and supporting and building local capacity at the community level in order to strengthen the reach and authority of the state. The handbook acts as a fundamental tool to which staff can refer to and ensure a more effective contribution to UN civil - military missions. It is multi-dimensional, covering a variety of topics essential to working in challenging environments, including: the context for civil affairs work, preparation for and overseeing civil affairs work and implementing civil affairs roles. It too draws upon the experiences of those already seconded to missions.

The legal framework for UN interventions, and its evolution

The scale and complexity of UN interventions worldwide over the past sixty years has led to an inevitable questioning within both the international and academic communities with regard to the legal basis and justification of UN missions and operations. The aims of those missions are often complex and encompass inter alia: the overriding concern for peace and security; the protection of civilians; disarmament; protection and promotion of human rights; support to the organisation and conduct of elections. The cornerstone of those actions is the UN Charter which has invested the Security Council with the prime responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under its Chapters VI, VII and VIII. New staff should be aware of the legal framework for UN interventions. In particular it would be helpful to read the mandate relevant to the mission and recent reports submitted to the Secretary-General – sometimes monthly and available online.

International human rights law is also an integral part of the legal framework for a UN DPKO-led peace intervention. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides the cornerstone of international human rights standards and therefore all missions are conducted in full respect of human rights and seek to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandates. Similarly, international humanitarian law (IHL) is designed to protect civilians in armed conflict. It follows that staff deployed to peacekeeping

¹⁹ http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/civilhandbook/Civil_Affairs_Handbook.pdf.

missions should have an understanding of at least the basics of international human rights law and IHL and observe and apply them in appropriate situations.²⁰

Immunities and privileges of “Experts on Mission”

“Expert on Mission” is a specific, legal term used by the UN under which an individual deployed by the SU is most likely to be posted. As a seconded expert on mission, you are not a staff member of the UN but you will, fortunately, be accorded the privileges and immunities that are contained within the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.²¹ The relevant section of the Convention is Article VI, Sections 22 and 23. In summary, this means you have immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of your baggage, and immunity from legal process of every kind.²² The Convention states that this immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the person concerned is no longer employed on missions for the UN. In reality however the application of the privileges and immunities can be somewhat haphazard so it is worth thinking before invoking the Convention should you find yourself in a difficult situation. In all cases the UN will provide you with the appropriate IDs and you should always seek advice on the local situation vis-a-vis application of the Convention in practice. The Convention obviously does not give you total freedom to act any way you like whilst overseas.

Familiarisation with UN acronyms and terms

In order to greatly reduce the learning curve and increase the effectiveness of a first time deployee a basic pre-understanding of UN jargon and terms is necessary. All organisations use jargon but the UN can be particularly challenging due to the multiple tasks it undertakes and its blend of civilian and military personnel. A simple understanding of both UN terms and any post/local specific language can reduce the sometimes overwhelming nature of first time deployments. New arrivals should request a list of acronyms and abbreviations, or research them before arrival in order to become familiar with important concepts and UN specific jargon.²³

Personal Preparation

Understanding the mission and *your* role

In conjunction with the more general preparation discussed above, individual deployees should focus specifically on the role they are seconded to undertake. Deployments to UN missions are usually initiated with some form of understanding with regard to an

²⁰ See in particular The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observance of International Humanitarian Law of 6 August 1999 (ST/SGB/1999/13) which sets out the fundamental principles and rules of international law that may be applicable to United Nations peacekeepers.

²¹ Convention on the Immunities and Privileges of the United Nations (1946).

²² At least for the performance of mandated duties.

²³ See, for example: ZIF (2010) Glossary: Peace Operations. Centre for International Peace Operations, and the UN Planning Toolkit at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/>.

individual's role/mandate within the broader mission, through job descriptions and correspondence with UN personnel and then usually cemented by means of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) agreed between the host UN Agency and HMG. It is most important that the nature of such an MoU and the Job Description do not conflict and that your sponsoring organisation is in agreement with both the job description and the general secondment details. The SU evidently needs to consider objectives and expectations of secondments to the UN in every instance – to avoid wasting time and money. Deployees can highlight issues to HMG before, during and after deployment.

In advance of deployment it is therefore suggested that new staff would greatly benefit from high levels of research and consultation ahead of deployment in a number of related areas. It is also often the case, as a result of changing circumstances and developments at a post, that a deployee's role may change or that they are required to undertake responsibilities not previously expected. With this potential ambiguity, in the case of changes to role and position within the mission, it is advisable to ensure that the SU is fully informed of developments.

Understanding the local, regional and geo-political background

Equally important to an understanding of the broader mission and your own individual mandate, is an understanding of the political/conflict environment in which the mission operates. To ensure an effective contribution, staff must have a good understanding of the region in which they will be deployed. More specifically its history and culture, and current political, security and stabilisation situation should be researched extensively. Such information can be obtained through a wide variety of sources, including UN OCHA Sitreps, Reliefweb, SRSR Reports to the SG, the UNDAF (if available) but also other wide-ranging press and media articles to more detailed country information available from SU and other HMG Departments. Discussion with predecessors and those recently returning from the locality can also be of value in developing a greater understanding of recent developments, issues, and priorities. It is not prudent to rely solely on in-country briefings.

Staying current with stabilisation guidance

Advisers are deployed in UN civil military missions because they offer knowledge or expertise that could be beneficial to the specific post and to the mission more generally. New deployees should have a broad and up to date understanding of UK stabilisation theory/policy/practice and be able to offer the mission new perspectives on how best to fulfill its mandate. An important preparation for any deployment therefore is to refresh individual knowledge and understanding of key stabilisation principles and policy, and be up to date with latest thinking and developments ahead of departure. In addition to UN resources mentioned at the end of this paper, of interest is material produced by the OECD. In particular, deployees should ideally familiarise themselves with the OECD work on conflict

and fragility, peacebuilding and statebuilding and the development of the “New Deal” to support the aid effectiveness agenda.²⁴

Colleagues and managers in the UN system will know that a SU deployee is seconded by HMG and that the UK has advanced stabilisation doctrine. However, when providing stabilisation advice it is essential that it is not given as the “UK’s” advice but rather, as impartial advice to the UN as a whole. Incidentally, in certain circumstances it may be that a deployee may have to coalesce the UN and donors (such as USAID, DFID, CIDA, SIDA, DANIDA, etc) into a single stabilisation approach, particularly if deployed to an AFP. As a secondee to the UN, individuals must understand that such coalescing is done on behalf of the UN, not on behalf of the UK. This, too, is where understanding the available stabilisation tools is essential. The selection of available tools in the UN system are likely to be slower and less focused in comparison to those available within a UK or NATO operation. Adapt your stabilisation advice and plans accordingly as these may be the *only* tools available in-country.

UK stakeholders and the UN

Obtaining support from HMG for the work the deployee is undertaking is not the responsibility of the deployee. However, to ensure the effective contribution of staff to a mission, and consistent with the UK’s integrated approach, it is important that all have a clear understanding of the various stakeholders and their perspectives. A fundamental lesson from previous deployments is that deployees should understand the position of HMG stakeholders with a particular emphasis on:

- Developing a good understanding of UK stakeholder politics, perspectives and priorities;
- Proactively resolving differences of opinion and achieving consensus on the role of the deployee and the nature of his/her interfaces with local stakeholders where there is a difference of opinion;
- Facilitating and supporting subsequent engagement with local representatives of UK stakeholders on arrival, and identification of other stakeholders with whom contact should be made.

Prior to deployment, staff should therefore identify and engage with UK stakeholders to ascertain perspectives and ensure understanding and support for the role and its modus operandi. An important role for HMG country office and SU is to ensure that the UN mission/agency is also honoring their responsibilities in the MoU. Practically speaking, this will mean talking to the UK mission in-country including representatives from FCO, DFID, MOD and potentially the SU. Wherever possible, areas of concern or potential friction should be discussed in order to achieve resolution ahead of deployment.

²⁴ More at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/44282247.pdf>.

It is fundamental that an individual deployed into the UN system knows and respects the relationship between themselves and the UN, to HMG, and/or to other UN Member States, donors and other relevant parties. Secondments and deployments as “Experts on Mission” are expected to demonstrate professional allegiance to their UN organisation (in the case of a secondment to UNHQ, for example, this is a legal requirement). Not to do so would be considered unprofessional of the individual, and would very likely damage the relationship between the UN organisation and the nearest UK mission, at the very least. Individuals must be aware of this inter-organisation context before taking up a post with the UN, and take it into consideration when reviewing the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the post to ensure objectives can be met within this arrangement.

That said, it is recognised by the UN that such posts as these are intended for mutual benefit, particularly where it may relate to HMG funding. The UN organisation will also acknowledge that HMG will have some responsibilities and administrative functions in support of the individual, which may require occasional visits to the UK mission in country. This does not alter the professional relationship, and so long as this is not affected, the individual may diplomatically maintain a useful relationship with HMG. Perceptions are important and balancing this relationship is largely down to the individual. Deployees should not be afraid to remind the SU, Crown Agents and the UK mission in country of what is required. Embedding yourself in the UN organisation and using your knowledge and experience to help it deliver stabilisation and other operations more effectively is, after all, what all parties are wanting to achieve.

The reverse side of the coin is that you are not a UN staff member and the nature of secondments means that the person in the role is often extremely limited in terms of ability to act and respond on the ground. The situation can be particularly frustrating where the deployee works on a programme that has been poorly designed. Where programmes/projects are, inter alia, ineffective or limited by poor design, exhibit conflicts of interest, lack key design components such as M&E, or are poorly coordinated, the deployee can try to bring about change through an inception report and regular updates to the stakeholders.

Personal motivation and maximising your effectiveness and contribution

Staff are motivated to work in UN missions for a wide range of professional and personal reasons. For many reasons, an individual deployee can become exasperated working in the UN system. A new deployee should not think this unusual. Many deployees will immediately aspire to “make a difference”. However, when seconded to challenging environments, deployments can occasionally fail to meet these aspirations. It is therefore important that deployees take time to reflect on their own personal and professional motivations for undertaking a post, and ensure from the outset that the deployment in question actually offers what they seek. Many missions are in difficult places where the necessities of life may be in short supply and missions have a history of ineffectiveness.

In the first tier of the UN are some exceptionally experienced and capable individuals – world leaders in their field. Below this, amongst the grades where the SU deployee is likely to find him/herself, outstanding individuals are proportionally fewer, and some missions have experienced significant gaps in knowledge, experience and know-how, particularly with regard to recent advances in peacebuilding, statebuilding and stabilisation. This is understandable, as is the case with many bureaucracies, many UN staff have spent their careers becoming tied-up in the bureaucracy and administration of the multi-national world body. This presents the deployee with the opportunity to have real influence and greater access than one would normally be allowed in a HMG, NATO or similar organisation. HMG and the individual will benefit most if this situation is exploited to the maximum. Similarly, a secondment or “Expert on Mission” status usually enables an individual to be sufficiently “in” the organisation to provide best advice and support, whilst not becoming distracted by the daily administrative tasks of the institution. Use this to your advantage.

Making things happen in the UN system can be frustrating. There are many rules, regulations and administrative hurdles to get over, but these have mostly been put in place for the right reason, not least to address malfeasance and to encourage probity. The deployee cannot change the rules, so the knack is to identify individuals in the system who can “make things happen”, be that in administration, logistics, access to key political figures, etc. These individuals do exist, often have years of relevant experience, and really are the ones who can help you to make things work. They are allies and tapping in to these people will be a determining factor in the success of the deployment. It is most important to focus on building those relationships.

Living conditions and daily life

The MoU governing your deployment will determine the responsibility for visas and getting you “into country”. Once there, ensure visa renewal is being looked after.

Whilst on deployment, living accommodation and conditions can vary enormously. Generally speaking in the UN system, staff are responsible for their own accommodation arrangements. However, in very difficult postings the mission may be actively involved in organising secure accommodation. This can vary from multi-person tents with shared facilities to individual en-suite accommodation in designated buildings.

Working conditions, food, leisure and welfare facilities can also vary considerably depending on the location and nature of the deployment. Staff should ensure that they fully understand the level of accommodation and facilities available ahead of departure, and take clothing and personal equipment appropriate to those conditions. More likely, the responsibility for accommodation will be agreed in the MoU. It will probably fall to the receiving UN mission/agency. It is often the case that staff are made aware of conditions pertaining to their positions. Particularly where conditions are deemed to be difficult, an appropriate “kit list” is often provided. Discussions with predecessors and/or other staff with experience of the location will also assist in ensuring proper preparation in this area.

Be ready to be emotionally affected by some of the challenges associated with settling into your post. Of particular frustration can be internet and mobile phone communications. Additionally, there may be few if any people of your nationality in your location. There will be cultural differences. English may not be their first language. It can be lonely. Be prepared to thrive in this environment. Be ready to be open, friendly, and focused on doing, not complaining. Understand that the phrase “respect for diversity” means working effectively with others who may have what you perceive as a “wrong” idea. Sometimes such people are proven right.

Performance in Post

The importance of performance and performance appraisals cannot be over-estimated. When posted in a UN mission it soon becomes apparent that there is a wide variety of approaches to performance appraisal. Staff may find themselves working in isolation from other staff, may find work colleagues performing at levels lower than one would expect in an international organisation, and frustration can set in. In the UN there is a great deal of focus on process and procedure, some of it seemingly unnecessary. The employee will have to navigate this terrain with little support from London. It is also likely that the sponsoring UN mission will wish to provide feedback reports to the donor on the performance of the employee in post. This is likely to be specified in the MoU. The issue of having someone in the UN writing a deployee’s appraisal has been raised previously as an issue: it should be expected that the SU will provide clear guidance on the appraisal process and what to do if there is an issue between deployee and appraisal writer which could have (unfair) consequences. In some cases there may also be a strong interaction between the employee and the local UK mission, in which case there will be a way of facilitating informal feedback on performance, especially if the employee is a UK civil servant.

It is beneficial for individual staff and broader project stakeholders that deployees utilize their experience in a post in order to provide feedback and lessons learned (which HMG can reference to improve the levels and effectiveness of support and advice it provides to first time deployees, as with this guide). Evidence from previous deployees highlights the benefits of recording issues and lessons immediately, rather than trying to recall them at the end of a deployment. Staff should therefore ensure that local channels are available for regular performance appraisal reports, and maintain a record of issues and lessons to inform their responses to appraisals as well as the end of deployment brief.

Risk management and duty of care

Staff should research and understand the various risks and mitigation strategies relating to their specific roles. There can be a wide range of risks, from immediate conflict to adverse health or climatic conditions. Staff should ensure that they review and discuss the risks associated with their post prior to deployment and continuously review them throughout their tenure in post. This is important to maintain safety within a post and ensure that staff are not unaware of the risks. The terms of the secondment will very likely specify that staff

will be expected to comply with all UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) regulations, orders and directives. Through a unified security system the UNDSS provides the mission and AFPs with security guidelines as well as security advice. The implementation of advice and guidelines however lies with the AFPs. Since the Baghdad Canal Hotel attacks in 2003 the UN has unfortunately become both more cautious and a more frequent target for attacks.

The highest ranking UN civilian, usually the Head of Mission or Deputy is the “Designated Official” who approves all decisions relating to the safety of the UN staff. Depending on the security phase declared, the UN will have a “ceiling” of essential/non-essential staff and a very strict head count per mission area. Therefore, prior to deployment, UNDSS will have to approve a “Security Clearance” for each staff member who falls under its (ie Designated Official’s) security umbrella. In-country travel will also have to be authorised by a separate Security Clearance. UNDSS aims to know who is where at any time in case of a need for evacuations. Communications awareness training (manly use of hand-held radio sets) is part of UNDSS-imposed security regimes and subsequent in-theatre briefings. The latest UNDSS rules can be checked online. You will also have to complete the UNDSS online security certificates for basic and advanced security in the field before deploying, and regular refreshers. This is in addition to any HMG requirement for security preparedness.

Driving 4x4 UN satellite-equipped vehicles is possible and often necessary and a UN driving test is sometimes required (taken in a UN compound) and mission-specific. Ensure you travel with your UK licence if you have one.

Notwithstanding the above, UK duty of care obligations to the secondee may trump any UNDSS regulations. It will depend on the contents of the MoU and which mission system is in place to regulate legal obligations of the UN vis-à-vis those of HMG-seconded staff. In addition to the SU’s HEAT course, deployees may be required to attend UN SSAFE Training on arrival in post. Additionally, HMG medical clearance is sufficient to be deployed and deployees will not usually need to undergo a UN medical clearance.

What to Expect: Key issues and Challenges

Whilst the command and control is clear for peacekeeping operations, it is not so clear cut when integrated with the work of the UN Country Team. It is interesting that no Agency has tried to incorporate how this relates to the relationship with the UN Country Team. Although performance of Integrated Missions is improving, the success rate in long-term peacekeeping and stabilisation, by the UN’s own admission, is too low, with many countries relapsing into conflict after an initial stabilisation period. This section outlines some of the most prominent challenges so that first time deployees are aware of some of the broader issues involved with peacekeeping missions.

Lack of Understanding and Agreement of Stabilisation Concepts

Feedback from deployees previously seconded to the UN points to many potential problems with technical aspects of their deployments and the impact on their own performance in post. The most common include:

- The absence of a shared and coordinated vision of stabilisation;
- Vague objectives, absent baseline analysis;
- Poor M&E – with little in the way of indicators of progress;
- Problems of coordination in the UN system and with other parties;
- Lack of a clear political vision and engagement with local authorities by the UN;
- Lack of clarity over what success looks like;
- Poor line management.

Paying attention to these issues can assist in identifying barriers to success and help define the way forward.

The Humanitarian/Political Dilemma

This dilemma refers to the contradiction between the partiality involved in supporting a political transition process and the continued need for impartiality (neutrality) in providing various forms of humanitarian assistance. The UN is politically dependent on the will of its Member States and in particular the UNSC, so its political role is arguably limited by default. What it offers is the space, a forum, and sometimes discreet diplomacy. What it does not offer (despite frequent claims to the contrary) is neutrality. For example, it does not talk to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Taliban, the Syrian Opposition and other similar bodies, even if they are the de facto authorities in some parts of the world.

For all peacekeeping and development actors involved in a transition process, their activities are normally based on a peace agreement and/or UN Security Council mandate that determines the direction of operational efforts. While the UN, in some cases, may support an internationally recognized transitional government and oppose those who try to undermine the transition process, other humanitarian agencies and NGOs working with the UN must uphold the well-established humanitarian principles of impartiality.²⁵ In order to fulfil their mandate and reduce the loss of lives, humanitarian actors may need uninterrupted open access to all areas and communicate with all actors, even though the UN at large cannot do so due to political considerations. With these conflicting agendas several critics of integrated missions argue that integration by implication undermines the impartiality of humanitarian action. This reinforces the C2 problem, of strictly humanitarian,

²⁵ See Travieso, B. (2011). *Mémoire de MAS en Action Humanitaire: Impartiality and UN Integration*. Geneva Center for Education and Research in Humanitarian Action.

impartial agencies reporting to a SRSG who runs an essentially political mission.²⁶ Afghanistan is a case in point.²⁷

UN Integration - Perspectives from Afghanistan

Over the years the debate on integration in Afghanistan has been highly contentious. There is continued concern from humanitarian actors that aid is being politicized i.e.: aid has not reached areas controlled by the Taliban and it has been used to further a political agenda. The UN mandate to support ISAF forces and the Afghan government have been deemed significant factors in the politicization of humanitarian aid and lead to a general perception that aid agencies are not neutral, independent or impartial (affecting aid worker security and access to populations in need). The resulting lack of access to over 50 per cent of the country, impedes assessment of needs and the delivery of appropriate assistance and protection. The lack of access is also due to the fact that security restrictions have confined most UN humanitarian agencies to fortified aid compounds which further restrict engagement with local populations. This raises questions about whether the UN, in highly politicized situations, can effectively play an operational humanitarian role.

Stakeholder Cohesion/Cooperation

The planning of integrated missions is an inter-organisational process, both at headquarters and in the field, involving the Mission HQ, the UN Country Team and other relevant actors present in the operational area.²⁸ Widespread stakeholder engagement is therefore necessary to encourage a coordinated and more effective peacekeeping operation. This is particularly important in locations such as Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia - where the stabilisation environment is cluttered with a large number of organisations pursuing differing objectives, and where a lack of coherence and linkages can easily emerge. Mission design necessarily must reflect the operational inputs of participating organisations, and not be simply reflections of the perspective of one UN department only. While integration is intended to facilitate rationalisation, the reality to date is that the implementation of

²⁶ See Eide, E, Kapsersen, A, Kent, R. And Hippel, K. (2005). *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*. An Independent Study commissioned by the United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs. Also: Collinson, S and Elhawary, S (2012). *Humanitarian Space: a review of trends and issues*, ODI, London. Available at <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7643.pdf>

²⁷ See: Jackson, A. Haysom, S. (2013). *The Search for common ground: Civil-Military relations in Afghanistan, 2002- 2013*. HPG Working Paper.

²⁸ Worth referencing here how the UK's Integrated Approach (as promoted by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review) refers to people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims. An integrated approach recognises that no one Government Department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation contexts and that by making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of Government Departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing. The intent behind HMG's shift from "comprehensive" to "integrated" approach in 2010 therefore was to establish greater cross-Government collective analysis, leading to more coherent strategy development, followed by collective operational delivery of HMG, rather than Departmental priorities delivered in siloes. Other governments and international organisations (e.g. NATO and EU) sometimes use "whole of government" or "comprehensive" to describe similar collaboration.

integration has frequently resulted in the creation of parallel structures and in rare cases even system dysfunction.²⁹

Stakeholder coordination and the building of relationships and managing those relationships is one of the keys to success for a deployee, as is managing expectations in a highly political environment.

Stakeholder Cooperation - Some Experiences in South Sudan

A deployee seconded into the UN is in an excellent position to provide a wider coordination role. Once established within the UN Organisation, and outwardly with an appropriate relationship to Member States of the Security Council/international donors - including HMG – providing a coordination function brings considerable value to all these stakeholders. In South Sudan during the design phase of a multi-donor stabilisation programme, the embedded StabAd positioned himself in the centre of a triangle, reaching out to the wider UN (the Mission and the CT); the donors (five European national development agencies); and the national government, to coordinate these actors around a common understanding of stabilisation, in order to be able to move the programme design forward. Without a universal definition of stabilisation, it was necessary to coalesce all stakeholders around a definition for the programme that a) met their national requirements; and b) the needs of the situation in South Sudan. A subtle and diplomatic relationship with DFID, which did its own coalescing of the donors, was extremely important in moving this forward; as was the accepted view that UK's stabilisation doctrine was considered more developed than the other stakeholders.

Concluding Remarks

Deploying into a deeply political environment such as a UN integrated mission is undoubtedly challenging. Deployees will need energy, drive, dedication and support to make a real difference. HMG's approach is to maximise the use of deployed staff and to provide all necessary support to enable individuals to succeed. Deployees should not hold back from drawing on that support, both in-country and through London.

Ultimately one has to understand that the effectiveness of the peacekeeping system depends on the political will of its governors (UN Security Council). The best way to succeed in the complex and highly political nature of international peacekeeping is to stay focused on the particular task you have been handed and make your contribution to the best of your ability. No organisation is perfect and the UN can appear unwieldy, cumbersome and sometimes inefficient. However, there are very few organisations in which thousands of people, rations, water, helicopters and tents, and so on, can be organised so swiftly, and experts deployed to extreme situations. The positive elements greatly outweigh the little niggles and drawbacks.

²⁹ Eide, E, Kapsersen, A, Kent, R. And Hippel, K. (ND). *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations*. An independent Study commissioned by the United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs.

Annex A: UN Key Resources

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Annex B: “At a Glance” Checklist for Deployees

- The purpose of the 1945 UN Charter is to maintain international peace and security. All actions of the UN essentially flow from this. Those seconded to UN missions should always be aware of the broader goals that representatives of the international civil service strive towards: peace, respect for fundamental rights, economic and social progress, and international cooperation.
- There are broadly two types of UN mission; peacekeeping operations and special political missions (SPMs). With regard to the former the UN regards its most critical roles in peacekeeping as the protection of civilians, the peacebuilding roles of peacekeeping operations, and more *effective* peacekeeping. SPMs can include special envoys, sanctions panels and monitoring groups, and field-based missions.
- Deployees should be aware of the legal framework for UN interventions, and in particular the specific Security Council mandate for the UN mission in which they will be deployed.
- Deployees should familiarise themselves with the organisational structures relating to the post they are undertaking and the broader UN structures. If unfamiliar with UN jargon/terminology then research it in advance, if possible through those previously deployed. For mission specific terminology new arrivals should request a list of acronyms and abbreviations. Other mission/country-specific terms can be learned on the job.
- Deployees would greatly benefit from understanding the UN and its capabilities, politics and structures. This will enhance the effectiveness in the post and reduce the incidence of frustration and friction upon arrival or throughout the deployment. In particular, know and understand the capacity of the stabilisation “tools” available in the receiving UN organisation and the assets (national contingent peacekeepers, police, logistics, air assets, and so on).
- In order to be most effective, refresh individual knowledge and understanding of the key concepts in peacebuilding and statebuilding including stabilisation principles and policy, conflict, legitimacy, authority, capacity development and key topics such as security sector reform or others as applicable. Get up to date with the latest thinking and developments ahead of departure. Be aware that UN and UK stabilisation development policy and doctrine may differ.
- Deployees should take time to reflect on their own personal and professional motivations for undertaking a post, and ensure from the outset that the deployment in question actually offers what they seek.
- Understand you will be working in a high stress environment, vastly under resourced. Do not focus on what is wrong. Focus on “why we are here”, and how you can help with

the available resources that you can put your hands on now. Focus on how to assist other colleagues in delivering their part of “what can best be done”. Forget the utopian vision.

- Develop and possess a sound overall understanding of the region in which you will be deployed, prior to deployment. More specifically its history and culture, and current political, security and stabilisation situation, and key individuals and organisations, both formal and informal, should be researched extensively.
- Deployees should be aware of the multitude of national and international stakeholders within a region - and have an understanding of their plans, priorities and policies. You will need to build relationships to succeed. Revise and adapt on the ground in order to achieve results.
- Deployees should identify and engage with UK stakeholders both before and during deployment to ascertain perspectives, their understanding of the role and responsibilities between UN/HMG/deployee, and their respective support.
- Deployees should ensure that they fully understand the level of accommodation and facilities available ahead of departure, and take clothing and personal equipment appropriate to those conditions - which in some missions will be basic. Be ready to take your own mosquito net and first aid kit and other necessities.
- Deployees should ensure that they review and discuss the risks associated with their post prior to deployment and continuously review them throughout their tenure in post. Be conversant with the security responsibilities that are covered through the MoU, whilst recognising the difficulties of implementing them in the field.
- Deployees should ensure that local channels are available for regular performance appraisals as well as channels back to the SU where appropriate. Maintain a record of issues and lessons to inform an end of deployment brief. Clarify your reporting lines before deployment. Ensure if possible there is only one reporting line and stick to it.
- If “seconded” to the UN your reporting line will most likely be within the UN system, not to HMG. In which case, ensure local HMG staff know – and respect – your contracted line management arrangement. Beware, if you maintain dual reporting lines you may be perceived as an “interloper”. Your loyalty to your UN organisation is critical to your ability to add value in the post.
- Staff seconded or deployed will be expected to comply with the UN’s Codes of Conduct and related HR guidance. Recognise that the deployment means you are effectively an “Expert on Mission”.
- Do not be afraid to appraise frankly the programme you are working in and your role. Choose opportunities to discuss this carefully and constructively, and understand the sensitivities and perceptions around such comment.

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Annex D: The Roles of Key Personnel in UN Missions

USG for Peacekeeping - The Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping reports directly to the Secretary-General of the UN. The office provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. The Department works to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities in the context of peacekeeping operations.

Special Envoys - The SG can appoint Special Envoys to act on his behalf. Special Envoys are widely respected, experienced and impartial diplomats dispatched to travel to areas in conflict to help reduce tensions and resolve disputes.

SRSG - The role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in the context of UN Integrated Missions is primarily a leadership function and specifically to facilitate a process that can generate and maintain strategic direction and operational coherence across the political, governance, development, economic, and security dimensions of a peacebuilding process. Four specific roles can be identified: Facilitator of a political process; Head of UN presence; Head of Mission; and Interim or transitional administrator

D/SRSG - The Deputy to the SRSG. Usually one of two in each mission. SRSG typically has one DSRSG or a designated officer-in-charge during temporary absences. Additional deputies can be appointed in particularly complex missions. A DSRSG may be selected for a particular expertise, e.g., economic development, civil administration or humanitarian assistance.

COS - The Chief of Staff (COS) supports the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and provides advice on all policy matters. He/she has overall management responsibility for the staff working in the immediate office of the SRSG, and is the focal point for communication with United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) in New York.

Force Commander - The Head of Military Component (HOMC) reports to the SRSG (in his/her role as Head of Mission). The HOMC exercises operational control over all military personnel, including Military Observers, in the mission.

Police Commissioner - The Head of Police Component (HOPC) reports to the SRSG (as Head of Mission), and exercises operational control and provides direction to all members of the police component of the mission. This includes all UN Police Officers (including all members of Formed Police Units) and relevant civilian staff serving in the Police Component.

Director Mission Support - The Director of Mission Support is what the UK would recognize as the Accounting Officer. Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS) reports to the SRSG and is accountable to the SRSG for the efficient and effective provision of administrative and logistical support to all mission components. He/she advises on the rules and regulations relating to the commitment of UN financial resources to ensure the provision of efficient and effective administrative and logistical support to all mission components. He/she has sole UN authority in the field to commit UN financial resources for any purpose, including any contractual arrangements for the use of local resources