Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability

Guidance Note
Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability in Brief

A Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) is a strategic assessment used to underpin UK National Security Council Strategies. It was introduced by the UK’s Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) in 2011 as a tool to strengthen cross-government approaches to tackling overseas conflict and instability and to “identify the situation-specific interventions that will be most likely to succeed in helping to prevent conflict and build stability”.

Why Do a JACS?

The two main results of a JACS are the shared understanding of the actors involved in and the causes and drivers of conflict in a particular situation, and agreement on the key priorities for UK government intervention to promote stability, security and long-term peace. These outcomes can be achieved in various ways, and teams are encouraged to design and follow a process that reflects their context, government requirements and available resources.

A JACS helps the UK government to understand the historical causes of conflict, the relationships between key actors, how it has evolved and what drives the conflict now. As an analytical framework, the JACS adopts the form of other similar strategic conflict assessment tools, examining the conflict actors and the causes of conflict and instability, and exploring the dynamics created by the interaction and relationships between the two.

A JACS seeks to answer the question: “What are the key conflict drivers that the UK government should and can target right now, building on which resiliencies and opportunities for peace, bearing in mind what risks?” Without such an analysis, interventions (from the strategic to the local) run a higher risk of inadvertently exacerbating conflict dynamics, undermining state legitimacy and failing to respond appropriately to the context.

A good JACS can:

✓ sharpen UK policy and strategy by providing a common understanding of the context in which the UK is engaged, ensuring that the government’s approach is tailored, realistic and achievable;
✓ provide a compelling rationale for UK engagement and decision-making, supporting prioritisation and ensuring a focus on what is most important in complex operating environments; and
✓ underpin robust risk management and conflict sensitivity by identifying competing interests and potential harmful consequences of various courses of action.

Joint analysis strengthens the basis for an integrated response to conflicts. As a cross-departmental endeavour, the JACS process combines the UK government’s analytical capacities, to generate analysis that is more insightful than the sum of its parts and create a shared understanding of the context across departments.

Using This Guidance Note

This guidance note sets out the essential components of the analytical framework and provides practical guidance on how to carry out a JACS. It is designed to be used flexibly, according to need. The additional detail and suggested tools to apply the analytical framework contained in Appendix B are for the use of those designing and facilitating workshops.

Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability in Brief

1. Overview: JACS Essentials
   1.1 Why do a JACS? .......................................................... 2
   1.2 Who is Involved in a JACS? ........................................... 3
   1.3 Stabilisation Unit’s Role ............................................... 4
   1.4 When to do a JACS ...................................................... 4
   1.5 Baseline Assessment of Stability and Conflict ................. 6

2. Methodology: Phase One – Initiation .................................. 8
   2.1 Establishing the Appetite, Need and Scope of a JACS ........ 8
   2.2 Appoint a JACS Lead and Agree the Stakeholders .......... 8
   2.3 Literature Review and Pre-analysis Research .................. 9
   2.4 Terms of Reference .................................................. 12
   2.5 Outputs of Phase One ............................................... 13

3. Methodology: Phase Two – Analysis .................................. 13
   3.1 Framework of Analysis .............................................. 14
   3.2 Harness Internal and External Resources ....................... 19
   3.3 Determine Key Findings ............................................. 21
   3.4 Outputs of Phase Two .............................................. 21

4. Methodology: Phase Three – Utilisation ............................ 21
   4.1 Agreement on Recommendations ................................ 21
   4.2 Outputs of Phase Three ............................................ 23
   4.3 What Can the JACS be Used for? ................................. 23

Appendices ........................................................................ 25

Appendix A: JACS Quick Reference Guide ............................. 26
Appendix B: Framework of Analysis ..................................... 27
Appendix C: Conflict-Sensitive Recommendations .................. 35
Appendix D: Conflict Analysis Resources .............................. 36
Appendix E: Accessing JACS Material .................................. 37
Overview: JACS Essentials

The Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) is a strategic assessment used to underpin UK National Security Council Strategies. Underpinning policy development, operational planning and programme design with analysis such as a JACS is essential for more effective engagement in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It is also required to ensure that the UK government acts in a way that is sensitive to the particular conflict and minimises potential harms.

The methodological approach taken may vary; however, all JACS should arrive at an understanding of the key characteristics of the conflict, covering the following areas:

- What are the causes of the particular conflict and instability?
- Who are the main actors involved?
- What are the dynamics between actors and causes, leading to what key drivers?
- What could trigger further conflict?
- What opportunities exist to reduce instability and promote peace?

JACS consistently strengthen cross-government relationships and enable better integration of diplomatic, development and defence approaches to conflict and instability. Across government, departments value JACS for developing a common understanding, based on a broad spectrum of source material and perspectives which reflect government’s interests.

To strengthen its impact on policy, strategy and programmes, a JACS should aim to meet the following principles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JACS Principles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Jointly commissioned at a senior level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The role of senior commissioners is not simply to approve work on a JACS but to champion and resource it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Commissioned with a clear policy or programmatic objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government departments need to agree the purpose of the JACS; for example, to reassess the government’s position following a major shift in context. This will determine the appropriate scope, depth of analysis and frequency of updates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Carried out and overseen cross-departmentally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACS should be joint at all levels – oversight, drafting and delivery. In practice, departments often have different levels of resources that they can commit, but wide consultation and engagement is vital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Meets minimum standards of quality assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following the robust analytical framework in Appendix B, making use of external challenge to avoid group bias.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Based on all available source material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The available time and resources will determine the breadth of stakeholders and sources that can be consulted, but it is critical to integrate a mix of perspectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Receives sign-off by those who commissioned it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JACS commissioners should sign off the analysis and recommendations and ensure that follow-up action is taken to apply the analysis to policy and programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Aligns with wider UK policies and strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to link analytical findings with key relevant thematic areas of government policy, such as Women, Peace and Security, Organised Crime, and Counter-terrorism, should be considered in the initiation phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Conflict-sensitive, both in terms of process and outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The process of JACS research and analysis should not cause harm (for example, through raising expectations, placing key informants at risk). JACS recommendations need to be reviewed for their likely impact on the conflict and the risk of doing harm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UK government’s approach has evolved in the following ways, as it has become more experienced in joint conflict analysis:

- increasing trend for JACS ‘refreshes’ or light-touch updates at regular intervals;
- adapting the approach to intensely violent settings in which the UK government has little or no presence, including innovative use of third party and partner organisations to gather the views of local stakeholders; and
- increasing in-house ownership and capability.

This document outlines the essential components of the analysis, as well as providing practical guidance on how to carry out a JACS. This updated guidance reflects the findings of the JACS Review of 2014 and the subsequent evolution in UK government policy and practice captured through cross-government consultations in 2015 and 2016.

1.1 Why do a JACS?

Understanding the conflict context is crucial to operating effectively in fragile and conflict-affected environments. Doing so jointly across departments, developing a common understanding across government, ensures that decisions made and actions taken are better aligned.

The Report of the Iraq Inquiry sets out the vital role of proper conflict assessment in informing UK government responses to conflict and instability. It argues that to act effectively in such contexts, government must ensure that its political objectives are achievable, and regularly reassess the context to ensure that the assumptions on which policy is being made and implemented remain correct.

A good JACS can:

- sharpen UK policy and strategy by providing a common understanding of the context in which the UK is engaged, ensuring that the government’s approach is tailored, realistic and achievable;
- provide a compelling rationale for UK engagement and decision-making, supporting prioritisation and ensuring a focus on what is most important in complex operating environments; and
- underpin robust risk management and conflict sensitivity by identifying competing interests and potential harmful consequences of various courses of action.

There are a number of reasons to do a JACS, including informing or refreshing a country or regional National Security Council (NSC) strategy in light of a change in context or a shift in UK government ambition. By undertaking a strategic analysis of the conflict and sources of instability, the link between the key conflict drivers and the sectors prioritised for intervention, for example under a country allocation from the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), can be clearly articulated and evidenced.
JACS also play a role in ensuring government priorities on emerging and existing issues, such as gender and countering violent extremism, are adequately considered in the context in question.

Additionally, strategic-level analysis is the first step to ensuring the conflict sensitivity of a country portfolio. Understanding the context in which interventions are taking place is crucial to ensuring that the policy choices and programmes undertaken minimise harm and contribute to increased stability.²

1.2 Who is Involved in a JACS?

A range of UK government officials are involved in a JACS, including Ambassadors, Heads of Office from the Department for International Development (DFID), and overseas representatives of other relevant government departments. This breadth of individual perspective and expertise is critical to enabling the success of the JACS and ensuring that the analysis is utilised. The individuals involved are broadly divided into three main roles within JACS: commissioners, leads, and contributors.

**JACS commissioners:** Commissioners are ordinarily the most senior individuals at post or Director-level in Whitehall. Drawn from relevant departments, the commissioners are ultimately responsible for initiating and signing off the JACS when they are content that it represents a joint and accurate understanding of the conflict context. They are crucial to the success of the JACS: experience has shown that those JACS with engaged commissioners have been the most successful. Commissioners may decide to appoint representatives to engage in day-to-day JACS activity on their behalf.

**JACS leads:** JACS leads, ideally including conflict advisers comfortable working across government, are responsible for the delivery of the JACS product. They are not the sole writer of the JACS, but are a conduit for analytical inputs from across government and are responsible for weaving the analysis into a coherent and concise narrative. JACS leads report to the JACS commissioners.

**Government contributors:** In order to ensure that JACS are not simply joint in name and sign-off, subject matter specialists from across government can be called upon to contribute relevant analysis. These contributors can be either desk officers or analysts from Whitehall, and/or advisers, political officers and defence representatives in theatre. The JACS leads coordinate and collate the input of contributing analysts. JACS commissioners or their representatives can be key to ensuring the availability of analysts from their respective departments.

It is important to gather first-hand views and experiences of actors directly engaged in and affected by the particular conflict, such as politicians, civil society, armed groups and communities. However, it is not always possible, whether for reasons of time or access. In challenging contexts, consider how else to incorporate local views. Expertise from diaspora communities can sometimes be accessed more easily; for example, nationals working in UK academic institutions. Valuable alternative perspectives, challenge and validation can be

---

achieved through drawing on research conducted by other organisations (multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental – international and national), helping to counteract group think and cognitive bias. Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) research analysts can provide recommendations of contacts and resources from academia. Appendix D identifies a range of internal and external sources of analysis that can contribute to a JACS.

A Word on Bias
We are all influenced by the social norms of our particular culture, media, household and community, and by the institutions in which we work and by events in our own lives. These norms – our cognitive bias – can affect our perceptions, interpretations and judgements about situations. Examples include: confirmation bias – the tendency to interpret information to support preconceptions; and framing bias, where a situation is perceived differently, depending on how it is presented. Key informant interviews and triangulating information from numerous sources can help to overcome this (see Section 3.2 for more detailed guidance).

Where teams are highly cohesive, or under pressure to make good decisions, there is a risk of group think – a desire for consensus that overrides alternative viewpoints or critical challenge. This can lead to poor outcomes because alternatives are not fully considered or insufficient information is gathered to make an informed decision. Building in opportunities to hear from external viewpoints, or to test and challenge emerging analysis, is good practice (see Section 3.2 for more detailed guidance).

1.3 Stabilisation Unit’s Role

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) serves as a point of contact for assisting in the planning and execution of JACS. SU staff can provide advice on developing terms of reference (ToR), support aspects of the process such as facilitating workshops or commissioning literature reviews, identify experts to contribute, and provide a quality assurance or challenge function throughout.

1.4 When to do a JACS

JACS in the Planning Cycle

NSC strategies should be underpinned by robust analysis and understanding of the context in which the UK government is operating. Consequently, both these strategies, and the CSSF country bids that accompany them, should ideally be underpinned by a piece of strategic analysis, such as a JACS.

Those CSSF bids, at both the country and programme level, that are underpinned by some level of conflict analysis, present a stronger case for the requested CSSF funding allocation. The end of Quarter 4 in one financial year is the opportune time within the CSSF planning cycle to commission and carry out a JACS, in anticipation of the development and submission of CSSF bids in Quarter 2 of the following financial year.

However, a JACS can be used effectively at all stages of the planning cycle, as illustrated in figure 1 below.
When to Do a JACS in the Conflict Cycle

The JACS methodology can be applied at all stages of conflict. Conflicts do not develop in a linear fashion, but can follow phases involving a growing polarisation of differences, followed by escalation and intensification of violence, followed by periods of de-escalation.

In pre-war scenarios, the UK government has used the JACS framework to explore the potential triggers and risks for conflict escalation and to develop scenarios in order to design appropriate strategies (e.g. Zimbabwe in 2016).

In situations of ‘hot’ conflict, the UK government has designed JACS processes to explore how the conflict might develop and evolve and the implications for NSC strategic objectives and to inform discussions around resourcing (e.g. Iraq in 2017).

In post-conflict scenarios, the UK government has used the JACS framework to assess the durability of the political settlement, to identify potential risks of a return to violence and opportunities to consolidate peace (e.g. Western Balkans in 2017).
**JACS as an Upstream Activity**

The utility of JACS as an upstream strategic analytical tool should not be overlooked. JACS have in the past been commissioned in anticipation of increased UK government engagement (such as with Mali in 2013). There is also a significant benefit in conducting a JACS in a context where the UK has little institutional knowledge or experience (such as North Africa, 2013), or when the situation on the ground has changed (such as Burundi, 2016).

**JACS and Programming**

A JACS is not a programming tool; however, such analysis is necessary to ensure or refresh understanding of a conflict context, prior to increases in programmatic spend. As the UK government’s focus shifts, and countries ascend the priority list, they may be allocated greater amounts of funding. It is necessary to ensure that this funding is being spent on priority areas, directly addressing conflict drivers, and a JACS can identify these.

**JACS Refreshes**

Conflict is dynamic and proximate (immediate) drivers and triggers for violence can change. Even though analysis of the long-term factors (root causes) underpinning the conflict can remain relevant for many years, it is good practice to refresh a JACS regularly. There is no set timeframe for doing this and practice varies. In very ‘hot’ conflicts, such as Syria (2014–17), conflict analysis is updated on a quarterly basis, focused on key drivers and actors. Analysis for other conflicts, such as Pakistan and Yemen, has adopted an annual refresh. In some cases, such as Burundi (2016), a significant change in the context has prompted a refresh.

The JACS refresh can inform an up-to-date awareness of key risks to UK government activities, as well as provide ongoing monitoring for conflict sensitivity. This need not be an onerous or complicated task. The refresh methodology used may simply be a comparison between the existing analysis and the current context in the form of a short workshop to identify and discuss what has changed and what the implications are for the UK government. This can then be captured in a capping document or Appendix to the initial JACS.

**1.5 Baseline Assessment of Stability and Conflict**

Reacting in rapid-onset ‘hot’ conflicts without any joint analysis is highly risky and yet it can be difficult to set aside time to step back and analyse the context. Under such circumstances, a cross-government workshop to agree a Baseline Assessment of Stability and Conflict (BASiC) is recommended. This can and should be used as a starting point for a future JACS.

Undertaking a BASiC analysis will not yield the same depth of analysis as a JACS. The objective of a BASiC is to rapidly draw together the extent of UK government understanding of the key conflict causes, actors and drivers, based on already available resources. This process can shape immediate priorities for engagement, highlight risks and blind spots. However, it needs to be regularly reviewed, refreshed and deepened over time.
Existing resources can be used to rapidly develop a picture of the context, which can then be reviewed and challenged or developed in cross-government discussions, to assess how successfully it explains the current conflict dynamics and the potential implications for the UK government. Analysts from across government³ can be invited to kick-start discussions with short presentations on the key issues. Free resources such as DFID’s Knowledge for Development (K4D) Helpdesk⁴ can turn around a literature review on a specific question within two weeks.

Alternatively, a BASiC workshop can take UK government’s existing understanding as a starting point and be used to identify blind spots and uncertainties as priorities for additional research and analysis. This can be commissioned via FCO research analysts, Ministry of Defence (MOD) intelligence analysts or in the form of papers for the Joint Intelligence Committee (where appropriate).

A BASiC analysis should still be a cross-government effort and commissioned and signed off in the same way as a JACS.

---

**Baseline Assessment of Stability and Conflict (BASiC): Suggested approaches and tips**

1. **Set expectations**: The process won’t provide deep and nuanced understanding – it’s a starting point. Plan to keep the findings under regular, light-touch review (task a small team with this).
2. **Use existing analytical resources** to help to bring all relevant government staff quickly up to speed on the context.
3. **Be honest about gaps in knowledge and understanding** and make use of quick and free resources to plug them, either before or after a cross-government workshop.
4. **Be flexible and smart about using staff time**: Shorter but frequent discussions have been found to be more manageable than trying to draw people away from pressured jobs for half a day or a day.
5. **Structure the discussion around the JACS methodology** (causes, actors, dynamics, triggers, opportunities for peace).
6. **Use an experienced facilitator** who is not involved in the crisis response. This ensures that everyone who can contribute is participating fully in the discussion.
7. **Make time for external inputs** (via research analysts or a literature review) and external challenge. Research analysts can convene a good selection of UK-based academics at short notice to discuss the emerging findings of the BASiC.
8. **Plan to build on the BASiC**: For example, incorporate analysis into aspects of the UK government response, such as including budgets for partners to conduct rapid conflict analysis or perception surveys to build understanding while taking action.
9. **Be prepared to have your assessment challenged by the context** and be prepared to adapt your response as the conflict evolves and greater clarity develops around the nature of the conflict and the conflict parties.

---

³ Cabinet Office assessments staff, FCO research analysts and MOD intelligence analysts are all well placed to provide this support.

⁴ This can be accessed via the DFID geographical desk or conflict adviser, or via Stabilisation Unit staff. K4D will provide five days of dedicated research support, cost-free. Turnaround time is two weeks.
2. Methodology: Phase One – Initiation

The purpose of the initiation phase is to define the scope of the JACS through engaging the appropriate cross-section of individuals and departments from across government. Those who have initiated the JACS should meet with all stakeholders (individually or collectively) to establish consensus around the requirement, process and scope early on. This can then be clearly articulated in the ToR for the JACS and signed off by the JACS commissioners.

2.1 Establishing the Appetite, Need and Scope of a JACS

Robust analysis should underpin engagement in fragile and conflict-affected environments as a matter of course; however, there may be instances when a specific need for a JACS arises. This may include, for example, significant changes to the context. This need should be clearly articulated, and cross-government support for the JACS garnered.

Experience suggests that for a JACS to be effective, both in terms of analysis and utilisation, cross-government engagement should be both broad and senior. Departmental interest should go beyond agreement for the commissioning and sign-off of a JACS, with a willingness to provide resources where applicable. In other words, the JACS’ joint nature should be evident throughout the analysis process, not just in its commissioning and sign-off.

2.2 Appoint a JACS Lead and Agree the Stakeholders

JACS should be led by an individual or small group, directly answerable to the cross-government commissioning team. JACS leads will ideally include conflict practitioners; however, they will also require good knowledge of cross-government architecture, processes and dynamics. Facilitation skills, as well as an ability to engage non-conflict specialists, are crucial. If there is no dedicated conflict practitioner within the team, FCO, DFID and SU advisers can provide short-term technical support, for example to develop ToRs or support workshop design and quality assurance.

JACS leads should usually be drawn from UK government personnel from National Security Council departments due to the importance of cross-government working and ownership. JACS teams may benefit from using external consultants to augment analysis efforts. Should an external consultant be contracted to help lead the process, then s/he should always work closely with and alongside core government staff, and a UK government lead must hold responsibility for the overall process, manage the consultant and must report to the senior JACS commissioners. The Stabilisation Unit can help to identify and contract suitable individuals.

---

5 These include DFID conflict advisers based in London or country offices, regional conflict advisers in Embassies and High Commissions, and SU conflict advisers and consultants known as deployable civilian experts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Using Internal UK Government Personnel</th>
<th>Using External Consultants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advantages:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improves UK government ownership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better able to navigate cross-departmental tensions</td>
<td>Can dedicate 100% of their time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships built throughout the process</td>
<td>Can bring expertise not present within government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t require additional budget</td>
<td>Can bring fresh perspectives and a challenge function to government views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of appropriate personnel may be an issue</td>
<td>Less likely to be familiar with government architecture and processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger of ‘group think’ bias</td>
<td>Budget required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can reduce UK government ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The JACS lead should establish which government departments need to be involved in the commissioning and sign-off of the JACS. Once a commissioning team has been established, the timeframe for the completion of JACS Phase One – Initiation should be agreed.

### 2.3 Literature Review and Pre-analysis Research

**Commission a Literature Review**

A commissioned literature review can provide a solid platform for analysis. It can distil key issues, providing a starting point for both field research and discussions. For example, some of the key findings can be used to formulate discussion points for use in key informant interviews or workshops with UK government and external partners.

A literature review should be designed to check assumptions and overcome biases. It may also highlight inconsistencies or gaps in existing knowledge and understanding. Teams may then wish to commission additional, targeted research to address these.

It is important to develop good research questions, which set clear boundaries as to what should be included and excluded. There tends to be less analytical data covering the very recent period of a conflict. To compensate, consider including findings from unpublished sources; for example, perception surveys carried out by partners, diplomatic cables (Diptels) or UK government papers such as those developed by FCO research analysts (see Section 3.2 for more detailed guidance).
Possible Approaches to Literature Reviews

- Define or measure a specific phenomenon, e.g. what is the impact of forcible evictions on demographics in a specific location?
- Test a hypothesis or theory, e.g. what evidence supports the theory that failure to manage environmental degradation has generated grievances among the rural population and contributed to popular support for anti-government protests?
- Compare two or more theories, e.g. does the evidence favour corruption or environmental degradation as a key driver of conflict?

Pre-analysis Research

Additional research can serve to fill specific knowledge gaps on relevant issues, to identify priorities for analysis, and to ensure that specific UK government commitments to include a number of cross-cutting issues in its policy, analytical and programme work are met. Current UK government policy commitments and areas of cross-cutting interest include, among others: violent extremism, gender, migration and organised crime. DFID’s Building Stability Framework is another useful resource; it summarises key global evidence and drivers of stability, and can help to identify research and analysis needs in a given context.

The following text box provides a breakdown of cross-cutting areas of current UK government interest or policy commitment, as well as the relevant departments that JACS leads should contact to ensure that commissioned research builds upon rather than works in parallel with existing government efforts.

Current UK Government Policy Commitments and Priority Areas of Cross-Cutting Interest

Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Conflict and instability create a permissive environment, which terrorists can exploit to grow and thrive. Globally, 99.5% of all terrorism occurs in countries in conflict, or with high levels of state-sponsored political violence. Violent extremism and terrorism is a tier 1 national security threat, which should be considered from the outset of a JACS, where appropriate.

Many structural drivers of conflict and instability in general, such as inequality and corruption, have been identified as ‘push’ factors, which generate grievances that can be exploited by violent extremists and terrorists to gain support. The role of religious ideology is not generally a primary factor driving extremism, but rather is used to frame existing grievances or beliefs or as a marker of individual or community identity.

Although a broad population may be affected by these structural drivers, only a minority support violent extremism and terrorism, pulled into violent extremist and terrorist groups through their social networks (‘pull’ factors). As a consequence, radicalisation, recruitment and mobilisation is often highly localised and occurs at the community level, although sometimes with international or cross-border links. It is important to understand the ‘pull’ of ideologies and extremist individuals, institutions and networks; and how and where they operate. Extremist groups’ relationship with and ‘offering’ to communities will vary: extremist group members are incentivised by different things. Participation ranges from voluntary to coerced; from passive to active. Indeed, extremist groups are therefore not generally homogenous: group members’ motives are often varied. Although the evidence is currently limited, certain factors such as community cohesion, inclusive societies and a strong sense of national identity can bolster resilience to violent extremism and terrorism.

Given contextual differences, detailed and specific analysis is needed in order to develop appropriate and effective policy and programmatic responses. Responses could range from tackling the underlying permissive

---

conditions for extremism to take hold; targeting those who participate in or support violent extremist groups; and/or promoting resilience.

JACS leads have access to a broad range of teams, which they can engage on issues of violent extremism: the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security (CHASE) Extremism Hub (DFID); the International Counter-Extremism Group (FCO); the National Security Research Group (FCO); Joint International Counter-Terrorism Unit (FCO/Home Office); the Extremism Analysis Unit (Home Office); the Research Information and Communications Unit (Home Office); Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (FCO); and the Joint Intelligence Organisation (Cabinet Office).

Gender
There are a number of empirical studies that have correlated gender equality with a country’s prospects for peace; and gender inequality with a country’s likelihood to engage in conflict. In addition, the UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security (WPS) outlines a policy commitment to ensure WPS is considered by the UK’s conflict assessment tools, including the JACS.

The International Development (Gender Equality) Act 2014 requires all UK spending under the International Development Act to be considered for how it will contribute to reducing gender equality before assistance is provided. All CSSF programmes must also be 100% compliant with the act. Programmes based on a gender-sensitive conflict analysis are more likely to be effective in addressing the specific needs, capabilities and experiences of the whole society in question, including women, men, boys, girls and sexual and gender minorities.

JACS leads should make contact with the Stabilisation Unit as well as the Participation and Protection Team within the FCO Conflict Department, and DFID’s Women and Girls team, which can direct JACS leads to other government points of contact as necessary.

Organised Crime
Organised crime has emerged as a factor that can exacerbate conflict, complicate peace negotiations and corrupt political transitions. Organised crime and criminal enterprise can no longer be seen as distinct from the state. In fact, organised crime may be best understood as a strategy adopted by a range of conflict actors (including the state) to secure control of rents (lawful and illicit), and to govern and protect illicit trades. Where organised crime is identified in the early stages of a JACS, it is worthwhile drawing on other analytical frameworks, such as that of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, to develop a full picture of how illicit markets work, who has power and who has legitimacy in these markets, and to identify entry points for a whole-of-government response to organised crime as a driver of conflict and instability.

JACS leads should make contact with the Stabilisation Unit; DFID’s Security and Justice Group in the Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department; the National Crime Agency; and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, which can provide oversight of efforts to understand organised crime in a given conflict context.

Other areas of policy interest, not articulated in depth here, should be taken into account as relevant UK government priorities and stances develop.

7 Stabilisation Unit (2016) Issues Note: Integrating Gender into Conflict Analysis. Available from SU Gender Adviser
11 These may include migration and peacebuilding, among others.
Key conflict-sensitivity risks and opportunities may also be identified in this phase to be further researched during the core analysis.

2.4 Terms of Reference

The JACS terms of reference (ToR) should encapsulate the agreements reached between departments on the JACS’ purpose, scope, depth, resources and timescales. The ToR will provide guidance for the JACS lead throughout the analysis phase, as well as a point of reference for the commissioning team prior to JACS sign-off, when deciding whether the JACS has sufficiently met its objectives.

Care must be taken to ensure that the ToR are realistic in terms of expected outputs for resources committed. UK government experience to date has shown that unrealistic ToRs will likely cause disagreement at time of sign-off. For example, findings may be seen as too ‘shallow’ due to overstretch of the analytical team, or recommendations open to challenge due to poor articulation of the purpose of the JACS.

**Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability: Outline Terms of Reference**

**Introduction**

This short section (2–3 paragraphs) should summarise the rationale for undertaking a JACS and how it fits into the planning cycle and any other related events or considerations (for example, to respond to a request from NSC or No. 10).

**Aim and Objectives**

This section should clarify how the JACS will be used. For example: “The overall aim of the JACS is to support the UK government’s existing strategy and approach, ensuring it is conflict sensitive, and that wherever possible, it responds to conflict and promotes peace and stability.”

It should also provide some specific sub-objectives. For example, it should:

a. provide a shared understanding of the structural and proximate causes of conflict, the key conflict actors, conflict dynamics, likely triggers for further conflict and the opportunities for increasing peace and stability;

b. identify information gaps to establish an agenda for future research and analysis;

c. describe potential implications for the UK approach, including shaping existing programming and framing engagement with partners; and

d. develop a mechanism for periodic, light-touch refresh of the analysis to ensure it remains current and relevant to policy and programme priorities.

**Approach and Methodology**

This section should reflect how the JACS framework will be adapted to the context and to UK government requirements. It can be helpful to set out some context-specific questions for the JACS process to explore, relating to the key components of the JACS framework (i.e. causes and drivers, actors, dynamics, triggers and sources of resilience).

The methodology should set out sequentially the process that will be followed, including, as appropriate, literature review, field research and workshops. It should clearly set out the timeline for the process, indicating the deadline for completing each step.

**Roles and Responsibilities**

JACS processes have been proven to be beneficial when they are owned at all levels and across the range of relevant departments. While external contributions are important, and internal government support can be very beneficial, the lead policy departments must own the process and the resulting content. This short section should clarify who has commissioned the JACS and who will lead or steer the process from the relevant departments, as
well as identify any external contributions, including whether the Stabilisation Unit and external consultants will be used.

Be clear: Who will commission the literature review? Who will design and facilitate government workshops? Who will undertake field research, key informant interviews? Who will be the lead drafter? Who will quality-assure the draft?

Costs
Include a note on how any anticipated costs (bespoke research, third-party involvement, field travel etc.) will be funded, if applicable.

The Stabilisation Unit has significant experience of assisting in the design of ToRs and can assist in the review of the ToR prior to its finalisation.

2.5 Outputs of Phase One

- Jointly agreed terms of reference to govern JACS activity – to be cautiously realistic in terms of ambition and to articulate a focused brief.
- A literature review – to provide up-to-date insight into the conflict context.
- Any additional, targeted analysis or research in collaboration with the appropriate UK government team or mechanism

3. Methodology: Phase Two – Analysis

The framework of analysis below outlines the key questions that every JACS should answer in order that key conflict characteristics are explored and understood. While not explored exhaustively here, further guidance on the framework of analysis is found in Appendix B.

The approach taken to undertake the analysis will differ according to the conflict environment in question and the resources available to the JACS team. Busy teams may find it easiest to conduct a series of separate workshops on each aspect of the framework – causes, actors, dynamics and opportunities – rather than trying to cover all of them in a consolidated one- or two-day workshop. This approach can work particularly well if the majority of stakeholders are located in one place.

Consider the regional environment and transnational issues in the scope of analysis
A country’s regional environment can reinforce or undermine stability. Fragile states are particularly vulnerable to transnational threats. Violent extremism and terrorist ideologies, transnational organised crime, illicit financial flows and international corruption challenge the stability of both state and regional-level institutions.12

---

3.1 Framework of Analysis

A JACS should systematically explore the causes of the conflict, its main actors, the key drivers and triggers, and existing opportunities to reduce instability and promote peace. This is the information required to provide a useful analysis of a conflict and instability context and to inform prioritised responses.

Gender in Conflict Analysis
Remember! Conflict shapes and is shaped by gender. Men and women experience and contribute to conflict in different ways. Integrating gender within conflict analysis therefore helps us to:

- better tackle the root causes of instability through understanding the gendered causes and drivers of conflict;
- better prioritise the form of the UK government response through a more in-depth understanding of the specific needs, capabilities and experiences of women, men, boys, girls and sexual and gender minorities;
- recognise and mitigate the risks of policies, programmes or other interventions that may exacerbate the gendered dimensions of conflict, or harm the post-conflict settlement; and
- build gender equality and peace by ensuring that conflict and post-conflict assistance doesn’t rebuild a gender discriminatory society that contains the seeds of future violence.

If there is not sufficient gender expertise within the JACS team or stakeholders, external expertise should be considered as early as possible. Gender considerations should be explicitly mentioned in the ToR in terms of questions for analysis, literature review and research, plans for workshops or discussions, and direct attention in output documents.

For more background information on how gender relates to conflict and security, please see the SU Issues Note on Gender, Conflict and Security and the SU Issues Note on Integrating Gender into Conflict Analysis. There are also many non-government resources on gender and conflict analysis.

This section provides an overview of the framework of analysis. Key guiding questions and further issues that need to be considered in the analysis can be found in Appendix B.

What Are the Causes of Conflict and Instability?

It is important to understand the historical root causes of a particular conflict, but also to recognise that conflict is dynamic. Analysis should also focus on how these causes have evolved and identify the key drivers currently enabling the conflict. This combination of factors can then be explored to enable appropriate prioritisation and response: what needs to be done to mitigate violent conflict in the short term and what is required to achieve sustainable peace and stability.

Causes exist across security, political, economic and social domains – useful lenses through which they can be analysed. They can emerge as a result of grievance or opportunity and occur across a number of geographic levels, whether local, national, regional or international.

Root causes (also known as structural or underlying causes) are long-term or systemic causes of conflict, which create an environment in which violent conflict can manifest. Examples

---

13 Stabilisation Unit (2016) Issues Note on Conflict Gender and Security (available from SU’s Gender and Conflict Adviser).
14 Stabilisation Unit (2016) Issues Note on Integrating Gender into Conflict Analysis (available from SU’s Gender and Conflict Adviser).
include geo-political pressures, deep-rooted social exclusion and demographics, such as a youth bulge in the population.

Gender Tip Analyse the structural inequalities that women and girls suffer, including: a lack of access to justice and services; poor economic, civil and political participation; and unpaid care work. These can often be magnified and multiplied in situations of armed conflict. Ensure that gender inequities are visible and identify the power structures that create and maintain them. Be sure to consider the interests, needs and vulnerabilities of men as men, not just as combatants, leaders or civilians.

Proximate causes (also known as immediate causes) are causes that are more recent, change more readily and can accentuate the root causes. They generally require more rapid responses. Examples include small and light weapons proliferation; food insecurity causing population movement; and the discovery of natural resources. The consequences of conflict such as forced displacement, sexual violence and emerging war economies can become proximate drivers of conflict in themselves. For example, significant volumes of displacement can lead to tensions between host communities and incoming populations fleeing from violence.

Remember – be precise!
Things are not causes and drivers of conflict in themselves. For example, ‘land’ and ‘water’ are not factors for conflict. However, ‘unequal access to water’ or ‘unequal distribution of land’ might be factors for conflict.

Avoid jumping to solutions. A lack of something—be it rule of law, employment opportunities or human rights etc.—is not a driver of conflict (although it might be something to address). Ask: what is the underlying problem to which rule of law, or employment or human rights (etc.) would be the answer?


Who Are the Main Actors Involved?

The purpose of identifying conflict actors is to understand how and why actors are engaging in the conflict, with a view to changing or reinforcing the nature of that engagement. Actors to be considered in the context of a JACS include the main individuals, groups or entities that can have an impact on a conflict – negatively or positively. For example, those most capable of driving the violence, or minimising it and resolving it.\(^{15}\) Consider their interests, motivations, power, influence, capability, legitimacy, opportunities and resources, as well as their vulnerabilities.

Actors may relate to and operate at local, national, regional or global levels. They can range from those directly contributing to a conflict (e.g. an insurgent grouping) or those undertaking activities that are enabled as a result of instability, as well as potentially feeding it (e.g. criminal networks). External actors (including the UK and other international or regional actors) may have significant influence over the direction of travel for conflict-affected countries. It is vital to consider the impact that these actors have on long-term peace and stability, including how these actors perceive external efforts to influence the conflict.

\(^{15}\) Analysis of conflict actors does not focus on those on whom the conflict has had an impact, but rather those who are able to have an impact on the conflict.
Gender Tip
Women are often portrayed in conflict situations either as victims of sexual violence, as mothers, or as uncritical advocates for an end to conflict and can often be overlooked in actor analysis. Yet, in contemporary conflicts, girls and women also take active roles as spies and high-ranking military commanders, in perpetrating inter-community violence, being active combatants, as well as being active supporters of violent extremist groups. Women face major challenges in engaging in formal peace processes and exclusion is often the norm. Their local contributions to peace efforts often go unrecognised as they take place outside of official, high-level forums. In a similar way, consider which men may be excluded by current gender assumptions.

What Are the Dynamics Between Actors and Causes, Leading to What Key Drivers?

Analysis of conflict dynamics is a clarifying process which helps to identify the most critical factors and actors driving and maintaining the conflict. The typical outcomes of the first stages of conflict analysis are static lists of causal factors and actors. The volume of information generated can be overwhelming. But not everything identified in the first stages of conflict analysis necessarily ‘matters’.

Conflict is not an absence of order, but a dynamic process of establishing a new order. Conflict-affected environments are complex, noisy and messy, and they can be fast-changing.

It can be helpful to think of conflicts as systems. This part of the analysis process will explore how these systems are created, organised and maintained. Instead of breaking down the conflict into its constituent parts, looking at conflicts as systems ensures a focus on what really needs to be addressed. This can reveal why the conflict is so resilient, and this can help to prioritise, identify entry points for and shape the design of meaningful responses.

Capturing conflict dynamics visually can clearly highlight the key drivers. Figure 2 below is a simplified version of conflict dynamics highlighted in a recent UK government JACS.
It is likely that there will be multiple and potentially interlocking conflict systems at work in a single context. These may manifest differently in distinct geographical locations.

Understanding conflict dynamics can also reveal overall trends; for example, whether the conflict is intensifying, decreasing or in a situation of stalemate.

Scenario planning can be a valuable tool for developing robust and resilient strategy and policy. Once the key conflict drivers have been identified, it is possible to develop scenarios or ‘possible futures’ which explore how the conflict may develop if certain drivers were to strengthen or diminish, or if specific events were to occur. Strategic scenario planning has now been introduced into the NSC strategy development process to help to identify the risks, opportunities and uncertainties that may affect UK government interests and objectives. Resulting strategies are expected to show how their approach will flex and adapt to changes in context.
Scenarios for Post-apartheid South Africa

Four scenarios were developed by a diverse group of 22 prominent South Africans – politicians, activists, academics and businessmen, from across the ideological spectrum. One scenario, named Flight of the Flamingos, illustrated how a new South Africa, with equality between races, might flourish. The scenarios were credited with playing a role in persuading the National Party to accept a negotiated settlement and convincing the ANC of the need for a credible economic policy.

Adapted from Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, Government Office for Science (2009).  

What Are the Triggers to Further Conflict?

An accurate understanding of conflict triggers – incidents or changes in the situation which may lead to a sudden worsening of levels of conflict or fracturing of peace – can enable timely and effective conflict mitigation. Example conflict triggers can range from the apparent (such as political manipulation of ethnicity around election time) to the unpredictable (such as the self-immolation of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi leading to civil unrest and the emergence of the Arab Spring).

What Opportunities Exist to Reduce Instability and Promote Peace?

By identifying what opportunities there are in the context for de-escalation, increasing stability and resilience, and promoting peace, JACS can further identify relevant entry points for UK government engagement.

It is worthwhile asking why the situation is not worse than it is. This helps to identify the factors that are either restraining conflict from manifesting in violence, or containing violent conflict in some way – for example, limiting its geographical spread. Among a number of factors to consider, it is important to understand a society’s ability and capacity to manage and contain conflict; to address incentives and motivations for violence; to restrict or deny access to weapons, access to illicit funding for violence and other resources; and to constrain opportunistic elites.

Looking at and Beyond the State

Stability requires functional national states that deliver core functions, such as security, justice and the rule of law, and financial and macroeconomic management. But it is about more than central state institutions’ capacity to govern. It requires improving the linkages between, and the capacities of, other state and non-state actors down to the local level – municipalities or civil society. What matters most (and therefore where to focus) depends on the context and on understanding the elite’s priorities and people’s expectations.

---


3.2 Harness Internal and External Resources

The UK government has considerable analytical capabilities, as well as subject matter and geographic expertise which should contribute to the JACS process. JACS leads should spend sufficient time consulting across government to ensure that they are aware of personnel and processes with relevant expertise. This expertise can then be harnessed to add value to the JACS evidence base.

Key Informant Interviews

Key informants are knowledgeable individuals who can provide insight into situations where it is difficult to be a direct observer, and they can illuminate the meaning of behaviour that is not easily understood by a researcher from outside the context. They can also serve as a check on the information obtained from other sources.

Internal: Key informant interviews (KII)s across government will provide valuable insight into the conflict context in question. These should incorporate individuals both in Whitehall and at post, remotely if necessary. There is no set formula or quota for the compilation of a KII list; however, consultations should be wide enough to ensure government-wide knowledge on the conflict context is understood and well documented. Additionally, the value of KII in eliciting buy-in to the JACS process and eventual recommendations should not be overlooked.

Key informant interviews with members of the intelligence community should be undertaken where possible. Intelligence documents frequently cannot feed directly into JACS due to classification levels; however, JACS leads should cross-check emerging findings with intelligence agencies to ensure that there is no disconnect in the UK government’s understanding of a given conflict context or dynamic. This will often best be done through a KII.

External: KIIIs with actors external to the government are helpful for providing nuance to the JACS’ evidence base, as well as serving a useful challenge function to reduce the risk of group think and bias. External individuals may include prominent national or international researchers, academics, or individuals from development agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Key individuals from the private sector, for example a mining company, may also be useful interviewees. It is important to get beyond ‘the usual suspects’ with whom government engages on a regular basis, as their views are likely to be known and already reflected in analysis. A fresh perspective can be gained by seeking interlocutors in different geographical locations or different government ministries, for example. Consider designing KIIIs to provide specific analysis or to address gaps in understanding, such as gender perspectives. Where possible, a range of ages and genders in KIIIs is desirable and helps to challenge assumptions.

Case Study: Commissioning Multiple Topic Papers

An initial workshop during the Afghanistan JACS identified numerous conflict drivers about which the JACS lead required further information. A total of 15 topic papers, just a few pages in length each, were commissioned from contributors across Whitehall.
Where possible, engaging individuals who are party to or affected by the conflict is likely to prove beneficial (although should be done with consideration for the relevant sensitivities). KIIs can be conducted remotely with appropriate individuals, and are most useful in exploring individual issues or dynamics. In very challenging contexts, there may still be perception surveys or public polls on issues related to conflict and security, which may provide some insight.

External KIIs can also be of particular utility when seeking to sense-check key findings of the JACS, to ensure that emerging government understanding is not at odds with the understanding of external experts.

An external KII list can be compiled throughout the JACS process, with a small amount of research likely to yield suggestions as to who would be appropriate interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggested List of Key Informants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Products and Sources**

**Internal:** JACS should make use of a wide variety of information sources in order to produce as accurate an analysis as possible of any given conflict context. All efforts should be made to keep the document classification as low as possible (official, preferably) to ensure that the completed JACS is a widely circulated product.

Across government, there are a multitude of sources, products and mechanisms that can both feed into JACS analysis and in turn be fed by it. JACS do not seek to replace these, but to draw on, synthesise and inform other sources though a cross-government strategic-level conflict analysis.

The following products are examples of those that can be consulted during the collation of background documents pertinent to a JACS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Internal Government Products</strong></th>
<th><strong>Source Department</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries at Risk of Instability tool</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research analyst papers</td>
<td>FCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive growth diagnostic</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country poverty reduction diagnostic</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Stability Framework</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence products</td>
<td>MOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee papers</td>
<td>Cabinet Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diptels</td>
<td>FCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country governance analysis</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political economy analysis</td>
<td>DFID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting from post</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Government Contributors**

These may include: FCO research analysts; MOD intelligence analysts; DFID conflict advisers; DFID humanitarian advisers Regional Conflict Advisers; Cabinet Office analysts; Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre analysts; SU advisers; Joint Secretariat; and National Crime Agency officers.
External: It will likely be necessary to augment the literature review outlined in Section 2.3, as the need to deepen understanding of particular issues emerges. External products and reports, particularly those based on recent field research and a range of local perspectives, will help to build a more nuanced and detailed analytical picture.

These can be found from a variety of sources and organisations, including international and national NGOs, think tanks, academia and research organisations.

3.3 Determine Key Findings

The key findings should flow from the analysis of conflict dynamics, summarising the trends and drawing out the implications. These should focus on the context, rather than the implications for UK government interests and policy, which are explored in the next stage of the JACS process.

Key findings must be agreed cross-departmentally, as they form the foundation for determining the implications for the government and subsequent JACS recommendations. This is also a good point in the process to ‘test’ analysis with external analysts, commentators and researchers to ensure that findings are robust.

3.4 Outputs of Phase Two

- A narrative report with a concise and justified list of key findings, presented in formats accessible to the departments involved.

4. Methodology: Phase Three – Utilisation

4.1 Agreement on Recommendations

Discussion should be held on the key findings of the analysis, ideally with the JACS commissioners present, focusing on the key findings of greatest relevance to the UK government. This is best done through a facilitated workshop involving all relevant departments and officials both from Whitehall and in post.

Recommendations should be based on the key findings of the analysis, suggesting courses of action to increase peace and stability and mitigate conflict in line with UK government aims. Some teams have found it useful to hold separate discussions on findings before developing recommendations. Alternatively, they can be explored and agreed within the same workshop.

These recommendations will not be programmatic in nature but will provide insight into the sectors or thematic areas that would benefit from intervention. This can be used to build the case for allocations sought from the CSSF and to feed into departmental planning and the development of NSC country strategies.
Recommendations should be scrutinised through a number of lenses during their finalisation:

1) Conflict sensitivity

JACS recommendations will naturally be formed with positive effects to the conflict context in mind; however, it is equally necessary to interrogate recommendations to ensure that they are not inadvertently causing harm.

To ensure that recommendations and courses of actions suggested as a result of the JACS analysis are conflict-sensitive, they should be subjected to a number of conflict sensitivity questions. A list of conflict sensitivity questions,\(^\text{18}\) which should be adapted and applied to recommendations, can be found in Appendix C.

2) Actions of other actors

There is a need to ensure that actions being taken by other actors within the conflict context in question are visible, so as to ensure that the JACS recommendations are not duplicating, and are coherent with, international community effort already under way. Efforts should be made to map initiatives and interventions being undertaken by: other governments, multilaterals and large non-governmental organisations.

3) UK government comparative advantage

The comparative advantage of the UK government should be harnessed wherever possible. This entails focusing on areas in which government has existing relevant experience, expertise, influence, relationships, capacity, resources or policy commitments etc, or in some cases political interest, relative to other international actors.

4) Policy realities

Recommendations must be cognisant of the policy landscape, with current government policy stances reflected in their wording. For example, a recommendation to work with a certain actor group should take into account the policy stance on working with that actor group.

5) Findings with potentially good cost–benefit ratios

Recommendations that can catalyse significant change for the resources invested are desirable. Given the strategic focus of the JACS, some recommendations may be wide-ranging, requiring significant resource investment to realise a return.

6) Availability of resources

Government resource availability is finite, therefore recommendations should be realistic. For example, if it is known that the UK government’s programme budget is minimal in a given context (and likely to remain so); recommendations may need to be

more focused on diplomacy and advocacy interventions (as with the Mali and Burundi JACS).

**Demonstrate the Anticipated Change**

Recommendations should be accompanied with short change narratives demonstrating how the recommendation is expected to drive the desired change. This not only ensures that recommendations are more accessible to uninformed readers, but also that they can be easily tracked, changed and adapted during refreshes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example Recommendation with Accompanying Change Narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Generate understanding and joint resolve across international community actors to combat, through political engagement, corruption within the Ministry of Finance in order to stop the slow and limited movement of funds to the sub-national level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption within the Ministry of Finance is not only having an impact on the legitimacy of government but stopping the disbursement of funds to the sub-national level and therefore affecting service delivery; this is causing further grievance and ongoing instability in local communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If we can work with international community partners to increase political pressure, then we will contribute to building enough pressure to alter the behaviour of corrupt officials and increase the flow of funds, mitigating an ongoing driver of instability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.2 Outputs of Phase Three

- A **concise list of key recommendations**, each of which is supported by an accompanying change narrative, and an indication of how it links to the JACS’ key findings. Where possible, recommendations should be prioritised. Recommendations must be signed off by the original JACS commissioners.

### 4.3 What Can the JACS be Used for?

Following agreement and sign-off of JACS recommendations, there are a number of uses for the jointly agreed analysis moving forward:

**Updating NSC strategies:** Supporting other government tools such as the Countries at Risk of Instability tool to provide an evidence base for NSC strategies and direction.

**Informing CSSF bids:** Providing analysis-backed rationale for country allocations sought, in particular thematic or sectoral areas of focus.

**Policy planning:** Sense-checking current policy articulated via NSC strategies and changing or refining if necessary on the basis of up-to-date analysis.

**Influence tool:** Using the analysis as an advocacy tool with which to communicate with international community partners, aligning them with UK government interests.

**Designing indicators for progress:** Designing indicators that can be used to track changes in the conflict context. These can be used to monitor conflict sensitivity of interventions.
Supporting risk management: Ensuring risk registers reflect the understanding afforded by a JACS, in particular the likelihood and impact of individual risks, will provide for an approach to risk mitigation ground in context realities.

Scenario planning: Using the analysis and understanding of the context to examine the ramifications of a variety of scenarios, including both changes within the context itself and changes to how the UK government interacts with the context.

Conflict sensitivity review: Informing a conflict sensitivity review at the portfolio level. See the Stabilisation Unit’s Conflict Sensitivity Tools and Guidance\(^\text{19}\) for further information.

---

\(^{19}\) Stabilisation Unit (2016) Conflict Sensitivity: Tools and Guidance. 
Appendices
## Appendix A: JACS Quick Reference Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
<th>RESPONSIBILITY</th>
<th>CONSIDERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Phase One:** | Establish requirement and buy-in for JACS | JACS commissioners and/or their representatives | ➢ Support from senior cross-government officials – in post(s) and Whitehall – must exist or be generated: a key enabler.  
➢ It should be an appropriate time within UK government planning cycles. |
|                | Agree the stakeholders               | JACS commissioners and/or their representatives | ➢ Establish which departments have ongoing or potential future interest in the country/region and which departmental representatives – both in post(s) and Whitehall – need to be involved.                                          |
|                | Appoint JACS lead(s)                 | JACS commissioners and/or their representatives | ➢ JACS lead(s) should ideally include a conflict practitioner with good cross-government facilitation skills.  
➢ Answerable directly to the JACS commissioners.                                                                 |
|                | Commission Quality Assurance oversight | JACS lead                                    | ➢ Commission technical or country-specific expert(s) to provide quality assurance and support throughout the entire JACS process. If the JACS lead is not a conflict practitioner, include technical quality assurance. |
|                | Establish the scope                  | JACS lead                                    | ➢ Jointly agree the purpose, scope and depth; agree resources to be committed; agree timescales; decide upon any pre-analysis research.  
➢ Capture the scope in a jointly agreed ToR, signed off by senior officials/regional boards. |
|                | Commission literature review         | JACS lead                                    | ➢ Commission broad literature review with due date in advance of the beginning of analysis.                                                                                                                                                     |
|                | Consider need for pre-JACS research  | JACS lead, government contributors            | ➢ Decide whether bespoke research should be commissioned in advance of the JACS, for example on key drivers of violence and government priority areas such as violent extremism, gender, organised crime.                                        |
| **Phase Two:** | Designate framework of analysis      | JACS lead, government contributors            | ➢ Map framework of analysis and conduct analysis to ensure specified issues are addressed: conflict causes, actors, dynamics, triggers and opportunities for peace.  
➢ Consider the use of analytical tools or facilitated analysis sessions.                                                                                                             |
|                | Harness cross-government and external resources and products | JACS lead                                   | ➢ Map UK government expertise and conduct key informant interviews, including sense-check with intelligence community.  
➢ Conduct key informant interviews with external experts to enrich analysis and provide an external challenge function.  
➢ Identify relevant government and external products which can deepen understanding of specific issues.                                                                                      |
|                | Determine key findings               | JACS lead, UK government contributors         | ➢ Identify key findings as well as potential courses of action to mitigate conflict.  
➢ Discuss key findings and recommendations, ensuring these reflect cross-government agreement.  
➢ Ensure key findings are insulated from policy realities and pressures.                                                                                                                |
|                | Quality-assure                       | JACS lead                                    | ➢ Commission a review of analysis and subsequent findings to test assumptions underpinning analysis.  
➢ Ensure that near-final draft is commented on by relevant JACS stakeholders, and further quality-assured.                                                                                                                      |
| **Phase Three:** | Agreement on recommendations          | JACS commissioners; JACS lead; government contributors | ➢ Apply a number of filters to recommendations: conflict sensitivity; actions of others; UK government comparative advantage; policy realities; cost–benefit ratios; availability of resources.  
➢ Ensure that each recommendation is accompanied with a change narrative.                                                                                                           |
Appendix B: Framework of Analysis

The following Appendix provides further nuance on how JACS leads should engage with the key analytical questions that form the basis of any JACS.

What Are the Causes of Conflict and Instability?

It is important to understand the historical root causes of a particular conflict, but also to recognise that conflict is dynamic. Analysis should also focus on how these causes have evolved and identify the key drivers currently enabling the conflict. This combination of factors can then be explored to enable appropriate prioritisation and response: what needs to be done to mitigate violent conflict in the short term and what is required to achieve sustainable peace and stability.

Causes exist across security, political, economic and social domains – useful lenses through which they can be analysed. They can emerge as a result of grievance or opportunity and occur across a number of geographic levels, whether local, national, regional or international.

Root causes (also known as structural or underlying causes) are long-term or systemic causes of conflict, which create an environment in which violent conflict can manifest. Examples include geo-political pressures, deep-rooted social exclusion and demographics, such as a youth bulge in the population.

Proximate causes (also known as immediate causes) are causes that are more recent, change more readily and can accentuate the root causes. They generally require more rapid responses. Examples include: small and light weapons proliferation; food insecurity causing population movement; and the discovery of natural resources. The consequences of conflict such as forced displacement, sexual violence and emerging war economies can become proximate drivers of conflict in themselves. For example, significant volumes of displacement can lead to tensions between host communities and incoming populations fleeing from violence.

Examples of Conflict Causes Identified in Previous JACS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Root Causes</th>
<th>Proximate Causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria – High levels of poverty and inequality, and growing youth unemployment</td>
<td>Nigeria – Activity of Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa – Large and porous borders enabling the spread of instability</td>
<td>North Africa – Illicit cross-border trade of illegal goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan – Real or perceived encirclement by India</td>
<td>Pakistan – Islamisation of the constitution, legislation, school curriculum, media</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of conflict causes is not simply about taking a snapshot of the conflict as it currently presents, but instead it requires a balance between immediate conflict priorities and the longer-term measures needed for a sustained effort to build sustainable peace. The inclusion of analysis on both root and proximate causes of conflict and instability allows for findings and recommendations that can both address the immediate conflict causes and take a measured approach to combating the root causes. It is the root causes that inhibit
long-term stability and provide a platform for ongoing incidences of violence. In this way, the core analysis of causes undertaken by JACS will have a longer shelf-life than many other analytical products, with root causes likely to remain unchanged in the short to medium term.

The following table provides a non-exhaustive list of example questions related to conflict causes, around which JACS leads may structure their interrogation of the issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of conflict and instability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- What are the country’s physical and demographic features?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How is power distributed, and used, between different groups at local, national and regional levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Which groups are most excluded?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Have there been individuals who have sought to exploit opportunities provided by instability causing further violence?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How equitably are resources shared?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How does it relate to surrounding countries?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What are the current activities destabilising the context?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Are there clearly identifiable conflict effects which are becoming causes in their own right?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How robust are local, national and regional mechanisms for managing disputes?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Who Are the Main Actors Involved?**

The purpose of identifying conflict actors is to understand how and why actors are engaging in the conflict, with a view to changing or reinforcing the nature of that engagement. Actors to be considered in the context of a JACS include the main individuals, groups or entities that can impact on a conflict – positively or negatively. For example, those most capable of driving the violence, or minimising it and resolving it. Consider their interests, motivations, power, influence, capability, legitimacy, opportunities and resources, as well as their vulnerabilities.

**Actors may relate to and operate at local, national, regional or global levels.** They can range from those directly contributing to a conflict (e.g. an insurgent grouping) or those undertaking activities that are enabled as a result of instability, as well as potentially feeding it (e.g. criminal networks). External actors (including the UK and other international or regional actors) may have significant influence over the direction of travel for conflict-affected countries. It is vital to consider the impact that these actors have on long-term peace and stability, including how these actors perceive external efforts to influence the conflict.

**Power is key when considering actors, specifically its distribution and control.** The inclusion of elites with power is ultimately important to avoid incentivising them to disrupt political, economic or social life. Elite inclusion, to a sufficient level, is at the heart of political settlement; therefore, recognising whether actors sit within that settlement - or outside it – is key to understanding their motivations and potential ability to have an impact.

20 Analysis of conflict actors does not focus on those on whom the conflict has had an impact, but those who are able to have an impact on the conflict.
on peace, either positively or negatively. However, a failure to widen political inclusion beyond elites can undermine stability later on. It is equally important to understand how actors who possess power are disincentivised to change the status quo.

**Sample Analysis of the Power and Influence, Aims and Needs, and Impact on Instability of Actors Analysed in a 2014 JACS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Power and Influence</th>
<th>Aims and Needs</th>
<th>Impact on Instability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
<td>The key political party leaders hold considerable power and influence, not only over their respective communities but also over the international community. The ethno-nationalistic card and playing on people’s fears, the use of political patronage and rewards such as employment ensures that politicians and their parties are able to maintain significant influence and control over their respective communities. They are able to manipulate the international community by threatening collapse as a means of reducing attempts to change the constitution and the balance of power.</td>
<td>The political party leaders are concerned about individual power – who has it, who controls it and what spoils it can bring them – but above all, keeping hold of that power. The maintenance of the status quo is of direct benefit to all political parties. Where reforms could provide the opportunity for consolidating their power or weakening that of another, then they are happy to embrace them. A zero sum game.</td>
<td>The interplay between the zero sum game approach, and the competing but entrenched political and ethnic needs of the different political leaders, causes severe structural instability, undermining the cohesiveness and the territorial integrity of the state. However, there are few indications that individual political parties or leaders seek openly to provoke further violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Actor analysis is crucial to understanding the conflict dynamics, whether it is intensifying or decreasing and, more broadly, where the actors, root conflict causes and proximate conflict causes converge.** Analysis and understanding of the characteristics of individual actor groups are necessary if you seek to change the behaviour of that actor but mapping and understanding the characteristics and motivations of actors is not an end in itself.

**A non-exhaustive list of potential actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Traditional, community and religious leaders</td>
<td>- Religious groups</td>
<td>- Neighbouring governments</td>
<td>- Donors, multilateral organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Community-based organisations</td>
<td>- Trade unions</td>
<td>- Cross-boundary ethnic groups</td>
<td>- Transnational corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ordinary citizens: men, women and young people</td>
<td>- Student groups</td>
<td>- Organisations of economic and political cooperation (South African Development Community, European Union, African Union etc)</td>
<td>- Inter-governmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Members of armed groups</td>
<td>- Criminal organisations and networks</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Humanitarian organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Refugee and displaced communities</td>
<td>- Security forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Human rights organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local NGOs</td>
<td>- Armed groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Women’s groups</td>
<td>- National political leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prominent civil servants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Businesses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conflict mediators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Urban elites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Government bodies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legal, justice institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The following table provides a non-exhaustive list of example questions related to conflict actors, around which JACS leads may structure their interrogation of the issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynamics</th>
<th>Define the key features of the conflict system and how it is organised and maintained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Actors   | - What do actors want and expect?  
- What is their capacity and what power do they have?  
- What methods do they use to hold power?  
- Are they perceived as legitimate? By whom? What are the sources of their legitimacy?  
- What financial resources or sources of external support do they have?  
- Are they vulnerable – in what ways?  
- How do various actors relate to each other?  
- What are their incentives and disincentives (towards peace or conflict?)  
- What is the strategic balance between actors – who’s winning? |

**What Are the Dynamics Between Actors and Causes, Leading to What Key Drivers?**

Analysis of conflict dynamics is a clarifying process which helps to identify the most critical factors and actors driving and maintaining the conflict. The typical outcomes of the first stages of conflict analysis are static lists of causal factors and actors. The volume of information generated can be overwhelming. But not everything identified in the first stages of conflict analysis necessarily ‘matters’.

Conflict is not an absence of order, but a dynamic process of establishing a new order. Conflict-affected environments are complex, noisy and messy, and they can be fast-changing.

It can be helpful to think of conflicts as systems. This part of the analysis process will explore how these systems are created, organised and maintained. Instead of breaking down the conflict into its constituent parts, looking at conflicts as systems ensures a focus on what really needs to be addressed. This can reveal why the conflict is so resilient and this can help to prioritise, identify entry points for and shape the design of meaningful responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dynamics</th>
<th>Define the key features of the conflict system and how it is organised and maintained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Actors   | - Who is promoting, reinforcing or benefiting from the conflict?  
- What is the distribution of power between the key actors in the conflict?  
- How are conflict systems organised and maintained? (Ideologies, narratives, finance and resources?)  
- What is the function of instability and violence in the system?  
- What are the patterns? For example, are there geographically distinct conflict systems at work?  
- What is the durability of the conflict and what contributes to this? |

Capturing conflict dynamics visually can clearly highlight the key drivers. The example below is a simplified version of conflict dynamics highlighted in a recent UK government JACS.
**Visual representation of conflict dynamics**

The coloured bubbles represent the key drivers of the conflict system.

The arrows demonstrate the dynamic relationship.

The white bubbles are examples of how these dynamics might be described.

**Narrative description of conflict dynamics**

Transnational terrorism with roots in neighbouring countries has gained a foothold in the border region, which continues to be the site of regional power struggles due to its geo-strategic position. The tide of criminality and smuggling continues to rise, primarily in people, arms and drugs. This is a funding stream for armed groups. Armed separatist groups are now highly fragmented. This allows for military containment of the problem but makes it difficult to design a political process that can deliver lasting settlement. Armed violence is increasingly complex and dynamic and sectarian in nature. The ‘security state’ has consistently reacted to nationalist/separatist demands with an iron fist. Civilian law enforcement is marginalised and reconciliation packages have failed to address core demands for greater political autonomy and fairer distribution of natural resources. New political commitments have been further undermined by security force abuses and there is a huge trust deficit between citizens and the state.

Understanding conflict dynamics can also reveal overall trends; for example, whether the conflict is intensifying, decreasing or in a situation of stalemate. Understanding trends enables the timing of responses to be improved, to prevent or limit instances of violence.

**Examples of conflict trends**

- **Polarisation** – have events forced parties to adopt stronger, more polarised positions? For example, as parties seek internal consistency the tendency to polarise can drive conflict escalation.
- **Spiralling, escalation or intensification** – reciprocal actions or reprisals may increase levels of hostility. Parties to the conflict may try to seek an advantage on the battlefield in the run-up to political negotiations.
- **Fragmentation** – under pressure, parties may fragment over strategy. Opportunities for advantage may lead to ‘break-away’ factions emerging.
- **Consolidation** – informal alliances may consolidate around issues or in response to events.

Scenario planning can be a valuable tool for developing robust and resilient strategy and policy. Once the key conflict drivers have been identified, it is possible to develop scenarios or ‘possible futures’ which explore how the conflict may develop if certain drivers were to strengthen or diminish, or if specific events were to occur. These different scenarios can then be used to assess the likely effectiveness of current strategies and test potential alternatives. Strategic scenario planning has now been introduced into the NSC strategy development process to help to identify the risks, opportunities and uncertainties that may affect UK government interests and objectives. Resulting strategies are expected to show how their approach will flex and adapt to changes in context.
Four scenarios were developed by a diverse group of 22 prominent South Africans – politicians, activists, academics and businessmen, from across the ideological spectrum. One scenario, named Flight of the Flamingos, illustrated how a new South Africa, with equality between races, might flourish. The scenarios were credited with playing a role in persuading the National Party to accept a negotiated settlement and convincing the ANC of the need for a credible economic policy.

Adapted from Foresight Horizon Scanning Centre, Government Office for Science (2009).²²

Further guidance on scenario planning and other futures analysis tools is available in the Futures Toolkit.²³

**What Could Trigger Further Conflict?**

An understanding of conflict triggers within a country allows for increased predictability of specific incidents, which can exacerbate conflict or undermine a fragile peace, enabling timely and effective mitigation. Identifying conflict triggers – incidents or changes in the situation which lead to a sudden worsening of levels of conflict or fracturing of peace – is an important aspect of the analysis.

**An example conflict trigger**

The result of the Kenyan elections in 2007 triggered violence which led to the death of over 1,000 people. Violence was a response to long-term inequality in the distribution of material and political resources, combined with the continuous use of hate speech, and deliberate mobilisation for violence by politicians.

To ensure analysis of triggers does not simply result in an arbitrary list, the triggers must be understood within the wider context, and through their interaction with root and proximate conflict causes, as well as actors impacting on the conflict context. A number of methods can be used to identify potential triggers. In particular, it may be beneficial to examine historical incidences of violence and map the triggers for that violence, and the severity of conflict that followed.

The following table provides a non-exhaustive list of example questions related to triggers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Triggers</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are there any upcoming activities which could potentially trigger an escalation in the conflict? For example, elections, return of displaced persons, removal of subsidies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have there been past triggers attributable to violence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a cyclical pattern to violence triggered by a specific incident of event?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the environment in question likely to experience significant natural disasters? Have these proved destabilising in the past?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What Opportunities Exist to Reduce Instability and Promote Peace?

By identifying what opportunities there are in the context for de-escalation, increasing stability and resilience, and promoting peace, JACS can further identify relevant entry points for UK government engagement.

It is worthwhile asking why the situation is not worse than it is. This helps to identify the factors that are either restraining conflict from manifesting in violence, or containing violent conflict in some way (such as limiting its geographical spread). Many contexts are affected by structural drivers of conflict and have actors and institutions with an interest in promoting division and disagreement. However, not all societies are affected by violence. Among a number of factors to consider, it is important to understand a society’s ability and capacity to manage and contain conflict; to address incentives and motivations for violence; to restrict or deny access to weapons, access to illicit funding for violence and other resources; and to constrain opportunistic elites.

Stability requires central state institutions that deliver security, justice and the rule of law, and financial and macroeconomic management. But it also requires strong functional linkages between, and the capacities of, state and non-state actors down to the local level – municipalities or civil society.24

What matters most (and therefore where to focus) depends on the context and on understanding the elite’s priorities and people’s expectations. Different groups within the population may refer to different institutions or non-state actors for services; an obvious example being official state services fulfilling the needs of the urban population, while customary authorities might remain the main provider for rural communities. Therefore, the vehicle through which opportunities for peace can be promoted may differ across a country, or exist in one part of a country but not another.

Careful consideration should be given to whether increased government support to individual institutions or non-state actors will strengthen or detract from their capacity as a peace resource.

Example opportunities to reduce instability and promote peace

| Nigeria | A political culture of deal-making which averts political crises by economic and political accommodation. |
| North Africa | Resilience through regional movement: fluid migration of cross-border communities to seek refuge with kin. |
| Colombia | The potential for increased decentralisation to promote the delivery of services. |

The following table provides a non-exhaustive list of example questions around which JACS leads may structure their questioning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities to reduce instability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Which actors have the capacity and desire to promote peace and stability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To what extent are the key institutions of the state effective and capable? Do they serve the general population rather than the elites?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What expectations do people have of the state and state services, including security and justice?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What role do community-based or non-state institutions play in security and justice provision and basic service delivery?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What formal and informal mechanisms for conflict management exist at local, national and regional levels? What is their capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Does the population support itself economically in any innovative ways?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What is the role of the religious establishment in guiding the activity of the population?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Conflict-Sensitive Recommendations

The following table provides questions that you can ask of JACS recommendations to ensure that they are conflict-sensitive. Note that questions should be adapted and expanded upon to reflect the key issues emerging from the analysis.

For further information on the subject, please see the Conflict Sensitivity Tools and Guidance.

What?
- Are there recommendations that focus on how the UK government will address conflict drivers identified in the JACS? Do these contain a viable theory of change?
- Are there any obvious trade-offs or tensions between different sets of recommendations? For example, between recommendations to support security objectives (including UK security) and those longer-term objectives to promote an inclusive political settlement and sustainable peace. Are these trade-offs articulated and are there recommendations on how they should be managed?
- Are there any recommendations that, if enacted, might strengthen the actors or drivers of conflict and increase hostilities or tensions (e.g. by reinforcing inequalities, strengthening certain elites etc)?
- Are any recommendations being made which, while coherent in isolation, might heighten the likelihood of conflict across borders or regions (e.g. building the strength of two opposing security forces, for domestic reasons, which also increases their capacity for conflict)?

Who?
- Will any of the recommendations lead to conflict actors inadvertently being empowered or disempowered with potentially destabilising consequences?
- Will any of the recommendations have an impact on how the UK government is perceived in the context? How might that affect what it is trying to achieve?
- Could recommended UK government action or association with groups or individuals make the latter targets for aggression?

Where?
- What is the likely impact of the recommended geographical focus of UK government interest on the conflict drivers? For example, is it concentrated in certain geographic areas (urban versus rural, different regions, centre versus periphery)? Could that reinforce grievances or divisions, for example around marginalisation?

How and When?
- How might the recommended choice of instruments and partners influence conflict drivers and opportunities for peace and institutional resilience? For example, decisions to provide support inside or outside of government systems, implementation approaches etc.
- Is there a risk of diversion of resources to pursue conflict-related aims or the potential for reinforcing corruption and patronage?
- Is the recommendation time-dependent? Will ceasing activity before the objective is achieved cause more harm?
Appendix D: Conflict Analysis Resources

This Appendix outlines some of the existing resources to support conflict analyses, which JACS leads may want to draw upon.

Government Sources to Inform Conflict Analysis

- Conflict Sensitivity Tools and Guidance, Tool 1: Programme level conflict analysis (SU)
- Countries at Risk of Instability tool (Cabinet Office)
- Country governance analysis (DFID)
- Country poverty reduction diagnostic (DFID)
- Building Stability Framework (DFID)
- Diptels (FCO)
- Gender inequality and social exclusion analysis (DFID)
- Human Rights Assessments and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (All)
- Inclusive growth diagnostic (DFID)
- Intelligence products (MOD)
- Joint Intelligence Committee papers (MOD)
- Political economy analysis (DFID)
- Reporting from post (All)
- Research analyst papers (FCO)

Non-government Sources to Inform Conflict Analysis

Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, United Nations, World Bank, EU,


Other resources with direct links can be found on: www.conflictsensitivity.org

Where to Go for Support: UK government sources

- Stabilisation Unit
- DFID conflict advisers and regional conflict advisers
- FCO research analysts
- MOD intelligence analyst
Appendix E: Accessing JACS Material

A permanent online platform accessible across government for accessing past JACS and JACS-related material is in the early stages of development. At present, the options for obtaining JACS and JACS-related materials are as follows:

1. Through the DFID QUEST system (until transition to VAULT is complete)
2. By emailing the Stabilisation Unit
   Email STARLearningHub2@dfid.gov.uk with a clear subject line stating JACS required and level of urgency

The JACS index below lists the JACS undertaken to date, additional documents of relevance, as well as their respective QUEST numbers. To enable us to keep this updated, please ensure that you share the final outputs from any JACS process that you are involved in with the Stabilisation Unit Learning Hub (STARLearningHub2@dfid.gov.uk).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country or Region</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication Date</th>
<th>Quest No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan JACS Final</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>JACS_Phase_One_Bangladesh_2012_HMG_RESTRICTED_PDF</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5210818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina JACS - Final.Docx</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5210835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Burundi JACS 2012 Final.pdf</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5210394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Burundi discussion doc for round table - 12 03 21.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5210881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Burundi JACS Refresh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Central Asia JACS.pdf</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5210892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>UNCLASS C Asia JACS Final 120912.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5210912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>DRAFT C Asia JACS ToRs.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5210900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>REST Colombia JACS - ToR - 20130816 ToR.doc</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5210929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>REST Colombia JACS Final Draft - 20131031.docx</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5210922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>DRC JACS Final Report 2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5212501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>DRC JACS Refresh</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq JACS - Full Report FINAL</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo JACS Final</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5212578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Macedonia Conflict Assessment - TORS. Doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5212629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country or Region</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Publication Date</td>
<td>Quest No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>REST Macedonia_Conflict Assessment 2012.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5213047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Macedonia JACS - Final.docx</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Mali JACS - Nov 2012.FINAL.PDF</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Moldova JACS - Restricted.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>DRAFT Moldova JACS ToRs.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigeria JACS Update</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigeria JACS</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Annex A - Mapping of Illicit Trade Routes.pdf</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5214327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>Annexes D E and F - References Consultations and Reading.pdf</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5214777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>RESTRICTED - North Africa Cross Border JACS</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5214791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>UNCLASS JACS N Africa intro and Ex Summary.doc</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5214796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>UNCLASS N AFRICA JACS</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5214911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>N CAUCASUS JACS ToRs.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>RESTRICTED N Caucasus JACS Final 140912</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>RESTRICTED N Caucasus JACS Annexes.doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan JACS Literature Review 171012.docx</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5214992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan JACS Annexes Final.DO CX</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5215000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan JACS Executive Summary FINAL.DO CX</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5215132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan JACS FiNAl.DO CX</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5215172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Sebia JACS - Final.docx</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5216179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>Sinai - Drivers of Instability - Dec 2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5216419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>Sinai - Annex 2 List of People Consulted.docx</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5216492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinai</td>
<td>Sinai - Annex 3 List of documents consulted.docx</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5216654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somalia - TORs - Drivers of Radicalisation (draft3).doc</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5216673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Somalia - Drivers of Radicalisation (OCT final)-</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5216683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country or Region</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Publication Date</td>
<td>Quest No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan Country Governance and Conflict Analysis - May 2013-RESTRICTED</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5216691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
<td>Western Balkans Regional JACS - Final.docx</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5216697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
<td>Western Balkans Regional JACS Refresh</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Conflict Analysis Update</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5031988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Yemen Conflict Analysis</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Zimbabwe JACS Final</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>