



HM Treasury

Treasury Minutes

Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Fifty-Ninth to the Sixty-Third reports from Session 2017-19



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Presented to Parliament
by the Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury
by Command of Her Majesty

December 2018

TREASURY MINUTES DATED 13 DECEMBER 2018 TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS ON THE FIFTY-NINTH TO THE SIXTY-THIRD REPORTS FROM SESSION 2017-19.

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Government responses to the Committee of Public Accounts Session 2017-19

#	Report Title	Page
59	Skills Shortages in the Armed Forces <i>Ministry of Defence</i>	1
60	Ofsted inspection of schools <i>Department for Education</i>	5
61	MOD Nuclear Programme <i>Ministry of Defence</i>	9
62	Spending on generic medicines in primary care <i>Department of Health and Social Care</i>	13
63	Interface between health and adult social care <i>Department for Health and Social Care / Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government</i>	16

Fifty-Ninth Report of Session 2017-19

Ministry of Defence

Skills shortages in the Armed Forces

Introduction from the Committee

The Armed Forces need sufficient skilled personnel to meet the Government's defence objectives and respond to the rapidly changing threats to the UK. The Ministry of Defence (the Department) is considering the capabilities and skills needed within the Armed Forces to meet these threats. However, in January 2018 it had 137,300 trained regulars, 8,200 (or 5.7%) fewer than it needed, and it will increasingly need more regulars with technical and digital skills. It faces external competition to recruit and retain the specialist skills that it needs at a time when it is already managing significant financial pressures. In 2016–17, the Department spent £9.6 billion on military personnel, which is 27% of the overall defence budget. Economic, social, cultural and demographic changes within the United Kingdom also mean that the Department must think differently about how it recruits and retains personnel. It therefore faces significant challenges in developing the skilled personnel it needs to meet the future ambitions for the Armed Forces and exploit its investment in new equipment.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 4 June 2018, from the Department on its understanding of the causes and consequences of the skill shortages in the Armed Forces, and its approach to attracting and retaining the skills that it needs. The Committee published its report on 12 September 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: [Ensuring sufficient skilled military personnel](#) - Session 2017-19 (HC 947)
- PAC report: [Skills shortages in the Armed Forces](#) – Session 2017-19 (HC 1027)

Government responses to the Committee

1: PAC conclusion: The Department does not have a clear view on how it will secure and retain the skills it needs in the future.

1: PAC recommendation: *Following publication of the Modernising Defence Programme in Summer 2018, the Department should develop and implement a workforce strategy to close existing skill gaps and secure the new skills that it needs. This should include an assessment of its ability to compete in recruitment markets for more specialist skills, particularly in the light of the UK's exit from the European Union.*

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: Autumn 2019.

1.2 Work to develop a Defence People strategy, including addressing skills shortages, is underway for completion in 2019. It will seek to recover critical skills shortfalls, and build resilience and stability into the core human resources system, working across the employment lifecycle, to secure better future defence skills capability. It will be the primary driver of coherence for strategic people planning in defence to around 2030 and will be achieved, in part, by an internal process of People Transformation. The new strategy will also address changing characteristics in the external environment, including demographics, economic competition, political environment and technology, in the national security outlook as well as for the workforce. On skills, the strategy will take account that while Armed Forces recruitment may not be directly impacted by Brexit, there may be a secondary impact in sectors where they are already national shortages of key skills or large numbers of overseas workers.

1.3 In parallel, the Department and Armed Forces continue to use a range of measures, to address Armed Forces skills needs. These measures include tri-Service programmes to: introduce a new approach to accommodation charges; deliver increased flexibility to work part-time or with a reduced deployment commitment; restructured Armed Forces pay system to better reflect market forces; opportunities to join in more senior roles (lateral transfers); encouragement re-joiners and inter-Service transfers in critical skills areas; and, easier interchange with industry through the Enterprise Approach. In addition, the single Services have initiatives which include: increasing the number of personnel in recruiting teams, improving candidate relationship management, streamlining entry criteria, reviewing and where appropriate revising medical standards, and focus marketing via social media and specialist recruiting teams. The Department will also continue to look at new and innovative approaches to resolving shortfalls in critical capabilities.

2: PAC conclusion: *The Department has an inadequate understanding of how Commands use their workforce budgets and whether they make informed investment decisions.*

2: PAC recommendation: *The Department's Head Office should look closely at Commands' use of workforce-related funding, including expenditure on marketing, recruitment and training. It should establish a bi-annual process to review—with Commands—how workforce funding is being used, learn from best practice and ensure Commands are making informed investment decisions to develop the skills they need in the future.*

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: March 2019.

2.2 The Department continues to develop and improve the processes by which Top Level Budgets are held to account for the delivery of Head Office priorities. Through formal quarterly holding to account meetings, and the rigorous scrutiny of Command spending plans carried out annually (rather than bi-annually), the Department will review the effectiveness of Commands' workforce planning including proposals for investment in the skills they require in the future including spending on marketing, recruitment and training. Lessons learned will be used to inform good practice and better targeted workforce related funding.

3: PAC conclusion: *The Department has not done enough to understand fully the causes or impacts of skills gaps in critical trades.*

3.a: PAC recommendation: *The Department should write to the Committee by December 2018 to explain how it is systematically exploiting its data to analyse the causes of shortfalls in pinch-point trades and better understand the strain its demands are placing on regulars.*

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: March 2019.

3.2 The Department will provide an update to the Committee by December 2018 on the progress of a review it is conducting on the definitions and processes for collecting information on skills pinch points for the Armed Forces and civilian workforce. This will look to improve the information pinch points can provide on the consequences of any shortfalls and the impact on individuals. This will build on the processes already in place within the single services and business areas to address the specific causes of individual pinch points and to monitor impact on individuals. The Department expects to implement the outcome of the review in March 2019. In addition, the Chief of Defence People is reviewing the most critical operational pinch points and the potential scope for greater cross service co-operation to address specific problems. Finally, the People Transformation programme, under the Defence Modernisation Programme, will include a People Data project to improve the analytical capabilities and resources available to support the development of the Defence People strategy, policies and processes.

3.b: PAC recommendation: *It should develop a more structured approach to exit interviews, which should be mandatory, including proper analysis of the data collected.*

3.3 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: March 2019.

3.4 Exit interviews are mandatory for all personnel leaving the Armed Forces. Each service collects data which is triangulated with feedback from Retention Working Groups, Armed Forces Pay Review Board visits, Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey and independent retention research. The Chief of Defence People's Research, Policy and Evidence Team is conducting a review with service occupational psychologists of how exit information is captured and will make recommendations on how this information can be more effectively captured, analysed and exploited across Defence. The review will report in March 2019.

3.c: PAC recommendation:

It should also maintain a database of regulars with key skills who have left in order to make it easier to reconnect.

3.5 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

3.6 The Department supports the intent of this recommendation however, there is no clear lawful basis under data protection legislation to retain information for all service leavers. It already maintains databases on former Armed Forces regular personnel who have a regular reserve liability, allowing it to call on those with the relevant specialist skills and experience to be mobilised for future operations. The single services are all strengthening their approach to encouraging re-joiners particularly in critical skills areas and the Enterprise Approach will facilitate greater movement between regular service, the reserves and industry so that key skills can be retained within the Defence sector.

3.7 The People Transformation programme will also address the capture and retention of information on individual skills, how this is linked to the delivery of new information systems and ensure information is maintained in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation. The requirement for the capture of skills on all those who have left the services will be seriously considered as part of this process.

4: PAC conclusion: *The Department's Head Office lacks the powers it needs to drive a strategic approach to workforce planning and tackle cross-Command shortfalls*

4: PAC recommendation: *The Department should write to the Committee by December 2018 to explain what it has done to increase the authority and powers of the Chief of Defence People, and develop a more strategic approach to workforce planning between the Department's Head Office and the Commands.*

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: March 2019.

4.2 The Department will provide an update to the Committee by December 2018. The Modernising Defence Programme has identified the development of a stronger, more authoritative and responsive governance of the Defence People function as a critical enabler for this work. The intent is to maintain the basic principles of the Department's delegated operating model, but to reset the paradigm to ensure that there is more co-creation and collaboration between the single services/business and Head Office. A new People Operating Model will be based on four key roles for Defence People and an improved way of working: strategic workforce authority; leadership of connected HR function across Defence; coherent and empowered central People function in Head Office; and a recognised design authority which will prioritise and lead the People Change portfolio.

4.3 The Chief of Defence People is working with key stakeholders to define what functional leadership means for the Armed Forces and how it can add value for Defence. A proposed operating

model for Defence People will be developed by March 2019. This will include establishment of clear governance structures, criteria to determine when/if harmonisation of HR policy/process across the business is beneficial, and encourage ways of working together to achieve the desired outcomes. It will also support the recognition of differences between the services and elements of the business. Detailed consideration on how to initiate this process through the setting up of a change management function within Head Office will be conducted in parallel. These changes are expected to strengthen the authority of the Chief of Defence People.

5: PAC conclusion: *The Department has not thought radically enough about how to adapt its existing approach to find innovative ways of recruiting people with specialist skills.*

5: PAC recommendation: *The Department should urgently assess the potential to expand Commands' innovative approaches to recruitment and retention, including the use of financial incentives, flexing entry requirements and the re-designation of roles. It should also examine how to overcome procedural barriers to increase the speed at which it can roll-out initiatives when they prove successful. The Department should write to the Committee by December 2018 with an update on its approach.*

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Recommendation implemented.

5.2 The Department has committed Defence Innovation funding (circa £ 1.4 million) to the services to enable experimentation with novel approaches to recruitment and retention and speed their implementation alongside current initiatives. As the NAO report¹ on '[Ensuring Sufficient Skilled Military Personnel](#)' acknowledged there is already a substantial workforce change programme to address recruitment and retention which has been underway since 2010 and which continues to be implemented. This programme includes: a new approach to accommodation charges; increased flexibility to work part-time or with a reduced deployment commitment; restructured Armed Forces pay system to reflect better market forces; targeted financial incentives for recruitment and retention; improvements to the recruitment process; opportunities to join in more senior roles (lateral transfers); greater encouragement of re-joiners; and inter-service transfers in critical skills areas, easier interchange with industry through the Enterprise Approach.

6: PAC conclusion: *In a rapidly changing world, the Department has not sufficiently adapted its recruitment processes to engage effectively with different groups in society.*

6: PAC conclusion: *The Department should ensure that its skills strategy sets out a credible approach to increasing interest in a career in the Armed Forces from among a broader base of society. This should also include a communications plan—based on research—to generate interest from more diverse groups in society and from among those who have previously served in the Armed Forces*

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: March 2020.

6.2 As already set out in response to the Committee's first recommendation, a Defence People strategy, incorporating work to address skills shortages, is now underway for completion in 2019. It will seek to recover critical skills shortfalls, and build resilience and stability into the core HR system, working across the employment lifecycle, to ensure better future Defence outputs. Building positive relationships with all sectors of society as an essential enabler is a key theme of the developing strategy. These relationships take time and consistency to deliver, among many different and disparate communities, which is both time and resource intensive. A communications plan will form a part of the means to implement the strategy. In parallel: projects are continuing to deliver Recruiting and Training Transformation; improve the Armed Forces diversity which includes outreach, research and communications activities.

¹ HC947 dated 18 April 2018

Sixtieth Report of Session 2017-19

Department for Education / Ofsted

Ofsted's inspection of schools

Introduction from the Committee

The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) plays a vital role in making sure that children in schools across England receive the quality of education that they deserve. We recognise that Ofsted's budget has been cut significantly in recent years, and the amount it spent on inspecting the schools sector fell by 52% in real terms between 1999–2000 and 2017–18. However, this has led Ofsted and the Department for Education to focus narrowly on the cost of inspection, rather the value of getting independent assurance about schools' effectiveness. There have been clear shortcomings in Ofsted's performance—it has completed fewer inspections than planned, it has failed to meet its targets for how often schools should be inspected, and schools are being left for longer between inspections. Ofsted now inspects good schools through just a short one-day inspection and, under legislation, outstanding schools are exempt from routine re-inspection altogether. Ofsted is therefore not providing the level of independent assurance about the quality of education that schools and parents need.

As well as reporting on individual schools, HM Chief Inspector's role includes advising ministers about the quality of schools. Championing standards is an important part of any independent inspector's remit, and we were disappointed that HM Chief Inspector seemed reluctant to offer her views about wider issues affecting the school system. For its part, the Department needs to be clearer about what the purpose of inspection is and where responsibility for improving underperforming schools lies.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence on 25 June 2018 from the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted) and the Department for Education (the Department). It also took evidence from the National Association of Head Teachers, the National Education Union and Education South West, a multi-academy trust that runs 10 schools. The Committee published its report on 7 September 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: [Ofsted's inspection of schools](#) – Session 2017-19 (HC 1004)
- PAC report: [Ofsted's inspection of schools](#) – Session 2017-19 (HC 1029)

Government responses to the Committee

1: PAC conclusion: *Ofsted incorrectly reported to Parliament that it had met the statutory target for re-inspecting schools every five years.*

1: PAC recommendation: *Ofsted should report annually to Parliament, in its annual report and accounts, on how many schools have not been inspected within the statutory target and the reasons why.*

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Recommendation implemented.

1.2 Ofsted's annual report and accounts are laid before Parliament and indicate whether Ofsted has met its statutory targets. There was a reporting error in the Annual Report and Accounts 2016–17. This was corrected in the 2017–18 report. Ofsted will continue to include this information in this report. Revised controls are now in place to ensure that regional directors seek approval from either the Chief Inspector or Chief Operating Officer before taking any decision that puts a school at risk from not being inspected within its statutory inspection window.

2: PAC conclusion: *It is unacceptable that so many schools are exempt from re-inspection and so have not been inspected for six or more years.*

2: PAC recommendation: *The Department should re-examine the rationale for exempting schools graded outstanding from routine re-inspection, and report back to us on its assessment in December 2018.*

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018

2.2 The Education Act 2011 inserted a new provision into the Education Act 2005, allowing regulations to stipulate that certain schools and colleges could be exempt from routine inspection in specified circumstances. The intention was to allow for a more targeted and proportionate approach to inspection, which recognised and rewarded schools and colleges that had demonstrated the strongest performance, and concentrated inspection where it is needed most.

2.3 The Department recognises that some outstanding schools have not been inspected for a considerable time and many have been inspected under previous Ofsted frameworks. However, removing the exemption would have workload implications for schools and colleges and risks diverting resources away from where it is most needed.

2.4 The Department has reviewed the rationale for this policy as requested. As a result, the Department has asked Ofsted to review its risk assessment arrangements and increase its inspection of exempt outstanding schools over the coming year to 10%. This is in line with the expectation agreed in Parliament when the exemption was introduced. The Department will continue to keep the exemption policy under review and will write to the Committee in December 2018 setting out this position in more detail.

3: PAC conclusion: *Ofsted's short inspections do not allow inspectors enough time to make a meaningful assessment of a school's performance or to help schools to improve.*

3: PAC recommendation: *Ofsted and the Department should review whether the short inspection model provides sufficient, meaningful assurance about schools' effectiveness, and evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative approaches, including carrying out more full inspections. They should report back to us on the findings in December 2018.*

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018

3.2 Ofsted introduced short inspections in September 2015 for schools judged 'good' at their previous inspection. These inspections were introduced to reduce the burden of inspection on schools that are performing well, without losing any of the accountability expected. A short inspection will confirm that the previous grade for overall effectiveness is accurate and the setting remains 'good' and that safeguarding is effective. If inspectors believe that a change of grade may be necessary, they will trigger a full inspection, which will make the full set of graded judgements using the four-point grading scale.

3.3 Ofsted will provide the Committee with the findings of its review into the short inspection model by December 2018.

4: PAC conclusion: *Ofsted does not give parents enough opportunity to contribute their views as part of school inspections.*

4: PAC recommendation: *In the report to us in December 2018, Ofsted should set out its plans, with specific actions and target dates, for collecting more and better evidence from parents about schools.*

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018

4.2 Ofsted is working on plans to reform its Parent View website, making it easier for parents to share their detailed views on a school with Ofsted at any time, not just during inspection. This includes the potential of including free text boxes, to allow for more extensive comments.

4.3 Ofsted also places importance on gathering parents' views outside of inspection. It has established a virtual parents' panel with over 1,000 members, who have contributed to several areas of policy development. It also runs an annual parents' attitude survey and the findings help to inform thinking and policy development. Ofsted also wants parents to get the most out of inspection reports. To this end, a number of focus groups with parents are being held to understand how best to reform inspection reports.

4.4 This work has been in progress for some time and Ofsted will provide the Committee with information about its plans by December 2018.

5: PAC conclusion: *Ofsted has struggled to employ enough school inspectors, meaning that it has failed to complete its inspection programme.*

5a: PAC recommendation: *Ofsted should write to us in April 2019 with an update on the gap between the numbers of HM inspectors employed and budgeted for, and the turnover rate.*

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: April 2019

5.2 Ofsted regional directors are free to vary the default mix of full time Her Majesty's Inspectors (HMIs) and contracted inspectors as they judge best meets the varying needs of their regions. In some cases, regional directors have therefore intentionally recruited fewer HMIs than had been budgeted, and have managed their inspection requirements with a higher proportion of contracted inspectors.

5.3 Ofsted will provide this update to the Committee by April 2019.

5b: PAC recommendation: *Ofsted should also consider opening up its training to headteachers and deputies working in schools graded as requires improvement and inadequate so that these schools can benefit in the same way as schools that are performing well.*

5.4 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Recommendation implemented.

5.5 Ofsted's recruitment process for school inspectors requires candidates to have 5 years' senior leadership experience at a good or outstanding school. Many inspectors have experience turning around a struggling school and helping it become good. It is important that inspectors understand what a good school looks like before they become inspectors.

5.6 However, Ofsted is already running a number of curriculum workshops, which are designed to share the substantive content of inspector training from the past 12 months to senior leaders of all schools. Ofsted also regularly runs regional conferences and workshops for senior leaders, which incorporate elements of Ofsted inspector training.

6: PAC conclusion: *Ofsted does not make the most of its unique position to use intelligence from inspections to lead change and be a force for school improvement.*

6: PAC recommendation: *HM Chief Inspector should write to us by October 2018 with her reflections on the main risks to schools' effectiveness and the systemic causes of poor performance, including the impact of funding pressures.*

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Recommendation implemented.

6.2 Ofsted's Chief Inspector, Amanda Spielman, has written to the Committee setting out her reflections on the main risks to schools' effectiveness and the systemic causes of poor performance, including the impact of funding pressures. This was provided to the Committee in 30 October 2018².

7: PAC conclusion: *The system for school accountability and improvement is muddled, leading to confusion for schools and parents, and inefficiency where roles overlap.*

7: PAC recommendation: *As part of its review of accountability, the Department should make clear where responsibility for school improvement lies. The Department, working with Ofsted, should also assess whether the balance of spending is right between different parts of the system for school accountability and improvement, including between Ofsted and the regional schools commissioners.*

7.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: September 2019

7.2 The Department published a new set of principles for the accountability system in May 2018³. This set out the roles of different organisations within the system and clearly set out that there will be no more 'inspections' of schools by representatives of Regional Schools Commissioners. Ofsted is the only body that can form an independent judgement about a school through inspection. From now on the Department will no longer mandate any new cases of conversion or re-brokerage on educational grounds unless a school is judged inadequate by Ofsted. The Department has also committed to a consultation focussed on how to identify those schools who will benefit from an offer of support.

7.3 As part of the upcoming Spending Review, the Department will assess where the right balance of spending is between different parts of the system for school accountability and improvement. This will include scrutiny of funding for Ofsted and the Regional Schools Commissioners.

² <https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/public-accounts/Correspondence/2017-19/Final%20PAC%20letter%20October%202018.pdf>

³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/principles-for-a-clear-and-simple-school-accountability-system>

Sixty-First Report of Session 2017-19

Ministry of Defence

The Nuclear Programme

Introduction from the Committee

The 'Nuclear Enterprise' is the network of equipment, people and infrastructure which must work together to provide the United Kingdom's continuous at sea deterrent. Currently, the Ministry of Defence (the Department) has at least one of its four nuclear-armed deterrent submarines, the Vanguard class, on patrol at any given time. In 2016, the Department began construction of a new class of deterrent submarines, the Dreadnought class, to come into operation in the early 2030s. The Department forecasts it will spend £5.2 billion across the Enterprise in 2018–19, of which £1.8 billion is on procuring and supporting submarines, £1.4 billion on the missiles and warheads, and £220 million on managing the Enterprise.

In 2017, the newly created Defence Nuclear Organisation (DNO), a top-level budget within the Department, took on oversight of the Enterprise. In 2018, the Department also formally established the Submarine Delivery Agency (SDA) as an executive agency to manage 51 nuclear procurement and support programmes. Initial feedback on these newly established governance arrangements has been broadly positive, but this has taken some years to put in place given the organisational weaknesses that the Committee identified as long ago as 2009. The Department uses four main contractors, which between them have 97% (by value) of the Enterprise-related contracts, and which in turn use an estimated 1,500 sub-contractors.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 2 July 2018, from the Department on the management and challenges it faces across the programmes within the Nuclear Enterprise. The Committee published its report on 21 September 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: [The Defence Nuclear Enterprise](#) - Session 2017-19 (HC 1003).
- PAC report: [Ministry of Defence nuclear programme](#) – Session 2017-19 (HC 1028).

Government responses to the Committee

1: PAC conclusion: *The scale, interdependencies and complexities of the Nuclear Enterprise create timetable risks across programmes.*

1: PAC recommendation: *Given the history of significant slippage across different Enterprise programmes, in its annual update to Parliament the Department should set out clearly its key milestones for the next 20 years, with their associated interdependencies, in order to make it easier to track progress across different aspects of the Enterprise, not just the development of Dreadnought.*

1.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

1.2 The Department remains committed to providing updates to Parliament annually on the future nuclear deterrent and will continue to report progress on the nuclear programmes through the Infrastructure and Projects Authority. While the Department is committed to promoting transparency, it is not possible to predict key milestones over the next 20 years for each programme, and their specific interdependencies, without breaching national security and commercial sensitivities.

1.3 In recognition of the lessons learnt from previous programmes, the Department has undergone a period of change to handle better the challenges it faces from the complex programmes managed by the Enterprise. The creation of the Defence Nuclear Organisation and the Submarine Delivery Agency has

strengthened the Department's ability to operate by providing the Enterprise with a coherent approach to governance, risk management and programme delivery. Specifically, the work of the of the Nuclear Portfolio Board and Defence Nuclear Executive Board ensures that the Department is aware of the cross-cutting interdependencies that exist across the major nuclear programmes, and provides the mechanism through which issues and risks can be managed.

2: PAC conclusion: Organisations across the Enterprise, including SDA, DNO, and the Navy and government contractors face continual challenges, including in attracting and retaining the range of skills they need.

2: PAC recommendation: The Department should regularly review how its new organisational structures and arrangements are working, and ensure it has the right skills by filling recognised gaps as soon as possible, developing succession plans for senior posts and, where appropriate, working with contractors and government to ensure they and the Department have the skills needed.

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Recommendation implemented.

2.2 The Department is in the process of understanding the skills requirement for the Enterprise. The Department recognises the need to focus on skills such as commercial, finance (for which the Department will be working with the functional management leads) and nuclear suitably qualified and experienced personnel (which for Defence, will be leading on but in collaboration with other Government departments and the civil sector to ensure collective direction for the UK). The Department is already looking at succession planning for senior posts to ensure effective leadership within the Enterprise continues in to the future.

3: PAC conclusion: In providing the Enterprise, the Department relies on four main contractors, whose past performance has been poor, and around 1,500 sub-contractors, many of which are small and specialist.

3: PAC recommendation: The Department should continue to push for high performance across contractors by using more joint incentives and closer working in future contracts, and ensuring a common approach to the supply-chain across contractors. It should update the Committee by March 2019 on ongoing work to understand the supply-chain and its fragility, explaining any contingency plans it will put in place.

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: March 2019.

3.2 The Department recognises that a resilient, responsive and efficient supply chain is critical to the delivery of our nuclear deterrent. A key focus of the Department, therefore, is supply chain improvement. The Department established the Dreadnought Alliance, consisting of the SDA, BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce on 1 April 2018, which will intensify efforts with our industrial partners to improve performance and put in place new industrial and commercial arrangements between Government and industry. This is a key step to getting better management of the delivery of the Dreadnought programme. Additionally, a new team has been established within the SDA to improve our engagement with the supply chain across the Enterprise.

3.3 The Department will provide a briefing on supply chain within the agreed timeframe. It should be noted that the content of the report would need to be mindful of commercial and capability sensitivities.

4: PAC conclusion: Wider political arrangements, such as international trade arrangements, could impact on the Enterprise.

4: PAC recommendation: As we get clarity on future international arrangements, the Department should set out for the Committee, by the end of the year, how it will manage the uncertainties arising from political developments and in particular how it will ensure the ongoing prosperity of its supply chain.

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018.

4.2 The Department has well established arrangements such as the Teutates Treaty with the French and Mutual Defence Agreement and the Polaris Sales Agreement with the United States which allows for international cooperation on nuclear issues. Any potential changes to the political landscape that could affect future international trade is primarily led by other Government departments such as the Departments for International Trade and Business Energy and Industrial Strategy. The Department works closely with international and cross-government colleagues to keep abreast of changes in the landscape, which in turn will help ensure that nuclear interests are addressed. However, to mitigate against any unforeseen events the Department maintains an active watching brief through the joint teams with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and through our delivery agent the SDA.

4.3 On our future partnership with the European Union, the Department is working with the Cabinet Office, Department for Exiting the European Union and others to ensure that the implications for the defence sector are considered in the future UK-EU partnership. The Government's proposed free trade area for goods would ensure continued frictionless access to each other's markets for goods and protect integrated supply chains, including in the defence sector.

4.4 In line with the 2017 annual report to Parliament on Dreadnought, the Department will provide an update on the supply chain.

5: PAC conclusion: The Department's infrastructure, including its facilities to maintain and decommission submarines, does not effectively support the Enterprise.

5: PAC recommendation: As a priority, the Department should review and determine its future infrastructure requirements to enable it to better plan and control the costs of these projects, and end the practice of delaying disposal of out of service submarines. Its annual report to Parliament on Dreadnought should also include a progress update on the decommissioning of submarines and key infrastructure programmes.

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018.

5.2 The Department will provide an update on relevant infrastructure programmes and a plan for decommissioning in the its next annual update on Dreadnought.

6: PAC conclusion: Decisions over the next few years will affect, and potentially increase, costs across an Enterprise that is already unaffordable.

6: PAC conclusion: Given the identified affordability gap, the Department should write to the Committee, following the outcome of the Modernising Defence Programme review and decisions on infrastructure programmes and refuelling, setting out how it will ensure that the funds it needs for the Enterprise are available.

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: October 2019.

6.2 The Department is committed to comprehensive and transparent reporting. The next Equipment Plan summary report will address funding across the Department, including nuclear specific issues, and provide funding lines against our major nuclear programmes. The Department will therefore report on these topics as part of the already well-established system, rather than providing a separate update.

Sixty-Second Report of Session 2017-19

Department of Health and Social Care

Spending on generic medicines in primary care

Introduction from the Committee

Medicines can be 'branded' or 'generic'. New medicines are generally marketed under their brand name and their patents are protected for around 20 years. During that time, no other company can manufacture or market the medicine. After this, other companies can manufacture and market the same medicine under its generic name, usually at a lower price. Generic medicines are commonly prescribed to patients in the community: of the £4.3 billion that the NHS spent on generic medicines in 2016–17, 81% was in primary care. Community pharmacies buy medicines on behalf of the NHS, for which they are then reimbursed. For generic medicines, the Department's policy is to rely on competition in the market between suppliers of generic medicines to control their price.

The Department does not set the price of generic medicines, but does set the amount that community pharmacies will be reimbursed by the NHS (the 'reimbursement price'). Clinical commissioning groups pay for these medicines out of the funding they receive from NHS England. Despite being the main purchaser of these medicines in the UK, the NHS has relatively limited influence over how much they cost in what is a global market.

During 2017–18, the costs of certain generic medicines increased substantially partly as a result of two large medicine manufacturers having their production suspended because of quality issues. One example of price rises was for a mental health medicine called Quetiapine: its reimbursement price for 100mg tablets peaked at £113.10, 70 times higher than the previous reimbursement price of £1.59.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence, on 4 July 2018 from the Department of Health and Social Care and NHS England. The Committee published its report on 12 October 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: [Investigation into NHS spending on generic medicines in primary care](#) - Session 2017-2019 (HC 1122)
- PAC report: [Price increases for generic medications](#) - Session 2017-19 (HC 1184)

Government responses to the Committee

1: PAC conclusion: *The NHS had to spend additional money, time and effort, for those generic medicines affected by the price rises in 2017, to make sure patients got the medicines they needed.*

1: PAC recommendation: *The Department should, by December 2018, share with the Committee its plan for maintaining the supply of medicines pre- and post- the UK's exit from the European Union, and confirm how it will ensure that patients will be able to obtain the medicines they need.*

1.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018

1.2 The Department has a dedicated medicines supply team that works closely with the NHS, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the pharmaceutical industry and others in the supply chain to manage supply issues and mitigate the impact on patients.

1.3 In relation to the UK's exit from the EU, the Government continues to prepare proportionately for all scenarios, including the outcome that the UK leaves the EU without any deal in March 2019. The Department has been working with the pharmaceutical industry in the EU Exit Medicines Supply Industry Collaborative Group. In August, the Department wrote to a number of pharmaceutical companies that supply the UK with medicines from, or via, the EU/EEA, asking them to ensure they have a minimum of six weeks' additional supply in the UK, over and above their business as usual operational buffer stocks, by 29 March 2019 in the event of a no-deal EU exit.

1.4 Also, in August 2018, the Department sent a letter to healthcare providers advising them, amongst other things, that they do not need to take any steps to stockpile additional medicines or write longer prescriptions. Additionally, in October 2018, the Department launched an invitation to tender inviting providers of warehouse space to bid for government funding to cover the capital costs they would incur by providing additional storage space for stockpiled medicines to support our contingency planning.

1.5 The Department will write to the Committee in December 2018 to expand on the Department's work and update on progress.

2: PAC conclusion: *There were clear signs that prices of certain medicines were increasing from June 2017, but the Department failed to take any action to manage costs until November.*

2: PAC recommendation: *The Department and NHS England should, by December 2018, establish clear and timely information flows between each other and local bodies to identify and inform about generic medicine supply and/or pricing issues, and write to the Committee to explain what they have done to ensure this. These information flows should include how clinicians can obtain greater transparency of the price of the generic medicines they prescribe.*

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018

2.2 We have improved and continue to improve the information flows between the Department and the NHS on medicines supply issues, pricing and reimbursement, including concessionary prices. The Department will write to the Committee in December to explain these information flows as well as how medical practitioners are supported with information about prices to support diagnosis and care of their patients.

3: PAC conclusion: *The price rises for certain generic medicines during 2017 contributed substantially to clinical commissioning groups' end-of-year overspend.*

3: PAC recommendation: *The Department and NHS England should, by December 2018, release updated guidance to clinical commissioning groups that sets out their contingency plans to mitigate the financial impact on clinical commissioning groups if there is a repeat of these unforeseen price increases.*

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018

3.2 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) are responsible for the costs of medicines prescribed in primary care, and for managing this expenditure within their overall financial allocation. NHS England continues to monitor the impact of medicines price changes and concessionary prices on CCGs, working with DHSC. The immediate cost pressure of concessionary prices on CCG budgets has been lower since the DHSC introduced a new methodology for setting concessionary prices, and from November 2018 CCGs have also been benefiting from reductions in prices to recover excess margin earned by pharmacies in previous years. NHS England expects CCGs to manage medicines price changes within existing budgets but will provide updated guidance in the event of material unforeseen net price increases.

4: PAC conclusion: *The Department has not yet set out how it will use its new powers, should similar price rises happen again.*

4: PAC recommendation: *The Department should, by December 2018, write to the Committee to set out the full range of actions it can take to address rises in the price of generic medicines, and what skills and capacity it has put in place to use its new powers.*

4.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018

4.2 For unbranded generic medicines the Department relies on a competitive market to drive prices down. This generally works well and has led to some of the lowest prices in Europe. However, there are situations where we see price rises, sometimes significant. One of these scenarios is that described in the NAO report where, for example, there might be a supply problem which in turn leads to an increased price as a result of decreased supply or availability of the costlier branded medicines only. This is what would be expected from a general competitive market.

4.3 In these cases, the Department sets a concessionary price for an unbranded generic medicine, as a temporary measure, to ensure that patients continue to get their medicines and that community pharmacies are reimbursed fairly for the products they dispense. Typically, supply increases again, and prices get driven down again. Another scenario is when there is only one supplier of the medicine so there is no competition to drive the price down and suppliers charge prices that appear unreasonable.

4.4 The Department will write to the Committee in December about its work to address the rise in the prices of generic medicines and how use of the data has helped in the setting of concessionary prices.

5: PAC conclusion: *We are yet to be convinced that the Department's new powers, and accompanying regulations, are sufficient to enable it to act effectively should similar price rises happen again.*

5: PAC recommendation: *The Department should, by September 2019, ensure that the first annual review of the regulations includes an assessment of how well the provisions for companies providing estimates and notifying the Department of an impending shortage are working, as well as the application of new information collection powers to 'specials' medicines.*

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: July 2019

5.2 The Health Service Products (Provision and Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2018 require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the regulatory provisions in the Regulations, set out the conclusions in a report and publish that report. The first report must be published before 1 July 2019. The Department will include the areas recommended by the Committee in its first review.

Sixty-Third Report of Session 2017-19

Department of Health and Social Care / Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

Interface between health and adult social care

Introduction from the Committee

People with social care needs also have healthcare needs; good social care can prevent ill health and speed up hospital discharge. The health and social care sectors need to work closely to provide people with joined up, efficient care. However, the sectors differ markedly in their structure, funding and culture. The NHS commissions and provides healthcare services that are largely free at the point of use. Local authorities commission social care from a range of mainly private providers. Social care services are means-tested, with many people funding some or all of their care. The NHS and social care operate under different legislation, and therefore different financial decision-making and accountability regimes. The Department of Health and Social Care (the Department) is responsible for policy relating to health and adult social care in England, while the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Ministry) is responsible for the local government finance and accountability systems. The accountability for the NHS at a national level lies with NHS England and the Department.

Based on a report by the National Audit Office, the Committee took evidence from the Department of Health and Social Care, NHS England and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on 18 July 2018. The Committee published its report on 19 October 2018. This is the Government response to the Committee's report.

NAO and PAC Reports

- NAO report: [The Health and Social Care Interface](#) – Session 2017-19 (HC 950)
- NAO report: [Developing New Care Models Through NHS Vanguard](#)s – Session 2017-19 (HC 1129)
- PAC report: [Interface Between Health and Adult Social Care](#) – Session 2017-19 (HC 1376)

Government responses to the Committee

1: PAC conclusion: *Despite continued efforts for over 20 years to integrate health and social care services, the government is still experimenting with ways to join up care and agree on what local areas should be doing to achieve the government's aims.*

1: PAC recommendation: *The government should, by April 2019, set out a costed 10-year plan for social care to go alongside its 10-year plan for the NHS (expected in November 2018).*

1.1 The Government disagrees with the Committee's recommendation.

1.2 It will be important for local government funding to be considered in the round as part of the 2019 Spending Review.

1.3 The Government has taken steps to address the short-term funding pressures facing adult social care. The Budget confirmed an additional £240 million in each of the two years 2018-19 and 2019-2020 for adult social care that must be used by councils to help alleviate winter pressures on the NHS. This funding, in addition to funding the Government had already made available to councils, means that councils will have had access to almost £10 billion more dedicated funding that can be used for adult social care in the three-year period to 2019-20. The Budget provides a further £410 million in 2019-20 for adults and children's social care. Where necessary, local councils should use this funding to ensure that adult social care pressures do not create additional demand on the NHS. Local councils can also use it to improve their social care offer for older people, people with disabilities and children.

1.4 In addition, the Government recognises that the NHS and social care provision need to work together effectively. Just as importantly, a sustainable social care system is needed to ensure that essential care services continue to deliver for the ageing population, and the increasing number of people who require care services. The Government has committed to publishing a Green Paper later this year.

2: PAC conclusion: *The current legislative framework makes it unnecessarily difficult for local areas to pool funds and work together, causing additional cost and wasted resources.*

2: PAC recommendation: *The Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government should ensure that their 10-year plans and the social care green paper address the challenges to integration presented by fragmented funding and separate means testing affecting people who receive adult social care, including consideration of any legislative change needed.*

2.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018.

2.2 The Government recognises the importance of the health and care sectors being able to work jointly. Integration will be at the heart of the social care green paper and the NHS Long Term Plan.

2.3 Government wants to support local areas to work well together and has established the Better Care Fund (BCF) to enable the pooling of budgets across health and social care, which encourages joint working and drives integrated care.

2.4 In 2017-18, 93% of local areas agreed that delivery of the BCF has improved joint working between health and social care in their locality, whilst 91% agreed that delivery of BCF plans had a positive impact on the integration of health and social care.⁴ Local areas have also consistently pooled more than the mandatory minimum contributions since 2015. In June 2018, the Secretary of State for Health announced a review of the BCF. The review will build on the vision of the green paper and the NHS England Long Term Plan.

2.5 The Integrated Personal Commissioning programme is also testing ways for funding to be joined-up and aligned around an individual's bespoke needs, through an integrated personal budget.⁵

3: PAC conclusion: *NHS vanguards have shown early promise but they risk becoming yet another short-lived initiative, supported at the start but then not adopted as widely as intended.*

3: PAC recommendation: *In its 10-year plan, NHS England should set out how it will support the national rollout of new care models, including how it will accelerate take-up in local areas showing the slowest progress.*

3.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018.

3.2 The Long-Term Plan for the NHS will set out further steps for sustaining and spreading the vanguard new care models across England. The Plan is due to be published before the end of 2018.

⁴ 'A system level evaluation of the Better Care Fund: Final Report', Quality and outcomes of person-centred care policy research unit (QORU), 2018; <https://www.pssru.ac.uk/pub/5424.pdf>

⁵ More information on the IPC programme can be found here; <https://www.england.nhs.uk/ipc/>.

3.3 Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs) and Integrated Care Systems (ICSs), which are more advanced systems, are partnerships between NHS bodies and local government that facilitate the implementation of more joined up and proactive ways of delivering care. These systems build on learning from the vanguard programme and are the primary means for spreading new care models. Half of the first wave of integrated care systems contained a vanguard, and all have plans for implementing new care models.

3.4 NHS England has collected and published good practice that can help accelerate progress in all systems, including lessons learned from vanguards now within wider ICSs. Using the learning from vanguards, the NHS is co-designing approaches to further integration of general practice and community services through primary care networks; encouraging neighbourhood, local area and the 'system' level collaborations of primary care, secondary care and social care; and supporting development of population health management approaches to inform planning and delivery of more proactive and preventative care. An example of this is how the Enhanced Health in Care Homes framework developed with vanguards (which includes enhanced primary care support and in-reach to care homes from NHS multidisciplinary teams) is now being embedded within all ICSs.

4: PAC conclusion: *There is a profound lack of transparency and accountability in local health and social care systems.*

4: PAC recommendation: *By December 2018, the Department, Ministry and NHS England should set out how accountability will work both locally and nationally under new integrated care system arrangements, and how the public can find out about progress on integration and the performance of the health and social care system in their local area.*

4.1 The Government disagrees with the committee's conclusion, but agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018.

4.2 NHS England and NHS Improvement are working with partners to agree how local and national accountability arrangements for integrated care systems will work, and how the public can access information about the progress and performance of their local Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships or Integrated Care Systems, as part of the process to develop the NHS Long Term Plan which is due for publication before the end of 2018. NHS Improvement has also produced a review of governance models, which has been disseminated to all Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships and will be published later this year.

4.3 NHS England and NHS Improvement will provide further clarity on the future of STPs and ICSs in the Long-Term Plan, including how STPs and ICSs will bring together commissioners, providers, and invite Local Authorities and other stakeholders, to support shared decision making and place based planning whilst also developing the appropriate accountability models.

5: PAC conclusion: *The quality and effectiveness of local health and social care leaders is variable, which makes it difficult for them to drive system-wide improvements in commissioning and service delivery.*

5: PAC recommendation: *The Department, Ministry and NHS England should write to the Committee by December 2018 to set out how they will develop and support local leadership consistently.*

5.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018.

5.2 The Government recognises the need to evolve and adapt to ensure the consistent development and support of local leadership.

5.3 Whilst individual employers, and the boards of health and care organisations, are responsible for the development and management of their leaders, the Government has a responsibility to ensure that individual employers and boards have the infrastructure and support in place to enable this to occur. NHS Improvement, will develop a plan and write back to the Committee by March 2019. The plan will be delivered through the seven new regions working closely with the NHS Leadership Academy which is transferring into NHS Improvement as part of the new Chief People Officer function.

5.4 At a national level, the NHS Leadership Academy and Skills for Care already provides development training and support to leaders across the sector. NHS Improvement, working in partnership with the Leadership Academy, is responsible for managing NHS leadership talent. Through the NHS Leadership Academy, HEE delivers a range of inclusive, high quality leadership development programmes for staff working at all levels in the health and care system. These programmes support staff to gain the skills, knowledge and behaviours required to lead people.

5.5 As part of the Care and Health Improvement Programme, the Department commissions the Local Government Association (LGA) and NHS Clinical Commissioners to co-design and co-deliver a sector-led leadership programme to support the development of Health and Wellbeing Boards. These provide a forum where diverse views from the community can be fed in.

6: PAC conclusion: *There is a wide gap in pay and career structure between people who work in the NHS compared with social care.*

6: PAC recommendation: *The Department should ensure its workforce plan addresses the previous criticisms made by the Committee and make sure it tackles the longstanding barriers between health and social care, particularly disparity in pay and conditions and the transfer of pension arrangements.*

6.1 The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

Target implementation date: December 2018.

6.2 The Government agrees that it is important to tackle the barriers between the health and social care sectors. In December 2017 Health Education England published a draft Health and Care Workforce Strategy. The Department published a consultation on the adult social care workforce earlier this year.

6.3 Evidence from this consultation, along with feedback from the social care workforce through Talk Health and Care, the Department's online engagement portal for front line staff, will inform the proposals for the social care workforce that will be set out in the Social Care Green Paper, published later in 2018. Options for the health workforce will be covered in the upcoming NHS Long Term Plan, with the strategy to be published following the spending review.

6.4 The care sector is predominantly a private market with providers free to set their wage structures and employee benefits, and so it is not the role of Government to mandate a particular level of pay, other than that already set by Government across all sectors by the National Minimum Wage and the National Living Wage (NLW). The Department does, however, work with representatives of the sector and its commissioners to support delivery of the best package of conditions for the workforce. Transfers of pension benefits between the Local Government Pension Scheme and NHS Pension Scheme are permitted and are governed by the public-sector club transfer scheme.

6.5 The NLW has increased by 16% between 2015 and 2018. Following the budget announcement, the NLW is due to increase on average by a further 5% in each of the next two years.

Treasury Minutes Archive⁶

Treasury Minutes are the Government's response to reports from the Committee of Public Accounts. Treasury Minutes are Command Papers laid in Parliament.

Session 2017-19

Committee Recommendations: 396
Recommendations agreed: 361 (91%)
Recommendations disagreed: 35 (9%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
December 2017	Government response to PAC report 1	Cm 9549
January 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 2 and 3	Cm 9565
March 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 4-11	Cm 9575
March 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 12-19	Cm 9596
May 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 20-30	Cm 9618
June 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 31-37	Cm 9643
July 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 38-42	Cm 9667
October 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 43-58	Cm 9702
December 2018	Government responses to PAC reports 59-63	Cm 9740

Session 2016-17

Committee Recommendations: 393
Recommendations agreed: 356 (91%)
Recommendations disagreed: 37 (9%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
November 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 1-13	Cm 9351
December 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 14-21	Cm 9389
February 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 22-25 and 28	Cm 9413
March 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 26-27 and 29-34 ⁷	Cm 9429
March 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 35-41	Cm 9433
October 2017	Government responses to PAC reports 42-44 and 46-64	Cm 9505

Session 2015-16

Committee Recommendations: 262
Recommendations agreed: 225 (86%)
Recommendations disagreed: 37 (14%)

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
December 2015	Government responses to PAC reports 1 to 3	Cm 9170
January 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 4 to 8	Cm 9190
March 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 9 to 14	Cm 9220
March 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 15-20	Cm 9237
April 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 21-26	Cm 9260
May 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 27-33	Cm 9270
July 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 34-36; 38; and 40-42	Cm 9323
November 2016	Government responses to PAC reports 37 and 39 (part 1)	Cm 9351
December 2016	Government response to PAC report 39 (part 2)	Cm 9389

⁶ List of Treasury Minutes responses for Sessions 2010-15 are annexed in the Government's response to PAC Report 52

⁷ Report 32 contains 6 conclusions only.

Treasury Minutes Progress Reports Archive

Treasury Minutes Progress Reports are the Government's response on the implementation of recommendations from the Committee of Public Accounts. Treasury Minutes Progress Reports are Command Papers laid in Parliament.

Publication Date	PAC Reports	Ref Number
January 2012	Session 2010-12: updates on 13 PAC reports	Cm 8271
July 2012	Session 2010-12: updates on 28 PAC reports	Cm 8387
February 2013	Session 2010-12: updates on 31 PAC reports	Cm 8539
July 2014	Session 2010-12: updates on 60 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 37 PAC reports	Cm 8899
March 2015	Session 2010-12: updates on 26 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 17 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 43 PAC reports	Cm 9034
February 2016	Session 2010-12: updates on 8 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 22 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 27 PAC reports	Cm 9202
July 2016	Session 2010-12: updates on 6 PAC reports Session 2012-13: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 15 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 22 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 6 PAC reports	Cm 9320
January 2017	Session 2010-12: updates on 1 PAC report Session 2013-14: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 18 PAC reports	Cm 9407
October 2017	Session 2010-12: updates on 3 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 7 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 12 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 26 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 39 PAC reports	Cm 9506
January 2018	Session 2010-12: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 5 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 4 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 14 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 52 PAC reports	Cm 9566
July 2018	Session 2010-12: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2013-14: updates on 4 PAC reports Session 2014-15: updates on 2 PAC reports Session 2015-16: updates on 9 PAC reports Session 2016-17: updates on 38 PAC reports Session 2017-19: updates on 17 PAC reports ⁸	Cm 9668

⁸ Contains updates on Treasury Minutes - Session 2017-19 - up to March 2018.

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