MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME I

MILITARY STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

Version 1.3
18 March 2015

Prepared by: Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC)
Document Custodian: MIC Steering Group
Document Review: Annually

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

SIGNATORIES

STEPHEN GILMORE
Rear Admiral
Deputy Chief, Joint Operations
Australian Defense Force

JONATHAN VANCE
Major General
Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff
Canadian Forces

for

DIDIER CASTRES
General de Corps d'Armée
Deputy Chief of Staff (Ops)
French Joint Defense Staff

for

HANS-WERNER FRITZ
Generalleutnant
Director, Strategy and Operations
German Federal Ministry of Defense

SALVATORE FARINA
Generale di Divisione
Director, Military Policy & Planning Div.
Italian Defense General Staff

for

ROBERT JUDSON
Air Vice Marshal
Assistant Chief of the Defense Staff (Ops)
UK Ministry of Defense

KURT W. TIDD
Vice Admiral
Director of Operations, J3
U.S. Joint Staff

The MIC Principals approved and signed the entire restructured CGB (3rd Edition) series during the November 2012 MIC Principals meeting.

ENDORSEMENT

During the March 2015 Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG) meeting, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations/plans branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	Steering Group
Version 1.1	07 November 2013	Ops Sup MIWG / Steering Group
Version 1.2	07 July 2014	Steering Group
Version 1.3	18 March 2015	Ops Sup MIWG / Steering Group

Summary of Changes:

1. Updated Chapter 1, Section V – Lead Nation Concept
2. Updated Annex A – MIC Document Reference List with NATO ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)
3. Updated the Narrative definition in Annex B.
4. Referenced the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands in CBG Vol III.4 under Stabilization section 0110.

Review Cycle:

Annual

Distribution:

Unlimited distribution; electronic copy of publication can be found on the MIC All Partners Access Network (APAN) website at https://community.apan.org/mic/

Comments:

Please forward your comments on this document to the MIC Executive Secretariat (ES) at js.mic.es@mail.mil

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SIGNATORIES i

RECORD OF CHANGES iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS vi

PREFACE viii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CBG VOLUME I xii

Chapter 1 – Fundamentals 1

- **Section I - Future Coalition Operating Environment** 1
- **Section II - Comprehensive Approach** 2
- **Section III - Non-military Contributions** 3
- **Section IV - Political Dimension** 4
- **Section V - Lead Nation Concept** 5
- **Section VI - Challenges of Coalition Operations** 9
- **Section VII - Principles of Coalition Operations** 11
- **Section VIII - Stages of a Coalition Operation** 12

Chapter 2 – Levels of Activity 25

- **Section I - Strategic National Level** 26
  - Essential Strategic Guidance 26
  - Nations' Decision Making Processes 27
- **Section II - The Military Strategic Level and the Implications for the Lead Nation** 28
- **Section III - The Operational Level** 29
  - Coalition Command 30
- **Section IV - The Operational Level Framework** 30

Chapter 3 – Command and Control 33

- **Section I - Command and Control Considerations at the Strategic Level** 33
  - National Interest 33
  - Legal 33
  - Rules of Engagement 34
  - Constitutional Constraints 35
  - Treaty Obligations 35
  - Policy Constraints 35
- **Section II - Command and Control Considerations at the Operational Level** 35
- **Section III - MIC Nations' Command and Control during Operations other than Combat** 36

Mission: Humanitarian and Disaster Relief 37
Mission: Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation 38
Mission: Peace Support 39

Annex A – Doctrine References A-1

General Remarks A-1

MIC Document Reference List A-2

Strategic Context A-2
Command and Control A-3
CTF Organizational Structure and Staffing A-3
Campaign Planning A-4
Personnel A-5
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance A-5
Operations A-6
Logistics A-7
Communications A-9
Medical A-10
Civil-Military Interface and Cooperation A-11
Legal Issues A-11
Public Affairs A-12
Financial Management A-12
Host Nation Concerns A-12

Annex B – Terms B-1

PREFACE

Background

The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) was formed in October 1996 to provide an oversight of coalition interoperability and assist in coalition building. MIC member nations are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The objective of the MIC is to influence the development of operational practices and enable more effective coalition operations.

The MIC, led by senior operations officers of the member nations, focuses on identifying and addressing interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment. It addresses inter-agency and comprehensive approach activities that are key to planning and conducting coalition operations. Additionally, it addresses civil-military activities that are key in establishing and conducting coalitions as well as policy issues for supporting and monitoring coalitions and/or multinational operations. It is not intended to duplicate or to subsume other interoperability working groups or forums.

Purpose of the Coalition Building Guide

The purpose of the Coalition Building Guide (CBG) is to facilitate lead nations, troop contributing nations and participants in the establishment, and effective operation of, a coalition anywhere on the globe.

Specifically, the Guide concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of multinational joint operations and identifies some of the essential factors associated with the process of coalition building. Additionally, it attempts to provide a common framework of reference for contributing nations.

Audience

This Guide has been written to assist MIC member nations, and their potential partners, to work more effectively together. It also aims to offer guidance to a lead nation, a designated Coalition Force Commander and the coalition staff.

Key Assumptions

1. Future military operations are increasingly likely to be multinational and inter-agency in character.

2. A multinational operation may be carried out within an established alliance framework or through the formation of a coalition.

3. In most cases, coalition operations will be facilitated by the selection of a lead nation, the definition and responsibilities are within this Guide.

4. Each MIC member recognizes that it may be called upon to perform the role of lead nation in future multinational operations.

5. There will be a recognized international organization that provides the mandate for a legitimate level of activities.

Coalition Building Guide Structure

The CBG does not constitute official policy or doctrine, nor does it represent a definitive staff planning or military decision-making guide. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joint doctrine, unless otherwise specifically directed, is the default doctrine for planning and conducting coalition operations.[1] Unlimited local reproduction and distribution is authorized.

The CBG is a living document that is developed when lessons are identified during the conduct of coalition operations, training and experimentation. It is also influenced by technological advances that may enhance aspects of coalition interoperability and communications, as well as national and alliance doctrinal development.

The CBG is organized into three volumes so that readers can easily extract the information required. Volume I covers the fundamentals and deals with interoperability issues at the very high strategic level. Volume II covers the principles of planning coalition operations at the strategic level. Specifically, Volume II covers:

- Campaigning;
- Strategic Planning Guidance;
- MIC Nations' Strategic Planning Framework;
- Coalition Operational Planning;
- Coalition C2 Structures; and
- Key Cross Functional Considerations.

Volume III is a compendium of separate MIC documents that covers key interoperability issues that need to be considered at the strategic/high operational level. This includes:

- Volume III.1 - Future Coalition Operating Environment (FCOE) document
- Volume III.2 - Cross-Cultural Awareness and Competence (CCAC) document
- Volume III.3 - MIC Nations' Decision Making Processes
- Volume III.4 - Stabilization Handbook

[1] This guide uses established NATO Allied Joint doctrine as a basis. NATO doctrine is the 'default' doctrine for a MIC member nation led coalition unless the lead nation specifies the military doctrine to be used. If a lead nation chooses to use other than NATO doctrine it must ensure all participating coalition partners have access to the doctrine in use. Operating procedures as well as tactics, techniques and procedures will be prescribed by the lead nation.

- Volume III.5 - Rapid Recce Handbook for H/DR
- Volume III.6 - Logistic Planning Considerations
- Volume III.7 - Common Record of Logistic Recce for Coalition Partners
- Volume III.8 - CIS Planning Considerations
- Volume III.9 - National Factors for COIN
- Volume III.10 - National Perspectives on the Use of Biometric Data
- Volume III.11 - National Positions about Private Security Companies
- Volume III.12 - Counter-IED
- Volume III.13 - Detainee Operations
- Volume III.14 - Internally Displaced Persons
- Volume III.15 - Military Contribution to Strategic Communications
- Volume III.16 - Cyber Defense

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CBG VOLUME I

Volume I covers the fundamentals of coalition building. In a globalized world, nations are unlikely to conduct operations on their own. Rather, nations are likely to get involved as part of an alliance or a coalition. In future operations, coalitions are likely to operate in an environment that is congested, cluttered, contested, connected or constrained. **To be successful in such a complex and shifting environment, interoperable capabilities, common doctrine development, coalition planning, exercises and experimentation will need to be considered well in advance and addressed**.

!

A comprehensive approach - aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions - will underpin how coalitions will operate. **The guiding principles of: engagement, collaboration, cooperation, coordination, shared understanding, unity of effort and working towards a common goal are enduring.**

!

While contributing a military force is the highest level of commitment for a nation, other non-military contributions are also vital to the success of coalition operations. These include: diplomatic, financial, logistic lift and support, basing, access and over flight rights.

The Coalition Building Guide is founded upon the lead nation concept. The selection of a lead nation will occur as a coalition begins to form and must be a politically acceptable choice for the other coalition partners. The lead nation, after consultation, will develop the coalition's objectives as well as lead the coordination and building of consensus during the coalition's planning and execution phases.

There are a number of challenges to building and working as a coalition that could threaten the success of the campaign. These may include: timely decision making; shared situational understanding; mission creep; interoperability; force protection; and a coordinated coalition information strategy underpinned by a common narrative. As well as the Principles of War, defining objectives and unity of purpose could assist the Coalition Force Commander (CFC) address some of these (and other) challenges.

At the strategic national level, nations are influenced by internal and external factors that shape national interests. They play a key role in establishing an appropriate decision making process among coalition nations, linking together the consultation and planning processes. **The development of *essential strategic guidance* is critical for a coalition as it defines the coalition's objectives and overall political-military approach and facilitates the development of a Strategic Communication framework**.

!

The military strategic level determines how military power should be developed and applied within a comprehensive approach framework to achieve coalition objectives; and how they relate to the end state. The role of the military force must be clearly understood by the operational commander.

The operational level provides the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. Shaping the operational environment, engaging to attack the opposing forces will and cohesion, exploiting opportunities, protecting the coalition force and its cohesion, and sustaining the force are 5 functions that form an operational-level framework that assist the CFC to both visualize and conduct the operation. The framework also enables a commander to describe how subordinate commander's missions relate to each other in time, space and purpose.

!

Command and control (C2) is a key to building an effective coalition. At the strategic level, national interests, legal frameworks, rules of engagement, constitutional and political constraints and treaty obligations will influence the level of command and control. It is vital, therefore, that well in advance, the CFC is aware of the C2 constraints. At the operational level, C2 considerations include: the complexity of the C2 arrangements, the delegated level of C2, tempo and political imperatives.

Humanitarian and disaster relief operations, non-combatant evacuation operations and peace support operations have specific strategic C2 issues that need to be understood by the MIC nations and their partners.

CHAPTER 1 – FUNDAMENTALS

0101. In a globalized world, nations are unlikely to conduct operations on their own. Rather, nations are likely to get involved as part of an alliance or a coalition formed to achieve nationally and internationally-agreed objectives. Cooperation between nations is key to working effectively and harmoniously in a coalition. This cooperation allows political and military objectives to be achieved when unilateral action would be insufficient or undesirable. Merging the capabilities of different military forces adds depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities), as well as providing access to national and/or regional infrastructure and, potentially, logistics, information and intelligence.

0102. This Chapter starts by looking ahead, highlighting likely interoperability issues that coalitions may face in the future operating environment. The remainder of the Chapter considers the contemporary operating environment, firstly discussing the comprehensive approach, the non-military contribution and the political dimension before introducing the lead nation concept. Finally, the Chapter highlights the key challenges of conducting coalition operations, identifies some principles and lists the stages of operation.

SECTION I - FUTURE COALITION OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

0103. In the future, coalitions are likely to operate in an environment that is congested, cluttered, contested, connected or constrained.[2] **To be successful in this complex and shifting operating environment, interoperability issues need to considered and addressed well in advance**. Increasingly, MIC nations are likely to operate with inter-agency, governmental and non-governmental organizations. These trends create several interoperability challenges for coalition nations in the areas of interoperable capabilities, common doctrine development, coalition planning, exercises and experimentation. !

0104. All instruments of national power may be employed in future coalition operations. This requires a comprehensive approach that must be developed, understood, exercised, and technically and legally enabled. Security access, reliability and vulnerability challenges must be addressed as reliance on commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf products increases.

0105. Future coalitions must be able to conduct rapid mission and end state analysis. This will generate commander's guidance and enable decentralized execution, while employing compatible doctrine, command and operating concepts as much as possible. **The ability to share information in a collaborative environment and to quickly adapt to changing situations continues to be essential. Team building and confidence are also key aspects**. !

[2] UK MOD Global Strategic Trends Program, *Future Character of Conflict*, February 2010.

0106. **CBG Volume III.1 - Future Coalition Operating Environment**: Interoperability Challenges for the Future provides a framework for enhanced interoperability at the strategic and high operational level in the future coalition operating environment (5-20 years out).

SECTION II - COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

0107. In response to a changing security environment, many governments and organizations are developing their comprehensive crisis management concepts and approaches. While there is no commonly accepted definition for the term comprehensive approach, there is broad agreement that it implies the pursuit of an approach aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international missions. A comprehensive approach seeks to promote a whole of government approach, exploiting cohesion and realizing synergies; it underpins how coalitions will operate.

0108. All efforts to comprehensively organize an international engagement in any given pre-crisis or crisis situation must be politically directed. But, military expectations for defined end states, goals or objectives, or a common understanding of planning, command and control, and communications may not – or only partially – be met.

0109. A military plan is most likely to succeed (in making a significant contribution to the desired outcome) when it is nested within a comprehensive response, itself based upon a shared understanding of the problem and a universal commitment to resolve it. **Unity of command may be elusive and, realistically, only unity of purpose can be achieved. In this case only through negotiation will commanders and other actors be able to confirm responsibilities, resolve differences, facilitate coordination and create unity of effort across a diverse multi-agency 'coalition'**.

0110. In an otherwise largely political process, militaries play a substantial role advising and enacting political processes throughout the phases of a conflict. To promote the synergies of a civil-military team effort, the military must specify its role and possible contributions throughout the entire evolution of a crisis.

- **Crisis prevention**. Requires an integrated diplomatic and military approach to foster regional security by influencing and, if necessary, deterring potential adversaries without the use of kinetic force. The prevailing military role may be an advisory one, while complementing ongoing activities of civilian organizations.

- **Stabilization.** Militaries can provide the civilian activities pre-condition of a safe and secure environment, and provide significant support to other comprehensive activities required to re-establish the legitimacy of a state in question. Military forces in planning for and conducting stabilization operations must build strong relationships through cooperation, collaboration and coordination with a multitude of governmental, non-governmental, private and international organizations and agencies as well as other

military forces. See CBG Vol III.4 The Military Contribution to Stabilization Operations, Annex C, for a case study on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands.

- **Transition**. Detailed integration of all civil-military functions will be transferred from the military to a follow-on authority, with agreed and coherent objectives established as soon as possible. However, this must be tempered by the requirement for the military to maintain security and provide specific functional area support the follow-on authority.

0111. Although the implementation of this comprehensive approach may vary between the levels of operation (strategic, operational and tactical), and from one crisis to another, a number of guiding principles apply:

a. **The need for proactive engagement between all actors, before and during a crisis**. !

b. **The importance of shared understanding engendered through cooperative working, liaison, education and a common language**. !

c. **The value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust and a willingness to cooperate – institutional familiarity and information sharing are key**. !

d. **Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common goal (or outcome), and ideally mutually agreed objectives, underpinned, even in the absence of unity of command, by unity of purpose**. !

0112. Having Terms of Reference, Memorandums of Understanding or agreements at a high level provides some framework for coordination. Implementing the comprehensive approach requires sensitivity, rapport, respect, trust, patience and tact, as well as a determination to collaborate with all actors, military and civilian, at all levels.

SECTION III - NON-MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

0113. Although the highest level of commitment is when a nation provides combat forces (troops, ships, aircraft and staff officers), the comprehensive approach recognizes that non-military contributions are also vital to the success of coalition operations (Figure 1.1). Diplomatic, financial and logistic support is required for all coalition operations. Logistic, lift and sustainment resources along with basing, access and over flight rights are required to sustain coalition operations. Stabilization and reconstruction resources, along with other governance and non-military ministerial support, is required to resolve conflicts allowing military forces to eventually withdraw.



Figure 1.1 – Coalition Contribution

SECTION IV - POLITICAL DIMENSION

0114. National contributions will be shaped by national interest and political imperatives. They should, therefore, be viewed in terms of their wider political, as well as purely military, benefit. The political advantages of multinational cooperation include sharing political risks, demonstrating economic, diplomatic, military or political support to other regions as well as influencing national and international opinion, all of which may be as, if not more, critical to delivering an enduring resolution to a crisis than any discrete capability.

0115. Political consensus is a necessary condition for coalition success and depends on at least three conditions:

a. **Legitimacy**. The use of force must be legitimate, and be seen to be so. It is the essential foundation upon which a commander builds authority for the campaign; it also bolsters morale and promotes cohesion within a force. It is based on international law and a clear mandate. However, it encompasses not only what is considered legally permissible (both nationally and internationally), but also what is judged ethically and morally acceptable. Normally a recognized international civil

authority, such as the UN, will endorse coalition activity and may also designate, or accept the offered services of, a lead nation[3]. It will also provide overarching political guidance, as well as endorsement of strategic goals and the desired end state. While it is possible that a coalition might act in the absence of formal sanction from a recognized authority, such a decision could undermine legitimacy from the outset.

b. **Political consultation allowing all participating nations to be part of the decision-making process**. Within the context of a firm legal basis and a designated lead nation, a forum for political consultation is essential. It must be inclusive and comprehensive – all nations should be represented at an appropriate level (e.g. Ambassador). Military participation in this process should be provided by a corresponding military authority.

c. **Political control through all phases of the operation**. Political direction of the operation will be exercised through the designated political authority.

0116. To coordinate the political/military interface, a lead nation will assist in the translation of political objectives into supporting strategic military objectives, with a desired end state. Essentially, it converts policy and political guidance into military direction. Moreover, as well as implementing decisions, it must report to the international community. **Functional links between the political and military authority should be established early**. !

SECTION V - LEAD NATION CONCEPT

0117. The Coalition Building Guide (CBG) is based upon the lead nation concept. For the purposes of the CBG, the lead nation is described as:

> *The Lead Nation is that nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, an/or tactical levels*.

[3] The lead nation concept is described in Section V.

To avoid possible confusion, it must be noted that the CBG definition differs from, but is roughly analogous to, terms utilized in NATO. The 'lead nation' referred to here would be recognizable within NATO as the 'framework nation,' whereas 'functional lead agent' would correspond to a nation within NATO which is designated as a 'Lead Nation' for functional specialty support. NATO's AJP-3, *Allied Joint Operations* defines 'framework nation' as follows. *Forces based on a framework nation are commanded by an officer of that nation. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures, although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework nation*. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the 'best ideas' of the contributing nations.

NATIONAL RESERVATION: France believes there may be instances in which will justify the creation of a 'group of lead nations', which may be possible if discrete nations have the strategic, operational and tactical leads, for example. This may also be the case in a situation which demands the 'division of labor' across nations at all levels in order to maximize specialist capabilities. This Guide does not explore that level of complexity. France believes that this definition should read as follows:

'The lead nation, **or group of lead nations**, is '*that nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels*.'

0118. The selection of a lead nation will occur within the international strategic context as a coalition begins to form. It is assumed that coalition operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized under international law originating with such an authority as the United Nations Security Council.[4] This recognized 'civil authority' will most likely act to initiate or approve the coalition activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching objectives and the desired end state. It is further assumed that this same entity would designate, or accept the offered services of a lead nation. **The lead nation must be willing and capable of assuming the role. It must be able to organize consultation on and the development of the coalition's political objectives, act as sponsor and spokesman for the coalition's operations in the world community, lead coordination and building of consensus during the coalition's planning and execution phases, and be competent to carry out the anticipated operation**. It must above all be a politically acceptable choice for the other coalition partners. The latter is likely to include consideration of the lead nation's ties to and

[4] **NATIONAL RESERVATION:** France does not agree with the wording that suggests that a body other than the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions such as those described in this Guide.

interests in the specific region or conflict and its acceptability to the regional actors involved. International political consultation and control of the operation needs to be carried out through an appropriate council of national leaders duly empowered by their respective governments. A preponderance or operationally significant share of the overall force contribution is a clear factor in selection of a lead nation; however, that nation must also possess the strategic and political attributes required to sustain a coalition, or the coalition effort is likely to fail.

0119. The lead nation provides the commander and the majority of staff with the coalition headquarters. Moreover, it is likely to dictate the language and command and staff procedures utilized. **Ultimately the lead nation assumes responsibility for all aspects of planning and execution and provides the Command, Control, Communications and Information (C3I) structure, doctrine[5] and logistic[6] coordination which supports it**. Other nations then assign contributions to the force, and fulfill some positions within the lead nation's staff. Clearly, a prospective lead nation must seek or consent to the role, which is likely to be driven by national interests across the spheres of security, economic, political, and culture. Such a commitment will be pivotal to selection. However, selection will also be shaped by acceptability to both coalition partners and the indigenous political structure.

!

0120. It cannot be assumed that any particular definition of Lead Nation will perfectly apply to each and every coalition operational situation. For example, during the French operation in Mali (Operation SERVAL), supporting nations maintained operational control of their own forces. France assumed political responsibility for the operation, provided the combat forces, led the planning effort, and determined operational and logistical requirements. Other nations participating in the effort provided support to the French operation under national operational control. The Mali example contrasts with the NATO and EU models, whereby one nation provides a coalition C2 framework or acts as lead nation within a coalition, and other nations' forces participating and/or supporting typically operate under the operational control of the established coalition C2 structure.

0121. The most critical activity at the outset of the establishment of a coalition or multinational operation is to determine the framework and C2 structure (including the liaison network) under which participating forces will operate and to clearly define the relationship between the various nations participating in the operation.

0122. The following chart illustrates notional roles for lead and supporting nations in the context of various frameworks (NATO, EU, UK Joint Expeditionary Force, Op SERVAL).

[5] NATO Allied Joint Doctrine is the default doctrine for a MIC member nation led coalition operations.
[6] According to NATO's AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, lead nation logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.

		NATO			EU	JEF	FR (Mali)
Decision & Responsibility	Political control & responsibility Defines strategy	NATO			EU	UK	FR
Combat Forces	Planning & C2	*Fully integrated*	*Lead nation*	*Framework nation*			
		NATO Proportional share	One nation provides CDR, staff, C2 capability, CIS, doctrine coordinates. Other nations can fill staff positions.	One nation provides C2 framework	EU OHQ (framework nation provides significant amount of HQ)	UK	FR
	Combat forces	OPCON	OPCON Other nations can contribute.	OPCON	OPCON (framework nation provides significant amount of assets)	OPCON All JEF nations	OPCON FR forces only
	Procedures	NATO	Lead nation	NATO			
Logistics & Support	Planning & execution	NATO / Lead nation LOG / role specialist nation coordinates	One nation provides log	NATO / Lead nation LOG / role specialist nation coordinates	EU OHQ (Logistic lead nation)	UK	FR
	Assets	OPCON	OPCON	OPCON	OPCON	OPCON All JEF nations	OPCON FR assets TACON of external assets

Table 1.1 – Lead Nation Concept

SECTION VI - CHALLENGES OF COALITION OPERATIONS

0123. Working as a coalition poses a number of key challenges that could threaten the success of the campaign. These include:

a. development of an agreed and accepted information strategy and narrative;

b. the formation of an effective command system;

c. an intelligence system which can draw and share data from a number of multinational and national sources;

d. the existence of national caveats on employment that may affect the use of force elements;

e. flexible coalition communications systems and procedures that allows nations to join coalition 'mission' networks quickly within a federated networking construct; and

f. a logistic system that acknowledges national responsibilities for support but also caters for multinational needs.

0124. Challenges that may need to be addressed include:

a. **Timely decision-making**. Multinational command may lead to slower response times than purely national command arrangements. The speed and quality of decision-making may, therefore, be reduced. Adopting common doctrine, procedures and realistic training can help mitigate such challenges.

b. **Shared situational understanding**. It is important to establish and maintain a common understanding of the operating environment and the problem that must be addressed in the operation that coalition forces are assigned to. For longer duration campaigns, for campaign continuity it is especially important to understand the overall campaign design and its underlying logic. **This understanding needs to be maintained and not lost during key personnel (commanders and planning staff), headquarters or unit rotation**.

!

c. **Mission Creep**. Mission creep is the adoption of additional tasks to a mission that may not conform to the original purpose. In such situations there is a danger of disconnection between strategic objectives and the realities in the Joint Operations Area resulting in poorly defined, unrealistic or inappropriate missions. This is distinct from deliberate reframing of the problem as the commander's understanding of the environment or problem changes.

d. **Interoperability**. The complexity of an operation will determine the appropriate level of interoperability and the composition of the force will determine the interoperability standards. A lack of interoperability in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities is likely to have a negative effect on force cohesion and capability. Procedural and tactical differences may present the force with situations where units from different services and nations not able to work together effectively. Language differences may present communications problems that could result in differences in interpretation of the mission or assigned tasks. Technical difficulties can cause a lack of system compatibility. National security concerns or a lack of interoperability can result in the inability to exchange information, intelligence, technical data, or communications. Inadequate or incomplete preparations to join coalition 'mission' networks may introduce unexpected or unnoticed system vulnerabilities that may undermine force protection measures or compromise classified mission information. Inability to use common sources may degrade logistic capabilities and thus affect the sustainability of the force. Joint and multinational forces must have interoperable combat identification procedures and capabilities to minimize the risk of fratricide and enhance operational efficiency.

e. **Force Protection**. Nations have different force protection philosophies, policies and priorities. **In a multinational force these differences should be reconciled into an overall Coalition Force Protection policy otherwise an opposing force can exploit them.** Both traditional and non-traditional threats, such as insider attacks, must be dealt with not only from a military perspective but from a comprehensive approach utilizing all levers of national power along with those of the host nation. Considering the contemporary computer network (or 'cyberspace') environment, nations' computer protection measures, their cyberspace threat and risk assessments, and their network certification and accreditation approaches should be standardized or at least clearly understood by coalition network planners before nations are permitted to connect their national systems within a federated coalition 'mission' network construct. **CBG Volume II, Chapter 6 – Force Protection**: Provides a Force Protection Model and considerations for staffing/planning force protection within a coalition.

f. **Coalition Information Strategy**. **It is important that coalition partners coordinate all activities across all instruments of power, in support of a coalition information strategy from the earliest stages of the coalition building and strategic planning process.** The coalition information strategy sets out the narrative, key themes, messages and audiences, which shape the general approach and the conduct of specific activities, both physical and psychological. It must be based on a sound understanding of the information environment. Individual nations will have full responsibility for then implementing these activities affecting their domestic audiences. Nations may also undertake additional information activities

independently, provided they are consistent with the agreed strategic-political guidance.

SECTION VII - PRINCIPLES OF COALITION OPERATIONS

0125. For commanders, principles are important guidelines in forming and selecting a course of action and in commanding and controlling operations. Although there is a common agreement on the importance and relevance of the principles, they are not absolute. The operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some of them rather than others. The Principles of War remain the overarching and enduring principles that can be applied to all operations. In addition to the Principles of War, for coalition operations, the following are applicable.

a. **Definition of Objectives**. Coalition operations should be directed towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end state. The mission and objectives should be defined with absolute clarity before operations begin and reflect the mission narrative. When an objective has been identified as the 'main effort', all Joint activity should be directed towards its achievement. Four key questions should be considered in the process of defining the objectives and the end state:
   i. What is the purpose of the mission?
   ii. What criteria constitute mission accomplishment?
   iii. What are the exit criteria?
   iv. Who declares success or victory?

b. **Unity of Purpose**. Coalition and inter-agency operations depend on cooperation in order to coordinate all activities to realize the maximum combined effort. Military forces achieve this principally through *unity of command*, which provides the necessary cohesion for planning and execution of operations. It is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and coordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander. In a complex operational environment the commander is also striving to achieve coordination with the other instruments of power. Unity of command is rarely possible when dealing with non-military agencies, so *unity of purpose* is more appropriate; where goodwill, a common purpose, clear and agreed division of responsibilities, and an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of others, are essential elements of achieving unity of purpose and achieving the maximum collective effort.

c. **Impartiality**. Some operations should be conducted impartially, in accordance with its mandate, and without favor or prejudice to any party.

d. **Consent**. The degree of acquiescence to the presence of a force charged with a peace support mission. Consent will vary in time and space horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict.

e. **Legitimacy**. The legitimacy of the operation and the wider perception of that legitimacy will provide the foundation for support from the international community, contributing nations, and involved parties (including the indigenous civil community).

f. **Credibility**. For an operation to be effective, it should be credible and perceived as such by all parties. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties' assessment of the force's capability to accomplish the mission.

g. **Mutual Respect**. The respect in which a joint force is held is a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the parties to a conflict and the local population.

h. **Transparency**. The Joint Force's mission and concept of operations should be easily understood and obvious to all parties. Failure to achieve common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility.

i. **Environmental Protection**. Environmental protection is the application and integration of all aspects of environmental considerations as they apply to military operations. Factors that should be considered include pollution prevention, waste management, conservation heritage protection and protection of flora and fault.

SECTION VIII - STAGES OF A COALITION OPERATION

0126. A coalition operation normally consists of a number of stages, some of which occur at the military strategic level (for example, force generation). Typical stages at the operational level, which may overlap and can occur at the same time depending on the situation and mission, are:

a. Orientation (develop a common understanding of the problem)

b. Knowledge development/analysis (framing the problem).

c. Development of a campaign plan/Operation Plan (OPLAN).

d. Force preparation, including build-up, assembly and pre-mission training.

e. Build-up of logistic support, including host nation support.

f. Deployment to the area where operations are to be conducted or the reinforcement of in-place forces.

g. Execution of operations.

h. Operation Re-deployment of forces.

i. Termination and military post operation activities.

j. Operation/Campaign analysis – doctrine evaluation and lessons learned.

0127. The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) should have, within constraints, the greatest possible freedom of action in the planning and execution of operations in a designated Joint Area of Operations. All stages of an operation require continuous coordination and review. Except where specifically restricted by agreements with nations, the CFC may reassign operational command and/or forces under his command as deemed appropriate. The following guidance applies: 'all command relationships must facilitate the smooth transition of all stages'.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

.

CHAPTER 2 – LEVELS OF ACTIVITY

0201. The CBG adheres to the 4-tiered strategic (political/governmental) – military-strategic-operational-tactical paradigm for the direction of operations (Figure 2.1). Note that some nations may insert a theatre strategic level between the national levels and operational levels. The political level concerns the application of the full range of national resources, across all instruments of power, to achieve national policy objectives. It is the domain of Heads of Government and ministers and encompasses the recognized civil authority, whose mandate underpins the multinational response. Within a coalition, responsibility for the application of resources in the pursuit of agreed objectives, which will be driven by both national and coalition interests, will be shared by coalition members at this level. Operations are then directed at the strategic level and planned, executed and sustained at the operational and tactical levels, based on their intended effect or contribution to realizing the stated objectives. This Guide is focused upon the military-strategic and operational levels.

Figure 2.1 – Tiered Levels

SECTION I - STRATEGIC NATIONAL LEVEL

0202. At the strategic level, nations are influenced by internal and external factors that shape national interests. The convergence of national interests is one of the main objectives of the political and military authorities. They play a key role in establishing an appropriate decision making process among coalition nations, linking together the consultation and planning processes. It is in this strategic context that the lead nation will be selected from among the members of an emerging coalition. Selecting the lead nation enables the development of the military-strategic options and the corresponding operational level planning by initiating the multinational planning process.

0203. Political and military authorities will establish an effective consultation process to assist the lead nation in establishing and promoting a strong political position in the international strategic context. The consultation process includes routine reports and updates as well as a concerted effort to sustain the political consensus necessary to see the operation through to its conclusion.

0204. **The first task for the lead nation is to develop strategic guidance and build political consensus for it. Though not normally considered as planning, the development of strategic guidance is critical and sets the context for the more detailed activities of the Coalition Force Commander (CFC) and his staff. Essential strategic guidance should define the coalition's overall political-military approach including the narrative and objectives, then provide specific direction for planning and execution. It should also make the scope of the coalition's mandate explicit, with any constraints or restrictions clearly articulated. In principle, this process of development should be comprehensive in nature**.

!

ESSENTIAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

0205. During the activation and forming of a coalition military task force, a useful construct is that of Essential Strategic Guidance. This construct is one that has been validated over the past decades as being the minimum essential guidance that the lead nation should provide to the strategic and operational military commanders of a multinational task force. It also provides a framework from which to pursue guidance from the lead nation if lacking during a crisis response situation. It contains 9 elements as a starting construct for a coalition operation (Figure 2.2). Development of this guidance involves the informal or formal consultation and coordination between the highest levels of national leadership from the respective nations involved in the coalition effort.

ESSENTIAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

1. Purpose of the Coalition operation expressed in a common narrative
2. Mission statement for the Coalition task Force (CTF)
3. Strategic end state and military end state for the CTF
4. Strategic objectives and broad tasks that support the end states for the CTF with guidance for termination or transition of military operations
5. Participating nations and expected initial contributions
6. Designated Lead Nation and supporting guidance
7. Common security interests involved
8. Specific diplomatic, economic, informational, military and socio-cultural guidance pertinent to the mission; and national guidance, limitations, concerns or sensitivities
9. Coalition Information strategy to clearly encompass all of the above

Figure 2.2 – Essential Strategic Guidance Construct

0206. Ideally all elements are fully addressed prior to the execution of multinational operations. In reality many of the elements may be incomplete or lacking due to the uncertainty and ambiguity present within a crisis response situation. **The lead nation's strategic and operational level coalition military commanders and staff must fully engage at the national strategic level to address incomplete or lacking essential strategic guidance**. Additionally, the lead nation strategic and operational level military commanders may have to assist in the national strategic levels in the shaping of this guidance based upon their forward assessments of the problem underpinning the crisis. !

0207. In all cases the goal is to reach agreement on the guidance with all participating nations, or, when UN channels are involved, to obtain an approved UN resolution and/or mandate(s) prior to execution of a multinational military response. **It is essential to recognize and acknowledge that this guidance is *normally dynamic and undergoes continual refinement* as the crisis evolves and situational conditions change**. This simply requires that lead nation's strategic and operational military commanders and staff maintain close and continuous coordination with the national strategic level (political and military) to advise and participate in this refinement process. !

NATIONS' DECISION MAKING PROCESSES

0208. The strategic level, therefore, encompasses broad politico-military national and coalition plans, policies, security objectives, essential strategic guidance, as well as the use of national and multinational resources to accomplish objectives. **Finally, every coalition needs to understand each nation's political-strategic decision making processes**. For the MIC nations, !

these are covered in **CBG Volume III.3 - MIC Nations' Decision Making Processes**. The volume will give the operational commander and his staff a better understanding of the process that leads to decisions within individual nations and how that process may impact operational planning and conduct of operations.

SECTION II - THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEAD NATION

0209. Military Strategy is '*that component of national or multinational strategy, representing the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations*'. A winning strategy hinges upon the successful union of **Ends** (objectives), **Ways** (strategic guidance) and **Means** (resources). Military strategy documents must contain an explanation of how military objectives relate to the realization of the strategic end state. **The role of the military force must be carefully considered by those setting out the strategy, and be clearly understood by the operational level commander**.

0210. **In military terms, it will be necessary for the lead nation to assume overall responsibility for planning, in the context of strategic mission guidance from the political authority, including the development of a concept of operations and an operations plan to fulfill the mission**. These documents will be approved by the political authority. (Further implications for planning issues; refer to **CBG Volume II - Strategic Design and Planning**). Finally, it must coordinate and synchronize the execution of the plan, which will demand constant adjustment in response to iterative assessment. **Essentially, the lead nation will be required to provide overarching command and control architecture (encompassing personnel, organizations and structures, processes and equipment/capabilities which support them), potentially down to component commands. At the same time, however, it is also incumbent upon the lead nation to promote coalition unity of effort to include political and public advocacy, legal coordination, information sharing, and implementation of the Coalition Information Strategy**.

0211. The breadth of demands placed upon a lead nation mean that criteria for its selection extend beyond availability and will of any one nation to undertake the role, to include consideration of whether a nation is actually competent to do so. Furthermore, international acceptability across the coalition and across the region will be a key factor. Regional ties to parties in conflict will shape any decision and if it is to have credibility, the nation selected must be perceived as an 'honest broker' by parties to a regional conflict.

0212. Notwithstanding the above, the selection of a lead nation may be driven by level of commitment – the nation who provides the largest force contribution leads the coalition. Though this is a very simplistic approach it has logic and the nation with a preponderance of forces (or some indispensable capability) may be most capable of providing the necessary overarching command and control, and support structures required to sustain an operation. However, the other factors mentioned above, and acceptability in particular, should not be ignored.

0213. In summary, the lead nation must be willing and capable of assuming the role. It must be able to:

a. **facilitate the development of the coalition's political objectives, and strategic guidance expressed within the information strategy and narrative**; !

b. **act as sponsor and spokesman for the coalition's operations across the international community**; !

c. **lead coordination and building of consensus during the coalition's planning and execution phases; and** !

d. **be sufficiently competent to carry out the anticipated operation**. !

0214. It must above all be a politically acceptable choice. The latter is likely to include consideration of the lead nation's ties to, and interests in, the specific region or conflict and its acceptability to the regional actors involved. A preponderance of force contribution is a clear factor in selection of a lead nation. However, that nation must possess the strategic political attributes required to sustain a coalition.

SECTION III - THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

0215. The operational level is '*the level of operations at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations*'.[7] The operational level provides the vital link between strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces. Without this link, it is unlikely that tactical actions will lead to the achievement of the operational (and therefore strategic) end state. So not only should appropriate actions be linked by the operational level to the aims of the overall strategy, but the strategy should also be linked through the operational level to what is tactically realistic. **Of prime importance is for the operational level commander to understand clearly how his activities mesh with other strategic lines of operation**. !

0216. The complexity of operations increases especially where there is a significant presence of non-military participants who are likely to be reluctant, even hostile, to the perception that they are functioning in a close or supporting role with the military. In all circumstances, the commander of a task force is placed at the center of a 3-dimensional web that extends upward to the strategic level, downward to the tactical level, and laterally to a range of military and non-military groupings and organizations.

[7] Modified Allied Administrative Publication (AAP-6), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

COALITION COMMAND

! 0217. **A coalition commander needs to develop effective personal relationships with key leaders, multinational partners and organizations operating within theatre**. He should also foster a constructive culture based upon:

a. **Rapport**. The personal relationship amongst military leaders, civilian leaders and personnel will influence every aspect of coalition cooperation.

b. **Respect and Trust**. Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs and values of participants. It is important to focus on the positive aspects of national contributions. Respect and trust cannot be assumed or quickly implemented; they should be developed over time.

c. **Knowledge**. Time taken to understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends. It is important that nations are given a role commensurate with their capability.

d. **Patience**. Differences of opinion, perspective and understanding may generate friction. Effective cooperation takes time and patience to develop.

SECTION IV - THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL FRAMEWORK

0218. At the operational level there are 5 key functions, underpinned by the principles of coalition operations described in Chapter 1 Section VII. When considered together, they form a framework for operations, assisting the commander in both execution and visualization. The five functions are: **shape**, **engage**, **exploit**, **protect** and **sustain**. They help the commander to visualize how major operations, battles and engagements relate to one another within the overall campaign. They should not be viewed as sequential, or separate and distinct phases; the key is to maintain a clear focus on success, balancing the need to be bold and decisive with the constraints and limitations of modern operations. The functions also enable a commander to describe how subordinates' missions relate to each other in time, space and purpose.

0219. **Shape the operational environment**. This viewpoint focuses on manipulating the operational environment to the coalition's advantage and to the disadvantage of an opposing force. This includes identifying those areas where coalition strengths can be exploited and information superiority attained while the opposing forces' strengths are minimized. Threatening an opposing force, or appearing to threaten him, throughout his depth, and never allowing him to feel secure anywhere, while using Information Activities coordinated through the Information Operations Function (Info Ops) within the framework of a Coalition Information Strategy can seriously undermine his understanding of the environment and reduce his freedom of action. Simultaneously, and acting within the wider political context, the legitimacy and justification for the use of force should be conveyed in order to build and maintain support for own actions in home and other audiences. The difficulties of doing this should not be

underestimated and illustrate the importance of a detailed understanding of the nature of the problem. **In fact, so important is the process of problem framing (placing the crisis in the correct context to maximize understanding), that it could be argued that Framing the Operational Environment is a first, separate function in its own right**.

!

0220. **Engage**, **through clearly aligned words and deeds** to affect the opposing forces' will and cohesion.[8] The decisive element of a campaign will usually involve some form of offensive action against the will and cohesion of adversaries. By breaking an opposing forces' cohesion, he is unable to coordinate and organize military and other actions; usually it is then much easier to defeat him piecemeal. By undermining his will, an opposing force will be less able to motivate his forces to take risky action, and may be more willing to accept political or other compromise. Will and cohesion are inter-connected: if an opposing forces' will is undermined his force will be less cohesive; if his cohesion is shattered his will to continue is likely to be reduced. It may be difficult to determine how to attack the cohesion of non-traditional military forces such as dispersed insurgent groups; nevertheless there will normally be some form of coordinating organization, however loose knit and dispersed. **Understanding the organization of such groups, and how they adapt to survive, is the key to attacking their cohesion**.

!

0221. **Exploit opportunity**. A commander should exploit opportunities to seize and retain the initiative (the ability to dictate the course of events), or regain it once lost, in order to achieve his mission. Making the most of such opportunities, whether they be created through successful engagement or arise through chance, relies upon a commander's ability not only to identify them in advance but to be able to generate the means to exploit them. More broadly, it involves not only identifying or creating opportunities, but having or obtaining the means and will to exploit them and achieving a higher tempo relative to the opposing forces.

0222. **Protecting the coalition force and its cohesion**. At the same time as attacking the opposing forces' cohesion, that of the coalition force must be protected. Cohesion of coalition operations poses a particular challenge that must be maintained. Contributing nations may have differing agendas and provide forces with varied degrees of fighting power, including different doctrine and incompatible equipment. Personalities and political influence are likely to have a disproportionate effect on the cohesion of a multinational force. One of the key contemporary challenges within the realms of protection is operations and information security (OpSec/InfoSec), specifically cyber, communications, and command and control systems' protections. This is an area of increasing vulnerability, directly proportional to nations' levels of dependence on such systems and the increasing operational need to interconnect coalition classified networks with many national and non-government organization networks.

0223. **Sustain**. Sustaining operations underpins the freedom of action available to a commander to shape, engage, exploit and protect. From a commander's perspective they include deployment and recovery, the assembly and movement of reserves or echelon forces,

[8] In a situation where there are no clear opposing forces, this might be the object of the mission, i.e. the thing which provides the greatest resistance to the mission and in this sense is 'affect' rather than 'attack'.

the redeployment and replenishment (or reconstitution or rehabilitation) of forces out of contact, host nation support, and the establishment of operating bases and lines of communication. They are most readily associated with the physical component of fighting power, but have equal impact on the moral component. Multi-nationality and interoperability present the coalition with particular challenges to sustainment. Sustaining operations represent an obvious target for an opponent's operations; an appropriate balance of force protection, in accordance with both the perceived risks and the necessary priorities afforded to shape and engage operations, should ensure a Commander's continued freedom of action.

CHAPTER 3 – COMMAND AND CONTROL

SECTION I - COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

NATIONAL INTEREST

0301. The decision to commit military force is ultimately a national, political matter. The national interest will therefore be both the first and the last factor to be considered while taking that decision - all other considerations are subordinate. National interest is impossible to define absolutely, being the product of economics, history, geography, national characteristics, party politics and the views of allies. **The examination of a national interest may offer nothing conclusive in predicting a state's behavior, however, an understanding of the influences on coalition members' national interests would be helpful**. !

0302. MIC partners would wish to understand members' national perspectives on, amongst others: vital ground and national survival; non-negotiable principles; domestic and international public opinion; perceived legitimacy of military involvement; political and economic factors (unlikely to be military factors); and history and historical obligations. Each state will decide to take military action based on the expected benefits for its own political, domestic, strategic and economic interests. Domestic public opinion may be a major consideration in governments' decisions. Often politicians take campaign stances based on the endurance of their state's military commitments, as well as limiting the duration of existing commitments in order to retain domestic political balance. Historically states have also withdrawn their contributions from ongoing coalition operations for national reasons. Finally, national interests change and are often redefined. New governments are elected; domestic policies are dynamic; economies adapt; and other higher priority interests may factor in a state's decision-making process. Thus it follows, due to the primacy of the national interest, that it is not possible to say in advance how a state might react when considering courses of action. **In sum, the various states' national interests, and how those interests might determine national behavior, are not definable or binding**. !

LEGAL

0303. A firm legal foundation is a fundamental requirement for the resort to the use of force *(jus ad bellum)*. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) provides the legal framework for the way in which force is used *(jus in bello).* The classic exceptions to the basic prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter Article 2(4) are United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) under Chapter VII and self-defense, whether national or collective. Some say there is also a customary international law exception of humanitarian intervention. It is possible that states may differ in their legal reasoning for the use of force in the same coalition operation, or differ in their understanding on the width of the self-defense ground and the actions that can be carried out in self-defense, or differ on any express or implied authorizations of the UN Security Council. Once a state has established it is lawful to used armed force it is unlikely that this decision will be revisited in the course of an operation. However, during ongoing operations

military activity will be continually scrutinized and reviewed, to reflect policy and military objectives. Not only national policy but also national legal interpretation will likely constrain national conduct within operations. At a tactical level national 'red cards' and caveats are used to avoid or remove national responsibilities for disputed coalition action. In a non-international armed conflict the domestic laws of the troop contributing nation as well as relevant international law, including treaty obligations (e.g. the Geneva Conventions) and customary international law, and where operating within another state with its consent that host nation's own domestic laws, will provide the applicable envelope of laws. **A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) typically will set out important jurisdictional arrangements**. International Human Right Laws must also be carefully considered, especially in complex operating environments other than armed conflict, such as a crisis resolution.

!

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

0304. Rules of Engagement (ROE) should reflect the policy and military parameters for the use of force. ROE are not law, but they should be lawful. ROE development is a vital component of campaign planning. While coalitions can operate under national ROE, there are many advantages of operating under agreed coalition ROE.

ROE, Self-Defense and Defense of Others. In coalition operations it is vital to understand the relationship between ROE, self-defense and defense of others. Different national views exist. Usually self-defense is considered an inherent right which stands apart from ROE. ROE are not needed to grant it and they cannot take it away. Defense of others may, however, be a matter of ROE, according to national policy and law.

0305. ROE are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force or other action may or may not be applied. ROE are intended to avoid ambiguity that could lead to a commander inadvertently violating national (or coalition) policy and objectives, or to a violation of international law through inappropriate action or reaction in a given situation. In regards specifically to international law, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other conventions and laws to which coalition members may be subject, ROE only exist to give *guidance* and cannot by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of any action. It remains the commander's responsibility to ensure that action is lawful. ROE are written as a series of prohibitions and permissions applicable to situations spanning the entire range of military operations.

0306. Although coalition participants may have similar political mandates, each nation is likely, as a starting point, to bring to the coalition a different national ROE reflecting that nation's unique political and legal interests and its reason for entering the coalition. Some national ROE will be relatively free of constraint, while others may not. Commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. To facilitate interoperability efforts should be made to standardize ROE with a view to developing Coalition ROE, but this may not be achievable. **Therefore, it may be necessary to tailor the**

employment of contingents to conform with and optimize their own national ROE. In these circumstances the commander will need visibility of coalition members' ROE so that he can work round national differences as much as possible.

!

0307. **Coalition ROE development is a time-consuming process and should begin early in the planning process**. As with national ROE doctrine, there will need to be rules for implementing, authorizing and requesting ROE, as well as a common understanding on delegations and permissions.

!

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS

0308. A nation may impose additional constraints on itself through its constitution[9] and its domestic law; these constraints may apply to both the commitment of military force and the use of troops once committed. Constitutional constraints should be distinguished from policy constraints; the former are likely to be considerably less flexible than the latter. Individual national advice will be required not only to describe the constraint, but to determine the extent to which it is nationally binding.

TREATY OBLIGATIONS

0309. National obligations arising from multilateral and bilateral agreements influence national decisions both *ad bellum* and *in bello*. While membership of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), might oblige a state to act in a certain way in a given set of circumstances, that would only be if that nation judged the participation in an operation to be lawful *(ad bellum)*. Similarly, being a signatory to, for example, the Geneva Conventions will oblige a state to constrain the way its forces operate during the operation *(in bello).*

POLICY CONSTRAINTS

0310. Policies, that is to say the way governments decide to do business, are within governmental control in a way that constitutional constraints may not be. Policy positions are likely to be taken in reaction to other factors rather than be factors themselves. Noting the distinction between national policies and national constitutional constraints, policy constraints will not be considered further.

SECTION II - COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

0311. While all command and control (C2) arrangements must be sufficiently flexible to cope with additional subordinate elements, the force commander and his headquarters should not be overloaded to the extent where efficiency and tempo are adversely affected. The formation of additional subordinate headquarters may become necessary in order to prevent such circumstances.

[9] The principles on which a state is governed that may be embodied in a statute or evolve by precedent.

0312. Some specialist, and often scarce, force elements provide critical cross-component capabilities. To ensure efficient employment they typically require C2 at the operational level and are not generally delegated to subordinate commanders. Discrete national contributions, as well as embedded component assets, may be brigaded under the control of a specific *commander* within the coalition headquarters. Specialist coordination at the operational level provides a pan-Joint Operations Area (JOA) view and the ability to re-balance resources across the force.

0313. In coalition operations, normally the lead nation will be responsible for establishing an effective C2 architecture, which may extend to component level, and is likely to adopt predominantly national or alliance structures and procedures. However, no single command structure necessarily best fits all circumstances.

0314. Specific C2 architectures must be driven by the context and may require iterative adjustment as the situation or tempo develops. Political imperatives, in particular, may have a significant impact. Participating nations should, however, strive to maximize unity of command, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. **CBG Volume II - Strategic Design and Planning** provides further detail.

SECTION III - MIC NATIONS' COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING OPERATIONS OTHER THAN COMBAT

0315. To provide an understanding of the key strategic C2 issues for: humanitarian and disaster relief operations; non-combatant evacuation operations; and peace support operations, seven generic questions were examined.

a. Who has the legal authority to commit military forces to a coalition for these missions?

b. What government agency/ministry has the lead for the missions defined above?

c. Within a coalition, who has national command authority to conduct the mission?

d. Who is the approving authority for your nation for ROE within the coalition? If the lead nation wishes to change ROE what national source has the authority to approve the change?

e. Should the mission change or transition from a single mission to multiple missions, who has authority to commit your nation's force to new missions (short of combat)?

f. Who has the authority to deploy and redeploy military forces as part of a coalition to complete the missions defined above?

g. Who is the authority to approve national and agreed coalition narrative and information strategy? Who is responsible for the translation into national characteristics?

MISSION: HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF

	Who has the legal authority to commit military forces to a coalition?	What national government agency has the lead for this kind of operation?	Who has command authority to conduct operation for your national contingent?	Who approves national ROE and changes?	If the original op changes, who must approve your nation's participation?	Who has the authority to deploy and redeploy forces?	Who has the authority to approve national and agreed coalition narrative
AUS	MINDEF	DFAT and/or DOD	CJOPS thru COMASC	MINDEF as advised by CDF	CJOPS	CDF thru CJOPS	TBA
CAN	Government of Canada	DFATD	CDS or an appropriate delegated officer	CDS	Depending on the scope of the original mandate, either the Government or the CDS	CDS, once missions have been approved by the Governme nt*	Governme nt thru CDS/SJS
FRA	PRESIDENT	INTERAGENCY	JCOS	JCOS	PRESIDENT	JCOS	TBA
DEU	Government	MoFA	MoD	MoD	Government	MoD	TBA
ITA	Government once authorized by Parliament	MoFA. MoD as well as other Department/ Agencies could be involved	CHOD retains OPCOM and delegated OPCON to COMJOHQ / Op Comd	CHOD approved, MoD authorized	Government if authorized by Parliament	CHOD, through MoD, once authorized	TBA
GBR	DFID/MOD at Ministerial level.	DFID	An appointed officer	MOD at Ministerial level	DFID/MOD at Ministerial level.	DFID/MOD at Min level level.	TBA
USA	SECDEF	USAID, DoD supports	SECDEF	President/ SECDEF	SECDEF	SECDEF	TBA

The used abbreviations are described at the end of all tables.

**Depending on the factual circumstances of each situation, 'Government of Canada' authority could be exercised by the Governor-in-Council, Cabinet, the PM or various Ministers, The decision to commit military forces to a coalition is normally based on a recommendation by DFATD and DND.*

MISSION: NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

	Who has the legal authority to commit military forces to a coalition?	What national government agency has the lead for this kind of operation?	Who has command authority to conduct operation for your national contingent?	Who approves national ROE and changes?	If the op changes, who approves nation's participation?	Who has the authority to deploy and redeploy forces?	Who has the authority to approve national and agreed coalition narrative
AUS	MINDEF	DFAT and/or DOD – thru Whole of Government approach	CJOPS thru COMASC	MINDEF as advised by CDF	CJOPS	CDF thru CJOPS	TBA
CAN	Government *	DFATD supported by DND	Task Force Commander	CDS	Depending on the scope of the original mandate, either the Government* or the CDS	Governme nt*, .. although in certain circumstan ces may be the CDS	Governme nt thru CDS/SJS
FRA	PRESIDENT	FOREIGN AFFAIRS	JCOS	JCOS	PRESIDENT	JCOS	TBA
DEU	Parliament	MoD	MoD	MoD	MoD, if within the mandate	MoD	TBA
ITA	Government once authorized by Parliament	MoFA and/or MoD	CHOD retains OPCOM and delegated OPCON to COMJOHQ/O p Commander	CHOD approved, MoD authorized	Government if authorized by Parliament	CHOD, through MoD, once authorized	TBA
GBR	FCO/MOD at Ministerial level	FCO	An appointed officer	MOD at Ministerial level	FCO/MOD at Ministerial level.	FCO/MOD at Ministerial level.	TBA
USA	SECDEF	Department of State DoD supports	SECDEF	President/ SECDEF	SECDEF	SECDEF	TBA

The used abbreviations are described at the end of all tables.

**Depending on the factual circumstances of each situation, 'Government of Canada' authority could be exercised by the Governor-in-Council, Cabinet, the PM or various Ministers, The decision to commit military forces to a coalition is normally based on a recommendation by DFATD and DND.*

MISSION: PEACE SUPPORT

	Who has the legal authority to commit military forces to a coalition?	What national government agency has the lead for this kind of operation?	Who has command authority to conduct operation for your national contingent?	Who approves national ROE and changes?	If the op changes, who approves nation's participation?	Who has the authority to deploy and redeploy forces?	Who has the authority to approve national and agreed coalition narrative
AUS	MINDEF	DOD/DFAT/AFP	CJOPS thru COMASC	MINDEF as advised by CDF	CJOPS	CDF thru CJOPS	TBA
CAN	Government *	DFATD and/or DND	CDS, or an appropriate delegated officer	CDS	Depending on the scope of the original mandate, either the Government* or the CDS	Governme nt*, although in certain circumstan ces may be the CDC	Governme nt thru CDS/SJS
FRA	PRESIDENT	DEFENSE	JCOS	JCOS	PRESIDENT	JCOS	TBA
DEU	Government / Parliament	MoD	MoD	MoD	MoD, if within the mandate	MoD	TBA
ITA	Government once authorized by Parliament	MoD	CHOD retains OPCOM and delegated OPCON to COMJOHQ /Op Commander	CHOD approved, MoD authorized	Government if authorized by Parliament	CHOD, through MoD, once authorized	TBA
GBR	PM/Cabinet	FCO/MOD	An appointed officer	MOD at Ministerial level	PM/Cabinet	PM/Cabine t	TBA
USA	SECDEF	Dept of State and coordinates with DoD	SECDEF	President/ SECDEF	SECDEF	SECDEF	TBA

**Depending on the factual circumstances of each situation, 'Government of Canada' authority could be exercised by the Governor-in-Council, Cabinet, the PM or various Ministers, The decision to commit military forces to a coalition is normally based on a recommendation by DFATD and DND.*

The following abbreviations were used:

AUS	MINDEF – Minister for Defense DOD – Department of Defense DFAT – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	DEU	MoD – Ministry of Defense

	CDF – Chief of the Defense Force CJOPS – Chief of joint Operations COMASC – Commander Australian Contingent AFP – Australian Federal Police Note: AUS does not use the term Humanitarian Operations and Peacemaking in Defense Doctrine	ITA	MoD – Ministry of Defense CHOD – Chief of Deface Staff COMJOHQ – Joint Operational HQ Commander
CAN	CDS – Chief of the Defense Staff MND – Minister of National Defence DFATD – Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development DND – Department of National Defence	GBR	PM – Prime Minister MOD – Ministry of Defense FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRA	JCOS – Joint Chief of Staff	USA	SECDEF – Secretary of Defense DoD – Department of Defense

ANNEX A – DOCTRINE REFERENCES

GENERAL REMARKS

A-01. Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way military forces think about, train for, plan, and execute operations. The principles and tenets of doctrine take into account all of the basic elements of a military force: weapons and other systems; skill levels; experience and training; deployment and sustainment capabilities; organizational issues; command and control philosophy and issues; and command arrangements. Doctrine deals primarily with extant capabilities. Doctrine is not about what is to be done, but about how it is to be accomplished. Doctrine is neither strategy nor policy, though it often influences and is influenced by both.

A-02. Coalition partners using different national doctrines will obviously have problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical interoperability. Forces operating on different fundamental principles will lack unity of effort, and could even work at cross-purposes. Areas where commonality of doctrinal approach is particularly critical include intelligence, command and control, operations and planning, logistics, and communications. Subsidiary functions of force protection, deployment, Coalition Combat Identification, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and civil-military cooperation are also key. **Finding ways to harmonize doctrine is therefore an important means to ensure improved coalition ops**.

!

A-03. There is a plethora of doctrinal publications that nations could refer to. The most relevant are listed in Table A.1. NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, unless otherwise specifically directed by the MIC, is default doctrine for planning and conducting coalition operations. Access to NATO doctrine is gained through the NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) protected website. The NSA protected website is the authority source for NATO pertaining to NATO standardization. The NATO Standardization Document Database (NSDD), accessed through the NSA protected website,[10] is the master repository for all NATO Allied Publications. Access to the NSA website is limited to officials from NATO, Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)[11] and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)[12] countries that have been certified by the NATO Office of Security.

[10] Procedure to Access NSA Website – connect to https://nsa.nato.int/nsa/. Click the link, request access here. Fill in user registration. Submit the request by pressing, request access. Upon obtaining access to the site, access to the NSDD can be achieved through the publications search link on the left.

[11] The Mediterranean Dialogue is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security. It is based on the recognition that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean and that the Mediterranean dimension is an important component of Europe's security structures. The aim of the Dialogue is to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean, to achieve a better mutual understanding, and to correct misperceptions about NATO among Mediterranean Dialogue countries.

[12] NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), was launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, with the aim to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.

MIC DOCUMENT REFERENCE LIST

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
STRATEGIC CONTEXT	
Strategic Context	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM)
	MIC CBG Volume I & II
Strategic Assessment of Mission (Review of Situation & Mission Progress)	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	MC 400 The Alliances Strategic Concept
	European Union Concept for Military Planning
	MIC CBG Volume II & III.3 (MIC Nations' Decision Making Processes)
	NATO ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)
Strategic Shaping & Influencing	
Manage Political Mandate	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	MIC CBG Volume I & II
Comprehensive Approach / Whole of Government / Integrated Operations	MIC CBG Volume I & II
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	NATO Defense College - Towards a Comprehensive Approach : Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of Strategy
Framework Nation	EU framework nation Concept
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Re-missioning Considerations of Specific Coalition Members	
National Caveats	
Rules of Engagement	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	USA - ROE Handbook For Judge Advocates
Targeting	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	AJP-2.1 Intelligence Procedures
	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	AJP-3.9 Joint Targeting
	MC 471/1 NATO Targeting Policy
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume II
Detainee Handling & Transfer Policies	AJP-2.5 Handling of Captured personnel, Equipment & Documents
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Military Support to Capacity Building	AJP-3.4.4 Counterinsurgency
	ATP-3.2.1.1 Tactical Stability Activity & Tasks

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP Vol 3, Annex I - Stability Operations
	MPAT Multinational Forces SOP Vol 3, Appendix 1 to Annex I - Guiding Principles for Stabilization & Reconstruction
	MIC CBG Volume III.4 (Stabilization Handbook)

COMMAND AND CONTROL	
Concept	EU Military C2 concept
Unity of Effort	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	AJP-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MIC CBG Volume I & II
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Interoperability	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	AJP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces
	MIC CBG Series
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Command Structure & Relationships (National Contingent Commanders/Senior National Representatives and Multinational Force Commanders)	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	AJP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume I & II
	Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in crisis
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Information/Knowledge Management	AJP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume II
	AAP-15 NATO glossary of abbreviations

CTF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND STAFFING	
Headquarters Structure (Functional Requirements & Manning)	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MC 389 Directive for Implementation of the Alliance Combined Joint Task Force Concept
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume II
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	EU FHQ Manning Guide
	EU OHQ Manning Guide
	Procedure for the handling of "concept" type papers emanating from outside the EUMS and for amending and updating existing Concepts
Force Generation (Force Size)	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	MC133 NATO Operational Planning
Functional Components vs Service/National Components	General principles and procedures for EU force identification, generation/activation and deployment

CAMPAIGN PLANNING	
High Intensity Conflict	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
Irregular/Asymmetric Warfare	MC 437/1 Special Operations Policy
Operational Planning	AJP-5 Operational Planning
	AJP-3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
	MIC CBG Volume II
	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
Peace Support Operations	AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations
	MC 327 NATO Military Planning For Peace Support Operations
	MA 327/1 Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations
	Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations
	UN Peace Keeping Operations - Guiding Principles
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief Operations	MC 343 NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations
	MIC CBG Volume III.5 (Rapid Reconnaissance Handbook for Humanitarian/Disaster Response)
Biometrics	MIC CBG Volume III.10 (National Perspectives on the Use of Biometric Data)
Private Security Companies	MIC CBG Volume III.11 (National Positions on PSC)
Counterinsurgency Operations	MIC CBG Volume III.9 (National Factors for COIN)
	ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance
	AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency
Counter Improvised Explosive Devices	MIC CBG Volume III.12 (C-IED)
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Device
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations	AJP-3.4.2, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	Council of the European Union (EU), ESDP/PESD 1103, Draft Concept for EU evacuation operations using military means
Reconstruction Efforts/Teams	ISAF PRT Handbook
	USA - PRT Playbook
	MIC CBG Volume III.4 (Stabilization Handbook)
Support to Electoral Process	UN Peace Building Commission UN PBC S/RES/1645
Security Sector Reform	MIC CBG Volume III.4 (Stabilization Handbook)
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration	UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, Framework Document
	UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, Operational Guide
	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration field guide (ISBN1-896551-54-8)
	MIC CBG Volume III.4 (Stabilization Handbook)
Stabilization	MIC CBG Volume III.4 (Stabilization Handbook)
Transitioning to Follow-On Authority	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume II
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	MIC CBG Volume III.4 (Stabilization Handbook)

PERSONNEL	
Personnel Tracking & Reporting	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	AAP-51 Edition 1 NATO Asset Tracking "TO BE" Business Process Model (Study)
Casualty Reporting	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Special Skill Requirements	
Rotation of Personnel	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Culture Awareness Training	

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE	
National Disclosure Policies	
Intelligence Sharing Among Coalition Forces	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
	AJP-2.1 Intelligence Procedures
	MC 128 Guidance For Intelligence Support to NATO
	Military ISTAR Concept for EU Crisis Management and EU-led Crisis Management Operations
	MIC CBG Volume II & III.8 (CIS Planning Considerations)

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
Collection, Fusion and Dissemination	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
Coalition ISTAR Architecture	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
Threat Assessments	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Intelligence Products	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
	AJP-2.1 Intelligence Procedures
	MC 128 Guidance For Intelligence Support to NATO
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Current Intelligence	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
Targeting - Effects Based (Battle Damage Assessment)	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	AJP-3.9 Joint Targeting (Study)
	AJP-3.9.2 Land Targeting
	MIC CBG Volume II
Linguistic Support Requirements	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations

OPERATIONS	
Coalition Task Force Planning Process	AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine For Operational Planning
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MC 133 NATO Operational Planning System
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume I & II
Language & Interpreter Requirements	AJP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Reporting Requirements	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Battle Rhythm	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Situational Awareness	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
Information Operations	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	NATO Military Information Operations Doctrine
	MC 422 NATO Information Operations Policy
	MIC CBG Volume II
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	Concept for EU Military Information Operations
Psychological Operations	AJP-3.10.1 NATO Psychological Operations Doctrine
	AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine
	MC 402 NATO Psychological Operations Policy
	Bi-MNC Directive 80-1 for Psychological Operations
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume II
	Concept for EU Psychological Operations in Eu-led Military Crisis Management Operations
Training Requirements Prior To & During Deployment	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
	AJP-7 Training and Exercise (Study)
	ATrainP-1 Manual For Training and Exercise For Peace Support Operations
	MIC CBG Volume II
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Force Protection	AJP-3.14 Force Protection (Study)
	AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	MIC CBG Volume I & II
Lessons Learned	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
Basing Locations	AJP-3(B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations
Personnel Recovery/CSAR	AJP-3.3.9 NATO Personnel Recovery Policy/Doctrine (Study)
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Meteorology/Hydrography	AJP-3.11 Allied Doctrine For Meteorological and Oceanographic Support to Joint Forces
	AWP-02 CH3 NATO Meteorological Support Manual
	ATP-32 NATO Handbook of Military Oceanographic Information Services
Rapid Reconnaissance	MIC CBG Volume III.5 (Rapid Reconnaissance Handbook for Humanitarian/Disaster Response)

LOGISTICS	
Logistics Interoperability	EU-Global approach on deployability
	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	AJP-4.9 Modes Of Multinational Logistic Support
	MC 319/2 NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics
	Bi-SC Functional Planning Guide Logistics
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Logistics Handbook
	CBG Volume II
	MIC Mutual Logistics Support Agreements
	Military logistic support concept for EU led crisis management operations
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Logistic Reconnaissance	MIC CBG Volume III.7 (Common Record of Logistic Reconnaissance)
Logistic Readiness and Sustainability	MC 55/4 NATO Logistic Readiness and Sustainability Policy
Multinational Joint Logistics Centre	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	AJP-4.6 MJLC Doctrine
	AD 85-6 Organization and SOP of the ACE Logistic Co-ordination Centre
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Logistics Handbook
	MIC CBG Volume III.6 (Logistic Planning Considerations)
Logistics Information Management	NATO LSM LOGIMG
Logistic Reporting	NATO Bi-SC Reporting Directive Volume V Logistics Reports
Managing Lines of Communication	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	NATO Logistics Handbook
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Host Nation Support	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	AJP-4.5 Allied Joint HNS Doctrine and Procedures
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MC 334/2 NATO Principles and Policies for HNS
	MC 336 NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support
	APL 12 Host Nation Support Planning Procedures
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Logistics Handbook
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	The Host Nation Support (HNS) Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations
Movement & Transportation	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	AJP4.4 Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	MC 336/2 NATO Principles and Policies for Movement and Transportation
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Logistics Handbook
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	The Strategic Movement and Transportation Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration	ALP-4.2 Land Forces Logistics Doctrine
	AJP-3.13 Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) (Study)
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume III.6 (Logistic Planning Considerations)
Supply	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	AD 60-70 Procurement of Military Budget Funded Property and Services
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
POL	MC 473 Directive for the NATO Petroleum Supply Chain
	AJP-4.7 Allied Joint Petroleum Doctrine
Mortuary Affairs	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Maintenance	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
Engineer Support	AJP-3.12 Joint Engineering
	ATP 52 Land Force Combat Engineering Doctrine
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Contractors on Deployed Operations	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Transfer of Materiel Between Coalition Nations	ACE Directive (AD) 60-80 Property Accounting and Control
	MIC Mutual Logistics Support Agreements
Asset Visibility - In-Transit Visibility	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	ACE Directive (AD) 60-80 Property Accounting and Control
	AJP-4.11 NATO Asset Visibility (Study)
Consignment Tracking	AAP-51 NATO Consignment Tracking "TO BE" Business Process Model
Asset Tracking	AAP-51 Edition 1 NATO Asset Tracking "TO BE" Business Process Model (Study)

COMMUNICATIONS	
National Communications	MIC CBG Volume II & III.8 (CIS Planning Considerations)
Coalition Communications	MPAT Multinational Force SOP

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	AJP-6 Command and Control Information Systems (Study)
	MIC CBG Volume II & III.8 (CIS Planning Considerations)
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Critical Operating Systems	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume III.8 (CIS Planning Considerations)
Spectrum Requirements/Deconfliction	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	ACP190 A guide to Spectrum management in Operations
Cyber Defence	MIC CBG Volume II
	NATO Policy on Cyber Defence - Defending the Networks
	NATO Strategic Cyber Security (Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE))
	NATO Frameworks for International Cyber Security (CCDCOE)
	NATO International Cyber Security Legal & Policy Proceedings (CCDCOE)

MEDICAL	
Medical Interoperability	AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
	AJP 4.10.1 Medical Planning (Study)
	MC 326/2 NATO Medical Support Principles and Policies
	AD 85-8 ACE Medical Support Principles, Policies and Planning Parameters
	A Med P-15 Military Medical Support in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief
	USA - JP4-08 Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	The code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Medical Reporting	NATO Bi-SC Reporting Directive Volume V Logistics Reports
Health Services Support Capabilities of Coalition Members	AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	Health and Medical Support Concept for Military EU-led Crisis Management Operations
Procedures for Medical Evacuation	AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
	AJP 4.10.2 Medical Evacuation (Study)
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Medical Supplies	AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
	A Med P-01 NATO Table of Medical Equivalents
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Patient Tracking Procedures	AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Quarantine	

CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE AND COOPERATION	
Interface/Coordination With Government Agencies, NGOs and IOs in the Area of Responsibility	AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine
	MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy for CIMIC
	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (DRAFT)
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	Civil-Military Co-operation Concept for EU-led Crisis management Operations
	MIC CBG Volume I & II
Establishment of Civil-Military Operation Centre	AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Liaisons	AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	MIC CBG Volume II
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Interface With Host Nation	AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine
	MC 334/1 NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support

LEGAL ISSUES	
Status of Forces Agreements	AJP-4.5 Allied Joint HNS Doctrine and Procedures
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Rules of Engagement (National & Multinational)	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MIC CBG Volume I
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	Use of force concept for EU-led Military Crisis management Operations -1st revision
Reporting Procedures (Accidents, Injuries to Locals, Deaths, Property Damage)	
Reporting Serious Incidents Involving Host Nation & Coalition Forces	

ISSUE	DOCUMENT/PUBLICATION
Cross-Servicing Agreements Between Coalition Forces or Host Nation	MIC Mutual Logistics Support Agreements
Compliance With National & International Laws	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Embedded Civilians	

PUBLIC AFFAIRS	
Public Affairs Coverage Plan	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
Media Handling	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Combined Information Centre	ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
	MPAT Multinational Force SOP
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	
Financial Management	AJP4.5 Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures
	AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine
Procurement Process	AD 60-70 Procurement of Military Budget Funded Property and Services
Currency Exchange	
Resource Management	
Tracking Expenditures	

HOST NATION CONCERNS	
Host Nation Military/Civil Capabilities	AJP4.5 Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures
	MC 334/1, NATO Principles and Policies for Host Nation Support
	APL 12 Host Nation Support Planning Procedures
	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
	The host nation support concept for EU led crisis management operations
Special Customs & Courtesies in Host Nation	AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine
Host Nation Technical Agreements	Allied Joint HNS Doctrine and Procedures
	APL 12 Host Nation Support Planning Procedures
Customs, Duties and Taxes	
Environmental Clean-Up	MC 469 NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection
Hazardous Waste and Material	NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations

Table A.1 - MIC document reference list

ANNEX B – TERMS

This Annex contains terms used in the Coalition Building Guide publication series.

Coalition Force Commander
The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) is the operational commander of a Coalition force.

Coalition Force Readiness Training
Combined or multinational collective training conducted by the assigned units and formations from the troop contributing nations to a coalition under the direction of the Coalition Force Commander with a view to harmonize the Coalition and to foster common understanding, combat efficiency and trust throughout the force.

Conflict
A situation when two or more parties find their interests incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take action to achieve political objectives, which damages the other parties' ability to pursue their interests.

Conflict of interests
Incompatibility of interests among different entities.

Crisis
Situation where the relationships between antagonist forces or interests within or between states creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political or military importance that potentially leads to violence.

Culminating Point
An operation reaches its culminating point when the current operation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage.

Decisive Conditions (DCs)
Key outcomes to be achieved in order to reach Strategic Objectives. This may require the involvement of several instruments of power and will have to be agreed upon by strategic decision-makers within the strategic planning process but adjusted and refined during the implementation planning.

End state
The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of the operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.

Information Environment[13]
The virtual and physical space, in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems.

Information Strategy
The information strategy forms the interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political guidance for information activities across all levers of power in support of mission objectives. Based on [Multinational Experiment 6 (MNE6) Framework Concept 2010]

Instruments of power
National or organizational means applicable to solve a conflict, including political, diplomatic, economic, informational, developmental, military, law enforcement activities, state-led/institutional humanitarian assistance and civil administration support.

Interest
Aspiration from an entity prone to motivate its behavior and to improve its state. Interests can be concurring, diverging, or incompatible.

Lead Nation
This model is based on one nation assuming responsibility for planning and execution of an operation. The commanding officer, staff, Command, Control, communications and Information's (C3I) structure, doctrine and logistic[14] co-ordination of the force will normally be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and fulfill some staff positions in the lead nation's staff. (AJP-3(A))

In amplification of the NATO definition the CBG considers a Lead Nation to be one with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as functional lead agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.'[15]

---

[13] Information Environment does not exist in Australian Defence Force doctrine.

[14] According to NATO's AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, Lead Nation logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.

[15] (a) To avoid possible confusion, it must be noted that this definition differs from but is roughly analogous to terms utilized in NATO. The 'Lead Nation' referred to here would be recognizable within NATO as the 'framework nation,' whereas 'functional lead agent' would correspond to a nation within NATO which is designated as a 'Lead Nation' for functional specialty support. NATO's AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations defines 'framework nation' as follows. 'Forces based on a Framework Nation are commanded by an officer of that nation. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures, although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework

National Contingent Commander
The Commander deployed by each country contributing forces to a multinational operation, with the exception of the lead nation, who will exercise national command and represent national interests at the operational level. The role of the National Contingent Commander is to support both the Coalition Force Commander and his national commanders, while informing his own national authority.

Narrative
A NARRATIVE is the structured expression of a thematic story about the rationale, intent and aims – the 'why' – of an organization. It reflects the vision and strategy of the organization, and, like a script or score, guides its mission conduct – the 'how' of its overall activity. (CBG Volume III. 15 Annex C)
NARRATIVES are more than simply 'stories'. Narratives describe the history, purpose and achievements of a collective entity, and they contribute in the process towards its unity and facilitate its continuous transformation. With that they are contributing an essential element to the coalition's efforts. (CBG Volume III. 15 Annex C).

Strategic End State
Threshold where the situation is sustainable enough to autonomously evolve toward the strategic vision. It is the single, unambiguous purpose towards which the plan is directed, and which will be attained by the achievement of the Strategic Objectives. The strategic end state must be sufficiently rich in context and content for subordinate levels to be able to use it to conduct their own planning. It will take into account the specificities of the situation and address the symptoms <u>and</u> the causes of the conflict. The strategic end state must be comprehensible and feasible because it defines the ultimate criteria for cessation of coalition activities in the crisis region.

Strategic Forum
Persons directly involved in and supporting the process described in this document; a notional three-tiered functional structure of the Strategic Forum could be the following:

- A high level policy contact group;
- A strategic working group (civil and military);
- A liaison team[16].

Strategic Objectives (SOs)

---

nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the "best ideas" of the contributing nations.'

[16] The Strategic Liaison Element would support both the high level policy contact group and the strategic working group in terms of information exchange needs and coherence between coalition, or coalition to be, governments and other concerned actors. As a whole, the Strategic Forum would most probably be implemented in a mixed mode of co-located and distributed activities. Individuals participating in the Strategic Forum would act as national representatives, in a multinational capacity or in both.

A description of the situation in terms of key achievements needed to reach the strategic end state. SOs are the highest level breakdown of the strategic end state.

Strategic Option
A short description of the selected Strategic Roadmap. It also provides a preliminary idea of the constraints as well as of the possible resources, time frames and synchronization requirements.

Strategic Roadmaps
Possible sets of coherent decisive conditions derived from the Strategic Objectives. They each indicate an overarching approach to guide the coalition's efforts. The achievement of all of the decisive conditions that comprise a Strategic Roadmap marks the attainment of the strategic end state.

Strategic Vision
A description in broad terms of the situation as it would fulfill political objectives.

INTENTIONALLY BLANK

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL (MIC)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

J-3 / MOD

3000 Joint Staff, The Pentagon

Washington D.C.

js.mic.es@mail.mil

https://community.apan.org/mic