MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Prepared by: Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC)
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PREFACE

Background

The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) was formed in October 1996 to provide an oversight of coalition interoperability and assist in coalition building. MIC member nations are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The objective of the MIC is to influence the development of operational practices and enable more effective coalition operations.

The MIC, led by senior operations officers of the member nations, focuses on identifying and addressing interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment. It addresses inter-agency and comprehensive approach activities that are key to planning and conducting coalition operations. Additionally, it addresses civil-military activities that are key in establishing and conducting coalitions as well as policy issues for supporting and monitoring coalitions and/or multinational operations. It is not intended to duplicate or to subsume other interoperability working groups or forums.

Purpose of the Coalition Building Guide

The purpose of the Coalition Building Guide (CBG) is to facilitate lead nations, troop contributing nations and participants in the establishment, and effective operation of, a coalition anywhere on the globe.

Specifically, the Guide concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of multinational joint operations and identifies some of the essential factors associated with the process of coalition building. Additionally, it attempts to provide a common framework of reference for contributing nations.

Audience

This Guide has been written to assist MIC member nations, and their potential partners, to work more effectively together. It also aims to offer guidance to a lead nation, a designated Coalition Force Commander and the coalition staff.

Key Assumptions

1. Future military operations are increasingly likely to be multinational and inter-agency in character.

2. A multinational operation may be carried out within an established alliance framework or through the formation of a coalition.

3. In most cases, coalition operations will be facilitated by the selection of a lead nation, the definition and responsibilities are within this Guide.

4. Each MIC member recognizes that it may be called upon to perform the role of lead nation in future multinational operations.

5. There will be a recognized international organization that provides the mandate for a legitimate level of activities.

Coalition Building Guide Structure

The CBG does not constitute official policy or doctrine, nor does it represent a definitive staff planning or military decision-making guide. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joint doctrine, unless otherwise specifically directed, is the default doctrine for planning and conducting coalition operations.[1] Unlimited local reproduction and distribution is authorized.

The CBG is a living document that is developed when lessons are identified during the conduct of coalition operations, training and experimentation. It is also influenced by technological advances that may enhance aspects of coalition interoperability and communications, as well as national and alliance doctrinal development.

The CBG is organized into **three volumes** so that readers can easily extract the information required. **Volume I** covers the fundamentals and deals with interoperability issues at the very high strategic level. **Volume II** covers the principles of planning coalition operations at the strategic level. Specifically, Volume II covers:

- Campaigning;
- Strategic Planning Guidance;
- MIC Nations' Strategic Planning Framework;
- Coalition Operational Planning;
- Coalition C2 Structures; and
- Key Cross Functional Considerations.

Volume III is a compendium of separate MIC documents that covers key interoperability issues that need to be considered at the strategic/high operational level.

[1] This guide uses established NATO Allied Joint doctrine as a basis. NATO doctrine is the 'default' doctrine for a MIC member nation led coalition unless the lead nation specifies the military doctrine to be used. If a lead nation chooses to use other than NATO doctrine it must ensure all participating coalition partners have access to the doctrine in use. Operating procedures as well as tactics, techniques and procedures will be prescribed by the lead nation.

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.1

FUTURE COALITION OPERATING ENVIRONMENT: INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

Version 4.1
07 November 2012

Prepared by: Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
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MIC FUTURE COALITION OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (FCOE)

RECORD OF CHANGES

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PREFACE

The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) is an operator-led multinational forum that addresses the core issues affecting coalition interoperability. The MIC identifies issues and articulates actions which, if nationally implemented, would contribute to more effective coalition operations. Following the MIC Principals meeting in December 2003, the Capstone MIWG tasked the CD&E MIWG with preparing a concept paper describing the desired functional capabilities for a *Coalition Information Exchange Environment (CIEE)*.

In 2008, the *CIEE* was replaced by and expanded upon in the first version of the current document -- *Future Coalition Operating Environment (FCOE), Interoperability Challenges for the Future (FCOE, V3.0).* This second version of the *FCOE* was developed by pulling key trends, ideas, and capabilities directly from MIC nations' existing strategic and operational documents that address issues related to coalition operations.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document envisions the future operating environment for the purpose of informing strategic and operational level interoperability development (Part I—*Context*) and identifies the key functions and capabilities likely required to operate effectively within a future coalition (Part II—*Application*). Within the MIC, this document informs internal strategy development and the Quadrennial Gap Analysis. It provides a framework for enhanced interoperability in the anticipated future coalition operating environment of 5-20 years in the future at the operational and strategic levels of coalition employment. In particular it outlines the essential military implications of future trends and the key functions and capabilities that MIC nations may need when conducting future coalition operations.

The future coalition operating environment will be as volatile, uncertain, complex, and dynamic as it is today, if not more so, driven by the ascendant global trends described in this paper. The future coalition operating environment must therefore be one in which interoperability has been contemplated and addressed well in advance. In light of the likelihood that MIC nations will increasingly operate with interagency and non-governmental organisations, these trends create several interoperability challenges for coalition nations in the areas of interoperable capabilities, common doctrine development, coalition planning, exercises and experimentation. MIC nations aim to establish compatible processes and complementary capabilities in the areas of coalition force preparation, logistics, CIS, command and control, and plans and operations.

Part I uses a strategic trends approach to describe a future coalition operating environment. The trends discussed are based on a review of national and international futures documents. This approach goes beyond merely identifying the likely future military threats deriving from security concerns against which coalition forces will have to posture. Rather, it seeks to identify key developments across the geopolitical landscape that will shape the wider context within which coalition forces may have to operate.

Trends in the future coalition operating environment are arranged into the following eight general categories: *Demography, Globalisation, Natural Resources and Energy, Climate Change, Cultural and Communication, Social and Political, Economic, and Science and Technology*. These eight generic trends combine to create mounting challenges for future coalition operations and have implications with regard to the conditions for future security policy, as well as for the design and employment of military forces.

Over the next 5 to 20 years there will be a changing balance of Global Power. FCOE Part I further defines four categories of potential adversaries: State Actors, Failed and Failing States, Chronically Fragile States and Non-State Actors. Part I also outlines the key Enduring Drivers for the Character of Future Conflict. These drivers are weapon and technology proliferation, the defence exploitation of technology, the future battlespace with its overlapping environments and the cognitive domain, and finally the legal framework and its associated challenges for the MIC nations.

Part I concludes by outlining a list of interoperability challenges. By focusing current multinational efforts on interoperability challenges, the likelihood of meeting future coalition objectives is increased.

Part II of the FCOE analyses four interoperability challenges (*Compatibility, Capabilities Integration, Information Sharing* and *Interagency Coordination*) and two cross-functional challenges (*Strategic Communication*, and *Legal Requirements*). These challenges are used as focal points upon which to orient multinational capability development. The analyses are built along nine lines of development (*Leadership Development, Command and Control, Education and Training, Doctrine, Logistics, Knowledge Advantage, Shared Situational Awareness, Organizational Constructs,* and *Planning*). From the analyses, key capability gaps are identified within each interoperability and cross-functional challenge.

The fundamental risk of not progressing towards interoperability in these functional areas is coalition forces that are ill-equipped and ineffective against the challenges they may face in the world to come.

PART I - CONTEXT

1. PURPOSE

This document envisions the future operating environment for the purpose of strategic and operational level interoperability development (Part I—*Context*) and identifies the key functions and capabilities likely required to operate effectively within a future coalition (Part II--*Application*). Within the MIC, this document informs internal strategy development and the Quadrennial Gap Analysis. It is meant to stimulate thoughtful debate and serve as a catalyst for the presentation and consideration of interoperability ideas. National militaries and agencies may also use *Future Coalition Operating Environment: Interoperability Challenges for the Future* to influence their own concepts and doctrine to assess potential integration requirements and opportunities within their organisations. The MIC will respect future analysis of other member states.

2. SCOPE

This document provides a framework for enhanced interoperability in the anticipated future coalition operating environment of 5-20 years in the future based on the lead nation principle at the operational and strategic levels of coalition employment. It outlines the essential military implications of future trends and the key functions and capabilities that MIC nations may need when conducting future coalition operations. It also identifies the increasing need for the implementation and promotion of an advanced Comprehensive Approach.

3. ASSUMPTIONS

When outlining and assessing the issues in this paper the following general assumptions have been made:

- The MIC nations have significant global interests and will wish to remain leading actors on the international stage.
- In the future, adversaries will seek asymmetric advantage to exploit our weaknesses, and they are likely to use a different logic than our own.
- MIC nations will generally act with others who share common interests. As such, operating with partners and allies in military coalitions will be key to success during operations.

4. VISION FOR FUTURE COALITION OPERATIONS

To be successful in the complex and shifting operational environment anticipated in the future, coalition forces must improve the speed and quality of decision-making and enhance their unity of effort, while acting on a high level of flexibility. The end state and a common strategic vision are to be shared initially. The future coalition operating environment must be one in which interoperability has been contemplated and addressed well in advance. This requires an investment in several fields including interoperable capabilities, common doctrine development, and coalition planning, exercises, and experimentation.

All instruments of national power may be employed in future coalition operations. This requires a comprehensive approach that must be developed, understood, exercised, and technically and legally enabled. Underpinning this approach is the intent to operate as a case-oriented compilation of a united, net-enabled force; a force which is interconnected, interoperable, and able to share situation awareness with all relevant actors. Standardised or commonly understood data definitions, metadata, protocols, operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and unclassified software can enable enhanced interoperability. Commercial off-the-shelf or government off-the-shelf web and basic core services can lead to lower costs and shorter development and acquisition timelines. Greater use of these readily available products should be a common denominator in future multinational systems and software acquisitions. Security access, reliability, and vulnerability challenges must be addressed as reliance on commercial off-the-shelf and government off-the-shelf products increases.

On the basis of different political mandates on the use of a comprehensive approach, future coalitions must be able to conduct rapid mission and end state analysis for the purpose of generating commander's guidance and enabling decentralised execution, while employing compatible doctrine, command, and operating concepts as much as possible. The ability to share information in a collaborative environment and to quickly adapt to changing situations continues to be essential. MIC nations aim to establish compatible processes and complementary capabilities in the areas of coalition force preparation, logistics, CIS, command and control, and plans and operations. Thus, the conditions necessary for success in the future coalition operating environment revolve around a coalition organisation characterized by information flows that are not unduly constrained, where the key parts of the organisation share situational awareness, and where acts of individual parts may be self-synchronized. Team building and confidence are also key aspects.

A lead nation coalition capability to achieve timely and precise coalition effects, in all terrains and against unpredictable and adaptive adversaries, must also be identified and developed on a case-by-case basis. To this end, legal, cultural, and other impediments to information sharing, intelligence gathering, and dissemination across mission partners must be resolved. Use of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrine among MIC nations is seen as an appropriate enabler[1].

To effectively move towards the MIC vision outlined above, the following lines of development, as a minimum, must be addressed:

- **Leadership Development.** Focused leadership development on coalition planning and decision-making with emphasis on involvement of all relevant actors
- **Command & Control**. An agreed-upon clear and robust C2 structure
- **Education and Training.** A practical education and training programme which emphasizes multinational and interagency aspects of coalition operations

[1] It is essential that Australia, as the only non-NATO MIC nation, has access to NATO doctrine so that they can align their doctrine where appropriate.

- **Doctrine.** Common and shared operations doctrine among MIC nations using the NATO doctrine where deemed appropriate

- **Logistics.** Preparation, deployment, sustainment, redeployment, and reconstitution capability and capacity that facilitate successful coalition operations

- **Knowledge Advantage.** Knowledge advantage is the effective tailoring and rapid updating of individual information requirements through common situational (including cultural) awareness and understanding at all levels

- **Shared Situational Awareness.** Command systems and procedures that promote continuous shared understanding of mission, intent, guidance, and progress

- **Organisational Constructs.** Flexible, adaptive, and agile organisational constructs which allow the coalition to respond to the complexity of the environment

- **Planning.** System, procedural, and organisational constructs that facilitate rapid, continuous, and near simultaneous consultation and planning

Operating as part of a Comprehensive Approach will be necessary. As such, enhanced functions will be required to address the integration and coordination of plans and actions across government departments within and across nations at both strategic and operational levels (note: MIC nations use four different languages).

5. MAJOR TRENDS OF THE COALITION OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

This document uses a strategic trends approach to describe a future coalition operating environment. The trends discussed below were selected based on a review of national and international futures documents. This approach goes beyond merely identifying the likely future military threats deriving from security concerns against which coalition forces will have to posture. Rather, it seeks to identify key developments across the geopolitical landscape that will shape the wider context within which coalition forces may have to operate. Defence decisions about how to posture in relation to these issues are considered over time, with the appropriate balance of judgment and risk, and take time to form and implement. This is appropriate, considering that the consequences of these strategic decisions tend to endure for some while. Nevertheless these trends can create neither a complete nor a definite picture of future developments. They merely help to gain a picture of expectations and to inform the decision-making process without being its sole basis. Therefore the existence of alternate futures has to be considered whenever discussing the Future Coalition Operating Environment.

Trends in the future coalition operating environment are arranged into the following eight general categories: *Demography, Globalisation, Natural Resources and Energy, Climate Change, Cultural and Communication, Social and Political, Economic, and Science and Technology*. These eight generic trends combine to create mounting challenges for future coalition operations and have implications with regard to the conditions for future security policy, as well as for the design and employment of military forces. Although certain trends may appear predictable, clear predictions concerning future

developments remains impossible. Shocks and strategic surprise remain certain. Coalition nations must therefore be prepared to anticipate shocks that may significantly alter the pace and/or the trajectory of these global trends and to adapt accordingly in a timely manner.

5.1 Roles of a Coalition in the Future Environment

MIC nations will likely to be required to lead coalitions in the future multi-polar world, with some nations more likely to lead in specific areas.

One of the key presentational advantages of operating as part of a coalition is that providing their actions are decisive and unified, they often give a level of both acceptability and legitimacy to military action within the international framework during 'intervention' type of operations.

Another clear advantage for the participants is that large coalitions increase the sharing of the burden of military operational fiscal costs among several nations. Different nations can contribute appropriate available expertise and niche capabilities to operations using individual nations' military strengths whilst taking less risk by not exposing individual weaknesses. Due to individual political circumstances some nations will be able to provide a full range of combat capabilities whilst others may only be willing or able to provide limited supporting functions to a campaign.

Over the past century western coalitions provided defensive forces as a deterrent against other state actors or were used for war fighting roles in conflict. Whilst these functions remain, in the future it is likely that military coalitions will play a greater role in assisting regions affected by large-scale natural and humanitarian disasters.

Security policy and military capability implications:

- The need for greater understanding between MIC nations on individual doctrine and force preparations used in planning for operations.
- Clear and continuous knowledge of each nation's capabilities in specialised areas, including perceived strengths and weaknesses and potential capability gaps.
- MIC nations should aim to operate and train together in a wider range of roles from war fighting to disaster relief and humanitarian missions.
- Operating with partners and allies in coalitions will be key to successful operations, but may add complexity
- Need to enhance capacity for intelligence sharing.

5.2 Demographic Trends

The current global population of 6.8 billion people will reach 7.6 billion individuals by 2020 (8.3 billion by 2030). Future population growth will mainly take place in the less developed countries. The small amount of population growth projected for more developed countries will be in the United States and Canada. The geographic imbalance in population growth will only intensify in the

upcoming years. This trend will most likely be nonlinear mainly due to possible variations as a function of changing fertility rates. Africa is the region with the highest birth rates and the largest percentage of population growth. Even after declines, Africa's birth rates remain high and its population is very young.

Growth of the mainly Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa has slowed as a result of major changes in marriage and childbearing in recent decades (e.g. Lebanon, Egypt, Iran and Tunisia).

Asia is projected to grow, despite substantial declines in births rates in many eastern Asian countries (e.g. Taiwan, Japan, South Korea – all of which have aging populations). These countries face the problems of population declining and extreme aging in their societies. China's population is still increasing but a decline is projected for 2030. China may also see a significant ageing in its population as a result of its one-child policy. The strongest absolute population increases will likely occur in India.

Extremely low birth rates in most European countries have intensified the discussion about population decline. Europe's population is projected to decline by 2015. Russia in particular has to deal with a declining population due to low fertility rates and a disproportionally high male mortality rate.

Although the world population is aging, the proportion of the population aged between 15 and 24 in less developed countries will continue to be higher than in more developed countries. This youth bulge has implications on job opportunities, youth expectations, opportunities for development and economic growth and consequently has implications for migration and security issues.

Of particular importance is a general trend toward urbanisation. By 2030, more than 60 percent of the world's population is expected to live in urban areas. Most of the increase in world population will be attributed to huge and growing mega-cities and migration from less-developed to more-developed regions of the world. Mass movements of humanity may result in political and social strains within and among developed and developing nations.

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Increasing risk of humanitarian catastrophe caused by a mixture of demographic trends and the inability of authorities to fully cope with population growth and urbanisation, the scale of which would likely require military support to civil authorities.
- Increasing potential for conflict as a consequence of a growing global populace, especially in developing regions and countries with large numbers of disenfranchised youth, the scope of which may result in increasing military engagements.
- Increasing potential for combat in urban and littoral areas.
- Demographic challenges will impact on future military recruitment practices in some coalition countries.

5.3 Globalization

The mega-trend process of Globalisation (which revolves around the transmittal of capital, trade, intellectual property, movements of persons and migration flows, economic activity, wealth and resources) represents a global network of physical linkages that are essential for the access and use of the global commons. These links join all the major centres of trade, finance, intellectual endeavour, energy production, logistics and markets. Much activity will occur in the global commons – the domains or areas that no one state controls, but on which all rely. They also, whether in the maritime, air, cyber or space arenas, either follow routes that pass though vulnerable chokepoints or are dependent on specific elements of technology such as satellite ground stations and internet server nodes. The control and security of the effective means of delivery of globalisation are a major security concern of the major powers.

Globalisation is likely to be increasingly driven by the consumer requirements of the rapidly developing rising powers as well as by the existing markets in the developed world. However this will require continued access to resources, especially those of energy, water, food and intellectual capital. The potential exploitation of developing and failed or failing states by more wealthier or aggressive nations for resources is likely to become a source of conflict. International crime is also an unwelcome facet of globalisation; which will rise to levels significantly above the current level of $1 trillion per annum; along with corruption it will continue to destabilise weaker states and regions.

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Access to armaments is easier; this makes control over stocks, transfer and exchanges more and more difficult. Irregular actors can get easier access to high end equipment. This allows both state and non-state entities to challenge established norms as well as stronger opponents on an equal basis.
- Containing the effects of crisis; in a globalised world crisis will need to be contained and ever more controlled by various military and non-military means as the ramifications of these crisis will escalate often due to globalisation itself.
- Nuclear and WMD proliferation risks will increase through globalisation.
- Need to consider the involvement of actors such as PMFs (private military/security firms/companies), which, if not strictly controlled can represent new sources of instability and become nothing more than unwelcome militias.
- In a globalized world, particularly in space and cyberspace, private companies must be considered.
- Globalised or global issues will call for global responses, global influence strategies, stronger alliances and coalitions, stronger interoperability initiatives (shared vision, shared means and assets, and optimised interactions between actors in theatre).

5.4 Natural Resource And Energy Trends

Sustained global development will involve a delicate balance between the physical/ecological limitations of natural resources and the desire among numerous government and non-government institutions to utilise those resources for economic growth. Access to resources and stable pricing will continue to be a primary concern for these institutions. Competition for strategic resources may increase due to a growing global appetite and decreasing availability. Currently, the global demand for oil is increasing an average of 1.7 percent annually with resources estimated to last approximately 35-40 more years. An increasingly elaborated discussion concerning when the time the oil peak might occur reflects the difficulties and ambiguity of a complex topic. By the 2030s oil requirements could go from 86 to 118 million barrels per day. The central problem in the near term is a shortage of drilling platforms, engineers and refining capability. Additionally, world-wide supplies of resources for nuclear power, an important energy provider, are currently estimated to last until 2060, depending on the adopted technological standard of future plants. Industrialised nations will continue to research alternative energy sources while being actively engaged in securing resource-rich regions and corresponding lines of communication. Whilst these alternative energy sources (bio-fuels and renewable energy) could generally meet higher demand for global energy, competition is likely over the finite amount of suitable agricultural land available to grow fuel related crops.

The supply of gas, either piped directly, or as liquefied natural gas will be of increasing importance, especially as developed states try to meet the challenges of climate change.

Continued economic development and urbanisation could create shortages of food and fresh water. Demographic trends and water shortages could merge to create a growing number of people without sufficient access to fresh water. Food and water will become increasingly valuable and, for the first time in some regions, a scarce resource. The number of nations facing water shortages (currently, North African, Near and Middle Eastern nations) is expected to increase from thirty-one up to forty-eight (including India and Northern China), impacting up to 35 percent of the global population. Additionally, increased mono-cultural agriculture practices, deforestation, intensified livestock breeding, and over-fishing of oceans and rivers may threaten global food production.

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Environmental and resource developments may widen the distance between locations of origin and consumption for fossil energies and food. As a consequence, the associated means and lines of communication could become increasingly important strategically. Some common energy markets might disintegrate. Economically integrated regions might be driven to find alternative ways to jointly access required resources.

- Those regions will integrate these strategic needs into the respective political approaches. Military forces may be called upon to lead peacekeeping or peace enforcement initiatives including securing global lines of communication associated with critical resources.

- Maritime boundary disputes and energy supplies will become critical factors in maintaining economic stability, especially within the EU, China, Japan and Asia. Other energy resources and the critical infrastructure that supports them will be of equal importance.

- Natural disasters, coupled with governance structures ill-designed to absorb environmental pressures, particularly in less-developed countries, may increase the likelihood for military employment at the lower end of the range of military operations.

- Potential for conflict due to uneven distribution of resources, environmental hardships, and a lack of socio-economic prospects is likely to be most significant in an area stretching from Africa, to the Near East, and into Central Asia; parts of Central and South America may also be impacted.

- Increasing water and food shortages, in combination with environmental problems and effects related to global climate change, will likely cause significant migration movements worldwide. Some nations will regard the security of their water and food supplies as straightforward survival and will devote resources to defend, secure or acquire them. These trends will require constabulary and security-related military options.

- Confluence of demographic and natural resource trends increases the potential for open conflict both within societies and nation-states as well as between societies and nation-states.

5.5 Climate Change

Climate change has two major implications: First, the environment will change, with increased desertification, melting ice caps, reduced water run offs and more severe weather events will make the military operating environment more extreme; secondly, it will directly effect large numbers of people, many of whom who live in regions and states that will not be able to adapt quickly enough to avoid the worst climate change effects. This will further exacerbate the stability of states; especially those that are already vulnerable to other factors.

Climate change may be exacerbated by continued economic development and urbanisation, creating shortages of food and fresh water. The increasing likelihood of droughts in Australia and New Zealand, flooding in Latin America and Europe, coastal erosions and hurricanes in North America, and desertification in parts of Africa may create a cascade of natural resource issues. Increased mono-cultural agriculture practices, deforestation, intensified livestock breeding, and over-fishing of oceans and rivers may threaten global food production.

Measures against climate change might be delayed by managing other challenges of short-term priority (i.e.: shortages of resources not as apparent due to reduced demand during a global financial recession).

Security policy and military capability implications:

- This will create sources of instability that will need collective and reactive interventions to reduce the level of violence and provide a secure environment in which to tackle the problem in the affected regions.
- A greater understanding of the climate change global stress zones by the military is needed to be better prepared.
- Prevention of the breakdown of governance in many of the deteriorating regions.
- Potential for flooding in littoral and riverside areas may necessitate coherent preventive measures, as well as posturing for disaster relief.

5.6 Cultural and Communication Trends

The 'Global Village' is becoming more inter-connected with many developed nations becoming more multi-cultural in their population make-up. Racial and cultural intolerance of others is likely to remain an issue throughout most of the world. The effects of globalisation such as omni-present media, changes in the social fabric of populations, an individual's increased access to information, and urbanisation have already triggered culturally and religiously-motivated movements at local and regional levels. These cultural and religious movements emphasise ethnic particularities and the preservation of independence and cultural traditions. These often have global reach. The increasing trend towards cultural fragmentation based upon sub-cultural identities may clash with opposing movements attempting to force unification. There will be a need to define what to defend and what are considered key national values (including what to promote and preserve).

Certain countries may witness a growth in fundamentalist groupings because of political and economic orientations (e.g., largely authoritative governments, social and economic imbalances, widespread corruption, religious fundamentalist movements, etc.). These countries may increasingly rely upon their diaspora communities in Europe and other regions to influence other governments and populations. Existing mechanisms of crisis management, arbitration, conflict prevention, and containment may be insufficient to overcome the security challenges associated with current cultural trends. Revisions to these mechanisms may require changes that address the fading distinction between war and peace, the legal status of non-state actors, and the means to effectively deter terrorists and religious extremists.

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Non-state and state proxy actors will likely use non-military, asymmetric methods, and irregular warfare to defend their culture and identity or advocate change;
- Organised militaries will likely continue to have difficulty responding effectively to violence perpetuated by non-state actors;
- Conflicts deriving from identity issues regularly require 'whole of government'-approaches rather than military solutions alone;

- Concepts that address national and transnational political and religious fundamentalism must be synchronised among coalition partners;
- Multinational collaboration tools that identify and interdict the global financial and logistical support of radical non-state actors are needed;

5.7 Socio-Political Trends

A dominant socio-political trend will be a dynamic tension between the continuing struggle for democratisation and the desire to maintain alternative systems of governance. A further complication is that individual and personal interests are likely to endanger collective interests. Democratic criteria other than free elections and a representative government should be taken into account when assessing governments around the world (e.g., basic human rights, accountability of public officials, good governance, status of women, status of minorities, responsiveness to needs of the populace, etc.). Such an expanded assessment would account for the various levels of social development that exist across the globe. Countries will continue to progress and evolve at different paces and in different directions. Tendencies toward modernisation and individualisation will contrast with traditional structures and could produce varying results that span all social functions.

Politically, we exist in a strongly integrated and interdependent multi-polar world, consisting of existing and rising superpowers, which may become more predominant. Its manifestations may range from cooperative to confrontational, leaving it undetermined whether this multi-polarity will lead to more or less international stability and order. Non-state actors, fuelled by their technological and economic means, will possess capabilities to challenge existing governments. Security will likely be a growing business, as corporations and governments operate in dangerous areas with a concomitant expansion of security risks.

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Prominent fault lines between disparate societies exist along Europe's southern/south-eastern borders;
- Imbalanced intra-societal and inter-societal developments may drive migration as a consequence of the difference in future possibilities and chances;
- Emerging new forms of security provision by non-state or state proxy actors may possibly challenge existing political structures (notably outside the area of influence of the superpower states);
- Interventions by the international community in failed and rogue states will increasingly focus on creating a basic security framework while promoting developments.

5.8 Economic Trends

Economic development will remain an important impetus for globalisation with unrestricted and uninterrupted use of cyberspace now vital for the global economy to function. The dynamics of the global economy will depend on whether the trend towards blurred economic boundaries continues

or whether a resurgence of strong nation-states will forge a return to traditional nation-state economic relationships. (i.e. a global economy versus global governance). The increasing complexity and speed of the global economic system combined with limited resources and markets may provide more significance to economic and resource alliances and blocs. Competing for access to markets and influence is increasingly becoming a joint governance-business issue, while traditional and international economic mechanisms are less effective. Another tendency includes the regionalisation of trade and investments in an effort to protect and strengthen regional equities. Complementing such economic global trends are changes such as continued weakening of the industrial sector and a strengthening of the service sector in most MIC nations. Changes are also underway within specific sectors that indicate an increasing need for a technically-savvy work force and a shift towards functionally-organised structures (most notably, infrastructure, information, and communication services).

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Potential for opportunities as well as risks concerning the continued globalisation of the economy.
- Possible marginalisation of individual economic, social, and political actors, including a potential for reactive violent behaviour.
- Reduced military budget for most MIC nations. Conflict prevention and management will require innovative risk mitigation tools. Likewise, there is an increased need for mutualisation and interoperability efforts in terms of common doctrine and capabilities.
- Extreme environments (i.e. space, deep underground, Deep Ocean, and Polar Regions) are increasing in economic, and therefore strategic, significance.

5.9 Science And Technology Trends

Over time, developments in science and technology and the defence-related capabilities from such developments have had a dramatic impact on the outcomes of military operations and the manner in which such operations have been conducted. The disruptiveness of both mature and emerging technology is especially worth noting. Rapid, revolutionary and novel scientific discoveries that are transferred or applied by cultures or societies (including military, business, economic) in unexpected, innovative ways can have the unanticipated effect of disrupting the status quo. This scientific and technological development can sometimes be unexpected and non-linear, triggering new and revolutionary changes and therefore influencing the way humans act and react.

Automation, customisation and miniaturisation support many technological breakthroughs that contribute to defence technology. Areas of interest include nanotechnology, micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS), information systems and sensors, networking technology, biotechnology, new energy/power technology and cognitive/behavioural/social sciences. As the positive trends in these developments will continue, so will the negative and perverse application by today's and future adversaries.

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Technological superiority can be as a weakness.
- Scientific and technological advances will more and more be driven by massive investments of private and multi-national companies instead of governments.
- COTS are available to everybody, including adversaries.
- High-tech and sophisticated systems could be neutralised by low-tech solutions.
- Potential of new and emerging science and technology has to be recognised at an early stage in order to be on the leading edge of technology.
- Energy concepts for 'green' fuels and efficient energy generation need to be developed.
- Trend towards more complexity needs to reflect the possible simplicity of an adversary.

6. POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES

Over the next 5 to 20 years there will be a changing balance of Global Power. Easiest to assess are the State Actors who may wish to oppose or, at the very least, challenge the current status quo. Failed and Failing States are likely to increase in number and will present varying challenges, few of which will be able to be ignored. Of greater concern are the Chronically Fragile States as it will be difficult to predict *if, where* and *when* intervention may become necessary to avoid a bad situation becoming considerably worse. One of the themes these states have in common is that the timescales the international community may be given to counter these threats will be short and the outcomes unpredictable. In the past 20 years the growing number of Non-State Actors, in various guises that have emerged as a new threat to all of the MIC nations (and their interests) as well as to all NATO member states have created a raft of challenges that will continue to expand and tax national governments for the foreseeable future. These actual and potential 4 groups of adversaries are explained in greater detail below.

6.1 State Actors

There will be residual challenges from Russia and even within Europe. There is likely to be little fundamental change in the strategic balance within the next 5 years. China will be one of the rising powers, but the US will first and foremost be the global hegemon. Some states may exploit alternative strategies (i.e.: hybrid strategies) to leverage their interests, evading direct competition with US (or other western) military power.

However, in a decade's time, a shift towards multi-polarity will be underway. The defence expenditure in China is rising in the mid-term. China's economic power will be the predominant influence in Asia and its influence will be global. China will maintain its status as a rising power, but is likely to feel constrained by access to resources, most crucially food and energy. The Chinese are likely to seek to secure lines of communication to vital resources and will devote a considerable effort to ensure their viability. China is looking to Africa, Latin America and Russia for resources and

influence, but might not hesitate to confront other powers if its interests are challenged. It will use all the elements of its national power, from state controlled commerce to influence over its Diasporas. Current activity in global computer networks and space already point to asymmetric capabilities that could strike at western vulnerabilities; countering these threats may become enduring defence tasks. Moreover, regional alliances may arise that could either confront or contribute to MIC-led coalitions.

The UN, World Trade Organisation, World Bank and IMF will increasingly be influenced by the rising powers. These states may then take a wider role in global security, consequently, the West may have to accept that it might not so easily achieve consensus (and thereby UN legitimacy) for its desired courses of action.

The upcoming global peak oil will lead to an extraordinary boost in power, for a limited period, for the exporting states. These states may use this window of opportunity to try and gain advantage by trying to influence the international system.

6.2 Chronically Fragile States

The changing international environment will continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states. These states are often a perfect breeding ground for radicalism and extremism. In some cases these are nuclear-armed or are critically important to enduring coalition interests. Over the course of the next several decades, conflicts are at least as likely to result from state weakness as from state strength.[2]

6.3 Sliding Powers – Failed and Failing States

States that cannot cope with the negative influences of globalisation, demography, climate change and resource shortages will risk collapse. Poor governance, economic deprivation, criminal expansion, and social inequality, already prevalent in parts of Africa, Asia, and Central America, are likely to spread further. Many failures will be accompanied by substantial outbreaks of violence. All MIC nations have large non-indigenous communities, particularly from South Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe (including Turkey), which provide us with a direct interest in either securing the stability of these regions or mitigating the consequences of any conflict.

6.4 Non-State Actors

Extremist non-state actors will present significant challenges. They are likely to range from state proxies such as Hezbollah through to major companies, to extremist interest groups or even trans-national criminal gangs. They could employ a wide spectrum of military capabilities, albeit at limited scale, but they will nevertheless be capable of innovative tactics that exploit inherent coalition weaknesses. The merging of state proxies, extremist ideologies and even criminal intent will make extremist non-state actors hard to counteract.

[2] US QDR Report (p.9) – Feb 2010.

7. ENDURING DRIVERS FOR THE CHARACTER OF FUTURE CONFLICT

Since the demise of the Iron Curtain, the use of MIC nations' armed forces in conflict has broadly fallen into 2 overlapping clusters: acting as a force for good, and addressing new threats of WMD and Islamic extremism. This has resulted in a wide range of operations and needs but with a smaller footprint. Islamic extremism is likely to be the main issue for the coming decade. That said, homeland security, the Middle East and South Asia are likely to remain the main strategic areas of focus.

7.1 Weapon and Technology Proliferation

The consequences of nuclear proliferation are typified by ongoing international anxiety about Iran and North Korea, with the risks of pre-emptive action, regional arms races and other countries reassessing their nuclear status. The era in which many states engaged in multi-tonne production, weaponization and stockpiling of chemical and biological (CB) agents is over and the number of countries with offensive CB programmes is likely to remain small. However, international terrorists are seeking to acquire CB weapons. Non-state actors' interest in CB capabilities will be limited mainly to simple toxins and poisons, but they may still use traditional CB agents. Moreover, while their use of a nuclear device without state sponsorship is less likely, acquisition of sufficient radiological material to generate a so-called 'dirty bomb' cannot be discounted. It is likely that coalition forces may be operating against, or near, a state with a ballistic missile capability, with at least one permanent Joint operating base within range of ballistic missile attack. The spread of ballistic missile defence capabilities may deter some states from developing or acquiring ballistic missiles, but it is unlikely to deter the threat completely.

As Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) spread, more states are likely to weaponize systems, either to deter opponents or as instruments of power in their own right. While it can be expected that Iran will join the list of nuclear weapon states, states in Asia, the Americas and the Middle East might also strive to obtain nuclear capabilities.

Proliferation of other weapon systems will be widespread and this will fuel instability and conflict. Based on the time required to develop new weapons, the west is safe for the near term, however weapon superiority may not be guaranteed past 2020. This has profound implications on how the West can manage its security; emerging powers will counteract Western air power by decentralising critical infrastructure, using camouflage, concealment and deception, and by countering conventional power with asymmetric means. Asymmetry could be through both low and high technology strategies. For example, the Chinese will use conventional capabilities and niche technology. Its doctrine of High Tech Local War could counter Western dominance in technology with low technology approaches. One example is by targeting pilots and aircraft maintenance teams, directly or through their families, rather than the aircraft themselves. Another is developing the relatively sophisticated but asymmetric means to deny US dominance in space, but without entering the kind of symmetric space race that Russia tried to win against the US and ultimately failed.

7.2 Defense Exploitation Of Technology

Technology affects the way in which an actor is able to fight and in turn the way in which he chooses to do so.[3] Technological advantage, proliferation and the natural cycle of countermeasures will continue. Any perceived Western technological edge is being rapidly challenged. Space technology is proliferating and the domain is now contested; computer network operations are also a daily reality, with both military and civilian applications, but systems may be susceptible in the near future to Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). Unmanned systems now promise to become increasingly capable and autonomous. But adaptation is not the preserve of developed states. Examples abound of seemingly inferior adversaries able to achieve tactical success beyond that suggested by their level of sophistication. Moreover, their rate of adaptation or tempo has been faster than technologically-advanced opponents; low technology has far less financial drag.

Technology will offer military advantage to those who can afford to develop or exploit it, but the vanguard of technological development is shifting away from the military to the commercial sector. Our acquisition process will be driven not just by what we want, but also by what is available and what industry wishes to sell. Our adversaries, including poorer states and non-state actors, will increasingly exploit low-cost, evolving or emerging technologies to gain asymmetric advantage. This may frequently be to our disadvantage, but it may also present opportunities for our countermeasures.

In people-centric operations influence is a key function, generating actionable understanding coupled with the ability to strike. Our ability to attack will, nonetheless, remain vital, and will require us to exploit newer domains such as space and cyberspace. Precision and discrimination are essential, in both time and location, implying the need for persistence. Only then will an adversary be held at a disadvantage, providing military options to a commander, though the route to success will be through timely integration and synchronisation of capabilities.

7.3 The Future Battlespace - Overlapping Environments and the Cognitive Domain

While the physical environments that our forces will operate in will retain their distinct characteristics, operations within any one environment will become increasingly dependent on capabilities designed for a different environment, because each environment will have ever-deeper overlap with the others. For example, the maritime environment can no longer be described in purely naval terms; it is a hybrid environment. Significant land masses are directly influenced from the sea, which stretches from the deep-sea bed, through to shallow coastal zones, including the air and space above those areas and inland, typically influencing fisheries, urban, industrial and agricultural areas. Global communication and trade routes criss-cross the oceans. The sea bed carries energy pipelines and fibre-optics communication cables. The surface transports global trade. Globalisation has thus driven each one of the traditional land, air and sea environments to be more strongly influenced by each other. Cyberspace and space will arguably knit what had been three

[3] The First World War is a good example of a number of technologies coming together to change the character of warfare. Telecommunications: vastly improving tactical level coordination of, for example, artillery; railways enabled large amounts of men and materiel to be marshaled; armour made its debut, ending the prospect of another trench-bound stalemate; and air power made its first full contribution, revolutionising reconnaissance on the battlefield while Zeppelins and Gotha bombers conducted German attacks on distant cities.

very distinct environments and areas of responsibility into a more interrelated but complex whole. The future Battlespace will be more contested, more congested, more cluttered, more connected, and more constrained.

The cognitive domain is also becoming increasingly more important. The globalisation of information allows all actors, state and non-state, to wield an influence on the decision making process of democracy. To preserve or being able to maintain the right political conditions for military engagement is a mandatory precondition to the success of an operation, whether that be for a projection of power or direct use of coalition armed forces. To secure such a precondition, a democracy needs to develop an influence strategy aiming at persuading any allied, neutral or opposing decision maker that their objectives (and selected modes of action to reach their military objectives) and end state bear legitimacy and credibility whilst also being relevant and efficient. Before, during and after conflict the cognitive strategy is implemented within the field of comprehension and perception of individuals or groups, to contribute to the construction of a favourable and positive situation in either the national interest of the intervening state or that of the coalition.

This capability to exert influence on identified targets (civilian authorities, their closest advisors and other elements of the general populous) takes place within the environment defined as both a virtual and physical space, within which information is emitted, released, exploited and received. The term 'information' includes the information itself as well as the information systems used to exploit it. The various actors within a crisis or conflict intervene within this space, to support or counteract the selected and implemented strategy. What is at stake is not only the credibility of the coalition partners but also the indirect pillars of image, power and foreign policy instruments: diplomacy, economy, principles of armed forces employment, etc.

Misinformation, manipulation, misunderstanding, lack of information accuracy, and the loss of real meaning are all key parts of the 'battle of perceptions'. This 'war of information', if not won by the coalition, can severely disrupt our strategy of action, especially our military strategy of action. Today's wars involve the clash of influence strategies between parties which aim at impacting perceptions. The minds of various populations, be they groups or individuals, and whether they are directly involved by the conflict or not, have become targets, in order to influence decisions, tarnish or lessen what has been declared as an achieved success or a victory. We have entered the battle of perceptions and winning it has become a key factor to the success of military strategies.

7.4 Legal Framework and Challenges

Western legal and social norms, which are essential to the legitimacy of our actions, will guide those actions, but will not guide the actions of many of our adversaries. Coalition action will remain bound by our own Western legal norms. This will include careful discrimination between combatant and non-combatants, the minimization of collateral damage, and careful control and precision in the use of force. All these practices, conditioned by military necessity, will continue to make current and future operation enormously difficult and challenging. If the demands for precision weaponry and the complementary need for greater and more accurate target intelligence continue to increase future operation may become much more costly.

There are also differences between MIC nations on issues of treaties and international protocols need to be defined and understood as they will create friction when operating together as a coalition (e.g.: differences in national stances on ROE, cluster munitions, land mines, etc).

Security policy and military capability implications:

- Legal frameworks impact on our military action (proportionality, target discrimination, and ethics, etc.).
- Legal challenges may be raised against the use of novel weapons and systems, such as Unmanned Aerial Systems, Directed Energy Weapons, non-lethal weapons and cyber operations.

8. INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES

The future coalition operating environment will be as volatile, uncertain, complex, and dynamic as it is today, if not more so, driven by the ascendant global trends previously discussed. In light of the likelihood that MIC nations will increasingly operate with interagency and non-governmental organisations, these trends create several interoperability challenges for coalition nations. These coalition interoperability challenges include:

- **Policy.** Each nation, whilst part of various individual coalitions, has different military policies and priorities based on their individual national needs. This exacerbates the challenges of interoperability as they are often beyond the gift of military personnel to change. As such it is important that each nation understands the key national policy differences in order to best mitigate the risks to the operational effectiveness of the coalition.
- **Procedures.** NATO procedures are often the most accessible and widely used 'standard' procedures for most MIC nations (this is not the case for AUS or certain parts of the US military (e.g.: PACFLEET). Consideration should be given to further expand the usage of these procedures to other nations where appropriate. Individual national procedures, particularly at the operational and tactical levels of operation, should be avoided whenever possible during coalition operations.
- **Facilities.** Facilities exist in each nation to support the national interest which can, in some circumstances, be used for coalition purposes. Clever and efficient shared usage of military (and appropriate civilian) facilities can enhance the overall strength of the MIC as a fighting and unified military force.
- **Compatibility.** Facilitate the compatibility of organisations, doctrine, training, technology, and equipment standards among coalition militaries.
- **Capabilities Integration.** Improve awareness of the disparate operational force capabilities and degrees of interoperability among nations and integrate these capabilities in a cohesive manner that supports coalition objectives.

- **Information Sharing.** Improve information sharing among national military systems within the constraints of national policy.
- **Interagency Coordination.** Establish policies, procedures, organisations, and systems to facilitate successful interagency coordination and synchronisation.

By focusing current multinational efforts on interoperability challenges, the likelihood of meeting future coalition objectives is increased. The latter four challenges identified above are used as focal points in FCOE Part II to orient multinational capability development analysis in order that coalition forces are better prepared to meet the challenges of the future.

9. CONCLUSION

Part I of this document establishes the context for future coalition operations and suggests that MIC nations will be participating in operations that span the full range of military operations. Trends that characterise the coalition operating environment of 5-20 years and beyond possess inherent risks, but also new possibilities for overcoming present day challenges. Environmental trends reflect global climate change, natural disasters, and the increasing importance of dealing with extreme environments. Other trends, associated with the behaviours of individuals or isolated groups, are driven by proliferation activities, religious fundamentalism, or non-state political movements. Finally, large-scale regional trends, such as demographic unrest, migration pressures upon the global economy, or turmoil erupting out of failed or rogue states, will likely impact entire societies and large portions of the global populace. Operating within the future environment created by these trends will require MIC nations to focus development efforts upon four interoperability challenges: *Compatibility, Capabilities Integration, Information Sharing,* and *Interagency Coordination*. Part II of this document analyses these challenges along the lines of development identified in Section 4.

PART II - APPLICATION

1. PURPOSE

The purpose of Part II of the *Future Coalition Operating Environment: Interoperability Challenges for the Future* is to look at the key challenges and what is required to operate effectively within a future coalition. It looks beyond key functions and capability areas, and addresses the very real practical challenges of interoperability. It highlights areas that the MIC nations should consider addressing (or at least be cognisant of) when planning to operate jointly. Within the MIC, this document informs internal strategy development and the Quadrennial Gap Analysis. It is meant to stimulate thoughtful debate and serve as a catalyst for the presentation and consideration of interoperability ideas at all levels of interoperability, from tactical to strategic.

The MIC Strategic Guidance Document (SGD) 2010 states that the main objective of the MIC is to influence the development of operational practices to enable more effective coalition operations, mainly by addressing their interoperability issues. FCOE Part II analyses four critical interoperability challenges identified in Part I[4] against nine lines of development.[5] These lines of development are directed at enhancing the awareness of the disparate capabilities which nations are able and willing to commit, as well as improving their degree of interoperability[6]. Part II includes analyses of two cross functional challenges (Strategic Communication and Legal Requirements) which were derived from the Strategic Guidance Document.

2. INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES AND CONSIDERATIONS

2.1 Compatibility

Challenge Description

The military forces of the MIC nations should be able, without significant modification, to train and operate with each other's procedures and equipment. This is a goal not easily realized since it must include compatible processes and interoperable capabilities in many areas: coalition force preparation, logistics, information systems, command and control, and planning, while national resources are constrained. Additionally, compatibility in these various areas will often be a critical supporting step to the achievement of capabilities integration among MIC nations. Challenges in compatibility span a spectrum from the commonality of supply and equipment to the compatibility of task or process accomplishment.

[4] Compatibility, Capabilities Integration, Information Sharing, and Interagency Coordination

[5] Leadership Development, Command and Control, Education and Training, Doctrine, Logistics, Knowledge Advantage, Shared Situational Awareness, Organizational Constructs, and Planning

[6] Interoperability: the will, common understanding and ability of coalition partners to bridge differences in culture, organisation, procedures and technology to effectively and efficiently cooperate towards achieving common goals
Military interoperability: The ability of military forces to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks (NATO AAP-6 ed. 2010).
Force interoperability: The ability of the forces of two or more nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks (NATO AAP-6 ed. 2010).

Analysis of Compatibility via Lines of Development

- **Leadership Development:** Leaders must become accustomed to working in coalition military headquarters to become comfortable and effective while serving with their military counterparts. They should have an understanding of coalition partner capabilities. Leaders must have opportunities early and often in their careers to develop these skills.
- **Command & Control:** The use of appropriate tools of liaison between several nations is a critical factor for the success of coalitions. The efficient use of "Liaison Teams" at the appropriate levels should be established as one of the training objectives of multinational exercises.[7] Further, sufficient numbers of liaisons with the appropriate level of rank and experience need to be provided and equipped with communications, protection, and transport.[8] Existing procedures that support compatibility in C2 and a common operating picture[9] should be used in exercises and in operations.[10]
- **Education and Training:** Minimum standards for Professional Military Education should be established among MIC nations, as well as criteria for assessing and monitoring the educational and training programmes' ability to meet operational requirements. National education and training programmes should emphasize multinational aspects of coalition operations, including cultural preparation[11] to operate within multinational environments (headquarters, staffs, units).
- **Doctrine:** Many interoperability issues arise from misunderstandings due to language, idiom, and doctrine. NATO doctrine is an example of multinational doctrine that is designed to minimize misunderstandings.
- **Logistics:** Units should be adequately equipped or prepared to provide logistical and administrative support to attached joint, coalition, or multinational forces. MIC nations should adapt their plans for development of national-level logistics automated systems that support logistics C2 with the intent to standardize so that information is shared and common reports produced.
- **Knowledge Advantage:** Knowledge Advantage is supported through committed and mutually-productive organizational relationships, extensive networks with key organizations outside the military and other government contingents, and effectively utilising all available information sources. In this regard, developing technology platforms that enhance interoperability and promote the timely passage of relevant information is important.[12]
- **Shared Situational Awareness:** The development of compatible equipment and processes is required to support rapid consultation and planning. Senior leaders need to be aware of relevant strategic-to-tactical activities conducted in the information environment, following intelligent screening. A majority of degrade/counter/amplify activities consists of actions such as flexible deterrent options, force movements, distribution of aid. While tactical in

[7] JLLIS lesson 10642, "Liaisons between MNFS and Partner Nations", SOUTHCOM, 27 October 2008.
[8] ABCA Report Number 042, *Coalition Lessons Analysis Workshop*, 3-7 September 2007.
[9] Such as the Coalition Logistic Handbook or the Coalition Health Interoperability Handbook
[10] ABCA Report Number 042, p. 5-6.
[11] "Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence, A Guide to Best Practices," 27 September 2011, MIC
[12] Government of Australia, *CIVMILCOE-Conceptual-Framework-Booklet*, Version 6, 2010.

their nature, these activities can deliver a strategic message and therefore should be part of senior leader information on effects in the information environment.[13]

- **Organizational Constructs:** Organizational designs should be created to accept compatible national contributions without modification. Within military segments of the coalition, nations should establish a minimum level at which multinational formations can effectively be used.[14]
- **Planning:** Acceptance of a baseline planning process and compatible tools facilitate coalition operations. Additionally, development of compatible security clearance and information release protocols to facilitate rapid consultation and planning is necessary.

Key Capability Gaps

- Standardization
- Common lexicon for military concepts, doctrine and operations
- Common Rules of Engagement (ROE) appropriate to an operation
- Secure computing / voice / video capabilities among coalition members
- Utilization of existing services and support doctrine[15] in training and exercises
- Common training
- Common tools for command and control

2.2 Capabilities Integration

Challenge Description

Whereas *Compatibility* addresses the ability of coalition partners to use each other's equipment and processes, *Capabilities Integration* addresses the coordinated and cohesive employment of nations' complementary capabilities for effective operations. Capabilities Integration:

- Highlights the burden sharing of responsibilities amongst nations;
- Provides participating nations a flexible tool to support the ultimate goals of the coalition, while minimizing the impact of domestic constraints and limitations;
- Helps effective and efficient employment of nations' scarce resources;
- Addresses possible coalition capability gaps in a Comprehensive Approach framework;
- Enhances the efficiency of force generation and force preparation processes.

The effectiveness of coalitions rests with the political will to share and pursue common objectives as well as the extensive integration of capabilities, which assorted nations are able to put in place. Due to individual political circumstances some nations will be able to provide a full range of military capabilities whilst others may only be willing or able to provide limited contributions to a campaign. Furthermore, different nations can contribute appropriate available expertise and niche capabilities using individual nations' military strengths whilst taking less risk by not exposing individual weaknesses.

[13] JLLIS lesson 14935, "Strategic Communication Integration," SOUTHCOM 05 October 2010.
[14] Recent experience indicates that in high intensity operations the company is the lowest level for interoperability; platoon level and possibly lower may be possible in more permissive circumstances. NATO JALLC Observation, "Lowest Level Echelon at which Multinational Interoperability Can Reasonably Be Achieved," 15 April 2009.
[15] Such as the ABCA *Coalition Logistic Handbook*

Analysis of Capabilities Integration Lines of Development

- **Leadership Development:** The relationships and trust amongst military leaders will influence every aspect of multinational cooperation within future coalitions. Senior leaders should strive to achieve a sympathetic rapport with their multinational counterparts and develop an understanding of mutual capabilities, in order to shape policy through sound military advice.
- **Command & Control:** Confidence in partners is essential when working in a multinational environment. Commanders should be encouraged to develop mutual trust in the professional ability of their counterparts and develop respect for their culture, history, religion, customs and values. Time taken to understand partners will pay dividends during coalition operations. Increased integration of command structures should be considered as the primary enabler for capabilities integration in conjunction with a clear and politically agreed-upon chain of command.
- **Education and Training:** Mission rehearsal prior to an operation will emphasize the level of integration amongst the diverse national capabilities. This allows the synchronization of battlespace management systems, the definition of common SOPs, and the identification of operational issues and concerns sufficiently early to inform corrective actions. These efforts will help harmonize multinational staffs in the execution of key military tasks, thus identifying issues and concerns. The process of capabilities integration will be enhanced by minimizing coalition discrepancies through training, exercising and operating together.
- **Doctrine:** The continued use of NATO doctrine among MIC nations is considered an important enabler for coalition operations. National concepts and doctrine should have regard for coalition capability integration requirements. Promulgation of national policies potentially affecting capability development should be considered.
- **Logistics:** Capability integration is increasingly influenced by national acquisition processes and the dynamics of the industrial and commercial sectors, as well as by technological and budgetary inequalities amongst coalition contributing nations. While equipment interoperability at the operational level should be fostered through the identification of common minimum requirements and the standardization of procedures, technological niche capabilities offered by nations should be exploited as opportunities for integration. A clear understanding of the services and opportunities regionally offered by national facilities should be fostered among MIC nations and included into planning considerations.
- **Knowledge Advantage:** The awareness of the capability landscape, including any risks and possible measures for their mitigation, should be fostered at the highest political level well in advance of any commitment to coalition operations.
- **Shared Situational Awareness:** Before conducting any military operation, a coalition and its contributing nations will conduct several preparatory activities, sharing responsibility and working closely together to prepare forces for the operation.
- **Organizational Constructs:** Force generation is a critical part of the capability integration process, being affected by both political dynamics and military requirements. Force generation dialogue should commence concurrently with political engagement because early visibility of coalition nations' operational capability and willingness is essential. Coalitions should take advantage of extant force generation databases (for example, NATO CJSOR) to

distil raw data on national military and non-military capabilities, national political and legal restrictions and caveats, into potential force capability packages with specific operational applications.

An efficient and comprehensive liaison structure, linking Coalition Headquarters at all levels, all force elements and other relevant organizations, will be paramount in any operation. This may include diplomatic and military agencies under diverse political authorities, as well as a potentially large number of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

- **Planning:** Strategic and operational level planning should consider the integration and coordination of diverse capabilities across government departments, within and across nations.

Key Capability Gaps

- Standards for Professional Military Education. National education and training programmes should emphasize multinational aspects of coalition operations
- Identification of mission needs that can be filled by niche capabilities
- A comprehensive liaison structure that links the Coalition Headquarters at all levels with all force elements and other relevant organizations
- Awareness of the capability landscape among coalition nations, including risks and possible measures for their mitigation
- Sufficient coalition training, exercising, and operating before operations

2.3 Information Sharing

Challenge Description

Information sharing is key to the MIC's goal of delivering better, more efficient military capabilities that are coordinated around the needs of the task. It is essential to enable early planning, intervention and preventative work, for effective and timely responses to crisis, and for the collective security and wellbeing of any wider coalition. As coalition nations move towards partnership working and integrated services, professional and confident sharing of information is becoming more important to delivering the benefits of these new arrangements. In sum, good information sharing is a vital element in improving outcomes for all; it should be necessary, proportionate, relevant, accurate, timely and secure.

Analysis of Information Sharing Challenges via Lines of Development

- **Leadership Development:** Information sharing is an essential component of collaboration. There can be significant consequences to not sharing information just as there can also be to sharing information. Operational Security (OPSEC) and Personal Security (PERSEC) are often used as arguments for not sharing information. There are times and situations when this is true but on many occasions some risk must be taken in an effort to improve overall effectiveness amongst trusted partners, be they state nations or other individual actors. It is therefore important that practitioners can share information appropriately as part of their

day-today practice and do so confidently. Professional judgement within the coalition should normally be the deciding factor on whether to share or not, and what information is appropriate to share.

- **Command & Control:** Command and Control depend on successful information sharing. Information exchanges are implemented via dozens of open and proprietary protocols, message and file formats. There are four primary information sharing design patterns for sharing information: one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many, and many-to-one. Technologies to meet all four of these design patterns are evolving and include blogs, wikis, really simple syndication (RSS), tagging and chat. As technology advances, information sharing platforms will provide controlled vocabularies, data harmonization, data stewardship policies and guidelines, and standards for uniform data as they relate to privacy, security, and data quality. Without an understanding of these advancements in systems and processes, command and control will become increasingly problematic.
- **Education and Training:** Correct governance and agreed protocols will be essential for information to be transferred between organisations and nations. This will mean that originators and recipients will have a thorough understanding of the requirements and methods needed for Information Management (IM), Information Exchange (IX) and Information Assurance (IA). An appropriate training programme will be needed to support this aspiration.
- **Doctrine:** The changes in information sharing technologies occur at a speed that makes their integration into doctrine virtually impossible. As a result, doctrine should concentrate more on "what" is needed to be achieved rather than "how".
- **Logistics:** Traditional military procurement processes struggle to cope with the pace of change in the information domain.
- **Knowledge Advantage:** Whilst the MIC's common language is English there are a total of 4 different languages in use amongst the current partners. Although many personnel at the higher levels of command speak and understand English, this is often not the case at the tactical level. For information sharing to be effective at all levels there must be considerable effort made to investigate new ways to display and present data so that it can be more easily understood by these individuals. Modern IT language translators are improving year-on-year but there are times when nuances and subtle variations in meaning are lost using such systems. When other nations are involved in broader coalitions there may well be significant cultural and moral differences that will require even greater care when information is shared so as to ensure that true meaning and intent is maintained and that misunderstandings and possible offence are avoided.
- **Shared Situational Awareness:** There will always be human factors that affect much of what is shared and understood. What is paramount is that Data Protection laws and customs do not create data denial that degrades any coalition situational awareness. The Network Enabled Capability (NEC) triangle is comprised of people, systems and information[16]. Each

[16] Data is defined as raw facts, without inherent meaning, used by humans and systems. Information is defined as data placed in context. Knowledge is information applied to a particular situation.

has a key role to play for any system to be effective. People have to understand their role in the pushing and pulling of information. It is the human element that normally analyses the data in most systems and then subsequently makes an assessment on which to act. Systems vary across MIC nations for all types of information technology, many of which are incompatible resulting in few truly joint multinational enablers. Overcoming this limitation must be a MIC priority as this alone will often halt information sharing despite the best intentions of personnel trying to operate together. Likewise agreements on access and security protocols on the information itself will need to be addressed.

- **Organisational Constructs:** Connectivity and systems compatibility often result in equipment interoperability issues within the coalition. This will be hard to overcome as current and legacy equipment is likely to remain in service for many years to come. Whilst many nations now strive for 'joint' systems between their armed services and other instruments of security and national power, the need to adapt them to work seamlessly with all the other MIC partner nations has often been a low priority. This has been due to individual nations' own security fears and the fiscal costs involved to get such systems agreed by all. Compromises must be reached in the near future to try and fuse more national military IT systems so that at least limited connectivity and interoperability may be achieved. Current interoperable systems, mostly NATO based, tend to be centred on pushing historical information or providing real-time situational awareness.
- **Planning:** Interface with the media, in all its different forms, is part of the information sharing challenge. Agreed approaches within the MIC are not unachievable but once other nations join coalitions it will become much harder to maintain a unified approach. Done badly it can have negative long-term strategic effects whilst when done well it can often aid a coalition in attaining its ultimate goal in any given operation. At the very least information sharing with the media and wider general public must not hamper coalition efforts or alienate domestic, regional or international audiences. For information sharing to truly work, greater emphasis by the MIC nations' militaries will need to be placed on the integration of information sharing in the Military Planning Process.

Key Capability Gaps

- Compatibility of information technology. This alone will often halt information sharing despite the best intentions of personnel trying to operate together. Likewise, agreement on access and security protocols on the information itself will need to be addressed.
- Common language for communication and information sharing
- Ability to maximise use of the media and to shape the information campaign
- Secure web-based interconnectivity allowing for broader access to trans-national data

2.4 Interagency Coordination

Challenge Description

The comprehensive approach is centred on the ability of all coalition military forces and other government departments, non-governmental agencies, and international agencies to plan, communicate and operate in a collaborative environment throughout all phases of an operation. These agencies will have their own agendas, and the need to coordinate with them may present a great challenge to achieving coalition goals. Unique challenges arise when stakeholders, including a widening array of non-military actors, come from different cultures. Coordination with third parties may further complicate interagency coordination.

Analysis of Interagency Coordination Lines of Development

- **Leadership Development:** Interagency cooperation should rely on habitual relationships based on trust and confidence at all levels of leadership within appropriate organisations and agencies. The diverse nature of crises makes it extremely difficult to plan for every possible combination of interagency relationship required and it may be necessary to pull together ad hoc organisations. Success in these situations will depend upon trustful leadership relationships previously established through participation in interagency training, exchange and exercise events involving coalition military and interagency partners. These events are essential in exposing operational and strategic leaders to high-level interagency decision making challenges and in developing interagency relationships and mutual understanding. National commitment to meaningful interagency and international leadership engagement, such as leadership liaison elements in pre-crisis periods, is essential.
- **Command & Control:** A perennial challenge for coalition military leaders is a limited influence over non-military agencies during operations. Establishment of a clear C2 structure is crucial for interagency coordination. It should consider relevant other governmental departments and incorporate, as appropriate, linkages with non-government and other international agencies. Equally important to effective C2 is the clear establishment of which organizations are supported and which are supporting. Additionally, networked C2 systems across agencies enhance coordination at all levels, reducing duplicate and contradictory command decisions in a complex campaign environment.
- **Education and Training:** National education and training programmes should emphasize multinational and interagency aspects of coalition operations, including cultural preparation to operate within multinational environments (headquarters, staffs, units). National and coalition training and exercises should incorporate interagency coordination objectives. New networking technologies such as virtual and distributed (remotely connected) training systems will help achieve maximum reach across various agencies.
- **Doctrine:** The use of common lexicon and terminology is paramount to efficient coordination. NATO standards are an appropriate baseline.[17] Widely used non-military agency practices can add important elements to the doctrinal baseline.

[17] Representative current doctrine publications include the US Joint Pub 3-08, *Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, the UK's Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, *Security Stabilization: the Military Contribution*, and the Australian handbook on *Strengthening Australia's Conflict and Disaster Management Overseas*.

- **Logistics:** Logistical capabilities are far more effective if greater interdepartmental, interagency and international cooperation and coordination are achieved *prior* to the "execution" phase of any operation. Lessons identified from numerous recent humanitarian relief operations have emphasized the need for a multinational logistics framework which can describe how the military synchronizes planning and execution of logistics support within a non-combat/ civilian led mission. In many circumstances, no single government, military or civilian organization will be able to accomplish its own goals without the support of the other agencies. One key element to the successful logistics support of a comprehensive approach is the availability of timely, accurate and relevant logistics information, which can be shared amongst the participating agencies and nations. Another major friction point which impedes successful logistic support within a CA is the complex legal and financial systems inherent among coalition members and others. Finally, the logistical needs of the host nation must be particularly considered and reflected in the planning and dialogue.
- **Knowledge Advantage:** This area was addressed Section 2.3
- **Shared Situational Awareness:** Situational awareness needs to be shared beyond military organizations, to include other interagency elements, regional organizations, NGOs, OGDs and commercial businesses.
- **Organisational Constructs:** Enduring formal arrangements that associate military, other-governmental, and non-governmental agencies improve interagency coordination through the establishment of coordinated pre-crisis procedures. Groups such as the Multinational Interagency Group, NATO's Civilian Advisory Group, and Civil-Military Operations better prepare all agencies to stand up a functional construct with minimal delay. Interdepartmental memorandums of understanding and temporary appointments across agencies break down organisational barriers and develop a shared understanding of agencies' roles. A growing challenge is the integration of new and potentially unconventional partners within a coalition construct. Partnership with these actors (such as former opponents, militias, transnational combatants, criminals with important linkages) can be crucial in achievement of a coalition's aim, yet their consideration as a 'coalition agency' sits uncomfortably with planners. Interagency understanding of the utility and agendas of these actors, and the means with which coalition hierarchy wishes to engage with them is important. A coordinated approach to dealing with non-aligned actors such as contractors and service providers is also necessary across agencies. Government commitment to domestic interdepartmental coordination is a crucial prerequisite for an aligned national approach to multinational interagency coordination.
- **Planning:** Involvement of all the governmental departments and consultation of non-governmental and international agencies will optimize the planning process. However, civilian organizations usually hesitate to duplicate the perceived heaviness and 'inflexibility' of the military. They may consider contributing to military planning efforts but at the same time strive to keep their independence.[18] Agencies must endeavour to gain a balanced understanding of the differing levels of planning fidelity. Awareness of these differences facilitates better coordination and should be accepted.

[18] MIC 2011, Comprehensive Approach Framework – A military Perspective v 2.0 Jun 2011 p.6.

Identifying and agreeing upon an achievable outcome, while difficult, is a central planning challenge. An understanding of the humanitarian and military spheres of activity requires mutual clarification of roles and activities in areas where the two domains intersect.[19]

An ideal planning team should include functional, regional, and planning experts representing all the agencies. But the lack of a joint assessment, strategy, or implementation plan will make it hard to agree on where resources should be focused, prioritized, and integrated into each agency's efforts.[20] An enhanced use of collaborative tools is necessary to improve the planning process when actors are globally dispersed.

Key Capability Gaps

- Coalition leadership engagement in dedicated fora that tests and enhances interagency coordination
- Availability of networked technology to enhance C2 structure and training systems to achieve maximum reach across agencies
- Incorporation of specific objectives addressing interagency coordination into exercise and training objectives
- Collaborative planning tools to allow interagency planners, even when globally dispersed, to work together in a virtual problem space to understand a common problem and plan and devise a solution
- National education and training programmes that emphasize interagency aspects of coalition operations

3. CROSS-FUNCTIONAL CHALLENGES AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 Strategic Communication

Challenge Description

In modern societies information has evolved into a decisive element of all security-related operations. All aspects of coalition activities have an information and communication component. Understanding the strategic security environment, including the information environment, is an essential prerequisite for crisis/conflict prevention and resolution.

Across all coalition efforts, effective communication is essential to sustaining global legitimacy and supporting strategic objectives. Aligning actions with words is a shared responsibility that must be consistent across coalition partners. Effective Strategic Communication requires engagement and better understanding of attitudes, opinions, grievances, and concerns of the global public as well as audiences in the mission area. This will enable a coalition to convey credible, consistent messages and to develop effective plans, while better understanding how its actions will be perceived. The aim is to persuade and convince either the allies, the neutral actors or the opponents about the rightness of ours actions.

[19] MIC 2009, The military contribution to Stabilisation Operations p. 73.
[20] loc. cit.

As a cross-functional process, Strategic Communication seeks to coordinate the work of traditional communication functions, such as Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and the military capabilities integrated through the Information Operations (Info Ops) function with other non-lethal and lethal elements of operations, which often have an immeasurably greater impact on people's perceptions than words or imagery.

Strategic Communication is not an adjunct activity, but should be inherent in the planning and conduct of all operations and activities, political and military, across all lines of operation. Strategic Communication is necessary at all levels of policy, planning and execution of operations.
In the armed forces, information is recognised as a decisive factor. The military Info Ops function plans, coordinates and assesses information activities as an integral part of military operations. Furthermore, it distils a comprehensive and systemic understanding of the information environment, considering all capabilities and activities able to create effects.

Key Capability Gaps

- Development and dissemination of timely and culturally-attuned messages based on a shared narrative and coined in a comprehensive, mission-specific information strategy
- Coordination of information activities with other actions, and the efforts of other agencies and partners, to shape the information environment, and achieve desired effects on selected audiences
- Ability to access, produce and maintain updated information and knowledge on perceptions attitudes, behaviours and beliefs of potential audiences in complex social communication systems
- Ability to detect, monitor, translate and assess the effects of information activities of other stakeholders – whether friendly, neutral or adversarial
- Ability to estimate the direct and indirect effects of potential actions and signals on perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, beliefs and actions of selected audiences.

3.2 Legal Requirements

Challenge Description

Perhaps the most important and certainly one of the most fundamental aspects associated with operating in a Coalition Environment is that of legal probity. Without an agreed legal mandate it is unlikely that an operation would be commenced in the first place, and agreement between partners is essential to ensure that the coalition remains intact and focussed on the appropriate outcome. Interventions are usually accepted and validated by the United Nations Security Council using resolutions to determine the possibility for states to use the chapter VI or VII of the UN charter.

International Law

International law governs international relations both in time of peace and in time of armed conflict. It covers, for example, the delimitation of international boundaries, international trade, the law of the sea, air and space law, human rights, protection of the environment, and diplomatic relations. It also regulates the circumstances in which states may use armed force (traditionally termed '*jus ad*

bellum') and the way in which armed force is actually used (traditionally termed '*jus in bello'* or 'the law of war'). Today the latter is more frequently known as 'the Law of Armed Conflict' (LOAC) or 'International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict' or more simply 'International Humanitarian Law' (IHL).

Law of Armed Conflict[21]

The main purpose of the LOAC is to protect combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering and to safeguard the fundamental human rights of persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in the conflict (such as prisoners of war, the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked) and of civilians. At sea, the law also serves to identify and protect ships flying the flag of states not parties to the conflict. By preventing the degeneration of conflicts into brutality and savagery, the law of armed conflict aids the restoration of peace and the resumption of friendly relations between the belligerents. LOAC applies to international armed conflicts and to the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are characterized.[22]

The increasing reach of International Human Rights Law further controls the behaviour of armed forces and affords protections and advantages in certain situations to those who are affected by military operations. In stabilisation there may also be good political or military reasons for exercising a greater degree of self-restraint than is legally required.[23]

LOAC comes from both customary international law and treaties. Customary international law, based on practice that nations have come to accept as legally required, establishes the traditional rules that govern the conduct of military operations in armed conflict. Additionally, soldiers are subject to national laws which must drive their behavior and derive from international law and treaty obligations.

The Contemporary Environment

Peace Support Operations (PSO), or what used to be known as "Operations Other Than War", are the most prevalent contemporary military operations, and the type that a future coalition is most likely to be required to conduct. While the legal requirements are the same for a PSO as they are for a war of national survival, there are additional moral, ethical and practical constraints which could complicate the perceived legitimacy of an operation. It is true that commanders on all levels undoubtedly have a great strain placed on their shoulders when conducting PSOs. The potential to make a faux pas, due to an inadequate understanding of cultural nuances, while under the full and intrusive view of embedded media, merely adds to the requirement not just to do the right thing but to be seen to be doing it as well. Operating in a multi-national coalition environment exacerbates the potential problems. The following key points are relevant:

- A commander will need to appreciate his subordinates' difficulties in balancing the risks to their own troops, against the need to offer maximum protection to the civil population.

[21] JSP 383 – The Joint Service Manual Of The Law Of Armed Conflict
[22] Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) The Rules of War By Rod Powers at usmilitary.about.com/cs/wars/a/loac.htm accessed 19 Jul 2011
[23] JDP 3-40 – Security And Stabilization: The Military Contribution

- There may be an absence of a well-understood, common moral code, especially when operating with a large mix of host nation military and civilian organisations.
- There may be risks associated with the reality of unity of effort in place of unity of command.
- There will be additional pressures when working in the glare of the global media.
- There may be an increasingly political nature of the role of the military commander.

The cultural requirement of the contemporary coalition commander has been identified as "an ability to respect the differences of others while still achieving effective command"[24]. There are four attributes essential for a coalition commander:

- Political acumen,
- Diplomacy,
- Applied intelligence,
- Mental stamina.

All apply to any senior military leader, but they become particularly important when operating with forces and agencies from other nations. Local culture does not relieve the commander of his responsibility for maintaining ethical and moral standards. He will need to strike a balance between tolerating what is acceptable behaviour in one culture, against condemning that which is unacceptable in any circumstance. Through all its actions and messages, the international force should lead by example, demonstrate compassion and empathy for the population, maintain the moral high ground and provide a moral compass for others.

Summary

The law of war is binding not only upon States as such but also upon individuals and, in particular, the members of their armed forces. Parties are bound by the laws of war to the extent that such compliance does not interfere with achieving legitimate military goals. For example, they are obliged to make every effort to avoid damaging people and property not involved in combat, but they are not guilty of a war crime if a bomb mistakenly hits a residential area. By the same token, combatants that *intentionally* use protected people or property as shields or camouflage are guilty of violations of laws of war and are responsible for damage to those that should be protected.
Maintaining the rule of law entails very different ethical obligations than fighting to establish it. Effective security exists when institutions, civil law, courts, prisons, and effective police are in place and can protect the recognised rights of individuals.

Maintaining complete legal and ethical concurrency across a coalition force will undoubtedly take significant time and effort, but doing so is essential if legitimacy, effectiveness, and positive public opinion are to be achieved. Without concurrency, mission failure is a virtual certainty.

[24] Ibid

Key Capability Gaps

- Coalitions require an agreed legal mandate to ensure the coalition remains intact and to ensure focus on the appropriate outcome
- A well-understood, common moral code, especially when operating with a large mix of host nation military and civilian organisations
- Maintenance of complete legal and ethical concurrency across a coalition force

4. CONCLUSION

Coalition forces must be capable of swiftly operating in an orderly, efficient and integrated manner with elements from other member states in a coalition system with little to no modification or conversion required. The key to operational success will be the long-term and effective preparations conducted in advance of any deployment to overcome, or at least mitigate, any actual or perceived compatibility issues. In order to effectively operate as a coalition, the following summary of gaps should to be resolved:

Key Capability Gaps in Compatibility

- Standardization
- Common lexicon for military concepts, doctrine and operations
- Common Rules of Engagement (ROE) appropriate to an operation
- Secure computing / voice / video capabilities among coalition members
- Utilization of existing services and support doctrine[25] in training and exercises
- Common training
- Common tools for command and control

Key Capability Gaps in Capabilities Integration

- Standards for Professional Military Education. National education and training programmes should emphasize multinational aspects of coalition operations
- Identification of mission needs that can be filled by niche capabilities
- A comprehensive liaison structure that links the Coalition Headquarters at all levels with all force elements and other relevant organizations
- Awareness of the capability landscape among coalition nations, including risks and possible measures for their mitigation
- Sufficient coalition training, exercising, and operating before operations

Key Capability Gaps in Information Sharing

- Compatibility of information technology. This alone will often halt information sharing despite the best intentions of personnel trying to operate together. Likewise, agreement on access and security protocols on the information itself will need to be addressed.
- Common language for communication and information sharing
- Ability to maximise use of the media and to shape the information campaign

[25] Such as the ABCA *Coalition Logistic Handbook*

- Secure web-based interconnectivity allowing for broader access to trans-national data

Key Capability Gaps in Interagency Coordination

- Coalition leadership engagement in dedicated fora that tests and enhances interagency coordination
- Availability of networked technology to enhance C2 structure and training systems to achieve maximum reach across agencies
- Incorporation of specific objectives addressing interagency coordination into exercise and training objectives
- Collaborative planning tools to allow interagency planners, even when globally dispersed, to work together in a virtual problem space to understand a common problem and plan and devise a solution
- National education and training programmes that emphasize interagency aspects of coalition operations

Key Capability Gaps in Strategic Communication

- Development and dissemination of timely and culturally-attuned messages based on a shared narrative and coined in a comprehensive, mission-specific information strategy
- Coordination of information activities with other actions, and the efforts of other agencies and partners, to shape the information environment, and achieve desired effects on selected audiences
- Ability to access, produce and maintain updated information and knowledge on perceptions attitudes, behaviours and beliefs of potential audiences in complex social communication systems
- Ability to detect, monitor, translate and assess the effects of information activities of other stakeholders – whether friendly, neutral or adversarial
- Ability to estimate the direct and indirect effects of potential actions and signals on perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, beliefs and actions of selected audiences.

Key Capability Gaps in Legal Requirements

- Coalitions require an agreed legal mandate to ensure the coalition remains intact and to ensure focus on the appropriate outcome
- A well-understood, common moral code, especially when operating with a large mix of host nation military and civilian organisations
- Maintenance of complete legal and ethical concurrency across a coalition force

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TABLE 1 – SUMMARY OF INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES AND CONSIDERATIONS PER LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

Interoperability Challenges and Consideration Areas

Lines of Development	Compatibility	Capabilities Integration	Information Sharing	Interagency Coordination
Leadership Development	• Leaders become accustomed to and in coalition operations	• Focused leadership development on multinational cooperation • Strive to develop understanding of mutual capabilities	• Share information despite OPSEC and PERSEC	• Trustful leadership relationships previously established through training, exchange events • Temporary assignments of officers in pre-crisis periods
Command & Control	• Efficient use of liaisons/liaison teams	• Develop mutual trust and respect of one's counterparts among all military personnel • Integrate command structures	• Correct protocols for information sharing between organizations and nations	• Commitment to domestic interdepartmental coordination • Establishment of clear C2 structure
Education and Training	• Minimum standards of PME • Education will emphasize multinational and interagency aspects	• Conduct mission rehearsals prior to operations • Enhance capability integration by training & exercising	• Correct governance and agreed protocols • Train to understand InfoManagement, -Exchange and –Assurance	• Incorporate interagency coordination into exercises • Use networked training capabilities
Doctrine	• Align to common doctrine	• Continue to use NATO doctrine and explore potential capabilities integration	• Concentrate more on the "what" rather than on the "how"	• Use common lexicon and terminology; NATO standards are appropriate baseline
Logistics	• Standardize national-level logistics-automated systems • Provide logistic and administrative support to joint, coalition and multinational forces	• Identify common minimum equipment compatibility requirements • Exploit national niche capabilities • Understand regional opportunities presented by national facilities	• Traditional procurement processes struggle to cope with pace of change in information domain	• Adopt common intermodal conveyances, fuel types, and standard methods for convoys, etc. Prior to operations • Need for multinational operational level logistics framework/ interagency log program • Shared vision to incorporate military and IA/NGO capabilities
Knowledge Advantage	• Platforms that enhance timely passage of relevant information	• Identify multinational capability landscape at highest political level before operations	• Investigate new ways to display and present data to all MIC partners	• Investigate new ways to display and present data to all MIC partners
Shared Situational Awareness	• Compatible equipment to support consultation and planning • Keep senior leaders aware of strategic & tactical activities	• Corporately prepare the force	• Overcome systems variations and incompatibility	• Situation awareness needs to be shared beyond military organizations
Organizational Constructs	• Organizations that can accept national contributions from other governmental departments • Establish minimum level at which multinational formations can be used effectively	• Force generation commences with political engagement • Take advantage of extant force generation databases	• Solve interoperability issues within MIC	• Temporary assignment of staff officers across agencies • Engagement with unconventional actors such as militias, criminals • Engagement with contractors
Planning	• Baseline planning process & compatible tools • Compatible security clearance and information release authorities	• Enhanced functions to address integration of diverse capabilities across departments among nations	• Integrate information sharing in the Military Planning Process	• Awareness of differences planning fidelity between military and civilian agencies • Include all agencies in planning teams

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.2

CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS & COMPETENCE

- A GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES -

Version 1.2
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TASK SCOPE AND ANALYSIS

Action: Identify best practices and current initiatives for Cross-Cultural Awareness & Competence.

Context: Lessons learned from the current Afghanistan campaign, and from other recent operations including Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) activities highlighted the value of Cultural Awareness to campaign progress, and also revealed the long lead time required for the establishment of Cultural Competence.

Cultural preparation may include language training, regional understanding, anthropological and sociological education, and historical and religious awareness. The training and education activities may include individual and collective training, force preparation, mission rehearsal, etc. This is not limited to the respective country, but may include partner nation(s) and neighboring countries. The follow-on step will be to determine possible synergies among identified initiatives.

1. Introduction

Coalition Forces will be engaged in highly complex operations with a multitude of actors involved. These operations will take place in complex operational environments where opposing forces and the population are intermingled in a way that it is hard to distinguish between the different stakeholders. Coalitions by themselves could be more challenging due to the number of nationalities they are likely to encompass.

> "On 25 March 2011, in the first meeting of its kind in the UK, General Sir David Richards, Chief of the General Staff, met the Afghan religious leaders at the Ministry of Defence's Main Building in London. General Richards spoke about the various cultural initiatives that were taking place across Defence to ensure better cultural understanding of Afghanistan and its people. He said: "We know that cultural awareness has been a weakness in the past. But there have been a number of initiatives set up in recent years to ensure that the military serving on the front line can have the best possible pre-deployment preparation and be equipped with the appropriate knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the region, its people, and its incredibly rich and diverse culture. Through developing an innate awareness of this unique society, of its tribal dynamics, customs and ethos, our soldiers are far better equipped to play their part fully in the delivery of security, stability and prosperity to southern Afghanistan."
>
> From: UK Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/HeadOfTheArmyMeetsHelmandsReligiousLeaders.htm

Being able to operate in such an environment requires the continuous and permanent search for the support of the local population as well as the support and the trust of all other friendly, neutral, or other groups in the surrounding area or from other Governmental or Non-Governmental Organizations (GOs or NGOs). Successful operations will involve every effort at least to avoid any inappropriate behavior and ideally to gain the trust of the people and to understand their claims and their needs.

Cultural concerns should not neglect that success rests on a multinational force whose ties rely on a sound mutual understanding, which emphasizes the need to pay also a great attention to partner nations' culture and customs.

Cultural aspects or cross-cultural differences, their knowledge and application, and the evaluation and synthesis of these subjects will remain relevant in current and future military operations, not only when operating in close proximity to foreign populations but in all kinds of military operations.

Concerned with matters of interoperability in coalition operations, the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) strives for a common understanding of the seven participating nations' best practices in the field of cultural aspects. In this paper, the nations' ideas, concepts and doctrines concerning cultural aspects in education, training, planning and conduct of military operations are examined. Synergies of the nations' best practices are then discussed and recommendations are given for a common understanding.

2. Cross Cultural Awareness and Competence (CCAC) Overview

While working in and/or with different cultures, it is important to be aware of one´s self-image. Only when people understand their own culture, will they be able to successfully interact with people of other cultures. In order to determine a common understanding of the different levels of cultural significance, it is necessary to analyze the different nations' approaches to Cross-Cultural Competence.

From a civilian point of view, "Cultural Competence" refers to an ability to interact effectively with people of different cultures. Cultural Competence is comprised of four components: (a) awareness of one's own cultural worldview, (b) attitude towards cultural differences, (c) knowledge of different cultural practices and worldviews, and (d) cross-cultural skills. Developing Cultural Competence results in an ability to understand, communicate, and effectively interact with people across cultures.[1]

Contemporary United States Marine Corps (USMC) research has defined "Cultural Awareness" as the ability to recognize and understand the effects of culture on people's values and behaviors. In the military context, Cultural Awareness can be redefined as the cognizance of cultural terrain for military operations and the connections between culture and war fighting.[2]

The United Kingdom (UK) Joint Doctrine Note 1/09 "The Significance of Culture to the Military" defines Cultural Awareness as the basic knowledge of cultural issues, the comprehension of their importance and impact, and the ability to apply this knowledge, skill and attitude to predictable scenarios to create the desired effect. Cultural Competence is defined as the advanced knowledge of cultural issues, the comprehension of their importance and impact, the ability to apply this knowledge, skill and attitude to unpredictable scenarios, and analyze and evaluate the effect in order to synthesize this evaluation to create new improved effect.[3]

A Canadian Forces paper defines Cultural Competence as the ability to function effectively in other than one's own culture as a result of personal attributes, knowledge, and skills. Cultural Awareness is described as a combination of culture-specific and culture-general knowledge.[4]

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[1] Martin, Mercedes & Vaughn, Billy, "Strategic Diversity & Inclusion Management" magazine, pp. 31-3, 2007, DTUI Publications Division, San Francisco

[2] Healey, Edward J. Jr., Major USMC, "Cultural Competency Training in the United States Marine Corps: A Prescription for Success in the Long War", 2008 thesis for the Master of Military Arts and Science at the US Army Command and General Staff College

[3] UK Joint Doctrine Note 1/09, "The Significance of Culture to the Military", Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), January 2009; see also UK Joint Doctrine Publication 04 "Understanding", Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), December 2010

[4] Davis, Karen (Editor) "Cultural Intelligence and Leadership: An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders ", Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009

The German *"Zentrum Innere Führung"* (Leadership, Development and Civic Education Center) defines Cross-Cultural Competence as knowledge and capabilities that adequately deal with different cultures and religions as well as the ability to develop understanding and sensibility for values, behaviors and conduct in other cultures.[5]

The Multinational Experiment (MNE) 6 framework concept "Integrated communication in multinational coalition operations within a Comprehensive Approach" defines Cultural Awareness as the recognition that not all people are from the same cultural background; that people have different values, different behaviors and different approaches to life.[6]

Putting these and other definitions for Cultural Awareness and Cultural Competence in the context of Bloom´s hierarchy of educational activities, this paper defines the first three steps - *knowing, comprehending* and *applying* - as **Cross-Cultural Awareness**. At the higher cognitive level, *analyzing, evaluating* and *synthesizing* cultural aspects are defined as **Cross-Cultural Competence**.



[7]

Therefore, **Cross-Cultural Awareness (CCA)** is the recognition that not all people are from the same cultural background, including the understanding of differences between oneself and people from other countries and/or backgrounds. It is the ability to behave appropriately based on this recognition and understanding. CCA forms the basis of cross-cultural hierarchy by addressing the ability to identify and describe basic cultural concepts. These concepts need to be understood, applied, analyzed and evaluated to determine mission relevancy.

[5] ZInFüBw, „Interkulturelle Kompetenz in der Bundeswehr: Handreichung für Multiplikatoren", 2009/2010
[6] MNE 6 Framework Concept "Integrated communication in multinational coalition operations within a Comprehensive Approach", p. 123 et seq.
[7] MNE 6, Obj 4.3 "Guidelines for Commanders & Staff: Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations

Cross-Cultural Competence (CCC) is the ability to use cultural information and knowledge of how to synthesize them across the Lines of Operations, including how to operationalize them for use in a plan.[8]Cross-Cultural Competence therefore forms the top of the hierarchy.

CCAC is a tool which helps commanders and their staffs consider culture as a key element within the decision making process leading to enhanced mission success, through a deliberately planned application of cultural facets of a mission.

The relevance of CCAC ranges from the tactical to the strategic level: if soldiers are not sensitive enough in cultural interactions, their behavior could endanger operations and result in strategic consequences. Conversely, CCAC at the political-strategic level will affect each soldier engaged in operations.

In order to integrate CCAC into military planning and operations, the relevant aspects of culture, which influence these operations and help us understand the effects of our own decisions vis-à-vis the socio-cultural fabric of the operational environment, must also be identified. CCAC should thus be applied in four key areas: education, training, military planning and conduct of operations.

3. Best Practices in Integrating CCAC in Education & Training

Cross-Cultural education is a pre-requisite to enable Cross-Cultural training, understanding and awareness. While experience acquired over time is paramount, cultural education, training and awareness forms the basis for every military practitioner including specialist cultural Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), who enhance commanders' and staffs' collective CCAC.

3.1. Cross-Cultural Education

Cross-Cultural education should be part of military education at all levels, from basic training to Joint General Staff Officer Courses. Every soldier should understand and be made aware of his/her own culture. Such preparation will help them successfully interact with people from different cultures without offense while preserving their own values. Principles, characteristics and dynamics that govern all cultures should be addressed in a generic approach.

3.2. Cross-Cultural Training

Cross-Cultural training must be tailored to the mission. Together with educational aspects, it is an essential element "[…] for creating the knowledge with whom, amongst whom and

[8]See also Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals; pp. 201–207;B. S. Bloom (Ed.) Susan Fauer Company, Inc. 1956.

against whom we operate."[9] Cultural training is not only language training and should not only take place at training facilities, schools or academies. It should be included in the unit or Headquarters (HQ) training and should be regularly exercised, including the use of SMEs and other cultural experts. It should be applied to a specific theatre of operations, most likely through pre-deployment training.

A detailed collation of MIC-Nations' best practices in Cross-Cultural Education and Training is at Annex A.

4. Best Practices in Integrating CCAC in Military Planning& Operations

Although CCAC is a regarded as a supporting factor to operations, it can be vital to the whole mission. It can be realized using SMEs in staffs or in the field, using Cultural Advisers, Red Teaming, Information Management and Knowledge Development, pools of regional expertise and technological support tools.[10]

Every participant in an operation should be culturally *aware*, but it is in the planning and execution phase of military operations that one needs *experts* who are qualified to be culturally *competent*. These experts should accompany the decision makers on all levels during the planning phase, and also accompany the troops out in the field to advise the leader on scene.

4.1. Planning Phase

Commanders and staffs need to promote a collective capability of CCAC. Many times, the only source of cultural expertise within a staff is from its own members through their own expertise. Certain staff members or specialists should be more sensitive to cultural matters than others (e.g. Intelligence, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, Information Operations), as they carry out tasks that are closely linked to or dependent on cultural factors. Staffs need to include dedicated SMEs, like Human Terrain Teams (HTT), special Cultural Advisors / Foreign Area Officers or other relevant experts, especially non-military experts who take an active part in every step of the military planning process. Most suitable are experts who routinely train with the staff in order to find the proper approach for developing a collective cultural expertise in the HQ.

Cultural considerations should be assessed throughout the planning process. Although the relevance of these aspects may differ according to the type of operation being executed, they should always be considered in the planning stage. In reference to the MNE 6 "Guidelines to Operationalization of Culture into Military Operations" CCAC should be integrated into military planning as follows:

[9] UK Joint Doctrine Note 1/09, "The Significance of Culture to the Military", Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), p. 5-1, January 2009

[10] UK Joint Doctrine Note 1/09, "The Significance of Culture to the Military", Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), p. 5-2 – 5-4, January 2009

a. Culture as a planning factor should be integrated in all planning procedures and in SOPs (incl. checklists, templates and other related documents) of all HQs.

b. CCAC should be included in HQ training and exercises.

c. Cultural SMEs and other sources of cultural expertise should be identified and continuously included in the planning process.

d. Cultural aspects should be considered by all planners in all planning areas, not just by the cultural SMEs.

e. All relevant actors in the Area of Responsibility / Area of Operations should be identified and considered during the planning process.

f. Perceptions, characteristics and attitudes of all forces should be considered.

g. The planning of different elements (e.g. Centers of Gravity) of the operation must consider cultural aspects.

4.2. Operations Phase

Cultural awareness is paramount in today's military operations. In addition to every single culturally aware soldier, SMEs ranging from interpreters and regional experts up to Human Terrain System – Teams, act as advisors on the scene to the respective decision maker in elements from platoons upward.

During the Vietnam War, the US Marine Corps implemented the Combined Action Platoons Program (CAP), which evolved into the Combined Action Force (CAF) in 1970. This concept is considered to be the result of the Marine Corps experience during the so-called "Banana Wars" fought in the Caribbean between 1915 and 1934, where the USMC advised, trained and fought side by side with local forces.[11] In Vietnam, squads of Marines were deployed to Vietnam villages in order to support the Popular Forces, the village militia, in the fight against the Vietcong and the

> "Those Marines in I Corps […] are also testing something that is new in warfare. Combined Action Platoons protect the population of about 80 villages. The Marine squads in those platoons train the villages' own Popular Forces--and then fight beside them when it's necessary. But the Marines are not just stationed in those villages. […] They live there as friends and neighbours, compassionate, understanding, helpful, working with the people, trying to assist them build schools, drill wells, and construct houses, showing them how to get more from their land, giving them medical treatment, looking after the lame and the sick and the old and the young. It is going to be a long time before the final results of their work can be assessed. But the enemy has already made his judgment. Recently, the enemy, the Vietcong offered $1,750--dead or alive--for the Marine sergeant of one of those platoons. That was more money than many of the villagers would ever see in an entire lifetime. But no one earned it--and no one really tried to earn it. When the sergeant's tour was up and he had to leave the village, all turned out for a farewell party for the man who had been a friend of each one of them. […] As a result, that village and other villages bear the mark of the Marines who have been there. They bear the mark of their Commandant's belief, that real victory is going to be won in the hearts of the people."
>
> Johnson, Lyndon B., during the retirement and presentation of the Distinguished Service Medal to General Wallace Greene, USMC on January 26, 1968;from "The American President Project", Papers of Lyndon Johnson, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/lyndon_johnson.php

[11] See Enclosure1, Fact Sheet on the Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, 31 March 1970

NVA. The same concept was used later in Somalia during Operation "Restore Hope".[12]

Similar to the CAP/CAF, ongoing initiatives in the US Army like the Foreign and Regional Area Officers (FAO) Program, the Human Terrain System (HTS)[13] and the concepts for Counter-Insurgency (COIN) have evolved[14]. The mission statement of the HTS is: "Recruit, train, deploy, and support an embedded operationally focused socio-cultural capability; conduct operationally relevant socio-cultural research and analysis; develop and maintain a socio-cultural knowledge base, in order to enable operational decision- making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge."

FAOs are used as advisers to senior leaders on political-military operations and relations with other nations, and provide cultural expertise to forward-deployed commands conducting military operations. FAOs build and maintain long-term relationships with foreign leaders, develop and coordinate security cooperation, execute security assistance programs with host nations, and develop reports on diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities.[15]

During operations it is paramount to fully integrate the socio-cultural information not only into the field, but also into the battle rhythm of the staff. The SME, either as an advisor or as a team member, must be present in all meetings, working groups etc. where cultural expertise is required.

A detailed collation of MIC-Nations' Best Practices in integrating CCAC into Military Planning and the Conduct of Operations is at Annex B.

5. Synergies & Analysis

5.1. Education & Training

All MIC nations agree on certain levels of cultural education and training. Apart from language training, which already receives a high priority in all member nations,[16]each MIC nation performs some degree of mission related cultural training. Cultural education has been broadly incorporated into military basic and leader training courses. This clearly shows that it is widely understood that mastering soldiering skills today must include an understanding of the cultural implications of actions in the field, because a mistake may

[12]Go, William, Major USMC, "The Marine Corps' Combined Action Program and Modern Peace Operations - Common Themes and Lessons", 1997, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Go.htm (22 July 2011)
[13]see http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil (22 July 2011)
[14]see http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/brewington.pdf and http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Papers/brewington.pdf "Combined Action Platoon: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement", Major Brooks R. Brewington, USMC 1996
[15] US DoD, Directive Number 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs, 28 April 2005
[16]E.G., U.S. Forces pay an additional compensation to service members who demonstrate proficiency in one or more foreign languages - U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation, "Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: Bridging the Gap", December 2010, p. 27-30

have a strategic impact far beyond an affected local population due to the discredit the mistake could cast on coalition operations if it is swiftly conveyed by the medias and exploited by opponents.

The majority of MIC nations have integrated cultural training into extant syllabi. Although one might consider cultural aspects being the same all over the different service branches, some countries still train their soldiers separately within their services, setting different standards and requirements (i.e. the USA and the UK).

Only three countries have dedicated joint schools and/or units that work on cultural issues. Already in 2003, France has formed the "Ecolemilitaire de specialisation de l´outre-mer et de l´étranger (EMSOME)", which carries out all the cultural training and education with the exception of language training. The EMSOME is an army school and with origins from the "Centre militaire d´information et de documentation sur l´outre-mer et l´étranger", an installation which dates back to 1901 which collected information about the "Département d´outre-mer" and other foreign countries, and distribute it to the French Army and Joint Forces.

The United Kingdom lead unit for cultural awareness training, the Defense Cultural Support Unit (DCSU), reached Initial Operating Capability in April 2011. The DCSU will be the Joint Training Requirements Authority for Cultural Training across the UK Ministry of Defense (MOD). Not only training deploying personnel, the DCSU will also focus on training Cultural Advisors (CULADs).

Cross Cultural Awareness Training is mandatory for all Australian Defense Force (ADF) members assigned to ADF or coalition operations. Individual Services still however run their internal Service culture education programs. On behalf of all three services, the 39th Personnel Support Battalion of the Australian Army conducts central CCAC training for specific theatres and cultures.

The cultural training for German Forces is currently restricted to current mission related training and the training of Intercultural Mission Advisors (IMA) for these operations. In addition, Cultural Education is not only part of the basic military training, but a very important aspect within the Innere Führung, the inner design and guiding principle of the German Armed Forces based on the application of the Basic Law, the German constitution.

In Italy, Cultural Awareness training is mission focused during the pre-deployment phase. Advanced training is only provided to select Intelligence, Information Operations or Special Forces personnel.

In May 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) published the "Implementation Plan for Language Skills, regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities"[17] which lays down the way for

[17]U.S. Department of Defense, „Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities", May 2011

DoD components to modify their strategy accordingly and to recognize the importance of foreign language, regional expertise and cultural skills to mission readiness. Below DoD-level, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff, the Services and Combat Support Agencies will adapt their efforts to align with this strategy.

Canada is the only MIC-nation to train its personnel not only joint, but within a whole-of-government-approach at the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston, Ontario. This institution works closely together with the Centre for Intercultural Learning (CIL) which is part of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. While the PSTC focuses on training individuals, key elements of unit and formation training for deployment includes cultural familiarization at the Canadian Maneuver Training Centre in Wainwright, Alberta. In addition to training and education, CCAC is being researched and experimented at the Canadian Defense Academy and at the Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC). The DRDC is Canada's centre of excellence for research into human effectiveness as it is applied to national defense and security matters.

5.2. Planning and Conduct of Operations

The early conflicts in Iran and in Afghanistan have once again shown that cultural awareness & competence in the military decision cycle and during military operations were not exploited to their full extent.[18] To successfully operate within foreign environments, coalition commanders ideally need to have a detailed understanding of the host society, and coalition forces in general need to have at least a basic understanding of that society; such understanding helps achieve order and stability as culturally sensitive operations are more likely to be supported by local populations than culturally insensitive operations.

> "And across the force, we're investing in new skills and specialties, because in the 21st century, military strength will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures that they understand".
>
> Remarks by President Obama to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, August 17th, 2009; from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-Veterans-of-Foreign-Wars-convention/

UK doctrine already reaches out far ahead on this subject, as they do not stop with the implementation of CULADs or other specialists. From a military perspective the Military Decision-making Process (MDP) should formalize 'Culture' as a factor to be considered during the formal estimate process. During the early stages of a campaign the accessibility of cultural information across all government departments is considered essential to aid the development of an effective strategic plan. Across the UK force, there is investment in new skills and specialties, because in the 21st century, military strength will be measured not only by the weapons troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures that they understand.

[18] "I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness". Commander US Third Infantry Division, Iraq 2003, from: "Operational Handbook – Working amongst different cultures", Australian Army Adaptive Warfare Branch, Headquarters 1st Division, 2011, p. 4

CCAC is regarded as a key component of U.S. Defense strategy which contributes to a comprehensive (whole-of-government) approach to supporting the development of capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. These advances are not only applicable against traditional and irregular military threats , but also help U.S. forces overcome cultural barriers which impede mission accomplishment by military and civilian forces alike.

For the Canadian Forces (CF), the incorporation of cultural considerations into the planning and conduct of operations, especially in Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) is today's *modus operandi*. CCAC is included in many doctrine manuals. A good example is the Canadian Army's Counter-Insurgency Operations manual, which describes a "Cultural Information Relief in Place Template" to be used between units arriving and departing an area of operations (see Enclosure 2 to this paper).[19] DRDC is currently running a project called *Human Effects Advisors* (HEA) to validate HEA officers who are trained in the social sciences and have the job to provide the "Whole-of-Government" team with socio-cultural data in high risk environments. Key to this project will be to identify methodologies and processes for data collecting along with assessing what education and training the HEA requires.

France integrates Cultural Awareness as an element of synergy contributing to foster influence and efficiency from the operational point of view. As it belongs to the cognitive domain, it is fueled by the continuous feedback, in particular at the lowest level in the field.

The Australian "Operational Handbook – working amongst different cultures"[20] presents a good overview of the subjects and strategies concerning CCAC that should be considered in operations.

The German Bundeswehr has introduced *Interkulturelle Einsatzberater (IntkulEinsBer)* or "Intercultural Mission Advisors" whose task is to advise military leaders on communication and interaction with locals, to identify and analyze local, ethnic, religious, political and socio-cultural structures, to keep contact to local multipliers and to support the units with additional training measures in theatre. These SMEs are not only involved during operations, but also play a vital part during the planning process and during the education & training phase of a mission. They are part of an academic expert network on cross-cultural matters, which is currently under development.[21]

[19]"Counter Insurgency Operations", B-GL-323-004/FP-003, CAN Chief of Land Staff, 13 DEC 2008
[20]"Operational Handbook – Working amongst different cultures", Australian Army Adaptive Warfare Branch, Headquarters 1st Division, 2011
[21]BMVg StvGenInspBw und Insp SKB, "Konzept zur Wahrnehmung der Interkulturellen Einsatzberatung in der Bundeswehr", 24 July 2009

6. Conclusions

The MIC nations' best practices in cultural education, training, planning and operations differ to varying degrees, but also include some encouraging commonalities. This is expected, considering the seven nations' differing cultural backgrounds. In applying the MIC charter of interoperability and compatibility, MIC nations should seek to identify and align those areas of differences, and seek to build on the commonalities.

The Australian Operational Handbook "Working amongst different cultures" is the only conceptual document which takes into account the difference in culture between coalition and other partners (e.g. NGOs, GOs). All other nation's conceptual documents relate to the difference to other cultures, mainly focusing on the difference to the Afghan cultures.
A coalition cannot neglect its own cultural differences among coalition partners. The more the coalition partners train and exercise together, the less "inside" cultural preparation is needed for coalition operations. Conversely, coalition partners that do not train and exercise together will need to devote a greater portion of their time during the coalition operation itself to fully understand one another—time that could otherwise be better used in executing the coalition operation at hand.

Most MIC nations do not have the resources to train SMEs for regions worldwide, and instead focus on current operations. While the USA is developing expertise through their regional Combatant Commands, France and the United Kingdom developed their expertise through a more historical context.

But even at a high degree of integration it remains questionable if soldiers from different cultural backgrounds can be trained and prepared together as one group for another, totally different culture. Referring to the pyramid in Chapter one, combining cultural training to enable cultural awareness of another culture might be possible and be applicable in the field, but these efforts will be transitory compared to the life-long national customs and military expectations that shape different coalition members, and those national customs/expectations may interfere with full accomplishment of coalition goals; it is easy to learn another language, to learn about traditions and heritage, to learn about "Do's and Don'ts" together with soldiers from another coalition nation. In most cases, the soldiers will probably be able to apply this knowledge out in the field. But still, the initial training for Australian soldiers, for example, needs to come from someone who thinks "Australian" or at least knows how "Australians think" – as there are certain differences to other nation's soldiers.

On a higher level, will a Subject Matter Expert from nation A be able to advise the decision maker from nation B? Will they be able to "understand" each other apart from speaking the same language? Most probably only to a certain degree, as the awareness of one's own culture again weighs too much in these interdependencies and cannot be replaced.

Turning to operations, CCAC has not yet been included in all MIC nations' Military Decision Making Processes. Therefore, the development of strategies concerning cultural differences and on how to work with partners in the area of operations is crucial, in order to avoid military stand-alone operations that contradict the comprehensive approach.

Merging the MIC nations' best practices from education, training, planning and operations, the following strategies are the MIC's Guidelines for CCAC in military operations[22]:

1. **Prepare your force.**
   Educate and train you soldiers in Cross-Cultural aspects of the mission.
2. **Recognize the challenges and prepare for cultural differences.**
   Make the subject of Culture a part of your mission.
3. **Put the campaign mission and the objective in context.**
   It is not only about defeating an enemy; it is about success of the mission.
4. **Include CCAC during the Planning Phases of Operations.**
   Realize the Cross-Cultural aspects that influence your mission planning.
5. **Develop specific strategies for communication.**
   Communication on all levels with all actors is crucial.
6. **Develop specific strategies for working with partners.**
   There will be cultural differences between the partners or within a coalition.
7. **Develop specific strategies for working with NGOs.**
   Even when coming from your home-country, they have a different organizational culture.
8. **Apply additional best practice CCAC principles.**
   - Conflict sensitivity: understand the local culture and politics and avoid adverse unintended consequences of projects in the battle space.
   - Delivery: focus on process as well as product. It is the 'how' and not just the 'what' soldiers do that matters.
   - Legitimacy: facilitate good governance and state-society relations.
   - Security: prioritize freedom of movement and broad human security for the local population before attempting to 'win hearts and minds' through development activities.
   - Experience: deploy experienced field personnel who are well-prepared for the cultural context in which they will be operating.

[22] See also "Operational Handbook – Working amongst different cultures", Australian Army Adaptive Warfare Branch, Headquarters 1st Division, 2011

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Annex B - CCAC Education & Training – Best Practices

GERMANY

There is a variety of seminars, trainings etc. based on the German "Concept for development and strengthening of intercultural competence". The core of this concept is the German leadership philosophy called "Innere Führung" with focus on the role model of the "citizen in uniform". This German concept stands on top of the core values (e.g. Human dignity) in the German constitution.

In the tradition of Clausewitz, it is most important to know about one´s own mental structure, attitudes, prejudice and last but not least one´s own culture, as this is the centre of all military leadership. He says: "Es ist überhaupt nichts so wichtig im Leben, als genau den Standpunkt auszumitteln, aus welchem die Dinge aufgefaßt und beurteilt werden müssen, und an diesem festzuhalten; denn nur von einem Standpunkte aus können wir die Masse der Erscheinungen mit Einheit auffassen, und nur die Einheit des Standpunktes kann uns vor Widersprüchen sichern" ("There is, upon the whole, nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from one standpoint; and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency").

In a first step, which can be called Cultural Awareness, this means "finding yourself". It makes no sense for a soldier on a mission to want to be "more Roman than the Romans". In most cases he will be not respected. We see and interpret things always from the view out of our own cultural background. This is a normal reaction and it is really important to be aware of this. The aim in this cultural general sense is an authentic soldier who is self-aware, aware of its own culture and respectful against other cultures. This hopefully leads to advantages in the field of COIN and self-protection. But not the other way round. COIN or the partnering concept is not the starting point of the cultural project in the German armed forces.

The first cultural training (90 min) takes place in basic training to find an access to this topic on a cognitive level. There are culture-specific follow-ups in the pre-deployment training. The German Forces developed an ISAF training board which is an interactive training tool in a classical sense with five to seven soldiers around a working paper to discuss the text, the pictures and the situation which is shown. This training is lead by so-called multipliers which are educated at the "Zentrum Innere Führung" in a one week course. Multipliers are not subject matter experts, but they are responsible for the education and training of their soldiers, those who are working close together with them. This system together with the concept mentioned earlier may lead to a similar way of thinking for people who teach Intercultural Competence at the units, schools academies and universities of the Federal Armed Forces.

In addition to the pre-deployment training, which focuses on the upcoming operation, the Bundeswehr provides for a one-day decentralized seminar called “Dimension Kulturen”. Small bicultural teams with SMEs from various areas travel around Germany and enhance the cultural awareness of German soldiers.

Language training is centrally conducted at the Federal Language School, mainly in preparing soldiers for international assignments or military attachés. Additionally, it should be noted that the Bundeswehr University in Munich will implement a master study course “Intercultural Communication and conflict analysis”.

UNITED KINGDOM

The UK lead unit for all cultural awareness training is the Defense Cultural Support Unit (DCSU). The DCSU reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in April 2011, and once it reaches Full Operating Capability it will become the Joint Training Requirements Authority for Cultural Training across defense. Its remit is still developing and is currently spilt between two distinct camps: deploying the Cultural Specialists (CULADs) into theatre correctly trained, and support to wider Defense in the developments and assurance of Cultural Training at a variety of levels. While the focus of CCAC training is predominantly on deploying personnel, there is a long-term aim to introduce education in this area during Phase 1 New Entry across all three services.

The UK "Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/09 The Significance of Culture to the Military" recognizes three levels of cultural capability within the military environment. This terminology should be borne in mid when referencing British approaches to Cultural Training. Specifically the standards expected at each of these levels are:

- **Level I – Awareness :** Displays an understanding of what effective performance looks like. Demonstrates some practical application at work.
- **Level II – Practitioner:** Displays detailed knowledge and understanding and is capable of providing evidence and guidance to others. Demonstrates practical application in a range of work situations.
- **Level III – Expert:** Displays leadership, extensive knowledge and understanding, and is seen as a subject matter expert and a role model for others. Demonstrates consistent practical application in a wide range of work situations.

All three services (Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and Army) run CCAC education and training courses as part of pre-deployment training for personnel heading into an operational theatre, although for obvious reason the focus is predominantly on LAND provision. The following is a list of the different types of CCAC training courses that are run by the UK:

All Ranks Briefing (ARB). For LAND this is the basic Cultural Awareness package that all deploying soldiers must complete prior to deployment. 22 Trg Gp (RAF) deliver Culture and Language at this level to their Force Protection wing (RAF Regiment) and Fleet deliver training to their deploying personnel during the two week Fleet OPTAG package.

Tactical Commanders Cadre (TCC). The TCC includes two 45 minute Cultural Awareness sessions.

Enhanced Cultural Understanding Course (ECUC). This is a two day package that contributes to the Cultural Understanding level of training. It is more practical in nature than CS1 but more in-depth than TCC and ARB.

CS1 – Cultural Understanding Course. CS1 is an intermediate level Cultural Understanding course conducted by LAND. The conduct of the course is currently such that a team of 4/5 officers will teach a large (40-strong) cohort per iteration. AIR have an SO3 Culture and Language in FP wing

who is qualified to teach CS1. FLEET do not formally conduct this level of training. There is bespoke provision at this level for SF elements of LAND and FLEET.

CS1 - Cultural Understanding Course Train the Trainer (T3). The CS1 package is delivered to LAND elements by ETS officers who have attended the T3 course, currently run by Cranfield University. The university provides course materials and a mentor to support the instructors' first CS1 course (if required).

CS2 – Advanced Cultural Specialist Program. CS2 is the specialist cultural program designed to meet the needs of the deploying Cultural Specialist (CULAD). It is divided into 4 blocks.

1. The first block is a two week course, generic in nature and solely academic. It comprises Research Methods, Social Science Foundation, principles and methods, Data gathering (techniques and assessment tools), Cultural Competency (as per the Competency Framework), Communication (incl. channels of comms, non-verbal comms, interpreting v translating), British Military Doctrine (plus an understanding of US doctrinal challenges).
2. The second block of training is the language phase. This currently stands at 15 months in duration and is a stand-alone package delivered by the Defense School of Languages at Beaconsfield.
3. The third block is the military and staff skills required to be a CULAD. This includes mandated "green" skills, Theatre specific SOPs, area specific J2 information, Battlegroup planning, basic Influence and Information Operations courses and liaison with key partners. This element of the program will compress or expand to fit the needs of the CULADs based on their operational experience and Arm or service. It generally fits within a 12 week pipeline.
4. The final block of training for CULADs is the country-specific course. This is a 3 to 4 week package focusing on Politics and Power relationships, economics and income generation, religion and beliefs, social identity relating to family, work, environment and history and security force lay down. Additional language training is provided during this phase in order to prevent skill-fade. In total the training pipeline will be approximately 20 months.

Under development are a Senior Officers' Course and improvements to Military and Defense Attaché cultural training. Both are subject to resource constraints but ad hoc senior officers have been briefed by experienced CULADs and small packages have been put together for Brigade HQs and Individual Augmentees. There is much appetite for this to be formalized but as the numbers involved are small it has yet to gain wider support.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Current Initiatives

In May 2011, a draft of the DoD Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities was published. The plan states that every DoD member will become cross-culturally competent, and receive the level of language-, regional-, and culture-specific training appropriate to support mission objectives and responsibilities. DoD components will modify their strategies to align with the implementation plan and recognize the importance of foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural skills to mission readiness.

- The combatant commands identify and prioritize language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) capability requirements for missions within their area of responsibility.
- The Joint Staff integrates and validates those languages, regional and culture capabilities requirements to forward on to the Services as well as recommends budget proposals for the Combatant Commands.
- The Services and Combat Support Agencies[23] will develop or modify their strategic plans to align with and support the DoD's Strategic Plan. Additionally, they will provide additional initiatives to ensure successful execution of the strategic, recognize capabilities critical to mission readiness, and provide progress reports to ensure the Services or Agencies are achieving strategic goals and objectives.
- The Defense Language Office and Joint Staff will develop the policies, programs, and procedures necessary to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities.

The Secretary of Defense set one of the key standards in language training. This requirement states that at least one member of each platoon, or like-sized organization, must have sufficient comprehension of the language spoken in the operational area. This supports cross-cultural awareness and competence (CCAC) in that more general purpose forces are required to have basic level communication skills in specified areas of responsibility.

1. Cultural Awareness Training

There are multiple ongoing efforts by each Service to achieve the goal of cultural competence. A common thread among the Services is the implementation of on-line pre-deployment training programs.

- The *U.S. Army* and *U.S. Marine Corps* offer pre-deployment training programs to provide additional language and culture instruction focused on the particular area to which a unit will deploy.
- The *U.S. Navy* requires standard pre-deployment training consisting of on-line coursework for individuals and classroom-based coursework for units.
- The *U.S. Air Force* emphasizes the use of language, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities in all three tiers of its Expeditionary Skills Training, or pre-deployment program, as a critical warfighting skill. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force developed expeditionary field guides for

[23] Combat Support Agencies are DoD agencies designated by Congress or the Secretary of Defense that support military operations, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and Defense Logistics Agency.

specific countries offering pocket-sized reference tools to connect cross-cultural competence skills with application in particular situations and new learning technology for interactive computer-based learning.

The Secretary of Defense mandated "Rapport", a specific on-line language and culture pre-deployment training program, for all forces deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. "Rapport" is a four to six hour online training course on basic language and cultural awareness. Available languages include Dari, Pashto, and Iraqi Arabic. It introduces culture, religion, and way of life of a specific linguistic group. The program includes ten military survival tasks from expressions of politeness, handling language barriers, commands, and basic questions.

2. Cultural Awareness Education

Each Service is implementing long-term, career-based cultural awareness education standards. The Defense-wide goal is all general purpose forces deploying to coalition operations complete the required mission-specific pre-deployment cultural and language training as well as be culturally competent to operate in a foreign area for the success of the mission.

- The *U.S. Army* offers new recruits courses to build basic cultural competence and is in the process of adjusting training programs in each of its schools to expand the amount of cultural content in training. Additionally, they provide some soldiers with an opportunity to study a foreign language in professional military education courses and develop foreign language skills through self-directed, computer-based training.
- The *U.S. Marine Corps* and *Air Force* language, region, and culture training builds upon cross-cultural competence skills developed through professional military education courses.
- *The U.S. Air Force* regards life-long education as the essential foundation for cross-cultural competence development. Since 2009, they have enhanced core curriculum instruction in several Air Force academic institutions. The Community College of the Air Force offers two online courses to increase cross-culture competence. The U.S. Air Force established the Language Enabled Airman Program, recently identified as a "model" for other Services by the House Armed Services Committee, which spans an airman's entire career and enables him or her to select, develop, and increase foreign language capability. The objective of this program is cross-culturally competent leaders across all Air Force specialties with working level foreign language-proficiency.

FRANCE

Armed Forces need personnel that combine expertise in social science disciplines with a good grasp of military affairs. Schools and training centers have this mission to prepare future commanders (War College).
The individual and collective training for the Human environment is completed at the EMSOME (Ecole militaire de specialisation de l'outre-mer et de l'étranger) which inherited more than 120 years of Marine Corps expeditionary campaigns. It has given a real capacity for operational culture training and education.

The Objective of EMSOME is to prepare soldiers for a mission to any destination where French forces contribution is required (short term to long term rotations [4/6 month or 1 to 3 years], individuals or units). The ambition is to help soldiers to adapt and integrate their new environment and know how to behave: "how to be" among distinct socio-cultural groups. This training is executed for operational purposes.

EMSOME is part of the sub-direction "Formation et Ecoles de l'armée de terre". The training offered by the EMSOME covers 20 countries (Africa and theatres of operations: Afghanistan, the Ivory Coast, Chad, Kosovo) and is provided by 18 instructors who have executed missions in the country they teach on. This training is enriched by the intervention of university lecturers and experts coming from various organizations (international, think thanks, NGOs). The nature of the teaching is multidisciplinary as it integrates geography, past and present history (that of guerrilla operations in distinct areas, When? Which tribes and clans? Where? How?), local economies, geopolitics, power balances, anthropology (how do these people behave and why) sociology, linguistic (mementos).

But EMSOME will not provide courses in foreign languages. This skill will be done by courses given in universities for non-common languages. Proficiency in a foreign language requires years of in-depth study combined with immersion in the country and is beyond the scope of pre-deployment training. Instead, the effort focuses on teaching officers and soldiers how to use an interpreter.

In the preparation of a unit for a mission, instructors also teach students how to interact with street vendors, local imams, and marabous; what greetings to use; which "codes" to apply when conducting a meeting; how to quickly identify dominant families or individuals in the neighborhood; how to understand the social value of bargaining with vendors in a market; how to bargain; and how to follow rules of hospitality. At this stage, small-unit leaders benefit from a two-hour basic language course providing them with about 50 key "icebreaker" sentences and numbers. Language proficiency, however, is not a priority.

This comprehensive vision and the approach of the socio-cultural environment favors the understanding of the operational environment. All productions and teaching are regularly up dated provided by previous rotations in the country, a media monitoring is done so as to adapt delivered information. Materials are available such as country and thematic monograph (CD and papers), cultural mementos, and online information via a sophisticated website.

The ENSOME does not use a template approach and adapts the topics to the mission (Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, and Lebanon). The training is provided via courses (adaptation training, specific training (military advisors) distributed publications and dossiers, and specific courses to all three

services and to various hierarchic levels (platoon and squads), to execute commanding responsibilities in specific contexts and among specific/ unique human, socio-cultural environment. Specific formation are provided to high military authorities such as overseas commanders to other specialties schools such as ESAG (engineers school) and units schedules to be deployed, before any mission.

This French cultural approach to education and training prior to any soldier projection is recognized abroad. Foreign students are welcomed at the EMSOME. There are also courses for NATO personnel. The EMSOME and its US equivalent, the Centre for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), based in Quantico met recently and presented their respective conception of cultural awareness and the integration of the cultural dimension within the units operational preparations. Both delegations focused on the growing importance of an enhanced integration of the cultural dimension in the conduct of operations. To achieve its objectives the ENSOME relies on 47 persons among which the school counts 17 instructors. More than 26.000 attendees have benefited from the training at the ENSOME institution.

ITALY

Education

Basic and advanced Professional Military Education programs, single service and Joint, are tailored for Officers and NCOs to include:

- notions of cultural anthropology;
- sociology and military sociology;
- notions of cross-cultural negotiation.

The needs of cultural-competent personnel coming from the Theaters of Operations are addressed through the mechanism of the *Selected Reserve*, which is the national system for recruiting civilian professionals with high valued skills and expertise (i.e. anthropologists, sociologists, cross-communication experts, experts in gender issues, etc.) able to cover the positions of cultural advisors, regional advisors or political advisors.

Training

Basic, mission focused, cultural awareness training is provided during the pre-deployment phase, at unit level, trough the provision of country handbooks and monographic documents, seminars, training activities, etc.

The aim of basic cultural awareness training is to disseminate at all levels the knowledge and the respect of the most important traditions, customs and social habits within the human environment of reference, in order to support a better understanding, communication and interaction.

Leaders and key staff personnel, during the pre-deployment phase, attend to cultural-oriented courses at the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger (NOR) and at the 28th Operational Communication Regiment "Pavia". The courses are focused on a deeper understanding of the human environment of reference, Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and negotiation techniques.

Advanced cultural awareness training is provided by the Joint Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Education Centre (Centro Interforze di Formazione Intelligence e Guerra Elettronica – CIFIGE) mainly to selected personnel of Intelligence and Information Ops branches, as well as to Special Forces personnel and military attachés.

Study of foreign languages of interest is also carried out, for the same purposes, by the foreign language schools of the Services.

CANADA

General: In the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) education and training in cultural awareness coupled with knowledge of the socio-political environment is considered to be a key requirement in preparing soldiers for operations "among the people." This training occurs at both the individual and collective levels and is task tailored to meet specific mission requirements.

Individual Training: CAF personnel designated for deployment receive cultural awareness training through a variety of methods including self study and distant learning, unit-run seminars and formal courses. Central to individual training programs is the Canadian Army's Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston, Ontario. As the CAF's Centre of Excellence for all cultural awareness education and training, the PSTC provides CAF members, individually and collectively, with social, cultural and analytical skills needed to operate effectively among civilian populations in an area of conflict. In support of its training mission, the PSTC works closely with the Centre for Intercultural Learning (CIL), which is part of the Department of Foreign Affairs International Trade and Development (DFATD) while using the academic and cultural resources of the CIL to develop course syllabi. The PSTC also employs CIL "cultural experts" to instruct classes as part of various pre-deployment training packages. PSTC students are not only military, but may come from other government departments and agencies that are providing personnel for the "non-kinetic" aspects of a mission. This approach reflects the importance – and necessity – of leveraging resources and talents that reside outside the military sphere in order to meet mission requirements.

At the PSTC, cultural awareness training is designed around three levels to be achieved. These are:

- Level 1 – Awareness;
- Level 2 – Understanding; and
- Level 3 – Application and Leverage.

CAF members are required to complete all three levels of cultural awareness training prior to deployment. Training is also tailored to particular unit requirements and mission specific tasks, such as for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Teams. The current cultural awareness training program conducted by the PSTC is focused solely on Afghanistan; however, future training packages are being developed for mission areas such as Sudan and Haiti and will be posted on the PSTC website when available. See: http://lfdts.kingston.mil.ca/pstc-cfsp/default_e.asp

Collective Training: While the PSTC focuses on preparing individuals for deployment, the Canadian Maneuver Training Centre (CMTC) in Wainwright, Alberta conducts collective level field exercises to prepare Army units and formations for full spectrum NATO and coalition operations. These exercises simulate the complexities of the contemporary operating environment entailing Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) operations. A key element of the training entails role playing, cultural familiarization and appropriate methods of personal

interaction in order to prepare soldiers to interact effectively with the people they will encounter. Training scenarios are developed with extensive feedback from deployed Lessons Learned teams and the advice of Cultural Advisors. Whenever possible, this training includes participation by the staffs of other Government departments and is supported by contracted cultural advisors and civilians from the same ethnic / cultural background that soldiers can expect to encounter in the theatre of operations. Known as "COEFOR" – an acronym for *Contemporary Operating Environment Force* – these contracted civilians are used to create a variety of human-centered exercise vignettes that soldiers and / or their units must respond to. In this way, deploying units are provided with as realistic a training environment as possible, making them well prepared for "operations among the people."

Other CF CCAC Education and Training Initiatives

In addition to CCAC education and training conducted by the PSTC and CMTC, the subject exists as a major field of academic research and concept development and experimentation by both the Canadian Defense Academy (CDA) and Defense Research and Development Canada (DRDC). Ongoing academic research by CDA includes:

- Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Technical Report May 2011 titled The Importance of Culture: Soft Skills for Inter-Agency Complex Operations.
- Canadian Defense Academy Directorate of Learning and Innovation Consultant's Report titled Lessons Learned – Culture and War

Both of these reports can be accessed through the CDA's virtual library at: http://cda.mil.ca/LITER/libr-eng.asp

On the defense science side, DRDC Toronto is Canada's centre of excellence for research into human effectiveness as it is applied to national defense and security matters. A key focus of DRDC Toronto's work is the "Human in Command," entailing all aspects of human performance, human-machine interaction, and the influence of culture on operational outcomes. A major subset of this work is Red Teaming, which includes the examination of cultural factors within an opponent's decision making process. Another DRDC initiative for developing cross cultural competencies is the Human Effects Advisor (HEA) Experiment, which is testing whether specialist officers trained in the social sciences can successfully collect, collate and analyze socio-cultural data in high risk environments in support of "Whole of Government" mission objectives. All of these activities are key components of the CAF's education and training development process aimed at preparing troops for the contemporary operating environment.

In summary, the Canadian Forces embraces a diverse, multifaceted and decentralized approach for education and training in Cross Cultural Awareness and Competencies, involving, military, academic and scientific components, and which are carried out at different levels among different organizations. Combined with appropriate doctrine for operating in a Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public environment, CCAC education and training is effective, timely, realistic and specific to CAF operational requirements.

AUSTRALIA

The philosophy of Australian Defense Force (ADF) cultural awareness and competence is based on a tiered approach to cultural competence. Commencing at the individual level, and then expanding to Service-wide, and domestic Defense Force level, before branching up into international Operations-specific cultural training. The ADF thus delivers CCAC training and education tailored to specific requirements. These programs are run by various organizations within Defense responsible for the appropriate program.

INDIVIDUAL AND DOMESTIC AUSTRALIAN CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING AND EDUCATION

ADF CCAC commences with individual commitment to the concept of the ADF as a values-based organization. The ADF values are Professionalism, Loyalty, Integrity, Courage, Innovation and Teamwork. These form the basis for professional decision making based on awareness of self and of others. This is linked with compulsory individual training for all Defense members to attain competence in Equity and Diversity in the workplace.

Service-specific cultural programs focus on the required service cultures and are again based on the Defense Values, as well as recognizing the importance of cultural diversity within the ADF.

ADF policies specific to domestic CCAC include the 2002 Defense Multicultural Policy and the 2010 Army Indigenous Strategy. The latter is a domestic starting point for principles that are equally applicable to international cultural competence needs for operations. The strategy strives for an integrated workforce, cultural diversity and to incorporate our Indigenous community into ADF planning and preparation for operations, capacity building and population support, through engagement with and recognition of traditional land owners, elders and communities on Indigenous culture and customs. The Directorate of Indigenous Affairs facilitates targeted education programs to enhance Defense's understanding of Indigenous cultural issues and improve capability through greater Indigenous participation in Defense.

OPERATIONS-SPECIFIC CROSS-CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING

Building upon the baseline individual and domestic cultural competence model, the ADF tailors cultural awareness force preparation training and education for operations to specific theatres and cultures. ADF members force assigned to an ADF or Coalition operation must undergo both Individual and Collective force preparation Cross Cultural Awareness Training.

Individual force preparation CCAC training is centrally conducted by the 39th Personnel Support Battalion, on behalf of all three services. The training is viewed as relevant and professionally delivered, and a significant improvement over earlier CCAC training. The training does not however currently cover cultural awareness in relation to coalition partners. This is an area for future development

The training is delivered in two parts as follows:

> ***Understanding Culture*** - provides generic Cultural Awareness for personnel deploying on operations with the ADF. The presentation is based on academic research and outline theories and trends in regards to social mapping, cultural norms and cultural intelligence. The presentation is not regional-specific but explores common traits and clashes between varying cultures, and how the Australian culture may affect the ability to work within and alongside other cultures;

Application of Cultural Awareness - takes the theory provided in Understanding Culture and applies it to a target area, including but not limited to Middle East, Central Asia, Africa, South East Asia and South West Pacific regions. It describes the different cultural groups within an Area of Operation (AO) and highlights how they differ to Australian cultural norms. A number of practical examples (from previously deployed personnel or regional SMEs) of cultural differences that deployed personnel have experienced are presented.

Collective CCAC training for formed bodies

Collective CCAC training for formed bodies is conducted as part of Mission Readiness Exercises by 1 Division. It applies aspects of challenging cultural situations in real time exercise scenarios.

SUPPORTING ORGANISATIONS for CULTURAL AWARENESS TRAINING AND EDUCATION

The Defense Force School of Languages (DFSL) supports CCAC for operations through the training and assessment of selected Defense Department personnel in specified languages, in order to enable them to conduct joint, combined and interagency operations and other Defense business in support of the Australian National Interest. The DFSL has provided pre-deployment cross-cultural awareness training for Defense, the Australian Federal police and United Nations personnel.

Training includes General Language (GL) courses and Specialist courses targeted to specific military tasks or vocations.

An example of Operations-specific cultural language training is the Arabic Basic Course which aims to graduate linguists who can use Modern Standard Arabic listening, reading, speaking and writing skills to complete simple instructional and transactional tasks in the military domain. The focus is on the completion of real-life language tasks using authentic Arabic texts wherever possible.

1st Division (1 Div) Adaptive Warfare Branch (AWB).

The AWB role is to integrate a short learning loop process into the 1 Div deployment cycle to support rapid learning during force preparation and to support FE deployed on operations. The AWB sponsored the *2011 Working Amongst Different Cultures* Handbook in the references.

Land Warfare Development Centre (LWDC)

LWDC will seek and drive institutional and cultural change in the Australian Army to enhance today's Army and shape the future joint land force.

The Defense International Training Centre (DITC)

Defense understands the benefits of close cooperation with defense forces drawn from a variety of cultures in its international operations. Recruitment of multicultural personnel into its workforce enhances Defense's international image leading to a better understanding of how other cultures operate. The DITC contributes to Defense regional engagement by providing training and support in Australia to South-East Asian and South Pacific Defense Forces and other selected overseas personnel. The DITC provides Australian cultural and military familiarization courses to overseas personnel; and provides cross-cultural awareness training for Australian personnel involved in this training.

STUDIES/RESEARCH AND LESSONS LEARNED

A number of recent and older studies inform the development of best practice CCAC within the ADF. These should be applied in conjunction with partner nation best practice lesson and studies.

Operational Handbook - Working Amongst Different Cultures – 2011 *Army Adaptive Warfare Branch Headquarters 1st Division*

This handbook compiles 'practical, hard-learned lessons from ADF forces', and of rigorous defense scientific studies. It contains knowledge about the environment, culture, history, people and combatants – essential information that everyone needs regardless of their role in an operation.

Cultural Awareness and Language Training Report. (2010) *(Land Warfare Development Centre)*

The aim of this report is to provide a valuable source of recent insights and lessons from operations to inform the preparation of future forces.

Key lessons included:

a. **Demand for greater cultural training**. Greater insight into the cultural aspects of theatre is required. Regional subject matter experts (SME) are necessary to enhance mission-specific CCAC training. An exemplar model is the US Marine Corps officer training initiative whereby each officer is assigned a region of the world to study (language, culture, etc), and these officers then become SMEs for training and operations.

b. **Region-specific language training.** Language training needs to be relevant to the specific region(s) that AS soldiers are deployed to, as the dialects change considerably between regions.

c. **Need for allied language training**. Deployed members have experienced difficulty overcoming the inter-coalition language barrier. Inter-coalition language needs must be assessed, with a view to providing language training to better enable AS forces to communication with non-English speaking allied nations.

d. **Training to work with interpreters.** Deployed members are increasingly required to work with interpreters in theatre. A training package on working effectively with interpreters would greatly enhance the ability and confidence of AS members who use interpreters.

Preparing Capable Australian Defense Force Personnel For Peace Operations (1999): *Australian Army Psychology Corps*

An older but comprehensive study of 41 ADF peacekeepers' deployment experiences to examine and improve extant human resource policy and practice in preparing military personnel for peace operations. The study evaluated the adequacy of (then) current pre-deployment preparation.

The findings are explored in two contexts. First, peace operations require different cultural skills, knowledge and attitudes beyond those provided in conventional military training and education. These include the 'soft' skills of advanced interpersonal interaction, to overcome obstacles in cross-cultural communication, leadership, negotiation, mediation and liaison. Second, the development of these skills requires an approach to training and education that is beyond competency.

Annex C - CCAC Military Planning & Operations – Best Practices

GERMANY

Interkulturelle Einsatzberatung (IEB) or Intercultural Mission Advise is based on the "Konzept zur Wahrnehmung der Interkulturellen Einsatzberatung in der Bundeswehr" (Concept for Intercultural Mission Advisors in the Bundeswehr) by the Vice Chief of Staff Bundeswehr and Chief of Staff Joint Support Service from July 2009. IEB provides the appropriate *Interkulturelle Einsatzberaterinnen/-er (IntkulEinsBer)* or Intercultural Mission Advisors (IMA), who advise the commander during education & training, mission planning and mission execution. IMAs can be civilian or military personnel from O-3/OF-2 and up to O-5/OF-4, in some cases even O-2/OF-1 or O-6/OF-5, depending on the level they communicate with. IMAs are at the same time sensors, effectors and advisors. As sensors, they collect information and add to the situational awareness of the commander, as effectors they can influence local decision makers, and as advisors they support the military decision makers in cross-cultural issues.

As part of the IMA-cell within the staff structure, they take part in all phases of mission planning and mission execution. They are responsible to maintain close contact to local civilian structures and for the buildup of local personal networks. Their deployment time should, in general, be nine months. After the deployment, they will be available for education & training in order to preserve their experience and knowledge.

IMA need to be sufficiently qualified in their specific cultural area including the appropriate language training.

UNITED KINGDOM

As UK operations in Afghanistan have developed it has become increasingly obvious that there is an enduring need to better understand the Social, Cultural, Historical, Economic and Political dimensions (SCHEP) of operating in a foreign environment. While in 2008 a single officer, previously employed as an interpreter but with no formal social science training, was tasked with understanding the SCHEP whilst attached to a Battle Group, since then the capability has evolved. By Jan 2011 there were 21 individuals specifically employed to analyze SCHEP and the rest of the force were increasingly culturally aware after better pre-deployment and in-theatre training. Evidence suggests that the Defense cultural capability is contributing significantly to the campaign in Afghanistan; variously being described as akin to an Electronic Warfare (EW) or the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capability. Commanders and Heads of Mission will require access to cultural capability in future conflicts, particularly when there is an emerging contingent operation. The formation of the Defense Cultural Support Unit (DCSU) has allowed the training, force generation and deployment of Cultural Advisers (CULAD) to evolve in response to the Op HERRICK theatre requirement. Having a Defense organization with the exclusive responsibility for cultural capability development has paid dividends but required substantial investment which will need to be continued.

It has also become clear that Cultural Awareness is everybody's business, but Cultural Competence should remain the preserve of specialists who are recruited, selected, trained and educated to deliver the specialist cultural capability that Commanders and Heads of Mission require. Notwithstanding the contribution made by the CULADs, Commanders and Heads of Mission everywhere require a cultural capability tool kit to help inform decision making; from a military perspective the Military Decision-making Process (MDP) should formalize 'Culture' as a factor to be considered during the formal estimate process. During the early stages of a campaign the accessibility of cultural information across government departments is considered essential to aid the development of an effective strategic plan. There is also an argument for the consolidation of the SCHEP information on each region or country into a central repository for subsequent and continuous exploitation by government departments. It has also been recommended that opportunities should be developed to exercise and train against challenging cultural scenarios to best prepare Commanders and Heads of Mission for the complexities of current and future conflicts.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Department of Defense (DoD) sets minimum language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capability requirements, allowing DoD components to specify the extent of training and education required beyond that minimum. The Office of the Secretary of Defense states the importance of identifying, validating, and prioritizing language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities.

- The key practice in cultural awareness planning is the language and regional expertise and culture capability requirement proposal to implement a standardized method for an identification, prioritization, and validation process of language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) capability requirements.
  - Combatant Commands are responsible for identifying and prioritizing these requirements within their areas of responsibility.
  - Joint Staff processes those requirements and forwards them on to the Services for implementation into each Services' training and education systems.
  - This system allows each component to be involved in a five-step planning process to articulate the language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) capability requirements for U.S. forces.

In regards to mission-specific operations, U.S. Central Command requires all forces deploying to their area of responsibility to complete cultural training that includes a general overview of the political and religious conditions of the country. Recently, the Secretary of Defense mandated a minimum requirement of a four to six hour on-line language and culture training program for all general purpose forces deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan.

Conclusion

A key component of U.S. defense strategy includes those activities that contribute to the comprehensive approach to support the development of capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. This strategy is applicable against traditional and irregular threats alike. The activities required to implement the strategy include the incorporation of language skills, regional expertise, and general and specific cultural awareness within the general purpose forces of the U.S. military. These advances in cultural awareness will help enable U.S. forces overcome language and culture barriers that impede the ability of our military and civilian personnel to successfully carry out essential missions. As stated in the 2008 House Armed Services Committee report, speaking the language with an appreciation of local culture is a potent tool in influencing a mission's outcome in our favor. The ultimate end state of these objectives is all U.S. forces acting in coalition operations are able to communicate effectively and demonstrate respect and appreciation for other cultures and ways of living.

FRANCE

There is no dedicated publication dealing with cultural awareness in the French doctrinal outputs. Nevertheless, cultural awareness is a major stake relevant to comprehensive approach. Accordingly, it is spotted as an important focus of forces' training before they are dispatched for new operations. A swift process analyzing lessons learned on the ground is also a great concern to share feedback and best practices as soon as they are gathered and set out to the forces. Failure in this realm may lead to failure of the mission if populace's disaffection and frustration swell.
As a result, cultural awareness is a concern for the military chief. It is taken into account at every stage of the operation and constitutes on the one hand a prerequisite for influence and leverage on action, on the other hand it shall warrant against social offences. It is refined when human environment is better known and shall be considered as a never ended state.

Implemented in the French camp of Mailly where French combined brigades are trained before their engagement, it resorts to civilian or military actors. They set out their own vision of cultural, tribal, sociological organization of the populace and try to give key elements for a best understanding of the social fabric. Not to mention the upstream information and training delivered by the training department of each regiment when it is marked as force provider for a combined brigade.
An effort is also made to improve mutual understanding of other actors on the ground like NGOs and development stakeholders whose actions will unfold on the same areas as militaries. CIMIC teams are ordinary aware of these topics. So they are to advise the forces and accustom them to the living together.
In the field, comprehensive approach is attached to the militaries' behavior. They are incited to have contacts with indigenous, in particular the elders, and to live among the population as far as security allows, to improve mutual understanding and trust and lead to a genuine acceptance of the force in the villages and the country.

ITALY

The positive impact of cultural awareness/competence is recognized on the whole spectrum of joint military functions:

- Command and Control;
- Intelligence;
- Maneuver and Fires;
- Information Operations;
- Civil Military Cooperation;
- Sustainability.

Although not yet formalized in a concept or in a monographic paper, clear references to the notion of cultural awareness and cultural competence are included in national Joint and Single Service doctrine and directives, and incorporated in the national Military Decision Making Process.

Lessons Learned from the main Theaters of Operations have been implemented with the establishment of the specific positions of *cultural advisors* and *regional advisors* to the national contingent commander. Pending the definition of the appropriate qualifying program for cultural competent personnel, the positions of regional advisor and cultural advisor are currently covered by Selected Reserve personnel or Ministry of Foreign Affairs specialists.

CANADA

General.

It is the modus operandi of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) that cultural considerations be incorporated into the planning and conduct of operations. Commanders are expected to understand the impact of cultural factors on the execution of their campaign plans coupled with the implications and challenges inherent in "human terrain." This is especially so for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Understanding and being sensitive to cultural realities can make or break the success of the mission, be it on the battlefield, in peacekeeping, nation building, or even humanitarian relief operations. The ability of commanders and soldiers to know and understand the human terrain in which they are operating is a key force multiplier allowing them to identify, shape and exploit opportunities critical to mission success, while preventing the enemy from dominating the human terrain's "high ground." In essence, knowledge of local conditions, including social and cultural mores, coupled with an empathetic awareness of the individual and collective concerns of the local population are key requirements for successfully operating in and exploiting human terrain to mission advantage.

Application of CCAC in Military Planning and Preparation for Operations

When planning and preparing for operations, CCAC considerations are elemental throughout the process. Drawing on after action reviews (AAR), the gathering of best practices (lessons learned) and academic research in the "human factors" field, CCAC requirements are provided for in the following ways:

Doctrine: Foundational understanding for the development and application of CCAC competencies in operations are contained in the Canadian Army's keystone doctrine manual Land Operations (B-GL-300-001-FP-001). In addition, the Army's recently published Counter-Insurgency Operations manual (B-GL-323-004/FP-003) contains a detailed description of CCAC requirements. This includes in Chapter 6 of the manual an extensive "Cultural Information Relief in Place Template" to be used between units arriving and departing an area of operations. Both manuals are used to frame operational training for Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) operations. They are also used to inform the various operational planning and professional development courses taught at the Army's training institutions, including the Canadian Army Command and Staff College (CACSC) and Peace Support Training Centre. The doctrine is also referenced in the education and training components of the Canadian Defense Academy, including the Canadian Forces College. Copies of these manuals can be provided to MIWG members on request.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs): Canadian Army units and sub-units deployed on operations rely extensively on both written and unwritten TTPs that are adjusted as necessary to meet mission specific requirements. These TTPs include actions (drills and policies) specifying

how engagements with local populations will be carried out, taking cognizance of social and cultural norms. These TTPs are regularly reviewed to ensure their suitability to the operational environment. In addition, local commanders conduct After Action Reviews following each task conducted, e.g. patrols, cordons, key leader engagements, with a view to acquiring knowledge of local conditions and how to interact most effectively with local populations in the area of operations. Lessons Learned teams are employed to record this information and ensure that it is incorporated during mission preparation training. Critical lessons are maintained online and in Lessons Learned publications. This information is also used to refine doctrine. Details of the human terrain and local cultural environment are also passed to incoming soldiers and replacements through formal handover procedures.

White Situational Awareness Teams: For the ISAF mission In Afghanistan, the CAF deployed white situational awareness teams to conduct research on cultural factors and provide advice and information for the planning and execution of operations. These teams proved to be a valuable tool for improving soldiers' understanding of the complex nature of the ISAF operating environment.

Defense Research and Development: The requirement for military members to possess cross cultural awareness and competencies when operating out of country is recognized by the CAF as being an important capability enabler. The challenge, however, lies in being able to impart these skill sets when time is limited and there are competing training priorities. To address this, several concept development and experimentation (CD&E) initiatives are ongoing or planned. These involve scientists from Defense and Research Development Canada (DRDC) and members of CAF's Influence Activities Task Force. Most promising is the Human Effects Advisor (HEA) experiment that will be conducted by 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) over the next two years. The purpose of the experiment is to validate the concept of Human Effect Advisors (HEA) operating as part of an Infantry Brigade Group deployed on a "whole of government" operation. HEA officers will be trained in the social sciences and have the job of providing the "Whole of Government" team with socio-cultural data in high risk environments. This includes contributing to G2 essential elements of information (EEIs) while forming part of the overall staff assessment of mission requirements. Key to the experiment will be identifying methodologies and processes for collecting this data along with assessing what kind of education and training is required by HEA officers. In addition, DRDC and the Canadian defense Academy have conducted academic studies and surveys on various topics associated with CCAC. These include a Lessons Learned in Culture and War study (Jan 2009) and Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Technical Report May 2011 titled The Importance of Culture: Soft Skills for Inter-Agency Complex Operations. Both of these reports can be accessed through the CDA's virtual library at: http://cda.mil.ca/LITER/libr-eng.asp.

AUSTRALIA

The **Operational Handbook- Working Amongst Different Cultures** – 2011 by Australian Army Adaptive Warfare Branch Headquarters 1st Division underpins latest ADF thinking on CCAC for current Operations. It is a compilation of practical, hard-learned lessons from ADF forces on the ground, and of rigorous academic studies by the Defense Science and Technology Organization. It contains knowledge about the environment, culture, history, people and combatants – essential information that everyone needs regardless of their role in the mission. The Handbook presents the following key themes and specific strategies for ADF Cross Cultural Awareness practices on operations:

1. **Recognition** of challenges and mental preparation for culture shock.
2. **The need to put the campaign mission and objective into context** - when it comes to measuring the progress of a Stabilization campaign, success can only be understood in terms of what constitutes stability, normality or positive change in the local culture. This is in contrast to conventional operations, where success is defined by defeating an easily identified enemy.
3. **Specific strategies to deal with key cultural differences** including: Identity, Behavior (time management, reciprocity, hospitality, dress, gender issues, and children), Religion, Law and Justice (local laws, land ownership, corruption, compensation) and Politics (national , local, tribal).
4**. Specific strategies for communication.**
5. **Specific strategies for working with partner agencies**. Selecting and working with interpreters; Principles for Culturally Sensitive Training & Mentoring of Indigenous Security Forces; recognition of cultural similarities and differences with partners coalition forces;
6. **Specific strategies for working with humanitarian and development agencies including Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)**. Knowledge of potential areas of discord and Engagement Strategies for Working with OGA and NGOs (Humanitarian space; political agendas; use of language and lexicon;)
7. Consideration of **The Paris Declaration** on Aid Effectiveness: an international agreement to which many countries and organizations are committed (including Australia). It is grounded on five mutually reinforcing Best Practice principles: local ownership, alignment, harmonization, results-based management and mutual accountability. In order to comprehend both the culture and operating practices of development organizations, ADF awareness of these principles is important.
8. **Additional best practice cultural principles**. Experience in stabilization and counterinsurgency operations has yielded a number of additional best practice principles. These include:
   - Conflict sensitivity: understanding the local culture and politics and avoiding adverse unintended consequences of projects in the battle space.
   - Delivery: focusing on process as well as product. It is the 'how' and not just the 'what' soldiers do that matters

- Legitimacy: facilitating good governance and restoring state-society relations.
- Security: prioritizing freedom of movement and broad human security for the local population before attempting to 'win hearts and minds' through development activities.
- Experience: deploying experienced field personnel who are well-prepared for the cultural context in which they will be operating.

The following Lessons from the US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned 2008 are recognized as valuable to ADF CCAC in Operations and worthy of 'best practice' consideration

- Train with classes on negotiation, specific local dialect and cultural awareness and on using an interpreter
- Cultural training needed to distinguish between friendly and hostile engagement meetings
- For culture awareness training to be effective, it must be focused on your particular area of operations and in the context of the COIN mission
- Translators required during training to better prepare for Leader Engagements and interaction with local populace
- Troops with a language aptitude should train intensively with Rosetta Stone; all others need to practice working with an interpreter
- Once in country, organize ongoing classes on language taught by your interpreters: Training is targeted more appropriately on the correct language and dialect. Troops are less likely to forget it. It will serve as a catalyst for your Soldiers and the interpreters to interact and to get to know each other

For effective SIGINT and HUMINT Cultural understanding is a must – need to build relationships with the locals and balance our concept of op tempo with the reality of how long it takes to get info.

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Annex D - Enclosures

1. Fact Sheet on the Combined Action Force, III Marine Amphibious Force, 31 March 1970

110929 CCAC Final Enclosure 1.pdf

2. Cultural Information Relief in Place Template

110929 CCAC Final Enclosure 2.pdf

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.3

MIC NATIONS' DECISION MAKING PROCESSES

Version 1.2
07 July 2014

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Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting action phase, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations/plans branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	MICES
Version 1.1	21 May 2013	Ops MIWG
Version 1.2	07 July 2014	Ops MIWG

Summary of Changes:

Updated national processes and charts for CAN and DEU.

Review Cycle:

Annual

Distribution:

Unlimited distribution; electronic copy of publication can be found on the MIC All Partners Access Network (APAN) website at https://community.apan.org/mic/

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AUSTRALIA (AUS)

NATIONAL STRATEGIC PROCESSES

Foreword: The following information is from Australian Doctrine publication ADDP 5.0 – Joint Planning. Collaborative staffing phases are not intended to align with national doctrinal planning phases, however equivalent staff processes and points of entry are readily identifiable and highlighted in the text and graphics.

NATIONAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

The Prime Minister, as the Chair of the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC), is at the pinnacle of the National Crisis Management Machinery (NCMM) and considers whole-of-government advice in response to a situation that has the potential to threaten Australia's national interests. To ensure a coordinated whole-of-government response, a lead department normally coordinates inter-departmental advice to government. Within Defence, the Strategic Command Group provides advice to Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) on possible military response options and is the link between the ADF and the NSC.

The NSC is the premier body for coordinating all aspects of Australia's national security interests. It is the focal point of government decision-making on national security matters, including crisis management. In addition, the NSC decides policy relating to intelligence, domestic security and law enforcement matters. Membership comprises the Prime Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the Minister for Defence, the Attorney General and the Treasurer, with other ministers attending as required. The CDF and Defence Secretary attend the NCS when Defence issues are discussed.

SENIOR DEFENSE STAKEHOLDERS AND PLANNING GROUPS

CDF. CDF is the principal military adviser to the Minister for Defence. CDF advises the government on the military implications of strategic developments, strategy and planning, and the conduct of operations. In discharging the command function, CDF issues strategic directives and future intentions. CDF is also required to keep government advised (through the Minister) of strategic developments that may require a military response, the progress of operations, future military plans and resource requirements to achieve national objectives.

Consistent with government guidance, CDF approves the requirement for joint or combined planning at the strategic level. After consultation with the Strategic Command Group (SCG), CDF provides appropriate guidance to military strategic planners including the requirement to conduct the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE)and authorize written orders through a CDF Planning Directive. The CDF Planning Directive can be expected to cover the following:

- statement of political constraints;
- national aim, end-state and objectives;
- military end-state, objectives and tasks;

- CDF intent;
- description of command arrangements;
- indicative force element allocation;
- resource restrictions;
- legal basis;
- ROE guidance;
- future intentions; and
- timing.

SCG. The function of the SCG is to provide advice to CDF on military response options and situational awareness on intelligence, policy and operational issues. The SCG supports CDF in his roles as the principal military adviser to government and as commander of the ADF. The format and attendance of the SCG is situation dependent, with participants comprising either Principals, Operations or Contingency staff. The SCG is chaired by CDF and its membership comprises SECDEF, CJOPS, the three Service Chiefs, Deputy Secretary Strategy (DEPSEC S), Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security (DEPSEC I&S), Chief of Joint Logistics (CJLOG), Director General Public Affairs (DGPA) and a military representative from the Chief Information Officer (CIO).

CJOPS. To assist CDF in the discharge of command functions, as they relate to military planning, CJOPS has specific responsibility for planning and conduct of campaigns and operations as directed by CDF. Contingency planning is conducted as required in accordance with Defence Strategic Planning Guidance (DSPG), strategic and operational level intelligence estimates and the Quarterly Strategic Review (QSR).

DELIBERATE PLANNING AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

The first stage of the deliberate strategic planning is the development of Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) by Strategic Policy Division (SPD). Stakeholders in the process include Capability Development Group, International Policy Division (PDIV), and Intelligence and Security Group. The DPG draws on White Papers and strategic updates and assesses the geo-strategic environment and other relevant influences on Australia and Defence in both the near-term (less than five years), and longer-term (out to 20 years). Specific guidance may be issued for identified scenarios to inform immediate and crisis planning for contingency response.



Figure 1 – AUS Strategic and Operational Level Planning Flow

IMMEDIATE PLANNING AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

Process. Immediate planning combines the cyclic development and review process of deliberate planning with the four-step planning sequence —situation development, plan development, execution and evaluation— with the steps often occurring in parallel. The immediate planning process is designed to enable the rapid development of military options, government approval of military plans and their subsequent execution and evaluation. The process is a flexible system that facilitates parallel and collaborative planning at the military strategic and operational levels, and is keyed to available response time. The process is a guide only and, given time constraints and other circumstances, may have to be modified as required. The actual sequence of actions and the time spent in each step is largely determined by the nature of the crisis, the tasks to be accomplished, resources and the time available.

Stakeholders. Underpinning the immediate planning process is the need for wide consultation both within Defence, with other government departments and allies/coalition partners in order to develop whole-of-government advice. The NCMM, comprising various stakeholder groups, formulates a whole-of government approach.

Within Defence, military strategic immediate planning is coordinated by CJOPS and provides advice to the SCG on military response options to a crisis situation.

Primary responsibility for liaison with potential coalition partners rests with CDF until a CDF Planning Directive or Warning Order (WNGO) is issued which then gives responsibility to CJOPS during the planning development and execution phases of immediate planning. HQJOC will then provide the bulk of the Australian component of the Combined Crisis Action Organisation that will be responsive to CJOPS.

SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

Situation development is principally a national/military strategic level activity and begins when an event or decision triggers the immediate planning process. The Minister for Defence, in consultation with the Prime Minister, may recommend the activation of the NCMM. It is initiated by a trigger event where CDF consults with the Minister and a decision is taken to conduct immediate planning. In most cases, the SCG will convene to consider the situation. An Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) or Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) may also be formed to consider the emerging situation and the whole-of-government approach to be taken.

CDF provides verbal guidance to CJOPS who convenes the Strategic Planning Group (SG) to consider the situation and develop military strategic options for consideration by CDF and the SCG. The SCG provides advice to CDF on the preferred option or options to be referred to the Minister and the NSC via a Ministerial Submission (MINSUB) or a Cabinet Submission (CABSUB). This advice (known as the 'First Stage Pass') once endorsed by government, is promulgated as a CDF Planning Directive to provide the framework for operational level planning.

Operational level input to the SPG is provided by HQJOC J5 (DGPLANS). J5 inclusion in the SPG enables collaborative and concurrent planning to commence simultaneously at the strategic and operational levels. Planning activity at the operational level would include a review of extant operational plans, concurrency and preparedness issues where appropriate. MSC, with CJOPS input, develops the CDF Planning Directive which is then issued by CDF to CJOPS.

PLAN DEVELOPMENT

At the strategic level, IPDIV or MSC, develop the CABSUB for the NSC. It is during this period that the WNGO and Alert Order (ALERTO) will also be developed by MSC in concert with SPG members. CDF may wish to issue a WNGO at any time after the trigger. NSC formally endorses a military strategic option, strategic end states and objectives at the second pass.

At the operational level, HQJOC conducts a detailed joint military appreciation process (JMAP) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) development for the NSC-approved or endorsed options(s). In this phase, the focus of the detailed planning effort shifts to the operational level while the strategic level continues to seek national strategic guidance and confirm military strategic guidance in terms of end-states, objectives, tasks, constraints and limitations. As these are confirmed, they are forwarded to HQJOC for inclusion in CONOPS development. CJOPS/DCJOPS now develops campaign and operational plans (including branches and sequels)

based on the approved CONOPS for the operation with the forces assigned. This phase continues to execution.

EXECUTION

At the strategic level, CDF issues the Execute Order (EXECUTO) once Government has approved the conduct of the operation. The Minister for Defence will be advised of CDF's intention to issue the EXECUTO. During the conduct of the operation, MSC staff monitor the operation, evaluate its progress against the plan at the strategic level, monitor compliance and anticipate changes in strategic circumstances. If required, new CDF planning guidance or directives may be issued separately as an amplification or amendment to the original EXECUTO. Changed strategic circumstances could lead to force rotations, changes to the force structure, draw down, or the transition to a different operation. Operations end with CDF issuing a Cease Order (CEASEO)

At the operational level, CJOPS will issue an Operational Order (OPORD) and/or Operational Instruction (OPINST) detailing how the campaign/operation will be conducted. Throughout the conduct of the campaign/operation, CJOPS will provide situation reports to CDF through the SCG.

Throughout the operation, the government is kept informed on the conduct and progress of the campaign operation in order to monitor the situation and assess when the military strategic objectives and end-states have been achieved and the national end-state satisfied. The Government will undertake periodic reviews during the execution phase to evaluate whether to implement other elements of national power.

EVALUATION

In the evaluation phase, post activity reports are developed at the strategic and operational levels to identify lessons learned. Lessons learned will provide input to all levels of the ADF and cover a range of issues from equipment, standard operating procedures and training.

	Strategic level activities	**Operational level activities**
Situation Development	Formulation of national strategic guidance	J5 staff input to SPG to develop MSO and concurrent planning
Plan Development	CDF issues Planning Directive CDF issues WNGO CDF issues ALERTO	HQJOC conducts JMAP and develops CONOPS for SCG consideration Campaign plan developed

Execution	CDF issues EXECUTO Planning for strategic branches and sequels Monitoring of operations	CJOPS issues operation order (OPORD) and/or instruction (OPINST) Planning conducted for operational branches and sequels Monitoring of operations
Evaluation	CDF issues cease order (CEASEO) Lessons learned analyzed	CJOPS issues CEASEO Lessons learned analyzed

Figure 2 – AUS Strategic and Operational planning activity

CANADA (CAN)

FORCE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING PROCESS



Figure 3 – CAN Force Employment Planning Process

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (GOC) PRIORITIES AND POLICIES

The GoC decides when and under what circumstances the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) will be employed. Normally, decision-making in this context involves two closely related planning processes. The first is a political process to assess the national interest and determine policy and/or whole of government (WOG) strategic objectives, which all departments and agencies support by formulating a range of closely coordinated strategies that exist across the spectrum of diplomatic (or political), informational, military and economic elements of national power. The second is a military feasibility process to determine how best to employ the CAF to achieve potential strategic objectives. From this analysis, a strategy is devised on how to organize and deploy the CAF given the threat environment, the capabilities required and the resources available.

INTEGRATED STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Ongoing formal strategic analysis is conducted by National Defence to identify domestic and international threats, crises or trends that may affect Canadian interests. This analysis is a collaborative effort involving ADM (Pol), Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), other strategic staffs and the operational Commands. Output generated from the strategic analysis provides the nucleus for practical considerations of the potential ends, ways and means of CAF Force Employment in the three to five year horizon. This is a continuous, iterative process, involving all strategic staffs in a variety of venues and processes such as Intelligence Indications and Warnings (I&W), Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG), strategic readiness, etc. In anticipation or response to a developing domestic or international event, the GoC will conduct a strategic assessment to consider how instruments of national power could be applied to resolve or influence the situation and whether it is appropriate and in the national interest to do so.

In concert with the WOG assessment, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and senior leadership of the Department of National Defence (DND)/CAF (assisted principally by strategic level staff) will consider how the CAF may be employed in conjunction with the other elements of national power to resolve or influence a developing situation. The first desired outcome of the WOG assessment is the identification of national goals, objectives, priorities, and interests. The second is broad guidance on the manner, or ways, in which instruments of national power will be integrated, directed and applied.

GOC / CABINET / MND GUIDANCE AND CDS MILITARY ADVICE

Informed by WOG/Strategic Assessment, the GoC may provide guidance to cease or reorient the active consideration of an issue. Such guidance may include: the priority of the planning effort; the lead and supporting department responsibilities; the degree of acceptable risk; the parameters within which the GoC response options should be situated; and the intended effects or desired outcome of this response. GoC/Minister of National Defence (MND) guidance at this stage will also articulate whether continued consideration of the military instrument of power is appropriate. As the senior military advisor to the GoC, the CDS provides advice to the MND on all military matters, including military requirements, capabilities and force employment considerations and options. When and where required, the CDS will also advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet directly. In parallel with CDS military advice, the Deputy Minister (DM) provides policy advice to the MND.

INITIATING DIRECTIVES

The purpose of a CDS Initiating Directive (CDS ID) is to formalize the initiation of strategic and operational level planning and communicate the deductions of the strategic assessment, either concurrently or following its completion. A CDS ID will state planning assumptions, define desired strategic objectives, outline CDS intent, impose appropriate limitations, appoint Supported and Supporting Commanders, identify key planning milestones and provide the force apportionment (an initial estimate of available forces authorized for planning). While the CDS ID initiates planning, it does not confer the authority to execute an operation. It may, however, authorize reconnaissance, heighten readiness states and permit preliminary movement.

THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS (OPP)

The Supported Commander's planning guidance focuses the planning effort. The Warning Order (Wng O) provides the necessary preparative guidance to assigned or apportioned assets to ensure that there is time to prepare and train to the directed level. Reconnaissance may take place at this stage. Courses of action (COAs) are based on ideas that may have originated from the Government, the CDS, or the Operational Commander. Regular and frequent communication between the CDS and subordinate commanders, as well as their respective staffs, will ensure unity of thought as COA development progresses. At a certain point, the operational commander will receive an information brief on the initial COA development process, allowing him to provide further direction and focus to the planning staff by eliminating some options and narrowing others. The authority to approve or select a COA very often rests at a higher level, especially for international operations. In these cases, the operational commander will therefore confine his direction to the range and nature of the COAs to be presented to the CDS. Consultation and close coordination with strategic and other government department (OGD) staff, as well as coalition partners and multinational organizations, as applicable, will ensure military force employment options support an integrated "WOG" approach as well as applicable coalition engagement strategies and planning efforts.

COA BACK BRIEFS

Once satisfied with the selected COA's effectiveness the Commander will normally seek and acquire CDS endorsement before proceeding with the effort to develop the COA into a Concept of Operations (CONOPs) or Campaign Plan. A formal briefing is presented to the CDS in which the Commander provides a graphic representation that clearly and objectively articulates the COA proposal that will best meet national and coalition objectives. Since the authority to approve or select a COA normally rests at the GoC level, especially for international operations, the CDS may also confine his direction to the range and nature of the COAs to be developed.

JOINT STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS (JSOR)

One of the products of the planning process at this stage is the JSOR, which is produced by the supported commander. The JSOR is briefed and submitted to the CDS in conjunction with the CONOPS. The JSOR illustrates the supported commander's requirements in terms of scale of forces, types of capabilities and equipment, and other resources and enablers needed to execute an operation.

FORCE EMPLOYMENT (FE) CONOPS AND CONOPS BACK BRIEF

After an endorsed COA or set of COAs has been developed into a CONOP, with an accompanying JSOR, the supported commander will brief it to the CDS, either in segments or as a whole. In some cases, if the GoC has already endorsed a COA, CONOPS approval allows the CDS to confirm his intent, ensure effective and efficient CAF-level coordination of FE, and identify issues that may require further interdepartmental coordination. In other cases, a refined CONOPS will require a CDS briefing to the MND or Cabinet before it is approved. The CONOPS back brief to the CDS is conducted in the presence of the Force Generators who will,

as appropriate, complement the FE CONOPS brief with a Force Generation (FG) brief outlining, in particular, sustainability over time of the anticipated commitment.

CDS Military Advice on Options

The presentation of COAs or a CONOP to the GoC will normally include the following:

- A summary of policy and strategic goals, objectives and end-state;
- A broad description of the capabilities involved, in terms of the:
  - Number of personnel, type of organization, and major equipment;
  - Sustainability over time; and
  - Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) costs and whether DND will seek additional funding to support the operation;
- A broad description of the ways, or types of operations, including consideration of inherent high profile factors such detainees and use of force; and
- A military risk assessment.

GoC / Cabinet / MND Direction

The MND carries legal responsibility and is accountable to Parliament for the administration, management and direction of the CAF and of all matters relating to national defence. All decisions and actions taken by the CAF are carried out, directly or indirectly, under the authority of the MND. In the case of FE planning, this involves the endorsement or approval of COAs for the employment of the CAF. The MND is then responsible to present these options to the GoC/Cabinet for decision on the advice of the CDS and DM.

A GoC/Cabinet decision is required prior to the commitment of military resources or commencement of any major military operation. The Cabinet can, without parliamentary approval or consultation, commit the CAF to action.

CDS Directive or FE Strategy

The approval of the strategic plan by the GoC and the detailed analysis of the selected plan provided through back briefs (COA, CONOP and Campaign Plan) will drive and aid in the development of CDS Directives, which refines the strategic direction given earlier.

Sustained Force Generation (FG) SUPLAN

Under the coordination of the primary force generator, all supporting commanders will prepare supporting plans to ensure the requirements of the supported commander are sustained over time. This plan will include the identification, training and equipping of forces for operations.

Plan Review - Strategic Assessment and GoC / Cabinet / MND Direction

The strategic assessment process is continuously conducted, even after the commencement of operations, to measure progress and identify necessary adjustments. Military assessments also

serve to inform “WOG” reviews. The outcome of these reviews informs advice to Government. Major changes to an ongoing mission require the same consultation and involvement by the same actors as in its initial stages. The outcome of this stage is GoC direction for the initiation, expansion, conversion, reduction, or termination of FE activities.

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FRANCE (FRA)



Figure 4

FRA Decision Making Process & CPCO Organization Decision Making and Planning Process

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The decision-making process followed at the strategic level in crisis management and operations is peculiar to France, and is linked to the core role of the CHOD working at the politico-military level in support of the President who, as supreme head of the armed forces, decides on committing our forces.

Crisis management is therefore strongly centralized.

The speed of communications and the ubiquity of the media demand frequent re-evaluation of the political and military options available. To be effective the crisis management process must adhere to these constraints.

It has therefore two characteristics; centralization and reactivity.

It can be brought into play in two different forms :

- In a forecast event , for which planning is done but which does not necessarily end in a commitment (Iraq) ;
- An unforeseen event which erupts suddenly; planning and execution are conducted concurrently (Ivory Coast).

ROLE OF THE CPCO (CENTRE DE PLANIFICATION ET DE CONDUITE DES OPÉRATIONS)

Under the authority of the CHOD, the CPCO is at the heart of crisis management, equally used for the anticipatory phases (strategic overview, planning) as for subsequent action (operations).

During the decision-making process, work is mainly carried out by the planning chain. The job of the various cells is to work up, by a strategic overview of their region, the construction of a body of analysis of the 'hotspots' there and to prepare military options to present to the CHOD.

So as to carry out the variety of planning tasks arising, 'ad hoc' or temporary working groups are set up which call on external competencies (This is a form of 'parasitism' which is a peculiarity of how the CPCO works).

These groups consist of:

- Analysis and pre-decisional evaluation groups (GAEP)
- Initiating groups (GI)
- Operational planning groups (GPO),

Operations are directed by the current ops chain using the work done by the planning chain. The cross-discipline or network structure of the CPCO prevents a breakdown during the transition from planning to execution. Once an operation is commenced, a situation cell is set up to provide current ops direction. It brings together staff from the various functional cells.

GERMANY (DEU)



Figure 5 – DEU Decision and Planning Cycle

The national decision and planning cycle is being conducted in 4 phases: crisis monitoring and early warning, planning, decision making and national command and control of the operation.

The lead for the different phases changes.

For the crisis monitoring and early warning the lead of the common activities lies with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is responsible for the overall crisis assessment. Once a need for national military contribution to an international crisis management has been identified, the planning phase under the lead of the MOD begins. This planning phase ends with a recommendation about possible military contributions to the desired strategic end state.

At the political level the formal decision making process depends on the type of operation. An unarmed deployment, e.g. humanitarian or disaster relief outside our national territory, requires a government decision only. The participation of German Forces in armed operations requires the approval of the Parliament in addition to the governmental decision.

Once the decision has been made and approval or mandate is given - normally limited by time and scope - the lead for national command and control lies again with the MOD.

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ITALY (ITA)

Crisis management entails the key functions of consultation, coordination and cooperation by strategic political and military actors.

The national organization for crisis management consists of the Political Strategic Committee (COPS) and the Interagency Nucleus for Situation and Planning (NISP).

The COPS is chaired by President of Ministers Council and is composed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Interior (MoI), Defence (MoD) and Finance. Other representative Intelligence Departments, the Chief of Defence (CHOD) the Chief of Civil Protection, and other civil defence departments assist at the meetings.

The Key role of the COPS is to provide the National guidance and strategic direction in crisis situations by determining contrast measures of all these crisis situations managed within International Organizations, such as UN, NATO, EU, OSCE and any other of which Italy is part.
Whenever a crisis situation is deemed to put at risk national interests by initiative of the Prime Minister or one of the participating ministers, the Political Strategic Committee (COPS) is summoned to start the decision making process for the management of the crisis and decide on the Crisis Response Options (CRO).

The PSC to make thorough estimates of all aspects of any crisis--political, military, law and order, informational, security, economic, and humanitarian assistance—and to ensure that they be addressed nearly simultaneously in a coordinated manner, is supported by the Interagency Nucleus for Situation and Planning (NISP). This entity can, by the way, be delegated the authority to autonomously and entirely manage the crisis situation.

The NISP is chair by the Undersecretary of State to the Presidency of Council and consists of representatives of the DIME members plus other representative of the Intelligence and civil agencies. The Key role of the NISP is to perform thorough and in depth analysis of the crisis situation and smooth multidimensional and interagency coordination and collaboration for the management of the crisis situation.

The COPS report to the President of Ministers Council for the approval of the proposed measures to adopt to handle the crisis situation, and whenever the situation so dictates it can directly temporarily adopt the appropriate contrast measures, in accordance with ratified treaties and international obligations.

In case of need or extreme urgency the President of Ministers Council following consultation with concerned ministers, members of the COPS, can direct the adoption of specific measures in support of the crisis.

Potential crisis situations/areas are continuously monitored at the CHOD General Staff level. When military involvement is foreseen, the proposal for engagement might be issued by The

General Staff Strategic Direction Office, which ensures continuous follow-on monitoring of the crisis. All possible information sources and inputs are gathered in coordination with MFA whose inputs are extremely valuable. Based on all the information available, strategic analysis is continuously made and strategic assessments are sent through the Chief of Defence to the Ministry of Defence. If the potential military engagement is significant the PM will seek for the Parliamentary approval as Italian Constitution dictates.

When the decision to launch an operation is made, periodic meetings occur between the appropriate levels of MoD and MFA as needed.

ITA DECISION MAKING PROCESS



Figure 7 – ITA Decision Making Process

Italian Decision Making Process with military engagement encompasses the following phases:

- Phase 1: Indications and warning;
- Phase 2: assessment;
- Phase 3: contingency strategic planning;
- Phase 4: operational planning;
- Phase 5: execution planning;
- Phase 6: execution and revision.

The phase 1 encompasses the routinely worldwide monitoring activities to highlight potential crisis situations through international events evaluation – other defence agencies information gathering and exchange with partners nations.

The Defence General Staff makes thorough estimate of the crisis situation to the Chief of Defence based on intelligence and other sources (steps 1 to 2 of the pictured process). The Services provide feasibility information to the process.

The phase 2 starts when the CHOD decides that the deterioration of a crisis situation may threaten national security and interests. This phase requires in depth screening of a specific situation and involves possible consultation/discussion with International Organizations/partners to decide if would be better to intervene with a coalition operation.

The DGS is the focal point for joint processes that involve military engagement. During this process the Joint Operational Headquarters work abreast with the DGS in elaborating the Operational and Strategic Estimate. Once the military Response Option is finalized, details should be briefed within the NISP/COPS so to let civil actors (interagency activities) understand how interagency support has to be structured and to come up with the National Comprehensive Strategy (NCS). The NCS provides the necessary elements to enable coordinated interagency implementation processes within and throughout all national instruments of power by refining and bringing greater detail to the previously agreed Strategic Option. **That document includes the Initiating Directive, handed over to the Operational Commander.**

The DGS advises the Chief of Defence on possible courses of action, decisive conditions that would allow the achievement of strategic Objectives and finally the strategic End state. The CHOD will make a recommendation to the Minister who in turn will present the advice or feedback on the terms of the potential commitments to the parliament for approval or sustainment of comprehensive effort, (steps 4 and 5 of following picture).

Once the engagement has been approved the MOD authorizes the CHOD to deploy forces. The CHOD gives his guidelines to the DGS (step 6 of the depicted process), which in turn issue an initial planning directive to the JOHQ (step 7). The Services are kept informed throughout the ongoing process.

During the Phase 3 the JOHQ (or the JCOSF) is requested by the DGS to prepare an Operational Estimate, upon which the DGS abreast with the COI/COFS will prepare the Strategic Estimate and consequently issue the Initial Planning Directive (IPD). Once received the IPD the COI/COFS will start the OPP in order to come up with a CONOPS. Allowing the CHOD to decide on the best military Crisis Response Option to adopt in support of the Crisis/Operation. Warning orders may be issued to units before the preparation of the packages if authorized by the CHOD.

During phase 4 to 6 the JOHQ and the JCOSF can contribute to the operational headquarters in a multinational coalition. Those phases are an iterative and interactive process that allows continuous assessment of operation progress and possibly to re-formulate strategic objectives to efficiently reach the intended End States. The CHOD retains operational command of the forces committed, while the operational control can be delegated as needed. Logistics remain a single Service responsibility.

UNITED KINGDOM (GBR)

THE CROSS-GOVERNMENT LEVEL

At the grand strategic level the Cabinet controls all the various means, diplomatic, economic and military, at the Government's disposal to deal with routine or expected events, and to resolve crises. At normal times, out of crisis, the National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister sets policy and deals with routine events. In the event of a crisis, the central Government's crisis management facilities (the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms or COBR) are activated to facilitate rapid coordination of the central Government response. Military action tends to be the last resort.

There is no single template for national crisis resolution and ultimately Ministers will decide on the most effective approach to tackling a particular crisis. The leadership and level of departmental input will vary depending on the nature of the crisis. National intelligence assessments, including strategic warning, are coordinated by the Cabinet Office through the Joint Intelligence Committee on which Defense is represented by the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) and the Director General Security Policy.

It is a principle of the UK's democratic system of Government that the Armed Forces remain under Government control and that civilian Defence Ministers are publicly accountable for the actions of the Armed Forces. The command structure of the Armed Forces is a single chain, stretching from the Crown, through the Defence Council under the Secretary of State for Defence (exercising the Royal Prerogative) to the individual unit and Service personnel.

For all operations the political decision to deploy the Armed Forces rests with the Cabinet. The Secretary of State for Defence is both a member of Cabinet and head of the Defence Council, through which the Royal Prerogative power to deploy the Armed Forces is exercised. The deployment of the Armed Forces in the UK (Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities) is governed by a mixture of the Prerogative Power, Common Law and Statute depending on the specific nature of the deployment. In practice, with the exception of where there is an immediate threat to life, a deployment in the UK requires an official request for assistance from a civil power or other Government department, authorization for the deployment from a Defence Minister, and direction to the Standing Joint Commander (UK) for forces to deploy in the form of a Directive from the Director of Operations (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations)) on behalf of CDS.

THE DEFENSE LEVEL

It is the responsibility of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Permanent Secretary (PUS) to ensure that sound and timely advice reaches Ministers. The Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) acts as the focus for the provision of Defense advice within the Government's overall management and resolution of crises. The DCMO provides the conduit for all briefings up to Ministers and for the dissemination of strategic direction to the operational level of command. It comprises the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, the Head

Office (as the military strategic headquarters) and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Standing Joint Commander (UK).

CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF ROLE IN DIRECTING OPERATIONS

As the principal military adviser to the Government, CDS will attend meetings of the National Security Council or its sub-committees as required and will draw on the operationally focused advice provided by the single-service Chiefs of Staff (COS) and senior civil servants through the COS Committee.

As the strategic commander, CDS, advised by the COS, is responsible for the formulation of the military strategy and for its coherence with Government policy. In doing this, he:

- Appoints the operational commander;
- Designates the theatre of operations and joint operations area;
- Gives strategic direction;
- Identifies the military conditions for success, and states the limitations (political, financial or legal) on the use of force, with particular regard to alliance or coalition partners;
- Allocates forces and resources and priorities for Reserves;
- Sets the strategic intelligence requirements;
- Establishes a command and control architecture (more complex in multinational operations);
- Dispatches and sustains the force in theatre and;
- Recovers the force.

Where the UK conducts operations in alliances or coalitions, and is not the dominant partner, senior national commanders may have only administrative and logistic matters directly under their control.

CHIEFS OF STAFF ROLE IN DIRECTING OPERATIONS

The Chiefs of Staff' (COS) conduct a range of activities in support of their roles as heads of Service, both individually and as part of the COS Committee. Their key military strategic role is to support CDS with professional advice on the conduct of current or prospective military operations and generating forces for deployment. Military strategic activities are those responsibilities of the COS that define the ways in which military force may contribute to the attainment of the Government's current and anticipated foreign and home security goals, and the determination of the means required to deliver the course of action identified for military operations or crises.

HEAD OFFICE ROLE IN DIRECTING OPERATIONS

In its role as the Headquarters of the Armed Forces, Head Office supports the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in his roles as strategic commander of UK military operations worldwide, and the Government's principal military adviser; supports the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) in developing military advice for Ministers on current and potential military operations; and

passes policy decisions to the military chain of command in the form of military direction or advice.

It concentrates in general on the fundamental policy questions, bilateral relations with allies and other nations, liaison with international organizations, and the strategic aspects of operations involving the UK Armed Forces. Its focus is to provide clear and unambiguous policy advice to Government and clear direction to the Armed Forces; it does not command forces directly nor involve itself in the day to day running of operations. It interacts with other Government departments (OGDs), at the strategic level, to synchronize military activity with other strategic activities. This is generally referred to as the comprehensive approach to crisis, and ensures that military activity is placed within the overall policy context and is not viewed as an end in itself.

A Current Commitments Team (CCT) is the crisis team formed at MOD. This usually includes staff from regional, capability, intelligence, logistics and movements MOD directorates, and from other Government Departments. The team is usually only 8-10 people, but will be authoritative: a 2* lead is possible but a 1* or OF5 lead would be more usual. Initially, the team forms in the offices of its members but as the crisis deepens it will move into the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) underground in MOD and work around the clock. The CCT's role is to handle current operational issues concerning the deployment, action and recovery of forces. The CCT thus fulfills the 'J3' role for the MOD.

When the CCT forms in MOD, a Contingency Planning Team (CPT) forms at PJHQ. The CCT and CPT work as a single entity through the medium of video conferencing. Together with the SPG, they produce initial advice on the crisis for CDS. The SPG will draft the CDS Planning Directive to the DCMO, based on the political direction given by Government. The product of the planning process is the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE), which is written by PJHQ (based upon the analysis in the GSE). The MSE will detail the military options including the implications for UK and the likely costs.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL HEADQUARTERS ROLE IN DIRECTING OPERATIONS

The primary function of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) is, when directed by CDS, to plan and execute joint, or potentially joint national and UK-led multinational operations conducted outside the UK. PJHQ exercises Operational Command (OPCOM) of UK forces assigned for a specific operation.

For overseas crises and associated military operations, PJHQ is responsible at the operational level of command for the deployment, direction, sustainment and recovery of a deployed force.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

Figure 8 - USA National Strategic Direction

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is one of the primary systems by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the combatant commanders (CCDRs), accomplishes contingency planning and provides military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and recommendations to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE). JSPS products - such as the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) - provide guidance and instructions on military policy, strategy, plans, forces, and resource requirements and allocations essential to successful execution of the national security strategy (NSS) and other Presidential directives. They also provide a means to evaluate extant US military capabilities, to assess the adequacy and risk associated with current programs and budgets, and to propose changes for the President's, SecDef's, and Congress' approval. Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between national strategic guidance and joint operation plans developed in Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Note: JOPES is to be replaced by Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX).

The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint operation planning or committed to conduct military operations are collectively termed the **Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC)**. Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the CJCS and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staff, the Services and their major commands, the combatant commands and their subordinate commands, and the combat support agencies (see Figure 9).



Figure 9 – The Joint Planning and Execution Community

In the planning process, the President and SecDef issue policy, strategic guidance, and direction. The President, assisted by the National Security Council (NSC), also issues policy and strategic direction to guide the planning efforts of Federal agencies that represent other instruments of national power. **The SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, organizes the JPEC for joint operational planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships among the combatant commands.** A supported commander is identified for each planning task, and supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs), Services, and combat support agencies are designated as appropriate. Similarly, supported commanders establish supported and supporting command relationships among their subordinate commanders. This process provides for unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.

- The **supported commander** has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP, the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), or other joint

operation planning authority. Note: CPG is being incorporated into Global Employment of the Force (GEF). In the context of joint operation planning, the supported commander prepares operation plans (OPLANs) or operation orders (OPORDs) in response to requirements generated by the President or the SecDef.

- **Supporting commanders** provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as required. Under some circumstances, a commander may be a supporting commander for one operation while being a supported commander for another.

Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including three broad **operational activities**, four **planning functions**, and a number of related **products** (see Figure 10).



Figure 10 – Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

This operational activity addresses procedures for describing the strategic environment, including threats to national security. This occurs while continuously monitoring the national and international political and military situations so that emerging crises can be determined

and analyzed, decision makers notified, and the specific nature of the threat determined. This activity emphasizes timely, relevant, and accurate information concerning the status of enemy, friendly, and neutral forces (such as enemy capabilities and intentions), and resources. All organizational levels are supported by this activity during contingency and crisis action planning and execution.

Situational awareness encompasses two activities: situation development and situation assessment. During situation development, an event with possible national security implications occurs, is recognized, and is reported. Through continual situation assessment of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, and other factors, those events affecting national security are identified and reported to the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The joint force commander (JFC) considers possible requirements for military force and initiates reviews of plans within the context of current strategic guidance.

Situational awareness actions support both contingency and crisis action planning. Situational awareness encompasses five related activities - (1) monitoring the global situation; (2) identifying that an event has occurred; (3) recognizing that the event is a problem or a potential problem; (4) reporting the event; and (5) assessing the event. An event is a national or international occurrence assessed as unusual and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

PLANNING

Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into executable OPLANs and OPORDs for contingency or crisis action response. Joint operation planning may be based on defined tasks identified in the CPG and the JSCP. Alternatively, joint operation planning may be based on the need for a military response to a current event, emergency, or time-sensitive contingency. Contingency planning is normally initiated by a CPG, JSCP, or a planning directive tasking. It is based on assigned planning guidance, derived assumptions, and apportioned forces and combat support activities. Crisis action planning (CAP) is initiated to respond to a current event, emergency, or time-sensitive contingency. It is based on planning guidance, actual circumstances, and assigned and allocated forces and combat support activities. In both cases, planning is initiated from a continuous awareness of global events, recognition of the need for a prepared military response to support the NSS, and follows a collaborative, iterative planning process.

Planning Functions:

- **Strategic Guidance.** This function is used to formulate politico-military assessments at the strategic level; develop and evaluate military strategy and objectives; apportion and allocate forces and other resources; formulate concepts and strategic military options; and develop planning guidance leading to the preparation of courses of action (COAs). The President, SecDef, and CJCS - with appropriate consultation with additional National Security Council (NSC) members, other US

government (USG) agencies, and multinational partners - formulate suitable and feasible national strategic objectives that reflect US national interests. The CCDR may provide input through one or more commander's assessments. The CCDR crafts military objectives that support national strategic objectives with the advice and consent of the CJCS and SecDef. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance such as the JSCP and CPG for contingency planning or a CJCS warning order (WARNORD), planning order (PLANORD), or alert order (ALERTORD) in CAP. It includes mission analysis, threat assessment, and development of assumptions, which as a minimum will be briefed to the SecDef during the mission analysis in-progress review (IPR). During this initial IPR, the CCDR should consider discussing USG strategic communication guidance. **The primary end product of the strategic guidance function is the supported commander's mission statement.**

- **Concept Development.** In concept development during contingency planning, the supported commander develops a concept of operations (CONOPS) for Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval based on SecDef and CJCS planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in Global Force Management (GFM) guidance and Service documents. GFM aligns force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies in support of the national defense strategy (NDS) and joint force availability requirements. In CAP, the supported commander develops, analyzes, and compares alternative COAs based on planning guidance, resource allocations from previously approved OPLANs, and a CJCS warning order (WARNORD). In time-sensitive situations, a WARNORD may not be issued and a PLANORD or ALERTORD might be the first strategic guidance received by the supported commander. Using the strategic guidance and the CCDR's mission statement, planners prepare evaluation request messages to solicit COA input from subordinate units and develop preliminary COAs based upon staff estimates. The supported commander recommends a COA in the commander's estimate for SecDef approval. The commander also requests the SecDef's guidance on interagency coordination and makes appropriate recommendations. As a basis for this discussion, the commander could brief the highlights of the OPLAN's annex V, ("Interagency Coordination)," during one or more of the in-progress reviews (IPRs). Concept development should consider a range of options to provide greater flexibility and speed transition during a crisis. The concept development IPR should address to the SecDef the CCDR's estimate, which broadly outlines how forces will conduct integrated joint operations to accomplish the mission. **Products from concept development include an approved COA and commander's estimate containing termination criteria, supportability estimates, and (if time allows) an integrated time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) of estimated force and logistic requirements by operation phase.** If developed, the TPFDD must ensure forces and mission visibility by phase to accommodate effective force integration and enable rapid adaptation as the situation changes.

- **Plan Development.** This function is used to fully develop an OPLAN, operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN), or an OPORD with applicable supporting annexes and

to refine preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, conflict termination, redeployment, and demobilization activities through the six-phase construct. Detailed planning begins with the SecDef's approval for further planning in a non-crisis environment or when the CJCS issues a WARNORD in a CAP situation. **The primary product is an approved plan or order.**

- **Plan Assessment (Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute).** During this function, the supported commander refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate commanders, Services, and supporting agencies complete their plans for review and approval. In general, the supported commander will, when required, submit the plans for the SecDef's approval. All commanders continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as required. The supported commander and the Joint Staff continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan refinement, adaptation, termination, or execution. The CCDR will brief the SecDef during the plan assessment IPR of any identified requirements to adapt, terminate, or execute an OPLAN.

EXECUTION

Execution starts when the execute order (EXORD) is issued. This component is comprised of mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, rotation, and demobilization activities. Protection and operations security are critical throughout.

Deployment encompasses all force preparation and movement to support an operation and all redeployment operations. Thoroughly planned, verified and fully documented TPFDD is the basis for force mobility and visibility. Effective command and control (C2) of deployment through the validation process ensures units are prepared and enables adaptability to unforeseen operational events.

Those units requiring transportation support must provide planning (movement requirement) information to the supporting command as early as possible and must comply with transportation directives to ensure in-transit visibility and C2 of their movements, to include joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI).

Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective.

Employment incorporates all activities required to complete the assigned mission. It spans the phases of the operation. Situation awareness and planning continue throughout employment.

Phase transition criteria and operation assessment processes support situation awareness and enable rapid transition to branches or sequels. Employment continues until the mission is accomplished or as otherwise directed by the SecDef or President. The ability to monitor and

compare actual with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment, terminating operations, and conducting redeployment.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Stabilization Operations

Stabilization is a multidimensional concept involving reconstruction and normalisation activities and tasks that involve attributes of other programs such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector (System) Reform (SSR) that must be considered in defining common approaches to a campaign. This document addresses the tasks normally performed by military forces in supporting stabilization operations when a host nation (HN) is unable to govern and/or to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Military forces perform a myriad of functions in supporting broad coalition reconstruction, SSR and stabilization efforts in order to establish a safe and secure environment in a fragile state. The stabilization tasks accomplished by military forces during a wide range of activities help set the conditions or framework for facilitating reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establishing political, legal, social and economic institutions; and setting the environment for transitioning responsibility to legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law.

Purpose of Handbook

This document has two primary functions:

- To provide a commonly agreed conceptual framework between MIC nations for understanding the military contribution to stabilization operations, including SSR, DDR, and reconstruction efforts.
- To provide guidance based on documented best practices / lessons identified for conducting Stabilization Operations based on past stabilization operations conducted or supported by MIC member nations.

Stabilization Operations and Comprehensive Approach

Stabilization Operations are typically lengthy endeavours where all tasks performed must focus on maintaining the delicate balance between long-term success and short-term gains. Military forces perform specific functions as part of a broader response effort, supporting complementary activities of other governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector and coalition partners while operating with the other instruments of national power to stabilise a nation affected by a conflict or a disaster. This Comprehensive Approach (CA) integrates the efforts of all actors to achieve a unity of effort towards a shared or common goal. Through a CA to stability operations, military forces provide the requisite security and control needed to stabilise conditions, restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the HN is capable of providing these services for their citizens. Stabilization operations involve multi-agency activities aimed at: preventing or reducing violence (Conflict Transformation), protecting people and key institutions, promoting political processes to lead to greater stability, and preparing for the longer-term non-violent politics and development.

Stabilization Tasks

There are five primary stabilization tasks that military forces retain primary responsibility for and must be prepared to perform. The accomplishment of these stabilization tasks provides the

foundation for the success of the other instruments of national power involved in stabilization operations. This foundation must sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future viability of the state. The primary stability tasks reflect a myriad of interrelated activities. The five stabilization tasks are: establish security; restore essential services; establish civil control; support governance; and support economic and infrastructure development.

a. The ***Establish Security*** task's overarching goals are establishing a safe and secure environment, developing legitimate and stable security institutions, and fostering sustainability tasks to consolidate HN capacity building. This task includes the enforced cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements after an armed conflict that sets the conditions necessary for DDR. These activities are critical to providing effective security for the local population by reducing their exposure to the threat of violent conflict. This task also focuses on the security and intelligence institutions that form the underpinnings of an effective SSR program based on a well-defined legal framework. A DDR program is fundamental to establishing stability and a lasting peace.

b. The ***Restore Essential*** *Services* task is one where military forces support HN and/or civilian relief organizations in providing services to the populace. However, when the HN cannot perform its roles, military forces may execute these tasks directly or in support of other civilian agencies and organizations.

c. The ***Establish Civil*** *Control* task deals with activities that regulate selected behaviour and activities of individuals and groups. A key activity is establishing public order and safety that provides a broad range of activities to protect citizens, provide interim policing and crowd control, and secures critical infrastructure. Additionally, establishing an interim criminal justice system that has skilled professionals (judges, prosecutors, court administrators, defense lawyers, corrections personnel, law enforcement, and investigators) is essential to restore governance. The support that military forces provide to law enforcement and policing operations is integral to establishing civil control over law enforcement services.

d. The ***Support to Governance*** task recognizes that when a legitimate and functional HN government is present, military forces operate in a limited way to support the government. However, when the HN cannot perform its basic civil functions, some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. After all, a state's legitimacy among its people is tied in part to its perceived ability to provide these essential services to its people. When the HN has collapsed or been overthrown, the initial response is to immediately fill the governance void. It is recognized that establishing governance at the local level is necessary since effective local governance depends almost entirely on the ability to provide essential civil services to the people and that restoring these services is fundamental to supporting humanitarian relief efforts.

e. The ***Economic and Infrastructure Development*** task promotes sound economic policies that promote equitable, sustainable growth that is a key factor to resolving

underlying tensions in society, allowing for recovery and long-term economic development. Thus, economic stabilization tasks are closely linked to other stabilization tasks such as governance, SSR, and DDR in providing stability to the HN. Building capacity within the economic sector requires an integrated approach to achieve sustainable growth. Civilian and HN organization and agencies are mainly responsible for the macro level development mechanisms but often need military forces to provide for security and other types of assistance so development activities can occur.

Information Engagement Task

Information engagement tasks, while not considered as stabilization tasks, are very important in supporting stabilization operations and are an integral part of all stability tasks. Information engagement activities integrate all stabilization tasks, compliment and reinforce the success of operations. The integration of information is critical in coordinating stabilization tasks and reducing the drivers of conflict. Information engagement is essential to achieving the results intended by ensuring all players have the information they need to accomplish their assigned stabilization missions and objectives.

Assessment

Assessment is vital to the success of stability operations. Military commanders and their staffs along with non-military actors continually assess current operations, gauging progress against the desired end state for the operations.

PART ONE SUMMARY

Part One of the handbook contains a narrative discussing the complex environment in which stabilization operations are conducted and addresses the key factors governing stabilization operations in failed, failing or at risk states.

The primary stabilization tasks include establishing security, restoring essential services, establishing civil control, supporting governance and participation, and supporting economic and infrastructure development.

Four stabilization objectives are discussed. These objectives are: preventing or reducing violence; protecting people and key institutions; promoting political processes that lead to greater stability; and preparing for longer term, non-violent politics and development activities.

Legitimacy is identified as a multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of stabilization operations. The four distinct factors that establish the legitimacy of a mission are: mandate or authority for the mission, professional manner in which intervening forces conduct themselves, consent of the HN being assisted, and expectations associated with stabilization operations in terms of goals, time and resources, that are realistic, consistent, and achievable.

Military tasks within Stabilization Operations include: security and control, support to initial restoration of interim governance, support for SSR, support to initial restoration of services and support for DDR.

Causes of instability are discussed through the context of the spectrum of instability, external and internal risk factors, country capacity and resilience, and external stabilising factors.

The five phases of a conflict - Prevention, Intervention, Stabilization, Normalisation, and Strategic Overwatch - are discussed as well as the importance of civilian-military cooperation and in utilising a CA in planning for and conducting stabilization operations.

Key insights identified and discussed include the need: for political, military, humanitarian and economic recovery activities that support one another; to be patient and realistic about time and money; to work with what is there and use local knowledge for risk analysis; to continually assess operations to ensure objectives are being met and to check for unintended consequences based.

An Assessment Process is outlined for assessing national and coalition interests along with three measurement tools - Measures of Performance (MOP), Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), and indicators - that assist commanders and others in measuring the progress made in accomplishing stabilization operations tasks. Additionally, the military planner must understand the conflict politics by identifying the various groups contesting for power in a country, in framing their stabilization operations.

PART TWO SUMMARY

Part Two of the handbook discusses SSR that involves the reform of security and judicial institutions that enable them to play an effective legitimate and accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens under the control of a legitimate state authority and to provide stability.

All MIC nations acknowledge principles developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which provide a common understanding of SSR, including a detailed implementation framework and guidelines. OECD identifies basic elements common to all SSR programs. These basic elements are: civil governance oversight and accountability, defense reform, police reform, intelligence reform, judicial reform, and prison reform.

The general aim of SSR programs is establishing a security environment based on development, rule of law, good governance, and local ownership of security actors. The concept of SSR is holistic in its approach to the security sector and includes all relevant actors and instruments in the process of transforming a dysfunctional security sector or establishing a new security sector depending on the circumstances. These programs include not only the HN's security services (armed forces, police, border and customs officials, corrections officials and programs, the courts and justice officials) but also non-state actors, and other armed groups as well as the civil society. Based on this wide assortment of actors, SSR programs have to be tailored to address the local environment.

OECD identifies four strategic objectives for SSR programs. These objectives are:

- Establishment of effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security system;

- Improved delivery of services impacting security and justice services;
- Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process; and
- Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.

The military performs many tasks that support SSR programs. These tasks are performed in a permissive and non-permissive environment and include the following activities:

- DDR of former combatants, including child and female soldiers
- Combating Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW);
- Transitional Justice;
- Strengthening the rule of law;
- De-mining; and
- Countering human, weapon, and drug trafficking.

Strategic planning is very important in supporting SSR activities for delineating responsibilities between civilian and military actors to ensure that resources (financial, personnel, and expertise) are identified and sufficient for the tasks being performed. A common understanding between contributing nations over the potential level of participation, resource allocation, and national objectives is needed to ensure a coherent, workable approach. All responsibilities for coalition or alliance partners should be integrated into a coalition campaign plan developed at the national and military strategic level supporting a CA. Other important considerations for SSR include mission analysis, operating environment, and synchronization of HN and different security forces responsibilities in providing SSR programmatic support.

PART THREE SUMMARY

Part Three of the handbook focuses on DDR activities that support stabilization, SSR, and long-term development efforts. The DDR program removes arms and weapons from ex-combatants, keeps them detached and separated from their armed group, and integrated into society socially, economically, and politically.

The primary attributes of DDR programs are Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration. These attributes are defined as follows:

- Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants, including civilians. It includes the development of a responsible arms management programs;
- Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups.
- Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the process of reintegration.
- Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.

The objective of DDR programs is to contribute to security and stability in post conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants is a complex process with political, military, security,

humanitarian, and socio-economic dimensions. Specifically, DDR programs deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching from conflict to peace, recovery, and development.

There are many contributions and tasks the military forces perform in support of DDR activities. The primary tasks include providing a safe and secure environment; supporting arms embargos; observing and verifying disarmament through site and unit inspections; safety and security of weapons/ordnance storage sites; and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) assistance for destruction.

The factors for success in conducting DDR activities by military forces include actions such as: early planning, adapting processes to local conditions/situations; creating a mechanism to facilitate close coordination between the wide variety of organizations and agencies involved in DDR to minimize the duplication of activities; conduct proper and efficient communication with all people effected by DDR activities; and support and ensure real time involvement of all participants. A successful DDR program helps establish sustainable peace, while failed DDR efforts can stall SSR, disrupt peace processes, and socially and economically destabilize communities.

PART FOUR SUMMARY

Part Four of the handbook discusses Reconstruction Efforts and the formation of Reconstruction Teams (RTs) that are comprised of international civilian and military personnel responsible for performing the functions associated with security, reconstruction, and support for central governance. RTs may also engage in relief operations under certain circumstances. Regarding security functions, RTs support the disarmament process, mediating conflicts between militias, and select elements of the SSR effort.

The primary activities of RTs are to conceive, plan, coordinate, and/or execute reconstruction and initial development projects and programs.

RTs adhere to the development communities' principles to the maximum extent possible. Those principles are:

- Ownership through enhancing and strengthening the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people;
- Capacity building through strengthening local institutions, transferring of technical skills, and promoting appropriate policies;
- Sustainability through designing programs to ensure their impact endures;
- Selectivity of resource allocations based upon need, local commitment, and foreign policy interest;
- Assessment of local conditions through the conduct of careful research, adapting of best practices and innovative design;
- Results based upon resources expended to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives;

- Partnership based on a close collaboration with government and community leaders, donors, NGOs, the private sector, International Organizations (IOs), RTs, coalition partners, and universities;
- Flexibility that takes into account changing conditions and opportunities to maximize efficiencies in the planning and implementation of development activities; and
- Accountability based on transparency of financial systems that include effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.

Guiding principles for RTs include operating as an integrated military-civilian organization driven by a unity of effort and actively engaged with leading political figures, HN central government officials, local communities and population through local councils, development committees, and other established and traditional bodies.

PART FIVE SUMMARY

Part Five of the handbook discusses Transition that, during the post-conflict phase of an operation, plans for and implements the transfer of specific functions and tasks to a follow-on authority in a seamless and organized manner. Coalition military forces will eventually hand over their responsibilities to other military forces (such as NATO or UN), other governmental departments (OGDs), NGOs, UN organizations and/or HN governmental departments and/or agencies. The ultimate goal of transition is to transfer all functions performed by coalition military forces in a smooth and orderly fashion.

Successful transition of functions, duties and responsibilities from military forces to non-military or other military forces involve a number of key activities.[1] They are:

- Conducting early planning with HN, IOs, and NGOs;
- Establishing workable objectives, goals, and end states;
- Providing for adequate intelligence and communications to all agencies involved in the transition;
- Ensuring unity of effort;
- Harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and
- Establishing the appropriate C2 to manage the transition.

Transition occurs when either the mission has been accomplished in accordance with a transition plan or when the coalition partner governmental officials so direct certain activities/missions to terminate.[2]

- Criteria for transition are complex and are based a number of factors such as events, measures of effectiveness (MOE) and/or military/mission success.
- Other organizations (such as IOs, the UN, NGOs, and HN) have the necessary capabilities to assume responsibility for the mission and activities being performed by coalition military forces.

[1] NATO Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations AJP-3(A), Ratification Draft, 2006, p. 4-20.
[2] U.S. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, February 8, 2001, p. III-32.

- A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summaries capabilities and assets, and assigns specific responsibilities in implementing the terms and conditions of the plan.
- Coalition military forces and other interested departments and agencies inside and outside the government should periodically review the Transition Plan. This collaborative review ensures planning assumptions are still valid and to make appropriate changes in the transition plan to meet different operational parameters.

Areas that impact the development of a transition plan must be considered. These areas are:

- Identification of issues;
- Key events (past and present);
- Work required to accomplish the transition; and
- A thorough knowledge of the organization or force taking over control of the operation.

Collaborative planning should deliver agreed outcomes across all phases of the campaign as a whole and must consider issues associated with the Transition phase from the outset. It should identify how, throughout a crisis, all agencies might/will contribute to resolution and establish a clear vision of how synergy will be achieved between the various agencies' disparate activities. Moreover, planning should be iterative that includes constant evaluation and re-evaluation of the crisis that will shape collaborative adjustments to the operations plan.

CONCLUSION

Stabilization operations include a wide assortment of diverse actors with widely disparate experiences, resources, mandates, and capabilities. Therefore, forging a CA with a shared understanding and appreciation for the intended end state is essential to effective stabilization operations. This CA is both the overall goal and the greatest challenge to mission accomplishment. Many actors in performing their duties cannot be compelled by military forces to work within a coalition construct, nor do they have any incentive to do so. Therefore, military forces in planning for and conducting stabilization operations must build strong relationship through cooperation, collaboration, and coordination with the various governmental, NGOs, IOs and the private sector as well as other military forces involved in stabilization operations through a CA.

PART ONE – MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION

INTRODUCTION

STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

0101. In the complex, dynamic strategic environment of the 21st century, nations are engaged in new challenges. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world; the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty. The global implications of these destabilizing forces are immense. Ideological conflicts marked by the rising threat of violent extremist movements are creating anarchy and instability throughout the world. MIC nations in this new international environment face emerging nations who are discontent with the status quo, flush with wealth and ambition, and seeking a new global balance of power. Yet the greatest threat to international security comes not in the form of terrorism or ambitious power, but from fragile states either unable or unwilling to provide for the most basic needs of their people. As nations operate in this era of uncertainty and persistent conflict, the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred and no longer conform to the clear delineations of the past. At the same time, emerging drivers of conflict and instability (religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power) are combining with rapid cultural, social, and technological change to further complicate our understanding of the global security environment. It is also clear, in confronting these challenges, that military operations and successes alone are not sufficient to prevail in this environment and that nations must strengthen the capacity of their government agencies and departments to provide a comprehensive response. Nations must also leverage the full potential of interagency partners as well.

COMPLEX WORLD ENVIRONMENT

0102. In this era of persistent conflict, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence continue to complicate international and multinational relations. These conditions create belts of state fragility and instability that present a grave threat to MIC nations' national security. Therefore, MIC nations must plan to work through and with others in the community of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states and provide vital humanitarian aid to the suffering. At the heart of this effort is a Comprehensive Approach (CA) to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with military forces, government and NGOs, international partners/organizations, humanitarian organizations, and private sector actors. The CA ensures unity of effort among a diverse group of nations and actors while fostering the development of new capabilities. These capabilities are designed to shape the operational environment in ways that preclude the requirement for future military intervention. Additionally, it postures the military forces of participating nations to perform the duties and responsibilities common for military forces - ensuring the safety and security of the local populace, assisting with reconstruction, and providing basic sustenance and public

services. Equally important for military forces are defining the support they will provide to the civilian agencies and departments leading complex stabilization operations.[3]

STABILIZATION OPERATIONS PLANNING

0103. The essence of stability operations is to plan for and provide the time to: bring safety and security to an embattled populace; provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of the people; restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to life; and rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability.[4] Nations must adopt an integrated approach to stability operations based upon a framework that applies across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. The framework must plan for the execution of a wide and diverse range of stability tasks performed under the umbrella of various operational environments that identify the roles and responsibilities of the various actors - civilian and military - that vary depending on the threat, stability of the environment, viability of the HN government, and others factors. The development of an effective intervention plan is based on a detailed conflict assessment which links the broad strategic goals to a realistic end state, supporting clearly defined objectives, and discrete, executable tasks. This assessment provides a thorough measure of factors that helps to appropriately delineate roles and responsibilities among the numerous and diverse actors involved in stability operations.[5]

ESTABLISHING STABILITY

UNITY OF EFFORT

0104. A major challenge faced by military and civilian leaders in conducting successful stabilization operations is collaborating effectively with the numerous and diverse actors involved in stability operations. This collaboration ensures unity of effort, which is considered a foundation for successful operations by integrating all the capabilities of a nation's governmental agencies and departments with those of other nations, NGOs, IOs, and the private sector. Some NGOs base their activities on humanitarian principles that embrace goals different from those of nations, coalitions and/or the international community, which will challenge the unity of effort intended by these collaborative activities.

FAILED OR FAILING (FRAGILE) STATE

0105. In an operational environment with unstable security conditions where the HN has either failed or is unable to function effectively, external military forces may be the only substantial stabilizing presence. They must therefore be trained and prepared to perform all the tasks essential to establishing and maintaining security and order while providing for the

[3] U.S. Army (USA) Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, Foreword.
[4] USA FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, Introduction.
[5] USA FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, paragraphs 1-10 to 1-15.

essential needs of the indigenous population. Stabilization operations aim to provide an environment within a HN where their political and government officials can address and begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. In stabilization operations the military assists the HN and/or others in performing their tasks, although the military may have to perform the tasks themselves if the HN is unable or unwilling to perform their legitimate governmental responsibilities.

PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS

0106. Stability tasks lay the foundation for the success of the other instruments of national power. This foundation must sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that are essential to the future viability of the HN. Each primary task includes major sub-tasks that facilitate the integration and synchronization of related stabilization activities. These primary stability tasks are: establishing security, restoring essential services, establishing civil control, supporting governance and participation, and supporting economic and infrastructure development. These tasks help to focus and unify stabilization efforts within specific functional areas of a society that require support and/or restoration; hence setting the foundation for successful stabilization operations within the HN.

0107. ***Establish Security***. Within a security sector, the initial response by military forces is to establish a safe environment and provide security and stability after an armed conflict or a disaster. Military forces enforce cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace agreements. Additionally, military forces work at establishing the conditions necessary to begin DDR activities.[6]

f. DDR activities include physically disbanding armed groups, removing the means of combat from former combatants and belligerents, and reintegrating the latter two into society. The groups involved in DDR activities include men, women, and children. Together, the tasks associated with DDR reduce the potential resurgence of armed conflict. Additionally, these tasks provide a means for these individuals and groups to re-enter society as contributing members through being reintegrated into society. The DDR program, which falls under civil security, represents one element of comprehensive SSR. The essential tasks associated with DDR programs include: military forces negotiating arrangements with belligerents for disarming; establishing and enforcing weapons control programs, including collection and destruction of weapons seized/confiscated; providing reassurances and incentives for disarmed factions; establishing a monitoring program for former belligerents; establishing demobilization camps; and ensuring that adequate medical, food, and security is provided for former belligerents.

g. A central component of civil security is the ability of the HN to monitor and regulate its borders. Border controls are necessary to regulate immigration, control the movement of the local population, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling, and control the spread of disease. Identification programs are important in vetting

[6] DDR is covered in more detail in Part 3.

HN personnel, encourage participation in representative government, resolve property disputes, and validate professional credentials. Although vital to other programs for rebuilding a functioning civil society, identification programs are equally important to civil security. These programs ensure that potential adversaries do not inadvertently reintegrate into society where they could potentially plant the seeds for future adverse activities against the HN's government and its agencies.

h. Military forces may also provide protection and support to key civilian personnel to ensure their continued contribution to the overall stabilization operation as well as protecting and maintaining critical infrastructure until the HN can assume these responsibilities. Military personnel responding may be required to:

- Protect government-sponsored civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel.
- Protect contractor and civilian reconstruction and stabilization personnel and resources.
- Provide emergency logistics support.
- Protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries and property ownership documents.
- Protect and secure strategically important institutions such as government buildings, medical and public health infrastructure; the central bank, national treasury and integral commercial banks; museums; and religious sites.
- Protect and secure military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps, and means of communications.

i. Explosive hazards such as minefields and unexploded ordnance inflict stress on the people while restricting freedom of movement, hindering international trade, and distracting from the ability of the fragile state to secure its borders and boundaries. Removing these hazards ensures the safety, security, and wellbeing of the local population while promoting the free movement of people and materials within the HN.

0108. ***Restore Essential Services***. When the HN cannot perform its duties and responsibilities in providing essential services, military forces may execute these tasks directly or to support other civilian agencies and organizations. Military forces, specifically functional units or functional specialists, may provide humanitarian aid and essential civil services such as electricity, trash collection, medical facilities, safety, food, and shelter necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored.

a. Military forces may be asked to:

- Provide food, water, shelter and medical support to meet humanitarian crisis.
- Ensure proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water.
- Provide interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal services.

b. Military forces may also provide support to civilians dislocated because of conflict or disaster as well as supporting efforts to support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs. One key task performed by military forces is the delivery of

emergency food aid to a HN's most vulnerable populations. Military forces perform a small but important role in providing non-food relief during humanitarian crises and natural disasters.

- This support is conducted in close coordination with relevant HN ministries, UN relief agencies, and other NGOs or private aid organizations.
- Another critically important task performed by military forces is marking and removing land mines and other explosive devices from transportation routes and public facilities to reduce the risk to the local population.
- Military forces support human rights initiatives by preventing further abuse of vulnerable populations, establishing conditions that support long-term development, and promoting/enforcing the rule of law in preventing human rights abuses within its own ranks.
- Military forces support public health programs by evaluating the need for additional medical capabilities, operating or augmenting the operations of existing civilian medical facilities, preventing epidemics through timely vaccinations, and repairing existing civilian clinics and hospitals.

0109. ***Establish Civil Control***. This task develops interim mechanisms for establishing or re-establishing the rule of law by restoring the justice system and processes for reconciliation. It provides a broad range of activities to protect the civilian population, provide interim policing and crowd control, and secures critical infrastructure. The long-term objective is to establish a legitimate, functioning justice system founded on international norms. Activities to establish public order and safety ensure the long-term sustainability of any reform efforts. When conditions require the restoration of governance, establishing an interim justice system is a prerequisite. This restoration requires a wide range of skilled professionals working under a clearly defined legal authority: judges, prosecutors, court administrators, defense lawyers, corrections personnel, law enforcement, and investigators. These personnel and the institutions they represent provide a temporary respite allowing the HN to restore its capacity.

a. The essential tasks that military forces may need to support for the establishment of civil control include the following:

   - Assessment of the current legal framework and the need for modifications or adoption of internationally accepted codes;
   - Deployment of interim justice personnel to complement HN criminal justice system;
   - Establishment of mechanisms to review the legality of detentions and minor cases to minimize pre-trial detention;
   - Enactment of interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law; and
   - Assessment of the HN's capacity to combat crime.

b. Military forces provide support to law enforcement and policing operations that is integral to establishing civil control. HN civilian law enforcement agencies and organizations may be able to provide law enforcement and policing operations depending on the security environment. In a fragile state, however, these

police/security institutions may be ineffective, non-existent, or corrupted and so the military police may be the only organization capable of providing law enforcement and policing operations in the HN.

c. When feasible, civilian police personnel will augment military forces in providing civilian law enforcement services. These units are trained and equipped for stability policing duties and responsibilities. Civilian agencies, not military units, typically provide training and capacity building support for law enforcement (national police) units.

d. In a fragile state or lawless environment, military police forces perform policing activities on an interim basis until the security environment is stable enough for policing activities to transition to civilian police and law enforcement agencies or organizations. These functions include:

- Identifying, securing, and preserving evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption, and transnational crime (terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, and narcotics, etc.);
- Identifying and detaining perpetrators of these offenses;
- Vetting, credentialing, and accounting for HN police forces;
- Deploying police trainers and advisors; and
- Inventorying and assessing police facilities and systems.

e. Stabilization operations support judicial reform, which is integral to the rule of law and provides the necessary framework for broader SSR activities. The support provided to judicial institutions parallels efforts with police and security forces to enhance the HN's capacity and capabilities to maintain civil control and security. Under most scenarios, other governmental, NGOs and agencies support the development of the judicial branch of government. In fragile states, however, military forces must perform those initial functions until they can be transitioned to civilian agencies or organizations. During the initial phase of stability operations, military forces can:

- Identify HN legal professionals;
- Identify actual and potential leaders to incorporate into reform process;
- Determine gaps or inconsistencies with international human rights norms in legal framework;
- Establish vetting criteria;
- Educate criminal justice personnel on interim legal codes and international human rights standards;
- Inventory and assess courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations; and
- Deploy judicial advisors and liaisons.

0110. ***Support Governance***. When a HN's government cannot perform its basic civil functions for whatever reason, some degree of military support for governance may be necessary. A state's legitimacy among its people is inexplicably tied to its ability to provide essential services

to its people. In cases where the HN's government has collapsed or been deposed, the initial efforts focus on filling as quickly as possible the void in governance.

a. Military forces may be asked to immediately fill the void in governance in fragile states. Military forces need to:

   - Vet HN officials where their trustworthiness is suspect;
   - Reconstitute leadership at multiple levels of government; and
   - Establish interim legislative institutions and processes.

b. Military forces may be tasked to establish effective governance institutions and processes at the local level before developing governance institutions and process throughout the HN. It is generally recognized that effective local governance institutions and processes are dependent on the ability of the governing to provide essential civil services to the governed. Additionally, restoring local governance processes is fundamental to conducting effective humanitarian relief efforts. Military forces may be tasked to:

   - Establish mechanisms for local-level participation;
   - Identify, secure, rehabilitate, and maintain basic facilities for local government officials;
   - Restore essential local public services; and
   - Provide resources to maintain essential local public services.

c. Military forces can assist transitional government by providing legal guidance and assistance to mitigate the impact of corruption that hinder efforts to establish governance, restore the rule of law, or institute economic recovery. The pervasiveness of corruption can undermine efforts to establish or reform governance institutions and processes. Military forces responding can:

   - Develop and disseminate ethical standards for civil services;
   - Ensure transparency in the dispersal of government resources;
   - Implement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation; and
   - Support witness protection programs.

d. The importance for state and local officials to conduct fair and secure elections is significant in establishing legitimate, effective governance. Military forces can assist civilian agencies and organizations conducting elections by providing support that enables broad participation by the local populace. Military forces can, in conjunction with local and HN officials, determine identification requirements for voter registration, establish or verify voter registry, and provide security at voting locations to ensure free and fair elections.

0111. ***Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development***. Sound economic policies are essential in promoting equitable, sustainable growth in any country and are considered the key to mitigating underlying tensions in society. Synchronizing efforts among the economic, governance, and security tasks decreases the chance of continued or renewed conflict. Building capacity within the economic sector of a country requires an integrated approach to achieve

sustainable growth. At the macro level of economic activities, civilian and HN organizations can make much progress through development mechanisms available to them, but may look to military forces for security and other types of assistance they cannot provide for themselves. Therefore, military forces must maintain an understanding of the economic sector, the impact of their activities on the economy – both regional and local – and the proper method to establish a stabilizing foundation that will support future sustainability and development. At the local level, military forces play a significant role in supporting economic stabilization and infrastructure development. The generation of employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through microeconomics, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure all form the building blocks for a broader national recovery. Military forces must understand the economic fundamentals of the local area such as key markets, revenue producers and price trends in order to gauge the impact of their activities on local economic activities. At the regional or national level, the focus is on comprehensive infrastructure improvements, such as rebuilding national power grids or roads and bridges. Intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the OECD help local and HN officials set sound economic policies while establishing conditions for long-term development and investment. There are a number of key attributes that support Economic and Infrastructure Development.

a. Support to Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation is dependent on an actively engaged labour force. The demand for local goods, services, and labour creates employment opportunities for the local populace. Local projects, such as restoring public services, rebuilding schools, or clearing roads, offer additional opportunities for the local labour pool. Military forces placing a demand for these types of services infuse cash into the local economy, which, in turn, stimulates market activities. This initial impetus can only be sustained through consistent capital availability and sustainable jobs programs. This targeted and intentional stimulus of the local economy sustains economic generation and enterprise creation. Meaningful employment and compensation for the local populace reinforces the military forces' efforts to establish security and civil order. Understanding local pay scales are critical in establishing job programs which compete with illicit actors for employing the local populace. HN enterprise creation is an essential activity whereby the local people organize themselves, their families, and neighbours. These job creation activities add to the sustainability of the economic enterprises created by the local populace that endure and flourish even when outside actors and facilitators depart the area. The availability of financing through banking or microfinance institutions is essential to enterprise creation.

b. Support for Monetary Institutions and Programs is dependent on military forces supporting the broad goals of maintaining stability of the currency and financial (banking) systems of the HN. Organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF can provide experts to establish or reform the central bank and provide crisis management of the currency and financial (banking) systems of the country. Mission success includes:

- Selecting a national currency;
- Working through the central bank to ensure the solvency of commercial financial institutions; and
- Balancing government expenditures and revenue.

c. Support to National Treasury Operations focuses on re-establishing the proper functioning of the ministry of finance. The military can assist in re-establishing the economic viability of the state by supporting the:

- Re-establishing of government payment mechanisms to fulfil recurrent and emergency expenditures;
- Establishing simple and reliable capacity to process, record, and report payments;
- Facilitating the assessment of revenue-generating activities for the national treasury;
- Identifying tax structure and sources of revenue; and
- Facilitating the establishment of basic audit functions to ensure officials use resources appropriately.

d. Support to Public Sector Investment Programs is provided by military forces in conjunction with government-sponsored development programs and initiatives. Public sector investments support the long-term viability of public education, health care, and mass transit. Additionally, these investments can assist development in industries such as mining, oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric. At the local level, military forces may encourage investment through grant programs or through direct public investment projects that stimulate public sector growth.

e. Support for Private Sector Development includes tasks that infuse much-needed cash into local markets that, in turn, initiate additional public investment and development. Local markets offer unique entrepreneurial opportunities as well as services that are vital to stimulating the economics of developing countries. Military forces can:

- Facilitate access to markets;
- Strengthen the private sector through contracting and outsourcing;
- Provide investors with protection and incentives; and
- Facilitate access to credit for legitimate banking and financial activity.

f. Protecting Natural Resources and the Environment is an activity closely associated with the requirement to secure and protect institutions of the state. Protecting natural resources helps preserve the long-term economic development and investment capacity of a fragile state. Military forces can assess and secure access to vital natural resources while assisting local and HN officials in preventing the illicit generation of revenues from natural resources exploitation.

g. Support for Agricultural Development Programs is a key activity of development agencies in establishing and institutionalizing practical solutions to the long-term growth of the agricultural sector. The agricultural sector is a key cornerstone in

establishing or re-establishing a viable market economy, providing crops and livestock vital to the local markets and international trade. Agricultural development activities may be hindered by property disputes, difficulty accessing nearby markets, poor irrigation systems, animal disease, minefields, or unexploded ordnance. Military forces can contribute to agricultural initiatives by:

- Securing and protecting post-harvest storage facilities;
- Rebuilding small-scale irrigation systems;
- Establishing work programs to support agricultural development;
- Protecting water sources;
- Establishing transportation and distribution networks;
- Channelling food aid to targeted segments of the populace to promote and stimulate market activity;
- Encouraging HN enterprise investments in providing goods and services to the agricultural sector; and
- Ensuring open transit and access to local markets.

h. Restoring Transportation Infrastructure is critical to economic recovery since underdeveloped or incapacitated transportation infrastructure limits freedom of movement, trade, social interaction, and development. Military forces are key enablers in initiating immediate improvement to the transportation and distribution networks of the HN. Military forces recognize the criticality of transportation and distribution networks in enabling freedom of manoeuvre, logistics support, and the movement of personnel and materiel to support on-going operations. Transportation infrastructure improvements assist humanitarian aid agencies and organizations in providing aid to those most at risk in fragile states. Military forces perform essential tasks such as:

- Assessing the overall condition of national transportation infrastructure (airports, bridges, railways, coastal and inland ports, harbours, and waterways), including facilities and equipment;
- Determining and prioritizing essential infrastructure programs and projects; and
- Conducting expedient repairs to damaged facilities, or building new facilities to promote commercial trade.

i. Restoring Telecommunications Infrastructure is essential in supporting a large number of entities within a HN. A failed telecommunications infrastructure accelerates the collapse of state institutions, isolates the state and populace from the outside world, and hampers development efforts. Military forces can assist in restoring telecommunication infrastructure by helping to determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects.

j. Supporting General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs are designed to rehabilitate the state's ability to produce and distribute fossil fuels, generate electrical power, exercise engineering and construction support, and provide municipal and other services to the populace. Capacity building projects are

essential in supporting HN rehabilitation efforts that establish the foundation for long-term development. Reconnaissance teams provide detailed information on infrastructure that the HN needs to help them prioritize their infrastructure programs and projects. In a fragile state, fuels, energy, engineering, and construction industries represent the difference between a primitive tribal state and a developing country that is able to support a functioning society. Military forces can help HN representatives in:

- Assessing the overall condition of national energy infrastructure;
- Determining and prioritizing essential infrastructure programs and projects;
- Assessing the conditions of existing power generation and natural resources conversion and distribution facilities;
- Assessing conditions of existing local, municipal facilities that provide essential services; and
- Conducting expedient repairs or building new facilities such as schools, medical clinics, and municipal buildings that support the local populace.

INFORMATION ENGAGEMENT TASKS

0112. ***Information Engagement***. Information engagement activities integrate all stabilization tasks that, in turn, compliment and reinforce the success of operations. This integration of information is critical in coordinating stabilization tasks between all actors helping HN recovery.

0113. ***Information Operation***. In conducting stabilization operations, military forces focus on gaining the cooperation and support of the populace. This is accomplished by shaping people's perceptions and persuading them that supporting these activities are in their best interest and will improve their safety, security and livelihood. Military forces perform tasks to:

- Identify or establish outlets for international, national, and local news media;
- Provide factual, accurate information to control rumours and disinformation;
- Issue effective press releases and prompt information being reported and communicated in local languages and dialects;
- Assist transitional civil and/or military authorities with public information programs;
- Synchronize messages provided to the media while ensuring that the messages are consistent with the actions taken;
- Tailor the information engagement strategy to the capability and capacity of the HN and the ability of the local populace to receive these messages; and
- Integrate cultural understanding with efforts to formulate an information engagement strategy.

STABILIZATION OBJECTIVES

0114. Stabilization involves a complex set of actions that may require external, joint military and civilian support that focuses on the legitimacy and capability of the state, and tangible benefits that establish or reinforce confidence in the HN's ability to provide for the basic needs

of its citizens through the political process. Stabilization is, therefore, a multi-agency, MN and complex set of tasks aimed at:

0115. ***Preventing or reducing violence***. This task requires understanding what actions and activities reinforce stability in nations while, on the other hand, understanding that these activities may promote instability under other circumstances. A realistic aim is to identify, manage and reduce, but not necessarily solve, underlying tensions around inequalities in the distribution of national services. The initial response by military forces may require the use of coercive force, the forceful pursuit and disarmament of hostile groups who refuse to take part in non-violent political process while taking into account political intervention by other nations.

0116. ***Protecting people and key institutions***. Where violence persists, a minimum precondition for stability is the provision of sufficient security so people can go about their daily lives without fear or intimidation, and for government agencies and organization to be able to provide basic services to their citizens.

0117. ***Promoting political processes to lead to greater stability***. An essential task in promoting stability in a failed, failing or fragile state is establishing or re-establishing political processes that encourage all parties and interest groups in the nation to peacefully contest for power and resources rather than resorting to violence and/or criminal behaviour.

0118. ***Preparing for longer term, non-violent politics and development activities***. In a broad set of scenarios, stabilization requires external involvement by outside nations, organizations, and/or institutions that can compensate for the weakness of domestic institutions and political processes. 'External' often means actors from outside the country or region; but it could also mean actors external to a particular region or part of a state, such as central government intervention in local areas to counter violence or lawlessness. While the activities of outside actors are essential to stabilise the situation, they cannot impose a political settlement or generate long-term confidence in the state among the local citizens. Only domestic officials and actors can achieve the long-term level of confidence over an extended period that leads to a stable, functioning nation. Additionally, there is a risk associated with thinking of stabilization activities as a linear logical process that progresses smoothly to a hoped for end state. In reality, stabilization activities reflect a myriad of interrelated actions conducted across diverse and sometimes disjointed stability activities. Due to this complexity there is no precise pre-determined period of time for completing stabilization operations. It is generally understood that stabilization operations are time consuming in nature and are normally accomplished incrementally over a number of years.

LEGITIMACY

0119. ***Central Principle for Nations or Alliances***. For actors involved in stabilization operations, legitimacy is a multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of their activities. Legitimacy is a central principle for nations or alliances approving operations to intervene into other nations. The legitimacy of a mission is predicated upon four distinct factors: mandate, manner, consent and expectations.

a. The mandate or authority that establishes an intervention mission often determines the initial perceptions of legitimacy especially among the local populace. Multinational missions with the broad approval of the international community (i.e., conducted by a coalition under a UN mandate) have a higher degree of legitimacy than unilateral missions.

b. The professional manner in which intervening military forces conduct themselves and their stabilization operations is critical. Highly trained, well-disciplined, and culturally aware professional forces strengthen their legitimacy by consistently performing their mission in accordance with the tenets and standards of international law.

c. Consent is essential to the legitimacy of a mission and, normally, no intervention is considered legitimate without the consent of the HN being assisted or through an internationally recognized mandate. The only situation where HN consent is not necessary is an intervention conducted to depose a regime/government that significantly threatens nations or the international community's security or intentionally creates conditions that cause humanitarian crises. For these missions to be perceived as legitimate there must be approval from the broad international community.

d. Expectations for stabilization operations in terms of goals, time and resources, must be realistic, consistent, and achievable. Well formulated expectations help ensure the legitimacy of a mission of indeterminate duration. Poorly designed or unrealistic expectations eventually sap the will of HN officials, the international community, and the citizens of the HN. Without the sustained will of the people, the legitimacy of stabilization operations will atrophy and the stabilization mission will fail.

0120. ***Facets of Legitimacy***. The legitimacy of government has many facets and is central to building trust and confidence among the people. It is derived from the legal framework that governs the state and the source of that authority. It reflects not only the supremacy of the law, but also the foundation upon which the law was developed: the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed. Therefore, the legitimacy of a nation is reflected or measured by the perceptions of several groups of actors: the citizens of the nation, individuals serving within the civil institutions and/or governmental agencies and organizations of the nation; neighbouring or regional states or actors, the international community, the UN as well as non-traditional actors. Generally speaking, a legitimate government:

a. Respects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms associated with freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association;

b. Responds to their citizens, submits to the will of the people when they vote for change in their government;

c. Maintains order within their own borders, protects independent and impartial systems of justice, punishes crime, embraces the rule of law, and resists corruption; and

d. Protects the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent businesses, and a market economy.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF STABILIZATION

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND STATE FAILURE

0121. The International System recognises the nation state as the central entity through which international relations and comparative politics are enacted. Although state roles and actions between states are defined and governed by an amalgam of international law, alliances and accepted norms, when elements of individual states begin to fail, (defined by the state's ability to provide security, representation and welfare to its citizens) international consensus, historical relationships and an assessment of national impacts will determine whether intervention by external actors is warranted or justified.

0122. The role of the UN is pivotal in analyzing events occurring in failing or failed state and determining the need for and legitimacy of external actors, including military forces, intervening to stabilize the nation based on the deteriorated political, economic, humanitarian conditions noted. Stabilization is the detailed process by which the legitimacy of failing states can be re-established through rebuilding their internal instruments so they are accepted both internationally and internally by their own people. Natural disaster can also precipitate state failure; however, such occurrences do not always result in widespread violence and thus enjoy a benign environment for reconstruction tasks to take place.

0123. Stabilization activities will most likely occur when the failure of a state has reduced or removed the state's ability to provide a secure environment for its citizens which precludes it from performing the legitimate functions of state and providing expected services to its citizens. In practice, the solutions to such problems require comprehensive activities spanning diplomatic, military, legal and economic spheres that fall outside the conventional reasons for employing military forces.

0124. Broadly speaking, stabilization is achieved when there is sufficient political agreement between the state and previously violent groups; so negotiations and activities can take place within an acceptable framework without the threat of violence. Obviously, the security environment dictates how permissible reconstruction activities will take place. It should be noted that NGO and humanitarian agencies will try to gain a foothold to deliver aid even in the most hostile environments. Figure 1 and Table 1 below give a first order model for the role of the military.

Offensive Activities	Defensive Activities	Stability Activities
		Security and Control Support to SSR Support to DDR Initial Restoration of Services Interim Governance Tasks
← Information Operations Activity Areas & Public Affairs →		

Figure 1: Role of Military Forces in Stabilization.

Examples of Military Tasks within Stability Activities	
Security and Control Patrolling Separation of Hostile Forces Cease fire lines Buffer zones Demarcation lines Interposition Route Control Convoy escort Curfew Crowd Control Observation Monitoring Cordon and Search Guarding Surveillance Protection of: persons, organisations, properties, minorities, borders, areas Enforcement of Restricted Areas Establishment and maintaining protected areas Control of the movement of populations; refugees, displaced persons. Evacuation of threatened persons	**Support to SSR** Disarmament of security forces, militias and / or illegally armed groups Weapons collecting and accounting Weapons destruction Protection, escort and transportation of demobilized personnel Assistance in selection for a new security service Selection and recruitment of future security force personnel Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure Training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility to indigenous military and, in short term, other security forces such as police and border guards
Support to Initial Restoration of Interim Governance Support border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement Support Identification Programs Support Establishment of Public Order and Safety Fostering Sustainability Clear Unexploded Ordnance Support Establishment of Civil Control Support Establishment of Interim Criminal Justice System Support to SSR Support Judicial Reform Support Property Dispute Resolution Processes Support Legal System Reform Support Human Rights Initiatives Support Corrections Reform Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals Support Public Outreach and Community Rebuilding Programs Support Transitional Administrations Support Establishment and Development of Local Governance	**Support to Initial Restoration of Services** Support Anti-Corruption Initiatives Support Elections Support Restoration of Essential Civil Services Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs Support Shelter and Non-Food Relief Programs Support Humanitarian De-mining Support Public Health Programs Support Education Programs Support Economic Generation Support Public Sector Investment Programs Support Private Sector Development Support Agricultural Development Programs Support Restoration of Transportation Infrastructure Support Restoration of Telecommunications Infrastructure Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs
Support to DDR – Military Tasks Security Information Gathering & Reporting Public Information & Sensitization Program Monitoring & Reporting Specialized Weapon & Ammunition Expertise Logistic Support	
← **Information Operations Activity Areas & Public Affairs** →	

Table 1: Examples of Military Tasks within Stability Activities.

THE CAUSES OF INSTABILITY

0125. There is no single definition of instability. Describing a country or a region as unstable suggests the presence of political, economic, or social upheaval. Instability can be manifested in a variety of activities such as: coups of state, other types of illegal or unpredictable political succession; the breakdown of political, economic, and social institutions; systemic corruption; widespread organised crime; loss of territorial control; economic crisis; large-scale public unrest; involuntary mass population displacement; violent internal or international conflict; or natural or man-made disasters.

0126. Political transition and rapid economic development are two factors that can increase the risks of instability. These risks often arise from political mismanagement or manipulation, especially where domestic institutions that manage change are weak. Strong, authoritarian states that lack domestic and international legitimacy face risks of instability, as their transition from authoritarian rule is often fraught with difficulties. If discontent expressed by disgruntled groups is suppressed, the risk of instability is likely to increase over time as the groups become more frustrated with the lack of a government response. Furthermore, there are varying degrees of instability that can be manifested across countries and within countries and regions over time. A country's capacity to manage effectively and peacefully discontented groups and other threats and adapt to their changing environment is at the center of its ability to maintain stability and the rule of law. However, addressing other instability factors – including structural risks – such as poverty and economic decline, natural resource dependence, and a bad regional neighbourhood – as well as external stabilizers – such as security guarantees and strong political associations – is also critical to fostering stability. Understanding the causes and dynamics of instability, therefore, involves looking at the interaction of three sets of factors (as shown in Figure 2 below):



Figure 2: Factors Affecting Stability.

0127. In situations where a country's internal capacity is weak, where many drivers of instability are present, and where few external stabilizers exist, the country runs a high risk of instability following a crisis. This can be manifested as any combination of factors such as: economic decline, political instability, violence, lack of territorial control, or at the extreme, as a failed state and/or major humanitarian disaster. These symptoms of instability exacerbate underlying risk factors, causing a country to be more prone to future crises. Shocks to this unbalanced system can also tip a country into crisis.

SPECTRUM OF INSTABILITY

0128. Stabilization operations may be launched without a pre-existing peace agreement depending on the level of violence noted in the failed or failing state as well as the threat posed to other states in the region. Military forces support intervention activities. External armed forces may deploy in an enforcement role even in the absence of a peace deal, in order to promote the authority of a weak or contested state against an insurgency or separatist movement. For crises with increased risk and complexity, a higher level of military commitment is needed to respond to the crisis. A key challenge in the higher threat environments is to find opportunities where a secure environment can be developed and then gradually expanded outward.

PHASES OF A CRISIS

0129. Figure 3 outlines the five phases nominally followed in responding to the full spectrum of state failures as recognized by MIC member nations. The most desirable time to respond is during the Prevention phase so the crisis does not have the opportunity to escalate to a later phase that involves significantly greater risk and expenditure of resources by responding nations. Nevertheless, major military contributions to stabilization occur in the prevention, intervention, and stabilization phases.



Figure 3: Evolution of Military and Civilian Contributions.

CLOSE CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION

0130. The need for collaborative planning, integration, coordination and cooperation between military forces and civilian organizations in planning for and supporting stabilization operations is clearly understood. Genuine unity of effort requires civilian and military planners who clearly understand one another's organisational cultures. The momentum established by the military's involvement in operations makes it essential that the military's role in the overall strategy be well understood by their civilian counterparts. Military organizations should, therefore, be flexible and interoperable as much as possible with existing civilian planning systems, or lack thereof. Civilian organizations should also be flexible and synchronize their planning approaches to support other organizations' planning approaches. All actors should adopt a long-term planning strategy that acknowledges that outcomes of their stabilization efforts will take months and years to accomplish.

STABILIZATION CONTEXT AND PRINCIPLES

0131. ***Stabilization operations, humanitarian and development activities are different***. Humanitarian, development, and stabilization activities often operate within the same theatre or HN but operate under different objectives and principles:

- Stabilization operations are explicitly political in focus and execution;

- Humanitarian assistance is strictly neutral and focuses on providing assistance to alleviate a humanitarian crisis; and
- Development activities tend to focus on rebuilding social and economic systems and infrastructure.

0132. ***Stabilization requires external intervention but internal settlement***. External intervention is often necessary to compensate for the weakness of domestic institutions and political processes. Long-term stability, however, can only be achieved with the direct involvement and consent of local political actors. "External" normally refers to intervention by actors from outside the country, though external intervention can simply refer to actors from outside the surrounding region or part of the state in crisis.

0133. ***Stabilization requires an integrated military and civilian strategy***. Stopping violence requires leadership from (and of) the diplomatic and development communities to support political processes and help the state fulfil its functions. Military forces are often required to intervene because armed violence precludes the conduct of humanitarian, development, and peace building efforts. Stabilization usually requires significant military contribution (often from UN-mandated forces rather than single nations or coalitions) to provide the essential security required to allow non-military actors to operate.

0134. ***Stabilization and counter-insurgency***. Insurgency is often the root cause of instability. Counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine recognises the political and economic basis for an insurgency that can be the foundation for its popular support. COIN operations focus on those political and economic areas of discontent, as well as the use of military force to end an insurgency. Since there are many drivers and complex reason for instability in a nation, effective counter-insurgency operations do not always lead to stability within the nation.

0135. ***Stabilization involves peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations***. Although these operations normally form the military platform for stabilization operations, operations are not always conducted in an integrated fashion between military, development, humanitarian, and diplomatic actors. The UN uses the term "multidimensional peacekeeping" that recognises the importance of integrated operations between the military, development, humanitarian, and diplomatic actors.

0136. ***Stabilization aims for a non-violent political settlement***. Although force is often used in stabilization operations to provide security, the aim of stabilization operations is a non-violent political settlement or interim solution that leads to a cessation of hostilities. Every actor in a stabilization operation should be working to achieve a non-violent political settlement.

0137. ***Stabilization involves state-building in acute situations***. The "exit plan" for stabilization is normally based on the state being able to provide the basic functions of governance (particularly security) that is essential for long-term stability. Stability is achieved through political settlement that allows the state to govern and function in providing for the needs of its citizens.

0138. ***Stabilization is a long and uncertain process***. Stabilization is not a linear process, though a sense of vision and direction is important to the development and implementation of

any long-term stabilization strategy. Instead, stabilization often involves iterative movement through the progressive stages of stability, involving setbacks and distractions. Stabilization operations are complex with no pre-determined timelines for completion. Some operations may require active military forces involvement in peace building operations for many years before stability is attained.

0139. ***Stabilization requires security.*** Failure to achieve a secure environment will hamper the development of adequate governance, development, and humanitarian work, vital to stabilization. Civilian agencies and organisations involved in stabilization operations need to recognise that, initially at least, the military might be the only actors capable of operating within an area due to the nature of the conflict.

0140. ***Humanitarian or stabilization projects.*** There is often a dilemma when apolitical humanitarian activities are occurring along with stabilization activities that have explicitly political aims. The apolitical and independent nature of humanitarian agencies has generally enabled them to work amid conflict unhindered by other stabilization or developmental activities. Stabilization operations involving counter-insurgency activities can lead to the perception among insurgents and the general population that all development and assistance-type activities managed by international organizations and agencies are political in scope. Additionally, foreign military forces' protection of humanitarian workers can seriously compromise these workers' claims of independence, which, in turn, can make them vulnerable to be attacked by insurgents. Where stabilization and humanitarian activities are operating in proximity to one another, the risks associated with these operations must be mitigated.

0141. ***The need for a Comprehensive Approach***. Stabilization operations require all actors involved – whether their perspective is defense, politics, humanitarian assistance, or development – to adopt a comprehensive approach. This means actors must compromise, understand, persevere, and recognise that the other communities involved in operations have different underlying objectives, operating cultures, and expectations about outcomes and the timelines for successfully completing their activities. Some key insights on operations are summarised below.

a. ***Political, military, humanitarian, and economic recovery activities must support each other***. Plans will not work if they are not coordinated and contain untested assumptions about how other actors and organizations will operate and what they aim to achieve in relation to local processes.

b. ***Understand the specifics of the situation and don't make assumptions.*** It is important that external actors when intervening must understand the complexities of the local environment and anticipate that their plans may not work as expected. Additionally, external actors should not assume that other actors, including the local population, agrees they have the authority to intervene or that they will be popular with people they are trying to help. It is crucial to understand the operation environment: the culture, power relationships, vested interests, economic relations, values, gender relations, motivation, and underlying causes of conflict. It is important that external actors do not impose their culture (including interpretations, expectations, and behaviours) on others. External actors should not assume that

communities and the public want a particular approach or means of delivering services. It is important to use the local mechanisms that are working and trusted by the people in providing assistance, and to identify what problems people see as needing to be addressed. Actors must understand the incentives and disincentives that influence the way people act and respond to external assistance programs and initiatives.

c. ***Have a clear goal based on local processes and work closely with others.*** The starting point for external actors in planning their operations is to understand how local and national actors interact to achieve a political consensus and settle disputes. All external activity should be structured to operate in this political environment. External intervention activities should clearly articulate the settlements and programs they are targeted to support. Operations should have a single strategic aim, which all actors can support and dedicate their efforts to accomplishing.

d. ***Be patient and realistic about time and money.*** Experience has shown that stability can take many years to several decades to achieve. In many cases, depending on the level of instability, a military presence may be required for at least a decade. A realistic game plan for sustaining stabilization operations is required from the outset in order to manage expectations and to provide a clear set of objectives. Plans have to strike a balance between addressing short-term needs and addressing the medium-to-long term needs of the failing or failed state. Nations involved in stabilization operations must be committed to providing substantial resources and investments to support the operations that include political capital, money, time, and sometimes lives. Actors should rapidly resource stabilization operations, and be prepared to follow up short-term military successes that establish a secure environment with additional stability tasks.

e. ***Work with what is there and use local knowledge for risk analysis.*** Wherever possible, actors should work within existing structures and systems that includes civil society and informal social structures, and to support the operations of these local structure and systems. It is time consuming and expensive to establish new structure and systems that may not fit with local methods of conducting these activities. International actors should work with national and local political and administrative institutions in planning and conducting stabilization operations. Knowing the local environment is important in understanding which local institutions have real constituency support and can effectively help conduct stabilization activities and those institutions that are only nominally supported by the local populace and would be less effective in supporting stabilization activities.

f. ***Continually assess operations to ensure objectives are being met and to check for unintended consequences based on potentially risky assumptions.*** These assessments are important to respond to activities that are ineffective in order to modify portions of the strategy to be responsive to changes in the operating environment. Unintended consequences can set back plans and operations, so it is prudent to invest time in risk analysis based on a renewed understanding of the local

political environment. Rural communities, women, youth, and marginalized groups such as refugee populations are excellent source in understanding what the local society really needs for stabilization operations to be effective and how you can make sure your planning and operational objectives are aligned with those of the affected population.

g. ***Learn and adapt***. Few plans, however well formed, remain relevant in a fast paced dynamic environment such as stability operations and, therefore, need to be reviewed and amended frequently. External actors will learn as they go along and adapt their plans while local politics can adapt to a changing environment more quickly. Strategies should be based on broad principles that support rapid adjustments as the situations mandate. Plans and decision-making structures need to be agile and be able to adapt to a dynamic, unstable operating environment.

h. ***Be prepared to talk to unpalatable political groups and "spoilers"***. The political process might necessitate talking to members of groups that are politically undesirable. "Spoilers" –those who are undermining stabilization activities and pose a potential threat to stability operations – need to be dealt with directly and effectively in order to mitigate their influence on the HN. This engagement might be conducted militarily or through political or economic negotiations. Experience shows that spoilers are often open to reconciliation; however, a clear appreciation and understanding of their motivations is needed since today's spoilers may be tomorrow's leaders. The instability problems associated with spoilers and other fringe groups are unlikely to go away until longer-term stability solutions are completed. Therefore, persistence and consistence in addressing these actors is warranted.

ASSESSING, MEASURING AND ANTICIPATING

ASSESSING NATIONAL AND COALITION INTERESTS

0142. Before intervention – what is the national imperative? Before any coalition action is initiated, each nation will conduct its own national risk-benefit analysis. The starting point will be assessing what interests the nation has and its legal and political mandate. In some countries a wide range of interests such as development activities, regional interests, terrorism, migration, strategic military and economic interests, and historical links may compel their involvement. Nations views on events will inevitably be different and the need to determine common ground through information sharing and collaboration early in the process will be key to successful operation. Even within countries, interests may be much stronger for some departments than for others. Nations will need to coordinate and address their national interests, share their assessments and determine what they have in common as the first important step towards integrated planning.

0143. Success depends on working with others. The effectiveness of stability planning and strategy depends on how well they support each country's own political plans, and how they support plans drafted by international and/or multinational organizations (from the UN, NATO,

EU, and coalition partners). Because a unilateral approach is unlikely to be successful in responding to a crisis situation, a comprehensive international response is desired.

UNDERSTANDING THE TERRITORY AND ASSESSING THE CONFLICT

0144. Every situation is different: planning is impossible without assessment. External stabilization interventions are initiated to address a multitude of instability issues in a failed or failing state associated with social, political, tribal, and economic issues. In order to properly address the situation, an assessment of all aspects of the HN is imperative to understanding how to assist the problems noted. A sound assessment gives nations a basis on which to plan their operations nationally and in conjunction with other nations. Since every crisis situation is potentially different, plans and strategies must be designed to address specific instances of instability. Responses need to be based on a clear understanding of the causes and dimensions of instability as well as on the challenges to be addressed related to a broad range of activities that are: operational, organisational, institutional, social, economic, and political in nature.

0145. Military commanders, senior civilian leaders, and their staffs along with other actors continually assess current operations, gauging progress against the desired end state for the operations and activities they are conducting. Based on these assessments, senior leaders direct adjustments as required, ensuring that the operation remains focused toward establishing the conditions that represent the end state. Assessment is a critical activity intended to inform situational understanding. It provides a continuous comparison of the actual operational conditions to the forecasted conditions contained in the concept of operations, mission and commander's intent of the operations order/plan. Assessment involves three discrete tasks.

- Gauging the strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of enemies and adversaries;
- Monitoring the situation while measuring the progress of the operation against the desired end state; and
- Evaluating the progress of the operation against the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

Map the underlying causes of conflict	Include political, security, social, and economic causes at all levels: local, national, regional, and international. Separate symptoms from causes and consider issues that cut across several areas (e.g. human rights, gender, environment, HIV/AIDS). Recognise how the conflict affects different groups depending on age, gender, social grouping, and religion. Also look at how these factors affect the conflict.
Map the actors	Who are the main parties in the conflict? Who is involved, directly or indirectly? Understand their interests, relationships, capacities, agendas, and incentives. By intervening, the donor nation itself becomes one more interested party and its role should be considered.

Map the institutions	What institutions (organisations, legal and political frameworks, formal or informal structures) exist to deal with conflict and mediate interests? Are any of these working? What are the pressures on them? From where? What is there to build on? Are there other institutions that could be used for stabilization (e.g. line ministries, NGOs – particularly women's organisations)?
Catalogue previous and current responses to the instability	What responses have there been by local people, by the government, by neighbouring countries, and by the international community? What affect did these responses have? Listing them helps to avoid repeating past mistakes and points to approaches that may have more success.
Wargame future scenarios	This will help to identify the different ways in which events may unfold and possible responses, allowing you to identify risks, mechanisms for monitoring trends, and understand better the resources required to make a difference. Identify what type of peace is possible or desirable, as well as a likely timeframe for achieving it.
Identify priorities for Stabilization Planning	When doing this, note the possible risk of worsening the conflict and be practical in addressing the security situation, access, and logistical issues.

Table 2: Example Assessment Process.

MEASUREMENT TOOLS

0146. Three measurement tools are normally used in the assessment process: measure of performance (MOP), measure of effectiveness (MOE), and indicators.

a. MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs are normally items on a checklist to track task completion. Examples of MOP include tasks such as construction of a training facility for HN security forces or increased border presence by friendly forces.

b. MOE is a criterion used to access change in system behaviour, capability, or operational environment that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOEs are focused on the results or consequences of task execution and provide information that guides decisions to take additional or alternate actions. Examples of measures of effectiveness include reduced insurgent activity, reduced inflation rates, and improvements in agricultural production.

c. An indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance and may inform multiple measures of

performance or measures of effectiveness. Indicators are measurable, collectible, and relevant to a specific time. Examples of indicators include bushels of apples sold in a specific market in the past month, number of escalation of force incidents along a given route in the past 90 days, or number of bridges repaired in the province.

0147. Stabilization operations normally are long-term in duration so progress must be gauged over the course of months or years. Responsiveness is an important consideration in selecting measurement tools for assessing operations and is defined as the speed at which a desired change can be detected by a measurement tool.

0148. Continuous assessment provides a constant flow of vital information on current operations that allows the commander and his staff to quickly act on unanticipated changes, take prudent risks, and create opportunities for future success.

0149. Examples of likely MOEs and means of data collection may include:

- Normality Indicators. Analysis of normality indicators provides a systematic measure of the progress towards normality by assessing key economic indicators.
- Patrol Reports. Observations and interviews carried out by routine dismounted patrols can be used to indicate trends in tension.
- Opinion Polling. The use of professional pollsters can provide statistical analysis of public opinion on key issues.
- Contacts Analysis. Records of incidents and attacks can be used to assess threat activity and trends.

0150. Table 3 suggests MOEs for use by those in command of a Military SSR. These MOEs are suggested to help begin the process of developing appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators in conjunction with national government and civil society. They are intended to capture changes in the context resulting from SSR activity. There are strong linkages between SSR, DDR, and reconstruction activities.

Activity	**Suggested MOEs**	**Suggested indicators/data sources**
Security	Changes in humanitarian security	Attacks on humanitarian workers (Source: ANSO) Humanitarian access
	Changes in overall security environment	Swiss peace FAST Reports
	Inter-militia intervention rate	Percentage of known inter-militia disputes in which security forces intervened
	Inter-militia mediation success rate	Percentage of inter-militia disputes (in which Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) intervened) that were successfully mediated/resolved
	Reduction in levels of lawlessness/banditry	Reported incidents of banditry
	People's ambient security expectations (including in returnee areas)	Surveys of public opinion on perceptions of security (should not be undertaken by military)

Activity	Suggested MOEs	Suggested indicators/data sources
	Number of police personnel/trainees that can be supported by Reconstruction Team (RT)	Number of police personnel
	Increased acceptance of military's mission	Views expressed by local community members of military's mission and role (interviews should not be undertaken by military)
	Improved co-operation between military and local population	Number of engagements by local community representatives with military in liaison capacity
	Force protection	Security intelligence on RTs provided directly by members of the local community
Reconstruction	Support to road network construction	Km road/year (with reference to any government targets). Use of roads
	Local employment in RT- funded reconstruction projects	Number of workers (full/part-time) Employee salaries compared to local salaries
	Component of reconstruction needs addressed by RT activities	Comparison of needs and RT activities
	Construction of facilities directly or under contract from RT to support deployment of police (e.g. police stations)	New/refurbished facilities (possibly measured by square metre) constructed by RT in province
DDR	Effective control of the flow of weapons inside the theatre of operations	Percentage of weapons and ammunitions collected
	Accurate estimation of the amount of weapons and ammunitions existing in the theatre of operations	Percentage of weapons and ammunitions collected
	Accurate estimation of the number of combatants and groups of combatants	Percentage of groups of combatant and/or combatants agreeing to get involved in the process; Percentage of ex-combatants involved in the DDR process improving overall security
Support to central government	Relative authority of central government in RT catchment area	Qualitative data: who collects 'taxes'/customs duties? Who provides security?
	Physical infrastructure available to support	Offices are staffed and functioning
	Support by RT to local government councils	Number of functioning local government bodies supported by RT
Relief Operations	Note: focuses only on delivery of relief supplies in areas where Non-governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHA) are unable to operate, or 'exceptional circumstances'	
	Relief delivered in specific sectors, according to verified need (e.g. health; food and nutrition; water and sanitation; and education sectors)	Sphere standards and indicators

Table 3: Example Measures of Effectiveness.

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT POLITICS

0151. ***Overview***. Stabilization is about helping to change incentives for groups contesting power, so that they do so peacefully (or not at all). The military is never a neutral player in a local context and will never be perceived as such. However large or small its presence, the military is one of many political actors and sources of influence. Therefore, in addition to analysing the conflict, a planner must have a very good idea of the dynamics of the environment as well as the forces that will emerge when the situation changes and how the military's presence will affect them.

0152. ***Understanding interest groups***. For each interest group, a planner needs to understand in detail: what the group needs to survive and prosper; why the group might (or might not) be more interested in peace than violence; what really influences the way its decisions are made; what room for manoeuvre the group has based on its sources of power; why it would or would not accept the right of a particular group to represent the state; and what influence the military may have on the group.

0153. ***Analysis of these interest groups must not include only formal authorities***. A host of interest groups that have real power may exercise traditional, illicit, or economic means to compete for influence and power alongside or in-place of statutory authorities. These interest groups may include groups that the military and/or civilian leaders find politically unpalatable or difficult to understand or negotiate with, or whose authority is derived from tribal or ideological allegiance. Interest groups may also include other influence groups such as market women's organisations or youth societies.

0154. ***Possible actors' classifications***. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is developing an approach to analysing "illicit power structures". These are non-state actors that challenge, within a certain area, the state's core function of monopolising the legitimate use of physical force. This approach examines powerful groups through five "prisms":

- Worldview. The way the group's leaders see the world, the way they want it to be, and their organisation's place in it. Some groups' world view and associated interests can be reconciled with the rule-based systems of states, while other groups challenge the basic premises of those systems.
- Motivations. Greed may be the defining motivation of some interest groups. For others it may be based on: political or economic grievances (need), and belief and identity (creed). Additionally, depending on the group, different levels of leadership within the group may be motivated by different things. There may be different motivations for the top leadership, mid-level commanders, rank-and-file members, and sympathizers.
- Methods. Groups may exert power by using a variety of methods that include violence, ideology, bribery, or the offering of economic rewards or incentives.
- Structure. Groups are normally organized in a hierarchical structure (with top-down leadership and decision-making) or networked (loosely structured with multiple leaders).
- Resources. Interest groups derive their financial support from a wide variety of sources depending on the constituencies they represent. Sources of revenue or

financial support include: state sponsor, the exploitation of natural resources, or criminal activities.

WARGAMING

0155. Anticipating scenarios through wargaming is a technique for thinking creatively about possible futures so that commanders and staff members do not just plan for the best case. Wargaming helps devise plans that are flexible, appropriate to the various possible futures, and resilient to risks.

0156. Wargaming can help analyse:

- How to monitor trends and triggers that will influence instability.
- Accessing the impact these events or changes will have on the situation.
- Whether and how the donor countries or others can influence these events.
- What we would do in various scenarios.

SUMMARY

0157. Part One discussed the complex environment in which stabilization operations are conducted and addressed the key factors governing stabilization operations in fragile states. It contains in-depth narrative addressing the primary stabilization tasks: establishing security, restoring essential services, establishing civil control, supporting governance and participation, and supporting economic and infrastructure development. These stabilization tasks are supported by four stabilization objectives performed by military forces that operate in conjunction with other governmental departments, the HN, and IOs: prevent or reduce violence, protect people and key institutions, promote political processes that lead to greater stability, and prepare for longer term, non-violent politics and development activities. The importance of legitimacy was addressed along with stabilization tasks that are normally performed by military forces. These tasks include: security and control, support to initial restoration of interim governance, support for SSR, support to initial restore essential services and support for DDR.

0158. The next three parts of the handbook will address in detail three important stabilization operations programs that address lawless conditions in a fragile state and provide a framework for restoring the rule of law and effective HN governance. Those key stabilization programs are:

- SSR.
- DDR.
- Reconstruction Efforts.

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PART TWO – SECURITY SECTOR (OR SYSTEM) REFORM (SSR)

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

0201. Security as a condition is broadly referenced. Security conditions are categorised in terms of "state security" and "human security." State security is an outcome of the apparatus applied by a legitimate control, whereas human security is a term used to describe a condition in which fundamental human needs are able to be met.[7] Security is viewed as fundamental to long-term stability and development. A wide range of state institutions and other entities are generally responsible for ensuring some aspect of security.

SSR ASPECTS

0202. This part aims to identify best practice for SSR within a CA that could assist coalition military operational planners. The following aspects are considered:

- Define the Security System and what is meant by SSR.
- The broad principles and process of SSR, including roles of the military and other actors.
- Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), both to judge when to initiate SSR and how to monitor performance.
- Current best practice in relation to SSR.

SSR DEFINITION

0203. SSR is defined as "The reform of security institutions to enable them to play an effective legitimate and accountable role of providing external and internal security for their citizens under the control of a legitimate state authority and to promote stability."[8] The OECD identifies the following basic elements of SSR:[9]

- Civil Governance oversight and accountability;
- Defense reform;
- Police reform;
- Intelligence reform;
- Judicial reform; and
- Prison reform.

[7] This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and used by development actors.
[8] UK Joint Doctrine Note 3/07 – Security Sector Reform.
[9] DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform – Supporting Security and Justice, OECD, 2007.

AIM

0204. SSR aims to develop a security environment based on development, rule of law, good governance, and local ownership of security actors. The concept of SSR is holistic in its approach to the security sector and includes all the relevant actors and instruments in the process of transforming a dysfunctional security sector or establishing a new one. This includes not only the state's security services (armed forces, police, border, custom, corrections, justice, etc), but also non-state actors, other armed groups, as well as the civil society. In this respect, the respective context, structures, and approaches in countries have differing implications for the application of SSR. As such, SSR programmes have to be tailored to address the local environment.

RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNANCE

0205. The focus of military SSR has shifted from "training and equipping" to providing capacity and governance of the security system.[10] SSR is not only about integrating relevant security branches, but also linking measures aimed at increasing efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of security forces to overriding concerns of legitimate governance. SSR-related activities must always be aimed at improving the governance of the security sector and ensuring reform linkages across the system. The security infrastructure must have delineated responsibility, accountability, oversight, and controls for each instrument. The formation of an effective security sector is vital to the long-term stability and growth in the economic and governance areas of a state and has consequences beyond its immediate borders.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

0206. Within the context of SSR, the OECD identifies the following four objectives:

- Establishment of effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security system.
- Improved delivery of security and justice services.
- Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process.
- Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.

POTENTIAL MILITARY TASKS

0207. *Context*. The requirement to conduct SSR might occur at any phase of the crisis. Two broad characteristics may be encountered as follows:

a. ***Requested or Non-Requested Assistance***. SSR may be initiated following a diplomatic request for assistance from a country in crisis or following a resolution by the UN for example. Whether requested or not, some form of legitimacy is necessary to achieve successful results.

[10] US CSRS SSR Workshop Out brief, p 9.

b. ***Permissive or Non-permissive Environments***. Depending upon the level of violence and security, SSR activities will have a greater or lesser degree of freedom to conduct their reform. The prioritization of the task will also vary depending on the environment. Each act of assistance needs to be carefully matched to local conditions:

- In a permissive environment the focus is likely to be the reform of existing security institutions and specific capability strengthening initiatives, such as improving indigenous counter-terrorist capabilities and airport security, or providing intelligence training and police investigative skills.
- The non-permissive environment represents the most demanding situation which will occur when armed hostilities are ongoing with security actors and/or national contributions of combat and reconstruction elements. As the situation allows, the military should concentrate on creating the necessary conditions for security to facilitate the overall conduct of security sector reform and focus its efforts on establishing and training indigenous armed forces.

0208. SSR includes measures aimed at strengthening civilian management and oversight, democratic accountability, and affordability of the security apparatus. It is imperative to link each area of engagement because efforts will not succeed unless complementary work is carried out in other areas. In post-conflict peace building, SSR is confronted with a unique set of challenges that are distinguished from the other contexts. Supporting SSR activities in post-conflict situations are:

- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, including child and female soldiers;
- Combating Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW);
- Transitional Justice;
- Strengthening the rule of law;
- De-mining; and
- Countering human, weapon, and drug trafficking.

0209. ***SSR activities***. All SSR activities should be integrated into a comprehensive SSR program. For example, combating SALW has little effect until security institutions establish rule of law. Only by integrating all instruments and combining them with democratic oversight can SSR initiatives influence the security situation and prevent the region from a flare up of the armed conflict.

0210. ***DDR***. The formal disbanding of military and paramilitary combatants that present a threat to state and human security is the start of a process that only concludes successfully when ex-combatants have been effectively reintegrated into society (and potentially into the reformed security system). DDR is covered in Part 4.

0211. ***Combating SALW***. The presence of small arms and light weapons poses a significant threat to security. Efforts to deal with the problems of the destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms should be situated squarely in the context of efforts to

defuse the tensions that encourage the acquisition and use of these weapons. In an SSR context, the restoration of effective mechanisms to maintain public security and an appropriate regulation framework for small arms represents the best long-term response, as can increased state capacity to monitor, check, and prevent illegal arms transfers, and to collect and destroy surplus weapons.

0212. ***Transitional justice***. Interim justice mechanisms may be used during a transition from crisis to the Normalization Phase to address issues related to the large numbers of offenders and victims that may threaten long-term peace and stability. This is particularly important in post-conflict countries where perpetrators who have participated in human rights violations may remain in a community with impunity due to insufficient capacity of judicial or security institutions. Important attributes of transitional justice systems include integrity and accountability which contribute to the legitimacy of the justice system. Transitional justice mechanisms contribute to increased confidence building in the political environment and the possibility for subsequent security system reform and peace building.

0213. ***Strengthening the rule of law***. Close cooperation between police and military elements is important in post-conflict peace-building to identify and counter illegitimate security actors.

0214. ***De-mining***. In certain environments, de-mining operations absorb considerable effort in order to protect the population in the first instance and thereafter to remove weaponry from circulation where it could be re-used in IED attacks.

0215. ***Counter-trafficking operations***. Trafficking operations provide an income stream for actors working to establish private power bases and impact on the perceived and real ability of intervening forces to establish a safe and functional democratic society. Trafficking has destabilising effects on human and physical security.

THE SECURITY SECTOR

DEFINITIONS

0216. The Security Sector (or System)[11] of a country is a more narrow definition that can be seen as the state's security and justice apparatus and the relevant civilian bodies responsible for its management. The Security Sector may comprise:

a. ***Core Security Forces***. Core Security Forces include the armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian), coast guards, border guards (at point of entry), customs authorities, and reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, government backed militias).

[11] Security Sector and Security System Reform are definitions used in recognition of the relationships between elements of security apparatus within state governance architecture. For the purposes of this paper, the definitions are interchangeable.

b. ***Security Management and Oversight Bodies***. National security advisory bodies, legislature select committees, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audits and planning units), and civil society organizations (civil review boards and public complaints commissions).

c. ***Judicial and Law Enforcement Institutions***. Justice ministries, police investigation and prosecuting authorities, courts and the judiciary, quasi-judicial bodies and ombudsmen, traditional indigenous dispute mechanisms, prisons and a penal system.

d. ***Non-State Armed Groups***. This includes groups filling security voids in failing or failed states such as guerrilla armies, political party militias, and criminal gangs. If a state is to have the monopoly over the use of lethal force, it must address non-state armed groups usually through a DDR process. DDR aims to integrate non-state armed groups, such as local militias, which may be closely linked to political interests. These actions will include leaders of non-state armed groups in the political process rather than having them marginalized and potentially radicalized.

e. ***Private Security Services***. A range of private security services provide security for both the public and private sectors including banks, national infrastructure facilities, government institutions, and commercial companies.

Figure 5: What is the Security Sector?[12]

[12] US CSRS SSR Workshop Out brief, p 2.

CHALLENGES

0217. Post-conflict environments generally share a set of challenges related to security: debilitated or destroyed police and military institutions, a discredited or dismantled intelligence system, and decrepit judicial and penal systems ill-prepared for emerging "secure" political and social environments.[13]

0218. There are several important legacies of contemporary armed conflicts, which impact on the structure and functioning of the Security System and will influence any reform process. The primary characteristic is the disappearance of the machinery of governance and the emergence of security voids that open the way to competing forms of political authority.[14] Figure 6 depicts the various actors that may move to fill voids in traditional state security.



Figure 6: Assumption of security roles by new actors.

SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM

CORE REQUIREMENT

0219. All MIC nations acknowledge principles developed by the OECD, which has made a significant and practical contribution to a common understanding of SSR, including a detailed implementation framework and guidelines. The OECD lists broad guiding principles that encapsulate the critical challenges and norms involved in SSR work, aiming to build greater

[13] NPS Workshop – SSR Education and Training conducted 30 Aug to 2 Sep 06, Dr Ann Igoe.
[14] UK Joint Doctrine Note 3/07 – Security Sector Reform.

consensus across the international community based on how security-related assistance should be provided. They apply to the work of OECD governments and their development ministries, other security-related establishments, and the wider international aid community.

0220. The OECD recognises the following core requirements:

a. Developing a nationally-owned concept of security and the policy and institutional frameworks required by states to handle development and security programs as distinct but integrated areas of public action.

b. Establishing well-defined policies and strengthening civilian governance of the security institutions that are responsible for formulating, executing, managing, and monitoring security policy.

c. Building accountable institutional mechanisms for implementation and capacity throughout the security system; this includes ensuring that any development of professional security forces leads them to be both accountable to the civil authorities and capable of carrying out the operational tasks asked of them.

LOCAL POPULATION

0221. To maximise sustainable impact on the populations concerned, SSR processes need to be acceptable to the indigenous population, and based upon shared values and internationally-accepted human rights principles. This is not to say that a functioning parliamentary democracy is a precondition for at least partial efforts at SSR, but SSR approaches that draw on and contribute to democratic institutions and institutional capacity are more likely to succeed. Principles behind SSR programmes should be transparent and agreed with by all stakeholders.

TENSIONS

0222. Experience suggests that there is significant potential for a conflict of objectives in SSR programmes. Tensions can arise between, on the one hand, the objective to enhance democratic control and accountability of security forces and, on the other, efforts to improve operational capacity to stabilise the security situation. Another tension may emerge between strategies for reduction in fiscal deficits which are often contributing-nation imposed and lead to significant cuts in security expenditures, and the need to invest in effective and sustainable security structures. This highlights the need for a participatory framework through which the needs and views of all stakeholders can be articulated and addressed.

FRAMEWORK

0223. SSR should be seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to address diverse security challenges facing populations and states through more integrated development and security system reform policies.

0224. Creating such frameworks can assist governments in allocating scarce public resources more cost-effectively in support of both security and development objectives. This can help to produce a more accountable and affordable security system.

0225. Although difficult to achieve, locally-owned strategic frameworks are particularly important because of the demands of policy coordination across a wide range of sectors and the dangers of multiple actors working at cross-purposes in their programming. Frameworks can help "mainstream" SSR throughout governments. They must use and combine the broad range of diplomatic, legal, social, economic, security, and political policy instruments available to them in order to develop appropriate military and non-military responses to security issues. There is a danger that without such frameworks, security policy will remain narrowly concentrated on agencies that deal with more traditional matters such as defense, intelligence, and policing instead of those civil bodies involved in oversight, including legislative bodies, judicial ministries, and civil society actors. This may allow the influence of authoritarian-inclined groups to persist; a problem which may be as much the result of a lack of new institutional mechanisms to implement new norms of democratic governance in the security system, as it is explicit resistance on the part of political elites.

0226. The security system should be managed according to the same principles of accountability and transparency that apply across the public sector, in particular through greater civil oversight of security processes. Key lessons learned:

- SSR is a highly political process, so time spent preparing the political terrain and understanding the context of reform is time well spent.
- Integrating an inception phase into a SSR program allows donors to build their understanding of the political and security context, to effectively target their support and to assess where donor support adds value.
- If local ownership is taken seriously, it changes the means and manner of engagement in SSR; as such, SSR assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining that path and leading them down it.

MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SSR

STRATEGIC PLANNING

0227. SSR applies the CA by seeking to orchestrate and integrate the instruments of national power in achieving favourable outcomes to complex situations. A shared understanding of the desired end-state and, given the wide variety of potential actors, the need for collaborative working or dialogue is paramount. Due to the diversity of skills and expertise required to reform the whole security sector, planning for these activities must be conducted at the earliest stage of stabilization operation campaign planning in a holistic context and at the highest level of decision.

0228. Strategic planning is necessary to delineate responsibilities between civilian and military actors ensuring that resources (financial, personnel, and expertise) are identified and sufficient for the tasks at hand. Earliest possible engagement with HN or local host authorities is essential to ensure that the support offered through a CA is appropriate, including military contributions. Plans need to provide scope for local ownership and partnership. Lines of operation developed for SSR instruments should aim to transform or establish a legitimate, accountable, affordable, and effective security system, carefully noting host and contributing-nation legal frameworks, HN management capacities, oversight and accountability, technical capacity and capability, capacity to support implementation, and capacity to mobilize effective demand for change.

USE OF MILITARY FORCES

0229. Military activity, conducted after armed conflict or state failure, ensures that conditions do not again foment crisis and conflict. Their efforts focus on stability, SSR, and reconstruction. Military forces can satisfy skills and expertise for a subset of SSR. While defense reform is the most obvious, military forces can provide useful support in the form of construction, health, logistics, border control, corrections, and police (refer Reconstruction Teams) that can set the conditions to allow other agencies to undertake further reforms, recognising that efforts to reform the military security apparatus are inextricably linked to that of other security elements. The end-state of these reforms sees the transition of military support to a mutually agreed goal, which could range from complete disengagement, strategic support through activities such as Defense Cooperation Programs, to co-dependent Defense security relationships. Additionally, there is a range of SSR related activities applicable to post-conflict situations for military planners to consider.

MULTINATIONAL (MN) PLANNING FOR SSR

0230. When considering coalition SSR activity, the development of a common understanding between contributing nations over potential level of participation, resource allocation, and national objectives is needed to ensure a coherent, workable approach. All accepted responsibilities for coalition or alliance partners should be integrated into a coalition campaign plan developed at the national and military strategic level supporting a CA.

MISSION ANALYSIS

Sustainable SSR is based on a good capability and capacity analysis of the HN's security framework at the outset. The most critical task facing countries embarking on SSR processes is to build a nationally owned and led vision of security. This is the foundation that countries require to develop appropriate security sector policy frameworks and the required institutional mechanisms to implement them. An analysis for the security framework and its security forces to be developed under SSR should include the following considerations:

- The operating environment;
- Synchronization;
- Capacity building;
- Transfer of security responsibility; and
- Measures of Effectiveness.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

0231. ***Threats*** in the operating environment play an important role in determining the rate at which the security system reform can proceed and develop, with cultural and political dynamics playing a very significant part in SSR activities. Political unity and societal acceptance of reform reduces the complexity and likely duration of external involvement considerably, however, that is the exception and not the rule. There is a requirement to be sensitive to indigenous ideas and conventions about security, considering that a "western" security model may not necessarily be applicable or gain genuine local approval.

0232. ***Regional considerations***. Factors that must be considered in deciding geographical force dispositions include regional requirements, force role and capabilities, terrain, and existing infrastructure. At the regional level, and sub-regional level in particular, states face broadly similar security needs and challenges, much of which SSR is designed to address. The governance of the security system requires regional approaches because:

- Security challenges often involve cross-border issues;
- It can be helpful to have collective responses to regional security issues;
- Unaddressed needs for SSR can lead to tensions and conflict that spread across borders; and
- Coordination and harmonisation of external actors' actions and policies is critical.

0233. ***MN framework***. In many cases, SSR is a MN undertaking requiring coordination and synchronization not only with the HN but also between contributing countries. These aspects are covered under respective coalition doctrinal references.

SYNCHRONIZATION

0234. ***Delineation of responsibility***. The roles of the newly developed security forces will reflect the capabilities and capacities for which they have been designed. There may be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed and

established. There is a requirement to educate the forces and their political leadership in the appropriate roles for each element of the security forces.

0235. ***HN involvement***. The ability of a nation to protect its citizens and defend itself from external threats is a fundamental consideration. Therefore, SSR activities must be developed in close cooperation with the HN and with the full understanding by all participants of the implications of external intervention. HN involvement in all aspects of the development and implementation of the SSR plan, as well as ownership of the timeline and decision points, is very important in establishing and maintaining trusting relationship between all participants.

CAPACITY BUILDING

0236. ***Force development***. In order for transition to occur, a capable and credible armed force is required whose capacity is based upon the security challenge faced and the degree of political control and economic opportunity surrounding the force. Establishing police primacy vice that of the military is a key task for successful stabilization operations. In the initial stages, the HN is likely to require close support and training, and as capability improves, this level of support will diminish and be replaced by a joint operations force involving indigenous security forces (ISF) and multinational forces (MNF). The ISF are likely to achieve a high degree of proficiency in tactical level tasks before achieving the required degree of proficiency in command and control, support, and coordination between ISF elements and their respective HN Government agencies.

0237. The armed forces and the capabilities to be developed will stem from the capability requirement analysis and will reflect HN aspirations. The various forces within an SSR program that the coalition may assist to develop are below, noting that not all activities are appropriate for military coalition forces to undertake:

a. ***Military Forces***. These should be developed, structured, and equipped to counter external threats to the HN and certain types of internal threats based on the analysis of the potential threats and the force capability required to effectively address state requirements. This can include paramilitary forces, civilian militia forces, state guard forces and military intelligence services.

b. ***Police Forces***. Internal constabularies or gendarmeries are a vital component to a democratic security framework. Although the military may initially assist in the development of civilian police forces, this task should be assumed by civilian police force personnel from the international community or coalition nations as soon as possible.

c. ***Other Security Sector Forces***. There may be a requirement for the development of other elements within the security sector such as corrections, coast guard, and border control forces, if the latter is not assumed by the police or combined with customs forces. This will depend upon the situation and the HN's requirements. These tasks should be assumed by the appropriate civilian entities and experts provided by international or multilateral organizations, coalition, or like-minded nations as soon as possible. It may also include civil intelligence services.

0238. ***Structure***. A holistic, logical approach is necessary in designing and determining the security forces required from the political and strategic levels down to the tactical level. Planning for SSR, and indeed as part of DDR, must include policies for the recruitment, selection, and vetting of future military force personnel. The development of the new armed forces cannot be limited to the physical structures and capabilities. In order to avoid a repeat of historical problems and sources of past instability, the moral and intellectual realms of a reliable and politically subordinate military force must be addressed.

0239. ***Resources***. An integrated and synchronized plan must be developed that addresses equipment and resource issues, to include the funding, procurement, and distribution issues. Military forces require suitable infrastructure support from the outset of their development. In most cases, the existing infrastructure will be used with the caveat that additional resources may have to be allocated to improve and/or expand the infrastructure. A plan must be developed at the outset for the hand-over of any coalition force infrastructure to HN agencies.

TRANSFER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

0240. In response to improving indigenous self-reliance, a MNF will conduct a transfer of security responsibility to civil authorities. This transition is included in the campaign plan with the conditions required to achieve this transition developed as the operation progresses. These conditions cover the whole range of security sector issues including governance capacity, rule of law, and economic reform. Since reform in these areas is usually the domain of Other Government Departments (OGD) and International Organisations (IO), the planning will include the requirement to coordinate the activities of the military forces. The conditions for the transfer of security responsibility to the HN are defined by the HN government with advice from the MNF and lead nation states.

0241. A significant degree of risk is associated with transitioning security responsibilities from the MNF to the HN. If the MNF withdraws too quickly, emergent HN forces may fail in their role and suffer a loss of self-esteem and public confidence. Conversely too slow a withdrawal could lead to dependency and a loss of public consent (or tolerance) for the presence of the MNF. As the lines of operation for the campaign are interlinked, planning must consider the requirement to keep coalition partners involved and engaged in the process and to coordinate the planning and execution of activity with all other civilian actors involved in an SSR program.

CONCLUSION

0242. Security is essential to legitimate governance and participation, effective rule of law, and sustained economic development. In countries torn by armed conflict and strife, external and internal capabilities must be focused on reducing or eliminating the drivers of conflict in order to create an environment of security and rule of law. The security sector is a complex assortment of players that normally includes military forces and any state-sponsored paramilitary forces; national and local police; the justice and corrections systems; coastal and

border security forces; oversight bodies; militia; and private military and security companies employed by the state.

0243. SSR is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes, in many cases with external assistance from other nations, to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice for its citizens. SSR programs are integrated activities to support defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, correction, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; DDR tasks; and concurrent reduction of armed violence.

0244. The objectives of the SSR program are supported by the DDR program. DDR efforts increase the stability of the security environment by disarming and demobilizing armed combatants and by helping return these combatants to civilian life. The next part of the handbook addresses the attributes of DDR and the importance of DDR activities in supporting stabilization operations.

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PART THREE – DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION (DDR)

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

0301. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a high-profile activity frequently required for stabilization, SSR, and long-term development. Effective DDR means that ex-combatants remain unarmed, detached from their armed group, and integrated with society socially, economically, and politically. DDR is often part of a peace agreement and ideally should be a state-led process. Ineffective DDR programmes can undermine peace agreements, aggravate instability, and inhibit development.

DDR CONSIDERATIONS

0302. DDR will fail if the potential participants feel insecure and are reluctant to give up their weapons. Any DDR programme also needs to take account of the roles of children and women. It must also be remembered that DDR for children should happen regardless of the progress of peace processes.[15] This is a specialised area and should be dealt with by the relevant agencies, including UNICEF and child protection NGOs, supported by donors. Strategies and resources for the reintegration phase take a particularly long time to set up so early planning is essential. In a "hot stabilization" situation, conditions may preclude a full DDR programme, though it may be possible to set conditions for DDR to take place in the future.

DDR PROGRAMME

0303. Sierra Leone, and Mozambique are all examples of more successful DDR programmes because they demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated combatants through effective coordination with other nations in theatre, local warlords and power brokers and HN officials. Afghanistan and Liberia are examples of poor DDR programmes that were politically manipulated and based on an inadequate understanding of the context and political environment necessary for successful accomplishment of all program elements. A DDR programme to be successful should ideally be:

- Part of a peace agreement in the wider context of SSR, including transitional justice and promoting the rule of law.
- Integrated with longer-term development initiatives.
- Based on effective reintegration.

[15] Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups.

DEFINITIONS[16]

DDR

0304. DDR is essentially a politically driven process and its success depends on the will of the parties to the conflict to demilitarize after conflict. This political will is usually reflected in a commitment by these parties to disarm and demobilize military personnel in formal armed forces or other armed groups within the framework of a ceasefire agreement or comprehensive peace accord.

DISARMAMENT

0305. "Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants, including civilians. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes."[17]

DEMOBILIZATION

0306. "Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of Demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose. The second stage of Demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion."

REINSERTION

0307. "Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during Demobilization but prior to the long-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families. Reinsertion is a short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one year."

REINTEGRATION

0308. "Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance with no direct military implication."

[16] UN "Operational Guide to Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)".

[17] This is not mandatory. It should be noted that Disarmament is often linked to civilian voluntary surrender programmes.

DDR

SCOPE

Amongst the greatest challenges facing these countries are the presence of large numbers of ex-combatants coupled with the ongoing violence perpetrated by members of still-active rebel groups. They have the real potential to 'spoil' a crisis resolution process that addresses security, economic, social, cultural, and legal issues. These ex-combatants need to be demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life or newly constituted security services. Their re-integration into society is critical for the security and development of their country. DDR activities are related to the following issues:

- Comprehensive Approach;
- Interagency;
- IOs;
- Transition to follow on authorities;
- Reconstruction efforts;
- SSR;
- Stability activities;
- "Three-block war"; and
- Mission change.

OBJECTIVE OF DDR

0309. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. DDR of combatants together make up a complex process with political, military, security, humanitarian, and socio-economic dimensions.

0310. This process aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching from conflict to peace, recovery, and development. DDR also helps build national capacity to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants and to support communities receiving ex-combatants by working for their peaceful and sustainable reintegration.

0311. Through a process of comprehensively disarming combatants, preparing them for civilian life, and providing them with opportunities for sustainable social and economic reintegration, DDR aims to support this high-risk group so that they become stakeholders in the peace process.

0312. DDR should, therefore:

- Be planned and coordinated within the framework of the peace process;

- Be linked to broader security issues, such as the reorganization of the armed forces and other SSR issues;[18]
- Take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament, weapons control, and management;[19]
- Be linked to the broader processes of national capacity-building, reconstruction and development in order to achieve the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants;
- Encourage trust and confidence in communities receiving ex-combatants and deal with the root causes of the conflict in order to prevent a return to violent conflict; and
- Be flexible and carefully adapted to meet the specific needs of a particular country (and region).

0313. There are five overarching principles that guide the UN approach to DDR, which have also been adopted by the MIC nations[20]:

- "People-centred;
- Flexible, transparent, and accountable;
- Nationally owned;
- Integrated; and
- Well planned".[21]

0314. DDR can apply to:

- Downsizing state armies or armed forces;
- Disbanding armed groups and militias;
- Supporting law enforcement.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY/DOCTRINE

0315. The UN is the only organization that has published a complete set of documents ranging from policy to "Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)" and "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)". Even if the UN is not primarily a military organization, the MIC nations endorse UN standards in order to increase their interoperability with all other agencies and organizations involved in DDR activities following the UN point of view. While no MIC nation has produced a comprehensive set of documents regarding DDR operations from a policy-to-task description perspective, all MIC nations share the view that civil agencies have the lead and DDR is part of the peace process. MIC nations also have a shared vision of the tasks and roles that armed forces members should perform in the DDR process where there are no civilian

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[18] In fact demobilization and reintegration has to be synchronized with SSR. An example is immediately after exiting the demobilized camps, the demobilized have to have immediate access to either a military training camp, or a reinsertion and reintegration package. This is not easy or very compatible to have recruiter(s) for new forces in the demob camps; however, the alternative might lead to failed demobilization or ineffective SSR.

[19] There are few examples of successful weapons database management programs.

[20] The escola de Pau DDR annual report may provide additional condition**s** of success **or** reasons for failure.

[21] UN "Operational Guide to Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)".

capacities. However, some countries acknowledge the UN concept while others do not mention it even if their positions are not mutually exclusive; and the relationship between SSR and DDR, even if acknowledged, is given different levels of importance by different nations.

DISCUSSION OF DDR

STRATEGIC OUTCOMES (OR) END STATES

0316. The DDR process is considered successful when the following results are achieved:

a. The collection, documentation, control, and disposal or reintegration in the SSR process of all illegal small arms, ammunitions, explosives, and light and heavy weapons from combatants and civilians;

b. The formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups; and

c. The acquisition of a civilian status and the gain of sustainable employment (including the security system) and income for ex-combatants.

INTERAGENCY OBJECTIVES

0317. The ultimate objective of DDR is the sustainable social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants. These reintegration activities have the highest probability of success when conducted in direct coordination with other agencies and organizations, government and non-government that embraces a CA to reintegrating ex-combatants back into society.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

0318. The objectives of the military can be:

a. Control the flow of weapons into the theatre of operations;[22]

b. Illegal small arms, ammunitions, explosives, and light and heavy weapons are under control of the coalition force or the legitimate government;

c. Most armed groups are demobilized and individuals are undergoing the reinsertion then reintegration process.

LIKELY MILITARY TASKS

MILITARY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITY

0319. "In the typical operational environment in which United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions take place, the primary contribution made by the military component of a mission to

[22] This is an essential element as repeated failures in this area have jeopardized stabilization activities.

the peacekeeping operation's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, if it has been mandated to do so, is to provide security. The military component could also contribute through the gathering and distribution of information specifically related to a DDR programme, as well as monitoring and reporting on security issues. Military ammunition specialist and weapon expertise could contribute to the technical aspects of disarmament.[23]

0320. In addition, military capabilities could be used to provide various aspects of logistic support, including camp construction, communications, transport, and health, if spare capacity is available. It must be noted that unless specific planning for military DDR tasks has taken place, and forces generated accordingly, then military logistic capacity cannot be guaranteed.

0321. It is essential to the successful employment of any military capability in a DDR programme that it must be included in planning, be part of the endorsed mission operational requirement, be specifically mandated, and be properly resourced. If this is not the case, the wider security-related function of the military component will be badly affected."[24]

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

0322. UN-mandated peacekeeping force is commanded by a force commander, an active duty member of his/her parent armed forces, who is a salaried UN staff member.

0323. The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) further notes that:

a. "All Member States retain national command over their own troops and most take a very keen interest in ensuring that their troops are employed as agreed in negotiations that take place (in UN Headquarters) before they deploy.

b. For the military component, DDR planning is not very different from planning related to other military tasks in UN peacekeeping. As in other military planning, clear guidance is necessary on the scope of the military's involvement.

c. Agreement on using UN peacekeepers as part of the DDR programme should be discussed with the national parties at the earliest possible stage.

d. The military component and the civilian DDR unit/team should create the necessary coordination mechanism to share relevant information regularly and carry out joint planning."[25]

MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS

0324. Potential Military DDR contributions include the following:

- Targeted military operations whose purpose will be to "pressure armed forces and groups into disarming voluntarily;

[23] Also see IDDRS 4.10 on Disarmament and IDDRS 4.20 on Demobilisation.
[24] UN "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards", December 2006.
[25] UN "Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards", December 2006.

- Security;
- Information-gathering and reporting;
- Information dissemination and sensitization;
- Programme monitoring and reporting;
- Specialized weapon and ammunition expertise;
- Logistic support."[26]

MILITARY TASKS [27]

0325. A coalition force can support a DDR process by:

- Providing and maintaining a safe and secure environment;
- Supporting arms embargos;
- Observing and verifying disarmament through site and unit inspections;
- Providing continuous intelligence, constant surveillance, and flexible reconnaissance;
- Safety and security of storage sites;
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) assistance for destruction;
- Logistic assistance in disposition of weapons and ordnance;
- Technical expertise on military ordnance;
- Information Operations (Info Ops);
- Controlling and securing assembly of units and equipment;
- Locating arms caches;
- Support for civilian general weapons management programs by providing a security environment in which UN Civil Police (CIVPOL) and HN police can operate;
- Building disarmament and demobilization sites;
- Providing escort and/or transportation as required.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

0326. The decision to participate in DDR activities is a political one and the implementation requires coordination between many different agencies, the coalition forces supporting the DDR process will not participate until all participating nations have coordinated and agreed on the actions to be taken.

0327. The coalition force commander may initiate the process that leads to the coalition nation's political decision to get involved in DDR activities. The commander will have to provide the information required to support this decision making process. The commander will take part in the planning for DDR activities because of his/her extensive knowledge of the area of operation. A military LO should be embedded within the DDR planning structure in order to assist in developing feasible plans supportable by the military.

[26] IDDRS 4.40 UN "Military Roles and Responsibilities for DDR", 2006.
[27] U.S. Joint Publication 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

0328. Because of the complexity of DDR operations (number of organizations involved and the national caveats), the tasks that might be assigned to the armed forces will be different based on specific theatres of operation. At a minimum, involvement in the DDR process leads to:

- The requirement to plan and coordinate with other organizations and agencies;
- The requirement to facilitate, support, and/or conduct DDR operations where necessary.

PREREQUISITE CONDITIONS

0329. DDR activities have occurred at the local, theatre wide, national, and international level. In all cases, it was important to establish and implement certain pre-conditions and it was required to engender the support of the local population regarding the DDR activities and programs.

0330. ***Security***. The security situation in a 'post-conflict' context is a key factor because providing security is essential to motivating ex-combatants to give up their weapon and for refugees, internally-displaced persons, and abductees to return to their homes and communities.

0331. ***Governance***. Improved governance is a fundamental factor for the revival of economic activities and interactions as well as for the ability to peacefully settle the disputes within a society. Both are essential for restoring confidence in the future among the general population and with ex-combatants.

0332. ***Livelihoods***. In countries emerging from war, jobs and income generation are often the principal concern of local people and ex-combatants, and one of the key determining factors in whether those who have been living by the gun will be willing to disarm and reintegrate into society.

0333. ***Justice and reconciliation***. Justice and reconciliation issues are integrally linked to DDR activities, specifically in the reintegration phase where ex-combatants are accepted back into their communities.

0334. ***Political context***. A shared will amongst the national and local authorities, the traditional leaders, and the warlords is essential to a peaceful DDR process.

NATIONAL DECISION CRITERIA

0335. The decision whether MIC member nations commit to a DDR activity will depend on a number of factors. This assessment is likely to include the following considerations:

- Will the DDR programme be civilian led within a CA to stabilization operations?
- Is the DDR process supported by the international community's (nations and organizations) will and legitimacy?
- Do the local population, authorities, and the parties to the dispute endorse the disarmament process?

- Is the reconstruction programme viable?
- Is the reinsertion process sustainable?
- Are appropriate funding mechanisms in place?
- Is there a mechanism that facilitates planning and coordination between all agencies and organizations involved in the process?
- Does the local population feel confident about, and support the peace process and reconstruction effort due to the improving political, justice and reconciliation, governance, security, and economic environment?

FACTORS OF SUCCESS

CONDITIONS FOR DDR

0336. The DDR process should not start until the following conditions are met:

a. DDR requires early and thorough planning. Better preparation is possible if planning starts early and is even initiated whilst negotiations are going on, but before an agreement is reached. DDR planning requires: labour market surveys, detailed knowledge of existing community structures, ongoing activities relevant to DDR, identifying the needs of all persons (men, women, and children), definition of target groups, and involvement of all organization and agencies that will be engaged.

b. Adapt the process to the local situation/conditions.

c. Create a coordination mechanism able to effectively coordinate a variety of organizations and agencies in order to avoid duplication of activities and structures.

d. Ensure a continuous DDR process.

e. Support and ensure real involvement of all participants. Maintain a participatory process ensuring community-level activities are provided and emphasized as well as high level engagements when reconstruction efforts begin. All DDR targeted groups and potential host communities need to be involved as active participants in the DDR process. This action ensures warlords are under control and international observers provide effective oversight of DDR activities.

f. Conduct proper and efficient communication. In DDR operations, two-way communications are vital so people affected by DDR initiatives are provided timely and accurate information on what the DDR process involves, what is expected of them, what they in turn can expect, and why it is important.

g. Linking DDR programmes that address broader peace building and development initiatives while tackling certain key issues would facilitate and strengthen efforts to deal with ex-combatants who are a risk to peace. DDR initiatives must target ex-combatants while, at the same time, identifying and addressing the needs and concerns of communities and their citizens.

LESSONS LEARNED

0337. The following lessons have been identified during military DDR operations:

- Do not fight to disarm;
- Take part in the planning process;
- Take part in the planning and coordination mechanism;
- Stay focused and on target – don't get dragged down in supporting every requesting organization;
- Retain a reaction capability to unforeseen events;
- Resort to the military on tasks only if civilian means are not available, is ineffective, insufficient, and/or inappropriate;
- Gain effective control of weapons flow inside the theatre;
- Influence the SSR process in building up new indigenous security forces.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

0338. Measures of effectiveness will be objective if the following conditions are met:

- Effective control of the flow of weapons inside the theatre of operations;
- Accurate estimation of the amount of weapons and ammunitions existing in the theatre of operations;
- Accurate estimation of the number combatants and combatant groups.

0339. The measures can be:

- Percentage of combatant groups and/or combatants agreeing to get involved in the process;
- Percentage of weapons and ammunitions collected; and
- Percentage of ex-combatants involved in the DDR process.

CONCLUSION

0340. The DDR program is a critical component of peace and restoration processes and is accounted for in the initial planning stages supporting stabilization operations. DDR planning directly ties to SSR activities, determining the potential size and scope of military, police, and other security structures. In addition, the reintegration of former combatants back into their communities sets the foundation for and determines the success of long-term peace building and development programs.

0341. DDR program activities closely coordinate with reform efforts in all sectors to ensure an integrated approach that synchronizes activities toward a common end state. Successful DDR programs use many different and varied approaches designed to respond to the specific security environments and conditions in the HN.

PART FOUR – RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

INTRODUCTION

RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (RTS)

0401. RTs were first launched, as a concept, in November 2002 with the goal of doing reconstruction work as a part of Phase IV of the operations of coalition forces[28] in Afghanistan. Due to the primary political sub-divisions of Afghanistan (34 Provinces each led by a Governor), teams operated in the various Provinces and were termed Provincial RTs (PRTs). This term is not helpful for a broader description of the roles of such teams and throughout this document the term RT will be used.

0402. RTs are a recent phenomenon with Afghanistan and Iraq providing two different models; lessons are still being learned on how best to organize and deploy them. They have changed considerably during the recent past and will likely continue to change. It is important that RTs and NGOs find the right balance for the sharing of work. The success of the reconstruction effort and of a viable exit point depends considerably on NGO work and the work of international development departments within governments.

0403. Because the reconstruction phase was not fully launched in Afghanistan, the objectives of RTs have become less clear-cut. Many now carry out a mix of military and reconstruction operations. Although these roles may seem to be contradictory, both types of operation in fact share the same goal – the creation of a stable government.

RT MODELS

0404. There are various RT models currently being implemented and a considerable difference exists between how PRTs are run by the US, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, and Germany. NATO is also developing a PRT model. While different RT models have been tailored to the needs of different regional conditions and national priorities of participating governments, the basic roles remain the same: to improve governance, to help stimulate development of SSR and to aid in the reconstruction effort. They serve as platforms through which the national government can become engaged in a region. The objective is to accomplish this while leaving only a small footprint – RTs are not to be seen as an army of occupation.

RECONSTRUCTION MODELS

STRUCTURE

0405. RTs are comprised of international civilian and military personnel (varying in size from 50-350 in each team). The detailed structure of a RT will be a balance of military and civilian

[28] Phases I and II were periods of active conflict to remove the Taliban and Al Qaeda from power. Phase III refers to stabilization, and Phase IV to reconstruction.

elements. Decisions on the size and nature of each RT will be a matter primarily for the country providing the core of the RT in coordination with contributing states and organizations. RTs' organizational structure should be based on unity of effort, clear co-ordination, and good communications. RTs are task-organized based on their mission, so the structure of each RT may vary. Figure 7 reflects the functional areas, but does not imply that RTs must task-organize in the same fashion.



Figure 7: Structure of a Typical RT.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

0406. There has been a lack of clarity on the exact roles and missions of RTs since their earliest deployments. However, as a general rule RTs focus on the three essential functions of security, reconstruction, and support to central governance – they also engage in relief operations in certain circumstances. In the security sector, RT activities span three sub-sectors: support to the disarmament process; mediating conflicts between militias; and select elements of SSR.

0407. The military component of a RT represents a credible interlocutor for supporting the disarmament of militias, but needs to be of adequate numbers to undertake this role. This 'credible interlocutor' role permits RTs to mediate in disputes or conflicts between various warring parties. However, given the size of the troop contingent in a RT, this mediating role is likely to be limited to low intensity engagements. These activities in support of disarmament, and in mediating between opposing militia forces, help in reducing insecurity resulting from inter-militia fighting. Thus, the RTs can have a positive impact on this source of insecurity, albeit the degree of impact depends on the wider security environment.

TASKS

0408. RT activities in support of SSR will assist in expanding the reach of the central government with the expectation of reducing general lawlessness and banditry. In addition to the operational activities of RTs, the very presence of the RT can invite opportunistic attacks from groups attempting to frustrate the transition to democracy. Since the number of troops at any one RT dictates that it must maintain a predominantly defensive (rather than offensive) posture, it is unlikely that a RT will be able to prosecute attacks against these elements. This potential reduction in local security may, however, be countered by the fact that the presence of the RT will make it more difficult for insurgent forces to coordinate and carry out offensive operations.

0409. ***Reconstruction***. Reconstruction activities designed to provide much-needed infrastructure to facilitate SSR, such as rebuilding police stations, provide tangible benefits to the nascent national police force and the judicial system. Reconstruction in these areas, as well as benefits of road construction to expand central authority, may assist in addressing insecurity by reducing the high levels of lawlessness.

0410. ***Strengthening government authority***. Strengthening government authority in a lawless state requires robust security forces, improved infrastructure (roads, buildings, communications networks), and support to emerging institutions. RTs should undertake activities in support of central government expansion in a planned and coordinated manner linking to the security and reconstruction functions.

0411. Several factors should be considered by military forces in advance of any civil-military deployments:

- Civil-military teams should exploit their comparative advantages in the areas of security.
- The teams should have the necessary capability to address security threats in their area of operation.
- Civil-military teams should be given and adhere to a clearly defined mission.
- Civil-military entities should consist of personnel that are appropriately trained for their missions and operating environment.
- Civil-military entities working in the areas of governance support and reconstruction should understand the role of emerging local political leaders and institutions and prioritize engagements as appropriate.
- The deployment of civil-military teams to undertake activities in the areas of security, reconstruction, and governance support ideally should be undertaken with a clear exit or transition strategy.
- The military must ensure that their civilian counterparts are aware of exactly what the “intent” of each RT will be. “Types” of missions, like COIN, will be a great mystery to the civilians on a RT. They must be brought up to speed on what all these terms mean in relation to how the RT operates.

PLANNING

0412. RTs have used a variety of informal and formal planning processes, as well as short-term and long-term focus throughout their existence. However, a consensus is emerging that RTs are most effective when they develop an inherently flexible multi-year plan of action based on their mission analysis and shaped by their analysis of what is driving instability and conflict in their area. The RT plan should be:

a. ***Driven by its mission guidance and directed tasks***. In addition to the RT's own plans, the RT needs to interface at the earliest appropriate time with other plans. There may be multiple documents (HN, international [e.g., United Nations], or NATO) that should be acquired and understood. Whether the mission is counterinsurgency (COIN), post-conflict stabilization, or reconstruction, the RT must ensure that its strategy, plans, and actions support and further those overarching objectives.

b. ***Shaped by a full understanding of the area assigned to the RT***. The plan should be developed with all RT participants involved following an assessment of the threats to stability in the RT's area of responsibility (AOR), including factors that increase and decrease the likelihood of conflict. This includes understanding who all the players are – locals, friends, and enemies - and what their agendas/needs are. The assessment should strive to determine the key impediments to achieving mission success. This assessment provides a common operating picture for all actors in the province that will shape, sequence, and focus their efforts towards achieving the mission of the RT.

c. ***Multi-year***. RT team members understand that achieving success in their AOR will take many years even though they are often deployed for no more than a year. Rather than a series of one-year plans, it is important to develop a flexible multi-year (three to five) strategy that promotes continuity of effort. The strategy should include: 1) key strategic interventions that are necessary to address the causes of instability and conflict; and 2) a long-term end state goal and the required objectives to achieve sustainable stability sufficient to provide an environment where normal development programs can flourish. The strategy can and should be reviewed and routinely revised, particularly before unit rotations or large personnel turnovers or as guidance or conditions change. The strategic objectives provide the basis for a multi-year implementation plan that should cover a time frame of at least two years to facilitate continuity.

d. ***Interagency.*** The RT is an interagency team and needs to plan as a team at the earliest possible time. Ideally, the RT's planning team should include functional, regional, and planning experts representing all the agencies active in the RT. There may be a tendency for each agency to want to perform separate assessments and then build separate action plans based on those assessments. But without a joint assessment, strategy, and implementation plan, the RT will lack a common understanding of the situation, making it hard to agree on where resources should be focused, prioritized, and integrated into each agency's efforts.

0413. An understanding of the humanitarian and military spheres of activity requires mutual clarification of roles and activities in areas where the two domains intersect. Experience has demonstrated that in some environments erosion of the boundaries emanates from relief activities undertaken by civil-military entities, including 'hearts and minds' activities. Military forces should consider the impact of their relief operations undertaken as part of peace-support operations, as illustrated in the table below.

Context	Position
Direct military implementation of humanitarian assistance in 'general circumstances'	It is never appropriate for the military to directly implement humanitarian activities in general circumstances.
Direct military implementation of humanitarian assistance in 'exceptional circumstances'	Only in exceptional circumstances and very rarely, is it appropriate for the military to directly implement humanitarian activities for which there must be specific criteria.
Use of armed military escorts/protection for humanitarian staff and goods	Humanitarian agencies will only use military armed protection as a last resort in extreme circumstances according to the criteria listed in the SCHR paper.
Information sharing	Certain types of information can and should be shared between humanitarian agencies and the military.

Table 4: Summary of Positions from Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response[29] (SCHR) (2002 revised 2004) position paper on humanitarian–military relations.

RECONSTRUCTION PRACTICES

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

0414. The primary activities of the RT are to conceive, plan, coordinate, and/or execute reconstruction and initial development projects and programs. Though RTs are not development institutions per se, RTs should adhere to the following development communities' principles to the extent possible:

a. ***Ownership***. Enhance and strengthen the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people.

[29] The Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) is an alliance made up of chief executive officers representing eight humanitarian networks or agencies (Care International, Caritas Internationalis, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam and World Council of Churches).

b. ***Capacity building***. Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies.

c. ***Sustainability***. Design programs to ensure their impact endures.

d. ***Selectivity***. Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.

e. ***Assessment***. Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.

f. ***Results***. Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable, and strategically focused objectives.

g. ***Partnership***. Collaborate closely with others: governments, communities, donors, NGOs, the private sector, IOs, RTs, coalition partners, and universities.

h. ***Flexibility***. Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.

i. ***Accountability***. Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.

0415. ***Imperatives***. In addition to the above guiding principles, the RT should:

- Operate as an integrated military-civilian organization.
- Work to a common purpose or end state with unity of effort.
- Lead from behind, ensuring HN ownership. Promote HN primacy and legitimacy. (Remember and respect that the operational pace will be that of the HN.)
- Actively engage with leading local political figures, HN central government officials, the local communities, and population through local councils, development committees, and other established and traditional bodies.
- Facilitate the visibility of the HN government in the province by assisting official visits to remote districts and villages (e.g. transportation and communications).
- Be conservative in your promises as to what you are able to deliver; manage expectations.
- Engage in programs or projects that your RT rotation can complete or handover. However, avoid focusing on only short-term projects at the expense of long-range strategies.
- Plan sustainability at the outset.
- Ensure that projects do not duplicate the work of others.
- Ensure that interventions at the provincial level support the HN's national processes and development plan or strategy.
- Lay the foundations for long-term sustainable changes.
- Be aware of and respect civil-military sensitivities.
- Have a finite lifespan linked to an end state of improved stability.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

0416. Objective criteria are required to assess whether RTs are effective in their four main areas of operation. Table 5 suggests MOEs for use by those in command of a RT. These MOEs help begin the process of developing appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators in conjunction with national government and civil society. They capture changes in the context resulting from the activities of the RTs.

Activity	Suggested MOEs	Suggested Indicators/Data Sources
Security	Changes in humanitarian security	Attacks on humanitarian workers (Source: ANSO) Humanitarian access
	Changes in overall security environment	Swiss peace FAST Reports
	Inter-militia intervention rate	Percentage of known inter-militia disputes in which RT intervened
	Inter-militia mediation success rate	Percentage of inter-militia disputes (in which RT intervened) that were successfully mediated/resolved
	Reduction in levels of lawlessness/banditry	Reported incidents of banditry
	People's ambient security expectations (including in returnee areas)	Surveys of public opinion on perceptions of security (should not be undertaken by military)
	Number of police personnel/trainees that can be supported by RT	Number of police personnel
	Increased acceptance of military's mission	Views expressed by local community members of military's mission and role (interviews should not be undertaken by military)
	Improved cooperation between military and local population	Number of engagements by local community representatives with military in liaison capacity
	Force protection	Security intelligence on RTs provided directly by members of the local community
Reconstruction	Support to road network construction	Km road/year (with reference to any government targets). Use of roads
	Local employment in RT funded reconstruction projects	Number of workers (full/part-time) Employee salaries compared to local salaries
	Component of reconstruction needs addressed by RT activities	Comparison of needs and RT activities
	Construction of facilities directly or under contract from RT to support deployment of police (e.g. police stations)	New/refurbished facilities (possibly measured by square metre) constructed by RT in province
Support to central government	Relative authority of central government in PRT catchment area	Qualitative data: who collects 'taxes'/customs duties? Who provides security?
	Physical infrastructure available to support	Offices are staffed and functioning
	Support by RT to local government councils	Number of functioning local government bodies supported by RT
Relief Operations	Note: focuses only on delivery of relief supplies in areas where Non-Governmental Humanitarian	

	Agencies (NGHA) are unable to operate, or 'exceptional circumstances'	
	Relief delivered in specific sectors, according to verified need (e.g. health; food and nutrition; water and sanitation; and education sectors)	Sphere standards and indicators

Table 5: Possible MOE for Evaluation of RT

PART FIVE - TRANSITION

INTRODUCTION

GENERAL

0501. The ultimate goal of Transition is to transfer all functions performed by the Coalition force to a follow-on authority, in a smooth and synchronized fashion, coherent with agreed, enduring, outcome-based strategic objectives. However, this must be tempered by the requirement to maintain security and support to the follow-on authority within specific functional areas, while guarding against dependency. As such, some functions may develop into a combination of Coalition, HN, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities as Transition progresses. The key is developing a clear understanding between all parties that their contribution, by function and in terms of Command and Control (C2), relationships, and the dynamics of the environment will change over time.

0502. Coalition operations inherently have both political and military goals so exclusive military lines of activity will normally not achieve the desired or envisioned strategic end state. While every campaign and major operation is directed towards a goal, at some point the military action is no longer the main effort. Interagency coordination throughout military operations is the linchpin[30]. Operational planning should be guided not toward military termination but toward setting the stage for continued interaction by peaceful means.[31] Therefore, it may be necessary for one mission to terminate and be replaced by another as part of a wider strategic plan. The term "termination" in this context is really more about transition than traditional notions associated with cease fires and victory parades.[32]

0503. As the crisis/environmental situation stabilizes during the course of an operation, Coalition control and coordination will become less critical thereby allowing for the delicate transition between Coalition forces to other military forces, governmental agencies, or the HN government. Similar to a traditional "relief in place" the coalition forces will carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition.

0504. Passing the lead from the military to other authorities usually requires extensive planning and preparation prior to the onset of operations. Therefore, the planning for termination and transition should occur from the outset of planning in a coordinated effort with relevant agencies, organizations, and multinational partners. The ability to understand how and when to terminate transition operations is instrumental to operational design.[33] Transition between military forces may take the form of relief in place or as a transition by function, such as medical, engineer services, communications, security and logistics.

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[30] Planning and Execution of Conflict Termination (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air Command and Staff College, 1995), page 94.
[31] Major J.R. Boulé (USA), Operational Planning and Conflict Termination paper, 2001, p. 3.
[32] NATO Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations AJP-3(A), Ratification Draft, 2006, p. 4-19.
[33] U.S. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, Chapter I – Strategic Context, 2008, p. I-5.

0505. The ultimate goal is to transition all functions performed by coalition forces in a smooth and orderly fashion. Some of the functions may develop into a combination of coalition, HN, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities during and as the transition advances. When functions are transitioned to international organizations or local organizations, they require detailed military planning. Ideally, once all transition activities are completed, the coalition military forces can depart. However, there may be occasions depending on the nature of the situation that a specified number of coalition forces will be required to take on a supporting role to train, advise and or assist.[34]

KEY ACTIVITIES THAT PROMOTE SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION [35]

- Conducting early planning with HN, International Organizations (IOs), and Non-Government Organization (NGOs);
- Establishing workable objectives, goals, and end states;
- Providing for adequate intelligence and communications to all agencies involved in the transition;
- Ensuring unity of effort;
- Harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and
- Establishing the appropriate C2 to manage the transition.

POLITICO-STRATEGIC CONTEXT

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

0506. Transition may represent not only a change in mandate but also threaten the cohesion of the force/authority. The strategic context and any changes to the political imperatives or expectations of contributing nations, or indeed the HN, must be clearly understood at the Operational level, and their impact made explicit.

CIVILIAN MILITARY COLLABORATION

0507. The military forces and civilian organizations may need to collaborate in the following areas:

- Access to intelligence products and services of civilian agencies,
- Early cooperation with the (possibly) civilian follow-on authority,
- Political and diplomatic support for agreements concerning handover of infrastructure, equipment and responsibilities,
- Political support amongst all coalition partners in order to perform the transition in a coherent, multinational manner, avoiding unilateral approaches.

[34] NATO Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations AJP-3(A), Ratification Draft, 2006, p. 4-20.
[35] NATO Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations AJP-3(A), Ratification Draft, 2006, p. 4-20.

TRANSITION PLANNING[36]

0508. To understand when to terminate military contributions to stabilization operations and how to preserve achieved military objectives are keys to attaining the strategic coalition end state. Once established, the strategic coalition end state and termination criteria enable development of the military strategic objectives and end state with the ultimate goal of transitioning all the functions performed by military forces in a smooth and synchronized fashion to other military forces, government agencies, IOs, NGOs or HN government. Military forces must therefore carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition to the relieving force, agency, or HN through collaborative coordination mechanisms that must be established.

0509. Normally, Civil-Military Operations (CMO) planners play a major role in transition planning and, based on their expertise, may be the best group to perform this function.

0510. Coalition Task Force Commanders may also consider the creation of an "Operations Transition Planning Cell" within their J5 directorate composed of military planners and functional experts from the international and interagency community. The purpose of the cell would be to assist the commander in achieving assigned political objectives while the rest of the staff focuses solely on military matters/operations.[37]

0511. In order for planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable military end state and properly conceived termination or transition criteria should be developed to ensure that achieved military objectives endure. Defining criteria varies from crisis to crisis but once developed must be constantly reassessed by all parties involved as the situation develops. Methods/approaches for defining criteria for termination or transition include but are not limited to the following:

- Events (e.g. development of a new constitution);
- Measures of Effective (MOE) and/or success (e.g. restoration of law and order to pre-crisis levels);
- Availability of resources (e.g. marked increase in locally produced water, food and electricity);
- Specific date (e.g. Elections);
- When other organizations have marshaled the necessary capabilities to assume the mission, military forces may execute a transition plan.

0512. A comprehensive transition plan includes specific requirements for all elements involved in the transition, summarizes capabilities and assets, and assigns specific requirements. Additionally, a transition plan written in easily understood terms is extremely helpful when transitioning from military to non-military organizations.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

0513. Collaborative planning should deliver agreed outcomes across all phases of the campaign as a whole and must consider issues associated with the Transition phase from the

[36] U.S. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, February 8, 2001, pgs. III-33-III-35.
[37] Major J.R. Boulé (USA), Operational Planning and Conflict Termination paper, 2001.

outset. It should identify how, throughout a crisis, all agencies might/will contribute to resolution and establish a clear vision of how synergy will be achieved between various agencies often disparate activities. Moreover, planning should be iterative that includes constant evaluation and re-evaluation of the crisis that will shape collaborative adjustments to the operations plan.

0514. Maintenance of Desired Outcomes and End-State is essential during the Execution of activities associated with Transition Operations. Maintaining focus on defined outcomes and the stated end-state will be particularly challenging during Transition from a *primarily* military operation (to deliver a secure environment, for example) to a situation where other organizations (like the UN or EU) or civil agencies may have the lead when reconstruction and stabilization activities become the primary focus. Collaborative planning across the various campaign phases that addresses the crisis as a whole will be of particular benefit during the final Transition phase to ensure focus is maintained on the desired end state. Ownership of the campaign plan at the strategic level will help provide unity of command during Transition and ensure that an enduring perspective is maintained. The preservation of corporate knowledge, as well as continuity of assessment and situational awareness, will also be critical during Transition.

0515. Transition between military forces may take the form of relief in place, or transition-by-function. Possible transition situations could be, but are not limited to, the following:

- Transition from military forces (under UN authority or not) to UN-led mission.
- Transition from military forces (UN or MN) to non-NATO military forces.
- Transition from military forces (UN or MN) directly to civilian control (regional organization, HN, UN, NGO, etc.).
- Transition from initial entry NATO Response Force (NRF) to follow-on force (NATO or non-NATO).[38]

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATION[39]

0516. In operational areas, the level of capability of local authorities can vary considerably. In failed or failing states, the environment may include very weak state institutions. In these cases, the UN mission may provide a transitional administration capability that is similar to a government. Transition activities can involve a number of issues that would be considered as outside the normal scope of military operations (e.g., law and order and provision of public utilities). Each of these issues will involve direct liaison and handover between counterparts.

0517. It is important that Combined Task Force (CTF) planners understand the range of potential transitions that can occur during an operation's life cycle. In many cases, these transitions reflect a meeting of two different cultures, the military operational framework and

[38] NATO Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations AJP-3(A), Ratification Draft, 2006, p. 4-19.
[39] MPAT Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP), Version 2.5, January 2010, Annex H, pgs. D1 H-1-D1 H-3.

the political-civilian operational framework. Communications, collaboration, and coordinated actions are critical for continuity of C2, operational success of ongoing functional missions, and to maintain a safe and secure environment. Several guidelines should be considered in the planning process based on an operation's life cycle.

a. Transitions are an "inherent fact" for Peace Operation (PO), and they are central for mission success.

b. PO Spectrum in the context of an operational Life Cycle involves all PO to include Peacemaking to Peace Enforcement, to Peacekeeping to Peace Building. These phases are overlapping and do not have clear divisions between them. They are variable and are dynamic in response to each unique contingency. Planners should, therefore, avoid trying to "box in" these missions or set artificial time frames since the phases are condition-based with time frames for achieving success.

c. Transitions must be thoroughly coordinated between CTF and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and subsequent UN-led Task Force (TF).

d. Transition from a Lead Nation Joint Task Force (JTF) to CTF is an internal transition within a MN command. The transition from a JTF Headquarters framework set-up to initially respond to a crisis to a CTF framework fully integrated MN command with unity of effort requires respect for all participating nations' national guidance, planning input, and limitations.

e. UN's Transitions are the domain of the UN and the UN established TF.

f. Contingency Planning is required to counter violence that may occur after a transition point occurs when a new command takes over and establishes their operational security. This planning is essential to counter threat forces that attempt to exploit "seams" (voids of perceived or real capabilities) between the commands during transition. To counter these "spoilers" requires contingency plans that avoid serious escalation of violence that can occur during transitions.

UN OPERATIONS[40]

0518. In operations sanctioned by the UN, there are two types of operations. These types of operations are UN authorized operation and UN-led operation.

a. A UN authorized operation is approved by the Security Council (SC) as a MN response to a crisis/situation, but is not authorised to activate a UN-led command. A Lead Nation (LN) is designated by the UN to provide the core military organization for the MN mission. Thus, a UN sanctioned LN Joint Task Force (JTF) organization is established that receives guidance and legitimacy from the UN SC. This form of command could be used when the level of force required is beyond the command and control capability of the UN or when a very rapid response is necessary.

[40] MPAT MNF SOP, Version 2.5, January 2010, Annex H, Appendix 1, pgs. D1 H1-1 – D1 H1-2.

b. A UN-led operation is sanctioned / sponsored by the UN SC and establishes a MN operational response that is directed, supported, and led by the UN. At the strategic level, the UN's DPKO provides direction to these operations. In the field, a UN Head of Mission (normally a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)) is appointed. The UN also assigns the Force Commander (FC) and other major appointments to support the operation.

0519. ***Operational Transition Planning***. The following transition planning considerations have been identified and set the conditions for successful transition operations.

a. ***Seamless and Operational Capability Continuity***. When changes in responsibilities occur during the various transitional phases, it is important that a reduction in operational capability should neither occur nor be perceived by the local population, threat factions, host governments, or other major actors within the mission area (IOs, NGOs, ICRC).

b. ***Exchange of Liaison and Planning Teams***. The exchange of Liaison Officers (LOs) between key commands and staffs is important for transition planning and PO. The practice of using LOs has been expanded to "Liaison and Planning Teams" to acknowledge the importance of "Liaison Planning" activities.

c. ***Conditions for Transition***. Mutually agreed criteria is essential for setting and understanding the preconditions that exist before a transition of command or activities occurs. The strategic criteria will be broad-based directions, which needs to be transformed into operational criteria agreed upon by the various key players in transitional operations. The conditions should be flexible to ensure that fundamental agreed conditions exist before handover is initiated. All participants should understand these criteria have an impact at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

d. ***Transition of Command***. Normally, for UN operations, details regarding the transition of command are contained in the UN SC resolution establishing the UN-led PO. When the UN Mission is prepared to assume command, clear and distinct change of responsibilities and authority must occur.

e. ***Unity of Effort***. Close working relationships between planners and staffs of organizations and task forces is essential in achieving unity of effort and success during the transition phases of an operation.

TRANSITION TO HOST NATION[41]

0520. There is no specific set of end goals that will fit all Transition situations. However, one prominent goal for Transition is that the post-conflict nation should possess a level of resilience to handle any future setbacks. Such HN resilience requires "success factors" – which primarily

[41] US Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Strategic Lesson Number 10: The "Essentials" of Transition, July 2012.

revolve around good governance and HN capacity to handle national affairs. “Success factors” include:

- The structure of the government has been agreed by its society; governance is stable;
- The government is able to provide reasonable, reliable services for its citizens;
- The government is being utilized to solve political disputes;
- The government is able to protect its borders, its citizens, and its national treasures;
- The government has demonstrated an ability to uphold the rule of law;
- The economy is stable; the government is able to provide regulation of the markets; and
- The government has gained commitments of support for development efforts.

0521. To maximize HN attainment of these success factors, it is imperative that the HN gain control – and gain proficiency – in the many sectors/functions that the intervening authorities (external nations/forces) have been managing. This transfer is a gradual process that requires careful planning by the intervening authorities and then close partnering with HN officials. An excellent example of this process comes from the UN contingent operating in Liberia in 2008. Aiming toward Transition, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) shifted its role from "leading" the delivery of services (security, reconstruction, social services, etc.) to "enabling" the Government of Liberia to take the lead. Primary measures used by the UNMIL Force in this "enabling" approach were: encouraging all external players to help the HN take the lead, inserting HN officials into the approval process and life cycle for all projects and services, conducting comprehensive information operations (IO) to improve the public’s perception of the HN government, and ensuring extensive civil-military coordination throughout the process.

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES

CRITICAL TRANSITIONAL POINTS

0522. Transition activities are likely to be characterized by uncertainty and potential volatility. Therefore, initial gains should be rapidly cemented or exploited if enduring progress is to be made and a favorable situation, which is transparent to the parties to any conflict, the indigenous population and HN decision-making infrastructure, is to be realized. Any concurrent Transition between forces or authorities at these critical stages further complicates the situation. Any lack of balance, situational awareness or focus may be exploited, both physically and psychologically, by an opponent. Additionally, these factors can potentially lead to a loss of perceived campaign legitimacy amongst HN and International actors. It is essential that every effort be made to identify critical transitional points during the initial planning of an operation and these points be reviewed following assessment and iterative/collaborative planning, to allow for their impact to be addressed and mitigated.

0523. ***Redeployment***. The redeployment of forces after termination of an operation is a highly complex matter, politically, militarily, economically and environmentally. It is not a simple case of reversing the deployment plan, but rather is a distinct operation in its own right.

Redeployment may be directed when operations have been terminated or higher authority directs movement of the assigned force.

0524. ***Redeployment Planning***. Mission planners should give the same considerations to the redeployment of forces as they did for the deployment of forces as it relates to C2 phasing and the orderly departure of all forces from the theatre of operations.

0525. ***Redeployment Timing***. Redeployment timing is an important factor in planning for the redeployment of troops and equipment. It is extremely difficult to formulate a redeployment plan before the operational end state has either been achieved or subsequent operations have been determined.

0526. ***Selectivity***. Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING FACTORS[42]

0527. Every operation has its unique planning factors; however, the following factors apply to all operations and will need to be considered at the redeployment planning stage:

- Clear and detailed operational and logistic requirements to determine the scale of the redeployment.
- The establishment of a planning team.
- Residual commitments, for example specialist logistic personnel, may remain in the operational area in an advisory capacity, e.g. to help with reconstruction efforts.
- Key events should be clarified at the earliest stage for planning in order to identify lead times and enable strategic lift planning to proceed, e.g. “earliest move” and “all out by”.
- The establishment of specialist teams to staff the hand-over of HN assets and to coordinate termination of contracts. Every effort must be taken to ensure that environmental, political and/or financial difficulties do not degrade relationships with the HN.
- Unit and formation integrity should be maintained during redeployment whenever possible and the commander should always keep in mind the reconstitution process for the next operation.

0528. Irrespective of how well the operation was conducted, a poor redeployment, under full scrutiny of the media, may well be the lasting image of the operation.

- There is considerable sensitivity about when and how planning is conducted, and its effects on own forces, local civilian and military morale.
- All HN and MN partners concerns should be taken into account so C2 for the redeployment is planned in advance and given careful considerations.

[42] NATO Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations AJP-3(A), Ratification Draft, 2006, p. 4-21.

CONCLUSION

TRANSITION ACTIVITIES

0529. Transition activities transfer functions performed by coalition military forces to a follow-on authority in a synchronized fashion in accordance with enduring, outcome based objectives. Activities are tempered by the requirement to maintain security and support to the follow-on authority within specific functional areas. Some functions may develop into a combination of coalition, HN, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities as the Transition progresses. The key in Transition is to develop a clear understanding between all partners of their contribution, by functions and in terms of C2, and how this changes over time.

OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

0530. A clear understanding of the operating environment as a whole is essential from the outset, prior to identifying a solution through planning. Effective analysis is vital to ensure that the underlying causes of a crisis/environmental situation, as well as the overt symptoms, are addressed. Specific emphasis will be required on understanding the effect that military activity may have on a wide range of participants in a given situation. This will be particularly pertinent during Transition.

0531. The incoming authority must have a sufficiently balanced capability to respond to any such eventuality.

- During transition, any differences in mandate, capability, risk appetite, interoperability and any national caveats must be transparent and mitigated against.
- When transitioning to civil authority the requirement for residual military capability must be considered and clearly defined. This may demand assistance in discrete functional areas or a broader overwatch or deterrent capability.

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PART SIX - SUMMARY

SUMMARY

STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

0601. Stabilization Operations involve various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted with other nations and other instruments of national power as well as NGOs, IOs and private volunteer organizations (PVOs). These operations are planned and implemented in failed, failing or dysfunctional nations to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

0602. Stabilization operations involve a variety of tasks and activities designed to restore a HN governance capabilities. These activities aim to: build partner capacity, strengthen legitimate governance, maintain rule of law, foster economic growth, and help forge a sense of national unity.

0603. Through a CA to stabilization operations, military forces leveraging their coercive and constructive capabilities establish a safe and secure environment that enables the efforts of the other instruments of national and international power to operate and to meet mission objectives. These efforts by military forces build a foundation for transitioning from military control to civilian control, and eventually to the HN control. Stabilization operations are usually conducted to support a HN government or transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate, functioning HN government exists. Generally, military forces establish or restore basic civil functions and protect them until a civil authority or the HN is capable of providing these services for the local populace. Military forces perform specific functions as part of their broader response tasks supporting the complementary activities of other agencies, organizations, and the private sector. When the HN or other agency cannot fulfil their role, military forces may be called upon to significantly increase its role, including providing the basic civil functions of government.

0604. Stabilization Operations are complex, high risk and lengthy endeavours. In most scenarios, stabilization operations do not aim to reduce the military presence quickly but aim to achieve broader national policy goals that extend beyond the objectives of military operations. The more effective those military efforts are for setting conditions that facilitate the efforts of other instruments of national power, the more likely it is that the long-term commitment of substantial military forces will not be required.

0605. Military contributions to stabilization operations operate with other instruments of national power to forge unity of effort through a whole of government approach. Therefore, integrating the planning efforts of all agencies and organizations involved in stabilization operations is essential to establishing long-term peace and stability in a fragile nation.

SSR

0606. A key program in establishing stability and security in a country or region rift with conflict and instability is SSR. SSR is a set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that are undertaken by a government to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice and is a key part of all stabilization operations. The security sector comprises the individuals and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the HN and its people. This group of individuals and institutions includes military and any state-sponsored paramilitary forces; national and local police; the justice and corrections systems; coastal and border security forces; oversight bodies; militia; and private military and security companies employed by the state. The security sector represents the foundation of effective, legitimate governance and the potential of the state for enduring viability. The military force's specific roles and mission in conducting SSR tasks is driven by the conditions of the operational environment. In a non-permissive environment, military forces expect to lead reform efforts. In a more permissive environment, other SSR partners perform specific SSR activities via military forces. During peacetime engagements, the military assist in reforming established HN defense institutions and processes, as well as providing security assistance activities aimed at promoting SSR objectives in HN forces. The military forces supporting SSR activities closely coordinate with other players, consistent with a collaborative, CA.

DDR

0607. A second important program supporting stabilization operations is DDR. DDR focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and belligerent groups, and sets the foundation for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these citizens live. DDR program planning directly ties to SSR, determining the potential size and scope of military, police, and other security structures. Along with disarming and demobilizing former combatants, their reintegration back into their communities sets the foundation for, and directly impacts the success of, long-term peace building and development programs. Generally, military forces do not lead the planning and execution of DDR programmes but are key contributors in the planning. Military forces are normally responsible for performing or assisting in the disarmament and demobilization phases of an operation.

RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS

0608. A third important program supporting stabilization operations is the work of RTs that are interim civil-military entities that operate in an area experiencing instability and insecurity. Within a set geographic or regional area, a RT focuses on improving the provincial government's ability to provide effective governance and essential services to citizens in a specific town, area, or community. Strengthening the provincial government is important given the decentralization of authority common in post-conflict environments and in many developing states. RTs are tailored to the needs of different regional conditions and national priorities of participating governments, and comprise of international civilian and military personnel with diverse and complementary functional specialities. With different tour service lengths for diverse team

members, it is a challenge to ensure continuity between redeploying personnel and new arrivals in order to maintain project priorities and prevent unnecessary program termination and restarts that expend scarce resources and interrupt the aid provided to the local populace.

TRANSITION

0609. A fourth important program associated with stabilization operations is Transition which focuses on the transfer of functions performed by the coalition military forces to a follow-on authority, in a smooth and orderly fashion, coherent with agreed, enduring, outcome-based objectives and an approved transition plan. However, this must be tempered by the requirement to maintain security and support the follow-on authority within specific functional areas, while guarding against dependency. As such, some functions may develop into a combination of coalition military forces, HN, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities as Transition progresses from military activities to non-military, civilian-led activities. It is important that planners understand the range of potential transitions than can occur during an operation's life cycle. In many cases, these transitions reflect a meeting of two different cultures, the military operational framework and the political-civilian operational framework. Communications, collaboration, and coordinated actions are critical for continuity of C2, operational success of ongoing functional missions, and to maintain a safe and secure environment during the transfer of responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

0610. This handbook is designed to demonstrate that military forces in conducting stabilization operations must operate with other instruments of national power, NGOs, IOs, PVOs in forging a unity of effort through a whole of government approach. An integrated planning effort involving all agencies and organizations is essential to long-term stability and peace.

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ANNEX A - ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ANSO	Afghanistan NGO Safety Office
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AusAID	Australian Assistance Infrastructure Development (AUS)
CAF	Country Assistance Framework (UN)
CAF	Conflict Analysis Framework (World Bank)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CDA	Conflict-related Development Analysis
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)
CIVPOL	Civilian Police (UN)
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CPR	Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSRS	Centre for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
CTF	Combined Task Force; Coalition Task Force
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DCE	Deployable civilian expert
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGCID	General Directorate for International Cooperation and Development (FRA)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
EC	European Commission
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
FAST	Swiss Peace Early Warning Program
FCO	Foreign Commonwealth Office (UK)
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (UK)
HN	Host Nation
IC	International Community
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IO	International Organization
ISF	Indigenous Security Force
JSA	Joint Stabilization Assessment
JSSR	Justice and Security Sector Reform
JTF	Joint Task Force

LN	Lead Nation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
MN	Multinational
NAO	National Audit Office (UK)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGHA	Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NRF	NATO Response Force
OA	Operational Analysis
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
OECD DAC	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
OGD	Other Governmental Departments
PBC	Peace-building Commission
PBSO	Peace-Building Support Office (UN)
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PO	Peace Operation(s)
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSD	Private-Sector Development
QiPs	Quick Impact Projects
RE	Reconstruction Efforts
RT	Reconstruction Teams
SA	Stabilization Adviser / Situational Awareness
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRSG	Senior Representative of Secretary General (UN)
SSR	Security Sector Reform/Security System Reform
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRF/TRM	Transitional Results Framework/Matrix
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDG (O)	United Nations Development Group (Office)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP BCPR	The UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UN SC	United Nations Security Council

US	United States
USAID	US Dept of State Assistance Infrastructure Development
US S/CRS	The US Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

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AUSTRALIA

AusAID (Australian Agency for International Development).

The Australian Government's overseas aid program is a federally funded program that aims to reduce poverty in developing countries. AusAID is the Australian Government agency

within the Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio responsible for managing Australia's overseas aid program. The objective of the aid program is to assist developing countries reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development, in line with Australia's national interest.

Australia's aid program focuses on the Asia Pacific region. Two thirds of the world's poor, some 800 million people, reside in the Asia Pacific, yet receive less than one third of total aid flows. Australia continues to provide selective assistance to Africa and the Middle East, primarily working through international and non-government organisations.

AusAID contributes funding to international organisations that help people in emergencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and through the United Nations to UNICEF and to the UN Development Programme, for their work in developing countries. AusAID contributes to global and regional poverty reduction programs set up by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.5

RAPID RECONNAISSANCE HANDBOOK FOR HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RESPONSE

Version 2.2
07 July 2014

Prepared by: Operations (Ops) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting action phase, the **MIC Steering Group (SG)** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations/plans branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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PREFACE

The MIC Rapid Reconnaissance Handbook for Humanitarian/Disaster Response is published under the direction of the MIC Principals. It is a compilation of best practice general information on humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance fundamentals, methods, approaches, teams, planning, information management, basic assessment understanding of lifelines, and critical facilities and lessons learned.

This handbook was developed by the MIC for commanders and staff at the strategic and higher operational levels as a reference tool for contingency and strategic/operational level reconnaissance planning in the event of or as a result of humanitarian/disaster relief. It was written with the assumption that international assistance, including military assistance, was requested by the host government/ Humanitarian Coordinator (in large scale disasters a separate Humanitarian Coordinator may be appointed), and that national governmental decision making processes to commit military forces in support of such emergencies/crises have taken place and have been approved. It was also assumed that these types of operations would be undertaken within a permissive environment; that the host nation maintains law and order in the intended area of operations and that the host nation government has both the intent and capability to assist in the operation.

It should also be noted that any use of foreign military and civil defense assets should be undertaken under the Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA guidelines) and Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines). Although a non-binding document, it establishes the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in international disaster relief operations.

The concepts outlined in this handbook, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, are relevant to the strategic and operational levels of command in military operations other than war (MOOTW) and are applicable whether or not a lead nation has been identified or a coalition formed. In certain situations the approach in concepts within this handbook may not apply or may be modified to fit the circumstances of the emergency/crisis.

This is a living document that will change based on lessons learned from coalition and national operational experiences. Suggestions for amendments to this publication are to be sent to the Operations MIWG Secretary or the MIC Executive Secretariat at js.mic.es@mail.mil.

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PART ONE: MILITARY STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION

WHAT IS DISASTER RESPONSE?

1. Disaster response is the sum total of actions taken by nations, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations (IO) in the face of a threat or occurrence of a disaster. These actions commence with the warning of an oncoming threatening event or with the event itself if it occurred without warning. Disaster response also includes aspects that may be in place prior to a disaster, i.e., the implementation of disaster plans and procedures. Response thus overlaps with disaster preparedness. The end of disaster response ostensibly comes with the completion of disaster rehabilitation program. Although national militaries play a significant role in disaster response, as directed by their respective government international development agencies and subsequent support to the United Nations (UN) Special Representative Secretary General and/or OCHA, civilian relief agencies will remain on the ground long after the military mandate has been met and forces have departed, ensuring that the rehabilitation programs are complete or well on their way to completion.

SCOPE OF NATURAL DISASTER RESPONSE

2. Disaster response picks up where disaster preparedness leaves off. Nevertheless, response activities should be considered as inseparable from the planning for them. This means having preparedness plans in place, standing operating procedures developed, stockpiles identified, emergency facilities and their capacities lined up, and legal authorization and emergency funds to implement post disaster activities in place.

3. The first activity of a response program, however, will be the disaster warning. This may initiate military response planning and produce public announcements about what actions to take as final preparations and what to do immediately after the disaster has struck. In some cases, evacuation will be called for.

4. After the disaster has struck, response will continue with both civilian and military personnel conducting search and rescue for the victims and an immediate reconnaissance of the damages and needs. Further assessments will be made as the emergency passes and as more information becomes available.

5. Emergency recovery will be initiated in the various sectors of health, food, shelter, public services and facilities, and others. The implementation of these programs will require the operational support of communication and information flow,

logistics and supplies and other resources. These programs will then be linked to the long-term development of the community, either indirectly, or by design.

6. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, military disaster planning, as part of the greater international community commitment, must include the integral involvement of the community population and its disaster victims, as part of a whole of government approach, in the implementation of the response programs.

RELATIONSHIP OF RESPONSE TO OTHER PARTS OF THE DISASTER CONTINUUM

7. Disasters are now recognized as being one of the major contributors to underdevelopment. It has also been recognized that, if disaster response is mishandled, many years of development activities can be wiped out or the chances for further progress set back. Disasters can alter agricultural patterns, settlement patterns, patterns of migration, work habits, diets and even basic family structure. On the other hand, if the military response is well planned and takes a development approach in coordination with the host nation and other international response organizations, a disaster can provide opportunities for accelerating the pace of development, and allow for constructive changes to be made.

8. All disaster-related activities are divided into distinct stages. The length of time any one stage will last can vary greatly depending on the type of disaster and other factors. As well, the time periods of the stages are unlikely to be discrete and will often need to be undertaken concurrently, therefore requiring a flexible response. It is important that commanders and staff involved in disaster response recognize the different stages and the appropriate activities that occur in each.

9. In general, disaster response can be divided into three broad stages:

a. Stage 1 – Immediate Life Saving Phase. Assessment, search and rescue, medical aid, delivery of water and emergency shelter;
b. Stage 2 – Stabilization Phase. Life preserving activities such as the ongoing delivery of food aid and the development of local capacity, assistance with water and sanitation, and the construction of emergency shelters; and
c. Stage 3 – General Recovery Phase. Rehabilitation and reconstruction aimed at community self-sufficiency and restoration of local/national governance.

DEFINITION OF RECONNAISSANCE

10. NATO defines reconnaissance as: "A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological,

hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area." The overall purpose of a reconnaissance is to provide information and to make recommendations that will enable timely decisions for an appropriate response.

11. Humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance operation requires forethought and planning to determine critical information support needs. Headquarters should review their information needs and prepare assessment plans as part of their general disaster preparedness activities.

DEFINITION OF ASSESSMENT

12. The term "disaster assessment" refers to the survey and information collection activities carried out to determine the effects of a disaster on disaster victims, the stricken community/area and the society in general. The purpose is to provide information that can guide emergency services and military support in search and rescue missions, pinpoint the location and nature of secondary threats that may continue to endanger survivors, provide information about the status of facilities needed to treat or support the survivors, and provide information about access to stricken communities. It is important to note that humanitarian/disaster assessment needs are primarily carried out by the host nation (HN) civilian aid agencies, governmental departments and civil facility authorities.

13. After the initial reconnaissance is completed, the assessment process continues with surveys designed to compile more detailed information about the extent of losses, and to provide operational planners with information needed to support relief and reconstruction programs. In this phase, damage is quantified and estimates of the impact of the disaster on the entire community and society are projected.

14. In long-term or continuing disasters, the disaster assessment process is first initiated to enable civilian agencies, supported by military organizations, to plan lifesaving activities, and then continues as a means of monitoring the situation and forecasting future needs of the victims and the supporting agencies.

IMPORTANCE OF RECONNAISSANCE

15. Humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance is a key element of successful disaster response. Evaluation of past disasters suggests that however urgent the crisis, time and effort spent on reconnaissance results in a better designed, coordinated and more cost effective relief support effort. A swift, accurate and credible reconnaissance will enable operational staff planners to proceed expeditiously with developing operational plans. Therefore, reconnaissance should be given a high priority in the initial stages of the planning process. Once political approval is given for detailed government planning,

subsequent reconnaissance visits should be planned frequently, and liaison teams from the designated HQ should be deployed to appropriate agencies within the affected area as soon as possible. Whenever possible, national reconnaissance should be coordinated internationally.

COORDINATION REQUIREMENT

16. National bodies and recognized organizations such as the UN, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), NGOs and a host of donor organizations, are likely to be involved in international relief efforts to mitigate the effects of humanitarian emergencies/disasters. While close and early coordination between civilian and military authorities/actors is essential within a comprehensive/whole of government approach, to overcome sensitivities, it is not always easy without an established command and control (C2) structure. Hence the significant role UNOCHA plays in bringing together national and international humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. Coordination and cooperation on the ground will depend on the experience and capability of the affected country and may, therefore, be erratic and confused, particularly in the first few days. Notwithstanding this, the pattern of operations is likely to be influenced significantly by the lead responding agency.

17. Although nations have the capability to operate unilaterally, the potential scale of any necessary humanitarian/disaster response is such that any national response is likely to be but part of a wider international relief effort. This international effort may include other nations' military forces to varying degrees. While potentially not part of a formal coalition, there may be opportunities to develop multinational support from and for other deployed forces, including Host Nation Support (HNS), logistic support and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). Neighboring countries will have to be consulted over a range of issues such as over-flight rights or staging areas for national forces. All efforts on the 'ground' should be coordinated with other contributors in order to generate the desired unity of effort in addressing the needs of the stricken country.

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

18. The engagement of military forces, with unique reconnaissance assets, in humanitarian/disaster relief operations is based on the necessity for speed of reaction, including proximity of suitable resources to the disaster area, the scale of effort required or specialist skills to deal with the consequences of a humanitarian emergency/disaster. Military forces will, therefore, normally only be engaged in response to rapid onset disasters and normally at the request of humanitarian organizations through official governmental channels. The magnitude of a disaster or the threat environment may also call for military involvement in the national response.

19. National task forces, both civil and military defense assets, should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms providing specific support to particular requirements in response to an acknowledged 'humanitarian gap' between the humanitarian emergency/disaster needs and the relief community resources available to meet those needs. Disaster relief operations will, therefore, normally be limited in both scope and duration. The use of military and civil defense assets should be undertaken in accordance with the MCDA Guidelines and the Oslo Guidelines as appropriate.

20. The role of military forces is not primarily humanitarian operations or disaster relief operations. However, military forces have an ability to quickly task organize to perform such operations and have unique capabilities that can complement the overall relief effort. In principle, military assets should be considered only when civilian capabilities have been or will become over-stretched, are not an appropriate alternative (unique capability), are unavailable or as a last resort and in certain circumstances, when the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action, and/or where the use of military assets is determined to be more cost-effective in overall terms. Military support should focus on indirect assistance and logistical as well as infrastructure support; direct support should be an exception. The composition of the military task force (TF) committed in support of humanitarian/disaster relief will vary depending on the circumstances, the state of civilian coping mechanisms and the complexity of the disaster.

21. When military forces are involved in humanitarian/disaster relief operations their assets are provided primarily to supplement or complement the relief efforts of the affected country's civil authorities and/or of the humanitarian relief community. This support may include but is not limited to logistics, transportation, airfield management, communications, medical support, distribution of relief commodities and security. Further examples of military support are contained in Annex F.

22. Notwithstanding specific missions, under all but exceptional circumstances, military forces will be deployed in support of disaster relief efforts and should normally not assume leadership of the overall disaster relief. This does not preclude supporting civil C2 or providing C2 infrastructure when necessary. However, wherever possible, maximum use of established infrastructure should be made in order to preclude the national TF from becoming a hub upon which other responding agencies become reliant, thereby creating the potential for longer-term dependency and making it more difficult to redeploy at the appropriate moment. The generic military role is to support and enable the effort to relieve emergency needs until such time as disaster coping capacities no longer require military support. This decision is taken by national government officials in consultation with their national ministry of defense. The senior national government representative and the national task force commander (TFC) will determine the direction of military activities on the ground.

23. Although it is the primary responsibility of the affected nation with their respective Local Emergency Management Authorities (LEMA) supported by international agencies to conduct disaster needs assessments, they may not have the ability to do so or capability to respond fast enough depending on the complexity, size and nature of the emergency/crisis. In such cases, along with multilateral and bilateral agreements, military forces may be requested to provide and/or assist in disaster needs assessments.

24. To assist Joint or "J" staffs in the planning, coordination and execution of reconnaissance missions, a MIC National Military Strategic Reconnaissance Point of Contact Directory is provided at Annex G.

CIVIL - MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

25. International operations have stressed the requirement for closer cooperation and coordination of CIMIC activities. The increasing complexity of international emergencies added to the number of stakeholders in a given area require task forces to synchronize military and civil phases of an operation and to consider associated strategic and operational factors which have a direct impact on command, control, communications and information systems. The national TFC and his staff, subordinate commanders as well as members of the force, must operate in a multidisciplinary environment to accomplish mission objectives. CIMIC activities in international operations are a command responsibility requiring leadership by all commanders. Prioritization of military and civil tasks will be based on mission objectives and the force's end-state, coupled with an effective and efficient civil-military resource allocation and management system, which should contribute to the elimination of duplication of effort among all stakeholders involved in the mission. The end result will be a reduction in the waste of civil-military resources earmarked for civil tasks. Cooperation and coordination of effort among all stakeholders are key to success in CIMIC activities and often, the mission cannot be achieved without significant progress in the civil phase of a military operation.

UNITED NATIONS – HUMANITARIAN CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (UN-CMCOORD)

26. UN-CMCoord promotes humanitarian principles, and protects humanitarian operating space, in humanitarian response operations where both humanitarian/civilian and military actors are present.

27. Defined as the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors, OCHA is the focal point for UN-CMCoord within the United Nations system, providing the international community with the development and facilitation of guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA). OCHA plans, mobilizes and coordinates UN-CMCoord emergency response tools in support of Humanitarian Coordinators and humanitarian assistance operations.

28. Interaction between the humanitarian/civil community and the military (domestic and/or foreign forces) ranges from coexistence to cooperation. The role of UN-CMCoord is invaluable in avoiding competition, minimizing inconsistency and when appropriate pursuing common goals between these actors. UN-CMCoord underscores the importance of coordination as a shared responsibility, to include:

a. Joint planning;
b. Information sharing; and
c. Task division, where practicable, between the humanitarian/civil and military communities.

SECTION 2 – FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE

STAKEHOLDERS

1. Generally, three types of organizations carry out assessments: governments; relief and reconstruction agencies (both governmental and non-governmental); and lenders or organizations that provide economic assistance either directly to the victims or to the governments and relief agencies.

2. The information needs of a government are more comprehensive than those of the other two types of organizations. Governments need information not only about the impact of the disaster on individuals and families, but also about its impact on lifelines (water, sewerage, communications and transportation networks, and electrical systems); critical facilities such as hospitals and government facilities; transportation facilities such as ports and warehouses, airports, and fuel supplies; and finally on the economy and means of production.

3. Relief agencies are primarily concerned with collecting information that will enable them to respond more efficiently to emergency needs and provide the information needed to plan relief and reconstruction programs.

4. Lenders and donors normally require information about the overall extent of the disaster and its economic impact. This enables them to estimate the economic assistance requirements at both the family and community levels.

REQUIREMENTS

5. Evaluation of past disasters suggests that the time and effort spent coordinating activities based on initial assessment performed by an experienced disaster assistance team results in a more effective relief effort. Disasters often seriously disrupt local infrastructure such as transportation (including airport landing and cargo handling capacity), communications, food supply and shelter provision. Under these circumstances, relief supplies and personnel (often unfamiliar with the area) sent into a disaster zone without a plan based on a sound assessment can hinder rather than help the situation; this can cost further lives through enthusiastic, but possibly inappropriate or inadequate response. An early reconnaissance of the nature and extent of the disaster and the type of aid needed is an essential requirement not only for the initial response but also for its long-term consequences within the relief effort. Three types of information need to be collected:

a. Situational Information. Situational information details the magnitude of the disaster, the extent of its impact on both the population and the infrastructure of society, and expectations of future events (possibility of aftershocks, ongoing flooding, population movement);

b. Needs Information. Needs information identifies resources and services for immediate emergency measures to save and sustain the lives of the affected population; and

c. Planning Information. Planning information on local capacities, the operations of local disaster management authorities, and the predicted international response of humanitarian agencies are required to assess potential courses of action.

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

6. Consideration of the use of military resources, whether for humanitarian or other purposes, should begin with an assessment of the desired effects, before determining the specific assets or capacity required to deliver them. To achieve this, national headquarters should identify key staff ready to move at short notice at the request of their governments. Military representatives should either be employed as liaison officers to their governments lead agency/department or if necessary work with their national representatives in the effected region. Appropriate authority within nations would be required to approve the deployment of personnel.

7. While deployed with the lead agency/department military representation should be low profile, so as not to create any expectation of military involvement, although it will be important to make sufficient declaration of their presence to the host nation. No assumption should be made at this stage that there should or will be a military contribution. The assessment will rather seek to ensure a swift and effective contribution if military assistance should prove appropriate and necessary.

8. The assessments and advice, which are sent back to nations by the joint team in theatre should adhere to a timetable set by the terms of reference/mandate of the mission, and should aim to reflect agreement about whether the use of military resources will be appropriate.

INITIAL OR RAPID RECONNAISSANCE

9. Initial or rapid reconnaissance comprises the gathering of both situational and needs assessment in the early critical stage of a disaster to determine the type of relief support required for immediate response. It also addresses diplomatic coordination focusing on status of forces, security, and coordination with the HN military, etc. Reconnaissance team members should also look for patterns and indicators of potential problems. The gathering of all this information must proceed rapidly. As such, initial reconnaissance aims to:

a. Identify the impact a disaster has had on a society and its infrastructure, and the ability of that society to cope;
b. Identify the extent of the damage and needs of the communities involved. This information is gathered from needs assessments, which are normally conducted by the HN civilian aid agencies and coordinated by a UN organization. Some of the assessment needs required are, but not limited to:

    (1) Identifying the most vulnerable segments of the population that need to be targeted for assistance; and
    (2) Identifying the most urgent relief needs and potential methods of providing them most effectively;

c. Identify the level of response by the affected country and its internal capacity to cope with the situation;
d. Identify the level of response from the international community;
e. Identify recommendations which define and set priorities on the actions and resources needed for immediate response;
f. Identify the resources required to support the relief response effort;
g. Highlight special concerns regarding the development of the situation; and
h. Determine the feasibility of the mission which is built on satisfying the pillars of health services support, logistics, force protection and determining the concept of operations.

ELEMENTS OF RECONNAISSANCE

10. Humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance can be divided into six primary elements:

a. Pre-disaster Planning. From a macro perspective, potential natural hazards can be identified well in advance; the means of collecting the necessary information and selection of formats for collection and presentation of the information should be established as part of general disaster preparedness activities;
b. Information Collection. The gathering of the information must proceed rapidly and thoroughly. Standard reconnaissance techniques, questionnaires, checklists and procedures are needed to make sure that all areas are examined and the information is reported using standard terminology and classifications;
c. Interpretation. Analysis of the information is the most critical part of the humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance. Those doing the analysis must be trained to detect and recognize indicators of problems, to interpret the information correctly, and to link the information to effective relief support plans;

d. Forecasting. On the basis of an analysis of existing information, the national TF headquarters must estimate the entire situation within their area of operations and forecast resources and trends for the emergency and reconstruction periods;

e. Reporting. Efficient reporting requires that the reconnaissance team present only essential information and structure the analysis so that the main patterns and trends are clear; and

f. Monitoring. Humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance should not be seen as an end result; rather it is a process that continues throughout the disaster and well into its aftermath. The initial reconnaissance should provide baseline information and a basis for monitoring the situation to determine whether it is improving or deteriorating. It also provides a means of measuring the effectiveness of relief support activities.

RECONNAISSANCE METHODS

11. There are generally four methods used for carrying out humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance. They are:

a. Field Reconnaissance. Provides the most accurate and complete method by actual on-site inspection by trained technicians and observers;

b. Over Flight Reconnaissance. Light aircraft and helicopters enable reconnaissance members to quickly fly over the area of operations to gather an accurate picture of the extent and magnitude of the disaster. However, over flights may also be misleading and therefore must be verified with information developed on the ground from reliable, qualified observers;

c. Aerial Photography and Remote Sensing Reconnaissance. Aerial photography is a valuable tool for a disaster reconnaissance. Aerial photography methods range from simple, out-of-the-window photography of the damaged areas and facilities to precision oblique and vertical photography using special cameras and specially modified airplanes. Remote sensing is the science of deriving information about an object, area or phenomenon from a distance (i.e. satellite). Aircraft imagery provides detail that satellite imagery cannot yet provide; and

d. Remote Reporting Systems. Remote reporting is a method used by governments to speed the initial reconnaissance. It is limited to reports on critical facilities, lifelines and other physical installations. Remote reporting uses a combination of electronic data transmission and field reports prepared by trained observers using standard reporting formats and damage classifications. Information is transmitted via radio, telephone, cell phone, Internet, courier, etc., to the national TF headquarters. Remote reporting speeds the reconnaissance process and allows the disaster

response planning staff to commence immediate analysis and disaster relief planning for the area of operations. However, to be successful, the remote reporting system must be established as part of a comprehensive disaster preparedness effort.

SECURITY / PROTECTION

12. While humanitarian/disaster relief operations are conducted in a permissive environment, a by-product of the disaster may be increased civil tensions and the possibility of isolated civil unrest and criminal activity. Subject to agreed bi-lateral arrangements and the provision of security by the HN, there may be a need to provide suitable security arrangements to secure high value assets, mission critical equipment and supplies, and the immediate operating environment, e.g. deployed aircraft, ground support equipment, port facilities, and aircraft operating areas. As well, military forces may be required to assist in planning and providing advice on security measures for humanitarian/disaster relief operations. Security collaboration in the field between the HN, UN, NGOs, IOs and other military forces is important.

13. In accordance with the duties and responsibilities of sovereign states under customary international law and practice, and subject to the provision of any HN agreement or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the primary responsibility for the security of deployed personnel, while deployed in a foreign country, is that of the government of that country. Accordingly, the authority to carry and use arms for the protection of the military personnel is a matter expressly dealt with in any agreement or SOFA that may be in place between the deploying nation and the host state. However, without further written or oral direction military personnel are entitled to use force in self-defense (up to and including deadly force) to protect oneself, other members of the force, and non-military national personnel who are attached or seconded to a force against hostile act or hostile intent.

KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL RECONNAISSANCE

14. A reconnaissance that is improperly planned or handled can delay the support response and in some cases cause increased suffering and even death. Reconnaissance that tries to quantify every detail of a crisis/emergency will be completed too late to be of any good, and no matter how hard the reconnaissance team tries, the information will still be subjective. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that reconnaissance provides "best estimates" of the situation. Several key factors that contribute to the design of a successful humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance are:

a. Identification of Users. Humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance should be designed to collect information for specific national TF headquarters staff planners;

b. Defining the Information Needed for Appropriate Response. In designing a reconnaissance, it is extremely important to consider what information is required to assist national TF staff planners in identifying and responding to the various operational support requirements;

c. Format. It is important that the information collected in the reconnaissance be organized and presented in such a way that its implications are clear and that it triggers immediate and appropriate staff action. This may mean breaking the overall reconnaissance information into a series of smaller, problem or situational focused reports. Annex E, based somewhat on OCHA template reports, provides a basic format for reporting that could be recognizable across multinational civilian and military actors and that could be adjusted accordingly to meet the crisis situation;

d. Timing. Situations and support requirements change dramatically from day to day, and the reconnaissance must be timed to collect relevant information at a time when the information is both available and will have an impact on response planning;

e. Standardized Rating and Classification of Information. Numerous national military forces operating independently will invariably carry out humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance. Therefore, in order to reduce duplication of effort and provide a basis for evaluating the information, standardized forms, terminology, definitions, ratings and classifications should be established;

f. Interpretation. Interpretation is the most crucial element of the humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance. It is important to design a reconnaissance that will distinguish between chronic and emergency support requirements. Reconnaissance team members must differentiate between what is normal for the location and what is a result of the disaster so that the supported relief effort can be directed to those most in need. They must also be able to spot trends and determine whether the information collected is accurate or erroneous;

g. Dissemination. Once the reconnaissance analysis is complete, it is important that the information get to the appropriate operational planners in a timely manner and in a useful form so that it will stimulate staff action and speed response. Failure to disseminate and share information derived from reconnaissance is one of the major problems in emergency response management; and

h. Consider Country-Specific Sensitivities. The reconnaissance team must be sensitive to the community's own response to the crisis, and the impact of the disaster on the coping mechanisms and the social structure of the families, victims, clans, tribes, villages and or other societies in the

community. The team needs to structure its assessment questions so that expectations are not created.

PART TWO: OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND PLANNING

SECTION 1 - RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES

RECONNAISSANCE TECHNIQUES

1. Although there are three general techniques used to collect information in disasters there is no one correct way of conducting a reconnaissance.

a. Checklists. Checklists are the most common method used in humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance. Checklists should be organized according to the priorities of the national TF headquarters and structured so that more detail is obtained about those sectors of concern to the headquarters.

(1) Annex A, Pre-Reconnaissance Checklist, represents information that should be available to the reconnaissance team prior to departure. This information will form the baseline for initial assessment but will need updating on arrival in the country to determine the current gravity of the disaster situation (reducing/worsening) and the capacity of the relief effort (increasing/reducing) to cope in relation to the needs of the stricken population (increasing/decreasing). This information can be acquired from the Department of International Development (or equivalent) or the overseas post in the affected area.

(2) Annex B, Operational Area Reconnaissance Checklist, represents those issues/questions which must be answered/addressed for the national TF headquarters in determining the feasibility of the mission and the necessary support required within the area of operations;

(3) Annex C, Disaster Needs Assessment Checklist, represents nine needs assessment areas, which the reconnaissance team should gather from the appropriate host nation civilian authorities/relief organizations or must answer/address on behalf of the host national government should that government's internal agencies not have the ability to conduct the disaster needs assessments due to the complexity, size and nature of the disaster; and

(4) Although the checklists contain a lengthy list of questions/issues to be considered, they are to be addressed and staffed accordingly and not just identified as being in place or not. While not exhaustive, the checklists do provide a basis from which to work from.

b. Questionnaires. Questionnaires appear to be a useful method for obtaining specific information for planning purposes in certain sectors, but not a good tool for collecting situational information in the immediate aftermath of the

disaster. Questionnaires are most commonly used in needs assessments by the host nation or various civilian organizations to help determine the individual needs and priorities of the victims;

c. Procedure Manuals. The purpose of the manual is to orient the reconnaissance team, provide information about how to conduct the reconnaissance and identify national TF headquarters staff or organizations that should be consulted. The procedures manual contains a combination of procedures, forms and specific instructions about how to obtain the information needed by the national TF headquarters.

SECTION 2 - COMMON APPROACHES TO RECONNAISSANCE

APPROACHES

1. There are two ways to approach humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance:

   a. Comprehensive or General Reconnaissance. This is the collection of information about every aspect of a disaster and as such requires an extensive information gathering capability and a large reconnaissance team. They are often conducted in phases, starting with the relief support requirements, resources and risks; and
   b. Critical Sector Reconnaissance. Focuses on those sectors that are affected within the area of operations by specific types of disaster. Once the critical sectors have been identified, each sector can be reconnoitered to determine likely post-disaster support requirements. When examining critical sectors, it is important to remember that support requirements change with time.

CONSIDERATIONS

2. There are several important considerations in understanding approaches to reconnaissance:

   a. Reconnaissance Priorities. Different types of disasters require different priorities in reconnaissance. Critical sectors will vary according to the disaster type;
   b. Information Requirements. The manner in which a military force will respond to a disaster often helps define the information that should be collected in the reconnaissance;
   c. Reconnaissance Timing. The planned response of the national TF headquarters also helps to determine the appropriate timing and location of the reconnaissance; and
   d. Distinguishing Between Emergency and Chronic Support Requirements. Virtually all disaster-prone countries of the Third World have long-standing, chronic support requirements in most, if not all, sectors. One of the important tasks of reconnaissance is to distinguish between chronic and disaster related support requirements.

CREDIBILITY

3. A major problem for operational planning staffs is establishing the credibility of other national reconnaissance information results. The reconnaissance must be

thorough and provide information in such a way that it reduces the necessity for other military forces or nations from conducting their own reconnaissance. In reality however, few military forces or nations accept the reconnaissance results of others because there seems to be a felt need for each national TF headquarters to assess the situation nationally in order to ensure that the reconnaissance is accurate. To some extent, this duplication of effort can serve as a means of verification. But if a reconnaissance is well planned, if the methodologies and procedures utilized provide an objective with a clear, concise and rapid picture of the situation, and if the reconnaissance reports describe the information gathering techniques, procedures and standards, the need for verification and follow up reconnaissance can be substantially reduced.

SECTION 3 - RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS

TEAM MODELS

1. There are many different ways that a disaster reconnaissance team can be structured. Several "models" have emerged as the most common:

a. Disaster Area Survey Team (DAST) / Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). DAST/HAST teams are comprised of trained specialists whose primary responsibility in case of disaster is disaster assessment. The teams are usually multi-disciplinary and are trained specifically for the disaster assessment role. Generally, DAST/HAST teams are used only by large governmental relief organizations in an international disaster assistance role. These teams may include but are not limited to; joint staffs J1 through to J9, medical personnel, engineering specialists, legal and political advisors, public affairs, special operations force staff, embassy/consulate liaison officers and a UN representative. They operate with their own equipment and can be inserted into a disaster area to develop a situation assessment. Military-based DAST/HAST teams have been especially criticized because their approach is too technical and they have often not recognized many fundamental societal problems and conditions that were endemic to the affected area prior to the disaster. The structure of a DAST/HAST is dependent on the mission, size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster and the needs of the affected country. The number of individuals assigned to a DAST/HAST is determined by how many people are required to perform the necessary activities to meet the strategic and operational objectives;

b. Designated Specialists. A popular approach for governments and national TF headquarters with staff experienced in a variety of areas is to form stand-by teams of specialists who receive training in disaster assessment methods in addition to their normal assignments. These teams can range in size from four or five to as large as twenty personnel;

c. Two-Person Teams. A two-person reconnaissance team has proven to be an excellent way of conducting a rapid reconnaissance for nations with predetermined approaches to disaster assistance. If the two are equipped with a systematic method of conducting the reconnaissance and standardized reporting forms or procedures, have access to the required transport and fuel, and have the generally required support of the host nation government, a two-person team can be very effective. Usually the team is composed of a specialist familiar with physical structures and an individual, who is familiar with public health, medical and nutritional aspects of disasters. Two-person teams are normally only used in Sector Reconnaissance rather than Comprehensive or General Reconnaissance; and

d. One Person Team. National TF headquarters may consider using a single or "key man" approach with experienced disaster personnel on their staff, generally to assess conditions in one particular sector. The key man approach is dependent upon experienced and qualified staffs that are familiar not only with post disaster situations and support requirements, but also with the support, which the national TF headquarters plans to set up. The disadvantages are that one person may not be able to gather all the facts quickly and the process may be delayed, and that the single individual approach gives only one point of view so that the quality of the reconnaissance is totally dependent upon one person.

AUTONOMOUS RECONNAISSANCE TEAM

2. The amount of HNS that an assisted state is able to offer will depend on the type, extent, scale and impact of any humanitarian emergency/disaster. The requirement to support deployed forces should not impact on the stricken state's mechanisms for coping with the humanitarian emergency/disaster situation. A deployed force may have to be self-sufficient or achieve the necessary support regionally. The provision, or lack, of HNS will affect the size and make-up of the deployed reconnaissance force and therefore raises 'footprint' and funding issues. The availability of HNS should be determined at an early stage. A consideration may be the deployment of a ship, which would require little HNS.

3. For a Reconnaissance team to be fully autonomous, they must be very much self-contained (including transport, food, water, communications, protection, power generation, fuel, etc.) and with the appropriate staffs represented within their team. However, this alone will not suffice. It is envisioned that there will always be some requirement outside of the team's ability to handle. This is where the nation's embassy/consulate and military attaché, in the area of operations, come into use. Through the assistance of embassy/consulate staff and or military attachés, local arrangements can be made with civilian contractors in preparation of the team's arrival without having to burden HN governmental agencies. It is important to keep in mind that the larger the team gets, the harder it will become to be self-sufficient.

SECTION 4 – RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING

STEPS IN PLANNING HUMANITARIAN/DISASTER RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES

1. When planning a humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance, it is important to remember that the information must trigger specific action and continue to feed information to the national TF headquarters and governmental departments throughout the emergency period and beyond. Thus, humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance must be developed as part of a comprehensive emergency preparedness activity and should reflect the information needs of the national TF headquarters and governmental departments receiving the reconnaissance reports.

2. The following steps may be used as a general checklist for planning any humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance activity:

a. Step 1. Identify the users of the reconnaissance information and the sectors in which they operate both during emergencies and during "normal" times. The users are defined as the national TF headquarters planning staff, governmental departments, non-governmental organizations and national or international agency donors. It is important that the potential users of the information be consulted and involved in designing the reconnaissance;

b. Step 2. Identify the information that is needed from each user area that will permit detection of specific problems and provide guidance for planning the relief support;

c. Step 3. Determine which information identified in Step 2 can be obtained by observation and which require more detailed or more quantitative investigations;

d. Step 4. Determine the most appropriate time or phase to collect the information. As part of this step, it is important to identify the information that must be collected prior to the reconnaissance, i.e. baseline information. This is especially vital so that chronic or endemic problems can be separated from emergency problems;

e. Step 5. Identify both civilian and military skills sets and qualifications required for the reconnaissance team to collect all the necessary information. This will also assist in determining the size of the team;

f. Step 6. Choose the reconnaissance method(s) most appropriate for the national TF headquarters, and decide which tools, techniques and equipment should be incorporated in the reconnaissance procedure in order to quantify or verify the information being gathered. Assessment of risks caused by the disaster is critical;

g. Step 7. Determine how the information is to be interpreted and disseminated to national, international agencies/departments and potential coalition partners;

h. Step 8. Determine the most appropriate format(s) for presenting the analyzed reconnaissance information;
i. Step 9. Formalize the plan; and
j. Step 10. Once the reconnaissance plan has been accepted by all parties and approved, the reconnaissance team members should be identified and briefed on the reconnaissance plan and their individual responsibilities and duties. Again, it is especially important to focus on reporting and terminology to ensure that the information is collected, analyzed and transmitted in such a way that it triggers the appropriate staff action.

SECTION 5– INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

1. The lack of information sharing, coordination and dissemination among national militaries and civilian relief agencies has been a recurring issue in all humanitarian/disaster lessons learned. Information sharing between all parties/actors is critical to maximizing unity of effort. While total information sharing is neither practical nor desirable, the headquarters must take the initiative to ensure maximum information sharing with the humanitarian/disaster relief community (e.g. by providing unclassified security information). To this end, communications should be declassified as much as possible in order to facilitate information sharing at all levels. However, security concerns may preclude the national TF headquarters from sharing complete operational information. Having said this, it is essential that a central focal point/coordination center be established for the management of information. It is through this focal point/center that information would be collected, analyzed, coordinated and disseminated both internally to the national TF headquarters and externally to the affected governmental departments and the various non-governmental organizations. As such, effective information management requires:

a. Facilities to receive, display, collate and assess information;
b. The capability for effective reconnaissance reporting;
c. A systematic decision-making process into which the information is fed. Therefore, some system of routing information and assigning it appropriate priorities must be established;
d. Feedback on the reliability/quality/usefulness of the information; and
e. A capability to disseminate and share information derived from assessments to all concerned national military headquarters and relief agencies.

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS)

2. The combined nature of humanitarian operations, the intense media interest, the significant involvement of non-military agencies and responsiveness by foreign government or international agencies make CIS a key element of any military contribution. Successful integration of military support to any international disaster relief effort will center on information exchange and the need to communicate. Key issues will be effective and timely communicated back to national headquarters and between the elements of other national military forces. Information exchange requirements between agencies must be identified early. Military forces also can provide an effective short and long-range communication capability in the early stages of a relief effort. Although communications support to the operation will need to be robust and should take account of the depth and breadth of the potential operating

area and the relative timeliness required of the various forms of communication, care must be taken to ensure that military communications are not made indispensable to a relief effort but are replaced early on by civil or UN communications infrastructure. Commercial bearers, particularly within a disaster-stricken country should not be relied upon as the primary means of communication.

SENSITIVITY OF INFORMATION

3. While operational security will not normally be an issue in this type of permissive operation, there may be a need to pass sensitive data, particularly in less stable conditions. In addition to the need to communicate within and between military forces, there will be a critical need to be able to communicate with the civilian agencies with whom military forces will need to integrate in order to support the relief effort. The requirement to identify the sensitivity of the information exchanged is critical. This is because the sensitivity of information varies significantly between militaries, governments, UN agencies and NGOs. The requirement for impartiality and confidentiality that is the basis of the effectiveness of many NGOs is a key consideration and cannot be understated. If efforts to coordinate humanitarian/disaster operations are to be effective, they must be based on the trust that results from knowing that information provided to an organization will be safeguarded in accordance with the sensitivity accorded to it by the originating agency.

CENTERS

4. Within humanitarian/disaster operations, military forces will be required to coordinate, plan and interact with a broad variety of agencies. Centers will be established by lead elements in the operation to coordinate the humanitarian activities. These could include On-site Operation Coordination Centers (OSOCC) – established by United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Teams and additionally manned by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator's staff, Humanitarian Operation Centers (HOCs) – normally, manned by civilian agencies, and Civil-Military Cooperation Centers – typically established by military forces. All these centers broadly serve the same purpose: the coordination of the humanitarian/disaster effort. This coordination enhances the ability of both civil and military leaders to prioritize, allocate, and undertake appropriate tasks, with a view to withdrawing military forces as soon as disaster coping mechanisms have recovered. This should help to keep the humanitarian operation limited to providing support to the relief effort and preclude the inadvertent creation of a parallel military relief effort setting its own priorities.

MILITARY COORDINATION CENTRE

5. Having a military coordination center plugging into the overarching support structure is a proven means of enhancing stability and interaction between host nation/UN Coordination Centre and civilian organizations. This provides for a central focal point for the management of information and improving overall control within an area of operations. In situations combining a high number of humanitarian actors and a rapidly evolving emergency situation requiring a high degree of real time operational coordination, national forces should routinely create such a center in the early stages of any military effort. To be fully effective it must also maintain close coordination with the HN, OSOCC and HOC operation centers. Basic strategies range from deconfliction to full cooperation. Across the spectrum, coordination (i.e., essential dialogue and interaction) is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. In case of a natural and/or humanitarian disaster, colocation of various centers might be the most effective and efficient option.

6. Coordination centers will normally be activated at the supported Strategic Commander's headquarters (strategic level) and/or at the national TF headquarters (operational level). These centers facilitate strategic integration and operational level coordination of forces into the planning and execution process of the force. Coordination centers address the complexities of coordination across the broad spectrum of national interagency differences, national sovereignty issues, regional nations' bureaucratic institutions, major policy issues, national pride, historical and cultural issues, SOFA issues, diplomatic clearances, support issues, and operational employment coordination.

7. Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as logistical and medical support, infrastructure engineering, HNS, movement control and CIMIC operations. However, as the operation matures, the center's role can be expanded to include C2 activities.

8. To resolve the issue of the sharing of reconnaissance information with other national military headquarters agreement amongst national headquarters would have to be established. As the majority of the information would be of an unclassified nature this information should be shared freely amongst all nations.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) CENTRE

9. The purpose of the CIMIC Centre is to coordinate and facilitate national and any multinational force's humanitarian operations with those of international and local relief agencies and with affected country authorities. The CIMIC Centre provides a physical location where the military can interface with the civil population, civil authorities and civilian organizations (IOs/NGOs). As such, it acts as a focal point and

communication link between the civil and the military communities. While the establishment of the CIMIC Centre usually occurs following the deployment of forces to the area of operations consideration should be given to the early establishment of the center prior to deployment. This has the potential of establishing the center as the central focal point for the management and coordination of the humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance reports and for all follow on actions and support plans. Again, this decision would have to be considered with regards to the complexity, size, nature and location of the crisis.

HOST NATION / UNITED NATIONS COORDINATION CENTRE

10. HN / UN OSOCC's are designed to facilitate the coordination of the entire international humanitarian/disaster relief operation overseeing activities by the HN, non-governmental organizations and military forces. The OSOCC is designed as a rapid response tool. To be effective, it should be initiated in the immediate aftermath of a disaster/emergency and before, or simultaneously with, the arrival of international relief resources and maintain close coordination with the military coordination centers. It is expected that an OSOCC in some form would be operational during the first, relief phase of an emergency until the national/local authorities and/or the traditional UN structure can cope with the coordination of international resources or until the international relief resources meeting emergency requirements have been withdrawn. Each international relief team within the area of operations has a responsibility towards the effective functioning of the OSOCC and the efficient coordination of its operation with those of local and national relief resources as well as with other international teams.

11. As the OSOCC becomes fully engaged in coordination, its role and activities are expanded to meet the requirements dictated by the situation, the authorities and/or the UN. The OSOCC, together with the local authorities, the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, international teams, relief agencies and military forces, will develop an operational plan of action, upgrade its communications and assessments, and introduce systems and procedures to sustain a prolonged commitment.

LIAISON

12. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital in any operation. Using liaison personnel/teams is an invaluable confidence-building tool between national forces, other government agencies, IOs, NGOs, etc. It also fosters a better understanding of the mission and facilitates the transfer of vital information, enhances mutual trust, and develops an increased level of teamwork. Liaison supplies significant information for the national TF headquarters about contributing nation and organizations readiness and capabilities. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems and operating procedures.

13. Liaison should be established as early as possible between a command and its higher and subordinate headquarters, assigned forces, as well as other appropriate HN, IOs and NGOs. Differences in operating procedures, organization, equipment, and capabilities among these players demand a hardier liaison structure. Once liaison is established, liaison teams become the direct representatives of their respective commanders.

EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES

14. National embassies, high commissions, consulate country offices and military attachés, which vary in resources and capability, play a key role in providing early information of emerging crises and situation assessments following disasters. Their links with host governments and in country humanitarian/disaster agencies makes them an important information source and part of the coordination system in the affected country. As a result of these contacts, they may be able to facilitate some disaster response activities, including local procurement of relief goods and the administrative and logistical support for humanitarian/disaster reconnaissance teams.

15. The diplomatic post accredited to the country/region affected is responsible for implementing its emergency contingency plan(s) including: an assessment of the situation on the ground; serving as a focal point when the reconnaissance team is deployed; and providing logistical support for the delivery of national humanitarian assistance. The post also serves as the point of contact with local authorities, embassies, media, donor agencies and other organizations present in the field, including the UN High Commissioner of Refugees, Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Pan American Health Organization, World Food Program and International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

WEB-BASED NETWORK

16. The national TF headquarters must “plug into” or establish an unclassified web-based network, to include unclassified e-mail capabilities, to enable operational staff planners to pull information from the various relief organizations, and communicate directly with these same organizations.

17. OCHA, UN Joint Logistics Centre, ECHO, Relief Web, and other relief organizations have web pages that post information on what NGOs and other relief agencies are doing, but this information is not necessarily “processed” or analyzed. Nonetheless, the operational staff planners need to be cognizant of the existing NGO information gathering/sharing system.

18. ReliefWeb is a key source of information on natural disasters and complex emergencies (www.Reliefweb.int) where the international humanitarian community will post a wealth of information that can be sorted by country or emergency. There may also be a Humanitarian Information Centre (www.humanitarianinfo.org) activated. The Virtual Operations On-Site Coordination Centre (OSOCC) is designed to facilitate the information exchange between responding governments and organizations during the initial emergency phase of a natural disaster (http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc/).

SECTION 6 - ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE TO LIFELINES AND CRITICAL FACILITIES

LIFELINES

1. "Lifelines" are the public facilities that provide essential life support services to communities. These public facilities are called lifelines not only for their life supporting services, but also because they are linear systems. Being linear systems, they are easy to assess in the aftermath of a disaster as breaks in the system can be easily traced. Normally, the department, agency or authority that operates each system assesses damages to lifelines. It is therefore incumbent on the reconnaissance team to seek out the various disaster managers or the central disaster management agency to acquire the damage needs assessments. These lifelines include:

a. Water Systems;
b. Sanitation Systems;
c. Electrical Power Systems;
d. Communications Systems; and
e. Transportation Systems.

CRITICAL FACILITIES

2. Governmental disaster management authorities need to have reports about the status of other facilities and systems that will be critical for emergency response. Responsibility for assessing and reporting on the status of these facilities usually falls on the agency or organization that operates each facility. During the emergency phase, the civilian disaster manager only needs to know whether or not the facilities are operating and, if not, what actions are being taken to bring the facilities back into operation and when the repairs will be completed. These facilities and systems include:

a. Shelters (to include housing and evacuation shelters);
b. Ports, Airports and Railroads;
c. Radio and Television Stations;
d. Fuel Storage Facilities (to include gas and liquid fuels, and refineries);
e. Hospitals; and
f. Key Government Facilities (concerned with emergency services).

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PART THREE: LESSONS IDENTIFIED/LEARNED

SECTION 1- LESSONS LEARNED

GENERAL LESSONS LEARNED

1. This section will be updated accordingly as lessons identified/learned from MIC nations humanitarian/disaster response operations are documented.

HAITI 2010 EARTHQUAKE

2. The following is a compilation of strategic reconnaissance lessons identified/learned from the MIC nations involved:

a. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations. During humanitarian / disaster response consideration must be given at the outset to the evacuation of national citizens and the remains of national citizens located in the crisis area.

b. Early/Rapid Reconnaissance. Early deployment of an interdepartmental strategic support team within the first 24 hours is critical in establishing the requirements, initial planning and deployment of critical assets.

c. Airflow – Strategic Enabler. Airflow is a key strategic enabler that permits the rapid inflow of forces and humanitarian aid. Initial planning, management and control of strategic airflow must be considered early on.

d. Strategic Assessment Teams. Development of a robust strategic response Assessment Team is essential.

e. Logistic Requirements. Incomplete information on conditions in Haiti at the onset of the crisis made determination of logistics requirements and priorities exceptionally challenging.

f. C2 Arrangements. Logistics response was proactive and robust but was marked by incomplete situational awareness and lack of a unified and integrated C2 arrangement. The early absence of an effective joint logistics C2 element, responsible for integrating the overall logistics effort, led to gaps in the RSO&I of forces, equipment and supplies.

g. Airport of Disembarkation (APOD). Initial reliance on the single APOD for throughput of relief supplies and personnel required development of a system for validating and prioritizing global international flights into Haiti.

h. Deployment of CIMIC Staff. With regard to sustainment of military organizations, the early deployment of CIMIC staff, within the strategic reconnaissance team, assists greatly in the interaction with the local economy and host nation (HN). Sustainment agreements need to be apparent to both the provider and receiver.

i. Ships – Key Link to Joint Operations. The planning, early deployment and location of ships are critical to operations. They assist in security ashore, perform shore connection duties, support air operations, supply water and provided a secure platform for VIP visits.

j. Liaison. Immediate and constant high level liaison is required between the Task Force Commanders and the Head of Missions (HOM). A temporary defense attaché needs to be appointed when operations are conducted in countries where they have not been assigned to ensure immediate military advice is available to the HOM.

k. Embassy Staffs. The need for the strategic reconnaissance team to coordinate with the embassy staff before deploying to the site is essential.

l. Rescue. If nations intend to conduct operations within the rescue phase of a humanitarian / disaster response then those requirements and capabilities need to be immediately identified for better deployability, sustainment and command and control.

m. Air Reconnaissance. Rotary wing assets proved of great value in the early stages of deployment as a platform for reconnaissance and assessment.

n. Planning. Humanitarian operations are based on needs assessments, which vary as the operation evolves therefore requiring different elements to rotate in and out of theatre as the operation progresses. Commanders must be aware and anticipate early on that the capability requirements will change and plan accordingly.

o. Comprehensive Approach**.** The need to concurrently execute the operation, integrate a multi-agency approach and position forces for future transition (an exit strategy) is a key lesson and one which highlights the need for a comprehensive approach from the outset. Collaboration and coordination between all agencies is essential.

p. Understanding the UN Humanitarian Community. Since humanitarian community have a wealth of experience and are the subject matter experts (SMEs) in dealing with HA/DR situations. Military leaders/personnel must understand the United Nation's (UN) mission and the mandates and limitations they operate under in synchronizing their efforts. It is important to understand that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the scouts/soldiers of the humanitarian effort and that through collaboration and coordination planning, resources and surge capability can play a significant supporting role for the UN and/or NGOs in accomplishing their missions. In working with the Humanitarian Community, military leaders/personnel must work to develop HN capacity, remember diplomacy in coordinating and collaborating and exercise patience, patience, patience.

q. Building Partnerships for Planning. Including others in planning and information sharing reduces duplication of effort while maximizing strengths and capabilities of responding forces. Identification of key

players within the HN, UN, other partner nation's militaries, inter-agencies, NGOs, charities and foundations, and non-traditional partners are essential at the outset of the operation.

r. Inter-Agency Cooperation / Structure**.** A Partnering Directorate existed to bring together representatives from other government departments (OGDs), NGOs, UN Liaison Officers (LNOs) and LNOs from other nations, in order to provide a common forum for information exchange. This was extremely useful as it provided wide visibility on not just the immediate issues but those that would emerge in the medium to long term.

s. Information Security Classification**.** All information, with the exception of information pertaining to sensitive military capabilities, was unclassified and widely accessible. Given the scope of the inter-agency work supporting the operation, this approach is essential.

t. Web-based RFI Forum**.** Within the information management structure, a web-based interface provided a Request for Information (RFI) forum where anyone could submit an RFI. This was an excellent tool, particularly as the Command Groups monitored RFIs and tracked those that remained unanswered over time.

u. Respect Host Nation. By going through and working with the HN legitimizes the government in the eyes of the people. Understanding the culture of the HN and being prepared to coach, teach, mentor and train HN personnel in responding to the situation is essential.

v. Biological Hazard**.** The appreciation of the potential scale of biological contamination was late and should have been addressed early.

Note. The above lessons identified/learned are extracts drawn from the following reports/organizations:

1. CAN
    a. Joint Lessons Report 01/10 - Operational and Strategic Lesson - Op Hestia

2. GBR
    a. UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ)
    b. Post Operational Report - Op Panlake/Op Unified Response UK Liaison Officer to US SOUTHCON - Initial Comments
    c. Joint Force Headquarters Interim Post Operational report - Op Panlake
    d. Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel Largs Bay First Impressions Report – Op Panlake

3. ITA
    a. MIC 2010 Power Point Presentation - Haiti Earthquake, by Col Del Bene

4. USA
    a. National War College - Haiti Earthquake Interagency Lessons Learned Workshop Report

ANNEX A

PRE-RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Type of disaster (earthquake, typhoon, etc.)?
2. Are there expected developments/likely secondary hazards (landslides, floods, fire, release of toxic substances, civil unrest, conflict, landmines) in the affected area?
3. At what time did the disaster occur (local)?
4. What areas were affected (geographic)? GIS/map coordinates?
5. Estimated total population in affected area?
6. Does the Department/Agency of International Development have any programs in the affected area?
7. If so, what are they and are all national and local staff accounted for?
8. What population density/settlement pattern building types are in that area?
9. What are the current and forecasted local weather conditions?
10. Has the government (or is it likely to) formally requested international assistance (for what)?

INITIAL ESTIMATE OF IMPACTS

Population Affected

1. How many reported: deaths, injured, missing, displaced, homeless?
2. What is the situation of those affected: coping mechanisms, accommodation, etc?

Public Health

1. What diseases are endemic, any outbreaks reported?
2. What percentages of hospitals are functioning and what are their capacities?

Shelter

1. What is the extent of housing/shelter damaged?
2. What housing type is specific to the affected area? (mud, stone, high-rise, etc).

Water and Sanitation

1. What are the effects on water supply, waste disposal, and availability of drinking water?

Transportation Infrastructure

1. What are the means of access to the affected areas, road/bridge damage?
2. Which is the nearest functioning airport(s): what is the handling capability (type specific)?
3. Which is the nearest functioning seaport(s): what is the handling capability (type specific)?

Food

1. What is the impact on food availability and access?

Communications and Power Supply

1. What are the impacts on power supply?
2. Do local facilities (hospitals/water pumping stations, etc.) have backup generators?
3. Are land-lines/mobile phones functioning?
4. Are satellite communication assets available?

Search and Rescue (SAR) Requirements

1. Has the disaster caused structural collapse (percentage)?
2. What types of structures have collapsed (e.g. hospitals, schools, government buildings, multi-story housing units)?
3. What types of materials are they constructed from (concrete/brick etc)?
4. Are the local authorities requesting assistance with SAR?
5. Who is conducting/coordinating the present rescue effort, and for how long has this been underway?

INFORMATION ON INITIAL RESPONSE

Assessments

1. What assessments have been made / planned?
2. By whom, what outcome?

Government Response

1. What has been the Government response so far?
2. Which is the lead Government ministry/body?
3. Is there a well-established in-country emergency response mechanism? Was it effective in previous disasters?
4. What is the role of other relevant structures (Military, Emergency Committee, Civil Defense Structure)?
5. What are the capabilities of the above to respond?

Other Responses

1. What is the response to date of the humanitarian community (UN/Red Cross/Donors/NGOs/Other)?
2. What are the capabilities of those responding? What are the gaps (food, water, shelter, and clothing)?
3. Which is the lead UN agency?
4. Is the UN Disaster Management Team present/have they met/is a disaster plan in place/has it been activated?

5. Have any 'situation reports' been issued? Has any other information on the disaster been shared?

Coordination

1. What coordination structures are in place for the disaster (Government/UN/local community)?

Factors Affecting Response

1. What is the security situation? Is the disaster site(s) safe for personnel to operate in?
2. What other country specific factors may affect response (e.g. public holidays)?
3. How is the situation being reported in the local and national media? Are they reliable?

Key in Country Contacts

1. This information is required in order to liaise directly and discuss response support needs and options with relevant in country contacts among governmental, UN, Red Cross and non-governmental agencies. Overseas posts can play a key role in providing this information.

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ANNEX B

OPERATIONAL AREA RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

MISSION ANALYSIS

1. What and how much of the affected nation's infrastructure should be restored?
2. How will our projected actions solve the long-term problem of the mission area?
3. What recommendations can be made to the national TF headquarters to control mission creep?
4. What is "one thing" the national TF can do to stabilize the situation?
5. What tolerance should the national TF have for violence?

J2 - INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

1. What links should be established with civilian agencies, to include the media? Have efforts been made to pool information with applicable civilian agencies?
2. What links should be established to local authorities (e.g. police) to gather information about the civilian criminal threat?
3. What infrastructure exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards, such as nuclear power plants, chemical industries, hospital radiotherapy sources?
4. Who are the host nation, civilian agency (i.e. government, information, communications, social services agencies, etc.), and media contacts?

J3 - OPERATIONS ISSUES

1. What is the current situation in the AO?
2. What are the special customs and courtesies of the population in the AO?
3. What areas are affected?
4. What is the estimated total population in the affected area?
5. Has the disaster caused structural collapse? What types of structures have collapsed?
6. Who is conducting/coordinating the present rescue effort?
7. What is the in country's emergency response mechanism?
8. What is the role of other relevant structures (military, emergency committee, civil defense structure, etc.)?
9. What is the response to date of the humanitarian community?
10. What local emergency services are present?
11. What is the security situation?
12. What are the key welfare agencies, institutions, and programs in place?
13. Who are the key officials and business leaders? Industry leaders?
14. Is rationing in place and on what?

15. What local monuments, institutions, and artifacts are valued?
16. How is the government structured and what is its relation to the local government in the area of responsibility?
17. Describe the armed forces and local and or regional and or national militias and paramilitaries?
18. Are the attitudes of the population cooperative or uncooperative regarding our presence? From which of the subcultures, ethnicities, or religions?
19. Do non-governmental organizations and civil-military cooperation activities affect the ground, sea and aviation plan?
20. What are the coordinating provisions for the HN aircraft / shipping services?
21. What are the HN perceptions and cultural issues that will likely impact aircraft / maritime operations?
22. What infrastructure exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards, such as nuclear power plants, chemical industries, hospital radiotherapy sources?

J4 - LOGISTICS ISSUES

Support and Capabilities

1. What areas will remain national issues?
2. What logistics support is available?
3. How will the national TF headquarters ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and information systems, to include automated data processing interfaces, between other military forces, civilian aid agencies and national support systems?
4. What is the relationship between other supporting nations, national and HN logistics elements?
5. What is the division of responsibilities between national, and HN logistics support?
6. What are the in-theatre capabilities and resources of civilian agencies in the AO?
7. What in-theatre staging, national command element and national support element areas, have been identified?
8. What is the projected logistics budget?

Host Nation Support

1. What HN logistical support is available for law enforcement, sanitation, medical services, facilities, power, water, transportation, rations, storage, and materiel?
2. What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure, to include water treatment plants, power stations, reservoirs, and bulk and retail fuel storage?
3. What support negotiations have been established or completed?
4. What is the impact of obtaining HN support on the host country's national economy?
5. What are the possible environmental impacts on the HN providing this support?
6. What specific technical agreements—such as environmental clean-up; customs duties and taxes; and hazardous material and waste storage, transit, and disposal—

must be developed to augment agreements that may have been concluded with HN support?

7. What HN legal considerations are there when contracting with HN suppliers?
8. Is there a requirement to establish multiple sources of supply to guarantee support?
9. What specific technical agreements such as environment clean up, customs duties and taxes, hazardous material and or storage, transit and disposal must be developed to augment agreements that have been concluded with the HN?

Medical

1. What medical facilities have been identified to support the operation?
2. Are chemical threats known, and are troops and medical facilities capable of coping with their possible use?
3. What graves registration and mortuary procedures have been put in place to service casualties to include recognizing cultural differences in dealing with casualties and procedures and policies for local civilians?
4. What is the public health policy?
5. What resources are available for hygiene and sanitation with regard to water, living conditions, food, refuse management, industrial pollution and post-operation pollution?
6. What are the animals of medical significance with regard to snakes, venomous arthropods, insects and stray animals?
7. What civilian health services are in the area of operations?
8. What non-governmental organizations are in the area of operations?
9. What infrastructure exists for assisting national task forces to deal with low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards like medical treatment facilities or detection equipment supply houses?
10. How will medical regulations, both in and out of theatre, be affected?
11. How is the area of responsibility set up for its own medical equipment and supplies?

Transportation

1. What are the requirements for and capabilities, limitations, and availability of airfields, railways, seaports, and inland transportation systems in the departure, intermediate staging, and objective areas? What resources are required for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities?
2. What is the ability of the HN to receive personnel and equipment at ports and airfields?
3. What are the access rights in the AO? The command must coordinate diplomatic efforts to arrange for support, country, and diplomatic clearances, over flight rights, and basing for forces in transit from one locality to another.
4. What is the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in theatre?
5. How will the movement into and out of airfields and seaports be controlled?
6. What are the customs, immigration and health requirements for movement in and out of the area of operations?

7. What fuel types are available?
8. How will transportation facilities be shared with other nations, civilian agencies and contractors?
9. What air transport agencies exist?

Transition Planning Issues

1. What are the customs, immigration, and quarantine implications for the incoming and outgoing forces?

J6 - COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

1. What areas remain national issues?
2. Will commercial companies establish telephone service for use by other national forces?
3. Do national laws require agreements defining payments for using the information systems networks or military satellite communication assets?
4. Have arrangements been made to allow contract host nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposing them to automated data processing and classified information used in daily operations?
5. What are the key laws governing communications?
6. Will commercial companies provide Internet access?

J8 – FINANCE

1. How are financial government institutions organized from the national to regional to local level?
2. What are the key applicable laws and regulations?

J9 - CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION ISSUES

1. What are the civil centers of gravity that need to be addressed? What are the associated decisive points?
2. What key civil organizations will be operating in the AO? Has an analysis been conducted on their respective end states, culture, objectives, and methods? How will they affect a military operation?
3. Where the national TF commander is to be reliant on HN support, are sufficient resources available to sustain his force and are memorandum of understandings and technical agreements in place? What will be the impact on the local economy as human and personnel resources are drawn to military HN support?
4. What national civil-military plan(s) have been coordinated with the other governmental departments?
5. Is the civil administration sound, or will one be established? If the latter, what resources will be required?

6. What are the requirements for restoring, or rebuilding the local infrastructure?
7. What are the requirements for restoring or providing essential services in the short, medium, and long term? The short-term tasks may become military tasks, and the military will need to plan accordingly—such as urgent provision of shelter, water, sanitation, and power.
8. What national TF support is required to assist or establish the HN civilian law and order system?
9. What IO, NGOs, and international and national donor agencies will be operating in the operational area?
10. What do the NGOs, IOs and donor agencies anticipate wanting from us?
11. What is the relation of the community as to the political, trade, school, and religious areas with that of the adjoining communities?
12. How do the inhabitants, groups, organizations, and governmental entities communicate within the community and with other communities?
13. What are the economic, religious and political situations?

LEGAL ISSUES

1. What areas remain national issues?
2. Do legal advisors understand national policies?
3. Has the SOFA been established with the receiving nation? Who has been designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFA's?
4. What are the environmental constraints and factors that may affect the conduct of operations?
5. What are the legal and fiscal restraints involving logistic assistance to non-military organizations and other nations' forces?
6. What are the force's obligations to the HN police forces, international police force, or both forces deployed within the AO?
7. What are the estimated bounds of civil rights in the AO?
8. Is the HN military judicial infrastructure intact? If so, has liaison been affected? If not, what resources and procedures are required to establish them?
9. What are the systems of civil and criminal law?
10. Describe the administration of justice (i.e. The judicial system in place or lack thereof?)
11. What is the relationship between HN MP and civilian police with MP and national civilian police forces?
12. What is the present status of civil authority?
13. What information is available on the criminal threat?

ENGINEERING ISSUES

1. What capabilities is the HN providing?
2. What are the unique area of operations characteristics that affect interoperability, such as severe climactic conditions?
3. What are the humanitarian and national assistance engineering requirements?
4. Are there any specific engineer contracts with the HN or other contractors?
5. What is the HN actually providing in terms of engineer services?
6. What, if anything, is the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and CIMIC activity in-theatre on the engineer plan?
7. What are the in-theatre engineer coordination mechanisms? Are they capturing lessons learned and informing all nations to allow in-theatre adaptations to doctrine and new problems?
8. Are there any HN cultural constraints and restrictions that are or could impact on engineer operations?
9. Describe the current interagency cooperation and coordination in the area of responsibility?
10. What sustainment capabilities are foreseen by the NGOs?
11. What do the NGOs anticipate wanting from us?
12. What are the environmental considerations?

PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MEDIA ISSUES

1. What areas remain national issues?
2. What are the main local and national media organizations operating in and around the area of operations?
3. What is the broadcasting situation?

ANNEX C

DISASTER NEEDS ASSESSMENT CHECKLISTS

WATER SYSTEM CHECKLIST

1. Determine the amount of water available per person per day.
2. Determine the source and quality of the water.
3. Determine how long the daily amount has been available.
4. Determine the evidence of water related diseases.
5. Determine the length of time users wait for water.
6. Determine whether there is safe access to water for vulnerable groups.
7. Determine the types of wells, transportation, and or storage systems used.
8. Determine if there are problems with well repair/rehabilitation.
9. Determine if there is equipment/expertise onsite, on order, or available for repair.
10. Determine the availability of additional sources of safe water if required.
11. Determine the need for water engineers to assist with evaluating requirements.
12. Describe the types of systems and sources that existed prior to the disaster in the affected areas (treatment facilities, mains, pump stations and distribution network).
13. Specify how many people have been deprived of a functional water supply.
14. Determine who is in charge of the local water system(s) (community group, committee, and national authority).
15. Determine whether the system is still functional or what the requirements for repair are.
16. Estimate the number of people who depend on the water sources by type (river, city water system).
17. Outline the impact of water loss on key facilities and on individual users.
18. Determine how quickly the responsible ministries can be expected to restore services.
19. Describe options for restoring minimum essential services.

SANITATION CHECKLIST

1. Determine the placement, number and cleanliness of latrines.
2. Determine if the design and placement of latrines are affecting their use because of cultural taboos.
3. Determine if there is a sanitation plan if the population increases.
4. Determine if there is safe access to latrines for women and girls.
5. Determine the evidence of water related disease.
6. Determine the proximity of latrines and refuse areas to water sources, storage areas and distribution points.
7. Determine the placement and plan for the disposal of copses.
8. Determine if there is a plan for the collection and disposal of garbage.
9. Determine if there is an insect and rodent control plan.

10. Determine the need for a specialist to assist with evaluating requirements.
11. Determine the adequacy of sewage disposal facilities in any public buildings or other areas being used to temporarily shelter homeless people.
12. Determine if waste disposal/sewage if forming ponds in public areas.

ELECTRICAL POWER CHECKLIST

1. Describe the complete power system.
2. Inventory auxiliary equipment that may be available locally.
3. Determine why power is not available.
4. Ascertain the condition of generating units.
5. Check the integrity of the fuel system.
6. Determine whether towers, lines and or ground lines are down.
7. Assess the condition of substations.
8. Outline the impact of power loss on key facilities.
9. Describe the options for restoring minimum essential services.
10. Ascertain whether load shedding and or switching to another grid can restore minimal services.
11. Identify local/regional suppliers of equipment and materials.
12. Determine the local/regional availability of technical services available for repair.
13. Describe the function of the facilities, their proximity to the stricken area and their relationship to the disaster itself.
14. Identify the host country organization that controls and operates the facilities.
15. Identify the suppliers, contractors and or donors that built the facilities.
16. Check on any proposed assistance from the original donors of the facilities.
17. Describe any damage to the system.
18. Check the soundness of the structures, outlet works and whether the reservoirs are watertight.
19. Identify any immediate or near term safety risks.
20. Assess the condition of canals or downstream channels.
21. Identify any changes in watershed conditions.
22. Evaluate the management of the facilities.
23. Determine whether storage and outflow quantities are being managed in accordance with prescribed curves.
24. Identify preparations for follow on storm conditions.
25. Describe the probable impact of discharging on downstream damage and or relief efforts.
26. Outline the repair plans of the host country officials.

COMMUNICATIONS CHECKLIST

1. Describe where the system's facilities are located.

2. Determine the broadcast/reception area or zone of influence.
3. Identify the organization/firm that is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the system.
4. Determine if there is a disaster response plan with identification of priority facilities, material supply and priority screening of messages.
5. Obtain technical information, such as broadcast power, operating frequencies, call signs, relay/transmission points, hours of operation, standby power sources, mobile capacity, and repair/maintenance facilities and language of transmission.
6. Identify key personnel.
7. Determine the degree of integration of military and civilian communications networks.
8. Determine what communications facilities exist that are operable or easily repaired and could be used to pass on assessment information and assist in coordination of life saving responses.
9. Identify the type of system assessed.
10. Describe specific reasons why a system is not operating.
11. Outline options for restoring minimum essential services.
12. Identify local/regional suppliers of communications equipment and materials available for repair.
13. Determine the local/regional availability of technical services available for repair.

HEALTH / MEDICAL CHECKLIST

1. Ascertain demographic information (total number affected, age sex breakdown, identification of at risk population, average family or household size, and number of female headed households).
2. Determine background health information (main health problems in the area, previous sources of health care, important health beliefs and traditions, social structure, strength and coverage of public health programs in the area).
3. Mortality rate.
4. Morbidity rate.
5. Determine the need for immunization programs.
6. Determine the capability of relief officials to begin or sustain an immunization program.
7. Determine or estimate the number of major injuries.
8. Determine the number and locations of health facilities that existed prior to the disaster.
9. Determine the number of facilities that are still functioning and the total number of usable beds.
10. Determine the number of indigenous health personnel who are available.
11. Determine the amount and type of medical supplies and drugs that are available onsite or in country.
12. Determine additional amounts and types of medical supplies and drugs needed immediately from sources outside the stricken area.

13. Determine what additional medical equipment is needed and can be readily obtained to deal with major injuries.
14. Identify water sources.
15. Ascertain the local disease epidemiology.
16. Assess local availability of materials for shelter and fuel.
17. Assess existing shelters and sanitation arrangements.
18. Determine if a health information system is in place to monitor the affected population and provide surveillance and intermittent population based sample surveys.
19. Determine if the affected country has in place or plans to begin various health programs.
20. Determine the pre-disaster conditions of the health/medical infrastructure.
21. Ascertain from the affected government the minimum needs for health/medical infrastructure recovery.

TRANSPORTATION CHECKLIST

1. Describe the road networks in the affected area by type.
2. Determine load capacity of bridges.
3. Identify the responsible ministries and district offices and constraints on operations.
4. Describe any damage to the network.
5. Determine which segments are undamaged, which can be traveled on with delays, and which are impassable.
6. Describe any damage by type.
7. Identify alternate crossing and or routes.
8. Evaluate the importance of the road network to the relief effort and rehabilitation.
9. Outline the options for restoring minimum essentials services.
10. Determine which elements must be restored first.
11. Describe the need for traffic control on damaged or one-way segments.
12. Determine how long the emergency repairs can accommodate relief traffic.
13. Determine if there is a requirement for emergency maintenance and fuel points in remote areas.
14. Identify the host country agencies, military and or civilian forces that are available to make repairs.
15. Identify whether these forces have the required equipment, spare parts and maintenance support.
16. Determine whether local or expatriate construction companies can loan equipment and or expertise.
17. Determine if regional sources of equipment and or expertise is available for repair.
18. Ascertain that arrangements can be made for standby forces, at damaged sections, to keep roads open.

HOUSING / SHELTER CHECKLIST

1. Determine the number of people requiring shelter and whether the need for shelter is temporary or if it is a displaced population requiring shelter for an indeterminate time.
2. Determine the average number of people in an individual dwelling.
3. Identify obstacles that prevent victims from meeting their own needs, both for temporary and permanent shelter.
4. Determine the area affected.
5. Approximate the number of private dwellings and public buildings damaged or destroyed by city, village or region.
6. Determine the number of damaged dwellings that are habitable without immediate repair, that are habitable only after repair, and that are not habitable and must be destroyed.
7. Inventory existing structures and public facilities that can be used as temporary shelters, giving careful consideration to access to sanitation and water.
8. Damage assessment data to be collected during the disaster assessment are as follows:

    a. Identification of the common types of buildings, building trends and housing preferences;
    b. Determination of the patterns of failure of each building type;
    c. Identification of sighting problems;
    d. Identification of urban design problems;
    e. Determination of material needs;
    f. Determination of the local building process;
    g. Identification of issues affecting program management;
    h. During the damage assessment, it is important that adequate photographs be taken of both damaged and non-damaged structures. It is especially important to photograph new buildings under construction to determine whether people are making any adaptations on their own to improve the performance of buildings;
    i. It is important to quantify some of the data collected in the assessment, including:
        (1) Estimates of the number of buildings damaged and destroyed;
        (2) Estimates of material needs; and
        (3) Estimates of the stock of building materials already on hand in the project area;
    j. Determination of whether local material suppliers will be able to obtain replacement material stocks;
    k. Determination of the amount of materials that will be supplied by other donors;
    l. Determination of extent of insurance coverage for housing within the affected area;

m. Determination of the cost of materials;
n. Determination of the production capacity of local material producers;
o. Determination of the shortage and handling capacity of ports, airports and warehouses in the project area;
p. Determination of the transport capacity of local trucking firms, and of the availability of fuel and usable roads;
q. Estimates of the cost reductions that could be made through local production of building materials; and
r. Determine the capacities, efficiency, credibility and commitment of each agency that might be involved. A unified approach by government and non-governmental organizations in regard to rehabilitation greatly enhances individual agency efforts to assist the victims.

FOOD SOURCE CHECKLIST

1. Describe the normal consumption pattern of the affected population, any taboos and acceptable substitutes.
2. Describe the normal food marketing system (including government involvement, imports, subsistence).
3. Indicate what food aid programs, if any, exist and describe them.
4. Outline the indigenous food processing capacity.
5. Ascertain the disaster's effect on actual food stocks and standing crops.
6. Determine if access to food has been disrupted and, if so, how long it is likely to remain disrupted.
7. Check market indicators of food shortages.
8. Check nutritional indicators of food shortages by sex.
9. Check social indicators of food shortages.
10. Determine how much food can be expected from future and or specially planted, quick maturing crops.
11. Determine where in the production cycle was the affected area when the disaster struck.
12. Estimate the local government stocks on hand and those scheduled to arrive.
13. Estimate the local commercial stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive.
14. Estimate the local PVO/NGO/IO stocks on hand and scheduled to arrive.
15. Determine regional availabilities.
16. Canvass other donors to find out what they expect to contribute.
17. Estimate how much food aid would be required during specific time periods.
18. Describe existing food aid distribution systems.
19. Describe the effectiveness of the distribution system.
20. Describe the role of women in the distribution system.
21. Describe government-marketing mechanisms.
22. Judge the capacity of the above to expand/begin emergency aid.
23. Explain the country's previous experience with mass feeding.
24. Determine the availability of facilities and materials, including fuel.

25. Determine whether repackaging facilities exist.
26. Analyze the likely price impact on normal food suppliers.
27. Decide whether food aid would free cash and labor for other aspects of relief, or divert labor and create a dependent attitude.

DISPLACED POPULATION CHECKLIST

1. Determine the approximate number of displaced people.
2. Determine their location, movements.
3. Determine how many are arriving per week and how many more could come.
4. Determine how they are arriving (scattered individuals or families, clans, tribal, ethnic or village groups) and by what means.
5. Determine the approximate number and ages of men, women and children.
6. Identify ethnic/geographic origin (urban or rural).
7. Determine their health status.
8. Determine the percentage of the male/female population that is literate.
9. Determine what emergency related skills are represented in the population that could be drawn upon by relief organizations.
10. Determine what the displaced population has as personal property and what was lost as a result of the disaster.
11. Estimate the number and types of blankets needed.
12. Identify what blankets are available within the country from personal, commercial, UN/NGO/IO, or government stocks.
13. Determine what is needed from external sources for blankets.
14. Describe the clothing traditionally worn, by season and area.
15. If clothing is needed, estimate the amount by age group and sex.
16. Determine if used clothing is acceptable, and if so, for which groups.
17. Describe normal heating/cooking practices.
18. Determine whether heating equipment and/or fuel is required.
19. Estimate the types and quantities of heating equipment and fuel needed over a specific time period.
20. Determine appropriate fuel storage and distribution mechanisms.
21. Identify what fuel is available locally.
22. Identify what is needed from external sources.
23. Determine if other personal effects, such as cooking utensils, soap, and small storage containers, are needed.
24. Determine if the displaced personnel brought any financial assets. Determine if those assets could be converted to local currency.
25. Determine if livestock was brought along.
26. Determine if shelter materials were brought along.
27. Determine if other possessions, such as cars, bicycles, or boats, were brought along.

ANNEX D

POTENTIAL RAPID RECONNAISSANCE TEAM MEMBERS CHECKLIST

A. Team Leader
B. Linguists/Interpreters
C. Legal Planners
D. Political Military Representative
E. Foreign Affairs Representative
F. United Nations Representative (as coordinated through the national UN military representative if appropriate to the mission)
G. Public Affairs/Information Planners
H. Personnel Planners (J1)
I. Human Resources Planner (gender requirements)
J. Intelligence Planners (J2)
K. Operational Planners (J3)
L. Engineer Planners
M. Military/Civilian Police Planners
N. Force Protection Unit
O. Special Operations Force Planners
P. Psychological Operations Representative
Q. Information Operation Planners
R. Air/Aviation Operation Planners
S. Maritime Operation Planners
T. Logistic Planners (J4)
U. Medical Planners
V. Movement Planners
W. Plans (J5)
X. Communication Planners (J6)
Y. Financial Planners (J8)
Z. CIMIC Planners (J9)
AA. Education Planners
BB. Embassy/Consulate LO
CC. Local/Regional Planners (as coordinated through the national embassy/consulate officials with the HN if appropriate to the mission)
DD. Public Work Planners
EE. Food/Nutritionists Planners
FF. Female Engagement Team/Personnel
GG. Cultural Advisers

Note. Although a somewhat comprehensive list, representatives can be added or subtracted as required depending on the mission, size, complexity, nature and location of the emergency/crisis.

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ANNEX E

HUMANITARIAN / DISASTER RESPONSE

RECONNAISSANCE REPORT

Highlights / Priorities

Identifies major/ key issues that need to be brought to the immediate attention of senior command.

Situational Overview

Represents a general overview of the situation.

Host Nation Response / Support

Summaries the response and support taken by the host nation. Details to be found in supporting annex.

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND RESPONSE

General Comments:

Support Item	Needs	Initial Response	Gaps and Constraints
Communication	*Identifies the general need requirements. Details will be found in supporting annexes / checklists.*	*Identifies the initial response needs that have been provided. Details will be found in supporting annexes / checklists.*	*Identifies those gaps / constraints in support of the overall need. Details will be found in supporting annexes / checklists.*
Education			
Electrical			
Engineering			
Food			
Health / Medical			
Housing and Shelter			

Internally Displaced Persons			
Population			
Sanitation			
Search and Rescue			
Security / Protection			
Transportation			
Water			

Airport Facility Status

Identifies the facilities overall condition and requirements needed to support operations. Details to be found in supporting annex.

Seaport Facility Status

Identifies the facilities overall condition and requirements needed to support operations. Details to be found in supporting annex.

OTHER MILITARY FORCES

General Comments:

Nation	Capabilities	Location(s)	Contact Info

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

General Comments:

Organization	Capabilities	Location(s)	Contact Info

Legal

Public Affairs / Media

Coordination Requirements

KEY CONTACTS

Organization	Position / Name	Contact Info

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ANNEX F

MILITARY SUPPORT EXAMPLES

1. Movement of relief items supplied by donor countries to the effected area;

2. Movement of relief items, personnel or equipment into or around the affected area;

3. Emergency support or repairs to vital infrastructure;

4. Advice on logistics or service provision;

5. Specialist equipment or capabilities in logistics, maritime or air safety, engineering, etc;

6. Additional capacity in planning, management or organizational skills;

7. Emergency medical treatment for victims;

8. Communications support and links;

9. Coherent and coordinated Media / Information Operations;

10. Air, land or sea survey / assessment; and

11. Expertise (Nuclear, Biological or Chemical; crowd and riot control…).

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ANNEX G

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE POINT OF CONTACT DIRECTORY

Country	Command/Headquarters	Department/Agency	Contact Information
Australia	Joint Operations Command	Operations Branch	Joint Coordination Centre Watch Supervisor, +61 2 6128 4333
Canada	National Defense Headquarters	Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)	Director Peacekeeping Policy 5, +01-613-996-1741
France[1]	EMA (Joint Chief of Staff Headquarters)	CPCO/J5 (Joint Strategic HQ/Plans)	Working hours: +33 142 198 380; Duty officer: +33 142 193 236
Germany	Federal Ministry of Defense (MOD)	Strategy and Operations III 5	Desk Officer +49 (0)30-2004-89416
Italy	Comando Operativo di vertice Interforze (Joint Operations Command)	Italian Joint Force Headquarters	J3 Ops Room Director, +39-06-46919053 or J3 Ops Room Shift Director, +39-06-46919076
United Kingdom	Joint Force Headquarters (HQ)	Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT)	PJHQ, JFHQ COS Coord, +44 (0) 19238 46969
United States	National Military Command Center	Joint Staff, Operations Directorate	Desk Officer, +01-703-693-8193 or +01-703-697-6340

[1] French reconnaissance and liaison team is called ELRT. It can be deployed within 96 hours.

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The MIC Executive Secretariat (ES) staff would like your feedback (comments and suggestion) on this MIC document. MIC documents are reviewed annually by one or more of the functional Multinational Interoperability Working Groups (MIWGs) and approved by the MIC Steering Group (SG) in order to ensure the currency and accuracy of all documents published by the MIC. Therefore, your feedback to the MIC ES staff on the content and scope of this document would be appreciated. Please forward your comments to the MIC ES staff at js.mic.es@mail.mil

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.6

LOGISTIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Version 1.1
07 November 2013

Prepared by: Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Executive Secretariat
Document Custodian: Operations Support (Ops Sup) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT

During the November 2013 MIC Principals and Strategic Planning Session Meeting, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	MIC ES
Version 1.1	07 November 2013	Ops Support MIWG

Summary of Changes:

In Version 1.1, CBG Vol III.6 has undergone annual review resulting in the addition of what needs to be done in the "Reception, Staging , Onward Movement and Integration" section.

Review Cycle:

Annual

Distribution:

Unlimited distribution; electronic copy of publication can be found on the MIC All Partners Access Network (APAN) website at https://community.apan.org/mic/

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BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

Individually, nations face significant challenges in deploying and sustaining their expeditionary forces. Historically, the participation of military logistic planners has been limited in the early phases of coalition and or multinational contingency planning due to security concerns or national policy. The *ad hoc* planning of many coalition operations does not generate the familiarity and trust conducive to management and execution of multinational logistics. Arrangements for cooperative logistics occur in many cases later during execution phases of an operation, which lends itself to redundant, and perhaps unnecessary, capabilities by all nations in an operational area, thus potentially creating a larger than needed logistic footprint and multinational competition for scarce in-theatre resources.

Consequently this guide encourages the early and active participation of logistic planners in the coalition-building process with the overarching aim of maximizing logistic cooperation among the coalition nations. Additionally, these same motivating factors support a growing trend away from logistics as solely a national responsibility – the historical norm. While nations have ensured logistic effectiveness in troop support by 'going it alone', it is now recognized that efficiencies may also be achieved without sacrificing effectiveness through burden-sharing and meticulous early planning. This section is intended to enable logistic planners at the strategic and operational level to achieve these objectives.

Multinational logistics is a general term used to describe any coordinated logistic activity involving 2 or more countries or organizations in support of a multinational force. To permit the CFC to execute his responsibilities for logistics effectively and efficiently, certain principles must be observed. These important principles have been developed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):

Primacy of Operations	Coordination	Timeliness
Responsibility	Provision and Sufficiency	Economy
Authority	Flexibility	Transparency and Visibility
Cooperation	Simplicity	Synergy

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

Multinational logistics, in the form of centralized coordination, management of common-user logistic activities and multinational support arrangements, can significantly enhance the ability of the participating nations to effectively and efficiently deploy and sustain forces. Multinational logistics potentially may:

a. Expedite and simplify logistic planning.

b. Speed force deployment, increase operational flexibility, and enhance logistic sustainment of the coalition forces.

c. Utilize in-theatre resources more effectively and efficiently through coordination of host-nation support and theatre-support contracting.

d. Reduce competition among nations for scarce resources.

e. Enable nations to contribute to the overall coalition logistic support plan according to their capabilities and strengths (without necessarily being self-sufficient).

f. Optimize logistic footprint.

g. Reduce force protection requirements.

h. Drive enhanced interoperability.

CHALLENGES TO MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

Planners must be aware of the following constraints and challenges to multinational logistics. Ongoing planning between nations responds to these challenges; however, some are likely to remain constraints for the foreseeable future. During an emerging crisis, early engagement and collaboration between national logistic planners will help overcome these challenges. During peace time, coalition exercises and training that set objectives to overcome multinational logistic constraints and challenges is also be helpful.

a. Nations may be reluctant during the force generation process to commit logistic forces to support the overall multinational operation. This reluctance can complicate the timely establishment of multinational logistic arrangements that are crucial for streamlining support from the outset of the operation. Advance planning and early involvement in the mission planning cycle can aid in overcoming this reluctance.

b. Most nations lack the deployable logistic assets to support both their own forces and to provide additional logistic units for general support of the coalition. The establishment of bilateral/multilateral arrangements with other nations and the involvement in the formation of multinational logistic support units can overcome these deficiencies.

c. Lack of a pre-established multinational logistic planning capability leads to disorganized multinational logistic operations, which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of operations. Advance planning before the advent of a crisis can develop outline organizational strategies for the provision of support of a coalition in a variety of scenarios. On the other hand, there will always be an *ad hoc* nature to multinational logistics. An approach that encourages flexibility, adaptability and robust 'plug and play' communication can mitigate many challenges.

d. Some functional areas are more challenging because of national sensitivities. Advanced planning and bilateral/multilateral arrangements/training may overcome some of these sensitivities. Examples include blood supply, sustaining ammunition and mortuary affairs.

e. It is difficult to achieve consensus during the planning phase regarding common funding for financing/reimbursement arrangements, yet up-front common funding can significantly reduce critical support costs associated with strategic lift, common infrastructure and Ports of Disembarkation improvements.[1]

f. There are many gaps in standardization, particularly between Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) and non-MIC military forces that impede multinational logistics. Workaround procedures implemented by participating nations are often required to lessen the adverse impact of this lack of standardization.

g. The current lack of commonality and capabilities in national database systems does not lend itself to the sharing and passage of logistic information that is crucial to the establishment and maintenance of multinational logistics. Coordination among the MIC nations prior to the outset of a crisis can produce a greater level of interoperability.

h. At the outset of a crisis there is often not enough time for mission analysis to include all coalition partners. Issues concerning releasability and the requirement for the national decision-making processes only add to the 'time-shortage' dilemma. Advance planning and the establishment of support arrangements are required to resolve common issues and to make multinational logistic contingency plans.

i. There is a lack of common understanding, training and exercises focused on multinational logistic planning and execution. Familiarity with multinational logistic' concepts and procedures gained through education, training and exercises can substantially reduce the conflicts of multinational logistics and maximize its benefits.

[1] Common funding is defined as expenses for forces required as either deployment or ongoing support enablers to establish/maintain an in-theatre presence through the provision of such services as Strategic lift, Combined Joint Task Force and component headquarters, Communications backbone infrastructure, ports and line of communications improvements, real estate and infrastructure improvement and select common user supplies/services.

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KEY PLANNING ISSUES

LOGISTIC STANDARDIZATION

Standardization is a continuum that extends from compatibility through interoperability and interchange ability to commonality. The focus of nation's intent on future coalition building is interoperability,[2] while simultaneously balancing national interests with a larger common mission. This is best achieved through cooperatively developed doctrine and procedures. Where possible, the adoption of NATO standardized agreements (STANAGs) and ABCA[3] quadrennial agreements (QSTAGs) could facilitate the standardization of procedures within the coalition. Early exchange of logistic planning information will contribute to interoperability. Though more difficult to achieve at the tactical level, multinational logistic standardization can increase the freedom and flexibility of action of tactical forces.

MUTUAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Mutual Logistic Support (MLS) is assistance between 2 or more nations in the transfer, exchange, loan or lease of logistic support, including contractor support. It is an important enabler in order to reduce support redundancies within the theatre and to fill national capability gaps. By working together and sharing resources, especially service delivery capabilities, nations, individually and collectively, can achieve economies in their logistic operations. The requirement for MLS should be considered early in the planning process so that nations can initiate negotiations for the establishment of MLS arrangements with other coalition members and factor in such dependencies into national planning.

MUTUAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS[4]

Mutual Logistic Support Arrangements (MLSA)s provide a framework for the exchange of logistic support between nations. MLSAs can be either generic documents covering any transfer of logistic support, supplies and services for a period of years, or an emergent document designed for a specific operation or exercise where no generic document exists. Many nations have developed mutual support agreements or arrangements, either bi- or multi-laterally, to ensure provision of logistic support to their forces to cover a range of military operation support. Full coalition visibility of such arrangements and other agreements is essential to ensure support arrangements fit into the overall coalition concept of support. Once MLSAs are in place, mission specific arrangements at the operational and tactical level can be quickly negotiated and initiated in the emergent context. Where pre-existing arrangements are not in place, significant time may be required to reconcile differences in national law and policy. In order to minimize the potential for differences in national law/ policy and regarding the content/language within MLSAs, it should be the intent within the MIC to establish MLSAs between all coalition members before the development of a situation requiring the deployment

[2] Interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
[3] America-Britain-Canada-Australia.
[4] In the case of the US, a MLSA is referred to an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).

of a coalition force. When authorized by nations, the agreements and arrangements may be negotiated and/or established by a CFC on their behalf. Nations may differ in their national interpretation of what constitutes an agreement's legal authority. However, authority may be provided by a nation to a CFC in order to negotiate operational-level implementing or technical arrangements.

MLSA Development and Documentation

Normally a MLSA is developed with subordinate documents elaborating the mission-specific procedural aspects and the detailed support requirements to implement the MLSA. Documents within a generic MLSA may include MOUs, Technical Arrangements (TA), Implementing Arrangements (IA) and/or Request/Invoice Forms. Planners should ensure that these subordinate documents are put in place as early as possible and be aware that variations in interpretation and in format and content between nations are likely.

Financial Considerations

While there may be circumstances where logistic support, supplies and services could be provided free of charge to some nations, the normal expectation is that MLS will be subject to reimbursement by the requesting/receiving nation to the supplying nation through cash, equal value exchange or replacement-in-kind transactions. Planners should ensure that financial procedures are understood and promulgated. For example, MLSAs will normally provide not only procedures, but also process timelines, order formats for supplies and services, dispute resolution procedures, credits and payment currency. Similarly, contractor logistic support to multiple countries will normally be arranged through bilateral contracts. Terms, conditions, services rendered and payment will be clearly articulated in such contracts.

Authorities and Responsibilities

In multinational operations, coalition nations typically retain operational command (OPCOM) but assign operational control (OPCON) of combat forces to the CFC. OPCON in itself does not include authority over administrative and logistic functions, and nations may adopt C2 arrangements for logistic units that are different from other forces. Consequently, command, control and support relationships for multinational logistics need to be clearly delineated in planning and reflected in relevant plans and orders. Planners should consider:

a. Routinely granting the CFC coordinating authority for logistics.

b. Obtaining agreement from the nations to place some logistic elements under OPCON of the CFC for tasking in support of the coalition. OPCON of logistic elements may be limited to specific phases, time, roles, sorties/operations and/or units reflecting the capabilities and limitations of coalition nations.

c. Obtaining agreement from nations to grant the CFC the authority to redistribute specified logistic resources to meet urgent and/or critical requirements during an

operation. The circumstances that might meet this criterion should be identified during planning.

d. Obtaining agreement from nations to grant the CFC directive authority for common support capabilities in other areas consistent with the OPCON of assigned and attached forces.

Routinely granting the CFC authority to exercise Tactical Control (TACON) of ground units transiting through the area normally designated as the Joint Rear Area (JRA). The authority and responsibility for TACON of units in the JRA or other designated rear area is normally subordinated to the commander assigned responsibility for these areas in order to coordinate security requirements and control main supply routes.

LOGISTIC LIAISON AND PLANNING TEAMS

From the outset, to facilitate planning and execution, the maximum use should be made of standing logistic liaison officers in relevant national headquarters. The requirement for logistic liaison officers increases commensurate with the complexity of command, control and support arrangements. While it may be obvious, it is essential to send qualified logistic liaison officers with tactical and operational experience in the type of operations in which they are intended to plan for. The lead nation will request the early dispatch of logistic liaison officers from nations that are considering participation in the coalition– and an logistic liaison officers matrix should be developed. Within the lead nation planning structure, these officers will assist the logistic planning teams at the strategic level and will facilitate the exchange of information between the nations represented and the lead nation. It is expected that the logistic liaison officer will be capable of advising the lead nation logistic planning staff of any national logistic constraints that may be faced by their respective nations and its potential impact on the coalition. The logistic liaison officers should also be capable of providing the logistic capability that potentially may be available from their respective nations should they decide to participate in the mission, however, the sharing of this information in no-way represents a commitment on behalf of the nation.

LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION IN COALITION OPERATIONS

The logistic C2 organization of a coalition operation encompasses both the internal logistic staff elements of the Coalition Joint Task Force Headquarters and the overall logistic organization, as integrated into the coalition C2 structure.

a. **Small Scale Operations**. If the operation is relatively small or involves only a few multinational partners, the CFC may rely on the Combined-Joint Logistic Officer (CJ-4) and staff, augmented (if necessary) with functional experts, to plan and coordinate coalition logistic activities.

b. **Larger Operations**. In the case of larger, more complex operations requiring more coordination and common support, the CFC may establish a separate organization to

assist the CJ-4 in developing and executing the operation's logistic support plan. NATO designates such an organization for coordinating and managing logistic cooperation a Multinational Joint Logistic Center (MJLC). NATO has developed detailed doctrine regarding the flexible structures for this center including the functions and staffing of various coordinating centers.[5]

MULTINATIONAL JOINT LOGISTIC CENTER STRUCTURE AND STAFFING

The MJLC comprises of logistic staff that executes the theatre-level logistic plans and policies of the CJ-4. Its size, structure and composition strongly depend on the mission, environment and the organizations it is designed to support. Guidelines for the structure, roles and staffing of the MJLC are found in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4.6 *Multinational Joint Logistic Center Doctrine* and if used should be defined early in planning and the obligations of nations for personnel, equipment and funding agreed. To be effective an MJLC should be constituted in sufficient time to allow for relevant induction, training and preparation. It is expected that the lead nation will provide the core of the MJLC; some nations may have standing deployable Joint logistic C2 capabilities that they may choose to contribute to a MJLC.

MULTINATIONAL JOINT LOGISTIC CENTER FUNCTIONAL COORDINATION

Within the MJLC, functional coordination centers (or other equivalent cells) may be established, based on the operational need to provide centralized coordination of common support services, such as engineering, movement control, medical activities, contracting, host-nation support, and the provision of common supplies, such as bulk fuel and rations. Possible structures are listed in AJP-4.6.

MULTINATIONAL JOINT LOGISTIC CENTER

When formed, the MJLC has a flexible and modular structure and may be established as one of the following:

a. An augmentation to the CJ-4's staff, especially during initial planning or for smaller operations of limited duration.

b. A separate staff section within the CJ-4 organization.

c. A separate organization integrated in or collocated with the Coalition Joint Task Force headquarters or other supporting headquarters.

d. A module placed within a component command under the Coalition Joint Task Force.

[5] Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 4.6 Multinational Joint Logistic Center (MJLC) Doctrine.

MULTINATIONAL JOINT MOVEMENTS COORDINATION CENTER (MJMCC)

When formed, the MJMCC should be structured to provide the following functions:

a. Coordination of the load-to-mode of all multinational movement assets (air, land and sea) in accordance with the Commander's priorities and direction.

b. Provide visibility of both inter-and intra-theatre force flow.

c. Movement coordination at designated points of disembarkation and embarkation.

d. Coordinate and liaise with national movement coordination agencies to access and advertise space available that can be utilized by other contributing troop contributing nation or by the multinational force commander. Command and control of multinational movements units and detachments throughout the joint operations area.

COALITION LOGISTIC BOARDS AND COMMITTEES

Boards and committees should be constituted to address cross-functional issues and to develop solutions to logistic challenges faced in strategic planning and by the CJTF when constituted. When established, boards and committees will seek consensus through representation by coalition participants. They will be convened on an as-required basis to meet specific operational requirements. Early in the planning phase, planners should consider requesting the assistance of standing multinational logistic organizations. Access to industry and key national/multinational logistic organizations can be facilitated through appropriate consultation and/or representation on relevant boards and committees.

MODES OF NATIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL SUPPORT

The following modes may be employed for the delivery of logistic support to the coalition:

a. **National Logistics**. National logistic support flows from national sources usually based in the home-nation through a strategic line of communications to their most forward-deployed national units in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Each nation will require national support for national unique materiel and services. Planners must differentiate between what support will be provided nationally and what will be provided by other modes (described below) in order to optimize support and deconflict Lines of Communications (LOCs). Planners should still be alert to opportunities for sharing LOCs and associated resources thereby avoiding transportation/distribution node congestion, reducing logistic footprints and enhancing efficiency.

b. **National Support Elements**. Regardless of the level of multinational or national logistics a nation employs, it is likely to employ a National Support Element (NSE) to provide integral national support to the forces it contributes to an operation.

c. **Host-Nation Support**. In the logistics context, host-nation support involves the provision of goods and services by national/local governments, often reducing costs, increasing efficiencies and avoiding sustainment over long distances. This is initially planned through logistic intelligence, then refined through *reconnoiter* and best carried out in-theatre in a coordinated fashion by the lead nation to avoid erosion of host-nation goodwill and overstressing host-nation infrastructure/resources.

d. **Lead Nation for Logistics**. Lead nation support involves one or more nations assuming responsibility for coordinating and/or providing specified support and other functions.[6] If the lead nation concept is employed, planners must coordinate agreed lead nation functions with all countries involved and ensure a means of reimbursement (if required) is in place. A lead nation mission is similar to a Role Specialist Nation mission with the main difference being that the lead nation mission is wider in scope for logistic support for all or part of the coalition force. The lead nation will assume responsibility for the coordination of a portion of logistic support to other nations within a defined geographical area.

e. **Role Specialist Nation**. A Role Specialist Nation assumes the responsibility for the provision of a single commodity, class of supply or service. It allows each troop contributing nation to exploit its unique logistic strengths and capabilities that, when combined with the capabilities of the other members of the coalition, can serve to make the whole of the logistic capability stronger than its individual parts. The Role Specialist Nation would not assume responsibility for coordination across the coalition; the lead nation for logistics would provide that function.

f. **Multinational Integrated Logistic Units and Multinational Integrated Medical Units**. A Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit (MILU) and Multinational Integrated Medical Unit (MIMU) is formed when 2 or more nations agree to provide logistic and/or medical support to a multinational force typically under OPCON of the CFC. Due to the complexity and degree of coordination required to form these units, planners should initiate assessments and coordination early in the planning process even if the requirement for the units is planned for a subsequent operational phase or force rotation.

THIRD PARTY LOGISTIC SUPPORT SERVICES

Third Party Logistic Support Services is the provision of selected logistic support services by a contractor. This can release scarce military resources for higher priority tasks elsewhere, overcome known logistic shortfalls and provide long-term endurance and sustainability. Planners should consider the cost-effectiveness and cost-sharing of Third Party Logistic Support

[6] A lead nation for support is separate from the lead nation concept for the C2 of the overall coalition operation. An individual nation, who is not the LN for the operation, may agree to be the lead nation for a specific range of materiel or services.

Services which can be sourced from within the host country, from the international market or from coalition national arrangements; different political and financial challenges may apply to each.

COORDINATION OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS /NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Activities of international and non-governmental organizations within the area of responsibility are to be taken into account at all levels of logistic planning. Close contact is to be established and maintained from the outset of the planning process. These organizations most often operate independently from the coalition force, however coordination of their activities is necessary in order to assure appropriate security and to harmonize competing demands for local resources. Establishment of effective working relations with these organizations provides for the exchange of relevant logistic information and cooperation on issues of common interest. International and non-governmental organizations often represent both challenges and opportunities. For example, their labor pool for humanitarian aid distribution may relieve coalition forces from similar tasks. The coalition may provide trucks and transport, while international and non-governmental organizations provide food, water and the people to serve the local distressed civilian population. However, when irregular actors or insurgents target non-combatants, international and non-governmental organizations may require protection that creates an unplanned protection requirement on limited coalition resources.

COALITION LOGISTIC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Appropriate management and timely distribution of logistic information is critical to the success of logistic planning. Exchange of logistic information between multinational and national command elements must be established from the offset. Policies and procedures must assure the timely release of logistic information to enable coalition nations to plan collaboratively and to enable the coalition force to operate effectively. Essential subjects to be addressed early during the planning stage are:

a. Lead nation responsibilities for setting up a robust coalition network, architecture and digital ROE;

b. Access to both classified and unclassified logistic networks for hosting logistic application with sufficient bandwidth for logistic communications;

c. Collaborative logistic planning and support tools including shared logistic databases and Logistic Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP);

d. Logistic data management and exchange protocols;

e. Development and management of Logistic Intelligence products, such as Aerial and Sea Ports of Disembarkation metrics and capabilities, road/rail networks, and host-nation support capabilities;

f. Review of lessons-learned from similar contingencies; and

g. Establishment of logistic reporting, data elements, formats and frequency.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection is an important consideration as logistic forces are particularly vulnerable. The coalition dimension can present further challenges, including a greater risk of fratricide. The following factors should be considered:

a. Coalition partners do not necessarily share the same views on standards of force protection. The complexities of differing national ROE, force protection profiles and national agreements with the host nation will need to be factored into the planning.

b. Strategic and operational LOCs are particularly prone to interdiction. The assignment of supported and supporting component relationships for force protection is key.

c. When setting the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) the lead nation should articulate the levels of force protection capability required to ensure uninterrupted logistic operations. Close coordination with the operational commander will be essential in order to tailor force protection capabilities with the threat. Access to coalition intelligence assessments will be a key information requirement to enable this activity.

d. The Coalition force protection guidelines and security plan should incorporate the needs and capabilities all logistic formations and organizations, other governmental agencies, host nation, Third Party Logistic Support Services as well as international and non-governmental organizations. Cooperation and liaison are keys to success.

TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS' LOGISTIC RESPONSIBILITIES

A guide to what is administratively and logistically expected of troop contributing nations is listed below:

a. To what level the troop contributing nation must be administratively self-contained on arrival at the Force Mounting Base (e.g. arrive self-sufficient for 28 days with 7 days stocks held in theatre and 21 days stocks pre-positioned).

b. Preferred method of stores/equipment packaging for deployment (e.g. ISO containers).

c. The expectation that troop contributing nation will provide their own organic and/or unique support requirements.

d. Detail of the provision of common support requirements by force elements. From where and how? (host nation; contractors, lead nation).

e. The expectation that troop contributing nation will contribute NSE commensurate with the size and structure of their national contribution to the coalition.

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RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI)[7] is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment and materiel arriving in the JOA, into forces capable of meeting the CFC's operational requirements. RSO & I of forces is fundamental to the concept of operations that envisions the projection of mission-tailored combat power into and within a JOA at the right time and in the right sequence. For this reason the CFC must prioritize and exercise coordinating authority and, where granted, C2 over the RSOI process.

During the build-up of forces, the force will expand rapidly in size, which implies that the level of burden borne by the host nation will increase dramatically. The CFC will endeavor to keep relations with the leadership of the host nation as close and amicable as possible and maintain support for the coalition presence at a high level, assisted by public information initiatives. Under no circumstances should the coalition adversely influence life in the host nation to such a degree that public and political support is weakened or lost. This requires restraint, consideration for local customs and traditions and the flexible conduct of all activities by all members of the coalition.

The build-up of forces should also be used as a show of force and power projection. It will directly influence an adversary's behavior and his situational awareness. The build-up of forces should be closely considered in relation to Info Ops (presence, posture and profile). Therefore the build-up of forces should be carefully planned and is not solely a logistic operation.

The establishment of a dedicated force for the RSO& I of incoming forces must be the first planning factor to be discussed and organized, as their presence shapes the unit's ability to dictate tempo, Force Extraction Team (FET) / Force Insertion Team (FIT) and overall operations within the AO. The RSO&I team needs to have conducted all briefs by the outgoing force, which must earmark certain supplies and time to allow this mission to be achieved.

Effective transition from one force to another begins and ends with RSO&I. The capacity to surge equipment for larger RSO&I units must be dictated within the Commander's Reserve within theatre.

Ideally, the RSO&I force moving in for a new rotation should take the equivalent stores to support up to a Company sized force (100man), allowing for the initial surge of forces into the operational theatre. Coupled with the stores in theatre, this offers flexibility for the Commander on the ground with regards to planning the insertion of forces and at what tempo they move into theatre.

The key planning factor for RSO&I is the need for flexibility with regards to capacity and supportability of forces within theatre. The planning stage should factor in what operational

[7] Detailed information in AJP-3.13, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces.

tempo is preferable and this then dictates what size RSO&I element goes into theatre for the FIT.

REDEPLOYMENT

The redeployment of forces after termination of an operation is a highly complex matter; politically, militarily, economically and environmentally. It is not simply a case of reversing the deployment plan, but rather a distinct operation in its own right. Redeployment may be directed when operations have terminated or higher authority directs movement of the assigned force. The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) should give the same considerations to redeployment as for deployment in regard to phasing of C2 and the desired order of departure. Successful redeployment requires the consideration of a number of significant Host Nation (HN) economic and environmental factors, political constraints, and competing national interests. Furthermore, nations must overcome the challenges of information sharing, synchronizing their efforts, and facilitating opportunities for collaborative solutions to common problems.

The redeployment of forces needs to be undertaken in a coordinated manner if resources, facilities, and the lines of communications are to be optimized. Doing so will set the conditions for a successful transition to the HN.

In a Coalition environment, while the Coalition is responsible to coordinate National Redeployment and retrograde plans, nations in turn are asked, normally on an iterative basis by issue to provide their intent; it is in fact a collaborative process. This is particularly important as the drawdown will inevitably overlap with ongoing operations, which further necessitates integrated planning between all staffs.

Finally, the complexity of the mission during the redeployment phase will require an increase in support facilitators, infrastructure and in-theatre contracting requirements. To ensure proof of good order and to maintain international reputation, it is essential that this increase of personnel is considered at the initial stage of the planning phase and articulated to national authorities for early approval.

DISCUSSION

Notwithstanding the fact the Coalition will have a generally agreed upon concept and course of action to govern mission transition and redeployment, individual national planning will be driven by internal political considerations as governed by the limitations of national laws and regulations. In that context, the desire for an efficient and effective redeployment should be a very powerful incentive for nations to share information and work towards collective logistics solutions.

The four factors highlighted as critical in the redeployment planning are:

a. the identification of the logistical requirements,

b. the development of a disposal process,

c. the identification of the lines of communications, and

d. the management of contracts and agreements.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE REQUIREMENT

Nations and Coalition formations must identify the overall type and quantity of materiel (materiel compendium) to be retrograded or disposed of and the quantity of infrastructure requiring disposition through transfer, sale, deconstruction or remediation. Mandated timelines (i.e. legislatively-imposed deadlines) must also be identified. To ensure coalition visibility, national information should be transferred to the coordinating authority to establish a coalition common operating picture.

Coalition policies and processes for transfer and disposal must be established early in the planning phase. Once identified, nations should indicate to the Coalition which materiel they intend to offer for transfer in order to ensure the HN has the capacity to effectively receive the materiel.

Materiel Compendium. Compendium is defined as "a collection of detailed items of information". With respect to mission redeployment planning, these national compendia should be the documents that list materiel holding quantities and expected dispositions. These compendia should also indicate if the material is to be retrograded, and if not, the in-theatre disposal plan. This asset accountability (stocktaking, cataloguing) will be necessary to achieve adequate baseline information for follow on activities including the development of the Task Force Movement Tables or providing in-transit visibility. The information will become more precise as the transition nears and the compendia evolve and become more exact as the redeployment date approaches (NATO common funded materiel or equipment would be treated equivalently or similar to national assets).

Detailed national compendium documents must identify the items that are to be handled with appropriate references to security, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), or Controlled Technology Access Transfer (CTAT) requirements. The documents must also specify the specific Nations that need to be consulted as part of ensuring a coordinated transfer. The Coalition could perform a useful "information clearing house" role in that respect, though whether this would be able to supplement bilateral national procedures requires further study.

Infrastructure. The in-theatre Coalition commander, after conducting an assessment with the HN, will jointly develop a detailed process for infrastructure transfer and most importantly disposal. The key is to have a single reality plan that integrates decisions on infrastructure. In the limited instances where opportunities are identified to transfer infrastructure, the Coalition has extant policies for transfer and site remediation to which nations should adhere.

There may be a requirement for additional infrastructure and resources to support redeployment and retrograde activities. The planning, funding and operation of facilities that

serve the common good should be performed by the Coalition rather than by individual Nations.

DEVELOPMENT OF A DISPOSAL PROCESS

The Coalition should be responsible for defining the disposal process and identifying the minimum acceptable standards for each specific theatre. Two key considerations in this review are the ability of the HN military or civil authorities to absorb the quantity and type of materiel proposed for disposal and the potential negative publicity resulting from large quantities of "abandoned" materiel.

When considering any eventual drawdown of materiel in order to reduce disposal efforts, national capabilities including Days of Supply (DOS) will need to be coordinated with the Coalition.

Methods of Disposal. Economies of scale should influence multinational disposal options including contracted solutions. There must be quality assurances that meet environmental and security considerations and an audit trail of the destruction portion of the disposal process. There are several methods for disposal, which are based on variations in the administrative process.

Sales. Based on historical experience, the value of materials sold may only be marginally greater than the incremental cost of processing the materiel for sale. Sales to the HN must be coordinated through the Coalition. As the priority for redeployment will be the reconstitution of contingent forces, materiel for sale that must first be removed from theatre will not attract a high priority for movement and therefore alternate methods of disposal should be explored.

Gifting / Donations. This is the permanent transfer of materiel to other national governments at no cost including the transfer to HN agencies, other government agencies and recognized charitable or non-profit organizations.

Gifting and donations must be coordinated through the Coalition to ensure long term benefit and proof of good order so that there is a clear long-term benefit to the HN receiving the materiel.

Destruction. This is the process of reducing materiel and infrastructure to a state where it is no longer useable for the original purpose.

Multinational solutions for materiel destruction must be coordinated through Coalition to ensure burden sharing. Examples of multinational solutions for destruction could include operation of a joint Small Arms incinerator; creation of a joint classified paper shredding capability; coordination of a joint briquetting and burn facility for secondary treatment of shredded material; contracting of a joint physical equipment shredding capability and

supervising of a joint disintegration facility for highly classified materials such as computer hard drives.

Demilitarization. This is the specific process of removing identified subcomponent parts from materiel in order to eliminate controlled capabilities.

The Coalition should coordinate any multinational solutions for materiel demilitarization in order to ensure burden sharing is optimized and processes are executed in a way to meet environmental and security standards. Due to security implications, it is very unlikely that a HN contractor would be engaged to perform this type of work and thus a collective approach could achieve efficiencies and most likely produce the highest level of success.

Transfer. This is the action of moving or re-identifying ownership of infrastructure from coalition forces to the HN. Nations must adhere to existing policies (for example NATO extant policies) for infrastructure transfer and site remediation. Transfer of infrastructure must be coordinated through the Coalition to assure long term benefit and environmental compliance. Full records of construction and environmental reviews should be provided. Environmental reviews should be done for all sites, and remediation measures undertaken where impacted areas are identified. The Coalition's role in the process should be the maintenance of a database of all environmental assessments conducted in theatre.

IDENTIFICATION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS (LOCS).

It is essential that each Nation ensures the integration of their redeployment plans with the Coalition and amongst each other. Common software tools (for example NATO LOGFAS) should be used to capture and share information to facilitate effective and efficient support, as well as to plan and coordinate operational and strategic movement. In this situation, the Coalition should provide the multilateral forum replacing multiple bilateral fora.

The Coalition must develop multinational lines of communication and coordinate their usage. Conversely, a lead nation could be identified to coordinate multi-lateral arrangements on behalf of the coalition. These will result in the coordinated use of in-theatre resources such as SPOEs and APOEs and will serve to deconflict movement along the LOCs.

The Coalition will coordinate the use of key logistics hubs and infrastructure that support identified lines of communications. There is significant potential to avoid contract fratricide when nations coordinate their overall movement intent. The Coalition should establish a liaison office with the HN in order to assist with issues such as customs clearances.

The Coalition should consolidate and coordinate an overall movement plan covering all LOCs once in receipt of all national redeployment plans.

MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS

The Coalition must retain total visibility of all contracts in theatre as nations draw down and terminate arrangements thus necessitating multinational solutions. This may include the transition to military solutions as contracted capabilities can no longer be assured due to reductions in force protection.

National plans must include provisions for the removal of all third country nationals at the point of contract termination and also ensure that contractors remain compliant with retrograde and environmental requirements throughout.

In general the use of support agencies (e.g. NAMSA for NATO) to provide long-term contracts for support redeployment may be the most cost effective. Wherever possible the Coalition should play a role in reducing contract competition and fratricide.

The Coalition must maintain visibility of all bilateral arrangements in order to provide more efficient cross national support.

Redeployment Task Force. It is recommended that the role of the Coalition be reinforced so that it may synchronize national efforts; facilitate the sharing of information amongst Nations, and exploit opportunities where collaborative solutions can be applied against common problems.

With the focus of effort by those in theatre remaining on operations, early consideration should be given to the establishment of a dedicated Redeployment Task Force (RTF). This RTF should be maintained for the duration of the redeployment phase to address ongoing changes to the redeployment plan.

PROPOSED RESPONSIBILITIES OVERVIEW

Coalition
Coordination of the national information requirements
Development of policies and processes for transfer, disposal and environmental remediation
Coordination of the LOCs
Development of policies and processes for joint destruction and demilitarization
Plan, fund and operate facilities needed for drawdown
Coordination of gifting and donation plan
Coordination of the multinational material destruction plan
Coordination of the multinational material demilitarization plan
Coordination of the disposal or transfer of infrastructure
Maintain visibility of all theatre contracts
Development of Overall redeployment plan
Coordination of days of supply through consumption or disposition policies
Development of multinational agreement database
Establishment of a LNO with HN
Establishment of a Redeployment Task Force

Nations
Identification of national requirements
Identification of mandated timelines
Identification of disposal policy requirements
Identification of lines of communications
Development of functional support plan
Development of contract closure plan
Development of environmental screening and remediation plan
Development of force protection plan
Development of materiel transfer and disposal plan
Development of infrastructure transfer and disposal plan
Development of national redeployment plan to inform COALITION
Identification of all theatre MN agreements to COALITION

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH CONSIDERATIONS

For any successful operation, it is necessary to understand the essential concepts of military logistics but it is even more critical to grasp the essentials especially in the context of a CA to crisis resolution. The following attempts to rationalize the critical needs for close military-interagency cooperation, and to identify the areas of potential logistical support which could be provided by the military logistics systems in a broad spectrum of crisis situations. Some of the major friction points are identified and those areas which require improvement and/or areas for further development in order to achieve a greater degree of national and multinational logistics support within a CA framework.

Lessons identified from numerous recent humanitarian relief operations have emphasized the need for a multinational operational level logistics framework which can describe how the military synchronizes planning and execution of logistics support within a non-combat/ civilian-led mission.

Military logisticians can no longer focus singularly on support to military forces, but must also consider a wide range of competing support requirements and parallel work efforts and thus must determine how best to coordinate their efforts with the support capabilities found within the government based agencies and NGOs in the crisis response. In most circumstances, no single government, military or civilian organization will be able to accomplish its own goals without the support of the other agencies.

It must be clearly understood that neither civilian agencies nor military forces alone have the capability to adequately respond to natural disasters of such magnitude. Furthermore, crises involving intra-state conflict present an even more compelling case for a comprehensive, coordinated national and/or international response and transition through the various stages of crisis response.

When faced with a crisis, all actors are best served when the national response is based upon a CA. It must be understood that logistical assets will be limited and that scarce supplies and services will be in demand by other agencies and nations. Key portions of the military logistics network can greatly facilitate the work of other agencies and their respective abilities to deploy and operate responsively.

Furthermore, military logistics' primary focus is making deployed military forces self sufficient. The military logistics network should not "poach" on the local economy, thereby leaving these resources for the locals and minimizing distortions to the local economy. Spare military logistics capacity can subsequently be offered to other agencies in the area of operations on a case-by-case basis and/or under formal or informal agreements.

Without a shared strategic vision of how the logistics network will operate, there is always a real danger that various actors – civilian and military – will cling tenaciously to their own policy

views and strategic orientations, unwilling or unable to integrate their perceptions and procedures with other agencies in a collective, coordinated effort.

The effective use of military logistics capabilities in conflict, post-conflict or humanitarian crisis situations demands the reconciliation of political ends and military/civilian means. CA can and should include a multidimensional logistical strategy involving national approaches, coupled with cooperative collaboration with IOs or IGOs, NGOs and the private sector. As such, military commanders and their logisticians, tasked to support these complex support activities must consider the effect of these additional agencies during their mission planning and while in the theatre of operations fulfilling their missions.

It is essential that the major contributing agencies, both military and non-military should work together to create standing CA logistical policies and an agreed upon/shared logistical doctrine that will allow for the development and continued enhancement of their communications and collaborative partnership networks as an on-going, day-to-day business practice. These pre-existing logistical agreements and relationships are imperative in order to have well-established lines of communications and known procedural practices, based upon a common collaborative doctrine which brings their agencies and respective resources and procedures together to meet the challenges, well in advance of a particular crisis or mission.

Logistics support to the war fighter is and always will be the primary focus of efforts of each of the respective national military logistics commands. In addition, as greater reliance upon multinational coalition efforts continue, it is essential that multinational logistics capabilities be further developed to meet these growing logistical needs and collaborative responses.

As such, military logistics is and will remain the essential component of any CA to crisis resolution if the military is involved in the mission. Though military logistics capabilities can and will vary in scope and magnitude from nation to nation, the fundamental provision of logistical services will, in general, be composed of the provision of the following core logistics capabilities which can be deployed/utilized on both a national or international basis in varying degrees of magnitude:

a. Ground, sea and air transportation networks and assets;

b. Supply, distribution and storage facilities and services;

c. Life support services (food, water and shelter);

d. Engineering assets and services;

e. Communications assets and services;

f. Medical assets and services;

g. Vehicle and aircraft maintenance, and

h. Management of contract logistics support.

Information exchange, not only between coalition military forces, but also with civilian counterparts, remains a significant impediment to overcome in conducting inter-agency and multinational logistics support missions.
Another major friction point which would impede successful logistic support within a CA is the complex legal and financial systems inherent within the MIC-member nations and others. Military multinational logistics operations continue to be hampered by complex legal arrangements making financial transactions between national militaries difficult and time consuming.

Operational military command structures need to be fully engaged and integrate the concept of CA, in particular, the application of logistics support in a comprehensive manner and take into consideration early in the operational planning process where the over-arching logistical requirements for collaborative planning (with their logisticians and among the other multinational and interagency participants) can develop and coalesce.

Some of the fundamental and key principles which need to be considered in the planning and implementation of military logistics support within the CA to crisis management are as follows:

a. Non-combat related/crisis resolution/humanitarian relief operations or missions will likely be civilian led with logistics support from the military (initially transportation assets most likely) in high demand;

b. There will be a requirement for early and high-level involvement by the national and multinational civilian and military logistics organizations involved in the mission;

c. The required collaborative logistical process, which should be established and institutionalized in advance of any mission must include an active dialogue and information sharing with national and international organizations and non-governmental communities;

d. The logistical needs and concerns of the host nation must be considered and reflected in the planning and dialogue;

e. An agile and flexible logistical planning process is essential to enable all support agencies to adapt to a rapidly changing environment and to coordinate activities with partners whose methodologies and priorities may differ radically. Respect for national, and just as important, respect of the local needs will be essential for effective mission success.

f. Specific effort is needed to develop hybrid support methods and procedures to coordinate military logistics planning and execution in cooperation with civilian logistics activities;

g. Depending upon the size / magnitude of the mission, a logistics coordinating forum should be established to de-conflict and prioritize the demands on host nations' resources and to orchestrate the sharing of resources between participating agencies;

h. There may be a requirement to establish one or more coordination centers, which would coordinate day-to-day activities and various high tempo or complex logistics functions. Personnel from various national and international agencies should jointly populate these centers;

i. There is a requirement for early logistics input into the framework of crisis response planning processes;

j. There will be numerous agencies all vying for the same, scarce host nation resources;

k. There are no formal or standardized mechanisms with which to coordinate activities or effective de-confliction of host nation resource usage. There is a need for robust situational awareness between coalition military logisticians and an effective communication network linking military and civilian agencies;

l. The key element of making cooperative logistics function within the context of CA is reliable logistics information exchange and trust between the coalition/mission collaboration partners.

The key to the success of any national or international mission is and will continue to be the level of effective logistical support provided to the mission. To ensure effective logistical support is available in the right place, time and magnitude required, pre-mission collaboration, planning and coordination should be achieved vertically through the existing military planners (J5), logisticians (J4), and operators (J3) command relationships and horizontally across other, new multinational and interagency crisis management relationships such as with the UN, and other IOs, IGOs and major NGOs. To accomplish this pre-mission readiness state, pre-existing communications networks and formal lines of command/interagency management need to be created, institutionalized and exercised at the local, the national and international levels.

Military logistics organizations have the capacity to bring vast capabilities to their military commands, their governments' agencies and to NGOs as well as to multinational partners and international organizations. However, these logistical capabilities will be far more effective if greater interdepartmental, interagency and international cooperation and coordination are achieved prior to the "execution" phase of any such mission and that coordination is continued

through all phases of crisis management, be it combat operations, stabilization and reconstruction missions or humanitarian relief.

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.7

COMMON RECORD OF LOGISTIC RECONNAISSANCE FOR COALITION PARTNERS

Version 1.1
07 November 2012

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PREFACE

To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in planning. By proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a first hand look at as much of the ground as circumstances render assessable to him. He checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he plans to assign it.

General Matthew B. Ridgeway
(Korean War)

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INTRODUCTION

NATO defines reconnaissance as: "A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area."

An essential element of logistics coalition building is obtaining and sharing reconnaissance information amongst coalition partners that enables logistics planning and execution. Coalitions are often formed with an initial nucleus where one or more countries enter and begin operations while other countries join over a period of time. As a result, nations that may lead and initiate a coalition should develop a sharable, agreed to in advance, common record of logistics reconnaissance that will serve to inform emergent/new coalition partners. Such a capability will decrease the time, cost and logistics footprint of all coalition partners as well as hasten new/emergent coalition member integration. It will also serve to enable increased operational effects.

Further, a common record of logistics reconnaissance will enable the Logistician to support the Coalition Force Commander's (CFC) campaign planning and decision support by identifying, assessing and estimating in-theater logistics resources, infrastructure, assumptions, restraints and constraints.

This document includes checklists (Chapter 1) that enable coalition logistics intelligence preparation of the battle space across the spectrum of conflict from Missions Other Than War (MOOTW) to Major Combat Operations (MCO). However, for humanitarian and disaster relief, the UN and other organizations have created more detailed checklists as documented in the 'links' section of this guide (Chapter 2).

CHAPTER 1 - LOGISTICS RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLISTS

Types of Reconnaissance. There are two types of reconnaissance: [1]

a. Deliberate Planning Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance can be conducted in support of deliberate planning and generally in accordance with a national pre-programmed schedule. There may be scope for sharing this data as a baseline prior to Theatre Reconnaissance; and

b. Theatre Reconnaissance. Theatre Reconnaissance normally occurs during crisis planning; the principal function is to inform the Estimate process.

[1] FM 5-116 (TBC).

In the context of preparations for potential Coalition Operations it is almost certain that Theatre Reconnaissance (as opposed to Deliberate Planning) will be required in response to a current or emerging crisis. There are three types of Theatre Reconnaissance:

a. Strategic. A strategic reconnaissance is required to help determine the feasibility of a nation's involvement and their potential contribution. The focus is on force contribution and materiel requirements;

b. Operational. An operational reconnaissance is required to support the development of the campaign plan and to provide the detail required to plan the deployment and sustainment of the Joint/Combined Force. Operational reconnaissance supports operational planning, that of linking tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives; and

c. Tactical. A tactical reconnaissance is required to inform the in-theatre planning. Tactical reconnaissance is normally undertaken by designated component Commanders. Tactical reconnaissance focuses on support to employment of units in combat.

It is likely that nations will have already conducted some form of Strategic Reconnaissance to determine their willingness to participate in an operation therefore the likelihood is that only Operational and Tactical Theatre Reconnaissance will be conducted in cooperation with Coalition Partners.

Theatre Reconnaissance - Summary of J4 Responsibility. Theatre logistics reconnaissance is normally conducted by the J4. The focus is on the availability of resources and infrastructure and at the same time documenting constraints and to the extent possible unknowns (assumptions). Logistics reconnaissance may be broken down into the following categories:

a. NATO 5 Classes of Supply:

i. Class I. Items of subsistence, e.g. food and forge, which are consumed by personal and animals at an approximately uniformed rate, irrespective of local changes in combat or terrain conditions,

ii. Class II. Supplies, for which allowances are established by tables of organization and equipment, e.g. clothing, weapons, tools, spare parts, vehicles,

iii. Class III. Petroleum Oils and Lubricants (POL) for all purposes, except for operating aircraft or for use in weapons such as flame-throwers

e.g. gasoline, fuel oil, coal or coke, (Class IIIa – aviation fuel and lubricants),

iv. Class IV. Supplies for which initial issue allowances are not prescribed by approved issue tables. Normally includes fortification and construction materials as well as additional quantities of items identical to those authorized for initial issue (Class II) such as vehicles, and

v. Class V. Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents of all types.

b. Logistics Services. To establish the availability of transport including rail, waterways and road transport (Heavy Equipment Transport (HETS), general cargo and utility vehicles) including identification of sources of supply (Host Nation Support (HNS) and commercial resources). This will entail the identification of Main Supply Routes (MSRs), distribution nodes and facilities, potential assembly and storage sites (e.g. industrial estates). To establish the availability of warehousing, supply services and availability and reliability of local labour; and

c. HNS. To identify potential HNS and establish/negotiate HNS arrangements (Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs), LOAs etc) in conjunction with J8/J9. The early identification of HNS is vital to an effective and economic deployment.

d. Movements:

i. LOC. To establish both strategic LOC and in-theatre LOCs,

ii. Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD). Identify suitable SPODs including and assessment of the HN and commercial facilities available at the port. This includes berths, draughts, reception, port clearance, cargo handling facilities, storage facilities for all classes of supply expected to be handles, vehicle holding areas, and the availability and type of allied resources, and

iii. Airport of Debarkation (APOD). To identify suitable APODs including an assessment of the Host Nation (HN) and commercial facilities available at the airports. This includes passenger handling arrangements, ramp space for logistics re-supply, aircraft handling capabilities and capacity, storage for all classes of supply which could be shipped, Deployable Air Command and Control System (ACCS) Component (DAC) handling limitations, and the availability and type of allied resources.

Medical Reconnaissance. Medical Reconnaissance is normally conducted by J Med. To determine the availability and suitability of local health facilities and infrastructure; casualty transportation and aeromedical evacuation requirements; liaison with National Government Agencies, HN and Non-Government Organization (NGO) medical representatives in theatre; status of endemic diseases and potential environmental health threats; where appropriate, assessment of local health needs (e.g. refugees).

Composition of Reconnaissance Teams and Combined Check Lists. Reconnaissance is invariably conducted as a team effort with experts from J1, J2, J3, J4, J6, J8, J9, J Med deploying. Logistics checklist requirements have a heavy overlap with other J-Code disciplines and are not easily extracted (nor should they be). Longer-term objective should be common reconnaissance across all the J-Codes.

Checklists – The Baseline. The Check Lists as detailed below are self-explanatory but the following notes should be considered before completion:

a. In any reconnaissance, the information in Sections I and I (General Country Data and Administration) is likely to be required. Although the information is more administrative than logistic in nature, it is relevant to all sections and therefore consideration should be given to completing this section first;

b. It is possible that some of the information required in the checklists is available elsewhere i.e. through the strategic links in Chapter 2. If this is the case it is suggested that the link is included and other information is reported by exception;

c. Where possible and appropriate published literature, flyers, regulation and rule sets should be attached to the check lists and referred to in the appropriate 'remarks' box;

d. Where alternative or diversionary APODs/SPODs are considered, the check lists should be completed as for the main APOD/SPOD to enable contingency plans to be made;

e. Where Mutual Logistic Support Agreement (MLSA)s or similar arrangements exist with host nations copies should be attached to the check lists; and

f. Responses on the checklists should be characterized with appropriate metrics (i.e. tons per day) where possible to enable operational planning and throughput.

SECTION I - GENERAL COUNTRY DATA

A - Country Details

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Country name.	
2	Location.	
3	Grid Reference.	
4	Map Serials.	
5	GPS.	
6	Time ahead of GMT.	

B - Geographical Conditions

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe in-country conditions.	
2	Describe the regional and immediate locale conditions.	
3	Describe the nature of HN infrastructure.	
4	Describe the specific physical characteristics including hills and mountains.	
5	Describe the prevailing weather conditions.	

C - LINES OF COMMUNICATION

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Briefly describe number/capability of local airports (civ/mil air transport through civil or mil APOD, distances). Note: See Section IV for detailed information.	
2	Briefly describe railways/head capabilities (condition, distances). Note: See Section VI for detailed information.	
3	Briefly describe local roadways (distances, locations, condition, facilities and special conditions). Note: See Section VII for detailed information.	
4	Briefly describe local seaports (distances, locations, condition, facilities and special conditions). Note: See Section V for detailed information.	
5	Describe general standard of telephone network.	
6	Describe any HN customs/inhibitors to freedom of movement.	

SECTION II - ADMINISTRATION RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

A - FINANCE

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What is the local currency?	
2	Can currency be exchanged both ways?	
3	Describe any standing service charges or taxes.	
4	Describe fees to pay before departure.	
5	Are local overseas allowances adequate?	
6	Who/where is the nearest national support element for uplift of cash?	
7	What is the name and address of a suitable bank (especially for long detachments)?	
8	What is the method of payment for:	
	Office Accommodation?	
	MT?	
	Fuel? (Carnets)	
	Hotel?	
	Meals?	

	Replacement of equipment used/destroyed?	
9	What is the price of:	
	Evening meals?	
	Drinks?	
	Soap?	
	Laundry?	
	Dry cleaning?	

B - PROTOCOL

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Is there a requirement for a civilian adviser/interpreter?	
2	What are the equivalent official titles for our personnel?	
3	What are the local rules for official uniform/dress?	
4	Describe the locally adopted alternative to military uniform.	
5	What type of civilian dress is acceptable?	
6	Describe the need for special protective clothing, if any?	

7	Is there a VIP reception area?	
8	What official functions are required?	
9	What places of particular interest exist locally?	

C - HOST NATION/LOCAL SUPPORT

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Is an in-theatre tri-service casualty-reporting cell required?	
2	State possible location(s).	
3	HNS available?	
4	Describe the necessary travel arrangements/facilities for compassionate/casualty cases.	
5	State the projected battle casualty rate.	
6	Describe local mortuary or burial facilities/locations.	

7	Describe any local burial/mortuary sensitivities.	
8	Describe any local emergency burial issues.	
9	Define projected coffin/body bag requirements.	
10	Describe local shopping, gym and general recreation facilities.	
11	Is there a local supplier for welfare material, books or newspapers?	
12	What are the local communications arrangements for IDD, radio, TV and both terrestrial and satellite internet including any radio frequencies?	
13	What are the local issues for personal security:	
	Crime, wildlife, roads.	
	Environmental.	
	Local justice.	

	Local law enforcement.	
	Gender.	
	Local transport.	

D - OPERATIONAL WELFARE PACKAGE

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Is a suitable environment for rest and recreation activities established?	
2	Define the quantity of rest and recreation activities sanctioned by the mission.	
3	Are HN options available for welfare services?	
4	Describe radio services available:	
	HN?	
	Frequencies available.	
	Possible locations.	
	Estimated coverage.	

	Local sensitivities.	
	Environmental considerations.	
	Required power supply.	
5	Describe television services available:	
	HN?	
	Satellite cover.	
	Possible locations.	
	Local sensitivities.	
	Environmental considerations for RX/TX.	
	Distribution of satellite TV in-country (terrestrial or satellite).	
	Power supply.	

6	Describe telephone services available:	
	Locations.	
	HNS?	
	Environmental considerations (RX/TX).	
7	Communication Security Establishment (CSE):	
	Possible locations.	
	Local sensitivities.	
8	EFI:	
	Possible locations.	
	Local sensitivities.	
	HNS?	
	Distribution.	
9	Internet:	
	Locations.	
	HNS?	
	VSAT siting.	
10	Rest and relaxation:	

	Possible options.	
	Bars/nightlife.	
	Sporting options.	
	Distance to locations.	
11	Operational stand-down:	
	Possible options.	
	Security.	
12	Are books/videos/newspapers available? Describe HNS options.	

E - MISCELLANEOUS

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe possible locations for Prisoner of War/detainee centers.	

2	Describe the division of responsibilities between coalition nations for Prisoner of War/detainee management.	
3	Describe Coalition policy for the transfer of detainees to Host Nation.	
4	Describe policy for internment.	
5	Project numbers of Prisoners of War/detainees.	
6	Define jurisdiction of Coalition legal officers.	
7	Describe any legal HNS available.	
8	Is DIPCLEAR for Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) established with local police	

SECTION III - SUPPLY AND SERVICES RECONNAISSANCE

A basic requirement of a reconnaissance is to identify the sources of supply services and support needed by a coalition. The checklist below provides a framework for this requirement.

MODE DEFINITIONS. There are seven modes of logistic support within the coalition. These are:

a. National - those logistic functions that are operated in accordance with national policies and doctrine. No common, collective sharing is possible. An example is organizational maintenance on non-common major equipment;

b. Host Nation Support (HNS) - those logistic functions that the coalition determines could best be provided by the Host nation (HN). An example of HNS function is local civilian labour;

c. Host Nation Local Contract - those logistic functions contracted for on behalf of the coalition by commercial vendors within the HN from any source. An example is a contract for fresh food;

d. External Logistics Supply Services & Support (LSSS) Contract - those logistic functions contracted for on behalf of the coalition but provided by a commercial vendor outside the Host Nation. An example is contingency construction;

e. Lead Nation (LN) - one nation within a coalition can provide the bulk of the resources required to perform a specialized function. In this instance, other nations are providing minor augmentation or supplementation under the control of the designated lead nation. An example is the provision of bulk fuel;

f. Role Specialist Nation (RSN) - those logistics functions that one nation (not necessarily a lead nation) provides for the entire coalition force. This model can be used where commonality across the coalition allows a simple interface. An example is reception operations at an air or sea port; and

g. Service Agreements - nations provide mutual and specific support to each other as described in standing agreements. An example is decontamination services.

NATIONAL UNIQUE ITEMS. It is recognized that regardless of function and mode in which it is performed, each nation is responsible for nationally unique items. An

example is the provision of repair parts for a weapon system or vehicle unique to a nation, such as the UK Warrior.

BLENDING OF MODES. The mission and coalition commander's operational concept will dictate how coalition planners will determine the use of committed national logistic forces to support the overall coalition. It may be necessary to blend modes with available coalition forces in order to accomplish the support mission.

A - Supply And Services Reconnaissance Checklist

Class of Supply	NATO Classes of Supply Description	US Classes of Supply Description	National	HNS	HN Local Contract	External LSSS	Lead Nation	Role Specialist Nation	Service Agreements
I	Items of subsistence (i.e. food and forge).	Subsistence--rations and gratuitous issue of health, morale, and welfare items.							
II	Supplies, items established by tables of organization and equipment (TOE) (i.e. clothing, weapons, tools, spare parts, vehicles).	Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool sets, and administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment.							
III	Petroleum, oils and lubricants, except aircraft and weapons fuel.	Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.							

IIIa	Aviation fuel and lubricants.	Aviation fuel and lubricants.							
IV	Supplies, non-TOE items, such as fortification and construction materials and additional vehicles.	Construction materials.							
V	Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents of all types.	Ammunition.							
VI		Personal demand items.							

VII		Major end items--includes tanks, helicopters, and radios.							
VIII		Medical.							
IX		Repair parts and components for equipment maintenance.							
X		Non-standard items to support non-military programs such as agriculture and economic development.							
Services and Support	Fresh water, fire protection, police protection, electrical power, catering, lodging, hauling, vector								

	control, laundry, shower, portable toilets, waste disposal, hazardous materials removal, and moral and welfare.								
Instructions: Resulting from mission analysis, for each class of supply & type of Service/Support, expand to include/list each critical commodity and insert the details of sourcing (answering the 5 W's as appropriate).									

SECTION IV - AIRFIELD RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

A - AIRFIELD OPERATIONS

A1 – AIRFIELD DATA

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Airfield Name.	
2	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Identifier.	
3	Airfield latitude and longitude datum.	
4	Airfield Elevation.	
5	Time Difference from Greenwich Mean Time (GMT).	
6	Daylight Savings Time? If so, what is date of change?	
7	Airfield hours of operation.	
8	Is there a Flight Information Publication (FLIP) entry? If not, identify alternate source (AIDU/DOD/AERAD/other).	
9	Is there an Air Transport (AT) or Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) Operations Manual Section 2 entry?	
10	Airfield Personnel Contact Information.	

11	Is there a designated area for military forces at this airfield?			
12	What aircraft types are present?			
13	Do aircraft present appear airworthy?			
14	Identify user units/airlines accessible to Coalition Nations. Obtain timetables/schedules.	For Passenger Transport:	For Casualty Evacuation:	For Cargo Shipments:

A2 – AIRFIELD OPERATING SURFACES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS		
1	Runway Direction Number (i.e. 175/355 in degrees).			
2	Prevailing wind direction (i.e. from SW).			
3	Runway Slope			
4	Runway surface material.			
5	What is the bearing strength of the runway surface (LCN/PCN)?			
6	Runway Dimensions.			
7	What is the length of the Take-Off Run Available (TORA)?			
8	What is the length of the Take-Off Distance Available (TODA)?			
9	What is the length of the Accelerate-Stop Distance Available (ASDA)?			
10	Define the Landing Directional Aid (LDA).			
11	What is the Take-Off Weight (WAT) limit for transport aircraft?			
12	Describe the general conditions of the airfield operating surfaces.	Runways:	Taxiways:	Aprons:
13	What are the obstacles/obstructions/hazards (note number and position)?			
14	What approach aids are available?			

15	Describe or attach FLIP details.	
16	What are the decision heights (DH)?	
17	What are the markings for runways/taxiways/aprons?	
18	Is there an arrestor gear system? Note: Define position (rigged/de-rigged).	
19	What is the volume in take-offs and landings per day for air traffic through the airfield?	
20	What are the priorities for military aircraft (high/med/low)?	
21	What is the airfield taxi pattern?	
22	Are there any turning radius problems? Note: Refer to attached diagrams.	
23	What is the normal parking allocation?	

24	What is the capacity of the aprons in terms of Maximum On-Ground (MOG)? Note: Define by aircraft type and include hazardous material, refueling, deicing and ammunition handling areas.	
25	Are overlapping turnarounds possible?	
	What is the required interval between turnarounds?	
26	What is the access to the parking ramp for vehicles by type?	
27	What is the distance from operations to the aircraft parking area?	
28	Describe the Foreign Object Damage (FOD) procedures, if any, for the airfield.	
29	What are the runway sweeping capabilities?	
30	Can the airfield handle Disarmament and Arms Control (DAC)?	
31	Where is the DAC parking area?	
32	What are the DAC unloading procedures?	

33	Where is the munitions storage area? Note: Include distance from airfield and any unique access issues.		
	Number		
	Characterize Capacities and Limitations		
	Type of Bunkers/Buildings		
	Layout		
	Protection		
34	Is there any Work in Progress (WIP) or planned on the airfield?	Alterations to runway lengths/capacities:	Presence of construction equipment:
35	Describe the road/rail links to the airfield.		

A3 – DIVERSION AIRFIELD

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Airfield Name.	
2	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Identifier.	
3	What is the bearing and distance from the primary airfield?	

4	What are the opening hours?	
5	Can it handle Coalition aircraft?	
6	What fuel and ground-handling services are available?	
7	What is the Crash Category and fire protection capabilities?	
8	What approach aids are available?	

A4 – WEATHER/METEOROLOGY

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the meteorological capabilities.	
2	What notice is required before a full forecast could be provided?	
3	What are the available languages?	
4	Can meteorological services be provided for the area of operations?	
5	What are typical meteorological conditions?	
6	What are any local phenomena (i.e. sea fog/dust storms)?	
7	What are the strongest winds and from what direction?	

8	Are there any special local problems (i.e. bird activity/turbulence)?	

A5 – OPERATIONS CENTER

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Where is the Operations Center/wing/room?	
2	What are the facility operating hours?	
3	What are the access limitations?	
4	Are the staff English-speaking? If not, what languages are in use?	
5	Where is the Flight Planning room?	
6	What facilities are available? Describe the types of forms in use.	
7	How much time is required for submission of Flight Plans?	
8	Where are Notice to Airmen (NOTAMS) displayed?	
9	What are the Inner Marker (IM) coordinates for pans and runway thresholds?	
10	Is there a Jetplan flight-planning terminal?	
11	What is the availability of office accommodation?	
	Location	
	Type of Building	
	Office for OC Detachment	
	Room for Operations	
	Room for Planning/Briefing	
	Crewroom for Ground Crew Furniture, chairs, tables, lockers?	

	Heating/Lighting	
	Security	
	Toilet Facilities	
	Refuse Collection and Times	
	Bunk or Sleeping Facilities	
	Safe for Valuables/Documents Protection from fire/attack?	
12	Are aerials/antennae visible?	
13	Are there stand-by operations facilities?	

A6 – AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL (ATC)

SER	ITEM	REMARKS			
1	What hours is the tower manned?				
2	What is the standard of spoken English?	Unsat:	Poor:	Sat:	Good:
3	Is a liaison controller required?				
4	Is a “Follow Me” truck available?				
5	What are the approach procedures? Note the DH and compare with FLIP.				
6	Are there any flow restrictions?				
7	Describe the local hazards:				
	Obstructions				

	Danger Areas	
	Airways	
	Noise Abatement	
	Sensitive Areas	
8	What are the radio frequencies?	
9	What is the civilian priority? Describe.	
10	What facilities are offered?	
11	What is the overall serviceability of equipment?	
12	What is the quality of service provided (by observation)?	
13	Describe the NAVAIDS available at the airfield.	

A7 – LIGHTING

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the approach lighting.	
2	Describe the runway lighting.	
3	Describe the taxiway lighting.	
4	Describe the apron/pan lighting.	
5	Are the lights adjustable in intensity?	
6	Is portable lighting with its own power supply available?	

A8 – CRASH/FIRE PROTECTION

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Where is the crash/fire/rescue section located?	
2	How many crash/firefighting vehicles are at the airfield? Describe.	
3	How many crash/firefighting personnel are in the fire section?	
4	What types of extinguishants are available?	
	Foam	

	CO2	
	Dry Powder	
	Water	
5	What are the quantities for each vehicle?	
6	What is the total 'water on wheels'?	
7	Can the Crash Category/Fire Protection be raised? If so, describe how.	
8	Are portable extinguishers refillable?	
9	Give an assessment of capability (by observation).	

A9 – CUSTOMS

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Is the airport a 'Port of Entry' or Export facility?	
2	What are the customs requirements? Describe inbound and outbound.	
3	What are the immigration requirements? Describe inbound and outbound.	
4	What are the health requirements? Describe inbound and outbound.	

5	Describe the customs regulations for clearing:	
	Passengers	
	Equipment	
	Essential Spares	
	Personal Weapons	
6	What is the attitude towards Duty Free imports?	
7	What are the Duty Free export regulations?	
8	Is there a Status of Forces (SOFA) agreement in place?	

A10 – PASSENGER HANDLING FACILITIES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	How many passenger terminals are present?	
2	What is the passenger throughput capacity of the terminal(s) (No. of pax per day)?	

3	What type passenger aircraft can the terminal accommodate? (i.e. DC9, 747,etc)	
4	Can pax board without using a terminal? If no, describe why.	
5	Can they walk between the terminal and aircraft? If no, describe why.	
6	Would the same check-in desk always be used?	
7	Quantify x-ray machines for hold (checked) and hand (carry-on) baggage.	
8	Quantify metal detector arches (walk-through metal detectors).	
9	What are the explosive detection capabilities? Describe.	
10	Are there secure areas designated as departure lounges?	
11	Is there a transit/transfer lounge?	
12	Are there VIP facilities?	
13	Describe the feeding capacity of any restaurant facilities.	
14	Is there adequate potable water? If no, describe why.	

15	What other facilities are in the terminal?	
16	What passenger handling agents are present?	
17	What are the international garbage disposal arrangements (i.e. collection and disposal)?	

A11 – FREIGHT HANDLING FACILITIES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What freight handling companies are present?	
2	What are the address markings for consignments?	
3	What are the business hours for delivery?	
4	Describe the handling equipment available:	
	Type	
	Size	

	Number	
	Serviceability	
5	What are the storage facilities?	

B - SERVICING OPERATIONS

B1 - AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Are there hangars at the airfield?	
	Number	
2	What size are the hangars? Check for C130/C17/Coalition Aircraft.	
	Ceiling height.	
	Access Doors.	

	Available Floor Space.	
3	What is the floor surface material?	
4	Where are the hangars located?	
5	Where is this relative to aircraft parking areas?	
6	What types of aircraft are serviced?	
7	What bay servicing facilities are available?	
8	What spares are instantly available?	
9	What specialist tools are available?	
10	What test equipment is available?	

11	What are the power supplies?	
12	What air supplies are available?	
13	What is the availability of:	
	Spares?	
	Ground Equipment?	
	Materials?	
	Oils/Liquids?	
14	What manpower is available?	
15	Are engine ground runs permitted?	
	At Idle.	
	At Max Power.	

16	Is there a facility for the disposal of contaminated articles?	
17	Are there toilet (emptying) facilities?	

B2 – GROUND HANDLING SERVICES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Who owns the Ground Servicing Equipment?	
2	What Ground Handling companies operate at the airfield?	
3	Are they tied to any specific fuel or catering company?	
4	What maintenance stands do they have?	
5	What generators are available (i.e. E45/46-60' cable)?	
6	Is there a Palouste (air start) cart (40psi/120lbs/min)?	
7	What electrical servicing trolleys do they have?	

	200v/3 phase/400Hz/60 KVA/max 28v DC	
8	Is there a time restriction on running the trolleys?	
	Connectors for 200v/28v	
9	What are the lifting facilities?	
	Crane (5-20 tons).	
	Max Lifting Capacity.	
	Mobility.	
10	What jacking equipment do they have?	
	Types (25/35/50T capacity).	
	Min to max reaches (i.e. 6 in to 8 ft).	
	Adapters Available.	
11	Is there a hydraulic test stand?	
12	What is available to access working heights of 40 ft?	
	Ladders.	
	Platforms.	

13	What chocks do they use?	
	Type and Number Available.	
14	What cooling trolleys do they have?	
	Connectors.	
15	What are the aircraft heater capabilities?	
16	What are the towing facilities?	
	Tractor (AC).	
	Tractor (GSE).	
17	Do they have a towbar? Define for aircraft type.	
18	What types of connection are they?	
	Dimension of Eye.	
	Height Above Ground.	

19	What forklift trucks are available? (10K-6K)	
20	What is used for passenger transport?	
21	Describe passenger transport trailers if any.	
22	Do they have a 25K Loader?	
23	Are there any weighing scales?	
24	Is there a toilet truck?	
25	What are the de-icing capabilities?	

B3 – POL AND GASES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Which fuel companies operate at the airfield?	
2	What is the method of payment?	
3	What fuel types are available?	
4	Is icing inhibitor additive present?	

5	Will the aircraft have to be moved to refuel/park?	
6	What is the method of refueling (hydrant or bowser)?	
7	How many refueling points or bowsers are available?	
8	What are the rates of flow?	
9	Are there any defueling facilities?	
10	If hydrant refueling, how many tanks and types of tanks and tank capacity?	
	Above Ground.	
	Below Ground.	
	Partially Buried.	
	Location of Pipe Runs.	
11	What are the normal holdings of oils/lubricants?	
12	Describe replenishment rig capabilities.	
	What is the replenishment lead-time?	
13	What greases are available? Quantify.	

14	What gases are available? Quantify:	
	Nitrogen Trolley 3000psi.	
	Oxygen Trolley 3000psi.	
	Air Compressor 3000psi.	
	LOX Trolley.	
	Storage by Cylinder.	
	Mobility of Trolleys.	
	Recharging Facilities.	

B4 – CATERING

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What catering services are available? Describe.	
2	What is the maximum meals per day available from catering services:	
	Boxed Meals.	
	Hot/Cold meals for aircrew. Passenger in-flight feeding.	
	VIP Rations.	
3	What is the quality of the food? Is there any record of problems with the quality.	

B5 – MEDICAL

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What medical facilities are on the airfield?	
2	Do they have their own ambulances?	
3	Where are the local hospitals?	
	Names.	
	Distance/Time.	
4	Are there any endemic local diseases?	
5	Is there any dangerous wildlife? Describe.	
6	What vaccinations are required?	
7	What are the available dental facilities?	
8	Do aircraft require disinfection for insects?	
	Are insecticide bombs available?	

C - CIVILIAN SERVICES

C1 – COMMERCIAL ACCOMMODATIONS

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Are there building(s) designated for use as personnel accommodation? Number of buildings.	
2	How many beds per room?	
3	What is the total number of beds available?	
4	What are the arrangements for bed linen?	
5	What is the laundry capacity?	
6	What are the personal washing facilities?	
7	What is the hot water capacity?	
8	Describe accommodation available for slip crews (i.e. phone access/noise level).	
9	Describe cold storage/fridge availability?	

10	Where are the nearest hotels?	
	Quantity.	
	Quality.	
	Name.	
	Address.	
	Tel Numbers.	
	Fax Numbers.	
	Latest date to book hotel or room.	
11	Is it a contract hotel?	
12	Are there discounted rates?	
	Per Night.	
	Per Week.	
	Per Month.	
13	What is the distance from the airfield?	
14	What size are the hotels (No. of rooms)?	
	Beds Per Room.	
15	Describe the hotel catering arrangements.?	
	24-hr Availability.	
	Box Meals Available.	
	Cost.	

16	What are the recreational facilities?	
17	What is the nearest town?	
18	What are the local customs of the people?	
19	What are the local holidays?	
20	When is the main holiday season?	
21	Are there any places of interest? Obtain local area info.	
22	What are the off-limits sites?	

C2 – COMMUNICATIONS

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What are the Emergency telephone numbers?	
	Ops	
	Fire Service	
	Medical	
	Police	
	ATC	
2	What are the useful telephone numbers?	
	Ops	
	ATC	
	Flight Planning	
	Met	
	Catering	

3	What is the address for signals/mail?	
4	If not 24-hrs availability describe.	
5	Is the telephone network shared?	
6	What frequencies can be used (if required for Ops Room)?	
7	What communications are located at:	
	Ops?	
	Accommodations?	
	Dispersal?	
8	What types and quantity of communications are available (Telephone/SIT A/Telex/Fax/SATCOM/Radio/Video-link/ASMA)?	
9	What type of equipment is it?	

10	Where are the antennae?	
11	What is the antenna orientation?	
12	Are communications systems available to hire?	
13	Is there a requirement for comms to the diversion airfield?	
14	What are the cryptographic/secure comms facilities?	

C3 – POWER SUPPLY

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What is the voltage?	
	What wattage is available?	
2	What is the power connector required?	
3	What adaptors and transformers are required?	
4	Is the power from a main source or site generator? If site generator describe capacities.	
5	Is stand-by power available?	
6	What facilities are protected?	
7	What is the reliability of power supply?	

8	Are mobile units available? If so quantify.	

C4 – TRANSPORT

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What MT (motor transport) is available?	
2	Does this include drivers?	
3	If not, do our drivers require briefing or training?	
4	Will MT be positioned at the airfield on arrival?	
5	What are the departure procedures regarding the MT?	
6	Are taxis available?	
7	What hire car companies are available?	
8	Is a driving license required? Is an International Driving License required?	
9	What are the vehicle insurance requirements?	
10	Is vehicle servicing available?	
11	Can spares be obtained easily?	
12	Can replacement vehicles be provided?	

13	Where is vehicle fuel obtained?	
	Unleaded.	
	Diesel.	
14	Are road maps of the local area available?	
15	Is there a vehicle washing and steam cleaning facility (location/description/adequacy)?	

C5 – SECURITY

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What is the security situation?	
2	Describe the terrorist threat, if any.	
3	What are the warning methods?	
4	Describe what weapons are required?	

5	Is there a requirement for Aero-Triangulation System Software (ATSy) to protect the AC?	
6	Are special passes/stickers required for vehicles?	
7	Do personnel need special passes?	
8	What is the presence of security at the airfield?	
	Personnel.	
	Efficiency.	
	Armed.	
	Schedules.	
	Details of Uniforms.	
9	What type of perimeter fence?	
	Condition.	
	Ditches/Culverts.	

10	What are the special surveillance methods?	
	CCTV.	
	IR.	
	Dogs.	
11	Is on base photography permitted?	
12	What are the airfield defenses?	
	Ground Defense Sites.	
	Air Defense Sites.	
	Position.	
	Type.	
13	What are the defenses in the local vicinity?	
	Ground Defense Sites.	
	Air Defense Sites.	
	Position.	
	Type.	
14	Is there any evidence of camouflage or deception measures around the airfield?	
	Description and Location.	

D - SUMMARY/MISCELLANEOUS

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What is the overall general impression of the airfield?	
2	Describe any difficulties with the Host Nation representatives?	
3	Were you made welcome?	
4	Is the base suitable for:	
	Joint Theatre Plan?	
	Evacuation Operations?	
	Air Port of Debarkation? (APOD)	
	Air Port of Embarkation (APOE) for Redeployment?	
	Air to Air Refueling (AAR) basing?	
	Standard Refueling Areas?	
	Tactical Towlines?	
	Fast Jet Ops?	
	Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS)?	
	Location.	
	Number.	

	Layout.	
	Type.	
	Construction.	
	Activity Associated With HAS Site.	
5	Would the locals be helpful or hostile?	

SECTION V - PORT RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

A - GENERAL

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe prevailing weather conditions.	
2	Describe sea/tide characteristics.	
3	List the charts required (if known).	
4	Identify and describe any sensitive local issues.	
5	Describe any local restrictions (i.e. carriage/unloading of explosives, HAZMAT, etc.).	
6	Describe the general port usage (i.e. how much will military activity would be allowed to disrupt local port working routines/economy?).	

B - SEAWARD APPROACH

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the approach channels (how many, restrictions, length, width, depth).	
1a	Describe the pilotage, tonnage restrictions, tugs and navigational devices in the approach channels.	
2	List the Ship Communications (local frequencies, call signs).	
3	Describe the available anchorages (i.e. within harbour/at sea, location, depth, mooring buoys, hazards).	
4	Describe the beaches (location, gradient, composition, depths, suitable for Mexefloats/Landing Craft /ship's boats, slipways, facilities, hard-standing).	
5	Describe the water depths (port entrance, alongside berths, max draught, accuracy of information).	
6	List the tidal information (tidal range, springs, neaps, currents, tide charts).	
7	Describe the turning restrictions/turning diameter limits.	

8	Identify and describe any silting issues (amounts, locations, responsibility for clearance).	
9	Identify and describe any obstructions (wrecks, man made, location).	

C - PORT FACILITIES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
	Are there any maps of the port available?	
1	Provide details for the Harbourmaster/Assistant HM, etc.	
2	Estimate of overall strategic capacity of port (i.e. tons per day/ meter length per day)	
3	Describe berths (types: Ro-Ro, container, general cargo, suitable for ammunition, Z berths, secure berths). Depth of water at berth. Overhead obstructions. Working areas – number, lengths/widths of ship working areas (coverage, construction, rail served)	
4	Describe mooring facilities (Catamarans, Brows, Fenders, Berthing Parties).	
5	Describe the port operating hours.	
6	Describe the available covered structures/warehousing (location, dimension (LxBxH), available floor space, construction, condition).	

7	Describe hard-standing (location, dimensions (LxW), access gates, construction, condition).	
8	Describe the ammunition storage areas (is suitable Material Handling Equipment (MHE) available?).	
9	MHE (locations, forklift trucks, craneage, capacity, availability, condition).	
10	Describe the marine repair facilities: owners, location, facilities, dry docks (size, location, construction, capabilities, construction, condition, availability) craneage, foundries, machine shops.	
11	Describe the floating equipment (type, crane, fire fighting, dredgers, ferries, condition, availability).	
12	Describe the waste disposal arrangements.	
13	Describe the available grey/black water disposal arrangements.	
14	Describe the contaminated fuel/oil handling facilities.	

15	Fresh water (availability).	
16	Power supply to ships (method, voltage, availability).	
17	Describe the dredging capabilities.	
18	Describe the tug capabilities.	

D - LANDWARD FACILITIES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the local populated area (location, population, employment rate, etc.).	
2	Is local labour available (Stevedores, skilled/unskilled, cooperation, labour organisation).	
3	Describe the medical facilities available (location, type, facilities, contact numbers, nearest hospital).	

4	Describe the POL arrangements for the port (offshore, fuel barges, port area, vehicle refueling, pump capacities, fuel types, bulk fuel storage, fuel offload capability, to include OPDS support).	
5	What is the local MHE availability (hire firms, contact numbers, equipment available by type, capacity, condition).	
6	Describe available power supply (type, voltage available in quay area, flood lights).	
7	Describe fresh water availability.	
8	What communications facilities are available (Tel/Fax facilities useful telephone numbers: police, fire, medical, harbour master, railway station, customs pilots)?	
9	Describe the fire fighting facilities available (location, tenders available, back up service).	
10	Harbour Masters (locations, names, responsibilities).	

11	Customs (locations, names).	
12	Chandlers (locations, names, contact numbers).	
13	Are Fridgecons available (location, condition)?	
14	Describe the feeding/dining facilities available.	
15	Describe the accommodation facilities available.	

E - PORT ACCESS

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the all round access to the port (gates, security manning, restrictions, perimeter fencing).	
2	Describe the road links to the port (main roads/routes to port, class of roads, conditions, obstructions).	

3	Describe the rail links to the Port (location, type of system, capacity, siding lengths, rolling stock available).	
4	Describe the IWT access (rivers, canals, dimensions, depths, bridges, wrecks, currents).	
5	Describe the air links to the port (nearest helo LS facilities (available to Mil helos?) nearest airport).	

SECTION VI - RAIL RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

A - FACTORS FOR ESTIMATING THE CAPACITY OF A RAILHEAD

Factors affecting the rate at which stores can be trans-shipped from rail to road (and vice versa) are:

a. Railway facilities including:

   i. Length and number of sidings,

   ii. System for shunting and the withdrawal of empty wagons, and

   iii. Length, height, width and bearing strength of platforms that may be used for unloading.

b. Road access including:

   i. Width of roadway,

   ii. Number of loading bays,

   iii. Number of wagons to which access can be obtained simultaneously, and

   iv. Number of road vehicles that can be worked and changed over at the same time.

c. Types of stores being handled and their ease of handling;

d. Mechanical handling equipment available including:

   i. Cranes,

   ii. Forklift trucks, and

   iii. Roller conveyors;

e. Number and types of road vehicles available;

f. The tactical situation which may lead to interruption of work by enemy action and which will determine whether:

   i. Work is possible during daylight, and

   ii. Lighting is permitted at night and to what degree.

Some of these factors are variable and therefore the trans-shipment capacity of a station will vary.

CALCULATION OF RAILHEAD CAPACITY

A drawing of the railhead layout is required. If not available, one must be made. It should preferably be to scale but, if not, it should be dimensioned and the effective length of sidings and loops must be shown. In the case of sidings, the measurement is from the fouling point of the turnout to the buffer stop or sand drag and in the case of loops, between the fouling points at either end.

Specific areas and parts of the station will be required for:

a. Transshipment - these areas must have good road access. Room must be allowed for mechanical handling equipment;

b. **Stabling -** the space needed for stabling railway wagons will depend on the operating plan. As a general rule, there must be room for one complete train;

c. **Operating - o**perating facilities needed to avoid congestion include:

   i. Space for trains to draw clear of the main line,
   ii. A shunting neck,
   iii. A locomotive run-round,
   iv. A locomotive spur, and
   v. At least 25 per cent of wagon standage to be reserved for wagon movement.

The next stage is to assess how many wagons can be worked at one time and then how long it will take to trans-ship the stores that are to be handled. For planning purposes, it can be assumed that four men, with reliefs as necessary, can load freight at the following rates. However, these are guidelines only and may vary considerable, subject to the type of load and other factors:

a. 4 ton vehicle - 20 minutes;

b. 10 ton vehicle - 40 minutes;

The frequency at which rakes of wagons will have to be replaced and the number of wagons in each rake can then be calculated.

The shunting plan is then made. It shows the time it will take to shunt out the empty wagons and replace them with full ones. The facilities at a railhead station will often be used for purposes other than those for which they are intended, and shunting may therefore take longer than usual. (A realistic estimate of the time that shunting will take is the time that it takes to walk the distance).

The following information is now known:

a. The tonnage of stores in each rake of wagons,

b. The time taken to trans-ship the load, and

c. The time taken to replace an empty rake of wagons with a full one.

The siding capacity can therefore be calculated as follows:

$$\text{Siding capacity} = \frac{\text{The load transshipped in tons per hour}}{\text{Transshipment time (hrs)} + \text{Rake replacement time in (hrs)}}$$

The total capacity of the railhead is the sum of the capacities of all the sidings that can be used simultaneously for transshipment, provided that a constant flow of road vehicles can be maintained.

ESTIMATING THE REQUIREMENT FOR ROAD VEHICLES

The capacity of a railhead may well be limited by the availability of road vehicles. To achieve maximum capacity, there must be at least one road vehicle for each rail wagon being unloaded. The number of vehicles needed to maintain a continuous flow at each transshipment point will depend on the vehicle cycle and may be calculated as follows assuming, for example, that the journey time form the railhead to the final destination is 30 minutes.

The cycle for a 4 ton vehicle is:

Loading time at railhead -	20 mins
Driving time to destination -	30 mins
Unloading time at destination	- 20 mins
Driving time to railhead -	30 mins
Total	100 mins

The number of vehicles needed for each transshipment berth in order to ensure that one is always available is therefore:

The total cycle time = 100 = 5 x 4-ton vehicles

Time taken to load = 20

A margin for waiting and moving up time should be added. It must also be stressed that these calculations may vary considerably depending on local conditions and other factors.

MEASURES TO DEVELOP TRAILHEAD CAPACITY

a. It may be possible to increase the capacity of a railhead by:

b. Increasing the length of existing sidings or by constructing new ones;

c. Removing fences, walls, huts etc to improve vehicle access;

d. Filling in alternative siding s with rubble or removing the tracks to improve vehicle access; and

e. Building end-loading ramps to facilitate the unloading of vehicles from vehicle train.

B - GENERAL

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Date/time of reconnaissance.	
2	Weather conditions.	
3	General description of railhead (include name of station, grid reference and diagram).	

C - DETAILED INFORMATION

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Limitations (number of lines, direction of travel).	

2	Sidings (number of sidings, lengths, inc platforms, if any, capacity of rolling stock, suitability for pax, frt and vehicles).	
3	Ramps (number and type, details, length, width, height, surface constructions, max wt capacity).	
4	Main line connection/marshalling yards (distance to main line connection/marshalling yard, direction to main line, name of marshalling yard).	
5	Overhead electrical cables/third rail (type, location, serviceability, requirements for night-time working).	
6	Specialised equipment (type, cranes, heavy lift, forklift trucks, quantities, availability, condition, capacities).	
7	Storage facilities (location in relation to sidings, dimensions L x B x H, floor space available, construction, condition, facilities, comms, heating).	
8	Container facilities (extent, ground space available for stacking containers, specialised container equipment).	
9	Lighting systems (local power sources, outdoor facilities).	

10	Accommodation (office, telephone, fax, telex, desks, chairs, sleeping accommodations, toilets, water, showers, nearest mil accommodations, transit).	
11	Road access (main routes to the railhead, classes of road, major obstructions, bridges, flyovers, overhead cables, gates, circuits (one/two way)).	
12	Vehicle holding areas (locations, space available L x B, surface obstructions, turning space, camouflage/concealment).	
13	Manning (degree of civil manning).	
14	Telephone numbers (station manager/office, local police, medical, fire, nearest mil establishment, nearest fax/telex numbers).	

D - SUMMARY

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Overall suitability for pax, frt, vehs and the number of wagons that may be loaded/off-loaded at a time (i.e. capacity).	
2	Sketch map of railheads/sidings (preferably to scale).	

3	Other data (timetables, photographs, maps, etc.).	

SECTION VII - ROAD RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

A - ESTIMATING THE REQUIREMENT FOR ROAD VEHICLES

The capacity of a railhead may well be limited by the availability of road vehicles. To achieve maximum capacity, there must be at least one road vehicle for each rail wagon being unloaded. The number of vehicles needed to maintain a continuous flow at each transshipment point will depend on the vehicle cycle and may be calculated as follows assuming, for example, that the journey time form the railhead to the final destination is 30 minutes.

The cycle for a 4 ton vehicle is:

Loading time at railhead -	20 mins
Driving time to destination -	30 mins
Unloading time at destination -	20 mins
Driving time to railhead -	30 mins
Total	100 mins

The number of vehicles needed for each transshipment berth in order to ensure that one is always available is therefore:

$$\frac{\text{The total cycle time}}{\text{Time taken to load}} = \frac{100}{20} = 5 \text{ x 4-ton vehicles}$$

A margin for waiting and moving up time should be added. It must also be stressed that these calculations may vary considerably depending on local conditions and other factors.

B - MEASURES TO DEVELOP TRAILHEAD CAPACITY

a. It may be possible to increase the capacity of a railhead by:

b. Increasing the length of existing sidings or by constructing new ones;

c. Removing fences, walls, huts etc to improve vehicle access;

d. Filling in alternative sidings with rubble or removing the tracks to improve vehicle access; and

e. Building end-loading ramps to facilitate the unloading of vehicles from vehicle trains.

C - GENERAL

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Date/time of reconnaissance.	
2	Weather conditions.	
3	General description (to include grid references of each end of section of road covered by the report).	

D - DETAILED INFORMATION

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Route markings (including road numbers, i.e. Hwy 25).	
2	Route classification.	
3	Shoulders (condition and width of shoulders and any variations from normal).	
4	Details of obstructions/critical points:	

5	Grid reference.	
6	Identified on overlay.	
7	Special comments.	
8	Enclosures (i.e. one overlay).	

E - ROUTE POTENTIAL AND CLASSIFICATION

It can be useful for planning purposes to show route potential in diagrams and tables, and on maps. It is expressed as follows:

a. Road capacity (v/hr) for one-way traffic;

b. Number of lanes (for normal vehicles);

c. Military load classification (tracked vehicles one way); and

d. Road capacity for two-way traffic, if applicable.

The standard route classification system used by NATO forces allows the authorities responsible for organizing movement more easily to assess the characteristics of a route or network of routes. The classification is expressed in a formula indicating:

a. The width of the carriageway in meters;

b. The type of route;

c. The military load classification;

d. Overhead clearance in meters; and

e. Special conditions.

Width - for any given section of a route, the width is measured at the narrowest part of the carriageway. This width determines the number of lanes, of which the dimensions are normally as follows:

a. For wheeled vehicles - 3.50 meters; and

b. For tracked combat vehicles - 4.00 meters.

Details of road dimensions are illustrated in the following diagram:



a.	Width of grading.	c.	Width of traveled way.
b.	Width of lane.	d.	Width of hard shoulder.

Road Width and Flow Possibilities - a route can be classified according to the number of lanes it has, as shown below:

Flow Possibilities		Route/Road Width
Classification	**Definition**	
Limited Access	Permits of isolated vehicles of appropriate width and in one direction only.	Up to and include 3.35m.
Single Lane	Permits use in one direction at a time only, but no overtaking or movement in the opposite direction.	From 3.35m to include 5.50m.
Single Flow	Permits passage of a column of vehicles and allows isolated vehicles to overtake or pass in the opposite direction at re-determined locations.	From 5.50m to include 7.30m. (At least 1 ½ lanes width desirable).
Double Flow	Permits use by two column s simultaneously.	Over 7.30m . (Must be at least 2 lanes width).

Type of Route - routes are divided into three types, depending on their ability to withstand the effects of weather.

a. Type X – All-weather Route - this normally consists of roads that:

   i. Have a waterproof surface and are never closed because of the weather, other than by snow or floods, and

   ii. Are passable, with reasonable maintenance, throughout the year to a volume of traffic never appreciably less than their maximum capacity;

b. Type Y – Limited All-weather Route - this normally consists of roads that:

   i. Do not have a waterproof surface and are considerably affected by weather conditions, other than snow or floods, which are considered separately,

   ii. With reasonable maintenance, are passable throughout the year, but if complete collapse is to be avoided during the bad weather:

      - The volume of traffic may have to be reduced to considerably less than the maximum capacity, and
      - The road may have to be closed for up to 24 hours at a time,

c. **Type Z – Fair Weather Route -** this consists of roads that are passable only in fair weather. They are so seriously affected by bad weather that the route may remain closed for long periods.

Military Load Classification - the military load classification of a route is usually governed by the weakest bridge or culvert and determined by the highest class of vehicle that can be accepted on the route under normal conditions.

Overhead Clearance - this is the vertical distance between the road surface and any obstructions above it, e.g. a bridge. It restricts the overall height of a vehicle, including its load that may travel over the route. Clearances of less than 4.3 meters must always be shown.

Obstructions and Special Conditions - these are indicated as follows:

a. Obstructions - a temporary obstruction or a single obstruction, other than a bridge, does not limit the classification of a route, but is indicated in the route classification formula by the addition of 'OB'. Examples of obstructions that must always be indicated include:

   i. A narrowing of the carriage-way to below the standards laid down in the table at paragraph 5,

   ii. A gradient of 7 per cent (approximately 1 in 14) or steeper,

   iii. A curve which restricts the free passage of vehicles, and

   iv. A ford; and

b. Snow blockage and flooding - if snow blockage or flooding is regular, recurrent, and serious, the route classification formula is followed by "T" and "W" respectively.

10. **Route Classification Formulae -** examples of route classification formulae are:

a. The formula for a 10 meter wide all-weather route with a class 80 load restriction, a 4 meter height restriction and an obstruction is:

10 m/X/80/4 m (OB)

b. The formula for a 6 meter wide limited all weather route with a class 50 load restriction and subject to snow blockage, but with no overhead clearance limit is:

6 m/Y/50 (T)

c. The formula for a 5.5 meter wide limited all weather route with a class 30 load restriction, a height restriction of 3.5 meters and an obstruction, and subject to flooding is:

5.5m/Y/30/3.5 m (OB) (W)

The lowest classification encountered on any part of a route determines the overall classification of that route.

Whenever possible, a basic military route network should comprise routes of the following categories:

a. Average traffic route - military load class 50;

b. Heavy traffic route - class 80; and

c. Very heavy traffic route - class 120.

A main supply route is normally at least class 100.

SECTION VIII - MEDICAL RECONNAISSANCE CHECKLIST

A - OCCURRENCE OF DISEASE

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	What is the occurrence of the following diseases:	
	Enteric/Diarrhoeal Diseases:	
	Respiratory Diseases:	
	Skin Diseases:	
	Sexually Transmitted Diseases:	
	Vector Borne Diseases:	
	Others:	
2	What is the most common cause of death in the area?	

3	What is the prevalence of AIDS/HIV in the area?	
4	What are the most common causes of accidental injury in the area?	
5	What is the availability of pharmaceuticals?	

B - METHODS OF DISEASE CONTROL

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Are there Active Control Programmes in place for:	
	TB.	
	Malaria.	
	Other.	
2	What Prophylaxis are being used for:	
	Drugs (including known/suspected resistance)?	
	Immunization regimes?	
3	Are there any Health Promotion Campaigns in place?	

4	Are Mother and Child Clinics in operation?	
5	Is there a Nutritional Surveillance policy in force?	
6	Miscellaneous.	

C - HYGIENE AND SANITATION

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the availability of water:	
	Sources.	
	Availability of supply.	
	Type and quality of treatment.	
	Local distribution capabilities.	
2	Describe the general living conditions:	
	General standard of housing.	

	General standard of sanitation.	
3	Describe the quality of available food:	
	Local habits and state of nutrition:	
	General availability.	
	General standards of food hygiene.	
4	Describe methods of refuse management:	
	Local arrangements for domestic waste.	
	Local arrangements for hazardous waste.	
	Local arrangements for clinical waste.	
5	Describe any industrial pollution:	
	Local industry types.	

	Air/water pollution potential.	
6	Describe any post-war pollution:	
	Areas affected by polluting ordinances.	
	Level of risk for air/ground/water pollution.	

D - ANIMALS OF MEDICAL SIGNIFICANCE

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Is there any risk from animals, reptiles or venomous arthropods in the local area?	
2	Is there any risk from insects in the local area?	
	Occurrence.	
	Methods of control.	
3	Is there any risk from stray animals in the local area?	
	Occurrence.	

	Methods of control.	
	Risk of rabies.	

E - CIVILIAN HEALTH SERVICES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the local civilian medical organization.	
2	Assess the civilian medical capabilities in the area.	
3	Describe the local civilian health care facilities. Attach detailed report.	

F - MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Describe the local military medical organisations.	

2	State an assessment of the military medical capabilities in the area.	
3	Describe the local military health care facilities. Attach detailed report.	

G - NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	Are there any NGOs deployed in the area?	
2	If so, are their aims and objectives clear?	

H - HOSPITAL/MEDICAL FACILITIES

SER	ITEM	REMARKS
1	State the number of available hospital beds in peacetime (define surgical/medical).	
2	State the number of available beds in wartime/crisis (define surgical/medical).	
3	State the total number of clinicians by specialty.	

4	State the number of doctors by specialty.	
5	State the number of nurses by specialty.	
6	State the number of para-medical staff by specialty.	
7	State the number of technical staff by specialty.	
8	Describe road access.	
9	Describe air access/HLS.	
10	Describe typical CASEVAC timelines.	
11	Describe water access (emergency water supply, fire-fighting supply).	

12	Describe security capabilities (collective/personal).	
13	Describe fire safety capabilities.	
14	Describe A&D/ER facilities.	
15	Describe the anesthetics in use.	
16	Describe the number of available operating theatres and their capabilities.	
17	State the number of ICU beds (ITU/HDU/ventilated).	
18	State the number of isolation beds.	
19	Describe general surgery capabilities.	
20	Describe the availability of orthopedics (traction).	

21	Describe any specialist surgical capabilities.	
22	Describe the ENT capabilities.	
23	Describe any ophthalmology capabilities.	
24	Describe any obstetrics/gynaecology/paediatrics capabilities.	
25	Describe the available psychiatric services.	
26	Is there a burns unit?	
27	Is dialysis available?	
28	Describe the pharmaceutical capabilities.	
29	Describe the x-ray and other imaging facilities.	
30	Is there a nuclear medicine capability?	
31	Is there a laboratory for clinical chemistry?	
32	Is there a laboratory for public health chemistry?	
33	Is there a laboratory for microbiology?	

34	Describe any blood bank/haematology capabilities (blood and blood product control/temperature control).	
35	Describe the availability and source of medical gases (piped or bottled).	
36	Describe the availability of calibration/repair for medical equipment.	
37	Is there a mortuary facility?	
38	Describe the hospital water supplies (potable, hot/cold).	
39	Describe the ablution/sanitary/drainage facilities.	
40	Describe the available ambulance services.	
41	Describe the patient feeding arrangements (food safety, nutrition, western diet).	
42	Describe any UN administration procedures (MOU).	

43	Describe the hospital administration procedures.	
44	Describe the general health & safety/electrical safety procedures.	
45	Describe the overall cleanliness of the facility.	
46	Describe any pest control procedures (mosquito nets/fly screens/wet spraying/fogging/rodent control).	
47	Describe any liaison arrangements.	
48	Describe the availability of amenities (TV/radio/other).	

CHAPTER 2 - SOURCE DOCUMENTS FOR RAPID RECONNAISSANCE

1. United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) - click on the GRD-Gulf Region for Iraq or Afghanistan Engr District for info in those areas.

   http://www.tac.usace.army.mil/extranet/

2. United Nations Joint Logistics Command (UNJLC) Deployment Requirements Assessment Team's Field Operations Manual and related Checklists. An excellent source for road, rail, airport, seaport locations (with maps) for some of the most desolate parts of the world.

   http://www.unjlc.org/11403/

3. Center of Excellence-Disaster Management/Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA).

   http://coe-dmha.org/index.htm

4. University of Texas - extremely detailed map library on every country in the world.

   http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/

5. Wikipedia - online encyclopedia that provides descriptions and locations on virtually every mode of transport throughout the world.

   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Transportation

6. Open Source Information Site (OSIS) - use this source to get a lot of unclass intelligence from around the world. Note that OSIS also protects the user's URL from being "seen" from the URL being opened on the "other side."

   http://www.osis.gov/

7. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIS) - the best source for quick PDF file unclass "country briefs."

   http://www.mcia.osis.gov/

8. International Monetary Fund (IMF) - this source helps find a lot of logistics "diamonds in the rough" as many economic projects throughout the world focus a lot on the logistics and transportation infrastructure.

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/decdo/contents.htm

9. BBC News - excellent country pages which also help you find other "links" to logistics networks.

   http://news.bbc.co.uk/

10. USAID - this link has a country locator which also points to many logistic and transportation networks.

    http://www.usaid.gov/index.html

11. CIA - this link provides broad overview of country information.

    http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

CHAPTER 3 - ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

References:

A. AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
B. NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents

Non-NATO Abbreviations and Acronyms:

A&D	Admissions and Disposition
AC	Aircraft
AIDU	Aeronautical Information Documents Unit
ASDA	Accelerate-Stop Distance Available
ATSy	Aero-Triangulation System Software
CFC	Coalition Force Commander
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
DAC	Disarmament and Arms Control
DH	Decision Height
EFI	Electronics for Imaging
ENT	Ears, Nose and Throat
ER	Emergency Room
FLIP	Flight Information Publication
FOD	Foreign Object Damage
HDU	High-Dependency Unit
HETS	Heavy Equipment Transporter System
HM	Harbourmaster
ICU	Intensive Care Unit
IDD	International Direct Dialing
IM	Inner Marker
ITU	Intensive Therapy Unit
LCN	Loading Classification Number
LDA	Landing Directional Aid
LOX	Liquid Oxygen
LSSS	Logistics Supply Services and Support
MOG	Maximum-on-Ground
NAVAID	Navigational Aid
NOTAM	Notice to Airmen
OB	Obstruction
OPDS	Offshore Petroleum Distribution System
PCN	Pavement Classification Number
SITA	State Information Technology Agency
TB	Tuberculosis
TORA	Take-Off Runway Available

WAT	Take-Off Weight
WIP	Work in Progress

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.8

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS) PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Version 1.3
19 January 2016

Prepared by: Operations Support (Ops Sup) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
Document Custodian: Ops Sup MIWG
Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting action phase, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	Ops Sup MIWG
Version 1.1	07 November 2013	Ops Sup MIWG
Version 1.2	07 July 2014	Ops Sup MIWG
Version 1.3	19 January 2016	Ops Sup MIWG

Summary of Changes:

Minor review of the Mission Thread (MT), Information Management, and Mission Thread Analysis (MTA) paragraphs. List of the Mission Threads' Services and their definitions was added.

Review Cycle:

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INTRODUCTION

An effective information sharing and exchange capability extends vertically, through national systems and horizontally, into the systems of other coalition nations. This information exchange 'environment' enables rapid transfer of information to appropriately designated receivers, whilst rigorously protecting information from unauthorized disclosure and release. The environment provides robust information assurance and network defense capabilities.

A Coalition Information Exchange Environments (CIEE) is '*the aggregation of individuals, organizations, system capabilities, processes and infrastructure for the common purpose of creating and sharing data, information and knowledge necessary to plan, execute and assess coalition operations*.'[1] The CIEE provides the coalition with the ability to rapidly share information, knowledge/ideas, reduce planning timelines and enhance coalition operations by enabling common-shared situational awareness and collaboration at all levels.

The primary mission of coalition Communication and Information Systems (CIS) is to facilitate command, control and support functions in conjunction with national affiliations at all levels. It is incumbent upon the lead nation to coordinate for, create, or provide communications and information management structures organized so as to accomplish specific mission-related information-conveyance and processing functions. The identification and establishment of CIS links between the 'recognized civil authority (e.g. UN), political and strategic CIS links in the early stages of planning is paramount. Existing links such as diplomatic channels (e.g. Ambassadors) and military channels (e.g. Military Attaches/Advisers) should be utilized in the first instance and expanded where necessary to meet additional political and strategic requirements.

Coalition CIS planners need to recognize the requirement to plan for and provide total CIS integration at all levels between participating nations in order to allow the rapid passage and exchange of information. It is also recognized that spectrum management has become a key element of CIS that must be addressed in planning both prior to deployment and during operations. It is therefore important that CIS planning representatives from participating nations and particularly those from any identified supporting force are included early in the planning process. This will ensure that any significant differences in methods of operation and the allocation of resources can be resolved at an early stage. It is assumed that the framework nation will provide the staff and tools to perform the spectrum management function.

[1] Adapted from USJFCOM's definition for their Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). Although a national environment, functionally, it is mirrored with the CIEE. The CIE includes guards and protection services as would be needed in the CIEE. Consequently, and in order to remain aligned with US efforts, this definition should stand.

LEAD NATION CIS RESPONSIBILITIES

The lead nation's primary responsibilities in any coalition CIS planning process are:

a. Coordinates the planning and execution of the overall coalition CIS framework and providing the strategic level J6 leadership.

b. Coordinates the design, architecture, governance and specifications of coalition secure and non-secure network requirements that will support the operation or activity including collaborative planning tool requirements.

c. Ensures adequate CIS strategic to operational command links are in place.

d. Identifies and organizes the provision of critical and specific CIS assets.

e. Plans, organizes, and provides effective information-sharing among all coalition participants.

f. Prepares the CIS, security and information release policy, guidance and requirements to enable the designated CFC to effectively operate within the coalition force CIS structure.

g. Coordinates coalition force CIS releasability issues.

h. Coordinates the CIS activities of the coalition force with relevant national organizations, contributing nations' forces and other entities as appropriate e.g. recognized civil authority, CIA, Gendarmes.

i. Coordinates host nation lead-time CIS requirements (e.g. frequency clearance and permission to operate CIS equipment) through the relevant strategic commands as required.

j. Ensures that measures are taken to minimize system degradation caused by network attack, action damage, system overload and/or Electronic Warfare.

k. Provides guidance to the CFC on Emission Control (EMCON) and Communications Security (COMSEC) requirements.

l. In coordination with national administration/spectrum management agencies determines the spectrum access requirements of the proposed coalition forces and develops a spectrum management plan.

m. Provides the spectrum management function in the CFC headquarters with links to national and subordinate spectrum management elements.[2]

[2] Note that items k, l and m contain significant spectrum management elements.

NATIONAL CONTINGENT COMMANDERS

The National Contingent Commanders' (NCC) primary responsibilities that need to be recognized in any coalition CIS planning process are:

a. Establishes CIS liaison with the lead nation and CFC.

b. Ensures own national CIS linkages within the CFC headquarters and coalition force as appropriate.

c. Supports the CIS activities of the CFC and coalition force with relevant national organizations, contributing nations' forces and other entities as agreed e.g. recognized civil authority, CIA, Gendarmes.

d. Prepares and promulgates own national CIS policy and guidance to enable subordinate forces to effectively operate within the coalition CIS structure.

e. Provides national input into coalition force security policy, standards and guidance.

COALITION FORCE COMMANDER

The CFC primary responsibilities that need to be recognized in any coalition CIS planning process are:

a. Ensures adequate CIS operational to tactical level command links are in place.

b. Requests adequate and effective CIS assets to support the coalition force.

c. Plans and publishes CIS plans, annexes and operating instructions, including EMCON, COMSEC, and Spectrum Management plans that support the CFC and coalition force assigned missions.

d. Nominates a coalition force J6.

ORGANIZATION

The organization of coalition CIS staff is critical to the overall accomplishment of the coalition force mission. It is imperative that the organization capitalizes on the capabilities of all participating forces and that the organization has a cross-section of all participants assigned to the various CFC and coalition force CIS staff positions. Formal and informal agreements may need to be prepared designating who furnishes, installs, operates and maintains key network systems and hubs as well as determining CIS staffing. Figure 5.2 depicts notional CIS organizational relationships between coalition participants from the strategic, operational and tactical levels.



Figure 1 – Notional Coalition CIS Organizational Relationships

CIS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

CIS Planning needs to consider the provision of a range of secure and non-secure CIS services available to the political, strategic, operational and higher tactical levels as listed in priority order. Planning CIS support in the dynamic environment of a coalition operation is a challenge. The situation may require several iterations of the planning process. Maintaining an awareness of the strategic and operational environments should be the first consideration for CIS planning. Some items to consider as potential situations develop are:

a. Strategic guidance given by the lead nation (including guidance given on 'recognized civil authority' CIS connectivity, assistance and requirements).

b. The commander's mandate in respect of rights of administrations as defined in the International Telecommunication Union Convention and Radio Regulations.

c. Existing coalition CIS assets within the JOA.

d. The operational status and availability of CIS assets.

e. Ability to use extant or 'in-country' telecommunications infrastructure.

f. Coalition information exchange requirements.

g. Nature of the Information Operations threat.

h. Bandwidth availability and projected requirements.

i. Availability of CIS personnel, assets and spares.

j. Ability to obtain reinforcements or rotate personnel for sustained operations or activities.

k. State of CIS training.

l. Compatibility and interoperability of CIS between Joint, Coalition and other integrated forces e.g. CIA, Gendarmes.

m. Existing host or 'in-country' telecommunications infrastructure.

n. Sitting requirements for CIS equipment and location of existing commercial infrastructure and cable routes.

o. Priority accorded to CIS requirements.

p. Coalition information exchange releasability and system accreditation requirements.

q. The availability/implementation of a coalition-wide capability required to more effectively support the coalition CIS information exchange requirements.

r. Existing CIS agreements, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and standards.

s. Spectrum management coordination, clearance and permissions to operate specified transmission and processing equipment within the area of operations.

OTHER CIS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The following should also be considered in the CIS planning process:

a. Determination of CIS requirements by phase.

b. Allocation of responsibility against capability (based on probable assigned force elements).

c. Provision of capability domains e.g. national, allied and coalition.

d. Use of commercial telecommunications carriers for sustained operations or activities and their legal considerations.

e. Compilation and promulgation of EMCON, COMSEC and Spectrum Management policy based on direction and guidance from the lead nation.

f. Sovereign rights over bandwidth.

g. Diplomatic clearance requirements.

h. Use or provision of necessary agreements (Service Letters of Agreements, Letters of Assist or Memorandum of Agreement or Status of Forces Agreements). This should include agreements made to meet interoperability engineering standards through such means as NATO Standard Agreements (STANAGS) and Quadripartite Agreements (QSTAGS).

i. Establishment of a CIS Management Group (strategic and operational) to provide oversight of the operation.[3]

j. Bandwidth requirements for transmission of imagery and video teleconferencing.

k. Lessons learned or identified from previous coalition operations eg MIC, NATO and contributing nations databases.

l. Security Policy and accreditation.

[3] A strategic/operational CIS Management Group need only be established where the level of CIS activity and complexity is considered to require a group that is able to specifically coordinate, manage, oversee and provide higher level guidance to the CFC J6 and CISCCC. The group should normally be headed by the Lead or Framework nation J6 and consist of nominated participating nation CIS liaison officers.

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Once CIS requirements have been established, tasks should be allocated to individual participating nations. Where appropriate, each nation, by Service, should tentatively allocate its own resources to ensure that overall commitment can be met with some reserve capacity. If at any stage of planning it becomes apparent that CIS resources are insufficient to support the mission or activity, the lead nation should be notified.

OTHER CIS PLANNING DOCTRINE AND PUBLICATIONS

Besides reference to relevant Allied Communications Publications (ACPs), the outcomes from the following forums, committees and working groups may be able to offer further guidance to coalition CIS planners, particularly in regards to CIS interoperability issues:

<table>
<tr><th>Multinational/ Coalition</th><th>Combined</th><th>National</th><th>Single Service</th></tr>
<tr><td>NATO CIS Planning Guide</td><td>Combined Communications Electronic Board (CCEB)</td><td rowspan="5">Relevant Combatant Command/Theatre planning guides</td><td>Australia/Canada/New Zealand/United Kingdom/United States Naval C4 Organization (AUSCANNZUKUS).</td></tr>
<tr><td>Networking Multinational Interoperability Working Group (Network MIWG).</td><td>The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP).</td><td>American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies (ABCA) Program</td></tr>
<tr><td>Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT)</td><td rowspan="3"></td><td>Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures (MNF SOP)</td><td rowspan="2"></td></tr>
<tr><td>Coalition Communications Interoperability Guide (CCIG)</td></tr>
</table>

COALITION NETWORKS

Coalition operations involve different communities of interest (domains). These are:

a. **National Domains**. The internal sharing of information is assumed to be seamless where proven technology allows full information exchange.

b. **Allied Domains**. These do not need a specific coalition operation to be formed. Rather, they require a permanent and protected environment for the sharing of classified or sensitive information. Bilateral domains offer the richest exchange of information between nations based on firm trust and mutual understanding, facilitated by common standards and proven technology shared between 2 nations.

c. **Coalition Domains**. Wider coalitions require robust but flexible C2. The CBG calls for a lead nation to provide a mechanism for the exchange of information between the coalition partners. A separate domain may be created for each operation so that a multinational coalition can work together, ideally, at all levels of command and at the necessary security level. Coalition domains are established for a specific operation or purpose and include non-traditional partners.

Ad hoc networks will usually be required because of the constraints in exchanging information across national boundaries. These networks, usually provided by the lead nation in an operation, provide the user with applications and reach into the operational and tactical environment that cannot be connected to national systems. Additionally, Network Centric Warfare [4] supports highly reactive Coalition Joint Task Forces through smaller and more agile mission groups. Commanders will have differing information requirements across the various levels of command and will require near-real time information. Domains between coalition partners must enable the sharing of information in a seamless, coherent and timely manner.

[4] NATO refers to NCW as NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC).

TIERED COALITION NETWORKING

The end-state for allied and coalition information exchange and collaborative planning is between national C2 systems, with the integrity of national information being maintained by Boundary Protection Services. Currently, Boundary Protection Services are not available for all coalition information exchange capabilities. Until a novel approach to the protection of national information appears, new capabilities will continue to be introduced which need Boundary Protection Services. Work should be undertaken to develop a standard Boundary Protection Services architecture for use in coalition operations recognizing that the selection of the key hardware, guard and cryptographic components is the responsibility of the lead nation. It is worth noting that this selection could be constrained by a list of approved hardware if such exists. Therefore, 2 types of capabilities will always exist: ones with Boundary Protection Services and those without. Until now, no model has been available that describes this current 2-state Coalition Information Exchange Environment (CIEE).

A 2-Tier approach provides a model to develop capabilities and evolve current and future networks. These are

a. **Tier 1 –** those capabilities (infrastructure and applications) with Boundary Protection Services solutions and can be connected to national classified C2 systems.

b. **Tier 2 –** those capabilities that do not have Boundary Protection Services solutions and require additional coalition C2 infrastructure.

Planners should note that both tiers require the development of agreed multinational domain policy, procedures and standards that include security and Computer Network Defense. The end-state for coalition information sharing between traditional partners is the migration of all Tier 2 capabilities into Tier 1. However, until such time as Boundary Protection Services solutions are available, Tier 2 capabilities will remain. In coalitions where the connection of national systems is not desired, but unfettered access to information is required, the provision of Tier 2 capabilities must be implemented.

The MIC has recognized and identified services considered necessary for future development of Tier 1 networks. These should be considered by CIS planners for implementation in support of coalition networks:

a. **Initial Web Capability**. This is the ability to share simple web page based information between nations;

b. **Directory Services**. As the Tier 1 user community expands, the Directory Service needs to be enhanced;

c. **Chat**. Chat provides operators with the ability to hold real-time or near real-time informal discussions with other operational planners through instant messaging;

d. **Basic Common (Relevant) Operating Picture**. A common situational awareness database or data structure and geographic format, used by commanders and staffs at all levels, to present relevant tailored situational awareness views. These may or may not use the same rendering software;

e. **Military Messaging**. Military Messaging is essential for the transfer of accurate, timely and non-repudiated information; and

f. **Reachback**. Reachback is technically not a service, but provides a capability for nations to extend national connectivity to remote, deployed or liaison national elements embedded within another nation.

The increasing demands of mobility and network-enabled capability can result in congestion of the electromagnetic spectrum which is likely to be exacerbated in coalition operations. This is another area in which a common coalition approach and advanced planning will be beneficial. Not only communications, but all uses of the radio spectrum must be carefully planned for well in advance and coordinated to maintain fighting capability and operational tempo.

MISSION THREAD AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Information is the aggregation of data into something which has meaning (semantics) through interpretation by human or automated processes. Aggregation occurs through organizing, collating, comparing, processing, analyzing and filtering data. Information is intended to have an effect on or to make a difference to the receiver.

Information Management is the process of determining what information must be obtained or 'received' to support the decision being made or the action being taken. In conducting information management, processes may aggregate, fuse, transform and filter existing information into Mission Threads.

THE MISSION THREAD (MT) AND MISSION THREAD ANALYSIS (MTA) PROCESS

A Mission Thread is an operational 'use case' and is the core operational description of the mission. It represents a path through the use case (e.g. medical evacuation). Mission threads are associated with one or more operational services. A service describes the operational requirements and supporting data to frame the overall environment: the geography, organizational structure and mission, strategies, tactics, and information on any protagonists, including their composition, strategies, tactics, and timing (e.g. for a MT of Battle Space Management an associated service would be Track Management). Mission threads can describe tactical operations, logistical operation and support operations. Mission threads serve as drivers for developing the architecture and the basis for test cases during a verification (technical) and validation (operational) cycle.

In relating Information Management (IM) to Mission Threads, the key is to understand the various information flows that enable decision-making. As a use case is investigated (aka Mission Thread Analysis), focus must be placed on what information is required, in what form, and to whom for each decision point identified in the mission scenario in support of the operational requirements. An example is the command decision to respond to a request for a medical evacuation. What information is required, in what format and to whom in order for the command to make a decision to respond to such a request? Discussion can quickly focus on utilization of standard reporting templates (e.g. 9 liner), the POC for receipt of such a request and the latency of the request being provided to an authorized decision-maker.

"Mission Thread Analysis" is the actual process of merging/correlating mission threads and data contributed by different organizations to achieve coherent and unified effort within a coalition force. The lessons identified from Afghan Mission Network (AMN) implementation were to not exclusively use Information Exchange Requirements to define Communications and Information System (CIS) services, but to use Mission Thread Analysis to the threads that span mission participants engaged in a military task (same community of interest at each echelon). The Mission Threads and supporting services decompose in a structured manner into architectural views and ultimately lead to technical implementation of associated services needed to support the mission.

The MTA is driven by the Operational Planning Group (OPG) who defines which MTs are required to complete the assigned mission. In the event that an MT needs to be adjusted or compared to the existing set of tools, to accomplish his mission, it is important to recognize that a MT has to be described through architecture (operational view) in order to show a clear process between the Minimum Operational Requirement (MOR) and a technical solution to fulfil the Information Exchange Requirements, interoperability standards, profiles and associated services eventually leading to a 'design' that can be built into the mission network.

The MT analysis and modelling approach for a full mission thread architecture recommended by MIC consists of the following steps:

a. Formulate Mission Thread descriptions by utilizing Joint Doctrine, Concept of Operations, and other similar guiding documents and logically decompose the scenarios into associated services and activity models.

b. Validate the Mission Thread services and associated activities with subject matter experts and conduct Course of Action Analysis to map out underlying information Exchange requirements and uncover the interactions between services.

c. Develop the logical data flows and deployment architecture. The logical architecture may be presented at several levels of detail and covering all echelons of command. Physical network architecture may also be identified as appropriate. Sequence diagrams should be used to describe data interaction between systems in the architecture.

d. Combine all of the above information to construct the full end to end mission thread and associated services around the activity model, with additional details for data flow, sequencing and timing.

Typically the analysis of Mission Threads will follow the path "from service to activity to military effect' that deliver the desired mission outcomes. The challenge is to achieve a synergy between the operational mission requirements and the technical capabilities in order to achieve information superiority and unity of effort.

MIC, in conjunction with the nations and as supported by the Coalition Interoperability Assessment and Verification (CIAV) team under the Statement of Cooperation have developed a baseline set of Mission Threads and their Services for consideration, adoption, and reference as a starting point by organizations, such as NATO or non-MIC nations, seeking to conduct detailed MTA. Refer also to “Mission Threads And Their Associated Services For Coalition Operations”, US CIAV, 29 April 2015. The below definitions and linkages will continue to be refined at least as frequently as the CBG periodic review cycle.

MIC proposed baseline operational Mission Threads:

JMT	Description
Battlespace Management[5]	The ability to manage operational environments in order to affect the behaviour, capabilities, will, or perception of partner, competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, and relevant populations. The ability to control or deny (destroy, remove, contaminate, or block with obstacles) significant areas, with or without force, in the operational area whose possessions or control provides either side an operational advantage.
Joint manoeuvre	Coordination of the movements of air, land and maritime units in a joint environment to maximize their effectiveness in achieving joint mission objectives
Joint fires	The ability to use kinetic and non-kinetic means in all environments to generate the desired lethal and/or non-lethal effects from all domains and the information environment. To employ lethal and nonlethal means to defeat enemy forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Operational firepower is by its nature, primarily a joint/multinational task. Firepower refers to the delivery of all types of ordnance to include bombs, rockets, missiles, and artillery as well as other nonlethal means against enemy targets at operational depths. The two broad categories of targets are planned and immediate. Planned targets are targets that are known to exist in an operational area and against which attacks have been scheduled in advance or are on-call. Immediate targets, either unplanned or unanticipated, are targets that have been identified too late to be included in the normal targeting process, and therefore, have not been scheduled. This mission thread includes Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) as a service.
Joint ISR	JISR comprises a selection of services that equip the commander, staff, operator, or analyst with the right information, at the right place, at the right time. JISR capabilities are network-enabled and supported by Collection Coordination Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) and information management procedures.
Force protection	All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.

[5] Battlespace management is the foundation Mission Thread and is essential for command and control and situational awareness.

Humanitarian Assistance	As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation. The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies.
Medical Support	Conduct patient evacuation and provide transportation of patients by any means to greater capability of medical care. To provide forces, resources, and evacuation channels for patient evacuation. Report, locate, support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel to friendly control. Execution of the mission includes the full spectrum of PR personnel, weapons systems, and methods from benign recoveries in permissive environments to Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Nonconventional Assisted Recovery (NAR). It is a requirement for components to conduct joint CSAR task force operations.
Logistics	The process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow and storage of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of meeting operational requirements.
Service Management	The ability to provide a framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability that allows all users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand and act on with confidence, and protects information from those who should not have it. The ability to provide awareness of, access to and delivery of information on the AMN via a small set of CIO mandated services.

MIC proposed baseline Mission Thread Services:

Name	Definition
Document Management Services	This service provides the functionality to capture, create, organize, store, disseminate and retrieve documents.
Portal Services	The Portal Service manages the access to the mission network by users.
VTC Services	This service provides the functionality for people in different locations to engage in face-to-face audio and visual communication.
Text-Based Chat Services	This service provides the functionality for text-based real time communication between two or more people.
Voice Services	Provide voice service using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) with end-to-end service compatibility and quality is guaranteed.
Email Services	This service provides the functionality to exchange emails throughout the enterprise.
Internet Access	This service provides the functionality to enable access to information, applications, tools, and services through a single start page. It includes search capabilities and the ability to customize the start page for different user groups and individuals.
Computer Network Defense	This service is an activity undertaken to protect against, monitor for, analyse, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within or directed against information technology systems. (CAN input 2014-09-29)
Service/Network Management and Control	These services provide the physical and/or virtualized resources required to host software services in a distributed and federated environment. Infrastructure Services include computing and storage capabilities that can be used as the foundation for data centre implementation.
GEO Services	Geospatial information includes the geographic location and characteristics of natural or constructed features and boundaries on the Earth, including: statistical data and information derived from, among other things, remote sensing, mapping, and surveying technologies; and mapping, charting, geodetic data and related products.
METOC Service	This service provides the required functionality to provide meteorological information and analysis on the enterprise network.
COP Management Services	Provides a shared visualisation service of the operational environment rendering in sufficient detail, accuracy and timeliness to support the planning process and operational decision making.
Battlespace graphics and object Mangement Service	The management of information concerning C2 influencing objects: it includes control features, facilities, organisations, individuals, equipment, events.
Track Management Service (Space, Air, Surface, Subsurface, Cyber)	This service provides the functionality to support the component of Track Management in support of situational awareness (SA)and C2. Track Management is defined as the injection, correlation, aggregation, tracking, identification and dissemination near real time distribution of a correlated view. Component of Track Management for anything which uses ground real estate. Track Management is defined as the injection, correlation, aggregation, tracking, identification and dissemination near real time distribution of a correlated view.
Event Management Service	This service provides the functionality to report, correlate and record information about events in the AOR. This provides for situational awareness of evolving situations as well as a log of the mission to support analysis for operational, planning, intelligence, historical and legal purposes.
Ground Movement Service	The Ground Movement service includes the movement of personnel and materiel by all surface modes except sealift and strategic airlift.
Strategic Airlift Service	Strategic Airlift includes the transport of personnel and materiel by dedicated medium and long haul aircraft. It may include both military and contracted civilian aircraft.

Military Sealift Service	Military Sealift includes the transport of personnel and materiel by common-user sealift transportation services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy US forces on a global basis.
In-Theater Air Support Service	The In-theater Air Support (ITAS) Service provides the air transport of personnel and materiel within the operational theater.
Targeting Service	This service provides the functionality to support the nomination, selection, prioritisation and prosecution of targets and the determination of desired (lethal and non-lethal) effects, including conventional combat and fire support missions.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)	SEAD is a tactical mission that supports other aviation missions.
Control and Coordination Service (Air, Naval Gunfire, CAS, Artillery Control, Information OPS, Cyber)	The Control and Coordination Service provides the data flow to conduct the Joint Targeting Cycle.
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Service	The BDA Service supports the decision to re-engage a target, assesses the remaining capability of the target following the engagement, and the effectiveness of the engagement itself.
Request and Dissemination Management Services	This service provides the functionality to co-ordinate collection of information in order to task ISR resources to achieve requirements and collection strategies, continuously track status, and dynamically adjust, as required.
Collection Service (GEOINT, HUMINT, OSINT, IMINT, MASINT, SIGINT)	This service handles the collection of intelligence from the receipt of the request for collection to the delivery of the collected data or physical product.
Processing and Production Service (Reports and Analysis, Primary and Secondary Imargery, Full Motion Video (FMV), Targeting Data, Biometrics)	This service provides the functionality to support the collection of biometric characteristics, collation, analysis and subsequent dissemination. Biometrics is defined as the process of recognising an individual based upon measurable, anatomical physiological and behaviourable characteristics. This service provides the functionality to support the collection, storage, dissemination, analysis and cataloguing of image products
Query Services	This service maintains an intelligence archive for the operating forces.
CBRN Service	The CBRN Service addresses Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defense. It includes protective and mitigation measures taken in response to situations in which any of these four hazards are present.
Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) Service	This service provides the functionality to support joint personnel recovery including Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). This may turn into MEDEVAC if circumstances demand.
C-IED	The objective of the Counter IED (C-IED) Service is to minimize the effects of explosive and projectile attacks which have the potential to kill personnel and destroy physical assets.
Medevac Services	Conduct patient evacuation and provide transportation of patients by any means to facilities having a greater capability to provide medical care.
Health Services Delivery (Role 1, 2, 3 & 4)	Health services delivery addresses how treatment is provided to casualties. There are four roles identified for the delivery of health care.
Humanitarian Assistance	FHA provided by US forces is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) that has the primary responsibility for providing that assistance. FHA may support other USG departments or agencies.

Logistic/Support Service (Deployment & Distribution, Supply, Maintenance, Demand Signals, Logistics Services, Contract Support Civil Engineering,)	The process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost effective flow and storage of raw materials, in-process inventory, finished goods and related information from point of origin to point of consumption for the purpose of meeting Operational requirements. (UK input 2014-10-08)
Coordination with uncleared GO/NGO/IO	Coordination with organizations that are not part of the Coalition mission networks. It includes local government agencies, utilities and services, and organizations like the International Red Cross and relief agencies.
Civil-Military Cooperation Service	CIMIC allows the military commander to support or augment the resources of the local civil authorities. It also facilitates the cooperation of the civil authorities in the accomplishment of the military mission.
Service Desk Service	This service provides the functionality to run the Service Desk. The service desk is the primary point of contact for users when there is a service disruption, for Service Requests, or even for some categories of Request for Change. The Service Desk provides a point of communication to the users and a point of coordination for several IT groups and processes.
Service Level Management Service	This service provides the functionality to support the SMF-related Service Level Management process which ensures that an agreed level of IT service is provided for all current IT services, and that future services are delivered to agreed achievable targets. Proactive measures are also taken to seek and implement improvements to the level of service delivered. The purpose of the SLM process is to ensure that all operational services and their performance are measured in a consistent, professional manner throughout the IT organization, and that the services and the reports produced meet the needs of the business and customers.
Service Planning Service	The purpose of the Transition Planning and Support activities is to: · Plan appropriate capacity and resources to package a release, build, release, test, deploy and establish the new or changed service into production · Provide support for the Service Transition teams and people · Plan the changes required in a manner that ensures the integrity of all identified customer assets, service assets and configurations can be maintained as they evolve through Service Transition · Ensure that Service Transition issues, risks and deviations are reported to the appropriate stakeholders and decision makers · Coordinate activities across projects, suppliers and service teams where required. The goals of Transition Planning and Support are to: · Plan and coordinate the resources to ensure that the requirements of Service Strategy encoded in Service Design are effectively realized in Service Operations · Identify, manage and control the risks of failure and disruption across transition activities. The objective of Transition Planning and Support is to: · Plan and coordinate the resources to establish successfully a new or changed service into production within the predicted cost, quality and time estimates · Ensure that all parties adopt the common framework of standard re-usable processes and supporting systems in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the integrated planning and coordination activities Provide clear and comprehensive plans that enable the customer and business change projects to align their activities with the Service Transition plans.

Cross-domain text-based chat service	This service provides the functionality for text-based real time communication between two or more people of whom some will use the mission network as transport layer and some the internet.
Cross domain email services:	This service provides the functionality to exchange emails between the enterprise using the mission network as transport layer and GOs/NGOs/IOs using the internet.
Cross domain VTC services:	This service provides the functionality for real time VTC-communication between two or more people of whom some will use the mission network as transport layer and some the internet.
Cross domain Portal service	This service provides the functionality of a portal service between mission partners using the mission network as transport layer and GO/NGO/IO using the internet.

MIC proposed linkages between Mission Threads and Mission Thread Services:



Figure 1. Revised Coalition Mission Threads

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.9

NATIONAL FACTORS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Version 1.1
07 July 2014

Prepared by: Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Executive Secretariat (ES)
Document Custodian: Operations (Ops) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting action phase, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

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The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	MIC ES
Version 1.1	07 July 2014	Ops MIWG

Summary of Changes:

CAN and DEU paragraphs were updated.

Review Cycle:

Annual

Distribution:

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AUSTRALIA (AUS)

DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

An organized, violent and politically motivated activity conducted by non-state actors and sustained over a protracted period of time that typically utilizes a number of methods; such as subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism in an attempt to achieve change within a state. **Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3.0.1 (Dec 09)**

DEFINITION FOR COIN

Those political, social, civic, economic, psychological, and military actions taken to defeat an insurgency. **LWD 3.0.1 (Dec 09)**

FUNDAMENTALS FOR A COIN OPERATION

The solution to any insurgency fundamentally exists with the government's ability to effectively deal with the cause at the political level. A whole-of-government multi-agency effort towards COIN is critical in order to achieve any measure of success.

A comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of an insurgency and attacks the legitimacy and authority of the insurgent forces thereby providing an enduring solution should form the framework upon which a COIN campaign is designed. This approach also integrates the instruments of national power – DIME.

PRINCIPLES OF COIN ACTION

- Political Primacy and Legitimacy
- Comprehensive Approach
- Intelligence
- Reinforcing the Rule of Law
- Support Good Governance
- Dominant Narrative
- Physical and Moral Isolation of the Insurgent
- Presence
- Adaptation
- Host Nation Primacy

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

Shape-Clear-Hold-Build

(These should not be viewed as 4 distinct independent phases. Depending on the environment these can be conducted concurrently)

OBSERVATIONS

The fundamentals for a COIN operation are not separately listed in LWD 3-0-1.

Arguably, from AUS perspective, the most important COIN principle(s) can be construed to be fundamental in conducting a COIN operation.

CANADA (CAN)

DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

A rebellion instigated by at least one non-state movement whose means the use violence against an established authority to achieve political change. **Army Terminology Panel March 2014**

DEFINITION FOR COIN

Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. **Defense Terminology Database (Record 3941)**

FUNDAMENTALS FOR A COIN OPERATION

Insurgency is not a movement or people. It is a competition, struggle or conflict involving different groups of people. As a manifestation of war, it is a competition of wills.

It must include at least one non-state movement to differentiate it from wars between states. The established authority need not necessarily be the government of the nation subject to an insurgency. It could be a local authority, a temporary military authority or a government of a third party.

Insurgencies seek political change like all wars. But the political nature of insurgency is so important, it should be emphasized in the definition. The change sought could be government collapse (typically an objective of 1950-60s communist insurgencies) or a lesser objective such as self-determination, regional autonomy or the release of political prisoners. **B-GL-323-004/FP-003**

PRINCIPLES OF COIN ACTION

- Effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim.
- Promote Unity of Purpose to coordinate the actions of Participating Agencies (including government machinery).
- Understand the complex dynamics of the Insurgency, including the wider environment.
- Exploit Intelligence and Information.
- Separate the Insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength, including addressing their grievances, real and perceived.
- Neutralize the Insurgent.
- Sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period.
- Conduct longer term, Post-Insurgency planning. **B-GL-323-004/FP-003**

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

Shape-Secure-Develop model

- Plan the COIN campaign.
- Implement and execute the campaign plan.
- Balance the campaign across Full-Spectrum Operations.
- Destruction of Insurgents.
- Build a secure future. **B-GL-323-004/FP-003**

OBSERVATIONS

Canadian COIN doctrine is primarily Land Doctrine. B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Counter-Insurgency Operations* is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff. It is currently under revision.

FRANCE (FRA)

DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

The actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion. **(AJP-3.4.4)**

DEFINITION FOR COIN

The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. **(AJP-3.4.4)**

FUNDAMENTALS FOR A COIN OPERATION

- Necessity in counter insurgency for a political project as a viable alternative;
- Necessity for a self-appropriation by the host Nation of the political project, its authorities and the local population;
- Necessity to integrate the multidimensionality of COIN in a comprehensive approach;
- Necessity to understand the context to guide the action;
- Necessity to develop an influence strategy.

PRINCIPLES OF COIN ACTION

- All levels of the Force should adapt to the local context;
- The Force should reinforce its credibility in every fields by making an appropriate use of the full range of military capabilities at its disposal and by systematically exploiting positive asymmetries;
- The Force should take and preserve the initiative; by imposing a decision making rhythm to the insurgents and master the operational pace
- The Force should seize every opportunity by decentralizing commanding structures and by promoting subsidiary; the force should seek the continuity of actions undertaken (avoid the methods being changed every time military commanders turn over);
- The Force should act as soon as possible in support of local forces;
- The Force should plan and conduct a combined and agile operative maneuver at theatre level;
- The Force should exploit the weaknesses of insurgents, rally the neutrals to the process and people that are less hostile; it should also marginalize and neutralize the irreconcilables;
- The Force should take the population into account: preserve it from insurgents influence and most particularly, protect the figures that have a positive influence;
- The force should seek the synergy between civilian and the military;

- The Force should maintain violence at its lowest level by respecting the principle of sufficiency when actions are undertaken and anticipate on undesired effects; Know, understand and get a grasp of the local context.
- Adapt to the local context.
- Take the population into account (protect it) and the local authorities.
- Reinforce the credibility of the force in every field.
- Make use, in an appropriate manner, of the full range of military capacities at disposal.
- Adopt the principle of proportionality in the force actions.
- Marginalize and neutralize the irreconcilable.
- Make the most of the state of grace.
- Anticipate and adapt on the long term.
- Develop the synergy between civilian and military actions ("control" military actions and coordinate civilian actions).
- Be modest and, if possible, discreet.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

SHAPE - CLEAR - HOLD -BUILD

(These are simultaneous actions and not sequenced phases)

OBSERVATIONS

These elements are to be confirmed as the French national doctrine on COIN is in the process of being approved.

GERMANY (DEU)

DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

Actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change or to overthrow a governing authority within a country or a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion
Insurgents are persons who carry out or support subversive and often violent actions and, by doing so, endanger the state's legitimacy and capacity for action. Insurgents may be a heterogeneous mixture of local power brokers, followers, supporters or even criminals. Their motives are manifold and often include local or regional interests.

DEFINITION FOR COIN

No literal translation of "COIN". DEU understanding of COIN:
Counterinsurgency (COIN) comprises all civilian and military measures to eliminate all acts of subversion and violence targeting directly or indirectly the political order of the state.

FUNDAMENTALS FOR A COIN OPERATION

Establishment of security and governmental order in crisis areas is a comprehensive and long lasting approach aimed to gain the support of the population in order to strengthen or establish the legitimacy of the government or governmental functions. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and analyze background and root causes of the insurgency

PRINCIPLES OF COIN ACTION

- Comprehensive approach necessary (overall national integration).
- Population must be the focus of all efforts incl. interaction with (all) civilian actors
- Local ownership
- Multinational integration, but transfer of authority as soon as possible to local government.
- integration of the military contribution
- Support and establishment of governmental structures as soon as possible.
- legitimacy
- learning and adaptation capacity

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

- Military action in accordance with all actors (comprehensive approach, multinational coordination, coordination with local actors in the field of security)
- Key to success is support of local population and their perception of the security situation.
- This requires presence in the area of operations in order to maintain contact to the local population.

The Task Fields Shape, Secure and Develop

Counterinsurgency operations can be assigned to three task fields, which do not represent a hierarchic sequence of phases, which cannot be clearly defined and which may have quite different local manifestations.

Fields of Action in Counterinsurgency



The following tasks can be assigned to these fields:

Field	Tasks, e.g.
Shape	– Key Leader Engagement (KLE) in different fields of action at the national, regional and local level, – Conduct of measures of PSYOPS and military intelligence, – Maintenance / promotion of the legitimacy of state authorities.
Secure	– Separation of insurgents from the population by means of a holistic approach of civilian and military actors, – Creation and maintenance of a safe and secure environment for civilian tasks (support activities of the government/administration, short-term stabilization projects), – Maintenance / promotion of the legitimacy of state authorities.
Develop	– Development cooperation (economy, infrastructure, social welfare systems), – Promotion of stability in the area of deployment, – Maintenance / further promotion of the legitimacy of state authorities.

OBSERVATIONS

German understanding of COIN is focused on the comprehensive dimension of security and the underlying strategy. The military is only one actor within this concept.

ITALY (ITA)

DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

The actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion. **(AJP-3.4.4)**

DEFINITION FOR COIN

The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances. **(AJP-3.4.4)**

FUNDAMENTALS FOR A COIN OPERATION

The strategic goal of the counterinsurgent is to promote the local authorities' legitimate governance by controlling violence and enforcing the rule of law.

As such, a comprehensive approach needs to be applied to coordinate all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, information and economic aspects and, when required, the military effort, in order to create the conditions for neutralize the insurgents' authority and support.

PRINCIPLES OF COIN ACTION

- Understand/pursue the political end-state.
- Legitimacy and credibility.
- Comprehensive approach.
- Unity of effort.
- Rule of Law.
- Intelligence.
- Separation of the insurgents from their material and morale support.
- Understand the key aspects of local culture and language.
- Protect the population.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

Shape, Clear, Hold and Build (SCHB) is the approach to prepare, plan and execute operations. Depends on the operational environment, these activities can be potentially conducted simultaneously.

The SCHB concept should be attenuated by emphasizing the non-kinetic effects, i.e. create s socio-economical development for the population**.**

OBSERVATIONS

The SCHB approach is not present in the Italian Doctrine, therefore the framework could be used is:

- Understand
- shape (create the conditions)
- engage (by kinetic and not-kinetic actions)
- hold
- transition

UNITED KINGDOM (GBR)

DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

1. *An organized, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority*. **(Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, Security and Stabilization: The Military Contribution**).

2. *The actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change of a governing authority within a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion*. **(AJP-3.4.4)**

DEFINITION FOR COIN

1. *Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat or contain insurgency while addressing root causes.* **(JDP 3-40)**

2. *The set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat insurgency and address any core grievances.* **(AJP-3.4.4)**

FUNDAMENTALS FOR A COIN OPERATION

Human Security. COIN campaigns have failed where basic human security is not paramount.

Intelligence and the Rule of Law. Operations to arrest and prosecute insurgents must be intelligence led. Loyal, trustworthy and professional police forces are key to upholding the rule of law.

Political Control. Population control measure, such as ID cards and check points, are effective in helping to isolate the insurgent form the population.

Political Process. The population needs to be encouraged to enter the political process. **AFM Vol 1 Part 10**

PRINCIPLES OF COIN ACTION

- Primacy of Political Purpose.
- Understand the Context.
- Focus on the population.
- Foster Host-Nation Governance, Authority and Indigenous Capacity
- Unity of Effort.
- Isolate and Neutralize Irregular Actors.
- Exploit Credibility to Gain Support.
- Prepare for the Long Term – Perseverance and Sustainability.
- Anticipate, Learn and Adapt.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

SHAPE – SECURE – HOLD - DEVELOP

Builds on proven COIN theories and enables closer conceptional linkage to governance and development of capacity. **(JDP 3-40)**

OBSERVATIONS

- NIL -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

DEFINITION FOR INSURGENCY

The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (**JP 1-02**)

DEFINITION FOR COIN

Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. **(JP 1-02.)**

FUNDAMENTALS FOR A COIN OPERATION

COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all host nation (HN), US, and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead COIN efforts. When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required for effective COIN. The military contribution to countering insurgency, while vital, is not as important as political efforts for long-term success. Military efforts are especially important initially to gain security. The national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy play key roles in determining COIN strategic context.

There are 3 possible general strategic settings for US involvement in COIN: assisting a functioning government as part of FID, as an adjunct to US major combat operations, or US operations in an ungoverned area. The potential global and regional scope of contemporary insurgency has added to the complexity and therefore the challenge of conducting COIN. This challenge requires a global or regional COIN strategic approach for success. A strategy of disaggregation includes the following activities: **containment, isolation, disruption, and resolution of core grievances, and neutralization in detail.**

PRINCIPLES OF COIN ACTION

The principles of COIN are derived from the historical record and recent experience. These principles do not replace the principles of joint operations, but rather provide focus on how to successfully conduct COIN.

Counterinsurgents Must Understand the OE. This understanding includes the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other aspects of the OE. Counterinsurgents must pay special attention to society, culture, and insurgent advantages within the OE.

Legitimacy Is the Main Objective. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government. Counterinsurgents achieve

this objective by undertaking appropriate actions and striving for a balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means as dictated by the situation

Unity of Effort is Essential. Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation. Otherwise, well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other or provide vulnerabilities for insurgents to exploit.

Political Factors are Primary. At the beginning of a COIN operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents. However, political objectives must guide the military's approach. Commanders must consider how operations contribute to strengthening the HN government's legitimacy and achieving US goals—the latter is especially important if there is no HN.

Intelligence Drives Operations. Effective COIN is shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at all levels and disseminated throughout the force. Reporting by units, members of the country team, and information derived from interactions with civilian agencies is often of equal or greater importance than reporting by specialized intelligence assets.

Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support. While it may be required to kill or capture insurgents, it is more effective in the long run to separate an insurgency from the population and its resources, thus letting it die. Confrontational military action, in exclusion is counterproductive in most cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential. To establish legitimacy, commanders transition security activities from military operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they often lose public support.

Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment. Insurgencies are protracted by nature, and history demonstrates that they often last for years or even decades. Thus, COIN normally demands considerable expenditures of time and resources, especially if they must be conducted simultaneously with conventional operations in a protracted war combining traditional and IW.

Manage Information and Expectations. To limit discontent and build support, the HN government and any counterinsurgents assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the populace, friendly military forces, and the international community. Information operations (IO), particularly PSYOP and the related activities of public affairs (PA) and civil-military operations (CMO) are key tools to accomplish this.

Use the Appropriate Level of Force. Even precise and tailored force must be executed legitimately and with consideration for consequent effects. An operation that kills five

insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

Learn and Adapt. An effective counterinsurgent force is a learning organization. Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics. Every unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results.

Empower the Lowest Levels. Successful COIN is normally conducted with decentralized execution based upon centralized vision and orders that include clear and concise rules for the use of force and rules of engagement.

Support the Host Nation (HN). US forces committed to supporting COIN are there to assist a HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself, which is also normally the goal even if the US begins COIN in an area that does not have a HN government. US forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory.

OPERATIONAL APPROACH

There are a range of possible operational approaches to COIN. COIN should strive to move from direct to balanced and balanced to indirect. The **direct approach** focuses on protecting US and HN interests while attacking the insurgents. The **indirect approach** focuses on the actions to establish conditions (a stable and more secure environment) for others to achieve success with the help of the US. **The approaches must be adapted to the demands of the local environment.** Three examples are: Clear-hold-build, combined action, and limited support. COIN should strive to move from direct to balanced and balanced to indirect.

OBSERVATIONS

COIN Doctrine is primarily ground-centric (Army-Marine Corps). Distinct and detailed SOF, Naval, and Air Force approaches to COIN need to be incorporated in the next doctrinal updates.

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.10

NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRIC DATA

Version 1.2
24 April 2015

Prepared by: Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Executive Secretariat (ES)
Document Custodian: Operations Support (Ops Sup) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT

During the November 2013 MIC Principals and Strategic Planning Session Meeting, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	MIC ES
Version 1.1	07 November 2013	Ops Sup MIWG
Version 1.2	24 April 2015	Ops Sup MIWG

Summary of Changes:

The MIC's "National Perspectives on the Use of Biometric Data" product influenced and contributed to the American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program (ABCA) published Report 138 "Biometrics Interoperability – Systems, Standards and Architectures"; promulgated on 3rd February 2012 (http://www.abca-armies.org/). The ABCA product builds consensus on the use of internationally recognized technology standards, as well as addresses doctrine and policy impacts which are crucial first steps towards achieving and advancing coalition interoperability.

In Version 1.2 the CBG Volume III.10 has undergone annual review resulting a change in the CAN amendment. Other nations remain extant.

Review Cycle:

Annual

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AUSTRALIA (AUS)

NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

The term 'Biometric data' as defined in the draft Defence Instruction is a general term used to describe a characteristic or a process.

a. As a characteristic: a measurable, unique or distinguishing biological (anatomical and physiological) and/or behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition and identification.

b. As a process: automated methods of recognizing an individual, based upon measurable (anatomical and physiological) and/or behavioral characteristics.

The Instruction only authorizes the collection of biometric data during ADF operations outside Australia from persons who are neither Australian citizens nor permanent residents of Australia (unless those persons provide informed consent). The instruction only applies to biometric data collected for purposes relating to military operations and does not extend to law enforcement activities. Collection of biometric data must adhere to privacy guidelines dealing with the protection and use of personal information.

Legal Framework for the Collection of Biometric Data

CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

International Law: Customary international law and elements of Australia's international treaty obligations may apply to a particular operation in which biometric data may be collected.

Host Nation Law: Where ADF operations are conducted with the consent of a host nation, the power to collect biometric data may be subject to the host nation's consent and host nation laws. Any status of forces agreement (SOFA) must be consulted when planning to collect data to ensure that the process complies with host nation laws. It will also be necessary to consider whether or not ADF personnel are immune from host nation laws as well as criminal and civil processes

CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

Increasing involvement in coalition operations, together with cooperation with other government departments in border protection, has shown that in many cases, the use and sharing of biometric data has become a vital tool to enhance operations, both domestically and internationally. The military considers that the availability of biometric data that assists intelligence staff to associate an individual with a particular event, such as an IED attack on an ADF force element, is fundamentally important to enhance force protection measures and to counter direct threats to ADF force elements.

Australia has entered into a number of arrangements and Memoranda of Understanding in relation to sharing biometric data to assist international cooperation in combating immigration

fraud and strengthening border control. Additionally, a data sharing plan was developed at the Five Country Conference (forum on immigration and border security) between AUS, CAN, NZ, UK and US. The protection of personal information is important to all countries involved.

As far as Australia is concerned, legislative protection of personal information is guided by the Privacy Act 1988.

The Privacy Act 1988 provides controls for:

a. The collection of personal information and limitations on collection.

b. The use and disclosure of personal information.

c. The quality and security of data collected.

d. Openness and accessibility to policies on the management of personal information.

e. Rights to access personal information and have inaccurate information corrected.

f. The rights of individuals to anonymity.

g. The transfer of personal information from Australia to someone in a foreign country, and

h. Limitations on collection of more sensitive information.

The Privacy Act 1988 has limited extra-territorial effect.

Consequently, a recent Defence Instruction relating to the collection and sharing of biometric data for intelligence purposes is being developed and will shortly be released.

BEST PRACTICES

MOU developed between AUS, CAN, UK, USA and NLD in 2009 to addresses the procedures by which the participants may collect and share biometric data for operational purposes. However, participants were still required to abide by their respective national laws.

NATIONAL CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS (PIRACY)

When biometric data that constitutes personal information is collected, the person should be made aware of the following, unless to do so would defeat the purpose of collecting the data:

a. The purpose for which the information is being collected.

b. The collection of information is being undertaken under the authority derived from the relevant multinational agreements, arrangements, Security Council resolutions etc.

The information may be shared with coalition forces and the host nation as applicable.

CANADA (CAN)

NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) see biometrics as measurable physical characteristics or personal behaviour traits such as facial features, voice patterns, fingerprints, iris structure, keystroke, gait or DNA that is unique to an individual and can be used to identify or verify the identity of that individual.

From an operational perspective, biometric data consists of data collected by the CAF from non-Canadians (citizens/permanent residents) during the course of expeditionary operations to remove the advantage of anonymity from a threat actor and to provide a high level of certitude about an individuals' identity. When authorized, biometric data could be collected, matched, stored, shared and analyzed to enable activities such as force protection, forensic exploitation, detention and identity intelligence.

CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

The CAF is drafting direction and guidance for the development of a biometrics capability to enable CAF preparedness for future deployed operations. The requirement for the collection and use of biometrics in operations is assessed on a case-by-case basis, and subject to legal and policy review.

The Department of National Defence has a bi-lateral biometrics information sharing arrangement with the US Department of Defense entitled the Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces – United States Department of Defense Joint Statement of Principles on Sharing Biometric Data Collected by Canadian Forces in Afghanistan. This sharing arrangement governs the handling of biometric data that was collected by the CAF in Afghanistan.

NATIONAL CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINTS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS

Currently the collection and use of biometrics on operations is governed on a mission-by-mission basis. DND/CAF is in the process of establishing an overarching biometric policy to apply to all CAF operations. However, it is expected that legal and policy reviews would be still be required for each mission to confirm specific parameters. Biometric information sharing with allies is also assessed on a case by case basis.

Any biometric data is collected, used, stored and shared in accordance with all applicable domestic and international laws, including human rights and humanitarian law.

The CAF does not collect, store or share biometric data on Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada unless specifically approved.

As mandated by legal and policy directives, a caveat appears on all CAF biometric data collected in Afghanistan including forensic exploitation of fingerprints: "*This data is provided by the Canadian Forces. It can only be used in support of the ISAF & OEF-A mandates and must not be used in a manner inconsistent with international law. Any use of this data for purposes outside of the above mandate requires prior approval by the Government of Canada*".

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FRANCE (FRA)

NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

French understanding on biometric is that it is a set of techniques that allows the automatic recognition of an individual according to their physical, biological, or behavioural characteristics. Biometric data is personal in nature and allows for the identification of a particular person based upon his unique and permanent traits.

The French framework for the use of biometric is closely related to the notion of personal data. In France, the notion of personal data is clear as it is any information related to an identified physical person or one that can be, directly or indirectly, by reference to an identification number or to several elements that are proper to this person. To determine whether or not a person is identifiable, it is appropriate to consider the whole range of means to allow such identification. These means are in possession or can be accessed by the body responsible of the information treatment or any other person.

NATIONAL RESERVATION. In France, photos, DNA samples, and genetic prints (genetic fingerprints) collections are strictly controlled by law. Such biometric data can be collected from individuals who are presumably suspected of serious law violations (all offences will not necessarily allow or call for a collection of genetic prints). If there is no conviction resulting from the person being investigated, no biometric data will be stored on any files on this particular person. The personal data of this person will be removed from all databases (those related to sexual offences, genetic data, and "general" databases of convicted people). The French independent national agency, the CNIL, is in charge of ensuring that such rules are indeed being abided.

The French military is allowed to make use of a database integrating biometric identification (whether that be for French citizens or foreigners); to collect and integrate biometrics data of French militaries within a database put in place by allied armed forces; to consult a database constituted by allied armed forces given that a decree from the "Conseil d'Etat" expressing the finality of the treatment of personal data has been issued. The use of biometric by the French army within the framework of a civilian operation is possible given that the finality of the use was the object of a special law regulation. In theatre: the burden of the use of biometrics would be less important than in France as populations from weak or failed host nations would not be used to any form of constitutional protection. The end would be to provide security and the means would be any measures within the line of International Human Right Law and national (French) standards (ethical, moral if not legal). In certain circumstances, the right to privacy appears less important than the right to have security. Thus in order to be fully operational on the ground French military forces would respect a range of added principles; these principles and procedures would change depending on the host nation (its cultural practices, rules, and vetoes: for instance for a traditional afghan environment) in which data are gathered. These principles would be:

a. Ethic: respect for the population and their local costumes (photos would not be taken in certain circumstances if not culturally accepted).

b. Respect of privacy: measures would be undertaken so as to prevent information and personal data leaks.

CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

In the case of an armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies. Thus any demarche is allowed short of what is forbidden by international conventions.

The International Human Right Law article that would be the most appropriate to such topic is article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which holds that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person".

Fundamental principles within international law that would apply in the circumstances:

a. Individual freedom

b. Respect for private life

c. Right of image

d. Respect of cultures

Concerning databases use and the notion of proportionality with regard to the information contained in this databases EU legislation is the most complete.

France external operations can take place within an agreed framework determined in a SOFA (Status of Force Agreement) signed by France and the host country. This document defines the rules to be applied and followed by French officers deployed within the host country.

In the absence of such document, the only rules that apply are that of the host country.

In the case of an armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies. Thus any demarche is allowed, provided that it abides by the provisions of international conventions.

The French law is always applicable to nationals. The treatment of personal data is understood under the terms of national law (article 2 law 1978, January the 6th) very broadly: use, collection, recording, organisation, conservation, adaptation, modification, diffusion, interlinking, deletion.

CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

The French White Paper on Security and Defence as well as the document presenting future strategic trends for the French Ministry of Defence presents biometric as a technology to be developed in order to facilitate work on the ground. It is an emergent topic and there is a will, at national level, to invest resources in various research programs to develop the techniques and means of security. These various research programs are essentially focused on security missions and aim at developing smart video watch in order to detect in a group of people behavioural anomalies and suspicious movements.

BEST PRACTICES

- NIL -

NATIONAL CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS (PIRACY)

Exchange of personal data: The French law accepts the transfer of personal information databases out of the European union (to NATO allies) if the receiving country can ensure the same standards of protection for private life and respect of fundamental principles with regard to individuals.

Direct support to military operations and production of military intelligence: The French Joint Chief of Staff has lifted the caveats that accompanied French forces intervention in coalition operations. Therefore that allows a collecting, sharing of biometric information within the framework previously mentioned.

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GERMANY (DEU)

NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

Biometric data is understood as data related with one person and which allows identifying that specific person. A legal definition is included in the national federal data protection act ("personal data"). In the context with biometrics regulations and procedures of "special personal data" (racial and ethnic data, political opinion, health etc.) apply

CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

In the case of an armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies

CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

For the German armed forces the following policies apply:

a. MoD Directive for the use of personal data

b. Bilateral Security arrangements for transfer of personal data

Basic principle is, that "special personal data" can only be collected with consent.

BEST PRACTICES

Operational experiences with ISAF show, that the use of biometrics proofed to be useful especially for access control, force protection and to identify suspects of criminal activities against ISAF, the afghan authorities and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

German soldiers responsible for the collection of biometric data were trained with regard to the specific equipment and with a view to the adherence of the legal restrictions which apply for that task.

NATIONAL CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS (PIRACY)

The use of biometrics in operations must conform to the following legal frameworks:

a. Resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations applicable for the respective operations.

b. Law of armed conflict.

c. German constitutional law.

d. National legislation on the use of personal data (e.g. Data Proctection Act)

e. Parliamentary Mandate for the deployment of German armed forces for the respective operation.

Other governmental directives on the collection and use of biometric data.

Germany participates fully in the "ISAF Biometrics Plan". In order to ensure conformance with national legislation and regulations, the German Armed Forces signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US Department of Defence. This MoU details procedures of storage and use of biometric data collected with ISAF.
Biometric data can only be collected or used for the purposes of ISAF. Any other use (e.g. for national prosecution purposes) is forbidden.

ITALY (ITA)

NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

Biometrics refers to methods devoted to the recognition of the identity of a person, using his physiological (a physical attribute unique to a person) or behaviour (traits which are learnt from a person). Physiological characteristics are fingerprints, iris, DNA, face, voice or retina, and could be used for controlling the access to some restricted areas (force protection), or for forensic purposes (corpse identification, criminal investigation, terrorist identification, etc.). However, being specific biometrics data linked with sensitive information about a person (such as race, gender, etc.), the legal concerns related to their collection and storage have to been taken into consideration

CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

Italy is a member of several organizations that influence the Country's treatments of privacy and personal data. Consequently, together with the national legislation, all biometric data collection is conducted in accordance with the International Law, including Human Rights Law, as well as the directives and conventions issued by the European Union, as the European Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

Referring to the national legislation, the "Privacy Code" relating to the protection of personal data, which was enacted by a Legislative Decree, fully implements the EU Data Protection Directive. This Code is enforced by the Data Protection Authority ("Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali", also "Authority"), who releases guidelines regarding this matter.

The Code has to be applied in case of processing operations carried out by public bodies for purposes of defence or relating to State, and it covers also the case in which personal data, if authorized by the Authority, may be transferred from the State's territory to countries outside the European Union. Accordingly, personal data can be shared if the transfer is necessary for:

a. Carrying out the investigations purposes;

b. Safeguarding a substantial public interest.

It is also clearly defined when this transfer is prohibited, i.e. if the laws of the country of destination or transit of the data do not ensure an adequate level of protection of individuals.

CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

In accordance with what aforementioned, biometric data can be shared within the coalition, also with not-EU Countries, on a case by case basis and, anyhow, in accordance with the International Laws (particularly the Human's Rights Law), the national legislation and with specific Memorandum of Understanding / Technical Agreements.

For Force Protection purposes, when established by agreements with the Host Nation, the Italian legislation is applicable within the Italian compound, and therefore, to the Italian personnel (military and civilian) deployed. Said that, and as clarified in some directives issued by the Authority, the admittance in some restricted areas, can be allowed based on biometric fingerprint recognition.

With regards to the locals, also the ones who are employed within the compound, they are subject to the Host Nation legislation. However, if specific directives are not established, in order to identify the employees, the collection and employment of biometric data (as the ones derived from digitally recorded fingerprints) is allowed in a consensual manner only

BEST PRACTICES

- NIL -

NATIONAL CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS (PIRACY)

The collecting and sharing of biometric information occur within the framework previously mentioned.

UNITED KINGDOM (GBR)

NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

The very rapid development of capabilities across partner nations has lead to a plethora of related terminology and definitions in the sphere of biometrics; a degree of ambiguity exists between the precise scope of each, in order to avoid confusion, clarification of UK Military understanding has been written into draft doctrine:

- The term biometric relates to measurable physical characteristics or personal behavioural traits that are unique to individuals; commonly used modalities are fingerprints, facial structure, iris and DNA.
- The activity biometrics is the deliberate, often automated, use of these characteristics to identify individuals, typically for the purpose of security and intelligence.

CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

In addition to the traditional legal framework within which military operations are conducted, biometrics occur within the scope of UK laws which regulate collection, processing, storage and sharing of personal data. Notably the Data Protection Act 1998 which is the UK's implementation of the European Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

Each time biometrics is utilised operationally, clear ROE will be produced to identify which elements may be employed, by whom, under what circumstances and any legal constraints that are additionally placed on collection, storage and sharing.

CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

The UK policy on employing biometrics in a Defence context remains classified.

BEST PRACTICES

Best practices developed through the ISAF use of biometrics in Afghanistan identifies the need to produce clear MOUs between participants at the start of an operation to address the procedures by which the participants may collect and share biometric data for operational purposes. Such MOUs will acknowledge the absolute requirement for participant nations to abide by their respective national laws.

The UK works with its ABCA partners to develop builds consensus on the use of internationally recognized technology standards, as well as addresses doctrine and policy impacts which are crucial first steps towards achieving and advancing coalition interoperability. Report 138 "Biometrics Interoperability – Systems, Standards and Architectures"; promulgated on 3 Feb 2012 is an example of best practice.

NATIONAL CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS (PIRACY)

The UK policy on employing biometrics in a Defence context remains classified.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING/DEFINITION

According to Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*:

a. A biometric is defined as: *a measurable physical characteristic or personal behavior trait used to recognize the identity or verify the claimed identity of an individual.*

b. The definition of biometrics is: *the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological and behavioral characteristics*.

The Department of Defense Directive for Biometrics (DoDD 8521.01E) defines biometrics as a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic or a process. As a characteristic: *a measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition*. As a process: *automated methods of recognizing an individual based on measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics*.

CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN USING BIOMETRICS

Together with national legislation, all biometric data collection is conducted in accordance with International Law, including Human Rights Law. In the case of armed conflict, the Law on Armed Conflict / Law of War apply. The most significant are the Geneva Conventions, of which the United States is a member. Department of Defense Directive 2300.01E, "DoD Law of War Program," requires all DoD components to comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts.

The Law of War is defined as: that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the "law of armed conflict." The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.

CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES ON THE USE OF BIOMETRICS

Department of Defense Directive 8521.01E, "DoDD for Biometrics," is the leading national defense policy regarding the use of biometrics. "The Capstone Concept of Operations for DoD Biometrics in Support of Identity Superiority" is also current national defense policy on the use of biometrics. There are various national and DoD-level policies guiding the ability to share biometrics with coalition and international partners.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo titled, "Sharing of Biometric Data and Associated Information from Non-U.S. Persons with Coalition Forces and Allies," signed January 10, 2007, allows the Department of Defense and services to share biometric data. The inclusion of NATO

in the Afghanistan coalition allows the sharing of biometric data and associated information with NATO members.

National Security Presidential Directive -59 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive -24 (NSPD-58/HSPD-24) included directions for the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the DNI, to coordinate the sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information with foreign partners in accordance with applicable law, including international obligations undertaken by the United States.

BEST PRACTICES

MOU developed between AUS, CAN, UK, USA and NLD in 2009 to address the procedures by which the participants may collect and share biometric data for operational purposes. However, participants were still required to abide by their respective national laws.

NATIONAL CAVEATS AND CONSTRAINS IN COLLECTING, USING AND SHARING BIOMETRIC INFORMATION DURING OPERATIONS AND IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS (PIRACY)

The United States has few caveats and constraints when collecting, using and sharing unclassified biometric information during operations and in international waters, as long as the biometrics DO NOT belong to a U.S. person. The Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo titled, "Sharing of Biometric Data and Associated Information from Non-U.S. Persons with Coalition Forces and Allies," signed January 10, 2007, allows the Department of Defense and services to share biometric data. The inclusion of NATO in the Afghanistan coalition allows the sharing of biometric data and associated information with NATO members. NSPD-59 / HSPD-24 included directions for the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the DNI, to coordinate the sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information with foreign partners in accordance with applicable law, including international obligations undertaken by the United States.

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.11

NATIONAL POSITIONS ABOUT PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

Version 1.1
07 November 2013

Prepared by: Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Executive Secretariat (ES)
Document Custodian: Operations Support (Ops Sup) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT

During the November 2013 MIC Principals and Strategic Planning Session Meeting, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	MIC ES
Version 1.1	12 September 2013	Ops Sup MIWG

Summary of Changes:

In Version 1.1 CBG Volume III.11 has undergone annual review resulting in minor amendments for Australia and major changes for United Kingdom. Other nations remain extant.

Review Cycle:

Annual

Distribution:

Unlimited distribution; electronic copy of publication can be found on the MIC All Partners Access Network (APAN) website at https://community.apan.org/mic/

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AUSTRALIA (AUS)

DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) / PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

The terms Private Military Firms (PMF)/Private Security Companies (PSC) do not have a legal definition in Australia (AUS). AUS is a strong supporter of the *Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict* (the Montreux Document) which clarifies existing international legal obligations relevant to States, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and their personnel during armed conflict and suggests good practices to assist States fulfil their obligations.

AUS is content to use the term 'PMSCs' and the definition in the Preface of the Montreux Document at sub-para 9(a) for the purpose of developing both national and any coalition policy and doctrine.

PMSCs are *'private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel*.'

Reference/Supporting Documents

Montreux Document On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices For States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, Montreux, 17 September 2008 (Montreux Document).

NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

The Australian Defence Forces' (ADF) utilisation of PMSCs relates to 'security' rather than 'military' services. Any proposal to use a PMSC would be considered on a case by case basis. PMSCs have made a valuable contribution to the delivery of AUS objectives both within AUS and in offshore area of operations, relieving ADF personnel to perform higher priority security tasks. AS will only engage contractors (including PMSCs) to carry out activities where the legal and operational risk is such that an ADF Commander is able to effectively fulfil AUS' international and domestic legal obligations. Where a security service can be outsourced, AUS will use all means appropriate (contractual, legislative and/or policy) to supervise the PMSC's conduct so as to ensure that AUS complies with its international and domestic legal obligations with respect to that State function. Where PMSCs are authorised to bear arms and use force in the execution of their duties, it would only be for a lawful purpose such as self-defense.

Reference/Supporting Documents

a. Australian Defence Force Publication 4.2.1 *Civilians in Support of ADF Operations* (ADFP 4.2.1)

b. Defence Instruction (General) Operations 5-3 *Civilians in Support of ADF Operations* (DI(G) Ops 5-3)

NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

Selection of a security service follows a robust ADF decision methodology, set out in doctrine, which requires an appraisal of alternative viable source options (including use of the ADF) and a risk assessment for each. If the decision methodology indicates that use of PMSCs as a source is a viable option (including that its use would be consistent with AUS international and domestic legal obligations), the decision on whether to use a PMSC is ultimately determined by an analysis of each viable source solution.

Reference/Supporting Documents

a. DI(G) Ops 5-3;
b. Montreux Document.

NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

A variety of national regulatory regimes are relevant to actually engaging a PMSC. Some of these are imposed by domestic criminal law, financial management and occupational health and safety. Other internal Defence policy requirements are set out in financial instructions, purchasing guidelines, security manuals and doctrine on the use of civilian support to ADF operations. AUS will also take into consideration the selection criteria good practices in the Montreux Document. In addition, Australia considers whether a PMSC is a member of an association with membership requirements (eg a comprehensive membership criteria and charter) that are consistent with AUS' international obligations.

Reference/Supporting Documents

a. Criminal Code 1995; Crimes (Torture) Act 1988; The Crimes (Overseas) Act 1964; Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988; Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997; Work Health and Safety Act 2011;
b. Chief Executive Instructions - Finance; Defence Purchasing Guidelines 402; Defence Security Manual; Defence Safety Manual; ADPF 4.2.1;

CONTRACTED TASKS

AUS policy views civilian support as integral to military operations. AUS may utilise PMSCs for a range of security services in support of operations (within the bounds of AUS international and domestic legal obligations and national policy requirements). Such tasks may include: training; monitoring; demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration; security sector reform; force protection and close protection tasks.

However, AUS will only engage contractors (including PMSCs) to carry out activities where the legal and operational risk is such that an ADF Commander is able to effectively fulfil AUS' international and domestic legal obligations and national policy requirements.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTORS AND THE MILITARY

AUS may exercise national criminal jurisdiction over PMSCs in certain circumstances, either through the nationality principle under relevant domestic legislation which applies extra-territorially, or through the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (DFDA). The DFDA provides limited jurisdiction over those contracted personnel who agree to be 'Defence Civilians'. Defence Civilians must comply with lawful directions given to them by their ADF supervisors. Most PMSC employees will not be Defence Civilians as it is neither practicable nor appropriate that they are in most cases..

The *Crimes (Overseas) Act 1964* provides AUS with criminal jurisdiction over Australian citizens or permanent residents who are working on behalf or under the direction of Australia in a foreign country that is a 'declared' foreign country (eg. Iraq or Afghanistan). That Act also provides AUS with criminal jurisdiction over Australian citizens or permanent residents working for PMSCs in a foreign country where the person is immune or exempt from criminal proceedings in that country by virtue of certain international agreements or arrangements.

The supervision of most PMSCs will occur via contractual means. Accordingly, PMSCs would be accountable to the ADF with the ADF contract manager having immediate oversight of actions. Allegations of breaches of IHL or IHRL would be reported to the appropriate AUS investigative authority and, if appropriate, the authorities of the host nation.

COORDINATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

Given the risk of damage to AUS's reputation should a PMSC violate national or international law, a PMSC contract would normally be approved by the Commander Joint Operations or higher. AUS has standard clauses in contracts to ensure that PMSCs are managed/controlled adequately. The ADF ensures that contractual provisions are consistent with AUS' international and domestic legal obligations and the Montreux Document. A contract manager has overall oversight for managing the contract but an on-site ADF member would be given direct responsibility for liaising with and coordinating the activities of the PMSC as provided for in the contract.

NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/FSC

The <u>main risks</u> with employing PMSCs are:

a. Competence to undertake assigned tasks professionally;

b. Capacity to perform the requirements of the contract for the duration of the contract;

c. Adaptability to escalated security environment;

d. Inability of ADF to command PMSCs and the risks this creates for ADF personnel;

e. Ability of civilians to adapt a military culture and environment; and

f. Use of PMSC is sensitive and can impact on international relations and on Parliamentary and public opinion. The reputation of the PMSC and its previous record may be unknown at the time of hiring.

g. The perception that PMSCs are legally unaccountable and can act with impunity in foreign countries.

h. The perception that PMSCs are motivated by monetary gain instead of national interests.

Benefits:
Allows scope for ADF personnel to undertake priority security tasks.

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CANADA (CAN)

DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) / PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

Canada does not use the term PMF/PSC. There is currently no approved Canadian policy on the use of private military contractors for security operations.

NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

There is currently no approved Canadian policy.

NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

There is currently no approved Canadian policy on the use of private military contractors for security operations.

NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

There is currently no approved Canadian policy.

CONTRACTED TASKS

There is currently no approved Canadian policy.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTORS AND THE MILITARY

There is currently no approved Canadian policy.

COORDINATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

There is currently no approved Canadian policy.

NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/FSC

There is currently no approved Canadian policy on the use of private military contractors for security operations.

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FRANCE (FRA)

DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) / PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

The term Private Military Firms does not cover any legal notion in France. The definition for Private Military Companies can be used for the purpose of research and can be formulated as: '*Private Military Firms are private businesses that provide services in the defence and security arena, for private or public contracting parties. They provide a military know-how. The activities or military missions that are executed by these actors can cover support to peace or post-conflict operations, military logistic training and military advice*.' However, this definition does not address the manner in which French authorities refer to PMF. What is often referred to in France is "Société d'appui stratégique et operational" (SASO): translated as a Company providing strategic and operational support.

NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

The prerogatives of state sovereignty (such as defence, justice, and foreign affairs and policing) cannot be outsourced or delegated to private actors. In this context, the national position on PMF was defined in 2003. The Ministry of Defence initiated several studies in order to assess this sector level of development, and to develop parameters in which these companies can operate, to include a legal framework regulating their conduct. Although, France has identified a number of areas in which it could make use of PMF there are several imperatives principles that France wants to respect. These imperatives are:

a. Respect the state monopoly of the use of legitimate force

b. No direct participation to hostilities

c. Preserve the specific role of the military

d. No outsourcing or subcontracting of an activity which military or political stakes would out weight the economic gains from such externalization

Nonetheless, the French Ministry of Defence has recently engaged into a new reflection that could possibly evolve toward an evolution of the relationship between PMF and the State. It is a question of self-defence only, in the understanding of French law. The French notion is more limited than the Anglo-Saxon understanding of self-defence.

NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

The selection criteria would only concern the hiring of private firms for support and logistic activities.

NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

Consideration for the use of PMF for a mission that does not necessitate the use of force.

The logistical support of any current external operation by PMF does not represent any major difficulty and can be easily conducted. Logistic missions include the activities that support the needs of national armed forces, at a given time and place, in adequate quantity and quality:

a. The necessary sustainment in terms of food, and combat support;

b. Provide proper means to ensure health and medical support to the national forces;

c. The maintenance of equipment. (PIA 04.201 Doctrine du soutien interarmées en opération).

Consideration for a use of PMF with a use of force limited to the strict principle of self defence of persons and equipments, in the sense of French law, within a national or multinational force. For instance, the securing of military bases or the surveillance of installations can be the object of an analysis for externalisation. The French *Marine nationale* already relies on PMF when disembarking in some areas. However, French national forces should be capable of preserving their autonomy. This type of reliance on PMF services necessitates specific coordination and measures of control at various levels of the State.

In a theatre, as a rule, France does not allow any participation in combat operations of contracted firms. This direct participation to combat can be defined as the accomplishment of specific and concrete actions in relation to the conduct of military operations between the parties to an armed conflict.

The status of PMF employees is subjected to the International Humanitarian Law whether it be in a context of international armed conflict or non international armed conflict. In French law, private businesses are responsible for any act executed in their name by their organisations or their representatives. They have to respect French law as well as that of the country they operate in, especially with respect to the carrying and use of weapons and common criminal law.

CONTRACTED TASKS

Direct participation to combat (offensive). Direct participation to combat actions cannot be outsourced to any private actor as it is a state prerogative. Combat actions can only be exercised by the National armed forces.

Support. The logistic support is a field which can be outsourced. These activities include managing properly transportation, supply and catering, support of infrastructures (guarding properties, furniture and infrastructures, in addition to the security provided by the Gendarmerie) and op maintenance of materials for tpt.

Training and monitoring. There is no training nor monitoring activities outsources to non national forces

Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR)/Security Sector Reform (SSR). France can outsource post conflicts activities: Security System Reform, demining (land and sea with permanent control to avoid traffic of sensitive materials), de-pollution, quality control. But these tasks are not necessarily "military" in nature.

Force Protection, Close Protection. Force protection which usually includes infrastructure security (base security) is the sole responsibility of national armed forces. A force protection outside the realm of fixed based security is also sole responsibility of national armed forces.

Others. The private sector cannot challenge the state monopole of the use of legitimate force. Therefore, activities such as command and control, combat and security missions, intelligence and counter-intelligence cannot be outsourced.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTORS AND THE MILITARY

There is a control of results by the commander but no command relationship. The national armed forces do not exercise any military or political control. The relation over PMF is one that is characterised by a client/furnisher type relationship. Armed forces ensure PMF is fulfilling its contract correctly, they are the oversight. The commander of an operation is responsible for everything pertaining to that operation and that include the service provided by the PMF and which the French Ministry of Defence would be paying for.

COORDINATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

The French relationship to PMF has not yet needed the construction of a legal framework or the instauration of a global control of the activities of these actors. Such framework and control would be inappropriate or disproportionate with regard to the phenomenon it would try to regulate.

NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/FSC

At national level, the utility of PMF is not denied and the French Ministry of Defence has engaged into a restructuring that could involve an increased reliance upon externalisation via these private actors and that includes their possible use in theatres of operations. The outsourcing of services in theatre concerns mainly operational and logistic support when security conditions on the ground allow it.

Pros:

a. These advantages are **political**, and linked to the reluctance in deploying national forces into low intensity conflicts with no identified or real strategic interests; externalisation allows a diversification in the means of states intervention, an enhanced administrative and political leeway. The financing of PMF being easier in this regard than the deployment of troops. Finally there is the possibility of disengaging military capacities more easily in order to diminish the national visibility.

b. The **operational** gains are to provide additional capacities to national forces in terms of support whenever national forces are involved in high intensity operations with heavy demands in capacities. Subcontracting for activities others than support can be considered on a case by case basis. PMF can also support national forces in their post conflict responsibilities in security systems reforms (SSR) and reconstruction.

Cons:

a. The **political** risks linked to the amalgam that can be made between national military forces and Private military firm employees. In these cases, the political message that is being conveyed by the states involved in the operation can be blurred as the population witnessing the interventions will not differentiate the national forces from the private ones.

b. A conflict of interests may arise between the objectives of the contracting states and companies. Even more so when contracts lack precision and allow an interpretation of the terms of the document.

c. The **juridicial** risks that derives from the loophole with regard to the use of force by private actors. Their lack of adherence to international as well as national law could involve the responsibility of the state.

d. The **Economic** risks in the long term as opposed to short term gains. The complementary nature of PMF (as a support to French armies), the extra-cost generated by their execution of a risky mission, transactions associated with externalisation procedures lead French authorities to reserve judgment on the economic gains.

e. And finally the risks in terms of **human resources** as far as the reliance on PMF could lead to a loss of expertise, knowledge and know-how. In addition, the private sector which often proposes higher wages could have a negative impact on the motivation of national forces operating with PMF employees on theatres. PMF could in the long term drain the armies from their most experienced and qualifies personnel

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GERMANY (DEU)

DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) / PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

Germany does no use any of the terms PMF/PSC in the context of operations of the armed forces, since the contracted service are all of a civil nature. Therefore, Germany refers to the respective companies as 'contractors'.

Reference/Supporting Documents

Answers of the Federal Government to question raised by parliament 15/5824, 16/1296, 16/9190.

NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

Contractors can be used for non-governmental key tasks. Governmental executive tasks which require coercive measure cannot be contracted. Due to the fact, that there is no definition of governmental (and military) key tasks, each contract will be negotiated on a case by case basis. Current contracts are limited to logistic services (including guard services). Examples are: Provision of food, Provision of fuel, Transport of goods, mail, personnel, Maintenance, Building, Waste disposal, Cleaning of vehicles, clothes and fabrics, Telecommunication services.

NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

The legally defined national and european selection criteria are employed. Due to its complex nature, no details are provided here. The contracting agency for the armed forces is the 'Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement".

NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

See national Position on PMF/PSC above.

CONTRACTED TASKS

Direct participation to conflict: Cannot be contracted.

Support: Yes, See national Position on PMF/PSC above.

Training and monitoring: Partially, depending on the service. Possible for example, for training and monitoring of newly employed weapon systems.

Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR)/Security Sector Reform (SSR): No, currently not used.

Force Protection / Close Protection: Camp protection partially, depending on situation, Force/Close Protection no.

Relationship between Contractors and the Military

The relationship is defined by the individual contract and depends on the contracted service.

Coordinating Oversight Mechanisms

The German MoD defines and coordinates on the strategic level the need for civil services. The German operational headquarter defines requirements and the joint support command transforms them in statements of work. The Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement will then initiate the bidding process and negotiate the contracts.

National Pros and Cons to Employing PMF/FSC

Pros. Externalisation allows a concentration to military key tasks and is therefore economically advantageous. It provides more flexibility for the deployment of troops into theatre due to the parliamentary approved national ceiling in theatre.

Cons. The reliance to externalisation in logistic area could possibly lead to dependence to contractors and his will and ability to fulfil the contract in a difficult environment. In an early phase of a conflict or in a degrading security situation it may be necessary, to provide a military "backup" for the contracted services in order guarantee the fulfilment of the necessary requirements of the armed forces.

ITALY (ITA)

DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) / PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

The terms Private Military Firms (PMFs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) are not officially defined in the Italian doctrine or in the national legislation.

At international level, however, the "Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices of States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict", agreed on 17 September 2008, and endorsed by Italy in 2009, provides a general definition of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs):

"*Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are private business entities that provide military and/or security services, irrespective of how they describe themselves. Military and security services include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel*".

Although the document is not binding, Nations are expected to comply with the obligations set up by it. However by such definition it can be understood that; the services provided by these companies envisage the use of weapons by the employed personnel and it seems that definition does not include contractors providing logistics support.

Reference/Supporting Documents

Montreux Document, 17 September 2008.

NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

In accordance with the current Italian legal framework, military activities, including logistics support, are considered to be exclusive State duties, therefore it doesn't provide for outsourcing or delegation to private actor.

Reference/Supporting Documents

Italian Constitution; National law of November 14th, n. 331 concerning the establishment of the professional military service.

NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

There are not specific national laws on the subject matter. As consequence: any assessment on possible relationships with PMFs/PSCs; selection, control and accreditation criteria; and/or the terms of their employment; are unavoidably postponed to future laws regulating this matter. In Italy there are not dedicated bodies responsible to regulate such PMFs/PSCs, neither official norm provide a specific regulation for PMFs/PSCs. However, the Italian agreement to the Montreux Document, which considers the use of private contractors as an undeniable aspect of modern warfare, underlines the national awareness that the phenomenon of PMFs is a significant presence, which is likely to increase. Accordingly, any possible coordination with

such companies, when hired by a third State, would be analysed and taken into account on a case-by-case basis. That said, the services provided as well as the relationship between the PMFs and the beneficiary of its activities. In developing this assessment, it has to be taken into account what already mentioned, i.e. that imperatives principles have to be complied with:

a. The activities carried out by these companies have to grant the compliance with International Humanitarian and Human Rights Laws;

b. The "use of legitimate force" concept can be applied to Armed Forces only, therefore these companies cannot be involved in any military activities;

c. Their Rules of Engagement/Code of Conduct have to be clearly defined;

d. Their own role, which have to been agreed by the Host Nation or, in specific circumstances, by the Lead Nation within the Coalition, have to be clearly defined;

e. They have to grant that their employers are clearly identifiable through the use of uniforms and/or badges, in order to avoid the "blue fire".

NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

In addition to what previously said, the approach is to tolerate those companies which provide logistical support in post-conflict situations, and which perform their duties within the Host Nation legal framework a well as the International and the Human Rights Laws (through dedicated TAs), as highlighted into the Montreux Document.

CONTRACTED TASKS

The lack of rules does not allow any definition of the services that could be contracted. To conclude, it has to be clear that military activities can be conducted only by national Armed Forces (including National Reserve) as authorized by Italian Parliament and Italian Private Security Companies can operate only within domestic boundaries.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTORS AND THE MILITARY

In accordance with that previously explained, ITA does not foresee any direct relationship.

COORDINATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

See relationship between Contractors and the Military above.

NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/FSC

At national level such possibility has not taken into consideration. However regarding the outsourcing of services mainly related to the logistics support of forces, there are clearly operational advantages due to the possibility to free military assets from supporting duties.

UNITED KINGDOM (GBR)

DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) / PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

Introduction

In 2008 the UK (and 37 other countries) signed The Montreux Document (Reference A), the product of an initiative by the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The document sets out the existing international legal obligations of States regarding private military and security companies during armed conflict. In summary, States contracting with PSCs (such as the UK) have an obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law by the PSCs they contract with, in particular to ensure that PSC and their personnel are aware of their obligations under international law and are trained accordingly; not encourage or assist in, and take appropriate measures to prevent any violations of international humanitarian law by PSCs and their personnel; and to take measures to suppress violations of international humanitarian law committed by the personnel of PSCs through appropriate means.

As set out in the Montreux Document, contracting states such as the UK retain their obligations under international law, even if they contract PSCs to carry out certain activities that may otherwise have been carried out by military personnel, for example, force protection. What the UK cannot do is contract a PSC to carry out an activity that international humanitarian law explicitly assigns to a State agent or authority (e.g. exercising the power of the responsible officer over a detention facility). PSCs are not able to become formal signatories of the Montreux Document, but they are able to express their commitment to the principles and practices set out in the document.[1] Both PSCs directly contracted by MOD and those sub-contracted by MOD contractors must be made aware of the obligations set out in the Montreux Document and must provide a written assurance that the PSC and its personnel will adhere to its contents[2].

PSC Categories

For the purposes of UK nomenclature, the term PSC means all companies engaged in security, defence and military related services including the provision of security related support and training wherever they are registered or based and their subcontractors both in the UK and overseas.

The UK MOD recognises three main categories within the Private Security Sector, MOD does not contract, or allow sub-contracts, with companies that sell, or have previously sold category C services:

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[1] A|D|S Group and the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) have already expressed their support for The Montreux Document

[2] This should be requested of existing MOD contractors who sub-contract PSCs, although it cannot be contractually enforced, and is a requirement for new contracts and contract renewals.

a. Category A - Risk Consultancy/Un-armed Defensive Services[3]. Predominantly concerned with minimising the operational risk to clients operating overseas. In delivering these services, companies use a number of tools and techniques including country analysis, intelligence, training and incident response. This category has developed security and justice sector capabilities in order to compete for stabilisation contracts, including the development of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, security reviews and audits, and training and awareness (capacity building). This category may also include mine clearance.

b. Category B - Armed Defensive Services. This category comprises PSCs who provide armed defensive security services. Weapons aside, these companies differ little from the security companies working solely in the UK and predominantly focus on the delivery of protection for personnel and assets worldwide, for governmental and commercial organizations. These companies may also deliver training packages for clients and prospective PSC employees. Example services include[4]:

1. Industrial/commercial site protection,
2. Convoy protection,
3. Humanitarian aid protection,
4. Embassy/mission protection,
5. VIP/close protection,
6. Surveillance and investigation.

c. Category C - Armed Offensive Services. This category may be termed Private Military Companies and includes those companies prepared to take on contracts which could have an impact on the security and political environment of the state through violent force. Potentially deployed as force multipliers, PSC personnel conducting offensive operations could be considered mercenaries. Most British PSCs would not entertain commercial proposals of this nature.

PSC policy, and the process for contracting, must be applied to all companies that fall under the definitions above. The UK MOD does not contract, or allow MOD Contractors to sub-contract, for Armed Offensive Services or with companies that sell, or have previously sold, these services. In reality, companies rarely fit cleanly into one of the categories identified, and there is likely to be some cross over - particularly between categories A and B. For example, a company which focuses primarily on security risk (Category A), may also offer close protection services as part of a solution; whilst a company that has traditionally focused on delivering defensive guarding may also provide security consultancy or even de-mining services.

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[3] Contracts, or sub-contracts, with unarmed PSC will be considered under this policy rather than JSP 567 Part II, (CONDO), due to the sensitive nature of the industry.

[4] Proposals that would require the use of armed PSCs to protect UK Forces on operations are not considered the norm and will need to be accompanied by a strong statement of need.

When managing or monitoring contracts personnel should be alert to the possibility that national laws may allow the carriage of personal weapons. Where this scenario is considered likely, the contract must clearly state acceptable and unacceptable behaviours of MOD contractor personnel.

References:

a. The Montreux Document: on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict, International Committee of the Red Cross (17 September 2008).

b. Military Interaction with Private Military and Security Companies, Joint Doctrine Note 1/08 (January 2008).

c. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers – 8 Nov 2010[5]

d. JSP 567: Contractor Support to Operations (CSO): Policy Overview: 4th Edition.

NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

The UK MOD does not contract, or allow MOD Contractors to sub-contract, for Armed Offensive Services or with companies that sell, or have previously sold, these services.

The services PSCs provide will evolve to meet market opportunities, therefore the categories identified above will be reviewed periodically by UK MOD Director Operational Policy (D Op Pol). D Op Pol retains overall responsibility for developing PSC policy and is supported in this task by a 2-star committee who will represent the wider views of the department. Any proposal to contract with a PSC contractor must be considered and approved on a case by case basis.

NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

When considering contracting out any task, it is important that a full appraisal is undertaken; including a VFM assessment. This must include a risk assessment (with a mitigation strategy), an appraisal of alternative options (which must include using UK AF capability), and a clear statement of the penalties and risks of each solution. When considering proposals to contract directly with a PSC there are a number of additional criteria that must be examined and reflected in submissions to Ministers:

[5] This Code, launched in Nov 2010, is the result of an inclusive, transparent multi-stakeholder initiative launched by industry associations, corporations and individual business leaders with the assistance of the Swiss Government and in consultation with the UK and US Governments as well as other stakeholders and relevant experts.

a. Legal Status. Is the legal status of the contractor and its staff within the country in which they will be operating clear?

b. Accountability. Are there sufficient legal and administrative checks in place to ensure accountability?

c. Coordination. PSCs engaged on operations in support of a military force must have a clear method of coordinating activity with the LMC.

d. Rules on the use of force (RUF). Where a PSC and his personnel are to be employed in any security role, Rules on the use of Force (RUF) must be agreed with the PSC and the MOD contractor and clearly stated in the contract.

e. Operational Situation. Local security conditions must be taken into account when developing contract parameters. In order to determine the impact that a changed security situation will have on the viability of the contract, a sensitivity analysis must be undertaken. This process will seek to identify possible drivers of change, the likelihood of these materialising and determine the impact to the contract should they occur. The findings of this exercise must be considered within any VFM assessment.

f. Wider Issues. Are there any reputation, security co-operation, political or presentational issues that would prohibit the contracting out of the task?

g. Capacity and Capability. Could contracting out the task have a longer term impact on the ability to generate internal capability in the numbers required?

h. Benefit Realisation. Contract Sponsors should consider the possibility that future potential benefits might be negated if a PSC was to conduct a task in lieu of the military.

i. Recruitment and Retention. Could contracting out a task encourage a buoyant market for which serving MOD personnel could be recruited?

j. Security & Vetting. Have all the security considerations been considered?

k. Reliability. As security risks change, PSCs (or their staff) may become unwilling or unable to fulfil their contractual obligations.

l. Behavioural Norms and Culture. In some cases the cultural norms of a PSC could have a counterproductive effect on HMG aims, and make for challenging relationships with the AF.

m. Contract Development, Transparency and Scrutiny. As with any other contract, consideration needs to be given to monitoring contract delivery. This is of particular importance when contracting for a task previously undertaken by the AF.

n. Pre-Deployment Training. Consideration needs to be given to the standard of training, covering such subjects as International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights, cultural and situation awareness, the right to use force in self-defence and local legislation. This training is in addition to role specific training.

o. Life Support. When employed on contracts overseas, consideration needs to be given to the life support arrangements of contractor personnel. These could include food services, medical and dental, insurance, training (including safety and security) and discipline. Costs, where they would fall to the MOD, are to be included in VFM assessments and where appropriate reclaimed from the contractor. Where the nature of the contract requires contractor personnel to be armed, then the relative responsibilities for force protection need to be clearly articulated within the contract.

p. Force Protection. Good liaison with Armed Forces personnel in theatre will be essential in enabling military commanders to give due consideration to any additional force protection requirements.

NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

Legal Status. When contracting for armed services, Contract Sponsors (CS) must have a full appreciation of the legal position of the contractor and their personnel in the host country, and for the task they are being contracted to undertake. This assessment must take account of any host nation legislation or guidance and any other agreements that may be in place between the Territorial State and the Contracting State addressing jurisdiction. In addition, consideration must be given to whether the contractor's staffs are to be subject to UK service law. Under the UK Armed Forces Act 2006 certain civilians working alongside the military may be designated as being subject to service discipline.[6] It will be important to consider any existing MOU or SOFA and discuss whether PSC personnel are eligible for inclusion in these documents.

CONTRACTED TASKS

The UK will only contract for types of work contained within 2 categories:

Category A - Risk Consultancy/Un-armed Defensive Services[7]. Predominantly concerned with minimising the operational risk to clients operating overseas. In delivering these services, companies use a number of tools and techniques including country analysis, intelligence, training and incident response. This category has developed security and justice sector capabilities in order to compete for stabilisation contracts, including the development of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, security reviews and

[6] Armed Forces Act 2006, Schedule 15, Para 7. . This act is applicable to UK nationals and to any person of another TCN when he is in a country of which he is not a national or in which he is not ordinarily resident

[7] Contracts, or sub-contracts, with unarmed PSC will be considered under this policy rather than JSP 567 Part II, (CONDO), due to the sensitive nature of the industry.

audits, and training and awareness (capacity building). This category may also include mine clearance.

Category B - Armed Defensive Services. This category comprises PSCs who provide armed defensive security services. Weapons aside, these companies differ little from the security companies working solely in the UK and predominantly focus on the delivery of protection for personnel and assets worldwide, for governmental and commercial organizations. These companies may also deliver training packages for clients and prospective PSC employees. Example services include[6]:Industrial/commercial site protection; Convoy protection; Humanitarian aid protection; Embassy/mission protection; VIP/close protection; Surveillance and investigation.

COORDINATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

In the UK, the process for approving the use of PSCs either directly or by contractors is managed through a 2-Star Committee. The committee considers all types of proposals for use of PSCs (e.g. static guarding of unmanned facilities, pre-deployment training for military personnel, convoy protection). Any proposal to contract with a PSC contractor is considered and approved on a case by case basis.

[6] Proposals that would require the use of armed PSCs to protect UK Forces on operations are not considered the norm and will need to be accompanied by a strong statement of need.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

DEFINITION OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM (PMF) / PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES (PSC)

The terms 'Private Military Firm' and 'Private Security Contractor' are not formally recognized. The generally recognized term is "Private Security Companies."

a. In US Statutes, the term is **Contractors Performing Private Security Functions**. The statutory guidance is very specific on duties and responsibilities for the contractors and the military commands seeking to employ them.

b. The Department of Defense defines Private Security Contractors (PSC) as '*a company employed by the Department of Defense, performing private security functions under a covered contract. In a designated area of combat operations, the term 'PSC' expands to include all companies employed by U.S.G. agencies performing private security functions under a covered contract. Contractors performing private security functions are not authorized to perform inherently governmental functions. In this regard, they are limited to a defensive response to hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent.*' DOD guidance is very specific when it comes to contractor duties and responsibilities for the qualifications, training and utilization of contractor personnel and the duties and responsibilities of the military commands seeking to employ them.

In common parlance, the term "Private Security Contractors" is used to specifically differentiate armed from unarmed contractors but this is not an officially recognized term.

Reference/Supporting Documents

a. United States Code: 10 U.S.C. 2302, section 861.

b. DoD Instruction 3020.50, "Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations"

NATIONAL POSITION ON PMF/PSC

The US is prepared to contract with Private Security Companies for the provision of "security" services. Very specific guidance on contract requirements, contract supervision and standards governing contractor qualifications and conduct, including adherence to the Rules for the Use of Force, are required by law to be written into the contract.

Reference/Supporting Documents

a. United States Code: 10 U.S.C. 2302, section 861.

b. DoD Instruction 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations*

NATIONAL SELECTION CRITERIA FOR PMF/PSC

There are no nationality restrictions on the employment of Private Security Contractors. Various national statutes as implemented in US Government acquisition regulations specify the requirements that contractors must meet before they can be awarded a contract and they must maintain in order to keep the contract.

Reference/Supporting Documents

a. United States Code: 10 U.S.C. 2302, section 861.

b. DoD Instruction 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations*

NATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EMPLOYING PMF/PSC

In the absence of a treaty or Status of Forces agreement indicating otherwise, PSCs must comply with the licensing and other legal requirements of the host nation. There are also US statutes that impose criminal and civil liability on individual Department of Defense contractors for certain forms of personal misconduct. Actual legal status and requirements are usually spelled out in the contract between the US Government and the PSC.

Reference/Supporting Documents

a. Criminal liability is generally under Section 552, Clarification of Application of Uniform Code of

b. Military Justice During a Time of War, of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007

CONTRACTED TASKS

PSC's are barred by law from direct participation in the conduct of combat operations. Their normal duties include: providing training for foreign security forces, security support functions (such as static security to protect military bases, housing areas, reconstruction work sites, etc), personal security and protection, convoy security and provide security for internment operations.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTORS AND THE MILITARY

There is no command relationship between the military and the contractor. The terms of the contract determine the extent of the military's control over the activities of each contractor. The US uses standard clauses in contracts to ensure that PMSCs are managed/controlled adequately. A contracting officer representative manages the contract on a daily basis. Specific contract language can be crafted to ensure that the PSC is responsive to changes in the overall military situation.

COORDINATING OVERSIGHT MECHANISMS

Each contract has mandated specific contract language that provide for the close supervision and oversight of the activities of PSC. This mandated language will be supplemented by the theatre combatant commander and, as appropriate, subordinate commanders who will establish additional specific guidance for the employment of PSCs in their area of responsibility. The contracting officer and contracting officer representative are responsible for the close supervision of the PSC's activities in support of the contract.

NATIONAL PROS AND CONS TO EMPLOYING PMF/FSC

There are no established national pros and cons to the employment of PSCs. US statutes, as implemented by Department of Defense regulatory guidance, have addressed the majority of concerns regarding the management of PSCs. The normal considerations that apply to the employment of any armed contractor would include:

a. Contractor competence and capability to meet the requirements of the contract.

b. Contractor's ability to dynamically react to changes in the military situation.

c. Contractor's ability to work within the military's culture.

d. International perceptions that PSC are mercenaries and subject to legal authority.

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL (MIC)

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.12

COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

Version 1.2
08 January 2015

Prepared by: Operations (Ops) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG)
Document Custodian: Ops MIWG
Document Review: Annually

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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting actions, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
Version 1.0	07 November 2012	Ops MIWG
Version 1.1	07 July 2014	Ops MIWG
Version 1.2	08 January 2015	Ops MIWG

Summary of Changes:

1. Minor formatting and grammar edits
2. Review to institutionalize lessons identified from Afghanistan
3. Updated national data of USA

Review Cycle:

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Distribution:

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CONSIDERATIONS

The evolution of threats in the contemporary operating environment has resulted in considerable change to the conduct of operations by coalition forces. In recent years, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in their various forms has become one of the weapons of choice for insurgencies in operational theatres, as well as representing a global threat. The IED has become a feature of the modern battlefield and is likely to remain a serious challenge in the future. In responding to this challenge, coalitions must remain adaptable and flexible while developing robust and effective Counter-IED (C-IED) policies and procedures. As a result, C-IED activities must be widely understood and integrated within the whole of government / comprehensive approach (CA) and across all levels of command.

The combined joint environment within which C-IED is conducted forms part of the coalition's CA. The IED threat permeates all aspects of the CA, affecting the cohesion of the coalition and the willingness of civil actors including host nation, International Organisations (IO), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and many others supporting the coalition's CA to remain in theatre. At the strategic level it is likely that early withdrawal of such agencies would undermine the CA and necessitate the provision from other sources of the humanitarian and reconstruction support that they provide. When combined with influence activities, IEDs can also have a disproportionate effect on the opinions of locals and amplify the strategic level issues. Therefore, the creation of a secure environment and the provision of education and training are key considerations.

The adaptive IED challenge will remain a threat across the full range of coalition operations. Consequently, integrating C-IED activities and enablers (people and equipment) for defensive (Defeat the Device) and offensive (Attack the Networks) operations require clearly documented and practised staff processes. Stove-piped C-IED expertise and operations have proven unreliable in supporting overall operational objectives and theatre campaign plans working together. Therefore, C-IED operations should and must be fully integrated into the national and coalition force strategic objectives. Designing an operation to defeat the IED threat requires a comprehensive strategy that integrates and synchronizes series of actions and tasks from the tactical to the strategic levels of command and requires interaction with non-military organizations and the populace.

The proliferation of IED use has resulted in a wide range of national, multinational, and coalition activities intended to find ways of addressing the threat. While often effective in developing approaches to deal with the IED threat in its current form, these activities risk duplication of effort and limited visibility between different programmes and projects. Consequently, the need to establish shared awareness of C-IED efforts through better coordination, ideally at the same time avoiding the creation of more network nodes, has been recognised at national and multinational levels. In an attempt

to bring transparency to this issue, each MIC nation identified their engagement to C-IED Initiatives and their respective C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact. The following is a list of ongoing C-IED programmes / initiatives:

a. NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA). Provides overall oversight of C-IED progress and acts as the overall integrator in the provision of NATO military capability acting as the coordinating body for driving forward C-IED packages. Also arranges regular workshops to bring together NATO representatives to take forward C-IED capability.

b. NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). NATO clearing house for C-IED material and equipment, producing a Material Roadmap to integrate individual member states initiatives into a clear and coherent programme, delivering interoperability and sharing best practice.

c. NATO C-IED Task Force. Established by the recognition for the need of a cohesive and coordinated effort throughout NATO organisations, structures, components, and nations. In implementing an agreed C-IED Action Plan, the Task Force (TF) coordinates efforts to validate strategic, operational and tactical requirements and works towards ensuring that the management of technological developments and industrial solutions is conducted through appropriate NATO bodies. It also addresses coherent, mutually reinforcing capability requirements with the European Union (EU).

d. NATO C-IED Action Plan – Revision 1. Agreed on 24 October 2013. NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1 envisages an End State in which NATO has a full understanding of the IED threat, and is properly prepared to conduct activities to minimize the impact of the IED and the networks which employ them. To achieve this it puts in place the process to define, review and update the Alliance's C-IED capability, to institutionalize C-IED in the NATO Command and Force structures and to support nations' efforts to institutionalize C-IED. It does this by examining eight lines of effort: Defence Planning; Concept Development and Standardization; Knowledge Development; Education and Training; Organization; Material and Resources; Co-operation; and Policy. The Annex to the Action Plan provides the detailed tasks required against each of the eight lines of effort to define, develop, and institutionalize C-IED within NATO across the three pillars of Attack the Networks, Defeat the Device and Prepare the Force. Implementation of the revised Action Plan is managed by the C-IED Task Force led by ACT's C-IED IPT.

e. NATO C-IED Procurements Initiative. In support of NATO's C-IED Action Plan this initiative will engage Allies and Partners in a substantive debate to

identify projects that can deliver operational benefits and economies of scale.

f. NATO C-IED Centre of Excellence (CoE). A further focusing of C-IED effort across the Alliance is provided by the NATO-accredited C-IED CoE. One of a number of independent, NATO-accredited CoEs (including the Joint Air Power Competence Centre) whose activities are coordinated by the Transformational Network Branch of Allied Command Transformation, the C-IED CoE offers independent expertise and capacity, complementing and supporting the NATO C-IED TF, Alliance members and partner nations.

g. European Defence Agency (EDA) C-IED Project Team. Established to support its Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities. C-IED is one of the top priorities of the Agency. The agency has established a C-IED Project Team that is taking a holistic approach to all aspects of C-IED in an effort to achieve a systematic and harmonised EU approach to the topic.

h. US Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established in 2006 by the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense to rapidly respond to the IED threat to U.S. forces along three lines of operation: Defeat IED Devices; Attack the Networks that facilitate or employ IEDs, and Train the Force to counter IEDs and attack threat networks. In 2013, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that JIEDDO leverage its capabilities to contribute to the Department of Defense efforts against counter-terrorism, counter-transnational organized crime, counter-weapons of mass destruction and other specified mission areas as well as counter-IED.

AUSTRALIA (AUS)

C-IED INITIATIVES

AUS Existing CIED Initiatives[1]			
	Attack the Network	**Defeat the Device**	**Prepare the Force**
NATO	Spanish sponsorship into NATO CNAD CIED Working Group		
UK	Regular '5 eyes' classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements		
NZL	Regular '5 eyes' classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements		
CAN	Regular '5 eyes' classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements		
USA	Regular '5 eyes' classified Government only symposiums and working group meetings coordinated through the 1* International CIED Steering Committee (ICSC) chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZL Bilateral information exchange agreements Permanently assigned staff within US Joint IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO)		
DEU	Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings		
FRA	Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings		
Other CIED Fora	Regular bilateral information exchange meetings Bilateral information exchange agreements		

[1] Activity IAW ADF CIED International Engagement Plan 2010 and Joint Capability Instruction 07/11, Countering IEDs (Aug 11)

C-IED Governance Structure and Lead Point of Contact

Role	Lead
Defence Proponent	Vice Chief of Defence Force
CIED SRO	Head Joint Capability Coordination Division
CIED 2 Lead	
Lead Point of Contact	Commander ADF CIED TF
Policy	DIR CIED Effects
Doctrine and Concepts	SO1 CIED Doctrine
Structures	SO1 CIED CNS
Operational Requirement – Expeditionary	
Operational Requirements – Domestic	HQ JTF633 DIR CIED
Equipment	HQ JOC
Intelligence	DIR CIED Intelligence
IM/IX and Ops IS	HQJOC
Prepare the Force	Staff Officer Doctrine and Training
Indigenous Force Development	Staff Officer Force Protection
Expeditionary Capacity Building	Dir CIED Capability
Science and Technology	CIEDTF Science Cell
Exploitation	Staff Officer Assessments
Other	Industry Liaison Officer

CANADA (CAN)

C-IED INITIATIVES

CAN Existing CIED Initiatives			
	Attack the Network	**Defeat the Device**	**Prepare the Force**
NATO	Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, CIED Centre of Excellence (Madrid), EOD Centre of Excellence (Slovakia), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) & Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), EOD & CIED WG		
UK	5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee (ICSC), chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN/NZ, ABCANZ EOD WG/HOD		
AUS	See above		
USA	See above, and numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff (e.g. National Ground Intelligence Centre (US Army G2) / JIEDDO) and bespoke conferences (e.g. CENTCOM, USMC, Home Made Explosives, JIEDDO), Countering Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO)		

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT

Role	Lead
Defence Proponent	Chief of Defence Staff
CIED SRO	Commander Canadian Army
CIED 2 Lead	Chief of Staff Land Strategy – Chief of Staff Land Operations
Lead Point of Contact	Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force Operations Officer
Policy	Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
Doctrine and Concepts	Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Command
Structures	Vice Chief of Defence Staff (Director Defence Program Coord)/Directorate Land Force Development
Operational Requirement – Expeditionary	Canadian Joint Operations Command
Operational Requirements – Domestic	Canadian Joint Operations Command
Equipment	Director Land Requirements 9
Intelligence	Canadian Forces Intelligence Command/ Land Force Intelligence Centre
IM/IX and Ops IS	Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Services)
Attack the Network	Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force – Attack the Network Section
Defeat the Device	Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force – Defeat the Device Section
Prepare the Force	Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force – Prepare the Force Section
Indigenous Force Development	Canadian Joint Operational Command and Canadian Defence Intelligence
Global Engagement Strategy in CIED Capacity Building	Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force – Operations Officer
Science and Technology	Joint Counter Explosive Threat Task Force – Prepare the Force Section (includes Electronic Counter Measures)
Exploitation	Land Force Intelligence Centre – Deployable Technical Analysis Laboratory (Level II Exploitation), Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (Level III Exploitation)

FRANCE (FRA)

C-IED INITIATIVES

FRA Existing CIED Initiatives			
	Attack the Network	**Defeat the Device**	**Prepare the Force**
NATO	Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, Centre of Excellence (Madrid), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) & Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)		
EU	Liaison with European Defence Agency		
UN	Development of LTT to inform positioning of IEDs as an illegitimate use of force, as agreed by UNAMA (Jul 11)		
UK	5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN		
AUS	See above		
CAN	See above		
USA	See above, and numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff (e.g. JIEDAC / JIEDDO, US Manoeuvre Support) and bespoke conferences (e.g. CENTCOM, USMC, Home Made Explosives, JIEDDO)		
DEU	Through NATO		
FRA	A "joint EOD Warfare structure" was created on 1st of July 2011 in Angers; this is an expertise, doctrine and training centre.		
	IOC MN TEL in October 2011. and leadership of this capability.	Increasing number of EOD in the forces deployed in Afghanistan.	Integration of an EOD training period before deployment in an hostile country
ITA	Through NATO		
Other CIED Fora		Numerous individual bilateral agreements and liaison (e.g. Israel, Denmark, Estonia) and Op MONOGRAM training (e.g. Pakistan, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco)	UK training (military & contractor) provided through numerous initiatives, including |Op MONOGRAM training delivered in host countries and EOD training at UK sites.

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT

Role	Lead
CIED SRO	Joint chief of staff (Paris)
CIED 2 Lead	Joint chief engineer (Angers)
Lead Point of Contact	Joint EOD warfare center
Policy	Joint chief of staff (Paris)
Doctrine and Concepts	Joint doctrine centre (Paris)
Structures	Joint chief engineer (Angers)
Operational Requirement – Expeditionary	Joint chief of staff (Paris)
Operational Requirements – Domestic	**For the Navy** : FRA Navy Staff (Paris) and FRA Naval Action Force MW department (Brest) **For the Air force** : FRA Air Force Support Command EOD department (Bordeaux) **For the Army** : FRA Army Staff (Paris)
Intelligence	Military Intelligence Directorate
Prepare the Force	**For the Army** : Land Forces Command (Lille) **For the Navy** : Naval Action Force (Toulon) **For the Air Force** : Air Force Command (Metz)
Indigenous Force Development	FRA CIMIC Group (Lyon)
Expeditionary Capacity Building	General Procurement Agency
Information Operations	Joint Public Relation and Information Department
Science and Technology	FRA Military Intelligence Agency

GERMANY (DEU)

C-IED INITIATIVES

DEU Existing CIED Initiatives			
	Attack the Network	**Defeat the Device**	**Prepare the Force**
NATO	Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1 including Clearinghouse Mechanism and Material Roadmap Sponsoring Nation of the Centre of Excellence C-IED (Madrid)		
EU	Participation in the European Defence Agency C-IED PT		
UN	Support of UNMAS by one DEU Staff Officer/ Military Expert C-IED as VNC		
Others CIED Fora	Bi-Multilateral Info Exchange		

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT

Role	Lead
Defence Proponent	Ministry of Defence Strategy and Operations Directorate I 3
Policy	Ministry of Defence Strategy and Operations Directorate I 3
Doctrine and Concepts	Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Center
Structures	Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Center
Operational Requirement – Expeditionary	Bundeswehr Joint Force Command
Operational Requirements – Domestic	Army Command
Intelligence	Federal Intel Service, Strategic Intelligence Command, Bundeswehr Joint Force Command Strategic Intel Comd, Information Centre C-IED
Prepare the Force	Army Concepts and Capabilities Development Center
Information Operations	Bundeswehr Operational Communication Center
Science and Technology	Ministry of Defence Directorate-General for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support
Exploitation	Ministry of Defence Strategy and Operations Directorate I 3 Ministry of Defence Directorate-General for Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support

ITALY (ITA)

C-IED INITIATIVES

ITA Existing CIED Initiatives			
	Attack the Network	**Defeat the Device**	**Prepare the Force**
NATO	Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, NATO C-IED Working Groups, NATO EOD Working Group, Workshops and Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)		
NATO	Full participation in the NATO Smart Defence Working Group (WG) on Attack the Network Information Sharing and Fusion (NATO Smart Defence Project 2.89)		
NATO	Development of the Route Clearance Capability; contribution to NATO Doctrine revision and taking part to MILENG COE NATO Route Clearance Workshop(s); participation to NATO Systems Concepts and Integration (SCI) Exploratory Team (ET) 011 "Technology Roadmap(s) FOR Future Route Clearance Capability"		
EDA	Member of the European Defence Agency C-IED Project Team (PT); starting from 2015 ITA is holding the Chairmanship of the EDA C-IED PT		
EDA	Lead Nation for development of the Military Search (MS) Capability (5 years plan project)		
EDA	Lead Nation for development of the Future Route Clearance Capability (FRCC)		
EDA	Participating Nation, expressing two permanent positions in the Joint Deployable Analysis Exploitation Laboratory (JDEAL)		
Other C-IED Fora	Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings		

Additional details:

FRCC. The FRCC is defined as the capability elements (Personnel, Procedures, Doctrine and Equipment) required to allow the Manoeuvre Commander to enhance freedom of movement (FoM) with regard to IEDs / Mines or Unexploded Ordnances (UXOs), in spite of the adversary's action. The aim of the Future Route Clearance Capability is to establish that a route is free from explosive hazards (IEDs, UXOs or mines), by detecting the presence of such devices, removing the threat, remediating the route to allow continued FoM. A Route Clearance Capability supports the overall C-IED effort by defeating the device.

MS. Military Search provides the expert advice and co-ordination required for systematic and flexible assurance to determine an absence of devices, or to indicate the location of suspect devices. Military working dogs and other C-IED enablers are often integral to search activities. The techniques of military search can be applied to all manner of search tasks to include combinations of personnel, buildings, venues, areas, routes, vehicles, vessels and aircrafts.

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT

Role	Lead
Defence Proponent	Vice Chief of Defence General Staff
CIED SRO	Chief of Defence General Staff – III Division
CIED 2 Lead	Vice Chief of Defence General Staff – III Division
Lead Point of Contact	Italian Defence General Staff – III Division
Policy	Italian Defence General Staff – III Division
Doctrine and Concepts	Italian Defence General Staff – III Division – Centre for Defence Innovation
Structures	Italian Defence General Staff – IV Division
Operational Requirement – Expeditionary	National Joint Operational HQ – J3
Operational Requirements – Domestic	National Joint Operational HQ – J3
Intelligence	Italian Defence General Staff – II Division
IM/IX and Ops IS	National C-IED CoE
Prepare the Force	National C-IED CoE
Indigenous Force Development	Italian Defence General Staff – III Division – Centre for Defence Innovation
Expeditionary Capacity Building	National Joint Operational HQ – J3
Science and Technology	National Armaments Directorate
Exploitation	Italian Defence General Staff – III Division – General Planning Branch

UNITED KINGDOM (GBR)

C-IED INITIATIVES

GBR Existing CIED Initiatives			
	Attack the Network	**Defeat the Device**	**Prepare the Force**
NATO	Full participation in the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, Centre of Excellence (Madrid), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) & Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD). NATO		
EU	Liaison with European Defence Agency		
UN	Development of LTT to inform positioning of IEDs as an illegitimate use of force, as agreed by UNAMA (Jul 11)		
UK	5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN		
AUS	See above		
CAN	See above		
USA	See above, and numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff (e.g. JIEDAC / JIEDDO, US Manoeuvre Support) and bespoke conferences (e.g. CENTCOM, USMC, Home Made Explosives, JIEDDO)		

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT

Role	Lead
Defence Proponent	Vice Chief of Defence Staff
CIED SRO	Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Military Strategy and Operations
CIED 2 Lead	Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Operations
Lead Point of Contact	Force Protection 1 Joint Capability – MOD London
Policy	Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Operations
Doctrine and Concepts	Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Doctrine Concepts and Development
Structures	Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Strategy and Policy
Operational Requirement – Expeditionary	Permanent Joint Headquarters Chief of Staff
Operational Requirements – Domestic	Operations Directorate
Equipment	Director Battlespace Manoeuvre
Intelligence	Head DIFC (Afghanistan)
IM/IX and Ops IS	Director Information Superiority
Prepare the Force	Headquarters Land Forces
Indigenous Force Development	Permanent Joint Headquarters Assistant Chief of Staff J7
Information Operations	Head Targeting and Information Operations
Science and Technology	Dstl Programme Director
Exploitation	Assistance Chief of Defence Staff Intelligence Capability

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

C-IED INITIATIVES

USA Existing CIED Initiatives			
	Attack the Network	**Defeat the Device**	**Prepare the Force**
NATO	Full support of the NATO C-IED Action Plan Revision 1, the C-IED Center of Excellence, (Madrid), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA), and Conference of National Armaments Directorate (CNAD). U.S. leads NATO Smart Defence projects to develop capabilities in jammers, threat network information sharing and fusion, entry control point suites, and persistent surveillance		
EU	Irregular engagement with European Defence Agency.		
UK	5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN. Numerous bilateral agreements & liaison through permanently assigned staff in JIEDDO		
AUS	Same as Above		
CAN	Same as Above		
NZ	5 eyes conferences, symposiums and agreements, coordinated by the International C-IED Steering Committee, chaired in turn by US/UK/AUS/CAN		
Others CIED Fora	Irregular bilateral information exchange meetings		

C-IED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND LEAD POINT OF CONTACT

Role	Lead
Defence Proponent	Deputy Secretary of Defense
CIED SRO	Director, JIEDDO
CIED 2 Lead	Deputy Director, JIEDDO
Lead Point of Contact	Coalition Branch, J5, JIEDDO
Policy	Deputy Secretary of Defense
Doctrine and Concepts	Deputy Secretary of Defense
Structures	Deputy Secretary of Defense
Operational Requirement – Expeditionary	US Combatant Commands (CCMDs)
Operational Requirements – Domestic	US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
Intelligence	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD-I)
IM/IX and Ops IS	JIEDDO, Joint Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange website (JKniFE), J6, C-IED Operations/Intelligence Integration Center (COIC)
Prepare the Force	JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE)
Indigenous Force Development	US Combatant Commands
Expeditionary Capacity Building	JIEDDO JCOE
Information Operations	N/A (COIC does Intel/Info Fusion)
Science and Technology	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD-AT&L); JIEDDO Deputy Directorate for Rapid Capability Delivery (DDRCD)
Exploitation	Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC)

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL (MIC)

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.13

DETAINEE PLANNING FRAMEWORK IN A COALITION ENVIRONMENT

Version 2.0
07 July 2014

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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting action phase, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Version Number	Effective Date	Responsible Organization
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PURPOSE

The different legal framework of each specific operation and the differences in the legal constraints brought into a coalition by its member nations will influence the management of detainee affairs in a coalition and will govern the methodology used by each nation in conducting detainee affairs.

Detainee affairs conducted in a coalition environment will be subject to the individual procedures and restrictions of coalition member nations. However, commanders at all levels must be aware of the applicable international law and must understand that conducting detainee affairs in a humanitarian fashion will benefit the coalition strategically in the long term; in particular, coalition forces must treat detainees with respect and dignity at all times..

Due to the range of potential impacts that differing procedures or policies for detainee affairs may have on a coalition's credibility, every effort must be made - under the responsibility of the lead nation - to establish an overarching common framework for the detention, transfer, collection of evidence, as well as other related concerns.

This document provides practical operational guidance and outlines best practices for planning Detainee Affairs during coalition operations. It does not purport to alter or interpret legal obligations of the member nations, nor does it contain an exhaustive list of such obligations.

PART ONE: PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETAINEE AFAIRS

INTRODUCTION

0101. Coalition commanders must develop a plan for detainee affairs early in the planning cycle of any operation. Extensive planning for detainee affairs should be in place prior to the start of operations. The commander should first analyze the wide array of logistical and operational requirements at play in the conduct of detainee affairs. These requirements begin with the correct number and type of personnel on the ground to conduct the operation. Other requirements are the identification, collection, and execution of a logistical plan to support detainee affairs throughout the coalition area of operations.

0102. Coalition commanders must establish the command and control (C2) relationships among all elements involved in detainee transfers and/or release operations. C2 relationships should be delineated clearly and succinctly. C2 guidance, both internal and external to the coalition, should be established as early as possible.

0103. Coalition authorities must ensure a process is in place to conduct initial and periodic reviews of the status of all detainees. Review should include consideration for transfer or release of the detainee.

DETAINEE AFFAIRS PLANNING

0104. Coalition commanders and their staff must be aware when planning operations that the inclusion of detainee affairs in the context of such operations may give rise to special considerations. Commanders should anticipate operational and logistics requirements well in advance of conducting detainee affairs, in order to effectively identify the resources needed to perform detainee affairs in a coalition environment.

0105. Ideally, the Host Nation (HN) should take responsibility for detainee affairs. As the operational environment allows, coordination with the HN is extremely important and should be undertaken in order to facilitate both the implementation of to allow existing bilateral agreements between participating countries, and the establishment of appropriate new legal arrangements, all with a view to smoothing out conflicting procedures that could otherwise have a negative impact on mission success.

0106. In the above context, Host Nation resources should be exploited to the fullest extent possible.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

0107. As with any operation, proper planning will set the conditions for the successful execution of detainee affairs. To this end, commanders should establish planning mechanisms that ensure effective consideration of potential detainee-related issues and the development of plans and procedures to respond to these issues as early in the planning process as is feasible. Because detention operations implicate operations, intelligence, logistics (supply, maintenance, transportation, health service support, explosive ordnance disposal, field services, and general engineering), personnel services (human resources support, religious ministry support, financial management, manpower, and legal support), and information aspects of the mission, the planning process requires coordinated efforts from all members of the staff potentially affected by detainee affairs.

A. FORCE PROTECTION

0108. To the maximum extent possible, places of detention will be protected from the hazards of the battlefield. In order to protect detainees, commanders must manage the control of captured protective equipment that could be used to meet the requirements of detainees, and commanders must also ensure that, when planning for protective measures and force protection, the potential presence of detainees is considered. As a general rule, detainees should derive the same benefit from force protection measures as do members of the detaining force. Logistics considerations should be reflected in the time-phased force data and deployment data.

B. LOGISTICS

0109. The following issues are a few examples of some of the unique logistic obligations and considerations associated with detention operations:

a. Temperature and Lighting. To the extent possible, the facilities will be protected from dampness, adequately heated and cooled, and appropriately illuminated.

b. Food and Water. When feasible, detainees will be fed three meals a day. At a minimum, basic daily food rations will be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety to keep detainees in good health. The justification for any deviation from the three meals per day standard will be documented by the commander of the detention facility and should be reviewed by both medical and legal support personnel. Account will also be taken of the habitual diet and religious/cultural requirements of the detainees. The detaining power will supply detainees who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labour in which they are employed. Sufficient drinking water will be supplied to detainees.

c. Clothing. Adequate clothing for the climate will be provided, and a clothing replacement program will be instituted at each facility. Issued clothing should be uniform in colour for identification purposes. If replacement clothing is not available, commanders will attempt to provide for the cleaning of detainee clothing in order to protect the health and well-being of detainees until a clothing exchange program can be instituted.

C. Property Safekeeping and Confiscation Accountability

0110. All personal effects and articles of personal use (except arms, military equipment, and military documents), will remain in the possession of detainees, including effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding, unless the detaining force considers continued possession to cause a risk for the detaining force or other detainees, or the item is of intelligence or law enforcement value.

D. Administrative Processing and Accountability.

0111. Detaining powers must establish an accountability system for detainees, and must ensure detainee records and reports are maintained and safeguarded. Detainees should provide name, rank, serial number (if applicable), and date of birth for tracking purposes and appropriate country notification. However, failure to do so must not result in any treatment not otherwise consistent with this publication. Actions taken by the detaining power must be recorded, and procedures must be put in place to ensure the preservation of records.

E. Religious, Intellectual, and Physical Activities.

0112. Religion. Respect for the religious preferences of detainees is an essential aspect of detainee affairs. Accordingly, the organization and administration of the detention facility must not be such as to hinder unjustifiably the observance of religious rites, and commanders should plan for the accommodation of the religious needs of detainees. Certain limitations may be necessary due to security concerns; however, a good faith balance should be struck between the detainee's obligation to comply with disciplinary rules and procedures and the detaining power's obligation to afford detainees the ability to meet their religious obligations and exercise their religious practices. The detaining power is also prohibited from imposing any adverse distinctions within the detainee population based solely on religion.

0113. Physical and Intellectual Activities. Physical and intellectual activities for detainees contribute to the maintenance of good order and discipline within the detainee population. Commanders may accommodate these interests when doing so is both feasible and consistent with mission requirements. The extent to which accommodation is considered and/or implemented will be determined by the needs of the facility population and will take into account both security limitations and available resources. Authorized activities and programs include, but are not limited to, participation in physical exercise, access to outdoor areas, and

the practice of intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits. Other programs that may be considered, where feasible and consistent with security limitations and/or mission accomplishment, include establishment of a family visitation program.

F. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Nongovernmental Organizations and Other Similar Organizations.

0114. During the course of detention operations, it is likely that commanders will encounter representatives of organizations attempting to assert a role in protecting the interests of detainees. Such representatives will often seek access to detainees, and/or offer their services to assist in the care and maintenance of detainees. Effective detention operations planning will establish a mechanism for command interaction with such organizations in order to maximize the benefit of potential contributions to the coalition effort. Commanders must anticipate that, upon initiation of detention operations, these organizations will request access to and/or information about detainees, and they will continue to do so throughout the operation. Commanders should seek guidance through operational command channels for responding to such requests prior to the initiation of detention operations, or as soon thereafter as possible.

0115. ICRC Role: Through the Geneva Conventions, the international community has mandated the ICRC as the only international organization to visit both prisoners of war and civilians interned or detained during armed conflict. ICRC detention visits aim to ensure that detainees or internees, whatever the reason for their arrest and detention, are treated with dignity and humanity, in accordance with international norms and standards. ICRC delegates work with authorities to prevent abuse and to improve both the treatment of detainees and their conditions of detention.

0116. ICRC detainee-welfare activities have a purely humanitarian aim: to promote detainees' physical and mental well-being and to ensure that their treatment and conditions of detention meet international humanitarian law and other internationally recognized standards. Through regular visits, the ICRC strives to prevent torture, other forms of ill-treatment, forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions, and to ensure that detainees enjoy fundamental judicial guarantees. The ICRC also takes action to improve conditions of detention and to maintain contact between detainees and their relatives. To promote detainee welfare, the ICRC:

- negotiates with detaining authorities to obtain access to people deprived of their freedom, wherever they are, and to ensure that the ICRC can follow procedures that guarantee the effectiveness and consistency of its action;
- visits all detainees in those facilities it visits, assessing their conditions of detention and identifying any shortcomings and humanitarian needs;
- monitors certain detainees individually (for specific protection, medical or other purposes);

- promotes contact between detainees and their families by facilitating family visits or transmitting Red Cross messages;
- provides detainees with medical and other supplies, either directly or through the detaining authority; and
- seeks to undertake confidential dialogue with the detaining authority.

G. MEDICAL CARE, DENTAL CARE, AND SANITATION.

0117. Coalition commanders should be prepared to provide first responder, forward resuscitative, and theater hospitalization care, as operational circumstances permit. The detaining power will take sanitary measures as necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of facilities, and to prevent epidemics.

H. MEDIA.

0118. Commanders and staff should anticipate media attention and ensure that supporting public affairs personnel develop procedures, in advance, for dealing with media requests for visits and information. Commanders should prepare and coordinate, in advance, public affairs plans for events such as detainee movements, transfers, or releases, with both the transferring and receiving commanders.

DETAINEE CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE

0119. Coalition commanders will ensure that procedures are established for detainee control and discipline. Considerations for maintaining control and discipline include, but are not limited to:

a. SOPs regarding positive control measures over detainees.

b. Procedures to ensure detainees understand rules, regulations, and expectations of compliance.

c. Viable mechanisms for detainees to raise grievances to the chain of command.

d. Privilege-granting and withdrawal processes to enhance compliance.

e. Rules for the use of force measures to enforce compliance when lesser means have been or would be ineffective.

f. Prohibition of fraternization between detainees and detention facility personnel.

g. SOPs regarding prevention of escape attempts.

h. A rewards and penalty program. For those detainees who are uncooperative and high risk, the Geneva Conventions address the minimal level of treatment and entitlements.

i. Separation of detainees according to the guidelines set forth in the Geneva Conventions.

LINGUIST SUPPORT

0120. Commanders will ensure appropriate linguist capabilities are identified and available, whether locally hired or from a region outside the coalition area of operations.

USE OF FORCE

0121. Coalition commanders should note that detainee affairs will be conducted in accordance with relevant international law, as well as individual national ROE and caveats. Commanders will ensure that detainee facility security personnel are prepared to employ the effective and proportional UOF necessary to protect themselves, other members of the force, and/or detainees. Overall coalition rules of engagement would remain in effect for defending the detention facility from external threat.

PART TWO: BEST PRACTICES

ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK

0201. Military planners, from the outset of any operation, will have to determine specific milestones in the management of the detainees affairs related to the specific missions. These milestones will set a framework defining the main actors of the process (decision-makers in theatre), the basis on which the detention process can or cannot be started, and a very clear statement which defines the approach to detention operations, further specifying in which conditions those operations can be conducted.

0202. Factors affecting a coalition detainee framework include, but are not limited to:

- Coalition mandate
- National limitations and caveats
- Capability of the HN
- Available resources
- FP considerations
- ROE

A. PLANNED/UNPLANNED DETENTION

0203. An accurate operational and legal rationale will need to be developed in order to justify all instances of planned detentions. A pre-planned detainee operation must have a clearly defined and agreed upon end-state.

0204. Unplanned detentions will require commanders at all levels to quickly understand the situation and expeditiously inform the chain of command.

B. FORCE STRUCTURE

0205. Coalition commander must consider national caveats and limitations when designing the force structure for the coalition. For example, it is unadvisable to allocate forces of one Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) to a commander from a TCN whose rules on detainee operations are incompatible.

C. STRATCOM

0206. Coalition commander must consider the impact of the conduct of detainee affairs on the larger coalition Strategic Communications effort.

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPS)

0207. The following SOPs highlight the key stages of the detention process, giving an indication of the minimum standards to be applied from point of detention to the transfer or release of the detainee. Various actions to be taken by the detaining authorities are highlighted.

A. REPORTING PROCEDURES

0208. Regardless of the duration of the detention, records of the events must be maintained and will contain the circumstances of the detention. An accurate record/database of detentions can provide valuable intelligence, and will also fulfil legal requirements. Ideally, a standard format will be provided to the coalition force. It is important to provide systems that ensure coalition standards and guidance are applied carefully and without deviation.

B. USE OF BIOMETRICS (ACCOUNTING/IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES)

0209. To facilitate identification and accounting procedures, biometric data is beneficial; it provides a way to avoid mistakes and expedite identification of individuals. However, the legal framework of the mission, the laws of the host nation and those of member states may limit the collection, sharing, and use of certain biometric data.

C. FACILITY OVERSIGHT

All the detention facilities in a given theatre of operation must be declared to the coalition commander who will ensure adherence to coalition guidance, through inspections or other appropriate means.

ANNEX A – PLANNING CHECKLIST

POLICY/LEGAL ADVISOR

1. How does the coalition intend to approach the handling, detention or transfer of captured persons?

2. If coalition policy is to transfer detainees to the host nation, what arrangements are in place to address any concerns related to the host nation authorities, such as if host nation laws or practices are in some cases contrary to fundamental human rights principles (such as the application of certain punishments)?

3. What is the status of each respective coalition nation as a State Party vis-à-vis the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols as well as the Convention Against Torture?

4. What are the coalition's mechanisms for inspecting coalition POW and internee or detainee facilities?

5. When are the coalition partners expected to report detainees to the ICRC? To the Host Nation?

6. What is the policy concerning the transfer of internees or detainees from one coalition nation to another or to the host nation, and have written agreements or arrangements been concluded between the relevant parties?

7. What is the policy on the repatriation or release of internees and detainees?

8. What is the policy concerning the questioning of captured persons by other nations?

9. Have the standards of conduct for units/personnel been agreed to by troop contributing nations (TCNs) prior to deployment?

10. Has the Host Nation's human rights record, particularly its record with respect to the treatment of prisoners, been assessed by the coalition or partner nations?

11. Have status-of-forces agreements (SOFA) been negotiated with the host nation regarding the capture, internment, or detention of persons by the coalition force, and are there any significant differences between SOFAs across the coalition?

12. What legal provisions does the mandate provide for the capture, internment, detention, or transfer of persons by the coalition force?

13. What is the legal position of each coalition nation regarding whether the conflict has crossed the threshold into armed conflict and whether it is to be categorized as a non-international or international armed conflict?

J3/5 PLANNERS

1. Is there a TCN designated as the lead for the provision of PW and civilian detainee facilities?

2. Are TCNs managing their own captured personnel?

3. Will captured personnel be transferred to the host nation and, if so, to what authorities? What is the procedure for transfer? Does it include an assessment of the risk that a transferred individual could be mistreated?

4. What is the coalition system to categorize and track the movements of captured persons to include those who are injured?

5. What are the liaison arrangements between those force elements responsible for interrogation and those responsible for internment and detention?

6. If an international police force has been deployed, can captured persons be transferred into the custody of that force?

7. What procedures are in place to protect the rights of captured persons, including inspections of internment and detention facilities by the coalition force commander, the ICRC, or other humanitarian organizations?

8. What is the logistic support plan for the PW, internee, or detainee facilities?

9. What is the procedure for the determination of the status of captured persons?

10. What are the procedures for moving captured persons to PW, internee, or detainee facilities?

11. Have interrogation techniques and procedures been authorized?

12. What are the procedures for the transfer of PWs (including personal equipment) to intelligence personnel for interrogation?

13. Have TCNs conducted pre-deployment training to ensure that the standards/codes of conduct are communicated to and understood by all its personnel?

14. Have the TCNs been trained in International Humanitarian Law?

15. What are the TCNs' capabilities and authorities to conduct arrest or detention?

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ANNEX B – DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

Specific definitions and terms related to detainee affairs were compared to determine similarities and differences of the member nations. These terms are defined as commonly used in practice and bear no legal significance of their own. They are independent from the specific legal terms, which may be defined differently. These terms include:

Prisoner of War (PW). **CAN, AUS, FRA, ITA, DEU** and **GBR** share the NATO definition for PW that is in accordance with Geneva Convention III. **USA** definition of Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) is: a detained person as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. In particular, one who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant's privilege of immunity from the municipal law of the capturing state for war like acts which do not amount to breaches of the law of armed conflict. For example, a prisoner of war may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one of the following categories who has fallen into the power of the enemy: a member of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps; a person who accompanies the armed forces without actually being a member thereof; a member of a merchant marine or civilian aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment; or individuals who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces.

Protected Persons. **CAN** generally defines "protected persons" as "persons who are protected by the Law of Armed Conflict", which includes, for instance, medical and religious personnel, wounded and sick persons who have fallen in the hands of the enemy, etc. **CAN** and **AUS** also use the definition found in Geneva Convention IV dealing specifically with the protection of civilians once they are in the control of a party to the conflict or of an occupying power as being "those persons who, at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals. The Geneva Conventions use the term "protected persons" repeatedly with the aim of providing special protections to various categories of individuals in times of armed conflict. All parties to the Geneva Conventions therefore share this basis for understanding the term "protected persons". **USA** definition of Protected Persons is: Persons protected by the Geneva Convention who find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.

Internee. Only the GBR uses the term "Internee" defined as, "during international armed conflict or belligerent occupation…a civilian who is interned for imperative reasons of security or because he has committed an offence against the detaining power. During an internal armed conflict, an internee is a civilian who is interned for security reasons." This definition is separate from the concept of a detainee (See below). Although no other MIC nation identified using a definition of internee, **CAN** uses the term "internee" within doctrine, primarily as it is understood in Geneva Convention IV. Geneva Convention IV does not define the term either but rather describes when states can intern "protected persons" as understood under that convention. All parties to the Geneva Conventions therefore share this basis for understanding

the term "internee". **IT** uses the term "internee" as it is understood in the Geneva Convention IV and also as it is understood in the Hague Convention V. **AUS** uses the term "civilian detainee" that is defined as, "an interned or detained civilian held for a protracted period is accorded the status of civilian detainee". For AUS, this term appears to be related to the concept of internee. No other MIC nation identified using this term.

Detaining Power. The **ITA** definition is, "the Power having custody of captured person and, in consequence thereof, having the duties and responsibilities pertaining to their treatment that are stipulated in the Geneva Conventions and other applicable international law." **CAN** does not have an definition of detaining power, however, the concept is recognized within doctrine as it is expressed within the Geneva Conventions. **GRB** also recognizes this concept within doctrine as demonstrated in their definition of internee above. All parties to the Geneva Conventions therefore share this basis for understanding of the term "detaining power".

Captured Person/Detainee. The **IT** definition of "captured person" is, "persons who have been captured or have surrendered during the course of a military operation are referred to as 'Captured Persons'. Captured persons may or may not have the PW status." **AUS** defines "captured person" as, "any person, other than a member of a national defence force, who is captured, detained or otherwise taken into custody by the force." **CAN** uses the term "detainee" defined as, "any person not consensually in the custody, care, or control of Canadian forces personnel." The **GRB** makes a distinction between an internee (see above) and a "detainee". A civilian (i.e. non-combatant) detained by UK Forces for committing a criminal offence against members of UK Forces or the laws of the territory in which he is detained or an offence against the law applied in an occupied territory, will be an detainee and not an internee. This distinction differentiates the UK understanding of captured person/detainee as less inclusive than **ITA**, **AUS**, and **CAN**. No other MIC nation identified using either of these terms. **USA** Definition of Detainee is: any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force.

Retained Person. The **GBR** definition is, "Medical Personnel, Chaplains and staff of National Red Cross and Red Crescent societies… who may be retained in order to carry out their duties on behalf of other PWs." No other MIC nation officially uses this definition. **CAN** employs the concept of a "retained person" without defining the term within doctrine. This doctrine is based on the provisions of the Geneva Conventions that provide for situations in which certain personnel (primarily medical and religious) may be retained by a detaining power. All parties to the Geneva Conventions therefore share this basis for understanding the term "retained person" as it pertains to medical and religious personnel. **USA** definition of Retained Personnel is: Enemy personnel who come within any of the categories below are eligible to be certified as retained personnel (RP):

a. Medical personnel who are members of the medical service of their armed forces.

b. Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the —

- Search for, collection, transport, or treatment of, the wounded or sick.
- Prevention of disease.
- Staff administration of medical units and establishments exclusively.

c. Chaplains attached to enemy armed forces.

d. Staff of National Red Cross societies and other voluntary aid societies duly recognized and authorized by their governments. The staffs of such societies must be subject to military laws and regulations.

Criminal Detainee. The GRB definition is, "a non-combatant (i.e. a civilian) who has been detained because he has committed, or is suspected of committing, a criminal offence against the laws of the territory in which he has been captured or an offence against the law applied in an occupied territory", ie the same as that for a detainee *simpliciter*. The **IT** definition is a "person who is retained in consequence of a crime." No other MIC nation identified has a definition for Criminal Detainee.

Unlawful Belligerent. The terms "unlawful" or "unprivileged" "belligerent/ combatant" are not contained in the Geneva Conventions, the Additional Protocols, or any other known Convention. Nevertheless, the terms have been used in jurisprudence and academic commentary and are employed by various nations

a. The GBR definition is, "enemy military personnel who do not comply with IHL and civilians who unlawfully participate in hostilities". With the exception of certain categories of personnel, including, for example, mercenaries, spies, saboteurs and those who fail to distinguish themselves from the civilian population, all enemy military personnel are entitled to PW status whether they have acted lawfully or not. Irregular forces that: are under responsible command, are subject to internal military discipline, carry arms openly and distinguish themselves from the civilian population are also treated as PWs. Civilians taking part in the conflict who are not 'irregular forces' or part of a *levee en masse*, are not entitled to PW status as defined by the Geneva Convention but remain entitled to the basic standards of humanitarian treatment set out in Geneva Convention IV Article 3;

b. **CAN** does not officially define the term although current doctrine recognizes both the terms "unlawful combatant" and "unlawful belligerent" and understands them as interchangeable. Unlawful combatants are described as: civilians taking a direct part in hostilities (except those participating in *levée en masse*); mercenaries; and spies. Unlawful Combatants are not entitled to PW status but they must nevertheless be treated humanely. It is Canadian Forces policy that all captured persons or detainees be treated to the standard required for PWs under Geneva Convention III, as this is the highest standard required under the Law of Armed Conflict;

c. The **ITA** definition is “a person who doesn’t have the requirements to acquire the lawful belligerent status in accordance with Geneva Convention (12 August 1949), and the Additional Protocol I (08 Jun 77)”;

d. **FRA** and **DEU** do not use the term; and

e. **AUS -** With regard to the term 'unlawful/unprivileged belligerent/combatant', Australia references the term 'unlawful combatant'. The understanding of an 'unlawful combatant' is that of a civilian who takes part in hostilities and therefore loses their 'civilian status' but is still to be afforded the protections given to Prisoners of War.

Prisoners of Indeterminate Status. The **GBR** definition is, “a person in the custody of UK Armed Forces who has not yet been classified as a Prisoner of War, Civilian Internee, or Retained Person.” **CAN** does not define this specific term but does define “indeterminate status” as, “enemy personnel whose status is not clear and whose status will be determined by a tribunal constituted under the Prisoner of War Determination Regulations.” Should any doubt arise as to whether a person is entitled to PW status, they shall continue to have that status until a competent tribunal (as provided for under regulations) determines their status. No other MIC nation identified using this term, however, the Geneva Conventions discuss procedures for determining Prisoner of War status. All parties agree to the Geneva Conventions therefore share this basis for understanding the requirement for status determination.

Arrested/apprehended person: a person (belonging to the same TCN , HN or allied TCN) who is arrested by a law enforcement agency’s personnel, while committing a crime, also related to international terrorism or subversion of constituted order.

Other - Enemy combatant: (also “EC”) used by the **USA** in general refers to a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict.

Using the terms and definitions identified in the preceding paragraph a comparison of similarities and differences was developed at Table 1. This table could be further developed and used by coalition planners to identify areas of detainee affairs where potential for confusion exists or where additional consultation, planning and coordination might be required (see other page).

	AUS	CAN	FRA	DEU	ITA	GBR	USA
Prisoner of War	C	C	C	C	C	C	D
Protected Persons	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Internee	S	S	S	S	S	D	S
Detaining Power	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Captured Person/Detainee	S	S	S	S	S	D	D
Retained Person	S	C	S	S	S	C	D
Criminal Detainee	N/U	N/U	N/U	N/U	D	D	N/U
Unlawful/Unprivileged Belligerent/Combatant	S	C	N/U	N/U	C	C	S
Prisoners of Indeterminate Status	N/U	S	N/U	S	S	S	N/U
Arrested/apprehended Person	N/U	N/U	N/U	S	C	S	N/U

Table 1: Summary of MIC Nations Definitions for Detainee affairs

C – common definition or understanding of a term exists between indicated nations.
S – similar term or shared basis for use of the term (i.e. Geneva Conventions) exists between indicated nations.
D – term or understanding different from other nations.
N/U – term not used or status/understanding of term unknown.

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ANNEX C – ACRONYMS

UN: United Nations
SOFA: Status of Forces agreement
ICRC: International Committee of Red Cross
PW: Prisoner of War
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
TCN: Troop Contributing Nation
SOP: Standard Operating Procedures

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NATO

MC 327/2 "*NATO Military Policy for non – Article 5 CROs*"

AAP-6 "*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions"*

AJP-2.5(A) "*Captured Persons, Materiel and Documents*"

AJP-3.14 "*Force Protection*"

AJP-3.2.3.3 "Military Police"

ATP-3.4.1.1 "*Peace Support Operations - Techniques and Procedures*"

ATP-73 "*Military Search*" (*ratification Draft*)

APP-12 "*NATO military police doctrine and procedures*"

STANAGs

STANAG 2067 "*Control and return of Stragglers*"

STANAG 2074 "*Handling of EPW on exercises*"

STANAG 2195 "*Captured persons, equipment and documents"*

MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL (MIC)

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MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL
COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME III.14
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

Version 1.0
07 July 2014

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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting action phase, the **MIC Steering Group (SG)** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

DEFINITION

> **Commonly used definition of IDPs, pursuant to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement** : Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. (definition by the IDMC – internal displacement monitoring center)

0101. IDP definition is a descriptive definition rather than a legal definition. It simply describes the factual situation of a person being uprooted within his/her country of habitual residence. It does not confer a special legal status or rights in the same way that recognition as a refugee does.

RESPONSIBILITIES

0102. Primary responsibility for protecting IDPs and all persons within their own country rests with the national authorities of the country.

0103. Yet, it is sometimes the very governments responsible for protecting and assisting their internally displaced populations that are unable or even unwilling to do so and, in some cases, they may even be directly involved in forcibly uprooting civilians.

0104. Even then, however, **the role of international actors is to reinforce, not replace, national responsibility**.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

0105. Some of the **particular factors of internal displacement** that tend to heighten protection risks are indicated below.

- IDPs have lost their homes and, as a result, may be in need of shelter. In some cases, they may be compelled to seek shelter in crowded camps or settlements, which can give rise to various protection risks.

- They have often lost access to their land and other property and are cut off from their normal livelihoods and sources of income. As a result they may suffer poverty, marginalization, exploitation and abuse.

- Access to adequate food, safe water and public services, such as education and health care becomes difficult, often leading to high levels of hunger, malnutrition and disease.

- Family and community-structures often collapse and family members become separated. Unaccompanied and separated children, single-headed households (in particular when headed by women or children), older persons and persons living with disabilities are often at heightened risk of abuse, including sexual exploitation, child labor or forced recruitment into armed forces or groups.

- Identity documents often are lost, destroyed or confiscated in the course of displacement. As a result IDPs often face difficulties in accessing public services, such as education and health care, limits on freedom of movement and heightened risk of harassment, exploitation or arbitrary arrest and detention.

- In many cases, IDPs are displaced to areas where they face marginalization, discrimination and hostility, are exposed to landmines or explosive remnants of war, or are targeted for abuse and attack. In addition, tensions in these areas can be exacerbated by, for instance, competition over scarce resources or an increased risk of attacks because of the presence of IDP settlements.

PART TWO: ICRC ROLES – NGO'S ROLES

0201. ICRC and NGOs role for IDPs are seen through the prism of humanitarian assistance.

0202. ICRC and NGOs are expected to adhere to the core principles of the *"Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief"* and have been encouraged to adopt it.

0203. An Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and coordinates the international response to humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is chaired by the ERC and has the membership of all UN operational humanitarian agencies, with standing invitation to ICRC, IFRC (international federation of red cross and red crescent societies), IOM (international organization for migration), UNHCHR (united nations high commissioner for human rights), the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, the World Bank and the three NGO consortia (ICVA – international council of voluntary agencies –, InterAction and SCHR). The decision whether to and who to appoint as Humanitarian Coordinator is made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

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Part Three: Military Contribution

CREATING IDP AS PART OF A MILITARY OPERATION

0301. International humanitarian law prohibits any party to an armed conflict from compelling civilians to leave their places of residence. Temporary evacuations may be carried out only if the security of civilians or military imperatives absolutely requires it and, even then, such evacuations are subject to strict conditions. All possible measures must be taken to ensure that family members are not separated and that the displaced population is received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. Moreover, such evacuations must be temporary, and those affected have the right to return in safety to their homes as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist.

MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SITUATIONS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

0302. In addition to ensuring the protection of rights in accordance with international law, national responsibility in situations of internal displacement entails:

- preventing displacement and minimizing its adverse effects;
- raising national awareness about the problem;
- collecting data on the number and condition of IDPs;
- supporting training on the rights of protected persons in IDP scenarios;
- creating a framework and strategy to uphold the rights of protected persons in IDP scenarios
- designating an institutional focal point on IDPs;
- encouraging national human rights institutions to address internal displacement;
- ensuring that IDPs participate in decision making;
- supporting durable solutions;
- supporting efforts by the national authorities;
- allocating adequate resources to address internal displacement; and
- cooperating with the international community when national capacity is insufficient.

0303. When possible, the military commander can participate to the points exposed above as far as they do not jeopardize the military strategy.

IN CASE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

0304. In the case of an explicit humanitarian mission, several core principles guide all action and should be respected by all staff and partners at all times. Respect for these principles is critical to the integrity of the work and the credibility and safety of humanitarian operations.

- **Do no harm**: Action, as well as inaction, can have unintended negative consequences. We must ensure that the actions and interventions (or lack thereof) do not disproportional adversely affect individuals or their communities, our partners or our

colleagues, and that they do not expose them to harm. Before taking action, we must anticipate the consequences, assess any potential risk factors and take measures to eliminate and minimize such risks.

- **Humanity and the humanitarian imperative**: The prime motivation and purpose of the work is to save lives and to prevent and alleviate human suffering, wherever it is found. Individuals must be treated humanely, with dignity and respect, and have a full and equal right and ability to receive humanitarian assistance.

- **Impartiality**: Humanitarian action must be taken without any adverse distinction based on nationality, ethnic origin, religion, class, sex, political opinion or other ground. Priorities for humanitarian action must be determined on the basis of rights and needs alone. The principle of impartiality, therefore, establishes two clear rules of conduct for humanitarian work: non-discrimination and proportionality according to need.

- **Independence**: Humanitarian action must be free from interference, whether political, ideological, economical or military.

- **Neutrality**: Humanitarian action must not take or be perceived to take sides in an armed conflict or other dispute. The principle of neutrality provides important guidance on how we should act, by considering how our actions might be interpreted by others. We, therefore, need to be aware of our own prejudices as well as the ways in which aid can be manipulated, diverted or exploited for political or military purposes. Our actions and activities must be transparent, balanced and based on objective criteria.

0305. These principles should be considered when planning and conducting the military humanitarian operations.

0306. Humanitarian actors often have to interact and liaise with military actors, especially when working in situations of armed conflict and complex emergencies. The nature and scope of such interaction will depend on the circumstances. It can range from mere coexistence with civilian and military actors, to closer coordination to ensure the effectiveness of respective efforts. This may include the provision of logistical, technical or military support to humanitarian operations by military actors to secure the environment in order to facilitate safe and rapid humanitarian access or military support for the physical security of IDPs and affected populations in displacement or upon return.

0307. The use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys or operations is an extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis.

0308. Operations undertaken jointly by humanitarian organizations and military forces can have a negative impact on the actual or perceived impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian

action. In general, the use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations in complex emergencies should only take place on an exceptional basis and as a last resort.

0309. Too close an association with peacekeeping actors may blur the lines between humanitarian and military action.

0310. The presence of military forces can also expose communities to attack or create other security risk.

0311. Relief operations by military actors, even when purely 'humanitarian' in nature, may have a detrimental effect on humanitarian efforts by blurring the distinction between humanitarian and military action. This may jeopardize the neutrality of humanitarian action; result in limited access to areas under the control of other parties to the conflict.

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Part Four: References

IDPs

- The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief - "Oslo Guidelines" Updated November 2006 (Revision 1.1 November 2007).
- Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (OCHA – office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs, 2008).
- Handbook for the protection of internally displaced persons (UNHCR).
- African union convention for the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons in Africa (Kampala convention).

MAIN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR)
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1967 (ICESCR)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1967 (ICCPR)
- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (CAT)
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948

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MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

INTRODUCTION

1. Any future MN coalition will be operating in an environment in which not only the role of information is critical to success but also its perception by diverse audiences. Coalition Commanders and their staff need to incorporate considerations about Strategic Communication (StratCom) at the outset of planning for a coalition operation.

2. StratCom in a multinational environment is a complex undertaking as it has to be coordinated between coalition members as well as within the government of each coalition member. If the coalition is within a NATO context then NATO StratCom policy and Directives will be used.

3. Therefore, this volume is intended as a 'capstone document' to provide an overview of what constitutes StratCom planning to coalition staffs. It also provides a repository of 'best practice' StratCom reference Documents and extracts of two key Annexes that will assist planners who have limited time. The MIC recommends that the NATO ACO is used for coalition StratCom planning. The other documents highlight national doctrine. This is important as it covers issues such as regional perspectives that is not covered in detail by NATO Doctrine. Therefore, planners may wish to be aware of these nuances depending on the membership of the coalition.

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

4. Here are the reference documents:

- NATO ACO Directive (AD) 95-2 dated 21 May 2012
- CD&E Multinational Experiment 6 dated 22 Oct 2010
- MCDC 2013-2014 Baseline Assessment Report Draft dated 10 May 2013
- GBR MoD Joint Doctrine Note 1/12 dated Jan 2012
- USA DoD Principles of Strategic Communication dated Aug 2008
- ITA Defence General Staff Doctrinal Note 003 dated 12 Sep 2012
- GBR Strategic Communication: A Primer dated Dec 2008
- AUS JDN 1-12: Understanding StratCom

STRATCOM DEFINITION

5. There are a variety of StratCom definitions but on balance the MIC has adopted the NATO version below believing it to be the most comprehensive and least contentious:

"…the coordinated and appropriate use of [NATO] communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance [NATO's] aims"[1]

PURPOSE

6. The purpose of StratCom is to assist the coalition mission by gaining and maintaining public awareness, understanding and support for the coalition as a whole and for each of its members. It also serves to support the coalition in achieving its' desired end state and strategic objectives as well as to strengthen the understanding within a coalition about the possible perception of the coalitions' actions.

THE 'GOLDEN THREAD' – LINKING STRATCOM TO MILITARY OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND TACTICAL ACTIVITY

7. StratCom is closely linked to the military operational planning process:.

   a. At the Strategic Level, the contributing Nations through their equivalent of a 'Strategic Communications Team'[2] which is sponsored by their Government will provide an agreed StratCom Narrative with Objectives and Targets to the Joint Force Commander (JFC). This process is not formalised and will require considerable political-military coordination by contributing allied nations given the complexity of a multi-national narrative and the fact that cross government and civilian agencies are more than likely to be involved.

   b. At the Operational Level, the narrative will inform the JFC's Operational Campaign design. Crucially, this will link the narrative to information effect and then a planned activity to achieve it.

   c. At the Tactical Level, it is anticipated that full spectrum targeting will be employed to allocate action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign to bring about desired behavioural changes. Once this process has started, it is essential that Commanders and planners monitor the outcome between 'action and effect' and adjust the plan accordingly. What may be assessed as a successful tactical activity from a military stand-point may not be perceived by different audiences therefore,

---

[1] PO(2009)0141,NATO Strategic Communications Policy, dated 29 September 2009 and MCM-0164-2009, NATO Strategic Communications Policy, dated 29 September 2009.

[2] Taking the UK as an example, a Strategic Communications Team will be established in response to a crisis. This team will develop an agreed pan-government approach to crisis response, in particular, articulating messaging priorities. After being refined by subordinate steering and working groups, a Strategic Communications and Action Plan will be developed – this will be provided to the Joint Force Commander.

an adjustment must be made to support the StratCom narrative and objectives. This is where coordination between coalition members is vital at all levels.

8. As long as the broad perception of a coalition's military actions match the intention of those actions, StratCom can be regarded as a success. Coalition's Lines of Operation have to be assessed constantly to understand their impact at various target audiences.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM) CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TARGETING PROCESS

9. Using lethal and non-lethal capabilities has an effect on all audiences in the information environment within and outside the area of operations, either positively by aligning actions with words or negatively by contradicting a coalition's message with actions. Therefore, all targeting activities must be coherent with the coalition StratCom framework and mission narrative. Negative effects can cause significant damage to a coalition's mission; a full spectrum approach to targeting ensures inclusion of and takes into account both information operations and the public audience.

FUNCTIONAL AREAS

10. StratCom requires a multidisciplinary forum to be effective and may include the following functional areas as a minimum:

- Public Diplomacy/Defence Attaches (DA)
- Public Affairs (PA) and Military Public Affairs
- Info Ops (IO)
- Psychological Ops (PsyOps)
- Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)
- Political Advisors (POLAD)

11. The above agencies should be collocated if at all possible.

STRATCOM FRAMEWORK

12. Thus far, this paper has provided and overview of process and those agencies that are likely to be involved. The final aspect to be covered is the 'product' i.e. the framework or plan that collates the strategic narrative, objectives, target audiences and effects. There are numerous ways of presenting this information contained within the References at Para 4. However, should planners have insufficient time, the two examples in the Annex are excellent products to start. The first one is the ACO Outline StratCom Framework, and the second one is the UK's Strategic Communications Actions and Effects Plan (SCAEP).

13. These examples will provide clear direction and guidance for a coalition mission and must be coherent with the Campaign Plan. The framework articulates the coalition objectives, its core message, StratCom themes, focus topics and direction on coordinating StratCom activities. It acts as a basis for more specific action plans. The SCEAP develops the above into more specific actions.

ANNEX A

NATO ACO STRATCOM FRAMEWORK SAMPLE

NATO ACO Directive 95-2, Annex A is an excellent example of a StratCom Framework and is set out verbatim below:

ANNEX A TO
AD 95-2
DATED 21 MAY 12

Outline StratCom Framework

1. The StratCom framework for major operations, missions, or activities will be issued by NATO HQ (PDD) to provide top-level D&G for all associated NATO Public Diplomacy, PA, military PA, Info Ops, and PsyOps planning and activities. The purpose of a framework is to provide overarching guidance common to all in order to generate a 'golden thread' linking top to bottom. Each level of command will then create more specific messaging and implementation plans that are appropriate to their circumstances. For smaller operations, missions or activities subordinate HQs can generate their own frameworks provided they are coordinated with SHAPE StratCom. The exact content of the framework will be dependant on the specific requirements of the operation, mission or activity, but it will routinely adopt the following format:

a. Introduction. A brief background to the issue giving political and operational context and outlining future challenges from a StratCom perspective.

b. Aim. The scope and duration of validity for the StratCom framework.

c. StratCom Core Message. Brief core message to underpin the StratCom approach to be adopted.

d. StratCom Objectives. NATO's StratCom Objectives for the operation, mission or activity. Objectives will routinely refer to friendly, neutral or adversary audiences.

e. StratCom Themes. The (3-6) themes which are to be promoted in support of achieving the StratCom objectives. The themes are not messages per se, but are intended to identify the key understandings among audiences that NATO's integrated messaging and actions will seek to achieve.

f. Focus Topics. Designed to complement StratCom Themes and to identify specific activities and/or calendar events around which focused StratCom action should be considered.

g. **Coordination.** An Overview of the key roles and responsibilities of specified HQ in delivery of the StratCom approach.

2. Additional annexes can be attached as required, concentrating, as highlighted above, on more specific issues and implementation of the objectives, themes and topics. These can include:

a. **Implementation Plan.** Using the framework guidance, specific actions appropriate to different levels of command should be developed to achieve the required effect. This can range from requirements for products and outposts to liaison mechanisms and detailed coordination.

b. **Key Messages.** Although key messages will usually be issued at the time of framework promulgation they are likely to change in response to developments, whereas the Themes and Focus Topics are unlikely to change in the short term. Periodic revision and reissue of the Key Messages, or the development of a mission-specific Rolling Brief, will ensure that all stakeholders have up-to-date messaging available.

c. **Risk & Opportunities.** Attached as an annex setting out the key StratCom challenges and opportunities, with appropriate actions for their mitigation or exploitation.

ANNEX B

UK STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIONS AND EFFECTS PLAN (SCAEP)

A fictitious Strategic Communications Actions and Effects Plan (SCEAP) is set out below ,again to provide planners with limited time what a detailed product is required to achieve the effects set out in the Campaign Plan.

LUNGA[3]
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION ACTION AND EFFECTS FRAMEWORK v2.3
Aug 13

Background / Context	▪ The PM highlighted the importance to the United Kingdom of stability in Post-Donald Munro Lunga and the surrounding HEBRIDEAN region calling for increased regional engagement and capacity building and being ambitious in our approach in Jan 13. At the same time FCO and DFID highlighted the urgent need for a nominated agency (MoD Military Strategic Effects (MSE)) to provide StratCom advice and support to Lungan ministries of state to foster their credibility in the country's transition towards democratic rule and self-sufficiency. ▪ Increased urgency to provide military capacity building to Lunga under Op MAGINTY was endorsed at the NSC on 5 Jul 13. Most significant in this initiative are the Joint Ops project to be delivered by JFHQ and PJHQ's task to deliver driver training in the MIC for up to 200 Lungan recruits. ▪ The recce carried out by MSE confirms that MoD is able to provide long term StratCom advice to the LMOD but that quick wins are needed in media support/structuring in order to energise the MIC approach.
MULTINATIONAL FORCE Strategic Aims and Goals	**Long Term**. ▪ MULTINATIONAL FORCE aims to, "through the most effective use of all resources, support a peaceful post-revolution transition, resulting in a stable, open and democratic government in Lunga contributing to wider regional stability and security, offering opportunities for British business and resolution of outstanding bilateral issues." We should develop our understanding of the Lungan military and political leadership and assist them to become self-funding working closely with the UN mission in Lunga, and influencing UN and other Multinational Force body thinking and approach to deliver a coherent approach to the Lungan Security Sector. **Short Term**. ▪ The MIC will increase its small military footprint and work in a cross government approach in order to: o Maintain a strong defence relationship with the Lungan MoD and Armed forces to permit access and over-flight rights. o Assist with security sector reform and restructuring. o Help to create the correct structures within the security sector (military and political) to bring the use of force back into Government control. o Assist with security sector capacity-building in order to support the elected government of Lunga. o Assist with disarming, disbanding and re-integrating the *Munrovian Militia*. ▪ Continue to push forward our direct relationship with the Lungan Navy and Air Force, and be ready to assist with the Lungan Army in a similar manner when we judge that the situation is right.

[3] Lunga is one of the Slate Islands in the Firth of Lorn in Argyll and Bute, Scotland. It has a population of 0, has an area of 250 hectares and is used as a fictitious country in this example.

Strategic Narrative and Themes	**Strategic Narrative**. *The stability of post-Donald Munro Lunga and the North Hebridean region is important to the MIC. Extremist group, threaten regional security and that of our nation and allies, and currently enjoy freedom of movement in Lunga's ungoverned space. Not yet unified, beset by inter-communal and political strife, and where armed groups proliferate, Lunga's current ad-hoc security mix prejudices transition to a credible national security infrastructure. Failure to address this could see the country slide into cultural conflict, impacting upon the Lungan people and risking contagion. Exploiting the success of her military and diplomatic investment during Lunga's liberation, the MIC has earned the trust and respect of the Lungan people. We will continue to enhance this partnership through increased cross government engagement, and providing expertise to help Lunga's democratic ministries of state and security forces gain and hold the trust of the Lungan People. Success in this initiative will afford the MIC valuable diplomatic, military and economic opportunities, significantly enhance regional stability and reinforce MIC national security.* **MoD StratCom Themes**. 1. Build the capacity of the LMoD and LAF as credible providers of internal and border security. 2. Enhance the defence relationship building upon the MIC's legacy of successful military assistance, demonstrating our capability to deliver soft effect and emphasising the MIC as Lunga's principal partner in defence reform and reconstruction. 3. Improve regional stability by countering the threat from extremist groups operating in Lunga's ungoverned space.
Key Target Audience Observations	**Lungan Military Leadership:** ▪ Defence Minister. Requires to ENCOURAGE better cooperation and coordination between currently disparate elements of the LMOD. In particular he is to be PERSUADED of the importance of StratCom oversight and the power of his media and press office. ▪ Deputy Defence Minister. As above. ▪ NSA. Requires to be PERSUADED to deliver the FCO Compact. ▪ COS Must loosen previous ties with specific armed groups. ▪ The Lungan Military Leadership is showing signs of impatience at the lack of tangible delivery by capacity building nations. **Lungan Armed Forces** ▪ A body of reporting indicates a significant rise in internal discord in the Lungan Army. ▪ Key leaders are emerging at the operational level who must be encouraged. ▪ A cultural sea change is required to regenerate pride and professionalism among the armed forces in order to foster recruitment and retention. ▪ Knowledge gained at senior level must be disseminated effectively and acted upon. **Other Armed Groups** ▪ Revolutionary and post-revolutionary groupings still fill the majority of the security void across Lunga and appear unwilling to surrender autonomy. **Lungan Public** ▪ The demographic profile is skewed towards a large, young population, unskilled and unemployed; however a significant proportion of the Lungan youth sector is keen to participate in Lunga's transition as long as it is unperturbed by factional inertia. ▪ The vast majority of Lungans seek to uphold the legacy of the martyrs sacrificed on all sides during the revolution. ▪ Most Lungans want a more urgent return to "normality" and no longer welcome the presence of [autonomous] armed groups

	▪ Lungans are starting to get fed up with the failure to improve their basic services. ▪ Internet penetration analysis indicates an increase in population usage from 5.5% to 17% in the past 3 years. This does not account for smart phone/internet hub activity which is assessed to be above 80% (DSTL). Access to Social Media is assumed to be high. **Extremists** ▪ Capabilities to be determined. **Neighbouring States** ▪ **Jura** and **Bute**, **Key Regional Partners** ▪ **Hebridean League Partnership**. More information is required to determine Lunga's influence and support. ▪ **Shetland**. Information is required to determine their current influence upon the Govt of Lunga. **International Organisations**. ▪ Coordinated activity with the initiatives of the EU, UN, World Bank and IMF. **Home**. ▪ MULTINATIONAL FORCE seeks to assure the MIC population of continued XGovt momentum in engagement with Lunga.

STRATCOM OBJECTIVES & ACTIVITY

Theme 1: ***Build the capacity of the Lunga MoD as credible providers of internal and border security.***				
Objective 1.1: Build LMOD STRATCOM Capacity and Credibility				
Effect	**Target Audience**	**Message**	**Enabling Activity (lead)**	**Success indicators (MOE)**
PROMOTE LMOD and optimise capacity building in other key areas. **ENCOURAGE** the Lungan Defence Minister and staff to foster greater interoperability between departments.	▪ Lungan Military Leadership ▪ Lungan People	The MIC will assist the LMOD to: ▪ Foster the trust of the Lungan people as the primary providers of internal and border security. ▪ Transform current ad hoc military establishment into a coherent, equitable and representative police and military structure under state control. ▪ Communicate the Lungan Government's national security aims and goals to the Lungan people.	▪ STRATCOM education/training for Defence Leadership. (MSE) ▪ Mentoring the establishment and operation of the LMOD Press Office including exploitation of the development of the LMOD website and its use of social media. ▪ IO projects(MSE) to: o Increase LMOD interoperability. o Promote Lungan Armed Forces.	▪ Increased public appearance of Lungan Defence Chiefs. ▪ Recruiting and development of a cadre of young, well-educated Lungan defence civilians as media staff. ▪ Increased hit rate for MoD website ▪ Increased positive social media activity wrt LMOD. ▪ Increased recruiting in the military sector. ▪ Co-location of the Minster of Defence and COS.

Theme 1: ***Build the capacity of the Lunga MoD as credible providers of internal and border security.***				
Objective 1.2: Build Capacity of the Regular Lungan Security Forces and Structure.				
Effect	**Target Audience**	**Message**	**Enabling Activity (lead)**	**Success indicators(MOE)**
PROMOTE as the principal internal and border security provider. **PERSUADE/COERCE** regional armed groups to surrender autonomy.	▪ Senior Politicians ▪ Regional Partners / Neighbouring States ▪ Armed groups ▪ Lungan Population	• The MIC MoD has the expertise to deliver the maximum boost to Lunga's achievement of a small, flexible, mobile (SMART) military structure with a reserve component, which will provide the most credible solution to guarantee Lunga's internal and border security. • Our advice planning and structural reform is based upon operational experience in which we have learned valuable lessons. • The MIC has significant experience in delivering effective military training to the Armies of other countries while maintaining the cultural identities and reinforcing the national pride of recruits.	▪ ▪ The Joint Ops Project (JFHQ) ▪ MIC training for Lungan Troops (PJHQ). ▪ IO Projects (MSE) to: o Promote Re-integration o Promote LMOD departmental interoperability. o Isolate Armed groups where necessary. o Promote Lungan Armed Forces to the Lungan Public.	▪ Decrease in influence/activity of extremist groups. ▪ Increase in recruiting within regular Defence Forces (long term).

Theme 2: ***Enhance the defence relationship building upon the MIC's legacy of successful military assistance, demonstrating our capability to deliver soft effect and emphasising the MIC as Lunga's principal partner in reform and reconstruction.***				
Objective 2.1: Raise awareness and confidence within Lunga that we are maintaining a proactive stance as Lunga's principal partner in reconstruction.				
Effect	**Target Audience**	**Message**	**Enabling Activity (lead)**	**Success indicators (MOE)**
ENCOURAGE Lungan MIC Diaspora to support increased engagement. **PROMOTE**. MIC engagement to the Lungan People	▪ Lungan People (incl the MIC Lungan Diaspora)	▪ The MIC will continue to stand by the Lungan people in their path towards self sufficiency	▪ Objective MIC media reporting (DMC). ▪ KLE within LMOD (DAT, DRA) ▪ Lungan Free Press – Exploitation of success (enhanced LMOD Press Office and DMC)	▪ Increased support for MIC Engagement
Objective 2.2: Raise awareness and confidence within the MIC that we are maintaining a proactive stance to achieve lasting impact as Lunga's principal partner in reconstruction.				
Effect	**Target Audience**	**Message**	**Enabling Activity (lead)**	**Success indicators (MOE)**
PROMOTE success from engagement thus far and threat from strategic miscalculation.	▪ MIC Cross Govt ▪ MIC Domestic Audience	▪ Cross Govt coordination is essential to achieve success in reforming Lunga and thereby increasing regional stability	▪ DMC Activity ▪ Op VOCATE CCT (Ops Dir) ▪ FCO Weekly VTC (IPP/Ops Dir)	▪ Continued support for MIC MoD Lungan Engagement.
Objective 2.3: Demonstrate a coherent approach with international and regional partners.				
Effect	**Target Audience**	**Message**	**Enabling Activity (lead)**	**Success indicators (MOE)**
ENCOURAGE international and Regional support for increased MIC engagement.	▪ UNSMIL ▪ EU ▪ AU ▪ USA ▪ FR ▪ ITA	▪ MIC engagement in Lunga is good for all those who wish to bring stability to the region and will be coordinated with the efforts of international partners as far as the MIC's national interests permit.	▪ MIC press via DMC. ▪ Bilateral and International Engagement (IPP/MSP/DAT)	▪ Continued support for MIC Engagement

Theme 3: ***Improve regional stability by countering the threat from extremist groups operating in Lunga's ungoverned space.***				
Objective 3.1: Reduce the freedom of manoeuvre of extremist groups operating in Lunga's ungoverned space.				
Effect	**Target Audience**	**Message**	**Enabling Activity (lead)**	**Success indicators (MOE)**
ISOLATE extremist groups operating in Lunga's ungoverned space. **REASSURE** the Lungan population.	▪ Extremists ▪ Lungan Population	▪ The MIC supports the Lungan Security Forces in their resolute intent to deny Lunga's territory as a manoeuvre space for extremist groups	IO Projects (MSE) to: ▪ Exploit success of Lungan Armed Forces against extremist gps. ▪ Isolate Extremist groups from popular support within Lunga and outside its borders. ▪ Dislocate extremist C2. ▪ Deny unauthorised movement across Lunga's Borders.	▪ Arrests

Risks (to primary objectives)	**Description**	**Probability**	**Impact**	**Mitigation**	**Lead**
	▪ Risk of Engagement: Misinterpretation by Lungan Target Audiences that MIC MoD seeks only to pursue its own goals	**L**	**L**	▪ Tempered Engagement ▪ X MULTINATIONAL FORCE Coord ▪ X Lungan Govt Coord	
	▪ Risk of limited Engagement: A lack of X MULTINATIONAL FORCE coordination and support could compromise MoD engagement by raising expectations within Lungan Target Audiences that are not achieved.	**M**	**H**	▪ X Govt Coord ▪ Management of expectations (bound objectives)	
	▪ Risk of Non-Engagement: A continued denigration of the influence of LMOD leading to increased instability and the rise of culturally focused armed groups to fill the security vacuum. This could lead to an increase in MIC defence posture and commitment in the region	**H**	**H/M/L**	• Consistency of Engagement. • "Quick wins". LMOD Press Office, •	

Enabling Activity	**Intelligence/Information Gaps**.	**Activity**.	**Lead**
	▪ Lungan Armed Forces capabilities. ▪ Identification of Lungan lead departments for internal activity. ▪ Lungan Armed Groups capabilities and network. ▪ Comprehensive Target Audience Analysis. ▪	▪ Regional MoD lead for Lunga. ▪ STRATCOM to support all MIC activity. ▪ Enduring StratCom advice to LMOD. ▪ Mentoring the establishment of LMOD Press Office. ▪ Joint Ops Project ▪ Training of Lungan Army Recruits.	**MoD Ops Dir** **MoD MSE** **MoD MSE** **JIAG** **JFHQ** **PJHQ**

References	
	▪ Sub Regional Strategy – Hebridean – IPP Scotland Jan 13 ▪ Lunga Country Strategy – IPP Scotland Dec 12 ▪ DAT Lunga Review – Interim Report Nov 12 ▪ IPP DE – Joint Ops Staff Project Directive – Lunga – IPP-SCOTLAND/Z dated Jan 13 ▪ Lunga Partnership and Conflict Pool Strategy for Lunga 2012-2014 ▪ Transitional Lungan Media: Free at Last? – May 13. ▪ SNP Report number 001 "Divided We Fall – Lunga's Enduring Conflict" 12 ▪ MSE Lunga Recce report Jun 13.

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ANNEX C

Narrative Development in Coalition Operations

INTRODUCTION

In all cultures, complex messages are communicated through stories and fairy tales which become a centrepiece for education and tradition. Such stories convey meaning in an effective way that naturally resonates with our understanding of the world. Stories connect complex topics with context and emotions in a culturally attuned manner using metaphors. Stories make information “stick”!

A Narrative is the structured expression of a thematic story about the rationale, intent and aims – the 'why' – of an organization. It reflects the vision and strategy of the organization, and, like a script or score, guides its mission conduct – the 'how' of its overall activity.

Narratives are more than simply 'stories'. Narratives describe the history, purpose and achievements of a collective entity, and they contribute in the process towards its unity and facilitate its continuous transformation. With that they are contributing an essential element to the coalition’s efforts.

A coalition's Narrative must be "the compelling foundation of all its communication efforts. It is the common reference point that should guide the development of all of the coalition's kinetic and non-kinetic plans." It ultimately portrays the coalition identity and provides an important foundation for achieving a desired image.

To achieve sustained outcome, the short-term communication focus of targeted messaging has to be coherent with the long-term goals of an organization. "Sustainable support for any institution or campaign is founded on both logic and instinct. The coalition therefore needs to ensure that, firstly, it has a core Narrative that resonates with its audiences, and, secondly, its operations and actions are consistent with that Narrative."

Narrative expresses and creates the essence of an institution or coalition for internal and external audiences.

Successful military operations depend on gaining the advantage in a highly complex and dynamic Information Environment. To meet this challenge, coalitions must communicate the rationale for their actions not only to the stakeholders in the deployment area but also to a large international community in order to maintain support and cohesion. A correctly constructed Narrative will overcome this challenge.

This concept will propose Narrative as an overarching umbrella for understanding the aim and scope of a coalition's engagement. It provides the tone and guides the planning, decision-making, communication, and actions of every single member of the organization across all levels. It connects the institutional desires of the organization to the actions of the individual.

Every decision, action, activity, and communication should first be compared to the Narrative to ensure it is consistent with its overarching tone and intent.

The Strategic Communication Capability Implementation Process into NATO has identified the requirement for a tool that helps the political and strategic level in developing a Mission Narrative. (For more background see MCM-0076-2011 NATO StratCom CIP). The task to develop such a tool was given to the MNIOE community in 2011. Since then, a group of military and academic experts has been working on the process on how to develop a Narrative.

The Narrative development process consists basically of 4 steps:

The "Situational Context" template is given to a team of expert analysts, which guides the analysis of the Information Environment. (IE is comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs. (MC 422/4))
The information obtained by this analysis is then used to identify the various actors involved in the crisis and their individual desires. Here, a first attempt is made to identify an outcome of the crisis that might be acceptable to all or most stakeholders. This outcome will become the coalition's desire. The step ends with a stakeholder analysis that vets the stakeholders against the coalition's desire by their essentiality (more or less) and motivation (low or high).

Based on this analysis, it will then be possible to dedicate specific roles to each stakeholder, for example who will be the Action Agent, Supporter or Opponent, if there is one.

In the final step, a number of questions will help write the Narrative.

Based on the analysis of the Information Environment, guided by these questions, and following the Narrative Arc model, it will then be possible to formulate a Narrative which is defined as a "concise but comprehensive written statement of an organization`s situation and purpose, which can stand on its own as the principle context to strategic planning directives or be used to support the creation of individual culturally attuned stories that will resonate with particular audiences and foster cohesion within the organization." (Regularly the Narrative is written as concise body text, preferably one single paragraph of no more than 200 words.)

It is essential that Narratives are approved and endorsed at the highest level in order to achieve permanence either alone or as part of an Information Strategy.

This Narrative then becomes the core element of the coalition's Information Strategy.

Development of Narratives

1. Narrative Framework

As guidance to the coalition mission, the Narrative forms a centrepiece for further military planning and operational design ('Narrative-led operations').[4] It forms the starting point and central input for the development and implementation of a common coalition communication plan: the Information Strategy.

The Narrative framework is a structural guideline for describing and analysing the problem area of a (potential) coalition engagement. It should be used at the earliest stage of the political coalition-building process. As such, it serves as an instrument for initial strategic planning in support of political level decision-making and action.

It consists of three building blocks:

- Situational context;
- Narrative landscape;
- Narrative script.

2. Narrative Development Process

Each of the three building blocks can be broken down into a series of steps comprising analysis, testing, and refinement activities within a continuous and iterative process:

- Purpose (Why to be done?);
- Input (What information is to be used and/or considered?);
- Procedure (What activities are required?);
- Involvement (Who needs to contribute?);
- Output (What products shall be delivered?);
- Tools & templates (What instruments shall be used?);.

This process can be tailored to the respective situation. The individual steps are therefore to be considered only a guideline and do not necessarily have to be dogmatically followed or sequenced through.

2.1 Situational Context

2.1.1 Purpose

The situational context analyses the background and context of a (potential) coalition engagement. It initially anticipates and later outlines purpose, aim and scope of the coalition mission as well as the coalition "desire" for the crisis region. It aims to provide an understanding of the overall crisis situation and its root causes. This understanding must

[4] Thomas Elkjer Nissen: Narrative Led Operations, Militært Tidsskrift, Volume 141, Number 4, pages 67-77, January 2013.

combine the coalition's point of view and other actors' perspectives, including the motives and desires driving their behaviour (which will be further analysed in the Narrative landscape). A key output from the context analysis is the identification of the actors and stakeholders that are most relevant to the coalition engagement.

The analysis of the situational context is an overarching, not a Narrative-specific effort. However, Narrative developers will contribute to the overall analysis of the situational context from their specific expertise.

2.1.2 Input

- Available political and military guidance, including strategic goals and desired end state;
- Assumed and/or formulated ambition of mandate and coalition engagement;
- Strategic assessments of nations and organizations;
- Agendas and interests of mandating organization(s) and coalition members;
- (Relevant/official) statements of involved organizations and coalition member states, as well as of other stakeholders;
- Discussion within, and agreements of coalition building process;
- Core and common values/principles of coalition members and partners (common denominator);
- (Assumed or stated) caveats, constraints and restraints;
- Results from (continuous) analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.

2.1.3 Procedures

- Define and structure the problem;
- Analyse context and aim of (potential) coalition engagement;
- Derive and refine coalition long-term "desire" for the crisis region;
- Identify actors and stakeholders relevant to the crisis development and their motivation;
- Indicate overarching, regional, and global impact of the crisis development.

2.1.4 Involvement

- (Strategic) analysts;
- Special staff, including StratCom, POLAD, LEGAD, CULAD and other relevant experts

and/or advisors as necessary/required as well as respective civil counterparts ideally from all relevant ministries/organizations.

2.1.5 Output

- Completed Situational Context template;
- Establishment of subject matter expert network (e.g., cultural and linguistic expertise on crisis region);
- Identified information requirements (guidance for analysis of IE, INTEL etc.).

2.1.6 Tools & Templates

The template below demonstrates how consideration of the above steps of the Situational Context leads to the statement of the coalition's desire as the first building block of the Narrative Framework.

1. Background & Context	*PMESII*
2. Purpose	*Why?*
3. Aim	*What?*
4. Scope	*How & How not?*
5. Interest & Benefit	
a. Individual coalition contributors	
b. Regional & local groups	
c. Others	
6. General & Overarching Potential Impacts	*Of crisis continuance*
a. Positive	
b. Negative	
c. Others	
7. General & Overarching Potential Impacts	*Of coalition actions*
a. Positive	
b. Negative	
c. Others	
8. Coalition Desire	

Figure 1: Template of the Situational Context

2.2 Narrative Landscape

2.2.1 Purpose

The Narrative landscape outlines results of the analysis of the Information Environment with a specific focus on the Narratives of relevant actors and stakeholders, such as coalition members, conflicting parties and local populace. It addresses the assumed desire and motivation of the considered actors, and their individual satisfactory outcome. Since Narratives are considered systems of stories, they are analysed in respect of existing myths, legends, characters, symbols, and stories. The analysis also compares objective facts on the (past, present, and future) situation development and the subjective reality perceived by the considered actors and stakeholders (considering tone and language of own and local media). In doing so, it shows which Narratives are dominant in a particular situation.

In order to prepare the development of a sustainable coalition Narrative, it is important to understand the cultural and situational frame for the interpretation of history and the development of the current situation and events. This addresses the question why and how the interpretation of specific actors leads to respective conclusions, emotions, decisions, and actions, and ultimately, their behaviour. A key output of this analysis is the identification of commonalities and differences among various effective Narratives and their interpretation in terms of events, activities, and any type of communication.

Findings from the analysis shape the definition of an overall outcome assumed to be acceptable to the analysed actors and stakeholders (most relevant to the crisis solution) from their perspectives. Understood as a common denominator, this overall outcome could indicate the most sustainable crisis resolution strategy since it focuses upon unifying commonalities, rather than separating cultural differences.

This identified overall acceptable outcome should be endorsed by the senior political (or military) leadership prior to the development of the Narrative script.

2.2.2 Input

- Results from the situational context analysis;
- Stakeholder analysis including target audience analysis;
- Lessons identified & lessons learned from previous experience.

2.2.3 Procedures

- Analysis of history, culture, religion etc..
- Define most relevant actors and stakeholders related to the crisis.
- Identify and summarize main existing Narrative(s) and dominant Narrative.
- Assess relevance of existing Narratives in terms of coherence, effects on international, regional and local audiences, short and long-term consequences etc.
- Identify and analyse myths, legends, characters, symbols, and slogans.

- Analyse existing institutional Narratives of involved organizations and partners.
- Propaganda and counter-Narrative analysis.
- Review lessons identified & lessons learned from similar previous crisis situations.
- Conduct media analysis.
- Identify satisfactory outcome for each relevant actor.
- Analyse and asses relevant actors and stakeholders; determine their relative significance in achieving the overall acceptable outcome and their willingness to be part of the process in relation to the achievement of the organization's desired end state.
- Derive overall acceptable outcome for all relevant actors.

2.2.4 Involvement

- Analysts, including cultural and language experts, ethnologists, historians, media specialists, and other subject matter experts, as appropriate;
- Experts from offices of ambassadors, diplomats, attachés, etc.;
- Experts from the communication disciplines;
- Military INTEL analysts.

2.2.5 Output

- Completed Narrative Landscape template;
- Stakeholder analysis schematic;
- Endorsed overall acceptable outcome;
- Further expansion of subject matter expert network;
- Identified information requirements (guidance for analysis of IE, INTEL etc.).

2.2.6 Tools & Templates

2.2.6.1 Narrative Landscape

The Narrative landscape is captured in the matrix below. It will be a highly detailed document, as analysts are encouraged to describe content within the above steps for **all** relevant actors without necessarily allocating them a role in the eventual Narrative. This information will be distilled in the production of the Narrative Script.

Conflict Description							
Groups	Desire & Motivation	Individual Satisfactory Outcome	Myths, Legends, Characters, Symbols Stories	Reality and/or Other Facts	Tone & Language of Own Media	Tone & Language of Local Media	Overall Acceptable Outcome
Coalition Partners							
Conflicting Parties							
Local Populace							
Other Stakeholders							

Figure 2: Template of Narrative Landscape

2.2.6.2 Stakeholder Analysis Schematic

In the Stakeholder Analysis schematic, each of the relevant actors and stakeholders are placed according their essentiality for achieving the organization's desire as well as how motivated they are in supporting the coalition to achieve its desire. In the next step, development of the Narrative script, this schematic will help assigning roles to the individual stakeholders. The schematic helps decide if one or several actors need to be considered opponents.



Figure 3: Stakeholder Analysis Schematic

2.3 Narrative Script

2.3.1 Purpose

The Narrative landscape is a collective description of different actors, their backgrounds and their place in the overall acceptable outcome. The Narrative script allocates the roles that the coalition wishes each actor to perform and the behaviour it wants them to show in the achievement of this outcome. This definition of roles is comparable to the description of characters in a script such as for a movie, TV-series, stage play, or novel.

In addition to reflecting the coalition's idea of any actor's roles, the Narrative script further defines how their related responsibilities and action patterns should be fulfilled. In other words, the defined roles are accompanied by actors' objectives and activities.

The Narrative script serves as plot or blue print for storytelling. By taking the most relevant findings from the Narrative landscape it connects conflict and desire to collective satisfaction (endorsed overall acceptable outcome) across the Narrative arc in a format which can then be used to craft a written Narrative.

2.3.2 Input

- Results from analysis of situational context and Narrative landscape, including endorsed overall acceptable outcome;
- Political and military guidance, level of ambition, and accepted level of engagement;
- Strategic assessments of nations and organizations;
- Agendas and interests of mandating organization(s) and coalition members;
- Relevant and official statements of involved organizations and coalition member states, as well as of other stakeholders;
- Core and common values and principles of coalition members and partners (common denominator);
- Assumed and stated caveats, constraints and restraints;
- Input from subject matter experts;
- Results from continuous analysis and assessment of the Information Environment.

2.3.3 Procedures

- Define most relevant actors;
- Along the idea of Narrative arc, identify options (courses of action) to get from the conflict and desire to the solution/satisfaction;
- Test and assess options in the light of political guidance (supported by appropriate methods, see chapter 4.4);
- Assign roles to relevant actors in accordance with most favourable options, including role of “opponent” (if applicable);
- Challenge the Narrative script from opponent perspective;
- Prepare most favourable option.

2.3.4 Involvement

- Subject matter experts;
- Civil and military planning experts;
- Political decision-makers or representatives from political decision-making bodies;
- Professional story, screen and play writers.

2.3.5 Output

- Completed Narrative Script template;
- Description of most favourable option within the Narrative Script template.

2.3.6 Tools & Templates

The Narrative Script template defines the different roles of key actors, distilling information where relevant from the Narrative landscape.

Conflict Description					
Actor	Role(s)	Desire & Motivation	Individual Satisfactory Outcome	Intended Behaviour	Overall Acceptable Outcome
	Owner/ Action Agent				
	Supporter				
	…				
	Opponent				
[Description of the most favourable option]					

Figure 4: Template of Narrative Script

3. Crafting the written Narrative

3.1 Purpose

By completing the Narrative framework, it is now possible to construct a concise but comprehensive written Narrative, which can stand on its own as the principle context to strategic planning directives or be used with the Narrative script to support the creation of individual culturally attuned stories that will resonate with particular target audiences. Nations and coalitions will adopt different perspectives as they construct their Information Strategies. In all cases, it is essential that the writer puts himself/herself in the mind of the coalition commander in writing this Narrative, which should conform structurally to the Narrative arc.

3.2 Input

- Narrative framework

3.3 Procedures

- Answering the following questions (conforming to the Narrative arc), using the information provided by the Narrative framework;
- "Red Team" the final Narrative.



Figure 5: Template of Narrative Script

3.4 Involvement

- Military staff with creative writing skills;
- Professional writers with military experience;
- Cultural advisers;
- Translators.

3.5 Output

- Concise body text, preferably one single paragraph of no more than 200 words.

4. Testing

4.1 Purpose

- Testing assesses elements of the draft Narrative prior to approval and should be conducted by an external group.[5] It is an essential element of Narrative creation that ensures the Narrative will be understood and accepted by coalition members whilst resonating with appropriate audiences and stakeholders. As the situation evolves, testing ensures that the Narrative remains consistent with emerging political guidance.

4.2 Input

The inputs for testing include:

- Draft/completed Narrative landscape and script;

[5] An advisory body outside the standard staff structure such as a PRISM cell, commander's initiative group or red teaming group.

- INTEL;
- Additional political strategic guidance;
- Assumptions (are they valid).

4.3 Procedures

The process for testing comprises

- Identifying, contacting, and gaining access to relevant red teaming/"war gaming"/role play expertise;
- Simulation;
- Expert panels;
- Pre-testing (focus groups, surveys, etc., if possible);
- Translation & re-translation;
- Marketing research (recall test, recognition test, etc.);
- Challenge the assumptions (are they still valid).
- 4.4 Involvement
- Strategic Communication experts (Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Info Ops, PSYOPS);
- LEGAD, POLAD etc.;
- INTEL, cultural experts, language experts, foreign area specialists, etc.;
- Selected representatives of relevant audiences;
- Research institutes;
- (High-level) political advisors.

4.5 Output

The output from testing is:

- A robust Narrative ready for approval;
- Future RFIs;
- Identified connotations;
- Once approved the, Narrative provides input for the development of the Information Strategy.

5. Approval of Narratives

It is essential that Narratives are approved and endorsed at the highest level to achieve permanence, either alone or as part of an Information Strategy. Different nations and coalitions will inherently adopt different procedures to achieve this.

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Appendix 1 "Template Instructions/Explanation"

SITUATIONAL CONTEXT

1. Background
   - Detailed Analysis of the Information Environment following the PMESII systematic.

2. Purpose

   (Close interaction with political process (resolution, mandating …) explanation)
   - Tradition and legitimation of the Coalition
   - Context/drivers/trigger for international engagement
   - References to resolution, mandate and mission statement
   - Description of development of crisis situation
   - Historical context of coalition-building
   - Coalition values
   - Reason for involvement
   - Reason for Engagement
   - Non-Purpose

3. Aim of Coalition Engagement

   (Close interaction with political process (resolution, mandating …) explanation)
   Aim gives the details of the purpose and what the Coalition tries to achieve in order to fulfil the purpose.
   - Strategic objectives;
   - Decisive conditions.

4. Scope of Coalition Engagement
   - Phasing;
   - Constrains/restraints;
   - Spectrum of coalition action;
   - In accordance with type of mission, including against vs. in support of/together with …
   - Risks

5. Interest & Benefit

a. Individual Coalition Contributors
   - Common credible, sustainable incentive for coalition members;
   - Sound cost-benefit-consideration (incl. Ethic basis).

b. Regional & Local Groups
   - See a. from regional & local groups' perspective.

c. Others

6. General & Overarching Potential Impacts of Crisis' Continuance

- Detailed description of the consequences if crisis continues without any outside/international intervention.

7. General & Overarching Potential Impacts of Coalition Actions
   - Detailed description of the consequences an outside / international involvement has for the region and for coalition nations.

8. Coalition Desire
   - End state
   - Long-term perspective for the region;
   - Future context, aligned with history, culture, and regional political developments.

Appendix 2 "Refinement"

PURPOSE

- Throughout the operation, the Narrative will be continuously assessed to identify any requirement to refine it. This ensures the Narrative remains consistent with political guidance as the mission evolves.

INPUT

The inputs for refinement include:

- Approved Narrative landscape and script;
- The Information Strategy;
- Feedback from relevant stakeholders;
- INTEL;
- Recent political strategic guidance;
- Mission statement;
- Operational design.

PROCEDURES

- Identify, contact, and gain access to relevant expertise;
- Gap analysis (through TAA, MOE, OA, CIMIC reports, media assessment etc.);
- Red teaming, "war gaming";
- Simulation;
- Expert panels;
- Focus groups, surveys, etc.;
- Marketing research (recall test, recognition test, etc.);
- Challenge assumptions (Are assumptions still valid?);
- Identify unintended consequences of the Narrative.

INVOLVEMENT (WHO)

- Campaign effect assessment staff (possibly as process leader);
- Strategic communication experts (Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Info Ops, PSYOPS)[6];
- CIMIC;
- LEGAD, POLAD etc.;
- INTEL, cultural experts, language experts, foreign area specialists, etc.;
- Selected representatives of relevant audiences;
- Research institutes;

[6] This should include personnel from previous rotations to provide corporate memory.

- (High-level) political advisors;
- Tactical level experts, such as TPTs.

OUTPUT

- Reviewed, adjusted, and refined mission Narrative;
- Input for refinement of the Information Strategy;
- Additional information requirements (guidance for analysis of IE, INTEL etc.);
- Input into OPLAN refinement.

Related Studies

DEU CD&E project “Analysis and Assessment of the Information Environment”

NATO ACT “Social Media” experimentation series

NATO ACT StratCom Capability Development & Implementation

Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) Focus Area Strategic Communication

Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Coalition-Building Guide (CBG)

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Definitions

Actor

Individuals (for example decision-makers and leaders; opinion leaders, opinion formers and spin doctors; journalists, editors, and media publishers)

Groups (population as a whole or parts thereof; for example by region, ethnicity, religion, activity; groups of the above individuals)

Organizations (government agencies and governmental organizations; international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, private volunteer organizations; regional and international enterprises; organizations of the above individuals and groups)

Actors need to be described by relevant characteristics, including the following: Personalities (comprising factors such as: psychological profiles/traits and personal history; culture, motives, interests, values, beliefs, attitudes, and stances; risk aversion, and sensitivities)

Diverse roles – official and unofficial

Perceptions, images, and opinions (How do actors see themselves and others? How do actors want to be seen? To what extent do actors trust the international community, coalition, coalition partners, other actors?)

Information flow and opinion-forming processes, main sources of information and trust in those

Intent and capabilities for conducting information activities/protecting the information environment against activities

Balance of power, including military, economic, socio-cultural, and religious aspects. In particular, control over media, communication/information processes and/or related means and infrastructure

Security situation and its stability, robustness, and sustainability

Supporters, and followers, and their respective subsistence levels; support networks; relationships towards other actors with regard to politics, security, economy, and psychology

Possible political, strategic, operational, and tactical short-, mid-, and long-term objectives, as well as their hierarchical schemes and prioritization of objectives (What do the actors want to achieve? How will they act in the information environment?)

Interrelationships and interdependencies between and among actors

Receptivity, addressing the psychological and technical/physical ability/capability of an actor to perceive/receive messages in any format (for example literacy, availability of electronic communication devices, use/ penetration of social media); this also includes aspects of external control, such as censorship

Susceptibility, addressing those issues that attract the actors' attention, regardless of the effects that may possibly result from consumption; also: 'areas of concern' to the actors (e.g. things they would read in a newspaper or radio station programmes they would tune to); these are often related to attitudes and values

Vulnerability, addressing those issues that directly affect cognition and emotion of the actors and can be exploited by own actions to create desired effects; assessment is based on results of present social research and refers to anxieties/fears and needs rather than to attitudes. (AJP 3.10)

Analysis
The study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions
Note: In the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification. (AAP-6)

Assessment
Staff must continuously assess and evaluate the impact of activities to determine what effect (intended or unintended) has occurred in the "target audience". Prior to any intervention, staff require baseline data on what represents normal and current perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of the target audience. This evaluation will inform of any necessary adjustments to activities and be feed into the overall campaign assessment process.

Attention
The interest that is shown in someone or something; the regarding of someone or something as interesting or important

Attitude
A settled way of thinking or feeling about something

Audience
An individual or group that witnesses an event or information conveyed through social audio-visual or printed media. In communication terms these can be divided as follows:
a. Ultimate. Those targeted, directly, or indirectly, by a product or activity.
b. Intermediate. Those reached, but not directly addressed nor presumably targeted. Clearly used to assist in getting something to the ultimate target audience
c. Unintended audience. Those reached, but not addressed nor targeted by product or activity. Such audiences will not be apparent until after the action and subsequent MOE. (AJP 3.10.1 (B))

Belief
Something one accepts as true or real; a firmly held opinion.

Campaign
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6)

Capability
Forces or resources giving a country the ability to undertake a particular kind of military action

An actor's capacity for action is dependent upon his physical capabilities and their utility in a particular situation. Information activities will seek to affect those capabilities, such as command, control and communications infrastructure and propaganda facilities that enable actors to understand a situation and apply their will.

a. Information activities seek to degrade, disrupt, deceive, destroy or deny those capabilities that allow adversary decision-makers to increase their understanding; bolster, impose, apply and sustain their will and to exercise effective command.

b. Within a comprehensive approach, information activities also seek to attack the source of an adversaries' power base, splitting internal and external groupings and alliances. The aim is to influence their decision-making processes, thereby preventing them from taking the initiative.

c. Information activities also aim to protect those capabilities. For example, friendly command, control and communication infrastructure that allow the JFC to exercise effective command, impose his will as well as seize and maintain the initiative. (AJP 3.10)

Chief Info Ops
The Chief Info Ops at each level is the commander's subject matter expert on Info Ops and advises the commander on issues relating to the Information Environment. He is responsible for the overall direction of Info Ops through the headquarters coordination and synchronization process and chairs the IACB on behalf of COS. Chief Info Ops leads the integration process, ensuring prioritization, de-confliction and unity of purpose for all information activities undertaken within the command. (AJP 3.10)

Command and control warfare
The integrated use of all military capabilities including operations security, deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare and physical destruction, supported by all-source intelligence and communication and information systems, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy an adversary's command and control capabilities while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against similar actions. (AAP-6)

Communication
The imparting or exchanging of information by speaking, writing, or using some other medium. Communication denotes the exchange of information between individuals through a system of signs, symbols, or behaviour. Based on: [MNE6 FC 2010]

Communications
Means of sending or receiving information, such as telephone lines or computers

Communication and information systems
A collective term for communication systems and information systems (AAP-6)

Coordinating authority
The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

Counter-propaganda
Counter-Propaganda is a multidiscipline effort led and coordinated by Info Ops to analyse an adversary's counter command and propaganda activities, to develop approaches and synchronize actions to counter these as appropriate. PSYOPS forces and assets, supported by other functions, take a lead role in the analysis of adversary's propaganda and support a variety of IA to counter it. (MC 422/4)

Credibility
The success of communication depends on their credibility from the target audience's perspective. The use of indisputable facts helps to ensure that given information survive the scrutiny of audiences. Conversely, the use of false information has the potential to undermine the credibility of subsequent PSYOPS (even if they are truthful), converting a possible short-term gain to long-term loss. Credibility will also depend on the Alliance's ability to deliver on its promises and meet any obligations made in PSYOPS products. (AJP 3.10.1)

Cyberspace
The imaginary place where electronic messages etc. exist while they are being sent between computers

Cyber-war
The use of computer technology to disrupt the activities of a state or organization, especially the deliberate attacking of communication systems by another state or organization

Effect
A change that somebody/something causes in somebody/something else; a result

A change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements), that results from one or more actions, or other causes

Influence
To cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a particular entity. (Selected projection or distortion of the truth to persuade the opposition to act in a manner detrimental to their mission accomplishment while benefiting accomplishment of friendly objectives) (AJP 3.10)

Information
Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence (APP-6)

Information activities
Actions designed to affect information and/or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protection measures. (MC 422/4)

Information effects
A desired condition created in the information environment as a result of information activities. Information effects should be measurable in order to enable analysis, planning, execution and assessment of related actions and the effects them self.

Information environment
Is comprised of the information itself, the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information, and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs. (MC 422/4)

Information factor
The actuality of information pervading societies, such that actors and audiences have become increasingly indistinguishable: 'to observe is to be part'. Every action sends a message, intended or not: 'one cannot not communicate'. In the military, information is meanwhile recognised as a decisive factor per se that will increasingly affect the operational factors force, space and time. (MNIOE)

Information management
The means through which an organization maximizes the efficiency with which it plans, collects, organizes, controls, disseminates, uses and disposes of its information, and through which it ensures that the actual value and the potential value of that information is identified and exploited to the fullest extent. (MNIOE)

Information operations
Info Ops is a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and NAC approved audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives. (MC 422/4)

Information objective
List of Information Objectives that are to be achieved or contributed to by military means, derived from mission-specific strategic and political guidance on information activities and the strategic OPLAN, Annex O (if available). (AJP 3.10)

Information strategy
The information strategy forms the interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political guidance for information activities across all levers of power in support of mission objectives. Based on: [MNE6 FC 2010]

Information system
An assembly of equipment, methods and procedures and, if necessary, personnel, organized to accomplish information processing functions. (MC 422/4)

Key leaders engagement
Key leader engagements are engagements between NATO military leaders and the key decision-makers of approved audiences that have defined goals (such as a change in policy or supporting the JFC's objectives). These engagements can be used to shape and influence local leaders within the operations area or may also be directed toward specific groups such as religious leaders, academic leaders and tribal leaders (for example, to solidify trust and confidence in NATO forces). Info Ops supports these engagements by identifying and maintaining a database of all key actors within the joint operations area and their inter-relationships. Having detailed knowledge of key leaders' personalities, leadership styles, ambitions, motivations, objectives (short and long term), current stances, dependencies, psychological profiles and personal histories is essential to providing the context to plan appropriate information activities. A vital component in all plans will be to recognize the complex, adaptive relationships and dependencies that exist between actors. The Info Ops staff will coordinate the commander's key leaders engagement plan (KLEP). This contains information on the situational context (planning milestones), critical events, planned contacts of the command group and special staff (key leaders) with relevant actors, objectives, main themes or issues to be addressed, desired effects and measure of effectiveness. (AJP 3.10)

Knowledge development
Knowledge development (KD) is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity carried out at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. It provides commanders and their staff with a comprehensive understanding of complex environments, including the relationships and interactions between systems and actors within the engagement space.

Measures of effectiveness
NATO Military Public Affairs is the function responsible to promote NATO's military aims and objectives to audiences, in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the Alliance. This includes planning and conducting external and internal communications, and community relations. Military PA at each level of command directly supports the commander and may not therefore further delegated or subordinated to other staff functions. (MC 457/2) (AJP 3.10.1)

Measures of performance
Measure of performance (MOP) is a criterion used to assess task accomplishment. For example, 'the intended target audience picked up and read the leaflets (or the functionality of a particular weapon system)'; this can be summed up as did we do things right? (AJP 3.10)

Media
Personnel (for example, management, owners, financiers, stakeholders, publishers, editors, journalists, employees)

Assets (official and unofficial, open and covert; used or employed by actors for indirect communication, information, entertainment, and other related purposes, including traditional communication, new and emerging media). (AJP 3.10)

Media operations
All activities pertaining to managing the interaction with the news media; can refer to the function responsible for such activities, such as the "media operations section." (MC 457/2)

Message
Any thought or idea expressed briefly in plain, coded, or secret language, prepared in a suitable form for transmission by any means of communication. (MC 422/4)

Objective
A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed (AAP-6)

Propaganda
Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view. (AJP 3.10.1)
Information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly:

- Black: Purports to originate from a source other than the true one.
- Grey: Does not specifically identify any source.
- White: Disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof. (MC 457/2)

Psychological Operations

The primary purpose of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) is to influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or groups in accordance with NAC approved PSYOPS objectives, to induce or reinforce behaviours favourable to overall Alliance objectives. PSYOPS plans and activities have to be in accordance with strategic guidance on information activities and Information Objectives determined in the Operation Plan (OPLAN) (See Annex 3B). Unlike Public Affairs (PA), PSYOPS retains direct control over contents, dissemination and audience. Effective PSYOPS requires timely provision of intelligence, resources such as linguistic support, graphics and print capability, broadcasting capability and other delivery mechanisms. Message presentation methods include print, radio, television, loudspeakers, face-to-face contact, the Internet, faxes, pagers and telephone. Besides the employment of own assets local media services may be contracted. Special support through reach-back can increase planning depth and production output. (AJP 3.10)

Military Public Affairs

Military PA and Info Ops are separate, but related functions. Both directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions; however, Military PA is the commander's interface with the media and the public in accordance with policy described in Reference E. Military Public Affairs is intended to improve public awareness and understanding of the military aspects of the Alliance's role, aims, operations, missions, activities and issues, thereby enhancing organizational credibility. NATO StratCom guidance provides the means to effectively synchronize military PA with IA, through the appropriate staff mechanism, in support of the Commander's operational objectives.

a) Although Military PA and Info Ops require similar planning, message development and media analysis are both conducted within the same overarching StratCom framework, their activities differ in audience, scope and intent. Therefore all IA must be closely coordinated with Military PA in order ensure consistency in the messages to external audiences and to promote overall effectiveness and credibility of the campaign.

b) This coordination is initially achieved through NATO's StratCom guidance documents. At the operational and tactical level it is advanced through regularly scheduled coordination boards and working groups. The chairmanship for these bodies is stipulated by the Commander. While coordination is essential, the lines of authority will remain separate and there shall be no overlap of personnel during operations.

Public Affairs
Public Affairs (PA) is the commander's interface with the media and the public. PA at each level of command directly supports the commander and should not be further delegated or subordinated to other staff functions. The chief, Public Affairs Officer (PAO) directly reports to the commander. Info Ops officers will not be used in a PA role and, conversely, PA officers will not be used in an Info Ops role; there shall be no personnel overlaps during operations in staff designated for Info Ops on the one hand and PAOs on the other. The PAO is responsible to the commander for all media relations, internal communication and community relations plans and activity. He coordinates with Info Ops staff to ensure that PA and other military information activities are mutually consistent.

Public Diplomacy
The totality of measures and means to inform, communicate and cooperate with a broad range of target audiences world-wide, with the aim to raise the level of awareness and understanding about NATO, promoting its policies and activities, thereby fostering support for the Alliance and developing trust and confidence in it. See SG(2003)0876(INV).

Strategic Communication
Strategic Communications (StratCom) are the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – public diplomacy (PD), public affairs (PA), military public affairs (Military PA), information operations (Info Ops) and PSYOPS, as appropriate – in support of the Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims. Strategic communications provide direction and guidance, including the strategic Narrative for the implementation of all information activities. (AJP 3.10.1)

NATO StratCom is a Pol-Mil process to ensure that NATO communications and information activities and disciplines are coherent, mutually reinforcing, and advances NATO's aims. It closes the gap between Alliance actions and messages. IA have potential strategic level effects. For this reason IA, planned and conducted at all levels, must reinforce relevant StratCom objectives and the overall Narrative. Commanders at the operational and tactical level ensure through the Info Ops function that all military information activities are properly coordinated as well as integrated into the operational planning process and support the overall StratCom approach. (MC 422/4)

Target
The object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex, an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation, neutralization or destruction by military forces.

Target Audience
An individual or group selected for influence or attack by means of psychological operations (see also audience). (AJP 3.10.1)

Theme
The unifying subject or idea of a message or set of messages (MC 422/4)

Understanding
Understanding and empathy are key to PSYOPS; target audience analysis is the tool by which this is achieved. Effective analysis should provide a rich contextual understanding of the cultural, historic and social composition of the target audience, along with a deep awareness of emotive and credible themes and symbols, all of which can be used to affect short-term behavioural and long-term attitudinal change. Knowledge development (including all-source intelligence (ASINT)) is essential to effective understanding. PSYOPS should be empathetic to the target audience's existing behaviours and attitudes to recognise how they may be changed or reinforced. It is also likely to make us more aware of what may create a negative effect. (AJP 3.10.1)

Will
Mental powers manifested as wishing, choosing, desiring, or intending. 'Will' includes factors such as motivation, intent, attitude, beliefs and values.

Glossary

CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
COA	Courses of Action
COG	Centres of Gravity
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COPD	Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
CPOE	Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment
CRM	Crisis Response Measure
CULAD	Cultural Advisor
EW	Electronic Warfare
FRAGO	Fragmental Order
GENAD	Gender Advisor
IACB	Information Activities Coordination Board
Info Ops	Information Operations
INTEL	Intelligence
JCB	Joint Coordination Board
JCO	Joint Coordination Order
JCWG	Joint Coordination Working Group
JOPG	Joint Operational Planning Group
JSEB	Joint Synchronisation Execution Branch
JTB	Joint Targeting Board
KD	Knowledge Development
KLE	Key Leader engagement
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LNO	Liaison Officer
LoE	Level of Engagement
LoO	Lines of Operation
MCDC	Multinational Capability Development Campaign
MEDAD	Medical Advisor
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
MNE	Multinational Experiment
MNIOE	Multinational Information Operations Experiment
MOE	Measurement of Effectiveness
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OPSEC	Operational Security
PA	Public Affairs

POLAD	Political Advisor
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RFI	Request for Information
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SitCen	Situation Center
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SPD	Strategic Planning Directive
StratCom	Strategic Communications

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ENDORSEMENT

During the June 2014 MIC Principals meeting and its post-meeting action phase, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations include: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

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INTRODUCTION

The Ops Sup MIWG was tasked in June 2013 to update the CBG volumes concerning cyber. As a result the CIS MIWG cyber paper, which was prepared in a draft form, was used as a basis for the development of this CBG. This CBG is provided as a guideline for the planning and implementation of cyber defense within the MIC community. Most MIC countries have created cyber strategies at the national government level, and several have established, or are in the process of establishing, strategies for their Ministries of Defence (MoD). As a general observation, all MIC nations recognize that the "cyber" environment, although difficult to define clearly, is an area that affects military forces and must therefore be considered carefully for coalition operations.

ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

The following assumptions and constraints apply:

a. **Assumption #1** – NATO cyber discussions may also include Australia. NATO classifies cyber discussions as NATO Restricted, thus placing specific NATO considerations "out of scope". MIC nations that are also NATO members will pursue cyber defense policy discussions within the Alliance context. NATO discussions involving cyber defense, and particularly those involving non-NATO partners working with NATO in operations can be expanded to include Australia, for example as a Partner Nation.

b. **Constraint #1** – "Cyber" is imprecise. The definition of "cyber" and "cyberspace" differs between MIC nations and in some cases nations have not fully defined them. In general, cyber refers to computers, computer systems, networks, software and data. Most nations clearly distinguish between Information Operations (IO), Computer Network Defence (CND) and Computer Network Operations (CNO) but the relationships between each type of operation may differ significantly[1]. For military operations, the thinking expands to include the terms: cyber warfare, cyber security and cyber defense.

c. **Constraint #2** – Limited to defensive aspects. National sensitivities and the unclassified information nature of the CBG necessarily restrict the discussion to concern the defensive and computer protection areas only, ie. computer network defense (CND).

[1] For DEU the difference between Cyberspace and Information space is very important; Cyberspace in DEU understanding does not cover personnel and human factors, because this could mix up Computer Network Operations (CNO) and Information Operations.

d. **Constraint #3** – Limited discussion forums. Currently, there is no 7-eyes forum that consults on cyber issues of mutual concern. Principals may wish to consider this for the MIC agenda going forward. Some nations consider NATO rather than MIC to be the preferred venue to develop cyber concepts for coalition operations, and have recommended against creating multiple, possibly redundant discussion forums.

CONTEMPORARY COALITION COMPUTER NETWORK ENVIRONMENT

NATO has set minimum security requirements for national networks connected to a coalition network i.a.w. the NATO Cyber Defence Action Plan. It has also developed a methodology to identify, what national networks are connected to NATO networks and are critical for operations of the alliance. NATO is developing the Future Mission Network (FMN) as a framework for coalition Networks.[2] The NATO FMN Implementation Plan (NFIP) being developed will cover CIS Security and Cyber Defence requirements in the range of governance down to technical implementation guidelines.

a. Increased complexity. The contemporary coalition computer operating environment will most likely include a combination of national strategic classified networks, mission classified networks involving national enclaves, and some form of unclassified information sharing with very broad participation e.g. interagency, NGOs. These combinations make the operating environment exceedingly complex, and this complexity is expected to increase in the future.

b. Federated constructs. Future mission classified networks will likely take the form of a "federated" system similar to NATO's current Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN). This construct adds a new layer of complexity, since effective defense of a federated network requires the coalition to standardize on their joining instructions, pre-planned responses and standard operation procedures - such as the frequency for anti-virus updates and common mitigation measures to counter the insider threat. FMN and MPE are developing standardization elements (e.g. Joining Membership Exit Instructions (JMEI)).

c. Internet ease of use. Leveraging its wide availability and ease of use, unclassified information sharing networks will rely primarily on the Internet or national extensions into the Internet to support operations in the contemporary environment. Unclassified networks may migrate to services hosted on the internet by the lead nation. These internet-hosted services will therefore be exposed to a broad range of threats.

d. Information sharing portal. The capability to provide an unclassified but reasonably secure information sharing portal varies amongst the MIC nations. One nation has a designated enterprise sharing solution, while other nations have no capability for sharing unclassified information with non-traditional partners.

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[2] Mission Partner Environment (MPE) is the US framework that enables coalition and joint force commanders access to a mission partner operating environment.

The Cyber environment presents some common requirements and planning factors for nations involved in a coalition operation:

a. National requirements. For their military command and control, communications & information systems, and intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance (C2, CIS and ISR) systems, nations must decide on the best arrangements for computer network defense (CND) between their in-place strategic systems and those that are deployed in support of coalition operations. Some nations may have well established capabilities to deploy CND operators. In other cases, national strategic CND operations may have insufficient coverage or awareness of the deployed network configuration to permit such connections.

b. Risk assessments. Nations must consider whether it is acceptable to deploy their national systems into a coalition environment, or whether the risks introduced from coalition partners justify a preference for deployment of a Mission Network. Nevertheless a Dynamic Risk Assessment Process has to be in place to mitigate the vulnerabilities against Cyber Attacks throughout the entire operation. A challenge for mission networks is to ensure effective and efficient transfer of information from national strategic C2 and ISR sources.

c. Linkages required to Allied nations' militaries. For planning their national CIS connectivity with coalition partners, nations should use well established relationships where possible. Examples include: NATO, AMN, Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB), and CENTRIXS. Previously arranged coalition networks have worked through many issues relating to security and network defense and can therefore be more easily deployed with coalition militaries.

d. Linkages required to non-military organizations (the International Organizations, NGOs, UN agencies) require special attention to connectivity arrangements and CND measures. The use of uncontrolled devices (e.g. non-Defence laptops, Personal Electronic Devices, etc.) that are permitted direct access to coalition systems will introduce unmanageable vulnerabilities into the network operating environment. It is not normally acceptable to authorize user access to national systems without some form of formal security vetting. User verification processes must be established if internet-based systems are used. These need to be administered efficiently to facilitate timely access for a large volume of users, but they must be robust enough to minimize the risk of compromise to unauthorized users.

e. Certification and Accreditation (C&A). Nations should adopt standardized approaches to C&A for networks and rules of engagement (ROE) for CND. Standardized C&A is needed for national systems as well as for the protection of other Allied nations' systems which every coalition member benefits from. Planners must endeavour to understand the nature of non-military connections, and those non-military networks (if any) and their associated threats / risks. Planners need to present these issues as factors for deliberate C&A decisions concerning information access. C&A decisions for federated networks will require a much better understanding of the risks accepted by other national networks. The issue may extend beyond the confines of CND. If coalitions establish access control measures on interface points (e.g. national gateways), we need to have effective processes to maintain appropriate configuration of business rules that control the flow of data across the perimeter. Gateway operations need combined SOPs for problem resolution and escalation. The NATO Accreditation Process should be used or at least recognized. In addition, the Multi-National Security Accreditation Board (MSAB) can be used to help develop and maintain an appropriate framework for the mutual recognition of security accreditation for multinational connectivity of CCEB nations, NATO nations and sponsored nations/organizations.

f. Collaborative services. Coalition partners will have different expectations of the types of services or applications used for collaboration or C2. Collaborative services based on Open Standards for data exchange, rather than using proprietary protocols developed for bespoke or specific commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) applications offer advantages. Open standards allow the use of national applications within the coalition operating environment to the greatest extent possible. The introduction of 'new' applications into national enclaves presents configuration management challenges that are best avoided from both an integrated logistics support (ILS) perspective as well as for security purposes. Planners should consider that Open Standards have difficulty in supporting the necessary security mechanisms that will permit their wide use for some classified networks. Approved NATO standards are able to provide enhanced interoperability and security features.

THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES

Threats and vulnerabilities in a contemporary coalition computer network environment are examined generally, reflecting the unclassified nature of the CBG.

a. Widely varied threats. A wide range of threats to coalition networks exists to include state sponsored programs, hacktivists, terrorists, criminals, recreational hackers, the ever-present insider threat, and more global strategic considerations such as supply chain vulnerability. As a component of network certification and accreditation, equipment manufacturers and the supply chain used to produce system components are a threat factor for consideration. Acknowledging this strategic level consideration, some nations consider that the supply chain aspect is not a military planning factor at the operational level for coalition operations.

b. Unintentional threats. There is a risk created from unintentional faults introduced by system administrators of other national systems, for example when an unintentional router miss-configuration may result in a DOS effect throughout the entire coalition network. These threats could lead to the theft, or exploitation of data, data manipulation, denial of service, and destructive actions which could seriously compromise the coalitions' ability to achieve its mission.

c. Broad Vulnerabilities. Agreement exists that coalition networks face a very broad range of vulnerability considerations:

- It is difficult to achieve total network defense. Vulnerabilities will always exist and they may be exploited in yet-to-be-determined ways as the threat capabilities continue to develop.

- Risk mitigation measures follow a similar format for all nations: Detect the threat, deny access, repair the damage, and resume service. However, the method for accomplishing each of these differs. As examples, not all MIC nations have invested in classified/unclassified "Public Key Infrastructure", and no agreement exists on the use of Identity Management for permitting access to networks and data.

- Western military engaged in coalition operations is acknowledged as being highly dependent on CIS across all functional areas.

- Low barriers to entry exist. Potential adversaries do not have to build expensive weapons systems to pose a significant threat to coalition and national security.

d. Socially engineered attacks. Some nations have noted an increase in socially engineered email attacks or "spear phishing" activities against their personnel. As a counter to this threat, increased emphasis is placed on user education in addition to technical measures to deny access to these adversaries. It is expected that socially engineered threats will become increasingly sophisticated and more difficult to counter, requiring continuous vigilance and investment in education and defensive capabilities.

e. Nations may introduce risk. From an Allied perspective, a cooperation should exist at the early planning stages of building a coalition network capability:

- Planners must understand and respect Allied nations' threat & risk assessments on their networks before connecting their systems to a coalition network.

- All partners must realize that with each additional nation or organization to a network, additional threat and risk considerations arise and could affect all who are connected.

f. Non-military may introduce risk. From a non-military perspective, experience has shown these connections present risks that equate to open connections on the internet. Non-military participants in coalition operations do not necessarily feel obliged to follow military or national government security rules. For planners, including non-military organizations in coalition network planning could be considered similar to permitting access to the public / international media orgs.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Considering the contemporary coalition operating environment, in addition to the cyber threats and vulnerabilities presented, some general coalition network planning and operational considerations have emerged as applicable for nations joining a coalition, as well as for coalition planners:

a. Centralize and simplify. Consider reducing and if possible centralizing to one national organization having the responsibility for making the connections and conducting CND and C&A activities relating to connections to Allied and non-military organizations. This centralization may be easier to accomplish for those nations with relatively small militaries.

b. Understand national risks. Acknowledge that risks to the networks are accepted by different organizations in each of the nations. Each nation should identify to central coalition planners which of their organizations are involved in the C&A process. For example, the United States and Germany take a risk managed approach to networks. This balances operational benefits against network risks, with the operational community deciding whether the benefits outweigh the risks. In some nations, risk acceptance decisions for networks are made by the intelligence community.

c. Use best CND practices. Wherever possible, apply international best practices for CND. These sources may include products and results of discussion within NATO and other CND related organizations like the NATO CCD CoE, EDA, ENISA. .

d. Understand nations' C&A processes. Follow standard national C&A processes for all connectivity planning. Understand and respect the C&A processes of our Allies who we are connecting with, but also recognize that risk calculation and migration strategies differ between nations. Coordinate these activities closely. Consider shared risk aspects, ie. risks to others of your network connections. This relates to coalition network risks as well as risks to other nations' systems.

e. Extra attention on non-military connections. In light of the additional risks presented, great care must be taken in planning for connection to non-military organizations. However, it is also necessary to ensure the adequate amount of connectivity is available to ensure the desired operational effect is achieved. Connections to non-military orgs are often essential to mission success.

f. National Lexicons. While standardized use of terms between partners is not essential, it is important that we have sufficient knowledge about other party's use of a term to align terms with our national lexicon.

POTENTIAL FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

Information sharing benefits. It is agreed by all concerned parties that the coalition cyber defense security posture will be increased by developing international shared situation awareness and warning capabilities that will assist with collective self defence. Some nations consider collective "deterrence" to be a closely related military consideration for CND, while others prefer network "resilience" as a more applicable to military planners since it implies an in-depth cyber defense posture for the cyber domain. The 5-eyes IA/CND MOU explicitly permits that sharing of CND responses, as well as situational awareness exchanges and other CND information sharing. Other bi-national agreements exist, but they do not appear to permit the sharing of pre-planned responses.

Coalition Building Guide. Considering the MIC Coalition Building Guide (CBG), any CBG amendment with easy to convey, general information relating to the cyber domain would be helpful to potential coalition members. Planning factors for coalition CND and cyber security advice on "things that coalition planners look for in nations" are suggested as possible additions. Operational procedures or standard reactions to network attacks tend to be "mission specific" and therefore are probably not helpful additions to the CBG.

CND Training. Many nations are addressing user training through NATO, International Computer Network Defence Coordination Working Group (ICCWG) and other international group exercises and activities. Future combined/coalition training activities/exercises would be beneficial to facilitate the sharing of pre-planned responses and SOPs, with the caveat that participating nations would have actually established the plans and procedures and have them in place. Care must be taken so as not to interfere with the primary training objectives of these combined exercises (i.e. much the same reason as EW/jamming is not routinely conducted on coalition exercises).

Terminology differences. Nations should establish clear and common understanding of terminology relating to cyber and CND. Lexicons should be exchanged to achieve this common understanding. Given the general willingness of nations to exchange information, it is unnecessary to adopt or force adherence to a standard CND terminology.

CND Doctrine development. As Cyber is considered a new operational domain for warfare, it is understood that even if all MIC nations agree on this principle, other nations may only be at the early stages of development whereby they are only beginning to considering the possibility. In many cases, the articulation of the cyber domain in doctrine remains in its formative stages. Significant questions arise when considering aspects beyond passive defensive measures. Questions relating to the

permissibility in coalition operations of Active Defence or "full spectrum" operations and measures to defend national interests extend into the (national) policy realm and are thus beyond the MIWG's discussion mandate for CND. Similarly, the MIWG members did not pursue the question of whether a substantial Cyber attack is considered an Act of War by nations or groups of nations with Treaty obligations (i.e. NATO, ANZUS). National declarations resulting from such a weighty consideration would necessarily be invoked at a high strategic level, well beyond the purview of coalition military planners, and could trigger a range of response options that may not be limited to cyberspace actions.

NATIONAL AND DEFENCE STRATEGIES

The following is a summary of participating MIC nations' relevant government and military cyber strategies and policy developments.

AUSTRALIA

a. Australia's Government released a Cyber Security Strategy in November 2009 that formalized roles, responsibilities and policies for intelligence, cyber and policing agencies to protect Australian internet users. The unclassified Strategy is available via the Internet.

b. An Australian Government Cyber Crisis Management Plan was released for internal government use in 2011.

c. Defence Cyberwarfare policy and Implementation Plan has been developed and endorsed at the 3-star Information Operations Coordination Committee (IOCC). These documents are to be Approved by the SEC/CDF.

d. A Cyberwarfare Joint Doctrine Note has been developed. This serves as a discussion paper and a decision as to whether formal doctrine is required or not should be determined in late 2014.

e. An MOU on information assurance and computer network defense (IA/CND) has existed between the 5-eye nations since 2003.

f. A draft Defence ICT Security Strategy has been developed and is being socialized at the 2-star level across all Groups and Services.

CANADA

a. In October 2010, Canada's government announced its Cyber Security Strategy in October 2010 with funding and intended to enhance protection from cyber threats for Canadian federal government systems, critical cyber systems outside the federal government (Provinces and Territories), critical infrastructure providers and Canadian citizens. The strategy aims to improve security for government information systems, strengthen critical infrastructure, and protect personal information "on-line". Areas of emphasis include public and private partnerships, building on international relationships, and combating cyber criminal activities. The unclassified Strategy is available via the Internet (http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/cbr-scrt-strtgy/index-eng.aspx).

b. The Department of National Defence (DND) contributes to the Government's strategy through participation and information exchange at the strategic / policy and operational levels. The Government facilitates regular meetings of professional groups and information sharing between government departments' network operations centers. The role of DND in the Cyber Security Strategy is to defend Canadian military networks , work with other Government

Departments to identify threats and possible responses, and continue to exchange information about cyber best practices with Allied militaries..

c. DND created a network operations center capability in the early-1990s which continues to ensure that vital military command, control and communications information systems are defended in the cyber environment. This Canadian Forces Network Operations Centre (CFNOC) is effectively developing the operating procedures for DND's computer network defense.

d. A new joint military Director General (DG) for Cyber was established in August 2011 within the national headquarters' Chief of Force Development (CFD) organization. This DG leads a Cyber Force Development (Cyber FD) team which documents joint CAF Cyber requirements, develops cyber concepts, recommends future cyber capability investments and coordinates military participation in international cyber meetings and events. He also leads the enterprise architecture and Joint C4ISR programs to ensure the "CAF Cyber terrain" is defendable.

e. Cyber continues to be considered a military "operational domain", however doctrine has not been developed. DND is currently reviewing the C2 and organizational structures to manage cyber operational capabilities.

f. CAF Cyber doctrine is the responsibility of the Director of Cyber FD (within DG Cyber) and a centralized approach is being taken to this work to ensure the Maritime, Land and Air doctrine developers align with the joint Cyber concepts and doctrine.

FRANCE

a. Following the release of the 2008 French White Paper on Defense and National Security, a national agency for cyber defense was created in 2009: the **ANSSI ("Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information)**.

b. The unclassified part of the National Strategy was published on February 15th , 2011 and is available on the Internet.

c. The French MoD Joint concept of cyber defense (classified RESTRICTED) exists. This document is written in concordance with the national strategy and provides centralized direction for cyber defense efforts inside the MoD. A French MoD Joint doctrine for military cyber defense (classified Restricted) was developed in January 2012.

d. The French White Paper on Defense and National published in April 2013 stated clearly the French national global doctrine with two complementary aspects:

- The implementation of a strong and resilient posture of protection of the information systems of the State, operators of vital importance and strategic industries, coupled with an operational organization of defense of those systems, coordinated under the authority of the Prime Minister

- A capacity of governmental global and appropriate answer to attacks of various nature and scale, which uses at first all the diplomatic, legal or police means, and the gradual use of the Ministry of Defense's means, if the national strategic interests were threatened.

e. The French MoD Joint doctrine for military cyber defense (classified Restricted) has been updated to take into account the White Paper orientations and to integrate even more the cyber operations in all stages of the military operations.

GERMANY

a. A National Strategy exists and was published on February 23rd, 2011. The Strategy is available via the Internet. The Federal Government advocates, as part of this cyber security strategy, the strengthening of preventive IT security measures in Germany. The focus in this connection is particularly on the protection of critical infrastructures and on international cooperation within the framework of a concerted cyberspace foreign policy.

b. The Cyber Security Strategy for Germany covers all types of IT incidents. The aim of the Cyber Security Strategy is to keep cyberspace as a domain where freedom, security and the rule of law prevail.

c. "Cyber security" is understood in this context as a comprehensive approach that requires collective acceptance of responsibility by all participants from the state, economy and society. It focuses on civil approaches when it comes to preventive and reactive protection of organic or friendly IT systems and infrastructures. The Federal Office for Information Security is, in its capacity as national IT security authority, responsible primarily for the advancement of IT security in Germany. Being the central IT security provider for federal agencies and institutions, the Federal Office for Information Security hence also works with manufacturers as well as private and commercial users and suppliers of information technology. The prime aims of the Federal Office for Information Security are yet closer cooperation with all actors in the IT and Internet industry in the field of IT security and support for the national Cyber Security Strategy (CSS).

d. The core aspects of the Cyber Security Strategy are:

(1) **Establishment and development of a National Cyber Response Centre.** The National Cyber Response Centre was set up at the Federal Office for Information Security on 1 April 2011. The Cyber Response Centre serves as an information platform for administrative cooperation between the Federal Office for Information Security, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK), the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), Germany's Customs Criminological Office (ZKA), the Federal Police (BPol) and the Bundeswehr, all of whom participate within the framework of their constitutional and statutory requirements. Liaison personnel have been

detached from the IT security organization of the Bundeswehr, central management and MAD (German Military Counterintelligence Service) to the National Cyber Response Centre for this purpose. The Centre functions on a co-operative basis, with the authorities concerned retaining their tasks and responsibilities. It optimizes the work between all the state agencies and coordinates measures aimed at protecting against and repelling IT attacks.

(2) **Pooling and coordination of information-sharing on IT security.** The BKA, or Federal Criminal Police Office, is responsible in its central agency role for police measures in combating criminal IT attacks. It is, under Section 4 Subsection 1(5) of the Act on the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKAG), also responsible for police measures to counter criminal IT attacks that pose a threat to the internal or external security of the Federal Republic of Germany or to vital facilities. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution is responsible for counterespionage in cyberspace. Measures initiated and adopted by other federal agencies and institutions to protect their IT systems in Germany range from offers for users, to the advancement of certified basic functions (such as De-Mail, electronic ID card), to specific support for such individual areas as commercial enterprises by the Task Force on "IT Security in Commerce" of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. Operational protection against attacks on the IT infrastructure of federal agencies and institutions falls within the remit of the Federal Office for Information Security . The Federal Office for Information Security also has an influence, through the standards and recommendations it publishes, on cyber security in the commercial sector.

(3) **Establishment of a National Cyber Security Council.** This inter-ministerial body at state secretary level works together under the chairmanship of the Federal Government Commissioner for Information Technology. The Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Chancellery, Federal Foreign Office, Federal Ministry of Education and Research, Federal Ministry of Defence, Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Federal Ministry of Justice and Federal Ministry of Finance, together with two representatives from the federal states and four associated representatives from the commercial sector, consult on current developments in the field of cyber security. It is within this joint high-level body that cyber-related issues are discussed politically and examined prospectively. The Cyber Security Council convened for the first time in May 2011 and has since met on a further four occasions.

(4) **Protection of critical infrastructures** in continuation of the CIP implementation plan. Under this umbrella, close cooperation between operators of critical infrastructures and the state has been built up since 2007 with a view to providing protection against IT disruptions. All areas of critical infrastructures, such as energy supply, are meanwhile reliant on IT and networked with one another. Outages would not only have serious consequences for the German economy but could also affect the common good and the functioning of state institutions.

(5) **Development of a concerted and coordinated cyber foreign policy.** This includes, particularly, the representation of German interests within the various international organizations and bodies that deal with cyber and/or Internet issues, as well as bilateral consultations with allied nations and with those states that subscribe to different views on the security and freedom of information. The Federal Foreign Office has, for this purpose, set up a cyber foreign policy coordinating staff.

e. All actors having full information on the current cyber risk situation is, in principle, a prerequisite for the nation's capability to act and the basis for a coordinated national response to attacks from cyberspace. Mechanisms for the early detection of dangers and the existence of warning and alerting systems are, also, central elements of the national cyber security strategy. The use of certified products and services additionally provides greater security in particularly sensitive areas.

f. The Federal Office for Information Security attends to these three aspects as part of its statutory tasks and responsibilities (especially as required under Section 4 of the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG): central clearinghouse for the IT security of federal agencies and institutions; under Section 5 BSIG: defense against malware and risks posed to the communications technology of federal agencies and institutions; under Section 7 BSIG: warnings; under Section 8 BSIG: security standards; and under Section 9 BSIG: certification).

g. Early detection is a 'pillar' of the cyber security strategy. An important hub for the sharing of information on the current risk situation, for early detection and for timely warning ahead of IT attacks is the Computer Emergency Response Team for federal agencies and institutions ("CERT-BUND").

h. This organization, established at the Federal Office for Information Security, analyses incoming incident reports, updates situational information and, from that, develops suitable technical recommendations on how to proceed.

i. The Computer Emergency Response Team of the Federal Office for Information Security is the central point of contact for precautionary and reactive measures regarding security- and availability-relevant incidents in computer systems. These incidents are handled in cooperation with the pertinent CERT-BUND members.

j. Cyberspace also has defense-related and military dimensions. According to the Cyber Security Strategy for Germany, military cyber security focuses on the amount and share of IT systems used militarily by Germany in cyberspace.

k. Militarily, cyberspace can today be classified as a so-called operational domain, comparable to maritime, air- or outer space. In that respect, while taking its special features into account, it is subject to the same strategic and operational principles that also apply in the classical domains.

l. On the topic of risk management, the Bundeswehr continually analyses and assesses the threats and risks posed to its IT system. To do this, the Computer Emergency Response Team of the Bundeswehr (CERTBw) keeps an updated picture of the IT security situation on the basis of an information exchange agreement with other national and international CERT organizations as well as with the support of its sensor technology. The Bundeswehr IT System Operations Centre additionally maintains an updated picture of the overall situation regarding the Bundeswehr IT system, including risks of a non-IT nature (e.g. natural disasters, fire). In the event of a possible critical situation, a risk management board representing the domains/areas affected by the risk(s) is convened, on which the officials responsible for the protection and restoration of security coordinate action.

m. The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Materiel, Information Technology and Equipment Management, or BAAINBw, and the accompanying CERTBw work closely together with the Federal Office for Information Security and the CERT-BUND established there, including the IT Situation and Analysis Centre of the Federal Office for Information Security, on the basis of the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIG). The aim of the cooperation is to identify and assess sources of risk as early as possible and to take concerted countermeasures as quickly as possible. Close cooperation with national and international manufacturers of IT security products is always important in this regard, too. The Bundeswehr notifies any critical IT security incidents to the IT Situation and Analysis Centre of the Federal Office for Information Security, as required under the “General Administrative Regulation Pertaining to Section 4 of the Act on the Federal Office for Information Security". Should the Federal Office for Information Security identify a general or national IT crisis, the IT Situation and Analysis Centre is then expanded into an IT crisis response center.

n. Fundamental issues of IT management and IT security of federal agencies/ institutions are, in addition, dealt with by the inter-ministerial Council of IT Commissioners (also known as the IT Council), on which the Bundeswehr is represented by its IT Director.

The Cyber Security Strategy for Germany has taken the existing measures of the Federal Government for assuring cyber security in Germany to a further level of development.

ITALY

a. On several international occasions, some main issues like info sharing, training and exercises identified a need to integrate cyber in all military activities. This has been stressed and highlighted as a national priority.

b. National Strategy in a specific Inter-ministerial round table (which includes the MoD) was established and work is in progress.

c. In 2012 the MOD wrote a specific military policy; a brand new document on CNO has been written in first draft.

GREAT BRITAIN

a. In November 2011, the UK Government published the UK Cyber Security Strategy. This built on the National Security Strategy of 2010 and aimed for the UK in 2015 to:

> *'derive huge economic and social value from a vibrant, resilient and secure cyberspace, where our actions, guided by our core values of liberty, fairness, transparency and the rule of law, enhance prosperity, national security and a strong society'*

It seeks to achieve this through 4 objectives; to tackle cyber crime, to increase resilience to cyber attack, to help shape an open, vibrant and safe cyberspace and to develop the necessary knowledge and skills to ensure our cyber security. These objectives are delivered through the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP).

b. The MOD is delivering transformation in its approach to cyber as an operational space, and cyber defence through the Defence Cyber Security Programme (DCSP) which is primarily funded from the NCSP. In accordance with the direction in the Cyber Security Strategy it has established a Joint Cyber unit to focus efforts on the defence of the MOD networks and systems with the intent that this effort will be integrated with Information Assurance through the newly formed Joint Force Cyber Group (JFCyG).

UNITED STATES

a. The President of the United States has published an "International Strategy for Cyberspace" (May 2011), which largely seeks to treat cyberspace according to accepted international norms. This includes the inherent right to self-defense, where hostile acts in cyberspace represent a national threat. The President's strategy also includes strengthening international partnerships and highlights that network defense requires components for both dissuasion and deterrence. The unclassified Strategy is available via the Internet.

b. In the United States, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) achieved full operational capability in October 2010. USCYBERCOM will fuse the U.S. Defence Department's full spectrum of cyberspace operations. The command is charged with pulling together existing cyberspace resources, creating synergy that does not currently exist and synchronizing war-fighting effects to defend the information security environment. Complementing this international strategy is the "Department of Defence (DoD) Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace" (July 2011). DoD strategy also states that the United States reserves the right to defend national assets as "necessary and appropriate", employ an active network defense, and to increase cyber defense exercises.

c. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (10 Sept 2012) introduces globally integrated operations. In this concept, Joint Force elements, globally postured, combine quickly with each other and mission partners to integrate capabilities fluidly across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations.

d. It is DoD strategy to build robust relationships with U.S. allies. To help achieve this, DoD seeks to develop an international shared situational awareness and warning capability. In the United States, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defence of specified DoD information networks; prepare to and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable activities in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries.

e. DoD Strategy also states that the United States reserves the right to defend national assets as "necessary and appropriate", employ an active network defence, and to increase coalition cyber defense exercises.

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