MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL
COALITION BUILDING GUIDE (3RD EDITION)

VOLUME II
STRATEGIC DESIGN AND PLANNING

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ENDORSEMENT

During the March 2015 Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG) meeting, the ***MIC Steering Group (SG)*** representatives approved and endorsed this document as contributing to the development of operational practices that enable more effective coalition operations across the contemporary operating environment.

The MIC SG representatives are the senior or lead O-6/NATO OF-5 from each MIC member nation's national defense headquarters/staff operations/plans branch, representing their respective MIC Principal and nation.

The SG is responsible for assessing and managing the MIC's work and recommending MIC strategy and guidance to the MIC Principals to facilitate improved interoperability for enhanced coalition operations. The MIC member nations are: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing multinational and or coalition interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment and articulating actions at the strategic and high operational level that, if nationally implemented by MIC member nations, will contribute to more effective coalition operations.

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RECORD OF CHANGES

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1. Minor formatting and grammar edits.
2. Updated Chapter 4 section IV with NATO ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), footnote.
3. Added section XI, Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR) Considerations, to Chapter 6.Updated Chapter 6 section I, Information Operations in order to provide a linkage and the new CBG Volume III.15 - Strategic Communications document.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF CBG VOLUME II

Volume II covers the principles of planning coalition operations at the strategic level by addressing the broad lines of recommended organization, processes and tools for a coalition to ensure more robust cohesiveness within the coalition at the strategic, military level. Its overall design is based on an understanding of national positions, and developing shared and agreed assessment of the situation, desired strategic end state, exit strategy and predictability of the risks and costs.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in the number of temporary coalitions and alliances to deal with crises and complex emergencies around the world.

Success in resolving unsatisfactory situations requires that all aspects of any crisis political, military, law and order, informational, security, economic, and humanitarian assistance be addressed nearly simultaneously in a coordinated manner. **The more coalition members and non-governmental interagencies/actors exchange information, estimates, options, the more the advice given to the political authorities will converge and the more political alignment would be made possible**.

!

Having stated the above it is incumbent on national staffs to embrace early collaborative engagement with multiple agencies sharing the intent to improve the situation. Therefore, Collaborative staffing planning must be seen as:

- Organization and processes, to provide guidelines for national staffs in their effort to efficiently collaborate and smooth over divergences
- Procedures and tools at the strategic level, to elaborate a common strategy to deal with the crisis and allow future coherent operational planning

Volume II is intended to facilitate the understanding of each nation's decision making process and to propose a common framework in which each possible coalition member can fit. It is not intended to replace national decision-making processes, but to be run in parallel.

Understanding the different national processes and some key cross functional considerations is important in determining where there are interfaces in national collaborative planning processes in MIC nations in order to facilitate collaboration with one another and develop common formats based on our understanding of the various MIC nations' national collaborative planning processes.

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CHAPTER 1 – CAMPAIGNING

0101. A **campaign** is a: 'a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces'.[1] It demands a way of thinking and specific processes that together enable the effective use of military capability, usually as part of a comprehensive response, to achieve favorable outcomes. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, Chapter 5 provides further detail on campaigning within *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Campaigning is underpinned by a number of guiding principles:*

a. Take a long-term view about both the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict.

b. Focus on strategic and operational outcomes as well as the conditions required to realize them.

c. Plan and execute a campaign in concert with the other instruments of power where practicable.

d. **Embrace collaborative engagement with those multiple agencies sharing the intent to improve the situation**. !

e. Consider the whole situation and recognize that it is complex, adaptive, non-linear, and, to a certain extent, unpredictable.

f. Conduct continuous analysis and assessment to deepen understanding of changing environments and to modify planning and execution.

0102. **Operational Art** is the orchestration of all military activities, in concert with other agencies, to convert strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to achieving a desired outcome. Although developed to address bi-polar, force-on-force operations, the concept is equally applicable to contemporary operations in which crisis resolution does not necessarily hinge on military success. It embraces a commander's ability to take complex and often unstructured problems and provide sufficient clarity and logic (some of which is intuitive) to enable detailed planning and practical orders.

0103. **Ends, Ways, and Means**. Operational Art seeks to match 'ends, ways, and means' in planning and conducting operations. **It requires that a commander and his staff appreciate the strategic context and answer three basic questions**: !

a. **Ends**. What conditions should be attained in the operational area to achieve the strategic objectives? If the political objective changes, as it sometimes will, over

[1] AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

time or in response to changing events, that new objective will invariably create a requirement for a change in the plan or even a new campaign plan.

b. **Ways**. What broad approaches will establish these conditions? Which instruments of power combine within these approaches?

c. **Means**. What capabilities and other resources are available and should be applied, within established limitations, to produce these conditions? How are the military and non-military instruments integrated to achieve these conditions? The commander considers the nature of the force, what objectives are within its grasp, and the nature of the risks, and their possible mitigation, inherent in pursuing that objective with the given force?

0104. **Operational Design** frames the problem, and then develops and refines a commander's operational ideas – his vision of how he sees the campaign unfolding – to provide detailed and actionable plans. Operational Design continues, often interrupted by changes in strategic guidance, throughout the duration of the campaign; it should not be deemed complete or immutable from the outset and never simply implemented as a given without adaptation in the face of changing circumstances. Review and refinement are critical aspects of continuous operational re-design, as the situation changes in response to military intervention, the actions and reactions of other actors (including adversaries), and the unavoidable consequences of chance and friction. It is for this reason that a commander should become accustomed to uncertainty, and should thrive on turning chaos to his advantage. **To that end, the commander should exploit assessment (including the invaluable contributions from his own battlefield circulation, dialogue with coalition partners and collaboration with other actors) as an integral part of his campaign design process.** [2]

!

0105. **Operational Management** integrates, coordinates, synchronizes and prioritizes the execution of operations and assesses progress. Because conflict is inherently adversarial, an opponent's responses will inevitably affect the course of an operation. Assessing the course of the operation and then acting quickly (in order to modify the plan to meet assigned objectives in light of changed circumstances) should be the main way in which a commander commands the force.[3]

[2] Extracted from Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine, Chapter 5.
[3] Ibid.

CHAPTER 2 – STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE

SECTION I - PURPOSE AND SCOPE

0201. A coalition is not very different from an international organization, the mechanisms on the field being very similar. Any strategic planning or consideration normally begins with the identification of an unsatisfactory or deteriorating situation by one or more nations who have a common interest in collaborating to deal with the area at stake. In a multinational environment, preliminary consultations occur between capitals, leading to the choice of a potential framework in which to operate (UN, NATO, EU, coalition…).

0202. A coalition, as it is an ad-hoc gathering of nations, suffers from a lack of a permanent structure, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the European Union Political and Security Committee (PSC), where decision makers and strategic planning group can physically gather.

0203. In most cases, though, the coalition is initiated and hosted by one member of the potential coalition, called the Lead Nation (LN)[4]. In that case, the coalition facilities are offered by the LN at an early stage. However, in some cases, the choice of the LN may not be as obvious as in others. In this event, the lack of permanent structures and procedures may delay the reaction capabilities of the coalition and even reduce its efficiency, especially if a common strategic end state has not been stated.

0204. For any intervention to be coherent, national and multinational processes must be clearly articulated and iterative. Planning staffs must understand where and how they can interface and share information with partner nations when planning coalition operations. This Strategic Planning Guidance chapter is intended to facilitate the understanding of each nation's decision making process and to propose a common framework in which each possible coalition member can fit. It is not intended to replace national decision-making processes, but to be run in parallel.

0205. Strategic staffing must be seen as

a. Organization and processes, to provide guidelines for national staffs in their effort to efficiently collaborate and smooth over divergences.

b. Procedures and tools at the strategic level, to elaborate a common strategy to deal with the crisis and allow future coherent operational planning.

[4] **"**Political consensus depends on […] political consultation allowing all participating Nations to be part of the decision-making process. With a firm legal basis and a designated LN, in depth political consultation is made possible through the creation of a political authority in which each Nation will be represented at an appropriate level (e.g. Ambassador). Military participation in this process should be provided by a corresponding military authority." *(**CBG Volume I**, page 5, 0117).*

0206. Implemented through a distributed collaborative planning, and collaborative staffing raises some challenges:

!

a. **First, understanding national processes is important in determining where there are interfaces in national strategic planning processes in partner nations in order to facilitate collaboration with one another and develop common formats based on our understanding of the various partner nations' national strategic planning processes**.

b. Second, definitions, doctrines and procedures are necessary to be able to share the same vocabulary and understanding.

c. Finally, mechanisms to exchange information (not necessarily intelligence) must be identified, in order to elaborate a common strategic end state, identify common strategic objectives, provide an initial estimate on the forces each nation may provide and to establish the go/no-go criteria for a Nation's military participation in the operations.

0207. To overcome these challenges, this chapter will:

a. Assume no LN has been identified at the beginning of the process[5].

b. Focus on military collaborative planning activities at the Strategic Level.[6]

c. Assume that national co-ordination between services, ministries, and agencies is an ongoing process.

d. Remain as close as possible to the existing national processes, since coalition member nations' militaries have different influences and authority regarding national decision making to employ military forces in response to a crisis.

e. Illustrate the Crisis Management process from the first exchange of information up to the initiating directive to facilitate understanding and coordination.

f. Offer a possible framework for high level mechanisms when engaging a coalition of nations in crisis or conflict resolution, based on the following building blocks: analysis and assessment of the situation; identification of the desired strategic end state and the appropriate strategic objectives leading to this strategic end state; initial considerations regarding the approaches and the means to deliver them and assess the effectiveness of their implementation. The designation of specific actors responsible for implementation remains a national prerogative.

[5] Considering that if a LN had been identified, it would be hosting the assessment and planning process.
[6] Operational planning tools and procedures already exist, which can be used by a coalition.

g. Provide a list of existing and or experimental tools in support to these processes at the strategic level.

SECTION II - THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN A COALITION ENVIRONMENT

PURPOSE

0208. In order to determine strategic staffing procedures and tools, this section intends to identify the phases describing the Crisis Management Process for a coalition. Although no formal organization might be in place (such as the NAC), the chronology described is very similar to the NATO Crisis Management Process.

PHASE 1: INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS

0209. The first phase in the crisis management process is the "**indications and warnings"** phase. This is when each nation provides to its national communities of interest (COIs) (inter-agency) its understanding of the situation.

PHASE 2: ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION

0210. When building a coalition seems to be a relevant option, a common assessment of the situation is required to set the basis for a possible coalition. This "assessment of the situation" phase is generally conducted by the diplomats. The military and other agencies being associated to the national decision-making process vary by nation. It should lead to a decision on the establishment of a combined/coalition operation and provide the first estimate on which nations will participate in the combined/coalition operation along with the potential identification of a LN.
At this point, the strategic assessments[7] *are still to be considered national; therefore, this is mostly a distributed phase*.

PHASE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDED RESPONSE OPTIONS

0211. To frame the coalition, nations should converge on a common way forward. Ideally, they will be committed to achieving common intermediate-states and a final strategic end state. This is the "development of recommended response options" phase, where political and strategic options are discussed, based on a common assessment/estimate of the situation. The purpose of this phase is to agree on a broad coalition crisis resolution concept, using as many levers of power[8] as possible. **At this stage, nations willing to participate in the operations should be identified and the LN should be chosen, if not done so earlier during Phase II Assessment of Situation**. This would normally be the time for a political statement, or the

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[7] The strategic planning is an interagency process, where various stakeholders' assessments are gathered. The military assessment process at the stage is commonly referred as the "initiation phase".
[8] Being called DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy) or 3Ds (Diplomacy, Defense and Development)…

proposal for a United Nations Resolution, giving a mandate to the Coalition, based on this Crisis resolution concept. **With or without a mandate, the strategic planning could be initiated, leading to the development of a Coalition Comprehensive Strategy while an Operational Commander would be designated**.

!

Like in the previous phase, distributed planning would most likely remain the most efficient way to collaborate. Indeed, being far away from their national authorities makes it harder for planners to answer questions and give national positions. Furthermore, while interagency planning is already a difficult task to achieve nationally, doing it away from the central decision makers would most likely make it unproductive.

PHASE 4: OPERATIONAL PLANNING

0212. On completion of Phase 3, an Initiating Directive must be issued, being the start point to the "operational planning" phase.

Operational planning would most likely take place in the LN's headquarters, under the Operational Commander's authority.

PHASE 5: EXECUTION

0213. The next phase is the "execution" phase, which is not considered in this document.

SECTION III - PROPOSED STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

PURPOSE

0214. The main purpose of this section is to identify the outputs and documents that should be produced by the strategic planners and the procedures to ensure this can be done on a distributed basis.

CHALLENGES

0215. Strong situational analysis and understanding of the strategic environment within the country and region, as well as the international context are crucial elements of any intervention. The more thorough the analysis of the strategic context, and the clearer the idea the coalition has of its strategic objectives, desired strategic end state and transition mechanisms to a stabilization phase, the better the chances are that the intervention will go smoothly and that deployments will not be protracted. Therefore, it is useful to identify some of the main challenges facing national political and senior military authorities in the establishment and employment of a coalition:

!

a. **The willingness to share/exchange national views, common interests and strategic assessments**

b. The correct understanding of the strategic environment in establishing go/no criteria

c. The achievement of common and agreed:
   i. Strategic end state
   ii. Strategic Narrative[9]
   iii. Strategic option
   iv. Command and control arrangements
   v. Rules of engagement
   vi. Resource contribution of each nation

d. Integration of all instruments of national power

e. Early interagency and multinational coordination !

f. Development of mechanisms to interact effectively with all actors

0216. Based on these challenges, the following SOPs are proposed, inspired from the Strategic Planning Guide (SPG) developed during past Multinational Experiments.

PHASE 1: INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS

0217. In this phase, the possible members of the coalition are not identified yet: therefore national SOPs apply, while diplomatic talks and liaison officers' consultation may occur.

PHASE 2: ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

0218. In this phase, the objective is to build a Coalition Strategic Assessment, allowing a common understanding of the situation. This is the first step of the actual Coalition Strategic Planning, which is essential in order to develop a common strategic vision among the coalition.

0219. The first part of coalition building is based on the sharing/exchange of common intelligence and or information, and national views of the situation/crisis aimed at improving awareness, perception and understanding of the situation. Potential coalition members share their national assessments of a probable or existing conflict situation, agree on a common narrative, identify common interests and available resources, and decide on a common strategic end state. Bearing in mind the attainment of the final end state, if too difficult to describe in precise terms during initial planning, coalition members may/will agree on a medium term strategic end state (which could be called stabilization end state or transition strategic end state) along with strategic objectives with associated timeframes, which will enable the coalition to overcome the major obstacles in reaching the long term strategic end state (strategic vision). If necessary, nations will continue to review their assessment of the situation as the strategic planning process progresses providing their national communities of interest (COI) and agencies with their understanding of the situation. **Therefore, to ensure unity of effort in a multidisciplinary planning process and to fully support the operational** !

[9] See CBG Volume I, Annex B – Terms, Page B-3

planning process it is essential to precisely define the coalition's objectives and end state to be achieved as soon as practically possible.

0220. This phase is generally conducted by nationally empowered representatives, such as diplomats, Chief of Defense Staffs and other high ranking agency officials, being associated to the national decision-making process. The elements developed during this phase will be presented to the political decision makers who will in turn decide whether or not to commit their nation to dealing with the situation within a coalition.

0221. In most cases, the military are the most capable in conducting information exchange[10], nationally and internationally; therefore, they may be the agency designated to coordinate transversal information exchange (see below) between nations. Vertical information exchange takes place nationally, through an interagency basis, using the full spectrum of DIME instruments[11].



0222. The main inputs are:

a. National Strategic Assessments

b. National proposals for a Strategic Vision

c. A preliminary notion of resources that nations could offer

!

[10] These information exchanges will of course remain non-binding, certain decisions and analysis being forwarded through the conventional political forums.

[11] DIME describes the instruments of Power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic. It may include other instruments such as cultural, humanitarian, civil administration. Civil instruments (C.) such as police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection should also be considered.
The humanitarian dimension (H), including humanitarian aid through IOs and donors should be taken into account, when necessary. It may be included in the Economic (E) instruments, but has security, informational and operational implications.

0223. The main outputs from this phase are:

a. A Coalition Strategic Assessment

b. A proposed Coalition Strategic Vision

c. A proposed Strategic End State

d. Proposed Coalition Strategic Objectives

e. A decision on whether or not to intervene (i.e., establish a coalition)

f. Identification of potential members and partners to a coalition

g. Early identification of a potential lead nation

h. A preliminary notion of resources that nations could offer

i. An overview of the limitations and constraints

0224. At this point, a first estimate of the time frame should begin to come out, possibly identifying short term and long term objectives. This time frame would be the basis for the elaboration of the exit strategy.

PHASE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDED RESPONSE OPTIONS

0225. Following the strategic assessment, this phase can be divided in two major steps:

a. Development of a Crisis Resolution Concept (CRC), possible basis for a mandate (supposedly a United Nations Resolution)

b. Development of the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy (CCS), from which an initiating directive will be issued to the Operation Commander

0226. Development of the Coalition Crisis Resolution Concept:

a. The purpose of this phase is to develop strategic roadmaps for achieving the strategic end state, based on the outputs derived from the previous phase. The selected roadmap chosen by the political governance process will represent the Strategic Option/Coalition Crisis Resolution Concept (CRC), which includes all levers of power[12] for the intervention.

[12] Being called DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy) or 3Ds (Diplomacy, Defense and Development)…

b. The Crisis Resolution step is a two-stage process. First, planners will study each strategic objective separately and derive its associated decisive conditions. Second, they will undertake a cross optimization of decisive conditions leading to the achievement of all strategic objectives defined in phase 2.

c. It is also during this step that the LN will be selected based on the potential coalition members previously identified. As with the Strategic Assessment step, national strategic assessments will continue to be reviewed.

!

d. **The main output from this step will be the coalition CRC, which is to include the**:

   i. Consolidated Coalition Strategic Assessment
   ii. Strategic Vision
   iii. Strategic End State with a timeframe and broad resources estimate
   iv. Strategic Objectives to reach the strategic end state
   v. Selected Strategic Option and an associated exit strategy
   vi. Outlined Integrated Information Strategy that incorporates the Narrative
   vii. Mandate for the appointment and defining the responsibilities and authority of a Coalition Special Representative in region for the intervention and Core Staff, tasked to establish an Interagency Implementation Forum
   viii. Identification of the LN

0227. Development of the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy:

a. This step develops the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy (CCS), which provides strategic guidance for subsequent planning (operational planning process) and evaluation efforts. The CCS provides the necessary elements to enable coordinated interagency implementation processes within and throughout all national instruments of power by refining and bringing greater detail to the previously agreed Strategic Option. That document includes the Initiating Directive, handed over to the Operational Commander.

b. The CCS is intended to be used for planning and evaluation purposes inside coalition partners' organizations. Coordination with international and regional organizations, local authorities, governments in the region of concern, NGOs, etc. will be sought whenever possible and feasible from a security perspective. Therefore, guidance within the CCS should include direction to coalition military authorities on expected and authorized interaction, including DIRLAUTH, with such non-coalition actors as are considered crucial to the definition and achievement of the desired strategic effects.

c. In developing the CCS, planners will further refine, expand or alter, within the parameters of the strategic option; the decisive conditions laid out in the CRC, and

provide an initial idea of their prioritization and sequencing. Strategic planners will also develop the initial assessment guidelines to evaluate the success or progress towards the strategic objectives and strategic end state. Implementation level planners will report back on progress being made towards the achievement of decisive conditions, which will in turn allow the strategic level to evaluate overall progress or readjust the strategy if necessary.

d. **This step culminates in the CCS representing the tenets that will support the execution of the cooperative implementation planning (CIP) process, which includes**: !

   i. Reasons justifying an intervention
   ii. National restraints, constraints and caveats
   iii. The Strategic Vision
   iv. The Strategic end state
   v. The Strategic Objectives
   vi. The Strategic Option, including a proposed exit strategy
   vii. A risk assessment
   viii. Indications of capabilities and resources required
   ix. A time frame, based on the estimated time necessary to achieve the strategic end state and strategic objectives
   x. Mandate for the appointment and defining the responsibilities and authority of a Coalition Special Representative in region for the intervention and Core Staff, tasked to establish an Interagency Implementation Forum[13]
   xi. Further development of the Coalition Information Strategy (to include themes and objectives)
   xii. Measures of effectiveness to evaluate the success of the strategic objectives and strategic end state
   xiii. Expected and authorized interaction with non-coalition actors

PHASE 4: OPERATIONAL PLANNING

0228. After the above phases have been completed, the Initiating Directive is issued, starting the "planning phase". Operational planning generally takes place in the LN's headquarters, under the Operational Commander's authority. Operational planning can be conducted in parallel (with the strategic and tactical levels) or co-operatively with only one CONOPS and one OPLAN between the strategic and operational levels.

[13] At a minimum, this implementation forum should be composed of the military operational planning group with close coordination with the other agencies involved in the CCS. At the best, this operational planning would be conducted on an interagency basis, all departments sending planners.

0229. Planning methods and tools already exist for Operational Planning, which can be used in a coalition environment.

The following matrix summarizes the Crisis Management Phases and identifies where the three strategic planning steps above fit into the process. This is important to understand as the Crisis Management Process is designed to facilitate political consultation and decision-making.
The Matrix also identifies other staffing procedures, such as participants, places, reference documents or possible exchange means.

STRATEGIC STAFFING PROCESS MATRIX

0230. Following a trigger event and when a coalition intervention is being considered the following process should be undertaken by all potential coalition members and partners:

Strategic Staffing Phases	Strategic Planning Steps	Action	Description	Output/Documents Produced	Staffing and exchange procedures(1)
PHASE 1 **Indications and Warning**		National Analysis / Assessment	Alert / Warning	National Strategic Assessment	Nationals Sensors • Embassies • Liaison Officers
PHASE 2 **Assessment of Situation**	**Strategic Assessment**	Situational Analysis and Assessment	• Exchange of national views, common interests and strategic assessments by all potential coalition members. ▲ • Official and unofficial talks between nations "J" staffs and inter-agencies. ▲	• Coalition Strategic Assessment • National resources available • Letters of agreement • Identification of national perspectives and unacceptable situations	*Who?* • Embassies • Liaison Officers • Heads of Departments • National – International Development Agencies • Experts (including Military) • IOs and NGOs *How?* • BICES • Secure Voice • CENTRIXS (Secure) • APAN (Unclassified)
		Agreement on a Strategic End State	Common long-term strategic end state endorsed by all coalition members. Sometimes referred to as "Vision".	• Proposed coalition Strategic End State • Potential identification of a Lead Nation	
		Identify Strategic Objectives	Together with the Strategic strategic end state, describes the main path that will lead the coalition to overcome the major obstacles to reaching the Strategic End State.	Proposed common coalition Strategic Objectives	

Strategic Staffing Phases	Strategic Planning Steps	Action	Description	Output/Documents Produced	Staffing and exchange procedures(1)
PHASE 3 **Development of Recommended Response Options**	**Crisis Resolution Concept**	Identification of Strategic Options	• Identify challenges to the coalition • Develop strategic effects • Organize synchronized and coherent decisive conditions • Identify potential lead instruments of power • Elaborate on possible road maps • Assess the road maps	Coalition Crisis Resolution Concept document (basis for a Political statement) ▲, to include: • Coalition Strategic assessment • Strategic end state • Key strategic objectives • Possible strategic road maps • Coalition Information strategy • Identification of the lead nation, if not established earlier	*Who?* • Heads of Departments • Experts (including Military) • Liaison Officers *How?* • BICES • Secure Voice • CENTRIXS (Secure) • APAN (Unclassified)
	Coalition Comprehensive Strategy	Development of the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy	The strategy will be based on the strategic option (Roadmap) chosen by the political level, refined and studied in greater detail to identify the strategic actions that will be undertaken by all levers of power. Its endorsement will officially launch subordinate operational planning processes.	Coalition Comprehensive Strategy, to include: • Coalition Strategic Assessment • National restraints, constraints and caveats • Strategic end state • Estimated time to achieve the strategic end state • Strategic desired effects	*Who?* • Liaison Officers • Heads of Departments • Experts (including Military) *How?* • BICES • Secure Voice • CENTRIXS (Secure) • APAN (Unclassified)

Strategic Staffing Phases	Strategic Planning Steps	Action	Description	Output/Documents Produced	Staffing and exchange procedures(1)
… **PHASE 3 (cont.)** **Development of Recommended Response Options**	**Coalition Comprehensive Strategy**	… Development of the Coalition Comprehensive Strategy (cont)	…	• Allocation for the responsibility for the achievement of the strategic effects, to include supported and supporting relationships at the DIME level for each effect. • Range of sequenced and coordinated strategic actions • Guidance on expected and authorized interaction (including DIRLAUTH), and coordination process/activities between civilian , military and non-coalition actors • Indication of available resources • Assessment methodology to evaluate impact and progress of the campaign	*Who?* • Liaison Officers • Heads of Departments • Experts (including Military) *How?* • BICES • Secure Voice • CENTRIXS (Secure) • APAN (Unclassified)
		Initiation (Start of Operational Planning Process)	Roadmap must be translated in a Military Strategic Option to initiate the Operational Planning Process	Initiating Directive issued. ▲	*Who?* Heads of Military staffs *How?* • CENTRIXS (Secure) • APAN (Unclassified) *Reference:* GOP **(2)**

Strategic Staffing Phases	Strategic Planning Steps	Action	Description	Output/Documents Produced	Staffing and exchange procedures(1)
PHASE 4 **Operational Planning**		Orientation	The designated LN is hosting the Operational Planning group, with representatives from each participating Nation.	Commander's planning guidance.	*Who?* Military Planning Groups *How?* • COPlans, • TOPFAS, • SADES *Reference:* • GOP • MNF SOP
		Concept Development		CONOPS Statement of Requirements (SOR) ▲	
		Plan Development		OPLAN ▲	
		Plan Review		▲	
PHASE 5 **Execution**	*Not considered in this document*				

▲ National Authorities' Decision, including formal statements to the International Community

(1) NOTA: In a distributed staffing process, military tools are the most reliable, efficient and secure communication systems
(2) Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP)
(3) Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange (CENTRIXS)
(4) All Partners Access Network (APAN): Unclassified network for cooperation, coordination and collaboration with the humanitarian community and other stakeholders
(5) Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP): https://community.apan.org/mpat

CHAPTER 3 – MIC NATIONS' STRATEGIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK

GENERAL FRAMEWORK

0301. This framework is a generic model to simplify the comparison of the various national decision making processes. **From a coalition perspective Phase 2 – Multinational Assessment is seen as an essential phase as it not only represents the beginning of coalition planning but is the point at which coalition planning staffs can commence sharing and collaborating information**. The "Political GO ▲" within the framework represents points during the process where national authority go/no go decisions will be made.



AUSTRALIA (AUS)



Notes:

Military Strategic

ADHQ -Australian Defence Headquarters
CDF -Chief of Defence Force
CJOPS -Chief Joint Operations
SCG -Strategic Command Group
MSC -Military Strategic Commitments (Strategic J3/5)
HQJOC -Headquarters Joint Operations Command
DGPlans -Operational J5
DGOps -Operations J3
SPG -Strategic Planning Group
JPG -Joint Planning Group
DCC -Defence Coordination Centre (ADHQ Watch Centre)
IPDIV -International Policy Division
DIO -Defence Intelligence Organisation
DIGO -Defence Imagery & Geospatial Organisation

National Strategic

NSC -National Security Committee
IDETF -Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force
DFAT -Dept of Foreign Affairs & Trade
PM&C -Dept of Prime Minister & Cabinet

CANADA (CAN)



Notes:
PM - Prime Minister
MND - Minister of National Defence
CDS - Chief of Defence Staff
SJS - Strategic Joint Staff
CFINTCOM - Chief Forces Intelligence Command
CJOC - Canadian Joint Operational Command
CF JHQ - Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters (Operational Level)

FRANCE (FRA)



Notes:
EMA - Joint Staff (Etat-major des armées)
DAS - Startegic Affairs Directorate (Délégation aux affaires stratégiques)
CPCO - Joint Operations HQ (Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations)

GERMANY (DEU)


PHASES
GERMANY
1
Indications and Warnings
Network Activation
National Intents
(MoFA)
MoD Policy Directorate
Political Go ▲
2
Multinational Assessment
Information Sharing
National Assessments
MoD Policy Directorate
3
Development of Recommended Response Options
Strategic Planning
MoD
Strategy and Operations Directorate
4
Planning
Coalition Planning
MoD
Strategy and Operations Directorate
5
…& Execution
Collaborative Execution
Same As Above

ITALY (ITA)


PHASES
ITALY
1
Indications and Warnings
Network Activation
National Intents
3rd Division Strategic Direction & Policy of Operations
Political Go ▲
2
Multinational Assessment
Information Sharing
National Assessments
3rd Division Strategic Direction & Policy of Operations
Chief of Defence General Staff 3rd Directorate Plans & Policy
3
Development of Recommended Response Options
Strategic Planning
3rd Division Strategic Direction & Civil-Military Cooperation 2nd Section Strategic Analysis
4
Planning
Coalition Planning
Joint Force Headquarter Directorate Operations (Operations Direction - Joint Exercise Direction) J3 Operations Division (Operational Direction - Maritime - Land - Air & Information Management)
5
…& Execution
Collaborative Execution
Same as Above

UNITED KINGDOM (GBR)



Notes:

FCO - Foreign & Commonwealth Office
JIC - Joint Intelligence Committee
MOD - Ministry of Defence
MOD Committees: COG - Current Operations Group
SPG - Strategic Planning Group
CCT - Current Commitments Team
PJHQ - Permanent Joint Headquarters
JFHQ - Joint Force Headquarters

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)



Notes:
CCDR - Combatant Commander
CJCS - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COCOM - Combatant Command
JFC - Joint Force Commander
JS/J-3 - Joint Staff Operations Directorait
JS/J-5 - Joint Staff Plans Directoriat
NSC - National Security Council
Sec Def - Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE - Secretary of State

0302. Detailed **MIC Nations' national decision making process** descriptions can be found within the **CBG Volume III.3**.

MIC National Strategic Staff Directories

0303. The MIC National Strategic Staff Directories provide an overview of operations related responsibilities at the strategic and operational level of all MIC nations, including respective contact information.

0304. MIC National Strategic Staff Directories are available through each nation's MIC National Secretary or through the MIC Executive Secretariat.

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CHAPTER 4 – COALITION OPERATIONAL PLANNING

SECTION I - POLITICAL CONSENSUS AND STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

0401. It is not normally considered a 'type of planning' in a military sense, the development of strategic guidance is a key consideration for coalition operations. **One of the major functions of the lead nation is to organize mechanisms for consultation in order to achieve political consensus among coalition members, and between the coalition and a recognized international authority or entity (e.g. the UN) sanctioning the operation**. This process must produce strategic level guidance for the CFC in order to proceed with planning. !

0402. Strategic guidance should define the coalition's military objectives and overall political-military approach, and coordinate strategic direction for planning and executing coalition operations. It should additionally specify the scope of the coalition's mandate, and any constraints or restraints on coalition operations.

SECTION II - PLANNING ARCHITECTURE FOR COALITION OPERATIONS

0403. The planning architecture employed for coalition operations will, in most cases, be based on that of the lead nation. This architecture must provide the basic structure necessary to facilitate the timely, efficient and coherent development of CONOPS and OPLANs. It comprises guidance, personnel and facilities, reference documentation and enabling tools available to assist coalition commanders and staffs in the development of plans.

a. **Guidance must include the overarching strategic guidance provided to the CFC**. The lead nation must provide for the continuing exchange of political-level guidance and military advice throughout the planning process. !

b. **The core of the coalition force's personnel and facilities will most likely be provided by the planning establishment of the lead nation. Each coalition partner, as a minimum, will provide a military planning liaison cell**. Each cell will be actively engaged in the coalition planning process and provide a link to its respective national planning process. This applies at both strategic and operational levels, and extends to logistical as well as operational planning. These cells may be physically collocated or, through use of electronic communications and collaborative planning tools, work together in a virtual manner. !

0404. Coalition operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized under international law originating with a recognized civil authority such as the United Nations Security Council. This recognized civil authority would act to initiate or approve the coalition activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching objectives and the desired end state.

! 0405. **The lead nation, as a minimum, is responsible for providing the overarching framework for consultation and planning**. Through this process, the coalitions' strategic guidance and objectives will be developed. The lead nation will probably be responsible for orchestrating continued liaison and reportage to the civil authority mandating the operation.

SECTION III - COALITION OPERATIONAL PHASES

0406. While Component Commands have the means by which military action can be prosecuted and delivered at the tactical level, their capabilities are most effective only when applied in concert. This is the principle of synergy, which is achieved through effective integration, coordination and synchronization. In this capacity the role of the Coalition Force Headquarters as the coordinator of the various component operations, is key.

! 0407. **It is counterproductive to try and over-regulate what is an inherently complex and chaotic activity; placing absolute faith in closely sequenced plans made in advance does not work. However, what is vital is the close synchronization of strategic, operational and tactical planning in the build-up, and to have a series of robust mechanisms in place to both keep the operation on track and to cope with the unexpected. An important and parallel consideration is to endeavor to keep the coalition force agile enough to cope with change in a responsive manner**.

0408. Most military operations consist of three generic phases: Preparation; Execution; and Termination and Transition; although the execution phase itself may have sub-phases. It is not always possible to determine a point at which a specific phase starts or ends. This point can differ for each element participating in an operation. Additionally, an element conducting an operation can be confronted with several simultaneous different activities, or even with different activities from different phases. In other words, the conduct of an operation may be planned linearly and sequentially but its execution may appear to be chaotic and event-driven.

PREPARATION

0409. During the preparation phase, nations and, depending on transfer of authority, an assigned CFC will deploy the forces, establish Lines of Communication (LOC) and liaison with host nations, international organizations and relevant agencies. The CFC has to shape the JOA in order to facilitate the actual conduct of the operation.

0410. Steps the CFC may consider as part of the preparatory activities are:

a. Establish C2 for the Joint Force and communications arrangements with the coalition headquarters through the Coalition Strategic Commander and with troop contributing nations.

b. Coordinate military activities to shape the information environment.

c. Create and protect the LOCs.

d. Coordinate the deployment of the forces.

e. Build-up the forces.

f. Develop logistic support, including host-nation support.

g. Prepare and execute combined training to integrate the forces within the coalition JOA.

h. Sustain forces during build-up and preparation for operations.

i. Protect and secure the forces.

j. Establish, when required, a liaison network.

k. Conduct, when required, preliminary operations.

l. Request an enabling budget and prepare a mission budget.

0411. Many of the activities that are conducted during the preparation phase are not the CFC's primary responsibility. Often he depends on the Coalition Strategic Commander and the troop contributing nations to facilitate the activities of the Coalition Force. For example, the strategic deployment is predominantly a national responsibility, with the Coalition Strategic Commander in a coordinating role and the CFC only monitoring progress.

0412. In addition, the CFC has limited influence over initial preparation and training of national troop contributions, although he can be asked to issue directives and guidance on the focus of the preparation and training program. After transfer of authority of the national troop contributions, the CFC will be, among other aspects of the operation, in charge of the protection and security of the forces, their build-up (including in-JOA preparation and training) and, when required the conduct of preliminary operations.

0413. **A critical function of the lead nation will be the identification of ways and means available to achieve the strategic objective**. This will translate into a matching of resources to the operational plan developed. This is likely to be an iterative process and one subject to considerable negotiation among the coalition members. The formation of a planning liaison cell(s) will also facilitate this process by providing a mechanism for exchange of detailed information regarding the capabilities of each partner and the willingness and/or ability of each to commit resources. **Funding authority to support coalition forces and the financial commitments of each partner should be identified as early as possible and procedures developed to ensure that there will be no adverse impact on operations**.

COALITION FORCE READINESS TRAINING

0414. For most coalition operations, multinational collective training prior to deployment will not be feasible. Therefore, this training will have to be completed upon arrival in theatre. As time available for this training will be limited, it is the responsibility of each troop contributing nation to prepare its forces prior to deployment to theatre. While nations can be relied upon to provide capable and high quality troops, a Coalition HQ should indicate to contributing nations the likely roles and tasks they should prepare for and indicate the standards that individuals should achieve.

0415. Differences in ROE, asset visibility, force employment and IT systems will always remain subject to national interests and caveats. A shared understanding of knowledge, experience, training and communications will provide satisfactory solutions to seemingly intractable problems. Training should therefore look at those elements of the program which are unlikely to be addressed by national training programs, acknowledge them as existing and develop the inter-personal requirements to work through these issues.

0416. The Coalition Force Readiness Training Plan will have two main objectives. First, it will prepare the troop contributing nations' forces for operations. Units and formations require the opportunity to conduct collective training with coalition nations in order to gain confidence and to integrate procedures and practices at all levels within the coalition. Secondly it provides commanders with the opportunity to assess the readiness of their forces. **This is especially important when units and formations are assigned to the coalition from nations that do not have a formal program of exercises and exchange**.

0417. Special considerations should be put into cultural awareness training at the very beginning of setting up a coalition force HQ. **Personnel with a good level of cultural awareness and intercultural competence are seen as a key when working cross borders and cultures within a coalition environment**. It can also set the foundation for a smooth hand-over to civilian agencies at a later stage. See also **CBG Volume III.2 "Cross-Cultural Awareness & Competence – A Guide to Best Practices"**.

0418. Lessons from past operations have indicated that **a robust initial cadre of, well trained, personnel is required** from the outset to establish the necessary SOPs, battle rhythm, and to prosecute the mission. Economies can be made once an understanding of the operational tempo has been established.

0419. Training objectives and topics to be considered during force readiness training are summarized at **Annex A** and see **Annex B** for respective webpages for reference.

MISSION EXECUTION

0420. In the planning phase, the CFC, acting at the operational level, will have identified the military conditions to achieve the desired strategic objectives and end-state. He will then seek to structure activities, sequentially and simultaneously, so as to fulfill the military conditions for

success. Execution consists of the application of the allocated military resources to sustain this sequence of actions. In the execution phase, the commander focuses on three fundamental processes: an intelligence function that seeks to determine the nature and extent of the threat or situation; the employment of allocated resources and capabilities in order to create a favorable situation for execution; and the operation to achieve the desired end-state.

SECTION IV - COALITION OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

0421. Modern Joint operations are complex and require careful organization. A number of control mechanisms exist that are used to order activities in time and space, and to ensure that priorities are clearly understood. The following paragraph concentrate on those areas in which the operational level Commander should play a significant role.

0422. **Monitoring and Assessment of Campaign Progress**. The measurement of progress or success is a fundamental aspect of military operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander. **The commander will have specified criteria for success in his CONOPS and OPLAN; these must be achievable and measurable**. The aim is to take a broad view of the operation and determine if the required effects, as envisaged in the plan, are being created, which in turn determines if objectives are being achieved. This monitoring is much wider than observing whether an individual target has been destroyed. It is particularly relevant in activities where the emphasis is on changing the attitudes of the adversary rather than on his physical destruction. **Whatever the nature of the operation, the commander should ensure that a monitoring and assessment process is rigorously conducted and that his staff does not get distracted by tactical level events and so lose sight of the operational end-state**. Assessment is the evaluation of progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement in order to inform decision making. It must reflect not just the impact of Alliance activities but also those of other actors including the host nation and adversary. There are 3 broad categories:

a. **Measurement of Activity**. Measurement of activity is the assessment of performance of a task and achievement of its associated purposes.[14] Effectively have the planned activities been carried out successfully?

b. **Measurement of Effectiveness**. Measurement of effectiveness is the *assessment of the realization of specified effects*.[15][16] Have the planned activities, carried out successfully, been effective?

c. **Campaign Effectiveness Assessment**. Campaign effectiveness assessment is *the evaluation of campaign progress, based on levels of subjective and objective*

[14] AJP 01(D).
[15] Ibid.
[16] NATO ACO COPD

measurement towards the campaign end-state.[17] Do the effects of the planned and successfully executed activities, and the decisive conditions thereby created, indicate progress towards the achievement of operational objectives and ultimately the campaign end-state?

0423. Assessments support decision-making by drawing together information and intelligence to inform auditable judgments on the progress of operations. Judging progress is a fundamental review and feedback function within the commander's decision cycle. If correctly assessed, this process will allow the commander to make judgments on apportionment, contingency planning and confirming adversary center(s) of gravity.

0424. **Managing Lines of Operation**. Lines of operation show the interrelationship between decisive points and as such, they are a way of visualizing the overall activity within a force, and coordinating and de-conflicting component activities. Careful management of lines of operation allows the realization of the full potential of the force. Two tools which can assist in this are: the Campaign Plan Schematic; and the Synchronization Matrix. The Campaign Plan Schematic enables the overall plan to be visualized at a glance and can be used to monitor its progress. The synchronization matrix is the method for planning the coordination of activity between components, in time and space, along the path to the objective.

0425. **Operational Rhythm**. Where a commander can consistently decide and act quicker than his opponent, he will generate greater tempo and gain a significant advantage. Operational rhythm should therefore be focused on enabling effective and timely decision-making within and between headquarters. It is the principal means by which time, information and activity are managed and directed at providing the right information at the right time so that the right decision can be made. It should never become a self-fulfilling prophesy, it is a means to an end not an end in its own right. Operational rhythm is key to creating a 'command advantage', i.e. orders and directives that are designed to seek tactical opportunity, plus a command structure that has a clear and common view of the situation and can communicate quickly and direct operations.

SECTION V - TRANSITION

0426. Coalition operations inherently have both political and military goals. Exclusively military lines of activity are unlikely to achieve the strategic end state. While every campaign and major operation is directed towards a goal, at some point the military action is no longer the main effort. It may be necessary for one mission to terminate and be replaced by another part of a wider strategic plan. Coalition forces will eventually hand over responsibilities to other military forces, governmental agencies, or the host nation government. Similar to a traditional 'relief-in-place' the coalition forces will carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition.

[17] Ibid.

0427. **The CFC should plan for termination and transition before deployment or as soon as possible during the initial phase**. Transition between military forces may take the form of relief-in-place or a transition by function, such as medical, engineer services, communications, security and logistics. The ultimate goal is to transition all functions performed by the CFC and the coalition forces in a smooth and orderly fashion. Some of the functions may develop into a combination of coalition, host nation, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities as the transition advances. Once all transition activities are complete the coalition forces can depart. !

0428. The CFC and his staff must consider the need to prevent a return to conditions that caused the crisis and required involvement of the coalition. **The CFC, in coordination with the coalition strategic commander, and civilian agencies in the operational area must identify 'high risk' transition points**. These points occur when the CFC passes responsibility to an international governmental organization, non-governmental organizations or host nation. It is incumbent on the CFC to manage these transition points to avoid the deterioration of the situation. !

0429. The ultimate goal of transition is to transfer all functions performed from one entity to a follow-on authority, well planned and not reversible, coherent with agreed, enduring, outcome-based objectives as far as possible. However, this must be tempered by the requirement to maintain security and to support the follow-on authority within specific functional areas, while guarding against dependency.

0430. As such, some functions may develop into a combination of coalition, HN, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities as transition progresses. The key is to develop a clear understanding between all parties of their contribution, by function and in terms of roles and responsibilities, and how this will change over time. As the focus lies on the successful transfer of authority, it is necessary to establish the necessary pre-conditions in the HN or follow-on authority for this transition process from the outset.

0431. Recognizing that many transition activities are not part of a phase but of a continuous process, the political nature and implications of considering and declaring transition have to be taken into account as this may affect the coalition itself, coalition member countries' and host nation's political systems, all of which has to be accompanied by comprehensive communication efforts.

0432. The following six aspects should be taken into account for planning and executing a transition from a coalition to a follow-on authority:

a. **Collaborative planning** should deliver acceptable outcomes across the campaign as a whole and must consider the issues of transition from the outset. It should identify how, throughout a crisis, all agencies might or will contribute to resolution and a clear vision of how synergy will be achieved between their various, and often

disparate, activities. Moreover, planning should be iterative, with constant evaluation and re-evaluation of the crisis to shape collaborative adjustments to the plan.

b. **Maintenance of desired outcomes**: maintaining focus on common goals will be particularly challenging during transition from a primarily military operation (to deliver a secure environment, for example) to a situation where the responsibility is transferred to a UN engagement or civil agency. However, collaborative planning from the outset should mitigate this through the planning of a process which addresses the crisis as a whole and thus provides focus throughout and continuity during transition in particular. Ownership of the plan at the strategic level will help provide unity of effort during transition and ensure that an enduring perspective is maintained. The preservation of corporate knowledge, as well as continuity of assessment and situational awareness, will also be critical during transition.

c. **Redeployment of forces**: transitional phases of a crisis, while they present opportunities, are likely to be characterized by uncertainty and potential volatility. Initial gains should be rapidly cemented or exploited if enduring progress is to be made and a favorable situation, which is transparent to the parties to any conflict, the indigenous population and HN decision-making infrastructure, realized. Any concurrent transition between forces or authorities at these critical stages further complicates the situation. A lack of balance, situational awareness, or focus may be exploited both physically and/or psychologically by an opponent or lead to a loss of perceived campaign legitimacy amongst HN and international actors. These critical transitional points should be identified during initial planning and reviewed following assessment and iterative/collaborative planning, allowing their impact to be mitigated.

d. **Understanding the operating environment**: a clear understanding of the situation as a whole must be established from the outset, prior to identifying a solution through planning. Effective analysis is vital to ensure that the underlying causes of a crisis, as well as the overt symptoms, are addressed. Specific emphasis will be required on understanding the effect that military activity may have on a wide range of participants in a given situation. This will be particularly pertinent during transition. Moreover, an in depth appreciation of the prevailing security situation will be crucial and, where necessary, resilience of the force/authority should be maintained. A combination of security for agencies facilitating reconstruction, the protection of the indigenous population, and possibly ongoing military action against an opponent may be required. The in-coming authority must have a sufficiently balanced capability to respond to any such eventuality:

- During transition between military forces any differences in mandate, capability, risk appetite, interoperability and any national caveats must be transparent and mitigated;

- When transitioning to civil authority, the requirement for residual coalition military capability must be considered and clearly defined. This may demand assistance in discrete functional areas or a broader over watch or deterrent capability.

Not only will the security situation, and the ability of the relieving authority to address it have an impact on the ability of that authority to conduct activities and protect itself, but it will also directly impact campaign legitimacy, both within the HN and internationally.

e. **Roles and responsibilities**: the practical conduct of the transition process and allocating roles and responsibilities is a key consideration for the coalition military and the follow-on authorities. It is important that both the in-place and relieving force/authority have a common understanding of, not only what the desired outcome is, but also of how the transition will be phased and conducted. The definition of detailed arrangements for roles and responsibilities during transition process should initially be led by the in-place force. However, this should again be a collaborative undertaking, recognizing the responsibility of the follow-on authority or host nation. Moreover, overarching strategic guidance should alleviate potential tension. The command and control arrangements of any residual coalition military capabilities in particular will demand resolution.

f. **Communicate the changing** politico-strategic context: transition may represent not only a change in mandate but also threaten the cohesion of the force/authority. The strategic context and any changes to the political imperatives or expectations of contributing nations, or indeed the HN, must be clearly understood at lower levels and their impact made explicit.

0433. In order to execute the required functions above, the **military may need civilian support** in the following areas: !

a. Civil-military collaborative planning.

b. Access to intelligence products and services of civilian agencies.

c. Early cooperation with the follow-on authority.

d. Political and diplomatic support for agreements concerning handover of infrastructure, equipment and responsibilities.

e. Political support among all coalition partners in order to perform the transition in a coherent, multinational manner, avoiding unilateral approaches.

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CHAPTER 5 – COALITION COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

COALITION FORCE COMMAND

0501. **The lead nation will provide the overarching framework for command, which will encompass not only the commander and majority of his headquarters' staff, but also structure, language, procedures, command and control, communications, intelligence and information management systems. It will generally lead all the key functional areas with staff from contributing nations being integrated throughout**. Figure 5.1 illustrates a notional operational level command and staff framework. The combination of a mature and experienced staff and the broader perspective of coalition partners is essential in building effective coalitions. **Staff training and rehearsals prior to operations are crucial**.



Figure 5.1 – Notional Multinational Operational Level Command

Notes:

1. The operational level commander is designated to the Coalition Force Commander (CFC).
2. Although certain intelligence assets will be available across the force, each nation is likely to retain a separate intelligence element. The role of the J2 staff is to provide as full and coherent an intelligence picture as national caveats allow. Wherever possible national restrictions should be minimized.
3. The Lead Nation will normally provide framework CIS assets and leadership of J6. The Lead Nation will establish the principles for a federated coalition mission classified network construct and the minimum cyber defense requirements for the inter-connection of networks.
4. Multinational Logistic Centre (MNLC) - Cell for logistic coordination, not a component command. Contributing nations may deploy a separate National Support Element.
5. In the same way as the CFHQ, component headquarters are likely to be based on a single nation with integrated staff from national contingents. National contributions may be discrete, self- contained force packages (an armored brigade) or individual capabilities (AAR). The level of multi-nationality will be dictated largely by the nature of the operation. The diagram depicts illustrative force elements within each component. Certain additional strategic capabilities (e.g. SOF, TLAM, ISR etc), retained under national command, may be made available for specific operations to the coalition.
6. .CFACC will control the CAOC, which will have clear linkages across all components.

LIAISON AND COORDINATION

0502. Regardless of the specific command and information structures established, differences in doctrine, organization, equipment and training are mitigated by a robust liaison structure. During multinational operations, participating forces should establish liaison early at all levels in order to: foster a better understanding of mission and tactics; facilitate transfer of information; enhance mutual trust; and develop an increased level of teamwork. Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams should be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, command, control, communications, computers, network security and procedures to permit information exchange with non-coalition partners, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and planning methods employed within their own commands, as well as having regional (or partner-specific) training and experience. These teams can provide communications using systems that might not be shareable with some coalition partners. Non-military organizations, (for example host governments or the UN) could also be recipients of these services. Liaison teams can act as filters for the exchange of information consistent with national disclosure and dissemination policies.

0503. **Liaison Officers**. Military personnel possessing regional language capabilities, cultural awareness, as well as experience of working and training with other countries' militaries, other agencies or the indigenous population are invaluable in ensuring understanding and increasing tempo. Liaison demands usually outstrip the availability of suitable personnel and additional requirements must be identified early in the planning process.

0504. **Coordination Centers**. Coordination centers can also facilitate control of multinational operations, which require interaction with a variety of agencies, both military and non-military. A coordination center can assist in C2 as well as coordinate a variety of functions, including logistics and civil-military operations. It can be the focal point for support issues, alert and warning, host-nation support, movement control, and training. As a coalition matures, the role of a coordination center can be expanded to include command activities. Member nations provide a staff element to the center that is comprised of action officers familiar with the relevant support activities. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff element with linguists and communications capabilities in order to maintain contact with their parent headquarters. A central coalition coordination center may be established as well as a number of functional coordination centers.

COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS

0505. The following are C2 considerations for a lead nation in determining the parameters that will define troop contributing nations' involvement in a coalition force:

a. The proposed level of staff integration.

b. National contingent headquarters expectations.

c. Coalition Commander and Deputy Commander nominations/appointees if known.

d. Potential functional leads (e.g. functional lead nation for logistics).

e. What C2 doctrine does the troop contributing nation(s) normally use? Is it willing to work under the lead nation's C2 doctrine?

f. Does it understand and accept the likely command relationship, which will place its contingent under operational control (OPCON) of the CFC?

g. At what point will the troop contributing nation(s) be comfortable with the transfer of authority of the contingent to under control of the designated coalition commander?

h. Is it comfortable with the planned coalition headquarters structure?

i. What staff contribution will it wish to make to the coalition headquarters?

j. Does it have the capacity or national intent to fill senior coalition command positions such as Deputy Command and/or formation command of other troop contributing nation elements?

k. Does it speak the same language as the lead nation, or is it able to provide sufficient Liaison Officers and linguists who can speak the lead nation's language?

l. What are its in-theatre National Command Headquarters intentions/arrangements?

m. Does it have the capacity to provide Liaison Officers at all levels within the lead nation framework?

n. Can it provide a Planning Liaison Cell immediately to the coalition planning process?

o. Will it agree to the connection of its national network to the Coalition wide-area network? Is it accredited to do so? Will the lead nation's major allies accept intelligence exchange with the troop contributing nation through the coalition framework?

p. What CIS capacity/technology does it have? Is it compatible with the lead nation? Will it require augmentation? Does it have the technological and skills capability/capacity to act as the coalition network manager?

q. Do troop contributing nation forces have/require reach back to the troop contributing nation?

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CHAPTER 6 – KEY CROSS FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION I - INFORMATION OPERATIONS

0601. **Strategic Communication** (StratCom) is a process that provides a framework within which words, images and actions can be coordinated in support of political and military objectives. In coalition operations it may well begin under the leadership of a single nation, however as a coalition is built all nation need to adopt and take part in the StratCom process.

StratCom can be defined as the coordinated and appropriate use of communications activities and capabilities – such as Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of coalition objectives.

The purpose of StratCom is to assist the coalition mission by gaining and maintaining public awareness, understanding and support for the coalition as a whole and for each of its members. It also serves to support the coalition in achieving its' desired end state and strategic objectives as well as to strengthen the understanding within a coalition about the possible perception of the coalitions' actions.

To assist MIC member nations with StratCom planning, see **CBG Volume III.15 (Military Contribution to Strategic Communications)**. This document provides best StratCom practices, reference documents, and examples of effective StratCom plans.

StratCom resides primarily at the strategic level for this is the level that political objectives or ends are set and where the ways and means, in terms of the instruments of power (Diplomatic, Economic, Military and Informational) can be integrated. To be effective it must be a comprehensive process involving all instruments and have a political rather than a military lead.

The strategic communication staff will take the desired political and in the coalition agreed end state and use this to develop a strategic communication framework which needs to include but is not limited:

a. Strategic narrative
b. Key themes and messages
c. Constraints and limitations.

This Framework will be, for the military realm, handed down to the Information Operations (Info Ops) staff function, where it will be translated and integrated into the military planning and coordination processes.

0602. **Narrative** is both a way of understanding and a way of representing information. In both cases it involves cause and effect of participants, actions, and events connecting desires (usually predicated by conflict) to resolution (actual desired or implied). In so doing it

embodies, promotes, and creates values, legitimacy, and identity around which entities (organizations or activities) can unite. Above all it resonates with its internal and external audiences.

0603. **Information Strategy**. The information strategy forms the interagency and multinational approach to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It constitutes mission-specific strategic and political guidance for information activities across all levers of power in support of mission objectives

0604. **Information Operations** (Info Ops) is a staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and approved audiences in support of Coalition mission objectives.

SECTION II - TARGETING

0605. Joint Targeting is the process of identifying the actions necessary to create the desired **effects**[18] based on means available to achieve the commander's objectives, selecting and prioritizing targets, synchronizing lethal and non-lethal actions, assessing their cumulative effectiveness and, if necessary, taking remedial action.

0606. A target is a selected geographic area, object, capability, person, or organization (including their will, understanding, and behavior), which can be influenced as part of the military contribution to a political end-state. A target is normally not critical in itself, but rather its importance is derived from its function and from there its potential contribution to achieving the commander's military objective(s).

! 0607. **The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) is responsible for establishing a combined joint targeting process led by the <u>Joint Targeting Cell</u>**. This process will undertake an analysis of all approved target sets and relevant target audiences and recommend actions against those targets that would significantly advance the coalition's objectives. The desired effect on the selected target may be achieved through a combination of the full spectrum of lethal and non-lethal actions and activities[19].

TARGET CLASSIFICATION

0608. Targeting falls into two general classes: deliberate and dynamic.

[18] An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. (NATO-AAP 6)

[19] This includes fires, information activities (PSY OPS, Public Affairs, Media operations, and Key Leader Engagement), CIMIC, electronic attack, and cyber.

Deliberate Targets		Dynamic Targets	
Scheduled	**On-Call**	**Planned Targets**	**Unplanned Targets**

Chart 6.1 – Target Classification

a. **Deliberate Targeting**. Prosecutes known targets in an operational area with scheduled actions. Examples range from targets on joint target lists in the applicable campaign plan, to targets detected in sufficient time that can be listed in the air tasking order (ATO), mission-type orders, or fire support plans.

   Deliberate targets have two subcategories: Scheduled or on-call.

   i. **Scheduled**. Targeting where actions are to be taken at a specific time.

   ii. **On-call**. Targeting where actions have not been specified by time.

b. **Dynamic Targeting**. Prosecutes targets that have been identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the deliberate targeting cycle, and therefore have not been scheduled.

   Dynamic targets have two sub-classifications: planned and unplanned.

   i. **Planned**. Prosecutes targets known to exist in an operational area but are not detected, located, or selected for action in sufficient time to be included in the deliberate targeting cycle; and therefore the F2T2EA[20] sub-process is used.

   ii. **Unplanned**. Prosecutes targets that are unknown or unexpected to exist in an operational area but, when detected or located, meet criteria specific to operational objectives.

0609. **Time-Sensitive Targets (TSTs)**. TSTs are defined as those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly operations or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity whose destruction is of high priority to achieve campaign objectives. The time available does not allow for the standard targeting timeline to be followed. The JFC provides specific guidance and prioritization for TSTs within the operational area. This guidance generally includes predetermined apportionment of forces, engagement authorities, applicable rules of engagement, acceptable levels of collateral

[20] F2T2EA: Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess.

damage, and desired effects. This guidance is normally promulgated via a TST matrix, developed by the Joint Targeting Cell.

TARGETING CYCLE

0610. The Joint Targeting Cycle is a process designed to support the achievement of the JFC's objectives. It consists of a series of steps that link Commander's intent with targeting activities to generate effects to achieve objectives throughout the battle space. The targeting process will normally be based on that used by the lead nation. A generally accepted 6-phase targeting cycle is depicted in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1 – The Targeting Process

TARGETING SUPPORT TO THE JOINT COORDINATION PROCESS

0611. **Synchronization of the Joint Coordination Process will depend on the lead nation**. Ideally, the joint coordination process should be centered on the Joint Coordination Board (JCB). Joint targeting is a supporting process that must be nested within an operation's planning, execution and assessment functions. Targeting is driven by the CFC's operational objectives, derived from strategic guidance and executed through lethal and non-lethal tactical activities. Each phase of a campaign has specific targeting requirements that need to be considered at the strategic, operational and component level. **However, due to political sensitivities surrounding targeting policy, direction for targeting may be retained at the highest levels**.

JOINT TARGETING COORDINATION PROCESS

0612. The Joint Targeting Coordination Process consists of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) and the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG).

0613. The JTCB, led by the Commander and facilitated by the Chief of the Joint Targeting Cell, is the permanent decision level body for the CFC that approves all target lists (e.g. Restricted Target List (RTL), Joint Target List (JTL), Joint Prioritized Target List (JPTL)), target priority and

force assignment for each target or target set. It is normally conducted daily, but is dependent on the operational tempo and battle rhythm. The JTCB receives inputs from the JTWG on target nominations from Components and CFC functional staff. The JTCB is normally comprised of representatives from all CFC staff elements and Components, as well as appropriate subject matter experts and National Representatives. Figure 6.2 provides an example of a JTCB.



Figure 6.2 – Composition – JTCB

0614. Joint Targeting Working Group is led by the Chief of the Joint Targeting Cell and is the permanent coordination working group for the CFC that reviews and prepares nominations for target lists (e.g. RTL, JTL, JPTL) and recommended priorities and force assignment for each target or target set forwarded to the JTCB for approval. It is normally conducted daily, but is dependent on the operational tempo and battle rhythm. The JTWG considers the full spectrum of targeting capabilities in developing targeting options to support planning and current operations, and considers combat assessment results for inclusion in overall campaign assessments. The JTWG receives inputs from Components and CFC functional staff, specifically the Information Operations, Electronic Attack/Warfare, Fires, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Cyber, J35 and the ISR Working Groups. Additionally, representatives from the targeting production centers are also highly desirable. As well, this is the venue for National

"Red Card Holders" concerns and issues to be addressed. Figure 6.3 provides an example of a JTWG.



Figure 6.3 – Composition – JTWG

IMPROVING INTEROPERABILITY

0615. Targeting in a multinational environment requires the ability to provide rapid exchanges of targets and targeting information between countries. To be able to achieve this requires **information sharing**, qualified and **trained staff, common procedures**, as well as efficient and **interoperable tools**.

0616. **Information Sharing**. Full spectrum targeting requires accessible, sharable, fused intelligence dedicated to target systems/audience analysis, target development, target approval and combat assessment. These information sharing attributes are critical to successful targeting operations in support of CFC objectives. **Therefore, Coalition partners should explore future and exploit current information sharing agreements as far in advance of actual deliberate planning for combat operations as possible**.

0617. **Operation Intel Fusion Center. CFC should identify an Intel fusion center at the beginning of the deliberate planning process. This Intel fusion center should be partly dedicated to targeting matters. In the absence of a designated fusion center by the CFC, the lead nation must be prepared to share all relevant intelligence to support operation**.

TRAINED AND QUALIFIED STAFF[21]

0618. The staff necessary to implement the targeting process could be drawn predominantly from the lead nation but ideally would be an integrated staff comprising suitably qualified personnel from all coalition-member nations.

0619. Staff involved in the targeting process, either at the strategic, operational or tactical level needs to have a common and standardized understanding of the targeting process. This mental representation implies a specific training that shapes specific skills in order to meet current and future targeting requirements.

0620. **The lead nation will provide the core of qualified staff to the CFC targeting cell. However, targeting cell will most likely rely on reach-back to units to assist the CFC during target development and/or Battle Damage Assessment**.

0621. **Common Procedures. The CFC is required to direct the common operating procedures used throughout the joint force for targeting support. Consideration should be given to leveraging interoperability standards and procedures inherent in standing Alliances**.

INTEROPERABLE TOOLS

0622. The targeting process uses and generates an enormous amount of information and data. **In order to make that information and data usable, the emphasis for coalition interoperability should be placed on common protocols and database standards and <u>not</u> on software applications or architectures**. This protocol and data standards emphasis allows all coalition members to use their organic national systems in support of and within any coalition automation design. It is likely to be a requirement to accredit national systems for operational use within the mission network. To that end, nations should be cognizant of these standards and incorporate them during the design of their national applications and systems.

The CFC is responsible for designating the automation tool or tools that will support the Coalition operations. Should the CFC designate a system that is not interoperable at the protocol and database standard level, the lead nation is responsible for providing and supporting the designated targeting systems.

0623. **The lead nation must provide a precise definition of target location methodology since no standard agreement is currently available**. The effectiveness of coordinate-seeking munitions greatly depends on the accuracy of target coordinates. National methodologies have been developed in order to provide the most accurate coordinates.

[21] Refer to NATO AD 80-70 Chapter 6-Targeting Training Requirements for more details.

0624. **Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology (CDEM)**. Any CDEM is to be used as an aid to the Commander's judgment and not as a "go/no-go" criteria for strike approval. **The lead nation must designate a Coalition CDEM for all actions against targets. While the CDE standards for high explosive munitions are well-defined by several national methodologies, it is not so for non-kinetic capabilities such as information operations, psychological operations and cyber. The CFC, in an effort to minimize strategic risk, should consider and develop a methodology or process that recognizes, quantifies and allows for the mitigation of these undesirable collateral effects**.

0625. The CFC should be aware that although the designated Coalition CDEM may support approval of a target for his purposes, national policies and sensitivities may not. **As such, it should be recognized that national policies will influence partner nation's interpretation of the outputs of the CDEM and may limit their ability to act**. National representatives (red card holders) should, as early as possible, provide national caveats and restrictions to the Chief of the Joint Targeting Cell in order to support a full understanding of the options available to the CFC.

TARGET ENGAGEMENT AUTHORITY

0626. The Target Engagement Authority (TEA) is the level of command required to authorize an engagement at each CDE level. ROE compliance and CDE concerns are considerations in the decision making process. **Identification and delegation of the TEA should be clearly delineated as soon as possible in order to expedite any national considerations which could slow down the targeting process**.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF TARGETING

0627. All operations are conducted in accordance with international law including Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Operations are based upon following principles:

a. Military Necessity
b. Humanity/unnecessary suffering
c. Distinction
d. Proportionality
e. Military Objective

Legal advice on ROE, LOAC and applicable international laws and treaties must be available to the commanders at the point of decision and available to the targeting staff throughout the targeting process.

0628. Domestic laws from participating nations will affect targeting activities. **Therefore, Legal Advisors (LEGADs) from participating countries must be made available and integrated into the targeting process. Ideally, this involvement would take place during all phases of the**

targeting process. Some member nations may have international treaty/convention obligations that are different from other coalition partners. These differences may impose nation-specific limitations on the types of targets that can be engaged, the types of weapons that can be employed or the Rules of Engagement (ROE) applicable to various types of target. **Consequently, close liaison between the coalition force headquarters and the national contingent headquarters is imperative to insure that only appropriate tasking is allocated to individual nations during the targeting process**.

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SECTION III - INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE

0629. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is an operations-intelligence activity that integrates and synchronizes the planning and operation of sensors and assets, and the processing, exploitation, targeting and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations.[22] ISTAR is a 'system of systems' that derives synergy through integrating surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition assets together with the intelligence process through a methodology of centralized coordination. ISTAR links intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance systems and sensors to cue maneuver and offensive strike assets, with particular emphasis on the timely passage of both critical and targeting information. **The principal users of ISTAR are the operations, intelligence and targeting staff**.

!

0630. An effective ISTAR capability will allow the commander to identify an adversary's weaknesses and enable him to make the decisions that will exploit those vulnerabilities. Systems that produce 'coarse grain' information are used to provide a general picture of the adversary's activity and cue 'fine grain' systems that permit the development of intelligence at the level of detail that the commander requires within his battle space. ISTAR permits fleeting opportunities to be exploited and mobile targets to be monitored and tracked. ISTAR provides intelligence support to the commander from the inception of his decision-making process, through the making of his plan and throughout the subsequent conduct of his operations. It is a key enabler of operational success.

0631. **ISTAR Architecture**. The ISTAR architecture encompasses the command and control (C2), common processes and communications that link the collection assets and their controlling organizations, analysis elements, the users of the product and the coalition information sharing infrastructure, allowing these separate elements and systems to operate as a synergistic whole.

0632. **ISTAR Planning**. The use of ISTAR collection assets must be carefully planned. This is not solely a J2 or ISTAR function but is one that requires involvement of staffs in many areas and across multiple levels of command. There must be strong linkage between the J2/ISTAR

[22] There is no NATO definition for ISTAR. This description is based on definition of ISR in US Joint Publication 2-01.

staff and the J3 staff to ensure consistency of effort. The allocation and tasking of ISTAR assets is the responsibility of the J2/J3 staff.

0633. **Multinational ISTAR**. The effective provision of intelligence support to multinational operations requires the ISTAR process to be conducted in accordance with agreed common procedures for the sharing of information and for the coordination and use of ISTAR collection assets. During multinational operations, the intelligence product supporting that operation must be shared and early liaison should be initiated at the highest levels of the coalition to ensure that the intelligence operations of each participant are coordinated. Such procedures must be in place and ideally, must have been practiced, prior to the commencement of multinational operations. Two broad approaches to the resolution of these problems are possible depending on the nature of the multinational operation and the participants:

a. **Integrated Information Sharing**. Under integrated information sharing, ISTAR collection assets, processes and personnel are fully integrated. This allows for the ready flow of information and intelligence and a synergy in the use of collection assets. It also reduces duplication and simplifies the dissemination of the product in formats that are readily useable by dissimilar national force elements. **However, the ability to release sensitive national information and intelligence may cause difficulties for participants, as experienced from operations, that will often only be solved through early judicious planning and pragmatism linked to an understanding of the sensitivities involved. Experience from the 2011 Libyan campaign has shown that the establishment of an Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC) within the HQ proved to be successful at generating timely and actionable intelligence free from national sensitivities. That said, the requirement to de-classify intelligence and information as much as practically possible for the benefit of all coalition partners should be an underlining consideration**.

b. **Parallel Information Sharing**. With parallel information sharing, different national ISTAR capabilities work separately, and often in parallel, with some integrated links to provide an ability to exchange information. This allows for national control of product, collection and security issues, but promotes duplication of effort and may lead to suspicion of the amount of knowledge not being released by partners.

SECTION IV - LOGISTIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

0634. Individually, nations face significant challenges in deploying and sustaining their expeditionary forces. Historically, the participation of military logistic planners has been limited in the early phases of coalition and or multinational contingency planning due to security concerns or national policy. The *ad hoc* planning of many coalition operations does not generate the familiarity and trust conducive to management and execution of multinational logistics. Arrangements for cooperative logistics occur in many cases later during execution phases of an operation, which lends itself to redundant, and perhaps unnecessary, capabilities

by all nations in an operational area, thus potentially creating a larger than needed logistic footprint and multinational competition for scarce in-theatre resources. **Consequently this section encourages the early and active participation of logistic planners in the coalition-building process with the overarching aim of maximizing logistic cooperation among the coalition nations**. Additionally, these same motivating factors support a growing trend away from logistics as solely a national responsibility – the historical norm. **While nations have ensured logistic effectiveness in troop support by 'going it alone', it is now recognized that efficiencies may also be achieved without sacrificing effectiveness through burden-sharing and meticulous early planning**. This section is intended to enable logistic planners at the strategic and operational level to achieve these objectives.

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0635. **Challenges to Multinational Logistics**. Planners must be aware of the following constraints and challenges to multinational logistics. Ongoing planning between nations responds to these challenges; however, some are likely to remain constraints for the foreseeable future. During an emerging crisis, early engagement and collaboration between national logistic planners will help overcome these challenges. During peace time, coalition exercises and training that set objectives to overcome multinational logistic constraints and challenges are also helpful.

a. **Nations may be reluctant during the force generation process to commit logistic forces to support the overall multinational operation. This reluctance can complicate the timely establishment of multinational logistic arrangements that are crucial for streamlining support from the outset of the operation. Advance planning and early involvement in the mission planning cycle can aid in overcoming this reluctance**.

!

b. Most nations lack the deployable logistic assets to support both their own forces and to provide additional logistic units for general support of the coalition. The establishment of bilateral/multilateral arrangements with other nations and the involvement in the formation of multinational logistic support units can overcome these deficiencies.

c. Lack of a pre-established multinational logistic planning capability leads to disorganized multinational logistic operations, which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of operations. Advance planning before the advent of a crisis can develop outline organizational strategies for the provision of support of a coalition in a variety of scenarios. On the other hand, there will always be an *ad hoc* nature to multinational logistics. An approach that encourages flexibility, adaptability and robust 'plug and play' communication can mitigate many challenges.

d. Some functional areas are more challenging because of national sensitivities. Advanced planning and bilateral/multilateral arrangements/training may overcome

some of these sensitivities. Examples include blood supply, sustaining ammunition and mortuary affairs.

e. It is difficult to achieve consensus during the planning phase regarding common funding for financing/reimbursement arrangements, yet up-front common funding can significantly reduce critical support costs associated with strategic lift, common infrastructure and Ports of Disembarkation improvements.[23]

f. There are many gaps in standardization, particularly between MIC and non-MIC military forces that impede multinational logistics. Workaround procedures implemented by participating nations are often required to lessen the adverse impact of this lack of standardization.

g. The current lack of commonality and capabilities in national database systems does not lend itself to the sharing and passage of logistic information that is crucial to the establishment and maintenance of multinational logistics. Coordination among the MIC nations prior to the outset of a crisis can produce a greater level of interoperability.

h. At the outset of a crisis there is often not enough time for mission analysis to include all coalition partners. Issues concerning releasability and the requirement for the national decision-making processes only add to the 'time-shortage' dilemma. Advance planning and the establishment of support arrangements are required to resolve common issues and to make multinational logistic contingency plans.

i. There is a lack of common understanding, training and exercises focused on multinational logistic planning and execution. Familiarity with multinational logistic' concepts and procedures gained through education, training and exercises can substantially reduce the conflicts of multinational logistics and maximize its benefits.

0636. Detailed key **logistics planning considerations** can be found in **CBG Volume III.6**.

SECTION V - TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS' FORCE CONTRIBUTION

0637. The following are key information requirements for a lead nation in determining the parameters that will define troop contributing nation involvement in a coalition force.

[23] Common funding is defined as expenses for forces required as either deployment or ongoing support enablers to establish/maintain an in-theatre presence through the provision of such services as Strategic lift, Combined Joint Task Force and component headquarters, Communications backbone infrastructure, ports and line of communications improvements, real estate and infrastructure improvement and select common user supplies/services.

a. What type of troops will be contributed by troop contributing nation? (combat forces, combat support forces, logistic forces, observers, civilian police, and/or civilian monitors?)

b. What size force is troop contributing nation planning to commit?

c. For how long are forces committed?

d. What national rotation policy for troops will be followed?

e. Will troop contributing nation contribute to a transition force?

f. What capstone doctrine does the troop contributing nation operate under?

g. Are troop contributing nation forces provided high or low-tech forces?

h. What skill-specific training do troops from contributing nations require before joining the coalition?

i. What levels/types of technical assistance will the troop contributing nation require to be interoperable with the lead nation and other troop contributing nations?

j. To what extent will the troop contributing nation need to interconnect their national communications and information systems with the coalition mission network(s)? Is the proposed degree of network interconnection acceptable to the major coalition allies?

k. Where does the troop contributing nation's military expertise lie? Does troop contributing nation have niche specialties?

l. Does the troop contributing nation have a war fighting approach?

m. What are the professional standards employed by its junior and senior leadership?

n. What levels of force preparation will be required in or out of theatre before troops are committed to the coalition?

o. What degree of acclimatization is required by troops before entering the theatre?

SECTION VI - CIS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

0638. An effective information sharing and exchange capability extends vertically, through national systems and horizontally, into the systems of other coalition nations. This information exchange 'environment' enables rapid transfer of information to appropriately designated

receivers, whilst rigorously protecting information from unauthorized disclosure and release. The environment provides robust information assurance and network defense capabilities.

0639. A Coalition Information Exchange Environment (CIEE) is '*the aggregation of individuals, organizations, system capabilities, processes and infrastructure for the common purpose of creating and sharing data, information and knowledge necessary to plan, execute and assess coalition operations*.'[24] The CIEE provides the coalition with the ability to rapidly share information, knowledge/ideas, reduce planning timelines and enhance coalition operations by enabling common-shared situational awareness and collaboration at all levels.

0640. The primary mission of coalition Communication and Information Systems (CIS) is to facilitate command, control and support functions in conjunction with national affiliations at all levels. It is incumbent upon the lead nation to coordinate for, create, or provide communications and information management structures organized so as to accomplish specific mission-related information-conveyance and processing functions. **The identification and establishment of CIS links between the 'recognized civil authority (e.g. UN), political and strategic CIS links in the early stages of planning is paramount**. Existing links such as diplomatic channels (e.g. Ambassadors) and military channels (e.g. Military Attaches/Advisers) should be utilized in the first instance and expanded where necessary to meet additional political and strategic requirements.

0641. Coalition CIS planners need to recognize the requirement to plan for and provide total CIS integration at all levels between participating nations in order to allow the rapid passage and exchange of information. **It is also recognized that spectrum management and computer/cyber defense have become elements of CIS that must be addressed in planning both prior to deployment and during operations**. It is therefore important that CIS planning representatives from participating nations and particularly those from any identified supporting force are included early in the planning process. This will ensure that any significant differences in methods of operation, network certification and accreditation, and the allocation of resources can be resolved at an early stage. **It is assumed that the lead nation will provide the staff and tools to perform the spectrum management and cyber defense function**.

0642. The lead nation's primary responsibilities in any coalition CIS planning process are:

a. Coordinates the planning and execution of the overall coalition CIS framework and providing the strategic level J6 leadership.

b. Coordinates the design, architecture, governance and specifications of coalition secure and non-secure network requirements that will support the operation or activity including collaborative planning tool requirements.

[24] Adapted from USCFCOM's definition for their Collaborative Information Environment (CIE). Although a national environment, functionally, it is mirrored with the CIEE. The CIE includes guards and protection services as would be needed in the CIEE. Consequently, and in order to remain aligned with US efforts, this definition should stand.

c. Ensures adequate CIS strategic to operational command links are in place.

d. Identifies and organizes the provision of critical and specific CIS assets.

e. Plans, organizes, and provides effective information-sharing among all coalition participants.

f. Prepares the CIS, security and information release policy, guidance and requirements to enable the designated CFC to effectively operate within the coalition force CIS structure.

g. Coordinates coalition force CIS releasability issues and sets the interconnection standards and policies for non-governmental organizations or non-coalition partners that may need to interconnect with coalition mission network.

h. Coordinates the CIS activities of the coalition force with relevant national organizations, contributing nations' forces and other entities as appropriate e.g. recognized civil authority, CIA, Gendarmes.

i. Coordinates host nation lead-time CIS requirements (e.g. frequency clearance and permission to operate CIS equipment) through the relevant strategic commands as required.

j. Ensures that coordinated measures are taken within the coalition networks, and for every new nation or organization that seeks to join a coalition network, to minimize system degradation caused by network attack, action damage, system overload and/or Electronic Warfare.

k. Provides guidance to the CFC on Emission Control (EMCON) and Communications Security (COMSEC) requirements.

l. In coordination with national administration/spectrum management agencies determines the spectrum access requirements of the proposed coalition forces and develops a spectrum management plan.

m. Provides the spectrum management function in the CFC headquarters with links to national and subordinate spectrum management elements.[25]

n. Standardizes coalition network joining instructions, pre-planned responses, and standard operating procedures - such as the frequency for anti-virus updates and common mitigation measures to counter the insider threat.

[25] Note that items k, l and m contain significant spectrum management elements.

0643. Detailed **CIS planning considerations** can be found in **CBG Volume III.8**.

SECTION VII - INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AS GENERAL PRINCIPLE

0644. From an operators perspective the **Information Management (IM)** in operational missions has to be oriented to the following basic principles:

a. The command structure of the employed set of forces defines the information relations and information requirements. Command structures of employed military forces or elements may change depending on the situation and specific tasks or missions. Changes and modifications to the command structure are a commanders´ decision.

b. The commanders and their staff are the "entities/players in the information space". They process information from their environment, determine the value and relevance of the information and develop measures, orders, reports and publish information based on their assessment in relation to the mission.

c. Military organizations are both action and decision oriented organizations. Information management should reflect the typical phases of a decision process (define, planning, execute and assess).

d. Supporting command and control and the corresponding information management must be derived directly from the command structures, staff structures and the decision making processes. This defines the required command facilities and the appropriate IT.

e. For coalition forces the willingness to share information is paramount. One of the best example of implementing such a principle was in Afghanistan where Afghanistan, German understanding is that this is designed as a kind of FAS in AFG to support coalition operations. Mission Network (AMN) has been built up with the scope of sharing the same information at every echelon of Command. AMN represents how the concept of the 'information age' in which information is the primary resource, and therefore a key enabler for the conduct of coalition missions has been implemented. The efficient and effective management of information is a critical factor in the successful conduct of operations. The procession of timely, reliant, and accurate information is a fundamental requirement for the decision making process of military operations in a complex information exchange environment.

0645. **IT (Information Technology) vs IM**. Various information technologies provide the physical means to store, sort, manipulate, move and present information in support of

operational planning and execution (part of the whole IM). As a consequence, information is the actual commodity and its effective use is a critical success factor for operations.

0646. **Mission threads (MT)** are the operational processes for executing specific warfighting capabilities in order to support Command objectives. That means to be operationally – driven, technically supported descriptions of the end-to-end interrelated activities required to execute a mission or a mission task. They are an essential part of the information management of the forces. Specifically the Information Management of critical data from mission thread execution contributes to commander's obtaining Information Superiority and the Initiative to act within the battle space as well as ensuring Unity of Effort among Coalition forces.

0647. **IM vs MT**. Information management by MT's is therefore the election and definition of single strings of co-operation within the overall information management of the forces that are mission critical or relevant. As this MT's do not describe the whole information management of an operation or a unit. They are single workflows within the overall information management of Coalition forces, standardized constructs for mission execution.

0648. The **Mission Thread Analysis (MTA)** results into the mission commanders (respectively the operators) decision with what means and in what command structure he intends to run a specific task or mission. His decision about the MT turns out into the respective information management (flows and procedures) for the respective mission task. It has to get translated into the configuration of the supporting information systems.

0649. **MTA vs OPP** (Operational Planning Process). The MTA has to be driven by the Operational Planning Group (OPG) who defines which MTs are required to complete the assigned mission. It is important to recognize that an MT has to be described through an operational view that brings to establish the correct process between the Minimum Operational Requirement (MOR) and the Information Exchange Requirements (IER). Technical contribution has to be based on the definition of interoperability standards, profiles and associated services eventually leading to a 'design' that can be built into the mission network (i.e. Federated Mission Networking/Mission Partner Environment).

0650. For further details see **CBG Volume III.8 "CIS Planning Considerations"**.

SECTION VIII - FORCE PROTECTION

0651. Security is one of the principles of operations, and protection is a key component of security. A fundamental military principle is that all military units must be able to protect themselves. A coalition force remains vulnerable to various traditional and non-traditional threats and hazards, including those inherent in the physical environment and those derived from the coalition's own force activities. Commanders at all levels must understand the importance of Force Protection (FP) to preserve force capability in the face of such threats and hazards.

0652. Non-traditional threats, such as insider attacks, undermine a coalition's ability in establishing a secure and stable environment as well as the cohesion of the coalition forces. Strategically, these types of threats provide a propaganda platform from which adversaries can threaten not only the coalition's objectives, goals and exit strategy but undermine the overall efforts of the international community. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication and cooperation between host nation and coalition forces affect military capability. Eliminating and or minimizing non-traditional threats, especially by proper preparation and training of coalition forces, is critical to mission success. However, tougher force protection standards and measures that are overtly heavy handed must be well balanced yet culturally sensitive enough to not send the wrong message to the very people and organizations the coalition is trying to protect.

0653. STANAG 2528, AJP-3.14 *Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection* is the NATO authority for FP principles within a coalition environment. FP is defined as '*Measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success.*'

0654. Some national variations exist within the MIC forum, recorded as specific reservations within AJP-3.14:

a. The UK defines FP as '*the means by which operational effectiveness is maintained through countering the threats from adversary, natural and human hazards, including fratricide, in order to ensure security and freedom of action*'. As a broader definition to that of NATO, the UK retains national primacy to employ counter force offensive means as part of FP operations.

b. Italy employs FP as an Operational Function that '*covers all aspects of protecting the Joint Force without any exception, considering anti-fratricide measures that affects combat activities as a FP issue*'. Much like the UK, Italy also retains national primacy to employ additional FP measures within a coalition environment.

0655. In support of forming FP policy within a Coalition environment, the Coalition Operations Handbook[26] provides cogent estimate advice to Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), reflected at annex A[27]. Principally, FP covers an exceptionally diverse spectrum of measures and capabilities. It may extend beyond the military personnel of a coalition force to include non-military personnel, civilians, or non-governmental organizations. FP applies to all phases of operations, including planning, preparation, deployment, employment, and redeployment. TCN provide their own FP, as well as contribute to and integrate into the wider FP plans of the coalition force.

[26] ABCA Publication 332, Coalition Operations Handbook, Edition 4, 14 April 2008, Chapter 15
[27] Ibid, pp15-3

0656. As there are TCN variations to the application of FP doctrine and practice, and perception of risk or risk thresholds, FP planning is considered through the following force model considerations:[28]

a. Identify the assigned and implied tasks through **mission analysis**.

b. Identify those assets that are critical to mission success (**criticality assessment**).

c. Determine likely threats and hazards to personnel and those assets that are critical to mission success (**threat assessment**).

d. Identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by threats and the impact of incidents on the force's effectiveness, thereby affecting mission success (**vulnerability assessment**).

e. Determine the risks to mission success from an assessment of the ability of the threat to exploit identified vulnerabilities, and accidental and environmental hazards caused by human error, topography, climate, weather and the presence of TIM and endemic diseases that pose risks to personnel and critical assets (**risk assessment**).

f. Identify and implement appropriate FP controls and measures to reduce risk to a level acceptable to command and calculate and monitor the residual risk or gaps in order to manage the mission (**risk management**). Willingness to accept risk is likely to be influenced by political constraints.

g. Identify and implement incident response and recovery controls and measures, including the development and implementation of an emergency response and recovery plan (**incident response and recovery**).

[28] AJP-3.14 Allied Joint Publication for Force Protection, November 2007, pp2-1

h. Maintain, reassess, and amend FP controls and measures throughout the mission (**supervise and review**).



Figure 6.4 – Force Protection Model

0657. Coalition FP considerations:

a. What is the coalition responsibility for providing force protection to non-military agencies such as nongovernmental organizations and contractors?

b. Does the force have sufficient assets to protect itself? Do they balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?

c. Who in the coalition is responsible for assessing threats and directing force protection measures across the force are clearly articulated and promulgated?

d. What are the command relationships with reference to force protection and delegations of authority to impose force protection measures within the coalition?

e. What are the variations in national rules of engagement and resulting interoperability implications for force protection?

f. What are the variations in national force protection capabilities and any resulting interoperability implications?

g. What are the legal, cultural, or political requirements of the host nation that may impose force protection constraints?

h. What is the coalition procedure to exchange threat and hazard warnings?

i. What are the coalition standards of physical protection?

j. What are the national force protection minimum requirements and vulnerabilities?

k. What are the coalition force protection minimum requirements and vulnerabilities?

l. What are the force protection capabilities and vulnerabilities of the host-nation security forces?

m. What are the national force protection dependencies that must be mitigated (such as a capability gap in an embedded contingent that must be filled by the supported nation's force)?

n. What are the specific coalition requirements for pre-deployment force protection training?

o. What are the coalition requirements for pre-deployment medical prophylaxis?

p. What are national or coalition restrictions on the use of hazardous, active force protection measures (such as invasive scanning)?

q. Are there effective coalition occupational safety measures?

r. Are there effective coalition traffic control and traffic discipline measures?

s. Are there effective coalition measures to deal with environmental hazards?

t. Are there effective coalition emergency response and damage control measures?

u. Are coalition procedures and standards for dealing with explosive hazards compatible?

v. Are there effective entry control measures for coalition bases?

w. What is the host nation's capacity and intent for coalition force protection, and will this change during the campaign?

x. What are the coalition visual and other methods of recognition to facilitate fratricide avoidance?

y. Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?

z. What are the troop contributing nation's policies to mitigate risks?

aa. Do national caveats impose limitations on force protection measures?

bb. Have the troop contributing nations conducted the required training to recognize friendly personnel and equipment?

cc. Does the coalition have combat identification measures?

dd. What are the national approaches to risk management?

ee. How have these approaches affected coalition operational output?

ff. What is the impact on the planning cycle and battle procedure?

SECTION IX - CYBER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

0658. **Contemporary Coalition Computer Network Environment**. The contemporary coalition computer operating environment will most likely include a combination of national strategic classified networks, mission classified networks involving national enclaves, and some form of unclassified information sharing with very broad participation e.g. interagency, NGOs. These combinations make the operating environment exceedingly complex, and this complexity is expected to increase in the future. This environment presents some common challenges and planning requirements for nations involved in a coalition operation.

0659. **Limitations**. Computer Network Operations (CNO) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) are classified elements of the wider Cyber domain and are therefore not discussed or addressed in the CBG. These planning considerations are limited to Cyber Defence.

0660. **Key Planning Considerations**. Some general coalition network planning and operational considerations emerge as important for nations joining a coalition, as well as for coalition planners:

a. Centralize and Simplify. Consider reducing and if possible centralizing to one national organization having the responsibility for establishing the connections and conducting CND and Certification and Accreditation (C&A) activities relating to connections to Allied and non-military organizations.

b. Understand National Risks & Caveats. Acknowledge that risks to the networks are accepted by different organizations in each of the nations. Each nation should identify to central coalition planners which of their organizations are involved in the C&A process. In some nations, risk acceptance decisions for networks are made by the intelligence community.

c. Use Best CND Practices. Wherever possible, apply international best practices for CND. These sources may include products and results of discussion within NATO and other CND related organizations like the NATO CCD CoE[29], EDA[30], ENISA[31].

d. Understand National C&A processes. Follow standard national C&A processes for all connectivity planning. Understand and respect the C&A processes of Allies but also recognize that risk calculation and migration strategies differ between nations. Coordinate these activities closely. Consider shared risk aspects, ie. risks to others of your network connections.

e. Connecting to Non-Military Connections. In light of the additional risks presented, great care must be taken in planning for connection to non-military organizations balanced against provision of adequate connectivity to ensure the desired operational effect is achieved. Connections to non-military organizations are often essential to mission success.

0661. Detailed Cyber planning considerations can be found in **CBG Volume III.16**.

SECTION X - AVOIDING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

0662. Minimizing collateral damage, which includes civilian casualties (CIVCAS), is one important aim in operations, and a legal obligation according to the Law of armed conflict (LOAC). In support of this goal, capabilities for precision engagements and accurately identifying targets have been developed to varying degrees by several nations. These capabilities contribute to the conduct of combat operations with lower relative numbers of civilian casualties compared to past conflicts. However, over the past decade these measures have not always be sufficient for meeting the goal of minimizing civilian casualties. Resulting

[29] NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
[30] European Defence Agency
[31] European Network and Information Security Agency

civilian casualties caused negative second-order effects that impacted strategic and operational interests. Rules of Engagement need to be clear and well defined.

0663. **Leadership and Guidance**. Commanders exercising effective leadership and promulgating key guidance contributes to the force's ability to reduce CIVCAS while maintaining mission effectiveness. During operational planning, leaders should identify CIVCAS as a critical vulnerability; planners should also consider the second- and third-order effects associated with CIVCAS.

0664. **CIVCAS Training and Education**. Training and education that addresses overarching principles and specific risk factors for CIVCAS enables the force to adapt its approach to better reduce and mitigate CIVCAS. Complementary to training, professional military education should include operational CIVCAS vignettes, as well as the legal, ethical and operational imperatives of reducing and mitigating CIVCAS. The development of Training would benefit from an analysis and consolidation of lessons learned from previous operations.

0665. **CIVCAS Tools**. A number of tools for reducing CIVCAS have been made available to There has been considerable effort put into the reduction of collateral This should include the specific challenge of discerning the presence of hostile intent. damage through technology and training. In order to mitigate against misidentification additional training and capabilities to improve the ability to PID enemy personnel need to be conducted. forces, often due to significant command focus on the issue. These tools include weapons designed to minimize collateral damage and nonlethal systems that can aid in de-escalation of potential incidents. In general, however, military forces often have very few effective means to de-escalate violence with tools organic to their organization, limiting the options available to commanders. Tools that aid discrimination between hostile/belligerent and civilian (such as higher-resolution imagery or night vision devices) are of value.

0666. **Consequence Management**. Coalition nations are encouraged to harmonize national policies with respect to CIVCAS consequence management and to work towards the codification of doctrine, TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures), and training so as not to re-learn lessons, previously identified. As a guide, consideration should be given to the findings from ISAF lessons learned regarding the reduction of negative second-order effects of CIVCAS and by developing best practices that include CIVCAS Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), key leader engagements to explain and apologize for incidents without accepting liability, and a streamlined communications approach in order to demonstrate empathy.

0667. **Misidentification Challenges**. The conduct of enemy personnel and current shortfalls in available training and tools complicates forces' ability to obtain positive identification (PID), which can contribute to civilians being misidentified as enemy. CIVCAS primarily occurs in one of two ways: the first is through collateral damage from an engagement with known enemy forces, where the effects of the engagement also impact nearby civilians; the second is through misidentification, where civilians are mistakenly believed to be enemy and are engaged because of that belief. Focused training and education to help commanders at all levels to

clearly define and articulate what constitutes hostile intent is critical to the conduct in mitigating against CIVCAS.

0668. **CIVCAS Monitoring**. Tracking and analysis of CIVCAS enables the force to understand root causes of CIVCAS incidents and address them in order to reduce and mitigate CIVCAS. The ability to track CIVCAS is analogous to monitoring other operational data such as friendly force casualties and the number of enemy forces captured or killed: a headquarters should be able to track this critical operational data.

SECTION XI – JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY (JPR) CONSIDERATIONS

0669. PR is a joint function. Joint functions need to be considered by the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in determining the capabilities required for the command. Nations have differing PR philosophies, policies, priorities and capabilities. In a multinational force, differences should be reconciled and an overall combined joint force personnel recovery policy should be established to facilitate unity of effort and enhance PR measures.

0670. The NATO Bi-Strategic Command Joint Operational Guidelines for Joint Personnel Recovery (NATO Bi-SC JPR JOG), dated 22 February 2011, is available for use by NATO and non-NATO nations and operational headquarters. The JPR JOG combines draft NATO PR doctrine (AJP-3.3.9 SD8), TTPs (ATP-3.7.1 SD2), Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Extraction (SERE) training standards (Study 7196 SD5), and individual national concerns.

0671. As an operationally driven gap-filler, the JPR JOG lacks the full strength and power of the NATO STANAGs. Consequently, while the NATO Bi-SC JPR JOG is an authoritative document, not all MIC nations precisely follow policies and guidance found therein.

0672. The following table highlights where MIC-member nations' standards differ from the NATO standard as defined in the Bi-SC JPR JOG, with the purpose of enabling lead nation planners to quickly identify where enhanced coordination may be necessary to effectively plan for JPR operations in a coalition environment.

	Oversight Agency	**Top Level Policy Document**	**Relevant PR Training and Standards MOUs**	**Significant National Interoperability Issues**
AUS	Joint Personnel Recovery Cell, HQ Joint Operations Command	ADDP 3.6 JPR (Consistent with JOG)	Nil	SERE training standard Equipment (beacon) ISOPREP form
CAN	Assistant Deputy Minister/Policy & Chief Military Personnel	In progress	N/A	SERE training standard Equipment (beacon) ISOPREP form

	Oversight Agency	Top Level Policy Document	Relevant PR Training and Standards MOUs	Significant National Interoperability Issues
FRA	FR Air force command (Plans & policy division – JPR cell)	DIA 3.3.9 (isolated personal recovery) PIA 3.3.9 (CSAR) Consistent with JOG	Nil	Nil
DEU	MoD Planning I 1 MoD Strategy & Operation I 5	JOG 11/01 AJP-3.3.9	N/A	Utilizes PRC 117 radio with ability to interrogate from ground, airborne and sea based platforms. Development of a tracking system is in progress.
ITA	MoD III General Planning	JOG 11/01 AJP-3.3.9 JIC-016(SD)	Nil	Equipment (beacon) JIC-016SD (Joint Integrating Concept)
GBR	Directorate of Joint Warfare – Joint Forces Command DSTO	Defence Policy for UK JPR - Recovery of Personnel from Hostile Environment Defence SERE Policy Defence CaC Policy	UK pers attend PR301 and the EDA PRCPC on an opportune basis. PR training for all UK within SERE Levels A, B and C. Will provide PR301 Cse by end 2015 for Air Cell PR Directors within UK Formations.	Survival radio OTH capability Compatibility between HOOK and other systems. Lack of dedicated JPR specialist deployments to JPRC/PRCC Not mandated or resourced but is the effective focal point for all SERE and JPR activity on a practical basis.
USA	Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)	JP 3-50	N/A	See note below

Table 6.1 – MIC JPR Information

Note from Table 6.1

USA: US current PR reporting is largely done by voice, chat or e-mail. Both within the US DoD C2 architecture and with partners, there exists no streamlined system of collection, integration and dissemination of critical PR planning and execution information. PR C2 architectures are a series of standalone systems with no integration with other C2 systems used for military operations, forcing the warfighter to manually transfer data from one system to another, introducing human error and possibly delaying transmission of vital PR mission data to other C2 units and PR recovery forces. Work is needed to define US and partner reporting systems and then map them to each other's PR reporting systems. Key to successful PR recovery operation lays in the ability to quickly and accurately disseminate critical PR data, machine to machine, from an isolated person to the recovery teams. However, country access restrictions to US and partner nations' classified networks complicate the interfaces needed to effect transfer of PR data. Key to coalition interoperability will be to collect information on all communication equipment used for PR by coalition members, and to note the capability to be interoperable with other equipment within a designated coalition operating area.

0673. The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) serves as NATO's catalyst for the improvement and transformation of Joint Air and Space Power, to include JPR. The JAPCC study, "Enhancing NATO Joint Personnel Recovery Capability", dated May 2014, complements the NATO Bi-SC JPR JOG, providing strategic, operational, and tactical level guidance.

0674. The European Personnel Recovery Centre (EPRC), a subordinate agency of the European Air Group, serves to coordinate and implement PR policy, doctrine, processes and procedures, and is expected to achieve Full Operational Capability by July 2015. The EPRC also provides PR training under NATO standards.

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ANNEX A – COALITION FORCE READINESS TRAINING OBJECTIVES AND TOPICS

Primary Training Objectives / Topics	References
Biometrics	• MIC CBG Vol III.10, National Perspectives on the Use of Biometrics Data
C4I and ISTAR Procedures Comprehensive reconnaissance and handover/takeover procedures	• AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine • ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook • Military ISTAR Concept for EU Crisis Management and EU-led Crisis Management Operations
Clear Statement of Coalitions Intent and Commander's Priorities	• OPP, Mission specific
Coalition Communications	• AJP-6 Command and Control Information Systems (Study) • MIC Coalition Building Guide • MPAT Multinational Force SOP • NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Commanders Planning and Decision Making Process	• Specific to the commander and mission
Command Structures and Relationships	• AJP-1 Allied Joint Doctrine
Comprehensive/Whole of Government Approach	• MIC CBG Vols I & II
Counter Improvised Explosive Devices	• AJP-3.15 Allied Joint Doctrine for Countering Improvised Explosive Device • ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook • MIC CBG Vol III.12, Counter-IED
Counter Insurgency Operations	• AJP-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency • ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance • MIC CBG Vol III.9, National Factors for Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations
Cultural Awareness Training	• MIC CBG Vol III.2, Cross Cultural Awareness & Competence
Detainees	• AJP-2.5 Handling of Captured Personnel, Equipment & Documents • MPAT Multinational Force SOP • MIC CBG, Vol III.13, Detainee Operations
Executive Authority of Staff (i.e. Comd, DComd, COS etc.)	• Specific to the commander and mission

Force Protection	• AJP-3.14 Force Protection • AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine • NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations • ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook • MIC CBG, Volume II, Chapter 6 – Force Protection
Host Nation Governance Structure, Relationships & Support	• Mission specific
Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations	• MC 343 NATO Military Assistance to International Disaster Relief Operations • MIC Rapid Reconnaissance Handbook for Humanitarian/Disaster Response
Lead Nation Concept	• MIC CBG Vols I & II
Legal	• AJP-4.5 Allied Joint HNS Doctrine and Procedures • NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations
Logistical support procedures	• AJP-4 Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine • AJP-4.4 Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine • AJP-4.6 MJLC Doctrine • AJP-4.8 Index of NATO Logistics Directives, Instructions and Manuals • AJP-4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Modes of Multinational Logistic Support
Medical evacuation and treatment	• AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
Military Support to Capacity Building	• AJP-3.4.4 Counter Insurgency • ATP-3.2.1.1 Tactical Stability Activity & Tasks • MPAT Multinational Force SOP Vol 3, Annex I – Stability Operations • MPAT Multinational Forces SOP Vol 3, Appx 1 to Annex I – Guiding Principles for Stabilization & Reconstruction • MIC CBG, Vol III.4, Stabilization Handbook
Non-Combat Evacuation Operations	• AJP-3.4.2, Non-combattant Evacuation Operations (NEO) • Council of the European Union (EU), ESDP/PESD 1103, Draft Concept for EU Evacuation Operations Using Military Means

Operational Planning Process	• AJP-5 Operational Planning • AJP-3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations • AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine • MC 133 NATO Operational Planning System • MPAT Multinational Force SOP • ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook • NATO ACO COPD • ADDP 5.0.1 Australian Military Appreciation
Private Security Companies	• MIC CBG Vol III.11, National Positions on Private Security Companies
ROE	• AJP-1 Allied Joint Doctrine • MC 362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement • MPAT Multinational Force SOP • NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations • Use of force concept for EU-led Military Crisis management Operations • ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook • USA – ROE Handbook For Judge Advocates
Role of Advisors (Military and Civilian) / Ambassadors within a MN HQ	• Mission specific
Role of Home Nation Government and HQ within multinational HQ	• Mission specific
Role of multinational Higher HQ	• Mission specific
Roles and Responsibilities of each Division/Branch/Organization (to include the Command Suite and Information Management Officer)	• AJP-1 Allied Joint Doctrine • AJP-3 Allied Joint Operations • ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook • MC 389 Directive for Implementation of the Alliance Combined Joint Task Force Concept • MPAT Multinational Force SOP • NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations • EU FHQ Manning Guide • EU OHQ Manning Guide
SOF Role	• AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations
Specific operational tactics, techniques and procedures (offensive, defensive, transitional operations)	• Mission specific
Stabilization Operations	• MIC CBG Vol III.4, Stabilization Handbook

Targeting (to include both deliberate and time-sensitive as well as kinetic and non kinetic)	• AJP-1 Allied Joint Doctrine • AJP-2.1 Intelligence Procedures • AJP-3 Allied Joint Operations • AJP-3.9 Joint Targeting • MC 471/1 NATO Targeting Policy • MPAT Multinational Force SOPs
Transition Planning from an HQ in Operations to a Follow on HQ	• Mission specific
Understanding J2 Roles and Responsibilities	• AJP-2 Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine • AJP-2.1 Intelligence Procedures • MC 128 Guidance For Intelligence Support to NATO • NATO Handbook For Coalition Operations • ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook
Understanding Battle Rhythms Between HQs and How They All Fit Together	• AJP-3 Allied Joint Operations • MPAT Multinational Force SOP • Specific to the commander and mission
Understanding of the Higher HQ Battle Rhythm	• Specific to the commander and mission
Understanding Nations Political Direction, Limitations, and Caveats	• Mission specific
Understanding the Information/Knowledge Management Environment	• AJP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces • MPAT Multinational Force SOP • MIC Coalition Building Guide

ANNEX B – WEB REFERENCE

Centre for Analysis and Simulation for the Preparation of Air Operations	www.caspoa.org/index.php?lang=en
Civil Military Cooperation	www.cimic-coe.org
Cold Weather Operations	http://mil.no/education-training/coe-cwo/Pages/coe-cwo.aspx
Combined Joint Operations from the Sea	www.cjoscoe.org
Command and Control	http://c2coe.org/
Cooperative Cyber Defense	www.ccdcoe.org
Counter Improvised Explosive Devices	www.coec-ied.es
Defense Against Terrorism	www.coedat.nato.int
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	www.eodcoe.org/aboutus
Human Intelligence	www.nhcoe.org/en/home
Joint Air Power Competence Centre	www.japcc.de
Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense	http://jcbrncoe.cz/joomla/
Military Engineering	http://milengcoe.org/Pages/default.aspx
Military Medical	www.coemed.hu/coemed/index.php
Modelling and Simulation	www.msc-les.org/mscoe
Naval Mine Warfare	www.eguermin.org/coe/coe.asp
Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters	www.coecsw.org
NATO Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)	www.jallc.nato.int
US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute	http://pksoi.army.mil/
US Center for Army Lessons Learned	http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/index.asp

ADF Joint Warfare, Doctrine and Training Centre	http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/centres/jwdtc/jwdtc.html
ADF Peace Operations and Training Centre	http://www.defence.gov.au/adfwc/peacekeeping/index.htm
RAAF - Air Power Development Centre	http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/
Sea Power Centre – Australia	http://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications
Australian Army - Land Warfare Studies Centre	http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/DARA/LWSC
Australian Army Journal	http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/DARA/Our-publications/Australian-Army-Journal/
AUSAID	http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Pages/home.aspx
AUSGOV Australian Civil-Military Centre	http://www.civmilcoe.gov.au/
American, British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand Armies' Program	http://www.abca-armies.org/default.aspx

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