Acknowledgements

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The authors of this report and the underlying analysis are government social researchers and economists based in the Cabinet Office Constitution Group.
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Executive Summary

During local elections in 2018, electoral administrators from eight Local Authorities (LAs), working alongside the Cabinet Office, the Electoral Commission and their Electoral Management Software (EMS) suppliers delivered voter ID and postal vote pilots as part of the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP). Five LAs participated in pilots with the aim to inform future design of the ID requirements and delivery mechanism for implementing the Government’s manifesto commitment for the national roll out of voter ID requirements in polling stations across Great Britain. Three LAs piloted measures to improve the security of the postal and proxy vote process.

Three models of ID were trialled at polling stations - the poll card model in Watford and Swindon, the mixed ID (photographic and non-photographic) model in Gosport and Bromley, and the photographic ID model in Woking. Three other sites, Peterborough, Tower Hamlets and Slough, piloted the postal/proxy vote process.

The models trialled were based on recommendations made by Sir Eric Pickles in his independent review into electoral fraud. We measured the impact of the voter ID requirement through a number of evidence strands: a pre and post election day public opinion survey; a polling station staff survey; data collected at polling stations; cost data collected by LAs; and qualitative interviews with electoral service teams in the participating LAs. We measured the impact of the postal/proxy measures through: a post election day public opinion survey; cost data collected by LAs; and qualitative interviews with electoral services teams. These data sources have also been used by the Electoral Commission in their independent evaluation.

To fully assess the different dimensions of the ID requirement, Cabinet Office evaluated the pilots through four themes: Integrity; Democracy and Equality; Delivery; and Affordability.

Overall, Integrity measures consistently increased in the photographic ID model, and showed varied results across sites in the mixed ID and poll card models. Confidence in how to go about casting a vote and satisfaction with the process of voting significantly increased post election day in the photographic ID model. Levels of confidence significantly increased in one of the two poll card model sites (Watford), but satisfaction remained unchanged. In contrast, confidence remained unchanged in both mixed ID models, yet satisfaction significantly increased in one of the two mixed ID models (Gosport).

The perception of the occurrence of electoral fraud at a local level has significantly decreased, and perception of electoral fraud at a GB level significantly increased in the photographic ID and mixed ID models (although Gosport remains unchanged on perceptions of fraud at a GB level). In contrast, perceptions of levels of electoral fraud at a local level
significantly increased in one of the two poll card model sites (Swindon), and at a GB level (Watford).

Democracy and Equality measures were consistent across each authority. Based on the public opinion survey there is no indication that the ID requirements impacted the reasons for not voting for any specific demographic group across the participating authorities. The predominant reason cited for not voting, among those reported they did not vote in the May 2018 local elections, in all pilot models was ‘too busy/other commitments’.

The most cited communication channel for awareness of the pilot was predominantly the poll card for the poll card model and the mixed ID model sites, with only electors in the photographic ID model citing a leaflet from the local council as being the most referenced communication source. All models found direct local sources to be the most effective communication method.

The most popular ID used was a driving licence in both the photographic and the mixed ID models, with the passport being the second most popular. The poll card was most popular in the poll card model, with a driving licence being used as a second favourite option.

Based on feedback from electoral services teams, most of the pilot requirements were able to be delivered in conjunction with business as usual activities for an election. Piloting authorities highlighted the importance of having enough time to plan for the extra requirements. Most piloting authorities were able to integrate voter ID training into the standard training and guidance given to polling station staff.

Perceptions of election day were largely positive across all models, with polling station staff giving positive feedback on the process, particularly in the poll card sites.

LAs would largely pilot the same approach again, with one of the mixed models (Bromley) citing they would reduce the number of ID options. The poll card model sites reflected that their model would need less of a behaviour change, with one citing that electors already bring their poll card to vote (Watford).

The central role that Cabinet Office and the Electoral Commission play were seen as being integral to further pilots or national roll out. All local authorities stated that a communication campaign would have to be centrally delivered, with one set of requirements nationally.

In order to assess the affordability of each ID pilot model, we have produced estimates for the additional costs of rolling out each model for a national poll. We have standardised the costs to allow comparisons to be drawn, and have omitted costs that were pilot-specific. There is an inherent degree of uncertainty in these estimates, primarily due to the small sample of participating Local Authorities. This is particularly acute for the Poll Card model, which required the use of technology in polling stations which was developed specifically for this pilot.
1. Context

1.1. Overview

In his review of electoral fraud\(^1\) Sir Eric Pickles made 50 recommendations for tackling electoral fraud across polling station conduct, postal voting, and proxy voting. This included requiring voters to provide a form of identification at polling stations before voting, and six specific recommendations to address the potential for electoral fraud in postal voting\(^2\).

The report recommended that the Government should consider options for electors to have to produce ID before voting at polling stations, noting that the Government may wish to pilot different methods. The Government included a commitment to national roll out of voter ID requirements across Great Britain in their manifesto. The Electoral Commission welcomed the pilots as a positive first step towards implementing its own recommendation that an accessible, proportionate voter identification scheme should be introduced in Great Britain.

Currently, staff working in polling stations may ask two statutory questions to further establish the identity of a voter they suspect of a personation offence:

- Are you the person registered in the register of electors for this election as follows?
- Have you already voted here or elsewhere at this election, otherwise than as proxy for some other person?

These limited checks in polling stations mean that electoral fraud is hard to prevent and detect, and the lack of a mechanism for verifying voter identities was cited as the main vulnerability of polling station voting by respondents surveyed by the Electoral Commission.\(^3\)

1.1.1. Reported Incidents of Electoral Fraud\(^4\)

There were 336 reported incidents of alleged electoral fraud across the UK at the elections in 2015\(^5\). Nearly half of these cases (165) related to campaigning offences, over a quarter of the reported incidents (104) were related to fraudulent voting, and the remaining incidents related to nomination offences (25) and registration offences (36).

The most frequently reported type of voting fraud related to the offence of personation (i.e. voting as someone else). Of these incidents, 28 were reported as occurring at the polling station, and 22 when using a postal vote. In addition, there were 13 cases related to the offences of personation by proxy. The remaining 41 voting cases related to the offence of undue influence (14), breaches of secrecy requirements (8), attempts to tamper with ballot papers (3), alleged bribery (8), and treating (8).

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\(^1\) Cabinet Office (2016) Securing the ballot: review into electoral fraud

\(^2\) Annex A contains the recommendations taken forward by Cabinet Office for piloting.

\(^3\) Electoral Commission, Electoral fraud in the UK, January 2014

\(^4\) Electoral Commission, Analysis of cases of alleged electoral fraud in the UK in 2015, March 2016

\(^5\) Elections included: a UK Parliamentary election, elections for local councillors in metropolitan boroughs, district authorities and unitary authorities in England, elections for Mayors in six English local authorities, and a Parliamentary by-election.
Of these personation offences, it is possible that the requirement of photographic ID at the polling station could have prevented the perpetrator from voting as someone else in person. It is not clear what the impact of non-photographic identification would have had upon these offences, or upon offences of personation conducted by postal vote or proxy.

Government has been clear that electoral fraud is not a victimless crime, and worked with the Electoral Commission and Crimestoppers to support the ‘Your Vote is Yours alone’ campaign that ran alongside the local elections to encourage the reporting of suspected electoral crime.

1.1.2. Public Confidence

In 2014, the Electoral Commission⁶ commissioned research to find out more about public attitudes towards electoral fraud. Their research found that people do not have a deep understanding about electoral fraud but they do have a general concern about the possibility of fraud taking place.

The most recent report from the Electoral Commission Winter Tracker⁷ found that in general voting was considered to be safe from fraud or abuse by 84% of respondents, however greater confidence was placed in the safety of voting at a polling station (88%) than by post (73%). Additionally, when asked what single measure would be most effective in preventing electoral fraud, over a third of respondents supported a requirement to show photographic ID at the polling station (37%). Only 6% of respondents supported stopping postal voting on demand, yet 19% believed political parties, candidates, canvassers and campaigners should not be allowed to handle postal vote applications and postal ballot papers.

1.1.3. Research Need

Five LAs participated in pilots with the aim to inform future design of the ID requirements and delivery mechanism for implementing the Government’s manifesto commitment for the roll out of voter ID requirements in polling stations across Great Britain. Three LAs piloted measures to improve the security of the postal and proxy vote process.

The pilots enabled electoral service teams to test a variety of photographic and non-photographic ID, the use of poll cards and the inclusion of additional information in a postal pack. The Cabinet Office communications team worked closely with each LA to ensure all electors were aware of the requirement to produce ID at the polling station.

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⁶ Electoral Commission, Electoral fraud in the UK, January 2014

⁷ Electoral Commission, Winter Tracking Research, March 2018
Therefore research was needed to:

- Provide Parliament and other stakeholders with evidence of the effectiveness of proposed reforms to the statutory requirements of polling station and postal voting
- Inform policy decisions and provide considerations for implementation of changes to voting legislation where appropriate

In doing so we aim to make a comprehensive and evidence-based assessment of the impact of implementing new ID practices. We will determine how successful each model is in delivering the defined outcomes, in order to facilitate an informed decision about which measures should be implemented.

1.2. Report Overview

The next section introduces the overall aims and objectives of the pilots. This is followed by a section on the design of the pilots that details the models tested and areas involved in the pilots. The subsequent three sections present the methodology design, our findings by each model, and our conclusions.
2. Aims

2.1. ID Pilot Aims

Following the Government’s commitment to rolling out voter ID requirements across Great Britain, the aims for the pilots were to inform the future design of the ID requirements and delivery mechanism for implementing national roll out of voter ID requirements in polling stations across Great Britain and to pilot measures to improve the security of the postal and proxy vote process.

2.2. ID Pilot Policy Objectives

With the above aims considered, the agreed primary policy objectives for the pilots were to identify options for ID requirements and delivery mechanism for a voter ID process that:

- Will reduce in person electoral fraud
- Have a clear solution for each elector
- Can be used for all types of polls
- Can be delivered in any polling station
- Will enhance public confidence in the electoral system
- Are most straightforward for local authorities to deliver
- Result in the fewest numbers or particular groups of electors not turning out
- Result in the fewest numbers or particular groups of electors being unable to vote
- Minimise disruption or delays at polling stations
- Are least expensive
- Will not introduce new opportunities for electoral fraud
- Are most easily understood by the electorate
- Will minimise change

2.3. Postal Pilot Aims and Policy Objectives

Following the Government’s commitment to piloting the inclusion of guidance in postal ballot packs on the secrecy of the vote and how to report electoral fraud, the following aims and policy objectives were agreed in Slough and Tower Hamlets:

- Reduce allegations and perception of postal voting fraud;
- Increase voters confidence in contacting the Returning Officer, police or Crimestoppers if they suspect fraudulent activity;
- Establish that postal voters complete and return their own postal ballot papers

Peterborough agreed the following aims and policy objectives:

- Improve the electoral process and take a tough stance in deterring individuals from committing electoral fraud;
- Assess different options aimed at reducing the possibility of electoral fraud relating to postal and proxy voting in order to uphold the integrity of the electoral system;
- Raise high level of awareness in relation to electoral fraud, ensuring that each elector casts their own vote without interference.
3. **Design**

3.1. **Legislative Requirements**

The powers to make the pilot scheme orders are in section 10 of the Representation of the People Act 2000\(^8\) which was passed by Parliament. The powers enable changes to be made to the rules regarding the conduct of all local elections in England and Wales. The powers were exercised in the local elections in relation to all eight pilots. The Orders were not subject to Parliamentary process.

Two Statutory Instruments (SIs)\(^9,10\) were brought before Parliament to allow electoral pilot schemes to be run at Local Authority Mayoral and Combined Authority Mayoral elections. There is already provision for electoral pilot schemes to be run at local council elections. The SIs allowed the planned pilot schemes in two areas during May 2018 to go ahead, where these authorities held local mayoral elections along with their council elections.

The two SIs were debated and approved in the Commons and Lords in December 2017, after a deferred division on the floor in the House of Commons. The SIs were signed by Chris Skidmore MP, then Minister for the Constitution and made into law.

Four of the enabling voter ID pilot Orders were signed by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office, and one pilot Order was signed by the Minister for the Constitution, and were published on 6 March 2018\(^11\). The enabling legal instruments for the postal vote pilots were signed by the Minister for the Constitution and published on 18 April 2018\(^12\).

The Electoral Commission is required under section 10 of the Representation of the People Act 2000 to evaluate every electoral pilot scheme, and report its findings within three months of the election.

3.2. **Local Authority Areas**

For the 2018 pilots, eight LAs piloted a mixture of ID and postal vote requirements. The ID requirements were piloted by five areas:

- Bromley
- Gosport
- Swindon
- Watford
- Woking

The postal vote and proxy requirements were piloted by three areas:

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\(^8\) Representation of the People Act 2000
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/2/contents

\(^9\) The Combined Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (Amendment) Order 2018

\(^10\) The Local Authorities (Mayoral Elections) (England and Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2018

\(^11\) Cabinet Office (2018) Voter ID pilots for the local election in May 2018

\(^12\) Cabinet Office (2018) Postal and proxy vote pilot schemes in May 2018
3.3. Selection Process

The opportunity to pilot voter ID in May 2018 was offered to all LAs in Great Britain and five committed to do so. An Electoral Integrity Pilots prospectus was published on GOV.UK in March 2017. It confirmed the approach to piloting and set out how authorities could submit an expression of interest. The Cabinet Office then worked closely with interested authorities to develop realistic research criteria and practical delivery plans.

Following initial discussions, authorities were invited to submit a formal application if committed to participating and if they met selection criteria. These formal applications were agreed by the Cabinet Office Electoral Integrity Project Board which includes representatives from the Electoral Commission and the Association of Electoral Administrators (AEA), with the Minister for the Constitution approving the final selected authorities.

Annex C contains further detail on the selection criteria.

3.4. Delivery Partners

The key delivery partners for these pilots were the electoral service team in each LA and the Electoral Management System (EMS) supplier teams.

3.4.1. EMS Supplier Delivery

EMS suppliers developed the functionality for Returning Officers (ROs) to administer the pilots. They amended registers for polling station staff to record essential data for evaluation, such as the types of ID used.

They also delivered functionality for the technology enabled pilots in Swindon and Watford. Poll cards included barcodes that were scanned using tablets on election day for validation. Polling station staff also used the tablets to record data for the evaluation.

The suppliers provided electoral service teams in the pilot authorities with training and ongoing support, including on election day.

3.4.2. RO Delivery

While EMS functionality allowed automated reporting on poll card outcomes, we were reliant on the electoral service teams to record key data relating to election day and the monetary and resource costs of administering the ID and postal requirements.

3.4.3. Electoral Commission

The Electoral Commission has a statutory duty to evaluate every electoral pilot scheme, and report its findings within three months of the election. The Electoral Commission provided support and scrutiny as part of the development of the pilots, and Cabinet Office worked closely with the Electoral Commission during the design and evaluation of the ID and Postal/Proxy voting pilots.

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13 Cabinet Office (2017) Prospectus on Electoral Integrity Pilots in May 2018
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prospectus-on-electoral-integrity-pilots-in-may-2018
(accessed June 2018)
3.4.4. Cabinet Office

The Cabinet Office helped with the set-up and running of the pilots, and recorded qualitative data on the electoral service teams experience of managing the pilots to help obtain evidence for the pilot research objectives.

3.5. ID Pilot Models

The Cabinet Office worked closely with LAs to design and deliver the voter ID pilots, and locally issued council ID was made available free of charge whenever an elector was unsure they were able to produce the required ID. Annex D contains the full list of accepted photographic and non-photographic ID for each piloting authority, and the deadlines for issuing council ID.

3.5.1. Poll Card Model

Swindon and Watford tested a poll card model, whereby electors were required to provide their poll card. Limited back up IDs (photographic ID for Swindon, and both photographic and non-photographic ID for Watford) were accepted in the absence of a poll card.

In Swindon specifically, if an elector did not have their poll card or other acceptable ID, they were able to bring someone with them to attest their identity. The person attesting needed to be registered at the same polling station, and have proved their identity by presenting their poll card or other form of specified ID. If an elector was unable to present the specified ID, or have someone attest to their identity, they were refused a ballot paper and were unable to vote.

3.5.2. Mixed ID Model

Bromley and Gosport tested a mixed model, whereby electors were required to provide photographic ID, or a combination of two forms of non-photographic ID, from a pre-approved list. If an elector was unable to present this ID, they were refused a ballot paper and were unable to vote.

3.5.3. Photographic ID Model

Woking tested a photographic ID only model, whereby electors were required to provide a valid form of photographic ID from a pre-approved list (e.g. a UK, EU or Commonwealth passport, or a UK Driving Licence). If an elector was unable to present this ID, they were refused a ballot paper and were unable to vote.

3.6. Postal and Proxy Pilot Models

3.6.1. Peterborough

Peterborough included a leaflet in all postal vote packs to inform electors about the secrecy of the vote and provided details of the relevant organisation to contact if fraud was suspected.

A selection of postal voters had their postal ballot packs personally delivered by council staff to ensure the right person received their vote.

Peterborough also tested ID at polling stations for proxy voters. Only proxy voters providing photographic ID from a pre-approved list would be issued a ballot paper and allowed to vote. Annex D contains the full list of accepted IDs.
3.6.2. **Slough**
Slough included a leaflet in all postal vote packs to inform electors about the secrecy of the vote and provided details of the relevant organisation to contact if fraud was suspected. A sample of postal voters were contacted to complete a face-to-face survey shortly after postal vote dispatch to confirm receipt.

3.6.3. **Tower Hamlets**
Tower Hamlets included a leaflet in all postal vote packs to inform electors about the secrecy of the vote and provided details of the relevant organisation to contact if fraud was suspected. A random sample of postal voters were contacted to complete a telephone survey shortly after postal vote dispatch to confirm receipt. A second survey was conducted after each opening session to confirm if the elector had completed and returned the pack.
4. Methodology
We decided to conduct a process evaluation as the overarching framework for evaluating the pilots, to help understand how local areas and electoral services teams would respond and implement ID requirements if they were rolled out nationally.

4.1. Research Objective
Considering the overall aims and policy objectives outlined in section 2, our primary research objective was to understand:

**What ID requirements and delivery mechanism should be rolled out nationally?**

4.2. Research Questions
To understand the full scope of the ID and delivery mechanism required for national roll out, we considered four themes: Integrity; Democracy and Equality; Delivery; and Affordability. Each theme had multiple research questions that helped frame our research design, analysis and evaluation and were considered alongside limitations of methodology. These research questions are noted in Annex E.

4.3. Data Sources
We used a number of evidence strands to address each theme.

4.3.1. Polling station data (ID pilot only)
This data was manually collected data recorded by polling station staff on election day. It was collected on paper by Gosport, Bromley and Woking, and electronically by Swindon and Watford. It includes key metrics such as ID used, electors turned away, and electors that returned to vote.

4.3.2. Local Authority data (ID pilot only)
This data was collected by LAs through the course of the pilots. It includes measures of new activity as a result of the pilot, such as the amount of local IDs issued by councils, as well as standard measures collected during an election, such as the overall turnout for each piloting authority.

4.3.3. ID Pilots public opinion survey - pre and post election day (ID pilot only)
Cabinet Office commissioned Bostock Marketing Group (BMG) Research to conduct a survey to assess public opinion and understanding of the ID requirements, and the impact it could have on voting behaviour and confidence in the electoral system.

The survey was conducted via face-to-face interviews in two waves: pre election day and post election day. This allowed us to understand if the requirements trialled had any impact on perceptions and claimed behaviour. “Comparator” authorities, matched with each LA based on demographic indices, were surveyed to provide a baseline for measurement of perceptions, and to indicate potential impact of the requirements.

The sample of the survey was representative of age, gender, ethnic group and socio-economic grade in each of the participating LAs, and also included a group that is demographically representative of England. This allowed us to understand any impact of the
requirement on particular groups and give a national benchmark. A breakdown of each sample size achieved in each pilot area is noted below (Table 1).

**Table 1: Number of people interviewed in the ID pilots public opinion survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID pilot local authority</th>
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<th>Post Election day</th>
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<td>507</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watford</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bromley(^\d)</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>4.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gosport</td>
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**Comparators**

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<td>4.37</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Electoral Commission also conducted a pre and post election day public opinion survey.

4.3.4. **Postal Pilots public opinion survey - post election day (Postal pilot only)**

We commissioned BMG research to conduct a survey to assess confidence in the electoral system and understanding of the leaflet included in postal packs in Peterborough, Slough and Tower Hamlets. Specifically, the survey sought to understand how the guidance included in the postal packs impacted elector awareness of the secrecy of the vote, to what extent electors understood the guidance, and elector understanding of the mechanisms for reporting suspicion of fraudulent postal voting.

The survey was conducted via post with a random sample of 2,000 postal voters in each authority, after election day. A breakdown of each sample size achieved in each pilot area is noted below (Table 2).

\(^\d\) Higher sample size due to additional days of fieldwork
Table 2: Number of returned postal pilot questionnaires from public opinion survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postal pilot local authority</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peterborough</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slough</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower Hamlets</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.5. **Electoral service team interviews**

We conducted in depth interviews with electoral service staff in the weeks following election day. These interviews provide rich qualitative data on the planning of the pilot, and the wider impact and delivery of the ID requirements.

4.3.6. **Polling station staff survey (ID pilot only)**

This survey was conducted by the Electoral Commission. Polling station staff filled in the survey on election day and indicated their views on their experience of polling day as a staff member and for electors. The survey was completed by 1,425 polling station staff across each of the piloting LAs (307 in Swindon, 135 in Watford, 733 in Bromley, 137 in Gosport, and 116 in Woking).

4.3.7. **Postal vote data (Postal pilot only)**

This data was collated by LAs on the number of people contacted, the number of people that provided information, the number of people that confirmed they did not apply for a postal vote, the number of people that confirmed that did not receive a postal ballot pack, the number of cases referred to the police in relation to postal vote fraud and the number of postal ballot packs issued but not returned. These evaluation metrics were defined in the postal order.

4.3.8. **Cost data**

LAs manually recorded the costs incurred while delivering the pilots, and provided estimates of the costs they incurred. We additionally collected cost data directly from the pilot authorities and supplemented it with data from Elections Claims Unit and detailed wage data from the Cabinet Office Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) cost survey.

4.4. **Limitations of Approach**

The limitations outlined below were taken into consideration when conducting the research. Although the limitations were taken into consideration, there was clear rationale and advantages to the approaches taken. The combination of the different research methods also improved understanding as a variety of sources could be taken into account when reporting the key findings. The measures provide the foundations, and a benchmark for, a broader evidence base to be developed to understand how the ID requirement will impact electors and mechanisms for delivery broadly.

4.4.1. **Capturing perceptions**

Perceptions of fraud are difficult to capture in an unbiased way, in that asking about fraud may cause people to believe the problem is endemic. We cannot track changes in
perceptions to a specific policy, as short- or long-term changes can be a result of events which cannot be controlled for, including media reporting or the introduction of counter-fraud policies.

4.4.2. Proving causation

We have compared the number of cases of alleged electoral fraud during the May 2018 election with previous years\(^\text{15}\). We are not able to compare cases of proven electoral fraud, as these have not progressed from allegations by the time of this publication. It is not possible to directly attribute any change in number of allegations or proven cases of electoral fraud to the introduction of the ID requirements. It is highly unlikely we would be able to attribute any change in numbers of postal voting fraud to the introduction of awareness methods (enclosing leaflets in postal packs or Crimestoppers contact details) and extra checks (door knocking or telephone calls) as this data is slow to emerge. We are reliant on evidence from the public opinion survey and self-reporting from electoral service teams, to indicate likely outcomes but these will be inferred and will not be able to prove cause and effect.

4.4.3. Generalising results

While we are confident in the robustness of the findings within each participating authority, there are limitations to the extent to which the findings of the evaluation can be generalised to indicate outcomes across Great Britain. The LAs participating in the pilots do not involve areas in Wales or Valuation Joint Boards (VJBs) in Scotland, and there are very few areas in total participating. Participating authorities share many characteristics and are not nationally representative\(^\text{16}\). We have not been able to assess the impact on all types of areas or electors. Further to this, we cannot say what the long-term impact could be when a policy beds in.

There are also limitations as to whether we can say a specific set of requirements would have the same impact or outcomes elsewhere. Each LA is trialing unique ID requirements, and we will not be able to generalise our results to other LAs/VJBs, with different characteristics and different population demographics and contexts.

Finally, these pilots were conducted during Local Elections, and we have not been able to generalise our results to other types of polls, notably UK Parliamentary General Elections (UKPGE) where a different electorate is eligible to vote, and a different group of electors may intend to vote.

4.4.4. Data source limitations

4.4.4.1. Polling station data

As outlined in section 4.3, we used a number of different data sources to evaluate the success of the pilot and to address the research objective. Our analysis of polling station data was supplemented with different qualitative and quantitative research approaches.

A key source of data was information received from polling stations, which provided data on the types of ID used, number of electors turned away, and number of electors that returned

\(^{15}\) At the time of publication, no allegations of electoral fraud had been received in the piloting authorities. Previous cases of alleged electoral fraud can be found in Annex B.

\(^{16}\) All piloting authorities broadly share the same characteristics, with the exception of Watford that has a large net BAME population of 28.08%. Swindon and Gosport also have the highest percentage of no passport held (18.26% and 21.38% respectively).
with correct ID. There remains a burden on polling station staff to record large volumes of information at the polling station, so we only included data collection we felt was justified in answering the research questions without putting a considerable amount of additional pressure on staff.

4.4.4.2. Cost data

LAs were asked to provide detailed accounts of all the additional costs incurred by the running of the pilot, and these were supplemented by standardised cost data forms. This allowed costs to be separated into definable categories, to identify costs that were pilot-specific (and therefore would not be incurred if requirements were rolled out nationally), and isolate the net additional costs of introducing new identification requirements.

The standardised forms were provided to ensure that there was an exhaustive ledger of additional costs, and to provide a consistent basis to draw comparisons between different models. This data is self-reported, and not receipt-based; as such, there is the potential for inaccuracy, though based upon our discussions with administrators we believe the scope for inaccuracy is limited.

The cost data evidence base was collated from five LAs across the three models. This is too small a sample to be nationally representative. As such, we have employed sensitivity analysis (i.e. variation in costs) to account for the level of uncertainty in calculating the additional costs of each model type when rolled out nationally. The uncertainty arising from such a small sample is mitigated in part by the detailed cost data from previous elections provided by the Elections Claims Unit, allowing us to account for differences in costs across the country. This was supplemented by an extensive cost survey of over 240 EROs across England, Scotland and Wales. The steps taken to utilise this data and to lessen the impact of these limitations are outlined in Annex F.

Several costs incurred during the pilot will be specific to the running of the pilot, and would not be relevant if ID requirements were rolled out nationally. For example, there were significant additional expenses incurred on local advertising and communication campaigns relative to a usual election, though we have excluded these on the basis that the need for additional advertising would diminish with the presence of a coordinated national advertising campaign. Details of costs that have been omitted in our estimates are explored in Annex F.

4.4.4.3. Electoral service team interviews

We supplemented the polling station data with qualitative research, such as interviews. The interviews used semi-structured topic guides, which included a list of topics to cover that would help address the key research objective and questions. The semi-structured nature of the sessions meant that LA staff were given flexibility to expand on topics they felt were important, allowing us to gain greater insights into individual experience and how the pilots were delivered within different authorities.

Qualitative research is criticised for being subjective and open to biases during the analysis of data. To overcome this limitation to some extent, we shared our initial analysis with electoral service teams to allow them to feedback on the findings and conclusions that had been drawn.
4.4.4.4. **Pre and post election day public opinion survey**

Electors would have had limited exposure to the policy given traditionally low turnout for local elections, meaning any conclusions drawn from the survey may have limited experiential evidence value. Further to this, we cannot prevent misleading responses or reporting that deliberately seeks to undermine the policy.

4.5. **Ethical Considerations**

The pilot orders were supported by Equality Impact Assessments that were completed by each piloting authority to ensure the ID requirements did not impact adversely on particular groups with protected characteristics. These assessments took into account the needs of different communities and wherever possible, LAs worked with any groups that were concerned about the impact of the ID requirements.

Not all types of identification are universally held by individuals who are eligible to vote in polls in GB17, and it was important that we maintained the accessibility of the polls. At the same time, we aimed to enhance electors’ confidence in the system in which they are participating on election day. The types of ID that we tested through these pilots aimed to balance these two requirements. As a result, any elector unable to comply and produce the necessary identification were offered another available option for proving their identity. Locally issued council ID was made available whenever an elector was unsure they were able to produce the required ID, be it photographic or not.

When conducting the research, ethical and data issues were considered. For example, informed consent was obtained from each participant who took part in an interview prior to recording. When conducting survey and interview research, electoral service teams, polling station staff, and the public were first made aware of what their data would be used for and who it would be shared with. We also informed participants that all data would be anonymised and not used in a manner that would allow identification of individuals.

All research participation was optional and participants could withdraw their consent at any point during the process. The public opinion survey fieldwork was carried out under the guidelines set out by the Market Research Code of Conduct.

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17 Census data indicates that passports are not held for 18.3% of the population in Swindon, 10.1% in Watford, 9.6% in Bromley, 21.4% in Gosport, and 9.3% in Woking. Across England and Wales, 16.9% of the population do not hold a passport.
5. Findings

The below sections outline how to interpret findings, and gives an overview of key findings followed by detailed analysis of each model piloted.18

5.1. Interpreting Findings

5.1.1. Themes

Our research questions were split across four themes: Integrity; Democracy and Equality; Delivery; and Affordability. These are defined below in Table 3.

Table 3: Themes across pilots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Key Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>Ensuring public confidence in the security of the electoral system remains high</td>
<td>Perceptions of the voting process (confidence in knowing how to vote, voting satisfaction) and perceptions of electoral fraud (safeguards and secrecy of the vote, polling station security, and occurrence of fraud in local area versus Great Britain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and Equality</td>
<td>Ensuring that the ID requirements being trialled do not prohibit electors from voting where eligible, and do not create more barriers for participation in the democratic process</td>
<td>Awareness of the pilot (recall of ID requirements and channel communications), voting behaviour (reasons for not voting and ID used), and attitudes towards the pilot requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td>Ensuring that the ID requirements can be delivered successfully</td>
<td>Electoral service teams planning and resourcing considerations, delivery of training, and working with delivery partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordability</td>
<td>Measuring changes, if any, to the monetary cost of delivering elections with ID requirements, including implementation and ongoing delivery</td>
<td>Affordability through cost modeling of national roll out including costs of hiring additional members of staff, training staff members, any additional facilities required, and the cost of issuing ID.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Unless otherwise stated, all averages referred to represent the arithmetic mean of averages.
### 5.1.2. Dictionary of Terms

Table 4 below refers to the terms categorising key points of information used throughout the report.

**Table 4: Dictionary of Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awareness</td>
<td>Awareness among all people aged 18 or older and were eligible to vote in the local election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballots Issued</td>
<td>The number of people who were issued a ballot paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparator Local Authority</td>
<td>Non-piloting Local Authority matched on the Indices of multiple deprivation score with piloting Local Authority. Bromley, Swindon and Watford were matched with Bexley, Gosport was matched with Redditch and Woking was matched with Richmond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day</td>
<td>3rd May 2018 polling day in the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Service Team</td>
<td>Council staff who oversaw the pilots - including Electoral Returning Officer, and Electoral Service Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligible Elector</td>
<td>An individual who can register to vote as they meet the eligibility requirements of age and nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England Comparator</td>
<td>Responses from randomly sampled Local Authorities across England(^{19}) to provide comparative results at a national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indices of Multiple Deprivation</td>
<td>A combined measure of deprivation based on a total of 37 separate indicators that have been grouped into seven domains, each of which reflects a different aspect of deprivation experienced by individuals living in an area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/central/high estimate</td>
<td>Cost modelling assumptions have been varied to include a low and high estimate in order to account for any uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No ID</td>
<td>The number of people that brought no ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People checked</td>
<td>The addition of the number of people who were issued a ballot paper and the number of people who experienced process handling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who did not return</td>
<td>The number of people who were originally turned away who did not return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling Station Staff</td>
<td>Presiding Officers, Poll clarks and Polling Station Inspectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process Handling</td>
<td>The number of people who were not issued a ballot on their first</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.3. **Statistical Significance**

When comparing the results between sites and pre/post election day waves in the commissioned survey we have noted where the difference is statistically significant. A result is said to be statistically significant if it is likely not caused by random chance but is instead more likely to be attributable to differences between the sites or waves. We tested for statistical significance where $p < 0.05$.

Where a result is not statistically significant we cannot be certain that the difference was not caused by chance.
5.2. **Poll Card Model**

The poll card requirement was piloted by Swindon and Watford.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integrity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Swindon and Watford showed mixed results, with Watford showing more positive movement on electors attitudes towards the Integrity measures after election day than Swindon.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| - **Confidence in knowing how to vote:** significantly increased post election day in Watford (91% to 95%) but did not change in Swindon (96%)
| - **Satisfaction with the voting process:** did not change in both Swindon (85%) and Watford (86%)
| - **Sufficient safeguards to prevent electoral fraud:** significantly increased post election day in Watford (38% to 53%) but did not change in Swindon (47%)
| - **Belief that polling stations are safe from fraud and abuse:** significantly increased post election day in Watford (83% to 88%) but did not change in Swindon (80%)
| - **Perception that photographic ID would stop electoral fraud:** significantly increased post election day in Watford (61% to 71%) but did not change in Swindon (73%)
| - **Perception that non-photographic ID would stop electoral fraud:** significantly increased post election day in Watford (41% to 49%) but did not change in Swindon (33%)
| - **Perception of fraud in GB occurring:** significantly increased post election day by eight percentage points in Watford (16% to 24%) but did not change in Swindon (21%)

| **Democracy and Equality** |
| *Awareness in the poll card model was significantly higher in Swindon.* |
| - **The number of people who did not return to vote:** 67 across both pilot sites (0.11% of people checked). In Swindon 25 people did not return (0.06% of people checked) and in Watford 42 people did not return (0.22% of people checked)
| - **Awareness of the ID requirements:** 79% in Swindon and 58% in Watford among eligible electors post election day
| - **Most cited channel for finding out about the ID requirement:** the poll card in both Swindon (56%) and Watford (50%), with direct channels having a greater impact than indirect resources
| - **Reason for not voting among those who reported they did not vote:** ‘Too busy/other commitments’ was the most popular reason in both Swindon (26%) and Watford (52%)

| **Delivery** |
| *Polling station staff were generally confident in the delivery of the poll card model and electoral service teams thought the poll card model would need the least behavioural change among electors.* |
| - **Most popular ID type used:** poll card in both Swindon (95%) and Watford (87%)
| - **Polling station staff confidence in delivering the requirements:** was 99% in Swindon and 97% in Watford

| **Affordability** |
| *The poll card model is expected to cost between £4.3m and £20.4m per UKPGE excluding the cost of IT equipment required in polling stations.* |
5.2.1. **Integrity**

**Perceptions of the voting process**

The public opinion survey results indicate that the requirement to show ID had significantly increased confidence in knowing how to vote post election day in Watford by four percentage points (91% to 95%). In contrast, confidence did not significantly change post election day in Swindon (96%) but the level was significantly higher than the England comparator group (92%). In Swindon, BAME groups show lower confidence (90%). This is independent of the ID requirements as confidence was in line with pre election day levels (83%).

Levels of satisfaction with the process of voting in both poll card pilots post election day remained the same in Swindon (85%) and Watford (86%). There was a significant difference between the poll card model and the comparator LA where the pilot sites were significantly more satisfied in the voting process than the comparator LA (78%, Bexley). Those from a lower socio-economic background, SEG C2, were less satisfied with the process of voting in Swindon (77%). This is independent of the ID requirements as satisfaction was in line with pre election day levels (80%).

**Perceptions of electoral fraud**

There have been no historical electoral fraud allegations in Swindon but a small proportion in Watford (Annex B). There have been no allegations made for the 2018 Local Elections, in either area, at the time of this publication.

The proportion of electors who believed there were sufficient safeguards in place to prevent electoral fraud in polling stations significantly increased in Watford post election day by 15 percentage points (38% to 53%). There was no significant change post election day in Swindon (47%). Electors in the comparator LA group were less likely to agree with the statement than in Watford (45%, Bexley).

The proportion who feel that voting in polling stations is safe from fraud and abuse significantly increased in Watford post election day by five percentage points (83% to 88%). In Swindon sentiment towards this did not significantly change following the pilot (80%).

The perception that having to produce photographic ID in polling stations would be an effective measure to prevent electoral fraud significantly increased post election day in Watford by 10 percentage points (61% to 71%) but did not change in Swindon (73%). Similarly, the perception that having to produce non-photographic ID in polling stations would be an effective measure to prevent electoral fraud significantly increased post election day in Watford by eight percentage points (41% to 49%) but did not change in Swindon (33%).

Perception of fraud being prevalent locally significantly increased post election day in Swindon by three percentage points (4% to 7%) but remained unchanged post election day in Watford (7%). In contrast, perception of electoral fraud occurring in GB significantly increased post election day by eight percentage points in Watford (16% to 24%) but remained the same in Swindon post election day (21%).

Overall, polling station staff found that the ID requirements made the process of voting in the poll card pilots more secure. The polling station staff survey results indicate that 75% of
polling station staff in Watford and 64% in Swindon agreed with the statement that voting was more secure because voters had to prove their identity.

5.2.2. Democracy and Equality

Awareness of the pilot

Awareness of the pilot requirements among all eligible electors was significantly higher in Swindon (79%) than in Watford (58%). It is unclear what is driving the lower level of awareness in Watford. As noted below, turnout in Watford increased compared to 2016 local elections, and the proportion of people who did not return to vote was in line with other piloting authorities.

Most electors in Swindon (56%) and Watford (50%) found out about the pilot through their poll card. 24% of people who took part in the public opinion survey recalled receiving a leaflet from Swindon Borough Council and 39% of people reported receiving a leaflet from Watford Borough Council. Hearing about the pilot through local media was recalled slightly more often than national media in Swindon (21% and 13% respectively) and in Watford (36% and 29% respectively). In Swindon, eight percent of eligible electors recalled finding out about the pilot on a poster from the local council, whereas in Watford this figure was much higher (21%).

In both LAs, polling station staff reported being confident that voters were aware they would be required to present ID before being issued their ballot paper (94% in Swindon and 96% in Watford).

Intention to vote

The public opinion survey showed that in pilot areas the ID requirements did not have an impact on most electors reported intention to vote.

While it is not possible to link the introduction of voter ID to actual turnout, official turnout figures for the 2018 local election was 39.43% in Swindon (up 5.40% percentage points from the 2016 election; the highest increase in turnout of all pilots) and 39.28% in Watford (up 2.57% percentage points from the 2016 local elections).

In total, the number of people who did not return to vote across both pilots was 67, which represented 0.11% of people checked. This breaks down to 25 people in Swindon (0.06% of people checked), and 42 in Watford (0.22% of people checked) not returning to vote. These levels are in line with other pilots, with Swindon marginally lower than any other pilot site.

On election day, 99% of polling station staff in Swindon and 98% in Watford agreed that the majority of voters were able to provide a correct form of ID.

Those who reported not voting in the 2018 local elections cited a variety of reasons for not voting (Annex G). The most cited reason was ‘too busy/other commitments’ (26% in Swindon and 52% in Watford).

In both pilot areas it was clear that the majority of people followed the primary requirement to bring their poll card to cast their vote (95% in Swindon and 87% in Watford). The second

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20 24 people in Watford were recorded as entering the polling station without the ID requirements but left no details, so were unable to be tracked to check if they were eligible or returned.
most common form of ID used was a driving licence (4% in Swindon and 8% in Watford). The third most common form of ID used in Swindon was a passport, that was used in one percent of cases, whereas in Watford this was a debit/credit card, used in three percent of cases.

The poll card acted as council issued ID; with Swindon issuing 66 replacement poll cards and Watford issuing 3 replacement poll cards in total. In addition, Swindon offered attestation at the polling station for people who did not comply with the ID requirements. In total, 107 people cast their vote on election day in Swindon through attestation (0.25% of ballots issued).

5.2.3. Delivery
Planning and resourcing
In both Swindon and Watford almost all polling station staff agreed or strongly agreed that they had successfully delivered the ID requirements in their polling stations on election day (99% and 97% respectively).

During the electoral service team interviews, both pilot sites were interested in piloting the poll card as they saw it as more “inclusive”, with Watford seeing the requirements as a natural progression of a practice already taking place in polling stations. They emphasised that a behaviour change would not be needed as electors already come to vote with their poll card in a lot of instances. Their key assumption when planning which requirements to use was that being on the register acts as an identity proof, and that the poll card is a verification of that process and a logical next step.

The majority of polling station staff in Swindon and Watford agreed or strongly agreed they had everything they needed on election day to deliver the pilots, both in terms of space and equipment (98% and 93% respectively).

Training
Both pilot areas took different approaches to train their polling station staff to deliver the technology requirements in advance of election day.

Swindon included a bespoke four day EMS supplier training on the technology in addition to standard training. They reflected that the training was lengthy but necessary to ensure all staff were trained to use the tablets. Feedback from staff highlighted that they were initially apprehensive, but following training were really positive about the process. This was reflected in their overall perception of the day, with staff giving Swindon positive feedback on using the tablets, and even suggested incorporating the Corresponding Number List (CNL) as well as the register on the tablet. Swindon also noted that by collecting the information offline they removed the risk caused by any issues with the wifi.

Watford ran training on the technology in a face-to-face format focusing on issues that could arise on election day. Overall, feedback from training was positive with staff noting that training would become more integrated with regular training procedure as they became more familiar with the requirements. Feedback was very positive on election day, with Watford citing that staff coped well with the requirements on the day.
The polling station staff survey results also indicate that the majority felt that the instructions on how to deliver and use the technology were clear, with 93% of polling station staff agreeing or strongly agreeing in Swindon, and 92% of staff in Watford.

**Working with delivery partners**

Reflecting on election day, the electoral service team in Swindon were positive about the possibility of delivering the poll card model again, even mentioning that some polling station staff may find it difficult to revert back to the old process. Similarly, Watford felt they would pilot the poll card again, citing that their requirements were a good compromise for electors.

Both sites felt the system worked well on election day - with Swindon citing an example of a husband and wife accidentally trying to use the same poll card, but the system spotted and flagged this. The Watford team felt that the technology made the poll card feel more secure and sped up the process.

Both poll card pilots stressed that the EMS suppliers were integral to the success of delivering the requirements, with Swindon emphasising that the EMS supplier training was crucial. Swindon also stressed that although there were upfront development costs, another benefit of the technology may be reducing polling station staff levels in future. Watford noted that the EMS suppliers should adopt the wording used by the council rather then their own terms to ensure the software is more user friendly for staff.

In terms of communications campaigns, Swindon emphasised that simplicity of the requirements is key, with a universal set of requirements across LAs. Similarly, Watford suggested that messaging had to be straightforward and universal across LAs, and that a long list of ID requirements would be confusing to communicate to electors.

### 5.2.4. Affordability

National roll out of the poll card model is difficult to estimate from these pilots. The majority of costs incurred for the running of the pilots were for the purchase and/or hire of IT equipment (both software and hardware) required alongside the poll cards. The costs of hiring additional staff members and training them to use the new equipment also made up a significant proportion of total costs. The production and issuance of scannable poll cards was also a significant proportion of total costs.

The cost of IT equipment - specifically, the cost of software licenses, hiring devices and other equipment - varied significantly between Watford and Swindon. Taken on a per-polling station basis, the average cost in Watford was £332, and in Swindon £659. It should be noted that there was no additional software license cost for Watford. Both LAs chose to hire their equipment for the pilot.

We have not made an attempt to estimate the cost of IT equipment if it were required for a UKPGE. The predominant reason for this is the lack of evidence and certainty in producing such an estimate. While both Watford and Swindon chose to hire their equipment, it is plausible that Local Authorities would choose to invest in purchasing the relevant IT equipment. Furthermore, it is also possible that Local Authorities would face lower rental prices as suppliers benefit from economies of scale. In either case, we cannot predict with
certainty the likely market suppliers’ pricing structures based on the limited evidence from the pilot.

Staff costs, which include both polling station staff costs and administrative staff, are expected to range from £0.7m to £8.9m. Swindon reported that around 515 extra administrative hours were required for its 42 polling stations, equating to approximately 5 hours additional administrative staff resource per polling station. Watford did not report any additional administrative resource, reflecting that the amount of additional resource required is dependent on factors pertaining to each authority. As such, we have varied this assumption, assuming that authorities require no additional administrative resource per polling station in the low estimate and 10 hours in the high estimate, double what Swindon required.

Both Swindon and Watford required polling station inspectors (PSIs) to help assist the Presiding Officers (POs) and other polling station staff to identify and solve any problems arising. In Swindon, 10 additional PSIs were required for its 102 polling stations, and in Watford, 2 were required for its 48 polling stations. This equates to approximately 0.1 PSI per polling station for Swindon, and 0.04 for Watford. Our expectation is that, on average, an additional 0.1 PSIs will be required. To account for uncertainty, we have ranged this assumption from a low of 0.04, in line with Watford, up to 0.16.

Additionally, based on reports from Swindon that 6 pilot supervisors were required for its 42 polling stations, we have assumed that there are 0.06 pilot supervisors for each polling station. Again, it is plausible that authorities may require a greater or lesser number of additional staff dependent on their circumstances, so we have included a range of 0.02 to 0.1.

Training costs are expected to range from £2.1m to £3.4m. Using feedback from Swindon and Watford, we have assumed that all polling station staff receive 1 hour 15 minutes training, which, based on detailed wage data collected by Cabinet Office, will cost £20. We have varied the amount of time taken to deliver this training to include a low estimate of 1 hour and a high estimate of 1 and a half hours, reflecting different approaches to training staff between authorities.

Under this model, scannable poll cards were issued to all electors who had not opted for a postal vote. As of the 2017 General Election, 82% of electors had not opted for a postal vote, and would therefore require a scannable poll card. As such, this is the minimum benchmark of required scannable poll cards. Our central expectation is a conservative one: 90% of voters may require a poll card - reflecting the possibility that those registered for postal votes may opt-in for a scannable poll card in the run up to a UKPGE.

To account for a scenario in which all voters request a scannable poll card, we have also modelled a high scenario. The additional cost of producing scannable poll cards, relative to existing poll cards, is approximately £0.03, with an additional £0.05 for delivery\(^\text{21}\). Both of these have been based on reports from Swindon, and adjusted for relative price differences across the country based on extensive ERO cost data held by the Cabinet Office. The total cost of issuing scannable poll cards is therefore estimated to range from £1.5m to £5.6m.

\(^{21}\) The additional cost for delivery of scannable poll cards is borne out of the requirement that deliverers recorded additional information, and that cancelled poll cards were re-delivered.
### 5.3. Mixed ID Model

The mixed ID requirement was piloted by Bromley and Gosport.

#### Key Findings

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<tr>
<th>Integrity</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Bromley and Gosport showed mixed results in terms of elector’s attitudes after election day.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Confidence in knowing how to vote:</strong> did not change post election day in either Bromley (97%) or Gosport (94%)</td>
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<td><strong>Satisfaction with the voting process:</strong> significantly increased post election day in Gosport (80% to 85%) but did not change in Bromley (84%)</td>
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<td><strong>Sufficient safeguards to prevent electoral fraud:</strong> significantly increased post election day in both Bromley (50% to 62%) and Gosport (35% to 41%)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Belief that polling stations are safe from fraud and abuse:</strong> significantly increased post election day in Gosport (81% to 85%) but did not change in Bromley (84%)</td>
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<td><strong>Perception that photographic ID would stop electoral fraud:</strong> significantly increased post election day in Bromley (61% to 71%) but did not change in Gosport (58%)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Perception that non-photographic ID would stop electoral fraud:</strong> significantly decreased post election day in Gosport (41% to 33%) but did not change in Bromley (51%)</td>
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<td><strong>Perception of local fraud occurring:</strong> significantly decreased post election day in both Bromley (13% to 8%) and Gosport (12% to 7%)</td>
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<td><strong>Perception of fraud in GB occurring:</strong> significantly increased post election day in Bromley (21% to 26%) but did not change in Gosport (31%)</td>
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<td><em>Awareness of the requirement in the mixed ID model was in line with other models.</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The number of people who did not return to vote:</strong> across both was 208 (0.25% of people checked). In Bromley 154 people did not return (0.22% of people checked) and in Gosport 54 people did not return (0.37% of people checked)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Awareness of the ID requirements:</strong> 80% in Bromley and 77% in Gosport among eligible electors post election day, with those aged 18-34 were less likely to be aware in Bromley (68%) and Gosport (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Most cited channel for finding out about the ID requirement:</strong> the poll card in both Bromley (63%) and Gosport (55%), with direct channels having a greater impact than indirect resources</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for not voting among those who reported they did not vote:</strong> ‘Too busy/other commitments’ was the most popular reason in Bromley (40%)</td>
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<td><em>Polling station staff were generally confident in the delivery of the mixed ID model on polling day but had the greatest issues with the data capture form due to long list of ID.</em></td>
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<td><strong>Most popular ID type used:</strong> driving licence in both Bromley (52%) and Gosport (54%)</td>
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5.3.1. **Integrity**

**Perceptions of the voting process**

Piloting the mixed ID approach had no significant impact on eligible electors confidence in how to go about casting their vote in either Bromley or Gosport, with the overall level of confidence in how to go about casting a vote remaining high post pilot (97% and 94% confident respectively). Those from lower socio-economic groups, SEG DE, showed less confidence than the general sample in both Bromley (96%) and Gosport (92%). This is independent of the ID requirements as confidence was in line with pre election day levels in both Bromley (93%) and Gosport (90%).

The public opinion survey results highlighted a difference in levels of satisfaction with the voting process between the two pilot sites.

In Bromley there was no significant impact on the level of satisfaction towards the process of voting following election day. The overall level of satisfaction post pilot remained high (84%), and six percentage points higher than the comparator group (78%, Bexley). This significant difference versus the comparator, but not against the pre pilot results, suggests that voters were already more likely to be satisfied with the voting process before the main voter ID communications campaign took place. In contrast, eligible electors in Gosport were significantly more satisfied with the voting process following election day. They saw an increase in satisfaction from 80% to 85%, and also a significant difference to the comparator site (77%).

Having administered the pilots, 79% of polling station staff in both Bromley and Gosport agreed that that voting was more secure because voters had to prove their identity, and over 9 in 10 in each site reported no incidences where they felt people were asking to vote whose identity they were unsure about.

**Perceptions of electoral fraud**

There have been no historical electoral fraud allegations in either Bromley or Gosport. There have also been no allegations made for the 2018 Local Elections, in either area, at the time of this publication.

Significantly more eligible electors agreed that there were sufficient safeguards in place to prevent electoral fraud in polling stations in both pilot areas after election day: this increased by six percentage points in Gosport (35% to 41%) and 12 percentage points in Bromley (50% to 62%).

Post election day, significantly more eligible electors felt that voting in polling stations was safe from fraud or abuse in Gosport (81% to 86%). In comparison, in Bromley, 9 in 10 eligible electors agreed that voting was very or fairly safe from fraud or abuse, and there was no significant change post election day (89%).

Post election day, a significantly lower proportion of eligible electors in both sites felt that electoral fraud was very common in the area they lived (8% in Bromley and 7% in Gosport, with a decrease of five percentage points in each pilot). In Bromley there was no change in level of agreement that it would be easy to get away with electoral fraud in Great Britain, and a higher proportion agreed post election that electoral fraud is a problem in Great Britain (21% to 26%).
In Gosport, a lower proportion of eligible electors felt that it would be easy to get away with electoral fraud in Great Britain (40% to 33%) and there was no change in the perception that electoral fraud is a problem in Great Britain (31% post pilot).

Showing photographic ID appears to be, from an eligible elector’s perspective, a more effective form of ID to use in order to stop electoral fraud. In both sites, significantly more eligible electors agreed that showing photographic ID would stop electoral fraud in polling stations after the election.

Responses from the polling station staff survey results also show that 99% of staff in Bromley, and 100% of staff in Gosport, reported that at no point during election day did they feel there were suspected cases of electoral fraud.

### 5.3.2. Democracy and Equality

**Awareness of the pilot**

Awareness of the ID requirements were in line with levels in other pilot sites. The majority of eligible electors were aware of the new requirements to bring either one form of photographic ID or two non-photographic IDs in both Bromley (80%) and Gosport (77%). Polling station staff reported being very confident or somewhat confident that voters were aware they would be required to present ID before being issued their ballot paper (97% in Bromley and 96% in Gosport), with the majority feeling very confident (66% in Bromley and 60% in Gosport).

Finding out about the pilot through their poll card was the most common channel cited in both Bromley (63%) and Gosport (55%). Local communications campaigns were more effective raising awareness among electors than the wider national media channels; 44% of eligible electors who took part in the public opinion survey recalled receiving a leaflet from Bromley, and so did 48% of people in Gosport. Hearing about the pilot through local media was recalled slightly more often than through national media (28% in Bromley and 26% in Gosport), and 27% of people in Gosport recalled finding out about the pilot on a poster from Gosport Council. In Gosport, 16% of electors recalled finding out about the pilot through national media, while this figure was higher in Bromley (27%).

**Intention to vote**

The additional ID requirements did not have an impact on most elector’s reported intention to vote. Those who reported not voting in the 2018 local elections cited a variety of reasons for not voting (Annex G). As in other authorities ‘too busy/other commitments’ was the most cited reason why they did not vote in the commissioned survey (40% in Bromley and 30% in Gosport).

On election day, 99% of polling station staff in Bromley and Gosport agreed that the majority of voters were able to provide a correct form of ID. The requirement did not seem to impact actual turnout. Official turnout figures for the 2018 local election was 39.95% in Bromley (down 0.88 percentage points from the 2014 election) and 33.29% in Gosport (up 1.31 percentage points from the 2014 elections).

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22 Most recent comparative Local Election to the 2018 Bromley Local Election

23 Ibid.
In total the number of people who did not return to vote across the two pilots was 208 or 0.25% of people checked. In Bromley 154 people did not return to vote (0.22% of people checked), and in Gosport this was 54 (0.37% of people checked).

A driving licence was the most common form of ID used across the two pilot areas (52% in Bromley and 54% in Gosport). The second most common form of ID used was a passport (23% in Bromley and 21% in Gosport). There was little variation in the types of IDs people chose to bring to the polling station, even with the extensive list seen in Gosport. Neither Bromley or Gosport provided any elector with a certificate of identity or electoral identity letter (council issued ID).

5.3.3. Delivery
Planning and resourcing
In both Bromley and Gosport, 99% of polling station staff agreed that they had successfully delivered the ID requirements in their own polling stations.

In qualitative interviews with electoral services teams, both sites noted their interest from an early stage to participate in the pilot schemes. In particular, Gosport recognised that the pilots provided an opportunity for them to take part in wider discussion on ID requirements at polling stations, and to ensure their views were taken into account in the trial stages of the policy. Both LAs felt it was important to ensure the list of IDs made available to electors for use on election day was inclusive of all their residents. For example, Gosport noted the high number of military personnel present in their local area, and how this specific knowledge about demographic in their area influenced their choice of ID types to pilot.

Bromley felt they had enough time and resource to implement the policy requirements, even with a change in council leader midway through the process. Gosport mirrored this view, and felt that if they were to run the pilot ID requirements again they would be able to reduce some of the time and resources allocated in the 2018 election, given they now had templates and experience from the pilots. For Gosport, it was important to pilot the new requirements in a non UKPGE year, where turnout would be expected to be lower, to ensure that any issues were highlighted in this context first.

The majority of polling station staff (97% Bromley and 94% in Gosport) agreed that they felt they had everything they needed on election day to deliver the pilots, both in terms of space and equipment.

In terms of planning, Bromley recognised from an early stage the need to take on additional polling station staff, although they noted they would reduce this number in future, and the need for commissioning additional requirements from their suppliers, especially in regards to printing.

Gosport considered the Electoral Commission's guidance when planning for the number of staff they would have at each polling station on the day of polling, whereas in previous years they had used historical turnout figures for local elections. They also highlighted the need to have a private area away from the main polling station space, and mirrors\textsuperscript{24} for elector use.

\textsuperscript{24} Government issued guidance recommended that following the removal of headwear, the elector must be given the opportunity to use a mirror, and to have privacy and time to put the covering back on.
There was a general consensus that there was no need to consider different buildings to the sites historically used as polling stations in order to accommodate the ID requirements.

Gosport were disappointed the final printed register that was used on election day was not aligned with their expectations. The printed register was particularly difficult to use for data entry, more so in Gosport as it had to accommodate a longer list of IDs. This had an impact on the experiences of polling station staff, and would ideally be rectified if the pilot requirements were considered again, as Gosport intend on keeping the the list of IDs relatively broad.

Both Bromley and Gosport informed their local police forces of their desire to pilot the ID requirements early on in the process, and were supported throughout by them. Bromley noted that the local police advised them on the communication channels they had planned to use. Gosport also noted the positive impact the local police had, in an advisory capacity, on the planning of the pilots, and they were able to integrate this into their usual planning for the elections. In Gosport specifically, the police did raise the need to plan for people who might attend the polling station to try and disrupt the ID checking process on the day, although they noted that this did not materialise on the day itself.

Training
Bromley and Gosport approached training for polling station staff differently. Bromley, ahead of their training sessions, let staff know about their intention to pilot the ID requirements in a letter. They also updated the guidance set out in the Electoral Commission's handbook they provided to polling station staff. It was noted that the Electoral Commission should take the lead on updating this guidance if the ID requirements were taken forward in future elections, as opposed to the LAs themselves.

Bromley noted that holding a “live” session where staff could have feedback and interacted with the training facilitators would have been beneficial, but the logistics of this would have been difficult at the time. Bromley felt their training was well received given they had no negative feedback from staff. They did note that a handful of staff, before the training had taken place, had already decided to not take part as they felt the new ID requirements would be too difficult to administer.

Gosport expanded their existing face-to-face training to include the new ID requirements. It was noted that there was significant preparation involved in creating the materials beforehand, but the specific delivery of the training was not particularly arduous. They also updated the handbook provided to each poll clerk with additional guidance. Polling station staff aired some concerns about the additional questions electors might have because of the new circumstances, but these concerns were addressed in the training Gosport provided. It was noted that after training staff were less worried about the process.

Working with delivery partners
Following the pilots, electoral services teams in both Bromley and Gosport felt there were clear roles that Cabinet Office, EMS suppliers, and the Electoral Commission could play. Gosport noted that the Electoral Commission should maintain overall oversight of the ID requirements whilst the Cabinet Office support LAs.
Gosport noted the need for templates to help with the delivery, and for the Cabinet Office to consider the number of data points requested as part of the ID pilot evaluations. It was felt that at times the requests put additional strain on polling station staff resources. Bromley also suggested more support was needed to capture the data, but did not specify where this support should come from. Bromley also noted that they would reduce the list of ID in future to aid with delivery of the requirements.

Bromley also noted the positives of meeting with other LAs who were piloting the ID requirements, as they offered an opportunity to share learnings and understand where each other was along the process.

5.3.4. Affordability

National roll out of the mixed ID model is expected to range in cost from £4.6m to £17.1m. As shown, the costs are driven primarily by hiring additional polling station staff, administrative support, and training those staff on the new responsibilities of checking ID.

The estimated cost of hiring additional polling station and administrative staff is between £2.9m and £5.8m, constituting 39% of the total in the central estimate. We expect that authorities will require one additional poll clerk (PC) at each polling station, based on information that Bromley required an additional 185 PCs for its 185 polling stations, and Gosport an additional 42 for its 48 polling stations. We therefore expect that 1 additional PC will be required per polling station, but acknowledge that some polling stations may be adequately staffed, and others may even require a second PC. As such, we have accounted for a variation between 0.8 and 1.2 PCs per polling station.

We have also assumed that the additional administrative support required by authorities will range from twelve minutes to around two and a half hours per polling station. This wide range is a consequence of the difference in quantity of extra resource required in the two pilot authorities. Bromley required 296 hours of additional administrative resource, whilst Gosport required just eight hours. This is likely a result of the considerably smaller size of Gosport compared to Bromley.

Both Bromley and Gosport hired an additional two PSIs, despite having significantly different numbers of polling stations (185 and 48 respectively), reflecting the difference in approach taken by the two authorities. This means that the effective number of additional polling station inspectors required at each polling station was 0.01 and 0.04. We have used these guidelines as our low and high estimate, and used the midpoint between them as our central estimate.

The estimated cost of training new and existing staff ranges from £1.7m to £3.8m, which constitutes 24% of total costs in the central estimate. This is based on the expectation that training existing staff will take approximately 30 minutes more than the current training of 2 hours. For new staff hired as a result of the new requirements, we have included training costs of two and a half hours, as the training required under normal circumstances is considered additional. Time taken to train staff depends on their level of experience, which varies between LAs and election years. To account for this, we have varied our assumptions to include both a low and high estimate, which assume that the additional training varies from 15 minutes to 45 minutes.
The estimated cost of issuing ID ranges from £0 to £4.9m, constituting 22% of costs in the central estimate. In Bromley and Gosport, there were no requests for council ID, and therefore, no costs were incurred. However, given that this is based on a local election, it may not accurately reflect a UKPGE. As such, we have assumed that 0.03% of the electorate would request council ID, with a low estimate reflective of the piloting authorities experience (i.e. no ID ordered), and a high estimate of 0.06%. The costs of producing council ID consist of the staff time taken to deal with the process, (electoral staff member checking application, producing certificate, marking internal records and handing to elector) estimated at around half an hour, and the cost of printing, which we have based on detailed data from EROs across the country at £0.11. This ultimately results in a unit cost of £8.08 per issued council ID - considerably more expensive than the poll card and mixed ID models - due to the labour-intensive production process.
5.4. Photographic ID Model

The photographic ID requirement was piloted by Woking only.

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<td><em>Woking was the only pilot site which showed consistent positive movement on electors’ attitudes towards the Integrity measures after election day.</em></td>
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<td>- Confidence in knowing how to vote: significantly increased post election day (92% to 96%)</td>
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<td>- Belief that polling stations are safe from fraud and abuse: significantly increased post election day (72% to 80%)</td>
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<td>- Awareness of the ID requirements: 72% among eligible electors post election day</td>
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<td>- Most cited channel for finding out about the ID requirement: a home delivered leaflet from Woking Borough Council (47%), with direct channels having a greater impact than indirect resources</td>
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<td>- Most popular ID type used: driving licence (60%)</td>
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<td>- Polling station staff confidence in delivering the requirements: was 99%</td>
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5.4.1. Integrity

Perceptions of the voting process

There was a significant change in elector confidence in knowing how to cast their vote in Woking, with post election day confidence levels rising by four percentage points post election day (92% to 96%). This was also four percentage points higher than the England control group. Those significantly less likely to be confident were from a lower
socio-economic background, SEG C2 (86%). This is independent of the ID requirements as confidence was in line with pre election day levels (93%). In addition, satisfaction with the process of voting increased significantly post election day (82% to 90%). This was eight percentage points higher than the England control group which suggests that overall, taking part in the photographic ID model had a positive impact on perceptions of the voting process.

Perceptions of electoral fraud
There have been a small proportion of historical electoral fraud allegations in Woking (Annex B). There have been no allegations made for the 2018 Local Elections at the time of this publication.
Following the election, there was a significant rise in the level of agreement that sufficient safeguards are in place to prevent electoral fraud in polling stations, from 30% pre election to 58% post election. This was also 14 percentage points higher than the England control group. Similarly, eight in 10 people agreed that voting in polling stations was very or fairly safe from fraud or abuse, eight percentage points higher post election day (72% to 80%).
There was also a significant change in perceptions towards electoral fraud post election day. The belief that electoral fraud is common in Woking had significantly decreased by five percentage points post polling day (16% to 11%). The belief that electoral fraud is common locally was also significantly higher in the comparator LA (Richmond) by eight percentage points, and the England control group by 10 percentage points.
The view that electoral fraud is a problem in Great Britain significantly increased by 13 percentage points (29% to 42%). This was also significantly higher than the comparator LA and England control group by 10 and 23 percentage points respectively. Yet, levels of agreement that it would be easy to get away with electoral fraud in polling stations in Great Britain pre and post election remained at 43%.
The public opinion survey results highlight that there was a significant increase in agreement that requiring people to show photographic ID would prevent fraud in polling stations (63% to 69%).
Having administered the pilots, 77% of polling station staff in Woking agreed that voting was more secure because voters had to prove their identity, and over 9 in 10 reported no incidences where they felt people were asking to vote whose identity they were unsure about (92%).

5.4.2. Democracy and Equality
Awareness of the pilot
Awareness among all eligible voters, of the requirement to show ID in polling stations in the May local elections, was 72% following election day. Only Watford reported a lower awareness of the ID requirements (58%) but awareness in Woking was broadly in line with the other pilot sites. Polling station staff reported being confident that voters were aware they would be required to present ID before being issued their ballot paper (99%), with the majority feeling very confident (74%).
Almost half of eligible electors recalled finding out about the pilot through a leaflet sent to them by Woking Borough Council (47%), with poll cards being the second most recalled source (44%). This suggests that direct communications were more effective in Woking than indirect sources. National media was recalled more than local media (22% and 17% respectively), and just over 1 in 10 found out about the pilot from posters displayed by Woking Borough Council (14%).

**Intention to vote**

Official Woking turnout figures for the 2018 local election was 37.75%, down by 0.83 percentage points in comparison to 2016 local elections.

In the public opinion survey those who reported not voting in the 2018 local elections cited ‘too busy/other commitments’ as the main reason (32%) for not voting (Annex G).

On election day, 100% of polling station staff in Woking agreed that the majority of voters were able to provide a correct form of ID.

In total, the number of people who did not return to vote in Woking was 51 (0.27% of people checked), comparatively the second highest figure across the pilots. The most common ID requirement used was a driving licence, used in six out of 10 cases (60%). The second most common ID type was a passport (25%), and the third was a Surrey Senior Card (12%). Woking used local elector cards as their council issued ID and received 64 applications, of which 63 cards were issued as one application was made by a postal voter.

**5.4.3. Delivery**

Planning and resourcing

In Woking, 99% of polling station staff agreed or strongly agreed that they had successfully delivered the ID requirements in their polling stations.

In qualitative interviews, the electoral services team highlighted they participated in the pilots to trial the Northern Ireland approach, with a focus on photographic ID. They kept their list of acceptable IDs short to make the process straightforward, and as a result found the data capture process easier than authorities trialing the mixed model.

Woking opted to use local elector cards as their council issued ID, and these were issued free of charge to electors who did not have the specified documents on the ID list. Woking undertook ‘roadshows’, where they took photographs of electors and allowed them to upload photos from smartphones, in order to apply for a local elector card. Local elector cards were issued to ten people who were homeless, and one transgender person. Homeless electors were also able to use the cards to register at the local job centre.

The electoral service team in Woking planned for additional resourcing to ensure they could deliver the standard election process as well as pilot specific tasks, such as creating the local elector cards. On average, the turnaround time to produce a local elector card took one day from the application. And the majority of polling station staff in Woking agreed they had everything they needed on election day to deliver the pilots in terms of space and equipment (99%).
Woking noted that they ideally would have liked approximately six months planning time to integrate the extra requirements and clarity in terms of responsibilities and overarching objectives.

**Training**
Training was mandatory for all polling station staff and was delivered in two sessions on the same day. The electoral services team also included a briefing session on the Monday before election day as a refresher exercise. Woking felt that the training went well, and measured understanding of the process through a group exercise. Staff needed initial reassurance about concerns over using their discretion to accept or reject ID, and were able to call the council office for extra support when rejecting IDs on the day. Another worry that staff cited was unfamiliarity with some of the photographic documents, such as Spanish ID cards.

**Working with delivery partners**
Woking were extremely positive about the delivery of the pilots and the list of ID requirements they used. They suggested that additional administrative support put in place was to ensure that as a pilot they had all the resources required, with one extra member of staff in the planning team being used to support additional workloads. Polling station staff levels were likely to be reduced back to pre-pilot levels although it was noted that polling station staff felt that the process was a lot easier to manage with the additional staff.

Qualitatively, Woking noted that despite some feedback that some less commonly held IDs were not permissible they felt that increasing the list of accepted IDs was not justifiable, as it would be at the expense of delivering a simple set of requirement for electors to follow. Overall, they felt that they received a lower number of complaints on the day, and subsequent days after polling day, than usual. They did not feel that any groups were impacted, and they worked hard to consider this through working with outreach groups to ensure eligible electors were aware of the requirements.

Woking noted that overseas electors would have to be considered in future awareness campaigns. They acknowledged that although the registers were much bigger (in terms of number of sheets), this was the best format to collate the data (as opposed to having a separate data collection form). They raised that Cabinet Office would be able to provide a more defined role in delivering one set of requirements, but they emphasised that each LA would have different demographics, and the final list of accepted IDs would have to take this into account.

**5.4.4. Affordability**
The photographic ID model is expected to range in cost from £5.9 to £17.9m, which is marginally more expensive than the mixed ID model. The main drivers of costs were additional staff costs, especially additional administrative staff costs, training costs, facilities costs and the cost of producing and issuing local elector cards.
The estimated cost of hiring additional staff ranges from £3.7m to £9.9m, which comprises 59% of the total cost in the central estimate. The main driver of staff costs is additional
administrative staff, of which we have assumed that authorities will require an additional 13.95 hours per polling station. This is based on information from Woking that an extra 600 hours of administrative resource was required to support the process and issue local elector cards across its 43 polling stations.

We expect that authorities will require 0.14 PCs per polling station, which is based on the fact that Woking needed 6 additional PCs for its 42 polling stations. The mixed ID model has an inclusive list of acceptable IDs, resulting in less scope for elector confusion. As such, fewer PCs were required to be on hand to deal with issues and queries. The precise staff requirement may potentially vary between LAs, and as such, we have varied this assumption to include a low estimate of 0.08 and high estimate of 0.2 PCs per polling station.

The estimated cost of training new and existing staff ranges from £1.2m to £2.6m, which constitutes 17% of the total cost in the central estimate. This cost is based on the assumption that training POs and PCs on the new responsibilities arising from ID requirements will take approximately one hour 15 minutes and 40 minutes respectively. We have assumed implicitly that it will take a further two hours to train new staff, as the standard election training would be an additional cost. As above, time taken to train staff is dependent on authority-specific factors such as experience of staff and the overall approach taken by the RO. To account for these factors, we have varied the additional time spent on training required for POs and PCs. The low and high estimate for POs is 1 hour and 1 hour and a half respectively. The low and high estimate for PCs is 30 minutes and 50 minutes respectively.

Additional facilities for the pilot are expected to range from £0m to £2.5m, constituting 15% of the total cost in the central estimate. This is based on the assumption that authorities will require approximately one privacy screen and one mirror per polling station, based on information provided by Woking. Some authorities will already have this equipment and capacity to allow voters to vote in private, and so will not require as many or any additional facilities. Conversely, others will be under-equipped and will require more. To account for this uncertainty, we have varied these assumptions to include low and high estimates assuming that authorities either need no additional facilities at all, or that they require an additional one privacy screen and mirror at each polling station.

The estimated costs of issuing the local elector cards ranges from £0.9m to £3m, accounting for 10% of the total costs in the central estimate. This cost is dependent on the percentage of the electorate that will require a local elector card. Woking reported that 0.08% of the electorate needed a local elector card. Given that turnout is generally lower at local elections, we use this as our low estimate, and 0.2% for our high estimate to account for a scenario in which more electors than expected require an elector card. Total costs are also based on the production and postage costs per local elector card, which are based on information provided by Woking.
5.5. Postal Vote Pilots

The postal vote pilot was undertaken by Peterborough, Slough, and Tower Hamlets. Peterborough additionally trialled a photographic ID requirement at polling stations for proxy voters.

Key Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Integrity</strong></th>
<th>Perceptions of local fraud being prevalent through postal voting was higher in Tower Hamlets but was not the majority view in all three pilot sites.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Perception of local fraud occurring through postal voting: 16% of registered postal voters surveyed in Peterborough, 14% of registered postal voters surveyed in Slough and 31% of registered postal voters surveyed in Tower Hamlets agreed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Democracy and Equality

Awareness and messaging of the postal voting leaflet was widely understood across all pilot sites with electoral service teams noting they would consider sending the leaflet again.

- The number of proxy voters who did not return to vote in Peterborough was 1 (0.76% of people checked).
- Incidents of ballot paper refusal in postal voters: there were no incidents in all three pilot sites.
- Message of the postal voting leaflet: ‘Your vote is yours alone’ was noted as the main message across all three sites the majority of the time.
- Rating of the postal voting leaflet: positively rated in terms of language used, layout, clarity of message and ease of understanding across all three sites.

Delivery

All three piloting authorities felt they had delivered the requirements successfully.

- Additional training: carried out across all three pilot sites for staff who would be carrying out the additional checks in a face-to-face format, received positively by staff.
- Staff selection: was targeted at staff who were already experienced in interacting with electors/customers through call centre/canvass work in all three pilot sites.

Affordability

The total costs of the postal vote pilots were made up of the cost of hiring additional staff, producing and distributing anti-fraud leaflets, and the cost of any additional facilities.

- Peterborough: Over 90% of total cost in Peterborough was accounted for by the cost of hiring additional staff.
- Slough: Over 90% of total cost in Slough was accounted for by the cost of hiring additional staff.
- Tower Hamlets: The cost of hiring additional staff; producing and distributing anti-fraud leaflets; and additional facilities each accounted for approximately one third of the total cost in Tower Hamlets.

5.5.1. Peterborough

5.5.1.1. Integrity

Perceptions of electoral fraud in postal voting

In Peterborough there were no incidents where an elector was refused their ballot paper. A total of 6,040 postal votes were delivered to electors, 3,224 of which were delivered by hand. Of the total postal votes, 3,412 people were contacted within 10 days of their ballot paper...
being delivered to them. At this checkpoint 41 people confirmed, when contacted, they had not applied to vote by post, and three people confirmed they had not received their postal ballot paper at this point. At the second checkpoint, no less than three days before polling, 575 people were contacted. And at this checkpoint there were no cases in which people confirmed they had not applied for their postal vote or that they had not received their postal ballot paper. There were no cases in which people confirmed they had not returned their postal ballot paper and postal voting statement and where these documents had been returned to the Returning Officer. There were also no incidences where people were referred to the police relating to postal voting fraud.

In Peterborough 95% of registered postal voters who took part in the commissioned survey felt confident in knowing how to go about casting their vote at an election, and 86% noted they were satisfied with the electoral process during elections. Most electors remained unsure about electoral fraud being a problem in postal voting for Peterborough (62% unsure). Sixteen percent agreed that postal voting fraud is a problem, and 18% agree that it is a problem elsewhere in the UK (69% don’t know).

The level of agreement that voting through a postal vote is safe is indicatively higher in Peterborough than the other pilot locations (not significantly), although only a minority agree that there are sufficient safeguards in place to prevent electoral fraud through postal voting (36%). This is reflected by an appetite for stronger identity checks for postal voting to ensure electoral fraud is prevented, with over half agreeing with this sentiment (63%).

Planning and resourcing

Having delivered the pilot Peterborough remained unconvinced that the new process was more secure. They noted that their staff felt confident in delivering the pilots to their best of their ability. However, they pointed out that improved communication between delivery partners would be important when planning the proportion of postal votes they had planned to check.

Qualitatively, Peterborough staff noted they felt there were fewer mismatches (the wrong ballot paper in the wrong envelope) than in previous years, which they attributed to the fact they processed these in-house. They also noted that for specific areas where face-to-face checks were completed, the levels of rejection were on par with previous years. On the whole they reported no cases in which the additional process was questioned, although electors did have some questions, and that translating the leaflets into multiple languages helped increase the level of understanding amongst their electorate.

When planning the pilot, they decided to carry out face-to-face checks as opposed to telephone, as they felt they didn’t have enough telephone numbers to ensure the pilot would be delivered effectively. They also felt the face-to-face checks would provide a more visual step for the electorate towards the prevention of fraud.

5.5.1.2. Democracy & Equality

Evaluating the postal voting leaflet

Approximately eight in 10 (76%) postal voters surveyed recalled receiving a leaflet in their postal pack directly from Peterborough, with those who reported themselves as voting being
more likely to recall the leaflet. The majority of those surveyed agreed that the layout, the language used within the leaflet, and the clarity of the message was very good or good (87%, 91%, and 88% respectively). Nine in 10 (89%) noted they were able to understand the leaflet, and significantly more postal voters noted the leaflet had very good or good clear formatting and layout in comparison to Tower Hamlets or Slough. A minority also highlighted that the fact the leaflet was available in multiple languages was a good thing (5%).

The message ‘Your vote is yours alone’ was noted as the key message by 51% of those who responded to the commissioned survey. ‘Your vote matters, don’t lose it’ (18%) and ‘You should report suspicions of electoral fraud’ (14%) were also highlighted as key messages, albeit to a lesser extent.

Qualitatively, the electoral service team felt their electorate were already used to contacting their council or police if they were concerned about electoral fraud. The commissioned survey reported that having read the leaflet, the majority (91%) would report electoral fraud; 48% noting they would report the fraud to their local council, and 41% to the RO. Significantly fewer noted they would report incidences of electoral fraud to the police, Electoral Commission, or to Crimestoppers than other pilot sites (32%, 16%, and 11% respectively)\textsuperscript{25}.

\textbf{5.5.1.3. Delivery}

\textbf{Postal voting}

The Peterborough electoral service team noted they would have liked to receive the finalised pilot order earlier in the process, to avoid making the subsequent deadlines feel rushed. They involved their local police force from an early stage, who helped hold talks with Royal Mail staff on best practices when carrying out the pilot instructions.

When planning, Peterborough recognised they would need additional resources in order to visit all the wards they felt necessary. They invited staff who would be carrying out the pilot to a face-to-face training session. The team noted the value in enlisting housing officers and parking enforcement officers, who were already familiar with completing door-to-door activities for the council.

\textbf{Proxy voting}

In total, one person was not issued their proxy voting ballot out of 132 people (or 0.76% of people checked). Qualitatively, Peterborough noted that given the steady rise in the relative number of proxy voter applications, they saw an opportunity to evaluate a form of ID requirement at the same time as the postal pilot. There was also an element of wanting to pilot ID requirements on a smaller scale, and they noted the importance they felt in keeping a broad list of IDs available to proxy voters to provide identification. As with the postal pilots, communication of the ID requirements occurred across many different channels, and the electoral service team reached out to a number of community leaders to ensure proxy voters were made aware. Training was carried out at the same time as the postal training. Overall,

\textsuperscript{25}Overall the communications campaign ‘Your Vote is Yours Alone’ generated 15 pieces of information that were reported to Crimestoppers during the campaign.
the electoral service team could not provide any negative feedback on the proxy pilot itself and would be receptive to the idea of piloting again.

5.5.1.4. Affordability

Postal voting
The postal vote model in Peterborough is estimated to have cost approximately £0.06m, or £2.93 per registered postal voter. This cost refers exclusively to the postal vote pilot; it excludes any costs associated with both the postal vote and the proxy vote pilot such as RO costs and legal counsel on the pilot Order. Rather, it includes only the costs of hiring additional staff, producing and distributing anti-fraud leaflets and any facilities costs such as stationery and printing costs.

The main driver of costs is staff cost, which includes the hiring of the visiting officers, postal vote issuing staff, administrative staff and any additional equipment associated with visiting officers, such as ID badges and high-visibility clothing. Production and distribution of anti-fraud leaflets and additional facilities are estimated to account for under 10% of total costs.

Proxy voting
As shown, the proxy voting model in Peterborough is estimated to have cost approximately £12k, or £90.07 per registered proxy voter. This cost refers exclusively to the proxy voter pilot and therefore, as above, excludes any costs associated with both the proxy vote pilot and the postal vote pilot. Rather, it includes only the costs of hiring additional staff and any additional facilities required such as CCTV, mirrors for polling stations and police support. Additional facilities account for approximately 75% of the estimated total costs and the cost of hiring additional staff account for the remainder.

5.5.2. Slough

5.5.2.1. Integrity

Perceptions of electoral fraud in postal voting
In Slough, 600 people were contacted from a random selection of postal voters, 374 of which provided information upon request. There were zero incidents in which a person, when contacted, confirmed they had not applied to vote by post, and there were no cases in which a person was referred to the police in relation to postal voting fraud.

No elector was refused a ballot postal paper as a result of the additional requirements, although 11 people did confirm they had not received their postal ballot paper at the time of being contacted.

In Slough the level of confidence in how to go about casting a vote in an election was high (93%) among those surveyed. Electors were also satisfied with the process of voting (83%).

As with Peterborough, the majority of those who took part in the public opinion survey were unsure whether or not postal voting electoral fraud is a problem in their local area or elsewhere in the UK (63% and 72%, respectively). This is reflected in the limited agreement that electoral fraud through postal voting could affect an election, with 40% agreeing it would
be easy to get away with postal voting electoral fraud, and 43% agreeing that there could be sufficient electoral fraud to impact an election result. There was limited agreement that there are sufficient safeguards to halt electoral fraud (40%). The majority agreed that stronger identity checks for postal votes would be necessary to prevent electoral fraud (57%).

Planning and resourcing
In the qualitative interviews, the Slough electoral service team reported feeling they had delivered the postal pilots to a high standard, despite being later than other authorities to sign up to delivering the pilots.

They did not receive any negative feedback from electors, but did receive some request for clarification on why they were doing the additional checks at this local election.

Overall the team noted their confidence had not necessarily increased because of the additional processes put in place as a result of the pilot. For instance, they noted their communications are already focussed on messaging around the appropriate completion of your vote. However, they did recognise that it was important to be seen to be addressing electoral fraud, which was a benefit of conducting the pilots.

5.5.2.2. Democracy & Equality
Evaluating the postal voting leaflet
There was high recall (82%) amongst postal voters surveyed of receiving the postal voting leaflet from Slough Borough Council. The majority of people evaluated the leaflet positively in terms of language used, layout, ease of understanding, and clarity of the messages (88%, 84%, 86%, and 87% believing it was very good or good). ‘Your vote is yours alone’ was highlighted as the main message of the leaflet by just over half of those who took part in the commissioned survey (53%), with the majority agreeing with this sentiment (86%).

Other key messages were pulled out less frequently; 16% noted ‘You should report suspicions of electoral fraud’ and 10% noted ‘There is help available to complete your vote’ as the main messages of the leaflet sent to them with their postal vote. The majority agreed they would report electoral fraud in some capacity; 43% to their local council, 41% directly to the police, and 36% to the RO. Crimestoppers and the Electoral Commission were less commonly cited (23% and 18% respectively)\(^{26}\).

5.5.2.3. Delivery
The Slough electoral service team highlighted the central role that the Cabinet Office should take on to ensure consistency in the Pilot Orders between LAs.

As with Peterborough, Slough chose to carry out face-to-face checks as they were not confident they had a sufficient number of telephone contacts. Once the pilot Order had specified that a proportion of applicants should be visited (something they considered important for future postal application checks), based on prior canvass experience they

\(^{26}\) Full evaluation of ‘Your Vote is Yours Alone’ campaign and Crimestoppers activity is awaiting publication - with breakdown of activity split by location
worked out how many people could be visited in an hour or so, and planned their pilot timing around this.

Slough stressed the need for additional planning time to deliver the requirements. They appointed a pilot canvasser manager who was available to check in with by staff if they experienced a problem on the doorstep. A consultant interim Electoral Services Manager (ESM) also worked on the pilot for two days a week which increased the staff’s confidence in delivering the pilot, as they felt supported and knew that there was someone to answer their queries.

Training was conducted through a face-to-face session. They also provided staff with a step-by-step guidance booklet, and pilot Order itself, to help with answering questions they had on an ongoing basis. Staff were selected on the basis that they had prior experience interacting with postal voters, so that they could use this experience during the face-to-face checking stage. They received positive feedback from the staff that attended the training.

5.5.2.4. Affordability

The postal vote model in Slough is estimated to have cost approximately £11k, or £0.84 per registered postal voter. Consistent with the cost evaluation of the postal vote model in both Peterborough and Tower Hamlets, these costs exclude publicity and communication costs. As shown in Figure 6, the main driver of the total cost was of hiring additional staff, which was made up of six additional visiting officers, one senior visiting officer and overtime incurred by an electoral services manager (AEA consultant). The cost of producing and distributing anti-fraud leaflets and canvasser material is estimated to have accounted for less than 10% of the total cost.

5.5.3. Tower Hamlets

5.5.3.1. Integrity

Perceptions of electoral fraud in postal voting

At the first telephone checkpoint Tower Hamlets contacted 2,134 electors, of which 950 answered. Five postal voters confirmed they had not applied for a postal vote - this response was related to electors who already had postal voted but had inadvertently asked for applications again and so were not taken to indicate occurrence of fraud. At the second telephone checkpoint 1,883 electors were contacted, of which 711 confirmed they had received their postal vote ballot, and 693 confirmed they had filled in their postal vote themselves. Possible reasons why a person had not directly recorded their vote themselves related to accessibility issues and requiring help to fill in the form. There were also incidents where a language barrier between the caller and the elector created confusion. There were no incidences where electors were referred to the police or refused a postal ballot.

Postal voters surveyed within Tower Hamlets were confident in the process of voting (95%) and were satisfied overall with the electoral process (82%). Compared to electors in other pilot sites, there were fewer who were unsure that electoral fraud through postal voting is a problem in their local area (54%). A significantly higher proportion of those who took part in the commissioned survey agreed with the sentiment that electoral fraud is a problem in their local area (31%).
The majority of those who responded to the survey agreed that postal voting is safe from fraud and abuse (56%). This is a lower proportion than in other postal voting pilots, which could reflect a wider awareness of historical allegations of fraud in the area.

The majority noted they would report electoral fraud (86%), with 45% noting they would inform the police, 36% the RO, and 29% the local council, or the Electoral Commission. As with other pilot sites, there was agreement that stronger identity checks for postal votes are necessary to prevent electoral fraud (55%), but only a minority agreed there are currently sufficient safeguards in place to prevent this through the current postal voting process (31%).

**Planning and resourcing**

Overall, the team felt that the pilot was carried out well, but the measures of the pilot did not were more of a reassurance process than a deterrence of electoral fraud. The existing process they had in place for tracking complaints made directly to the police was viewed as more effective than the pilot because it was more efficient than the local council themselves having to pass on complaints. They felt the value of the pilot came with the opportunity to interact with electors directly.

The team also raised concerns that by drawing attention to the pilots in the communication campaigns, it would raise perceptions that more fraud was taking place than in reality. They remained unconvinced that the new requirements would be the most effective way of getting to the root issues they perceived in electoral fraud through postal voting.

Tower Hamlets chose to call individuals during the pilot. It was noted they were often using the same number to contact multiple people in one household. They were also unsure whether a particular group was impacted more or less by the additional requirements, as there was not the opportunity or time to ask specific demographic questions. They received positive feedback from electors in terms of being seen to be doing something to prevent fraudulent behaviour.

Despite concerns over how effective the new process was, the electoral service team noted that if they were to pilot again they would not change the requirements asked of them, but they would work more towards stakeholder engagement; for example, in setting expectations for the relationship between Cabinet Office, Electoral Commission and LA.

**5.5.3.2. Democracy & Equality**

**Evaluating the postal voting leaflet**

Elector recall of receiving the leaflet in the postal pack was high, with eight in 10 registered postal voters noting they had received a leaflet from Tower Hamlets Council (81%). The majority also agreed that the language used, the clarity of the message, and the layout was good or very good (85%, 81%, and 73% respectively), and that the leaflet was easy to understand (81%).

Just under half of electors recalled ‘Your vote is yours alone’ as the key message from the leaflet (49%). ‘You should report suspicions of electoral fraud’ was recalled significantly more often as a key message of the leaflet than in the other pilots (24%).
5.5.3.3. **Delivery**

Planning for the pilots fell within the overall planning for the election, rather than as a separate initiative. The team felt they were planning throughout the process rather than upfront. In future, they would prefer the pilot Order to be signed earlier, to allow for more preparation time.

Tower Hamlets also chose to call households rather than running face-to-face checks, as opposed to Peterborough and Slough, based on previous experience with door knocking that had been resource intensive.

The team carried out two separate training sessions; one for the team co-ordinating the activity in the office, and another for those making the phone calls. The training felt relatively straightforward to administer and the requirements simple to explain. The team noted that they used professional call centre workers to conduct the phone calls with electors, and they believed them to be competent in carrying out their task. They felt using experienced call centre staff added value as they were able to input on making the script more accessible for those they were calling.

Some electors questioned where callers got their telephone numbers from, and some electors were confused when they received the call after they had already sent back the postal pack. Overall, the team noted that delivery of the requirements was a positive process.

5.5.3.4. **Affordability**

The postal vote model in Tower Hamlets is estimated to have cost approximately £19.8k, or £0.71 per registered postal voter. Consistent with the cost evaluation of the postal vote model in both Peterborough and Slough, these costs exclude publicity costs. As shown, the main driver of the total cost was of facilities, which was made up of IT software required for the telephone survey and additional room hire. This made up 36% of total costs. The cost of hiring additional staff and the cost of producing and distributing anti-fraud leaflets each made up 32% of total costs.
6. Conclusion

While the findings are robust in indicating the impact of the ID requirements within each piloting authority, there are limitations to the extent to which the findings presented here can be generalised to understand behaviour across Great Britain, and to different types of elections. The measures provide the foundations, and a benchmark for, a broader evidence base to be developed to understand how the ID requirement will impact electors and mechanisms for delivery more broadly.

Integrity measures consistently increased in the photographic ID model, and showed varied results across sites in the mixed ID model and poll card model. Confidence and satisfaction in the process of voting significantly increased post election day in the photographic ID model. Levels of confidence significantly increased in one of the two poll card models (Watford) but satisfaction remained unchanged. In contrast, confidence remained unchanged in both mixed ID models but satisfaction significantly increased in one of the two mixed ID models (Gosport).

The belief that there are sufficient safeguards and that polling stations are safe from fraud and abuse has significantly increased post election day in the photographic ID model. Perceptions of there being sufficient safeguards increased in both mixed ID models, but the belief that polling stations are safe from fraud and abuse only significantly increased in one of the two mixed ID models (Gosport). Similarly, perceptions of sufficient safeguards and the belief that polling stations are safe from fraud and abuse has only significantly increased in one of the two poll card models (Watford).

The view that photographic ID was an effective measure to reduce electoral fraud significantly increased in the photographic ID model, one of the two mixed ID models (Bromley) and one of the poll card models (Watford). The perception that non-photographic ID was effective increased in one of the poll card models (Watford) but decreased in one of the mixed ID models (Gosport).

The perception of electoral fraud has significantly decreased at a local level and significantly increased at a GB level in the photographic ID model and the mixed ID model (although Gosport remains unchanged on perceptions of fraud at a GB level). In contrast, perceptions of levels of electoral fraud significantly increased at a local level in one of the two poll card models (Swindon) and at a GB level (Watford).

We cannot generalise the impact that the requirements had on measures of integrity. Further research would be required to understand what is driving these differences across LAs. While having a measure of these perceptions is useful in considerations for policy creation for further pilots, or for national roll out, it would be misleading to apply these figures to populations of other LAs, to the national population, or to another type of poll. The results for the Democracy and Equality measures are more consistent across piloting authorities. Based on the public opinion survey there is no indication that the ID requirement impacted the reasons for not voting for any specific demographic group across the participating authorities. Some groups were generally less confident in how to go about casting a vote and were generally less satisfied in the process of voting - this is independent of the ID requirement and this score did not significantly change pre/post pilot.

The most cited communication channel for awareness of the pilot was predominantly the poll card (both the poll card model and the mixed ID model) with only the
photographic ID model citing a leaflet from the local council as being the most referenced communication source. All models found direct local sources to be the most effective communication.

The most popular ID used was a driving licence in both the photographic model and the mixed ID model, with the passport being the second most popular. The poll card was most popular in the poll card model with a driving licence being used as a second favourite option in this model.

There was also consistency among authorities in terms of Delivery measures. Based on feedback from electoral services teams, most of the pilot requirements were able to be delivered in conjunction with business as usual activities for an election. While most piloting authorities would have preferred more time to plan for the delivery of the requirements most were able to integrate voter ID training into the standard training and guidance given to polling station staff.

Perceptions of election day were largely positive across models, with polling station staff giving positive feedback on the process, particularly in the poll card sites. The mixed ID model and photographic ID model found that the printed A3 data capture form was difficult to use in practice, with the mixed model finding this more of an issue due to a bigger list of ID requirements.

LAs would largely pilot the same approach again, with one of the mixed models (Bromley) citing they would reduce the number of ID options. The poll card models reflected that their model would need less of a behaviour change, with one citing that electors already bring their poll card to vote (Watford).

The central role that Cabinet Office and the Electoral Commission play were seen as being integral to further pilots or national roll out. All local authorities stated that a communication campaign would have to be centrally delivered, with one set of requirements nationally.

Electoral services teams delivering the postal pilots were not confident that the requirements piloted would decrease electoral fraud. However, LAs did note that there was value in the pilot as an elector engagement exercise, given the positive feedback they received from electors in reaction to being contacted. One authority felt that it was important to be visible in taking steps to address electoral fraud. The accompanying leaflet was well received by postal voters and across pilots the electoral services teams thought it was a welcome addition.

In terms of Affordability, the Poll card model was less expensive than the others in terms of non-technology costs. The Mixed ID and Photographic ID models were broadly in line with each other in terms of affordability.
7. Annex A - Sir Eric Pickles’ Electoral Fraud Review

In 2016, Sir Eric Pickles published a review into electoral fraud in Great Britain\(^\text{27}\). 50 recommendations for tackling electoral fraud were made, and the Government has committed to further consideration of 48\(^\text{28}\), including requiring voters to provide a form of identification at polling stations before voting.

The report recommended that the Government consider voters and proxy voters producing personal identification (\textbf{R8 and R24}) and enhance measures to protect the integrity of the postal vote process (\textbf{R23}).

The Cabinet Office offered all local authorities in Great Britain the opportunity to pilot voter ID in their May 2018 local elections to enable the Cabinet Office to identify the best way to implement voter ID nationally.

Woking, Gosport, Bromley, Swindon and Watford piloted voter ID. Tower Hamlets, Slough and Peterborough piloted measures to improve the integrity of the postal and proxy vote process.

The following section contains the recommendations presented in Sir Eric Pickles’ review into electoral fraud that have been taken forward by Cabinet Office for piloting.

7.1. Recommendations

- **R8** - The Government should consider the options for electors to have to produce personal identification before voting at polling stations. There is no need to be over elaborate; measures should enhance public confidence and be proportional. A driving licence, passport or utility bills would not seem unreasonable to establish identity. The Government may wish to pilot different methods. But the present system is unsatisfactory; perfection must not get in the way of a practical solution.

- **R23** - It should be standard practice for local authorities to provide guidance in postal ballot packs on the secrecy of the vote and how to report electoral fraud.

- **R24** - The provisions on an ID requirement in polling stations should apply to those casting a vote as a proxy on behalf of a voter.

\(^{27}\) Cabinet Office (2016) Securing the ballot: Review into electoral fraud

\(^{28}\) Cabinet Office (2016) A democracy that works for everyone: a clear and secure democracy
8. **Annex B - Research into Electoral Fraud**

Currently, staff working in polling stations may ask two statutory questions to further establish the identity of a voter they suspect of a personation offence:

- Are you the person registered in the register of electors for this election as follows?
- Have you already voted here or elsewhere at this election, otherwise than as proxy for some other person?

These limited checks in polling stations mean that electoral fraud is hard to prevent and detect, and the lack of a mechanism for verifying voter identities was cited as the main vulnerability of polling station voting by respondents surveyed by the Electoral Commission.²⁹

8.1. **Reported Incidents of Electoral Fraud**³⁰

Despite difficulties in detection, there were 336 reported incidents of alleged electoral fraud across the UK at the elections in 2015, however, of these incidents nearly two thirds (207) were found to either not be an offence, or had insufficient evidence to support the claim of fraud.

Nearly half of these cases (165) related to campaigning offenses, which could include failure to include details about the printer, promoter and/or publisher on election material, making false statements of fact about the personal character or conduct of a candidate, or failure to submit a return of elections expenses.

Over a quarter of the reported incidents (104) were related to fraudulent voting, which could include personation (voting as someone else), breaches of the secrecy requirements, tampering with ballot papers, bribery or treating, or undue influence.

The remaining incidents related to nomination offences (25), which could include false statements or signature made on nomination forms; and registration offences (36), which could include providing false information in a registration or absent vote application form.

8.1.1. **Fraudulent Voting**

A more in-depth look at the 104 reported incidents involving fraudulent voting allows us to identify which of these could possibly have been prevented by voter ID being introduced at the polling station.

The most frequently reported type of voting fraud is related to the offence of personation (i.e. voting as someone else) (Table 5). 28 of these incidents were reported as occurring at the polling station, and 22 when using a postal vote. In addition, there were 13 cases related to the offences of personation by proxy. The remaining 41 voting cases related to the offence of undue influence (14), breaches of secrecy requirements (8), attempts to tamper with ballot papers (3), alleged bribery (8) and treating (8).

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²⁹ Electoral Commission, Electoral fraud in the UK, January 2014

³⁰ Electoral Commission, Analysis of cases of alleged electoral fraud in the UK in 2015, March 2016

³¹ Elections included: a UK Parliamentary election, elections for local councillors in metropolitan boroughs, district authorities and unitary authorities in England, Elections for Mayors in six English local authorities, and a Parliamentary by-election.
Table 5: Reported offences of personation during 2017 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>In person</th>
<th>Postal vote</th>
<th>By proxy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of incidents</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these personation offences, it is possible that the requirement of photographic ID at the polling station could have prevented the perpetrator from voting as someone else in person. It is not clear what the impact of non-photographic identification would have had upon these offences, or upon offenses of personation conducted by postal vote or proxy.

It is important to note that for the majority of these cases (74) the police took no further action following their investigations. In 22 cases this was because investigations suggested that no offence had been committed, and in 23 cases there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. In 24 cases it was not possible to identify a suspect, and in 4 cases the police identified that the offence did not involve electoral fraud.

8.2. Previous Allegations of Electoral Fraud in Piloting Authorities

At the time of publication, no allegations of electoral fraud had been received in the ID piloting authorities for 2018. Previous cases of alleged electoral fraud were found in Watford (Table 6) and Woking (Table 7). There were no historical allegations of electoral fraud in Swindon, Bromley and Gosport. Historical allegations of electoral fraud are also noted for the postal pilot local authorities (Tables 8-10) and for 2018, accurate at time of publication.

Table 6: Historical Allegations of fraud in Watford (2014-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Allegations</th>
<th>Allegations Voting</th>
<th>Reason: personation/legal incapacity to vote/multiple voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Historical Allegations of fraud in Woking (2014-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Allegations</th>
<th>Allegations Voting</th>
<th>Reason: personation/legal incapacity to vote/multiple voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 All historical allegations of fraud are from the Electoral Commission’s electoral fraud data and analysis: [https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/electoral-fraud/data-and-analysis](https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/electoral-fraud/data-and-analysis)
Table 8: Historical Allegations of fraud in Peterborough (2014-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Allegations</th>
<th>Allegations Voting</th>
<th>Reason: personation/legal incapacity to vote/multiple voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Historical Allegations of fraud in Slough (2014-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Allegations</th>
<th>Allegations Voting</th>
<th>Reason: personation/legal incapacity to vote/multiple voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Historical Allegations of fraud in Tower Hamlets (2014-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Allegations</th>
<th>Allegations Voting</th>
<th>Reason: personation/legal incapacity to vote/multiple voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>50(^{33})</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3. Public Confidence

In 2014, the Electoral Commission\(^{34}\) commissioned research to find out more about public attitudes towards electoral fraud. Their research found that people do not have a deep understanding about electoral fraud but they do have a general concern about the possibility of fraud taking place.

Additionally, evidence from the research showed that the views of the public are rarely influenced by first-hand experience of electoral fraud, but instead by cases reported in the media.

\(^{33}\) Of which 5 of these are allegations of registration offences which fall under false registration for a postal vote (under investigation). Data collected from the police force in each LA on the 5th July 2018.

\(^{34}\) Electoral Commission, Electoral fraud in the UK, January 2014

media and their own set of assumptions. Importantly, they found a small ‘research effect’ whereby asking about the topic of electoral fraud and discussing potential vulnerabilities in the system in more detail increased concerns.

The most recent report from the Electoral Commission Winter Tracker\(^{35}\) found that in general voting was considered to be safe from fraud or abuse by 84% of respondents, however much greater confidence was placed in the safety of voting at a polling station (88%) than by post (73%). Additionally, when asked what single measure would be most effective in preventing electoral fraud, over a third of respondents supported a requirement to show photographic ID at the polling station (37%).

In 2014 the Electoral Commission commissioned an additional sample of BAME respondents for the Winter Tracker\(^{36}\). Three quarters of those surveyed (76%) thought that registering to vote was safe from fraud or abuse, a steady decrease from the previous two years for BAME audiences (2013: 77%; 2012: 81%). Considerably more (18%) had heard about electoral fraud happening from someone they know compared to the wider population in 2014 (9%) and one in twenty (5%) said they had first-hand experience of seeing electoral fraud (compared to 3% of the overall population at the time). BMEs (15%) were also considerably more likely that the wider population (6%) to say that electoral fraud is very common where they live.

### 8.4. Availability of Photographic ID in Great Britain

The types of voter ID in the pilots were not restricted to passports or driving licences – but typically included poll cards and bank statements. No-one needed to purchase identification documents to be able to vote in these pilots. Local authorities provided alternative methods, free of charge, to ensure that everyone who was registered had the opportunity to vote. The full list of ID accepted in the different pilots is set out in Annex D.

The Electoral Commission\(^{37}\) have previously recommended that if ID were to be implemented in polling stations, only forms of photographic ID which possess certain security features, and an adequate level of verification to obtain should be accepted. This included:

- Photographic driving licence
- Passport
- Proof of Age Standards Scheme (PASS) card
- Military identification card
- Police identification card and firearms licence
- Certain photographic public transport passes (e.g. Oyster)

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\(^{35}\) Electoral Commission, Winter Tracking Research, March 2018


\(^{37}\) Electoral Commission, Delivering and costing a proof of identity scheme for polling station voters in Great Britain, December 2015
The Electoral Commission estimated that approximately 3.5m electors (7.5% of the GB electorate) would have no forms of the above photo ID, and limiting the list to passports and photographic driving licences would see potentially 11 million electors (24% of the electorate) without acceptable ID. Reducing the list to only passports, photographic driving licences and Oyster photocards would reduce the number of electors without ID to 6m (13% of the electorate).

The Electoral Commission’s research also highlighted that certain groups are less likely than the general population to hold an eligible passport, including: older people, people who are ‘White: Gypsy or Irish Traveller’ and people who are ‘Mixed/multiple ethnic groups: White and Black Caribbean’.

8.5. Voter ID in Northern Ireland

The requirement for voter ID at the polling station has been in operation since 1985 in Northern Ireland, with photographic ID required from 2003 onwards. Before 2003 voters could present non-photographic identity documents, however this system was considered to still be vulnerable to fraud because of the ease with which identity documents could be falsified and the fact that non-photographic identity documents were regarded as providing insufficient proof of identity.

The list of acceptable photographic ID is supported by the availability of a voluntary elector ID card for people (free of charge). The Northern Ireland scheme requires voters to produce one of the following documents to confirm their identity:

- A UK, Irish or EEA driving licence (photographic part).
- A UK, Irish or EU passport (EU passports are not accepted at UK Parliamentary elections).
- A specified public transport pass.
- An Electoral Identity Card issued by the Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland.

The document does not need to be current, but the Presiding Officer must be satisfied that the photograph is of a good enough likeness. A report by the Electoral Commission\(^{38}\) on the 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly election found that 99% of voters surveyed had experienced no difficulties with electoral ID on election day.

Almost 100,000 Electoral Identity Cards were issued during the first year of implementing the new requirement for photographic ID, less than 10% of the registered electorate at that time. On average, 25,000 new or replacement cards are issued annually of which half are provided to those registering to vote at schools for the first time.

There were significant initial setup costs in implementing the Electoral Identity Card scheme, including: data capture and validation as well as card production and distribution. Additional costs were also associated with public awareness campaigns by the Electoral Commission. It is estimated that initial setup costs were approximately £1.7m\(^{39}\).

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\(^{38}\) Electoral Commission, Electoral fraud in the UK, January 2014

\(^{39}\) Electoral Commission, Delivering and costing a proof of identity scheme for polling station voters in Great Britain, December 2015
Since the introduction of photographic ID at polling stations there have been no reported cases of personation, and the Chief Electoral Officer’s 2003-04 report concluded that the photographic identification scheme in Northern Ireland had “almost entirely removed the opportunity for personation”.

9. **Annex C - Pilot Selection Criteria**

Cabinet Office were interested in taking forward a small number of pilots in authorities representing a diverse range of relevant socio-economic and demographic conditions and different types of area (e.g. metropolitan, rural, urban).

Local Authorities were asked to submit an expression of interest and formal application for piloting if they met, or expected to meet, the requirements outlined below:

- have local elections scheduled for May 2018;
- demonstrate there is local support for the pilot;
- be able to demonstrate understanding of the Government’s objectives for the project and how the pilot fits with these objectives;
- be able to demonstrate the feasibility of delivering the pilot within the available time frame;
- demonstrate that there are effective planning management arrangements in place and sufficient resources and capacity in the local authority to deliver the pilot, including availability of staff after the election to contribute to the evaluation process;
- be able to demonstrate any management of service suppliers;
- be able to demonstrate understanding of the contingencies needed to be in place particularly to protect the security and integrity of the election;
- be able to present a clear and comprehensive communications plan covering all stakeholders;
- demonstrate the Electoral Commission’s evaluation process will be fully supported;
- demonstrate the pilot has an effective business case and offers value for money;
- be able to demonstrate there is learning value to be gained from conducting the pilot and there is a clear means of testing the impact of the innovation;
- demonstrate that any innovation is at least as secure as conventional electoral practices; and
- demonstrate that the pilot will maintain public confidence in the electoral process, that key risks and issues have been identified, and that a plan has been drawn up for managing them.
10. **Annex D - List of Accepted IDs at Polling Station**

10.1. **IDs Accepted**

Bromley, Gosport, Swindon, Watford, and Woking required all electors to present a form of ID at the polling station in order to vote. Peterborough only required proxy electors to present a form of ID at the polling station in order to vote.

**BROMLEY:**
One of the following:
- a passport issued by a Commonwealth country or a member state of the European Union;
- a photocard driving licence (including a provisional licence) issued in the United Kingdom or by a Crown Dependency, or by a member State of the European Union;
- an electoral identity card issued under section 13C (electoral identity card: Northern Ireland) of the Representation of the People Act 1983;
- a biometric immigration document issued in the United Kingdom in accordance with regulations made under section 5 of the UK Borders Act 2007;
- an identity card issued in the European Economic Area;
- an Oyster 60+ London Pass;
- a Freedom Pass (London);
- a PASS scheme card (national proof of age standards scheme);

Or two of the following (one of which must show the registered address):
- a valid bank or building society debit card or credit card;
- a mortgage statement dated within 3 months of the date of the poll;
- a bank or building society statement dated within 3 months of the date of the poll;
- a bank or building society cheque book;
- a credit card statement dated within 3 months of the date of the poll;
- a council tax demand letter or statement dated within 12 months of the date of the poll;
- a utility bill dated within 3 months of the date of the poll;
- a Form P45 or Form P60 dated within 12 months of the date of the poll;
- a poll card for the poll;
- a birth certificate;
- a marriage or civil partnership certificate;
- an adoption certificate;
- a firearms certificate granted under the Firearms Act 1968;
- the record of a decision on bail made in respect of the voter in accordance with section 5(1) of the Bail Act 1976;
- a driving licence (including a provisional licence) which is not in the form of a photocard.

Or, a certificate of identity.
**GOSPORT:**
**One of the following:**
- a passport issued by a Commonwealth country or a country within the European Economic Area;
- a photocard driving licence (including a provisional licence) issued in the United Kingdom or by a Crown Dependency, or by a member State of the European Union;
- an electoral identity card issued under section 13C (electoral identity card: Northern Ireland) of the Representation of the People Act 1983;
- a biometric immigration document issued in the United Kingdom in accordance with regulations made under section 5 of the UK Borders Act 2007;
- an identity card issued in the European Economic Area;
- an Oyster 60+ London Pass;
- Disclosure and Barring Service certificate showing the voter’s registered address
- an identity card issued by the Ministry of Defence which bears a photograph of the elector.
- a defence privilege card issued by the Ministry of Defence
- a concessionary travel photo card issued by any local authority within the County of Hampshire.

**OR two of the following (one must show their registered address):**
- Driving licence without photo;
- a birth certificate;
- an adoption certificate;
- a marriage or civil partnership certificate;
- a valid bank or building society debit/credit card;
- Financial statement, such as a bank or mortgage statement (issued within 12 months of voting day);
- Council tax demand letter or statement (issued within 12 months of voting day);
- Utility bill (issued within 12 months of voting day);
- P2, P6, P9, P45 or P60 (issued within 12 months of voting day);
- Statement of benefits or entitlement to benefits. (issued within 12 months of voting day);
SWINDON:
- Voters’ poll card;
- a passport issued by a Commonwealth country or a member State of the European Union;
- a photocard driving licence (including a provisional licence) issued in the United Kingdom or by a Crown Dependency, or by a member State of the European Union;
- an electoral identity card issued under section 13C (electoral identity card: Northern Ireland) of the Representation of the People Act 1983;
- a biometric immigration document issued in the United Kingdom in accordance with regulations made under section 5 of the UK Borders Act 2007;
- an identity card issued in the European Economic Area.

As a last resort, if an elector did not have their poll card or other acceptable ID, they were able to bring someone with them to attest to their identity and allow them to vote. The person attesting needed to be registered at the same polling station and have already voted themselves or have the ability to vote by presenting their poll card or other form of ID.

WATFORD:
- a poll card;
- a passport issued by a Commonwealth country or a member State of the European Union;
- a photocard driving licence (including a provisional licence) issued in the United Kingdom or by a Crown Dependency, or by a member State of the European Union;
- an electoral identity card issued under section 13C (electoral identity card: Northern Ireland) of the Representation of the People Act 1983;
- a biometric immigration document issued in the United Kingdom in accordance with regulations made under section 5 of the UK Borders Act 2007;
- an identity card issued in the European Economic Area; or
- a valid bank or building society debit card or credit card.

WOKING:
- a passport issued by a Commonwealth country or a member State of the European Union;
- a photocard driving licence (including a provisional licence) issued in the United Kingdom or by a Crown Dependency, or by a member State of the European Union;
- an electoral identity card issued under section 13C (electoral identity card: Northern Ireland) of the Representation of the People Act 1983;
- a biometric immigration document issued in the United Kingdom in accordance with regulations made under section 5 of the UK Borders Act 2007;
- an identity card issued in the European Economic Area;
- a Senior Bus Pass issued by Surrey County Council;
- a Disabled People’s Bus Pass issued by Surrey County Council;
- a Student Fare Card issued by Surrey County Council;
- 16 - 25 Railcard issued by the Association of Train Operating Companies;
- a railway season ticket photocard;
- a local electoral card.
PETERBOROUGH:

Peterborough tested photographic ID for proxy voters.

- a passport issued by a Commonwealth country, a country within the European Economic Area or Switzerland;
- a photocard driving licence (including a provisional licence) issued in the United Kingdom or by a Crown Dependency or by a member State of the European Union;
- an electoral identity card issued under section 13C (electoral identity card: Northern Ireland) of the Representation of the People Act 1983);
- a biometric immigration document issued in the United Kingdom in accordance with regulations made under section 5 of the UK Borders Act 2007;
- an identity card issued in the European Economic Area which bears a photograph of the voter;
- a disabled person’s bus pass issued by Peterborough City Council;
- an identity card issued by the Ministry of Defence which bears the voter’s photograph.

10.2. Locally Issued IDs

Any elector unable to comply and produce the necessary identification were offered another available option for proving their identity. Locally issued ID was made available, free of charge, whenever an elector was unsure they were able to produce the required ID, be it photographic or not. Table 11 below demonstrates the each local authority deadline for requesting a locally issued ID.

**Table 11 - Deadlines for issuing council IDs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locally issued ID and deadline for issue</th>
<th>Bromley</th>
<th>Gosport</th>
<th>Swindon</th>
<th>Watford</th>
<th>Woking</th>
<th>Peterborough (proxy voters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certificate of Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5pm the day before poll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Identity Letter (with photo)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5pm day of poll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll card for the poll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9pm day of poll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographic local elector card</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5pm the day before poll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral identity letter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5pm on the day of poll</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. Annex E - Research Questions

11.1. ID Research Questions

These questions helped to frame our research design, analysis and evaluation, and were considered alongside limitations to data collection.

**Integrity**
- What is the [likely] impact on incidences of in-person electoral fraud?
- How do requirements impact public confidence in the security of the electoral system and perceptions of fraud?

**Democracy & Equality**
- To what extent do requirements affect the proportion of all electors, overall and in key groups, who are able to vote?
- To what extent are electors aware of the requirements, overall and for key groups?
- To what extent do requirements affect accessibility?
- To what extent do requirements affect turnout, overall and for key groups?
- To what extent do requirements affect the proportion of electors wanting to vote, who are able to do so, overall and in key groups?
- To what extent do requirements affect proportion of electors turning out to vote who are able to do so, overall and in key groups?
- To what extent do electors understand the requirements, overall and for key groups?

**Delivery**
- To what extent are requirements straightforward, practical and workable for those who manage and administer elections, including Returning Officers and polling station staff?
- What, if any, practical arrangements or process changes are needed to deliver the requirements successfully?
- What training is needed for polling station staff?
- Are Local Government, Electoral Service teams and polling station staff, and Central Government, able to meet one-off implementation, annual and ongoing delivery requirements?
- What, if any, disruptions or delays occur to the process as a result of the requirements?
- Can the requirements be delivered in the context of all types of poll?
- Can the requirements be delivered in any/all polling stations nationwide?

**Affordability**
- What is the monetary cost of the requirements to Central Government and Local Government, including one-off implementation and annual and ongoing delivery for elections?
- Do requirements result in any changes in costs to Central or Local Government of related processes (e.g. registration)?

11.2. Postal Vote Research Questions

**Integrity**
- How do the requirements for guidance in postal packs impact the awareness of the secrecy of the vote?
To what extent do the requirements increase the Electoral Service team's confidence in administering the system of postal voting?

**Democracy & Equality**
- To what extent do electors understand the guidance in postal packs and the mechanism for reporting any suspicion of fraudulent postal voting?

**Delivery**
- To what extent are requirements straightforward, practical and workable for those who manage and administer postal voting?
- What additional training is needed for staff?

**Affordability**
- What is the resource and cost of the requirements to Central and Local Government?
12. **Annex F - Cost Data Methodology**

12.1. **Cost Categories**

To make costs consistent and comparable between each pilot model, costs were separated into the categories detailed below. Costs for the mixed ID model are based on cost data provided by local authorities Bromley and Gosport; costs for the photographic ID model are based on cost data provided by Woking; and costs for the poll card model are based on cost data provided by Swindon and Watford. Only costs included within those categories were scaled-up in order to model costs of a national roll-out. As mentioned, some reported costs were specific to the running of the pilot and would not be incurred during a national election - these costs are identified in the section below.

Although communications costs were a large cost for each pilot authority, they were not included as a category. This is because during a general election, the Electoral Commission typically undertakes centralised national publicity campaigns before all major polls. We expect that the messaging surrounding the new requirement for ID would result in limited additional costs due to the mature and developed communication channels that the Electoral Commission has in place. Local authorities often incur additional expenditure on publicity using their own budgets; again, we expect that this activity would incorporate messaging for ID requirements and therefore will not result in additional costs.

12.2. **Staff Costs**

12.2.1. **Included and Excluded Costs**

Only costs incurred by the hiring of additional polling station staff and additional administrative support staff were included. Excluded costs include fees paid to staff to test IT software; higher fees paid to polling station staff; staff travel and accommodation costs; emergency staff costs; additional days of management; and any other costs considered discretionary.

12.2.2. **Scale-Up**

Additional staff per polling station variables were constructed, based on information that both authorities provided us with. This could be applied to all constituencies across the UK, and then multiplied by the cost of staff in each authority. Regional variation in differences in staff costs was accounted for by the regional cost index.

12.3. **Training Costs**

12.3.1. **Included and Excluded Costs**

Only costs of training new or existing polling station staff on their additional responsibilities were included. Excluded costs include any training resource considered discretionary or unnecessary in the event of a national roll-out, such as the hiring of training venues and handbooks for polling station staff.

12.3.2. **Scale-Up**

As above, additional training per polling station variables were constructed, based on information that both authorities provided us with. This could be applied to all constituencies across the UK, and then multiplied by the cost of training in each authority.
12.4. Facilities Costs

12.4.1. Included and Excluded Costs
Only costs incurred by the purchase of legally required additional facilities for the purpose of the pilot were included. Excluded costs include anything that was not legally required for the running of the pilot or that would not be needed for the running of the pilot as a business-as-usual election, for example ‘wait here’ signs and polling station register printing. The latter was needed only to record data required for evaluation of the pilots.

12.4.2. Scale-Up
Local authorities were mandated by the pilot orders to provide privacy screens and handheld mirror for electors to remove and adjust any headwear. Only one authority provided information on the cost and number required of these. From this information, a number required per polling station variable and a cost per unit were constructed. As above, this could be applied to all constituencies across the UK.

12.5. Council Issued ID

12.5.1. Included and Excluded Costs
Costs incurred in the production and delivery of the ID specific to each authority were included. None of these costs were considered to be inessential for a national roll-out and therefore none were excluded.

12.5.2. Scale-Up
In each pilot authority, a new form of council issued ID was used as either the primary form of identification, or the form of identification that could be requested if an elector could not source any of the primary forms. The costs associated with these were reached by calculating a percentage share of the electorate that requested ID, and the postage and production costs per ID. Each of these could be applied to all constituencies across the UK based on the size of the electorate in each.

12.6. IT (Poll Card Model Only)

12.6.1. Included and Excluded Costs
Only costs incurred in the purchase of software licenses and accompanying hardware were included. Excluded costs include any costs incurred in software product development, which would be incurred by suppliers of those products, and, in the event of national roll-out, would not be relevant to government.

12.6.2. Scale-Up
A per polling station variable for the cost of IT equipment was calculated based off of information from authorities that used IT equipment, and applied to all constituencies across the UK.

12.7. Accounting for Regional Variation
To account for the regional variation in costs, we have utilised data from the Elections Claims Unit. The Elections Claims Unit handles claims for fees and charges for UK Parliamentary and PCC elections in England and Wales. This has allowed us to vary staff and training costs across the UK based upon the typical costs within each constituency during previous elections.
### Table 12 - Q12B: Thinking about the 3rd May 2018 local elections specifically, why did you not vote?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Bromley</th>
<th>Gosport</th>
<th>Swindon</th>
<th>Watford</th>
<th>Woking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I forgot</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too busy/didn't have time e.g. at work, studies*</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Away at the time e.g. on holiday, working away*</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Couldn't be bothered/wasn't interested/apathy</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't know anything about it</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't know who to vote for</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>*%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just didn't want to vote</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ill health/disability prevented me</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't receive a polling card</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>*%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just moved to the area</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family responsibilities/looking after children*</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I never vote</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had to show ID/didn't have any photo ID</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't have enough information</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing gets done/it's all talk but no action/they don't listen</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>*%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They're all the same/as bad as each other</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It wouldn't make any difference/there's no point/waste of time</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't vote in local elections</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't trust the candidates/they tell lies</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't understand politics</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not registered/eligible to vote</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>*%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not relevant in this ward/no voting in this area</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disillusioned/fed up with politics</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No party/candidate represented my views</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answered incorrectly</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular reason</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not answered/ prefer not to say</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number who did not vote: Bromley 127, Gosport 247, Swindon 214, Watford 192, Woking 272

*Too Busy/ Other Commitments - a summary code, grouping together: Too busy/didn't have time e.g. at work, studies, Away at the time e.g. on holiday, working away, and Family responsibilities/looking after children*