TECHNICAL NOTE: COORDINATION ON EXTERNAL SECURITY

Introduction

1. The Prime Minister made clear in her Munich speech that the UK wants to develop a new security partnership with the EU that builds on the breadth and depth of our shared interests and values. The Prime Minister explained that it would clearly be in our shared interests to continue to work with and alongside each other, coordinate, and deliver operationally on the ground. Europe’s security is our security, and the United Kingdom is unconditionally committed to maintaining it.

2. The Prime Minister stated that upon leaving the EU, the UK would pursue an independent foreign policy; and that as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, as a leading contributor to NATO and as America’s closest partner, we have never defined our global outlook primarily through our membership of the European Union or by a collective European foreign policy. But the UK and EU need to be able to work together to respond quickly and effectively to the evolving and challenging threats that both parties face, since around the world the interests that we will seek to project and defend will continue to be rooted in our shared values. We must therefore create a future partnership that allows the UK and the EU to combine our efforts to the greatest effect – where this is in our shared interests.

3. As set out in the UK publications of 9 May and 24 May 2018, the future UK-EU security partnership must respect both the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. It also needs to go beyond current arrangements between the EU and third countries if it is to capture the full depth and breadth of our envisaged relationship. We are therefore of the view that a new, flexible and scalable framework of consultation and coordination with the EU would be in our mutual interests and best suited to the unique circumstances we face.

4. In its technical note published on 24 May the UK set out a range of proposals for possible future UK-EU consultation on external security. These proposals were not an exhaustive list, but did indicate the range of ways in which the UK and the EU might chose to consult in the future. Much of this consultation could result in an exchange of views, experience and insight. The proposed framework for consultation could also result in coordinated UK-EU activity. As agreed with Taskforce 50, this technical note provides further detail on what such coordination might look like - particularly on development and defence capabilities, while Taskforce 50 considers the proposals the UK has outlined on CFSP and CSDP in our previous paper.

UK-EU coordination

CFSP

5. In its publications of 9 May and 24 May the UK set out proposals on how the UK and the EU might choose to consult on foreign policy and, when it is in our mutual
interests, combine our foreign policy efforts around the world to the greatest effect. These publications provide detail on the types of coordination and outputs foreign policy cooperation could lead to.

6. **Sanctions** are a key foreign policy tool, and much of our future cooperation on sanctions will flow from UK-EU consultation on foreign policy. The UK and EU will operate their own autonomous legal regimes for the imposition of sanctions. The UK regime is now set out in the UK’s Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, which became UK law on 23 May. This will include autonomy of decision making – the EU and the UK will choose independently when and how to use sanctions as a foreign policy tool. However, the nature of sanctions means that close UK-EU coordination would be of mutual benefit. Building on the detail in the publications of 9 May and 24 May:

i. A significant proportion of **existing EU sanctions** derive from UK information and analysis. As such, maintaining dialogue in relation to these sanctions after the UK has left the EU will be of mutual importance to the UK and the EU. Coordination on these existing EU sanctions could include the sharing of information and analysis on current issues and seeking a common approach where that might be possible.

ii. For **new EU sanctions** imposed after the UK has left the EU, given that sanctions are a complex and technical tool, subject to litigation and often designed at pace, mechanisms to enable UK-EU coordination on a range of technical details could be of mutual benefit. Using our diplomatic and technical expertise on sanctions, including in Brussels, the UK can offer support if there is mutual interest in doing so. This might include a scenario where the UK and the EU decide that common sanctions should be imposed, in which case a coordination process to discuss the details of those sanctions could assist in ensuring as much consistency and efficacy as possible, e.g. having measures come into force at the same time will prevent the risk of asset flight, or looking to ensure that exemptions are analogous.

iii. In respect of **reviews of sanctions listings** the UK may be in a strong position to contribute to these reviews, particularly where those listings were originally proposed by the UK, including by providing relevant evidence and information.

7. The UK is likely to remain a significant contributor in its own right to **election observation missions (EoMs)**, and is open to working jointly with the EU in this area too in future.

8. The UK has significant expertise in the field of **crisis preparedness and consular affairs**, a significant global footprint with 274 posts in 169 countries and territories, and currently works with a range of third country partners across the globe. The UK is open to maintaining a close level of cooperation with the EU, if this is perceived to be of mutual benefit, on crisis preparedness and consular affairs, including the provision of consular assistance to unrepresented EU citizens in third countries. In 2017, through its global network, the UK provided consular services to 207 EU citizens where they were unrepresented by their own Member State, and the UK is open to continuing this service on a reciprocal basis.

*CSDP*
9. In its publications of 9 May and 24 May the UK recognised the important role that **CSDP missions and operations** play in crisis management and response, and the shared interest the UK and the EU have in continuing to work together on them. In these publications we set out a proposal for what future consultation and coordination might look like – the UK as a third country, with a more structured and defined set of arrangements for liaison, commensurate with the nature of a possible UK offer.

**Development and External Programmes**

10. The UK will remain open to coordination with the EU on **development policy and external programmes**. The UK is a world leader in development policy, and the only member of the G7 to meet the UN target of spending 0.7% of gross national income on overseas development assistance. We are open to sharing knowledge and expertise if this is of mutual benefit. As set out in the 24 May publication, there are a number of fora and mechanisms through which we could exchange knowledge.

11. As explained in the 9 May and 24 May publications, if UK contributions to relevant **EU programmes and instruments** can best deliver our mutual interests, the UK and EU should both be open to that. This would be on a case by case basis, and would need to be underpinned by a shared framework that enables a level of influence and oversight over UK funds at the strategic and programme levels in line with any contribution, and enables the participation of UK entities. When the UK no longer contributes to all of the EU’s development programmes, we will carefully assess the rationale for close collaboration depending on the situation, and be rigorous in our assessment of whether contributions to EU programmes and instruments offer the best value for money.

12. There are three thematic areas where there is a particularly strong case for continued close cooperation: peace and security, humanitarian aid, and tackling migration. These three areas could form the basis of a strategic partnership on development cooperation, however our future partnership should not be limited to those three areas if other thematic or geographical challenges emerge where a close partnership is also the best approach. These key areas for cooperation could potentially be areas where we may jointly fund in the future if we can create the mechanisms that allow us to do so effectively.

13. Currently our financial cooperation with the EU on development is channelled through a number of mechanisms, including the on budget external action instruments, the off-budget European Development Fund, externally assigned revenues, delegated cooperation, EU facilities and trust funds. The ongoing future MFF discussions will set the shape of EU external action instruments from 2021. The EU and Member States have the opportunity to create a more flexible and open framework that allows for greater joint cooperation with partners.

14. In order to effectively tackle development challenges together, the UK and the EU should develop a partnership that goes further than existing standard third country partnerships. There is mutual benefit in flexible mechanisms that allow for future cooperation in geographic and thematic areas, mechanisms that give us a voice in shaping our strategic approach and oversight of our funds, and mechanisms that allow programmes to be delivered by UK NGOs who are widely regarded as being among the best at delivering aid in the world. The scope of our future cooperation would be constrained should this not be possible.
**Defence Capabilities**

15. The UK is the second largest global exporter of defence products and services. The publications of 9 May and 24 May explained that it is important that the UK and the EU continue to coordinate on the planning, research and development of defence capabilities. The primary focus for the UK’s capability development will remain a mix of national requirements and projects, close cooperation with key partners - including many European nations - and playing a leading role in NATO’s capability policies. The UK also recognises the EU’s increasing role in this area. UK-EU coordination will complement and support both consultation and collaboration on specific capability and industrial development programmes. Much of this existing coordination takes place through specific European Defence Agency initiatives and projects and would therefore be enabled by a UK-EDA administrative arrangement.

16. Examples of areas where the UK and EU could continue to coordinate activity include:

i. **Capability development priorities** – The UK and EU could coordinate with each other to understand and respond to Europe’s capability development priorities. The EU currently establishes these priorities through the Force Catalogue and the Capability Development Plan, and will further enhance the wider picture through the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. To ensure a cohesive approach to capability development, the UK and EU could coordinate on capability priorities to promote interoperability, cost reduction and burden sharing.

ii. **Development of military regulations and standards** – The European Defence Agency is responsible for the development of European military requirements in a number of regulatory areas, including airworthiness, air traffic control and chemicals. In order to ensure continued interoperability, the UK and EU could consider how best to continue to coordinate on these issues.

iii. **Specific projects and initiatives** – The EU and UK could continue to coordinate on specific initiatives and projects. This could include on Counter Surface-to-Air Fire, through continued UK participation in the C-SAIFIRE initiative which addresses how air platforms with different capabilities can be employed, helping to enhance interoperability. It could also include coordination on specific projects such as Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear explosives (CBRNe). These projects would support enhanced European capability in the relevant fields and allow experts to continue to work together to promote interoperability. The UK could offer added value to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) at the project-level as a third country through unique expertise; economies of scale and operational and capacity contributions.

iv. **Wider European security initiatives** – It will also be mutually beneficial to establish mechanisms for coordination for future initiatives such as the mobility of forces across Europe. Continued UK-EU coordination on military mobility will ensure that UK armed forces can move through EU Member States and beyond. This will contribute to our shared security by reducing barriers to UK armed forces exercising and operating with European allies and partners, and support coherence across initiatives beyond the EU.
17. The UK and EU could consider how best to ensure that this coordination can be flexible and adapt to new threats. This flexibility could, for example, be delivered through an administrative arrangement between the UK and the EDA which facilities UK participation in both current and future UK and EU initiatives.

18. The establishment of EU programmes on defence research and capabilities, which the UK has welcomed, is another area where coordination could have mutual benefit. Dependent on the extent to which those programmes and the projects they support are open to the participation of third countries on terms that would justify investment by a third country, then the UK is potentially a significant future partner.

Coordination in a crisis

19. As set out in the UK publications of 9 May and 24 May, a model that is flexible and scalable could enable the UK and EU to work together closely across the full range of external security tools to have maximum impact during a crisis. A flexible and scalable framework of consultation, cooperation and coordination would enable the UK and EU to respond effectively to a future crisis. This might include, often at rapid pace: the sharing of information and analysis; coordinating foreign policy positions; adopting mutually supportive sanctions; coordination of defence assets; and the use of external programmes and development expertise.

Exchange of expertise and information

20. Key to making all of the potential coordination outlined above work effectively would be the exchange of expertise and information.

21. The reciprocal exchange of expertise across foreign, security, defence, and development policy would enable us to share and pool expertise in areas of mutual interest. This could include the exchange of technical and legal expertise. The UK is open to a range of mechanisms that would aid this exchange of expertise. Any arrangements would respect the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. The proposals on consultation mechanisms that the UK set out in the 24 May paper would provide for dialogue between UK and EU experts, both as part of regular consultation and in times of crisis. There is also benefit in the exchange of official and military experts that would enable us to develop deeper and more effective policy collaboration and coordination. We know from our current experience of UK officials and liaison officers working in the EU, and from the arrangements we have with other bilateral and multilateral partners, the value of experts working together side-by-side.

22. Arrangements to allow the exchange of classified information are also crucial in building a deep and special partnership. As set out in the UK’s technical note on the Exchange and Protection of Classified Information, published on 25 May, the UK will seek arrangements that reflect the breadth of the proposed future partnership and facilitate real time exchanges of information, including in crises, where they help to protect the safety and security of Europe. Currently, the exchange and protection of classified information underpins cooperation across our relationship – informing, for example, planning for operations and missions, cyber threat reporting, collaboration in programmes such as Galileo, and defence capability development initiatives. A future
UK-EU Security of Information Agreement should not limit the scale of the future partnership between the UK and the EU.

23. In addition to the exchange and protection of classified information, we should enable mechanisms that allow the continued exchange of unclassified information - including that which carries a handling instruction or has a limited distribution. Information of this type is important across a number of areas, including sanctions.

**Conclusion**

24. The proposals set out above are not an exhaustive list and should be read in conjunction with the publications of 9 May and 24 May. The proposals respect the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.

25. **We should not wait where we do not need to.** Both the EU and the UK have agreed that future arrangements on CFSP and CSDP could become effective during the Implementation Period. It is self-evident that bringing arrangements into force early would allow the UK and EU to benefit from closer, more intense and more productive cooperation than the EU currently enjoys with any partner. It would ensure there is no drop off in our mutual effort in support of European security, and that we remain able to most effectively respond to crises ahead.